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Fellowship of Catholic Scholars

Scholarship Inspired by the Holy Spirit, in Service to the Church

Contents

Reminder: Membership dues will be mailed out the first of the year and are based on a calendar (not academic) year.

Remembering Pope John Paul II

by William E. May,
Michael J. McGivney Professor of Moral Theology,
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I first met Pope John Paul II when, as Karol Cardinal Wojtyla, he gave a talk on the freedom of the acting person at The Catholic University of America about a year before he was elected Pope. He had come at the invitation of Jude Dougherty, Dean of the School of Philosophy at The Catholic University where at that time I was teaching moral theology in the Department of Theology. Cardinal Wojtyla's talk was profound, and afterwards there was an opportunity for my wife Patricia and me to meet him. He had the marvelous ability to look a person in the eyes making him feel that he was the only person in the room, and his handshake was firm and strong.

The next time I saw him was in October 1979 on his first visit to the United States as Pope John Paul II. I was privileged to see him three times on this occasion, once at a Mass at St. Matthew's Cathedral, then at a convocation for academics from all around the United States held at the gymnasium of The Catholic University, and finally at the Capitol Mall on Sunday, October 7, when he celebrated Mass and gave one of the most powerful addresses of his entire pontificate, "'Stand Up' for Human Life!"

At the academic convocation at The Catholic University on Saturday, October 6 some individuals wore black armbands to protest John Paul's opposition to the ordination of women. I was in the row behind Margaret Farley, a Sister of Mercy teaching at Yale University. She and a colleague thought it quite humorous to observe that the "M" in the Pope's coat of arms stood not for "Mary" but for "machismo." I did not appreciate this humor.

On Sunday, October 7 I took five of my children—Thomas, Timothy, Patrick, Susan, and Kathleen—to the Mass on the Capitol Mall. My wife Patricia could not, unfortunately, come because of the flu, and our oldest son, Michael, then a student at Catholic University, was working at the time. Our oldest daughter, Mary Patricia, was studying at Harvard University, but she had been able to see and hear John Paul II in one of his appearances in Boston and was thrilled that she could do so. The Mall was packed and

the Pope gave an unforgettable homily on the preciousness of human life. In it he declared: "Nothing surpasses the greatness or dignity of a human person. Human life is not just an idea or an abstraction; human life is the concrete reality of a being that lives, that acts, that grows and develops; human life is the concrete reality of a being that is capable of love, and of service to humanity….Human life is precious because it is the gift of a God whose love is infinite; and when God gives life, it is for ever."

Sadly, however, some people walked out on his homily when he affirmed that marriage is an indissoluble union and that husbands and wives should be generous in welcoming new human life and must be "open to" it in their conjugal acts.

I next saw Pope John Paul II in Rome on April 10, 1986 when he gave an address to an International Congress on Moral Theology co-sponsored by the Pope John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family and by the Roman Academic Center of the Holy Cross (now the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross). After his address the Holy Father met with the participants in this excellent Congress devoted to a study of the theme "The Person, Truth, and Morality," and made each one of us feel as though we were doing him a favor and not he us.

Later in 1986 Pope John Paul II appointed me as a member of the International Theological Commission. John Finnis of England and I were the first laymen appointed to this body, which meets annually for a week in Rome to study specific issues either recommended by various Pontifical congregations or councils or academies, or proposed by the members themselves. The meeting takes place the first week of October except for those years when a Synod of Bishops is held during that month, and then the meeting of the Commission is held in December. My appointment was for five years, from 1986-1990; the Commission did not meet in 1991, but I was appointed for another five-year term in 1992 and thus attended meetings from 1992 through 1996. One of the greatest privileges given the members of the Commission was the opportunity once during the week to come to the Apostolic Palace early in the morning to participate in the Holy Father's private Mass in the beautiful chapel in his apartment, and on two or three occasions I had the great honor of being chosen to be the lector at his Mass. After the Mass John Paul II would then meet with the commission, which was under the governance of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, whose president all this time was Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, one of the finest priests and gentlemen I have ever met. Each year he would give a dinner for the members of the Commission; he sat through the meetings and listened intently to our discussions, and on the final day of our work (usually a Saturday morning) he would brilliantly summarize the major ideas set forth in an address given to us in Latin. (Later a translation was provided; however, his Latin is beautiful and in my opinion easy to read for anyone with a fair knowledge of Latin).

October 4, 1988 was the thirtieth anniversary of our marriage. Thus that year my wife Patricia came with me to Rome for the meeting of the International Theological Commission. Cardinal Ratzinger kindly invited her to the dinner he gave for the Commission members and treated her as his guest of honor, giving her flowers and a special blessing. He also invited her to come with the Commission to the Holy Father's Mass that we would attend that week. 1988 was the year that John Paul II issued his marvelous letter on August 15 entitled *Mulieris dignitatem*, "On the Dignity and Vocation of Women." I had bought a copy of it earlier in the week, and I asked Cardinal Ratzinger whether or not it would be appropriate for me to ask His Holiness to autograph my copy when he greeted each of us personally after the Mass. Cardinal Ratzinger told me to go ahead, and I did, and I now have a copy of this document with the signature, Joannes Paulus PM II. Pat, the day before, had attended a Mass in St. Peter's at which John Paul II had ordained Audrys Juozas Backis of Lithuania, whom he had previously appointed apostolic nuncio to the Netherlands, as a bishop. Pat had a copy of the beautiful missals that the Vatican prints for occasions of this kind. She asked the Holy Father to autograph her copy. He did not give her a full signature, but wrote in JPII PM. What souvenirs! Backis is now Audrys Cardinal Backis, Archbishop of Vilnius Lithuania.

In 1987 there was Synod of Bishops devoted to the theme, "The Vocation and Mission of the Lay Faithful in the Church and in the World," and for

some reason the Holy Father appointed me as a "peritus" at this month-long event. For the first two weeks John Paul II came to the Synod Hall to listen patiently to every bishop there give his views. The bishops then met in "language" sections to formulate major propositions. These were then revised to take into account modifications suggested by some bishops and deemed acceptable by committees appointed to review them. After these "propositions" had been approved, the bishops then met in full assembly with John Paul II for final sessions. John Paul let the bishops do their own work without any kind of arm twisting, and he spent a lot of time attempting to see each bishop personally by inviting bishops to his residence for breakfast, dinner (pranzo at noon) or supper (cena) in the evening. He also cordially invited the "periti" to dine with him, and I was so honored one evening, sitting right next to him. He made sure that everyone there had a chance to speak to him, and he did a great job of keeping the conversation going and of injecting some humor into it.

On two occasions during my service on the International Theological Commission he also invited its members for "pranzo." We split into two groups of 15 theologians each (there were 30 members of the Commission), and he also invited the great and gifted persons, male and female, who provided simultaneous translations of our discussions. Cardinal Ratzinger, of course, came to these "pranzos" and he also was very good in making sure that everyone there had a chance to say something to the Holy Father. After a "pranzo" held during our meeting in October 1989 John Paul II stopped me and Msgr. Carlo Caffarra (at that time a member of the ITC), the first president of the John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family in Rome, as we were leaving his dining room. He asked Msgr. Caffarra, a wonderful theologian and marvelous gentleman now Archbishop of Bologna, how the new session of the John Paul II Institute in Washington, DC was doing—it had opened in August 1988. Msgr. Caffarra told him that he thought it was off to a good start. The Pope then turned to me, looked me in the eyes and poked me with his index finger, saying, "And I want you to help the Institute in Washington." I said, "How can I, your Holiness, since now I am at The Catholic University of America?" He then said, "You will find a way!" Somehow I did, and thus since August 1991 I have been teaching at this wonderful Institute.

Another memorable meeting with the Holy Father was in May 2000 when I was in Rome for two weeks to teach at the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross. My wife was with me, and I had written to the Holy Father's private secretary, Msgr. (now Archbishop) Stanislaw Dziwicz, to see whether it might be possible for us to attend the Holy Father's private Mass. It turned out that this was possible, and we had the great privilege of participating in his Mass, and I was again asked to serve as lector, and afterwards he warmly received us.

The last time I saw John Paul II was on February 23, 2003, during the meeting of the Pontifical Academy for Life. I am not a member of the Academy, but that year I had given a paper on experimentation on human subjects to the members, and Bishop Elio Sgreccia, its vice-president, invited me to attend the audience the Holy Father granted to the Academy. This time John Paul II was confined to a chair, but his voice was still strong and he gave us a marvelous talk and afterwards each of us was able to come forward, shake and kiss his hand, and receive from him his loving look and a gift of the rosary.

John Paul II was a most remarkable person. His writings are among the most profound I have ever read, and I learn something new each time I read them. He had a fantastic personal charisma; he was able to make everyone who met him feel at home; his love for people, especially the weak and the poor, was palpable. I remember one time when I was among several thousand in St. Peter's Square in the year 2000 on a very humid October day on the occasion of a world meeting of the Holy Father with families. Different families from throughout the world were presented to John Paul II, seated; he loved to take children in his arms and kiss them, and several times he reached down to lift from a wheel chair a small crippled child whom he would embrace and bless especially.

He was without doubt the greatest champion of the dignity and preciousness of human life in our time and perhaps is unparalleled in the defense of human life in the history of the world. We will miss him. *Requiescat in pace.*

Lord Castlemaine's Plea for Liberty of Conscience

by Anne Barbeau Gardiner,
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Roger Palmer, Lord Castlemaine, first published his *Catholique Apology* in November 1666. It was only a pamphlet then, when Samuel Pepys summarized it in his diary on December 1st and noted that it was "suppressed and much called after." By 1674, it was 600 pages long and included all of Castlemaine's replies to the attacks printed against it by three spokesmen for the Church of England—William Lloyd, Pierre Du Moulin, and Edward Stillingfleet.

What made the *Catholique Apology* unique was that it was a work of pure anti-defamation at a time when theological controversy was the order of the day. As a layman, Castlemaine refused to "meddle" in theology and chose instead to expose the false accusations that caused Catholics to be deprived of their freedom of worship. Another unique feature of this work was that his arguments were not from natural right, like those of Protestant Dissenters, but from history. As a result of this work, Castlemaine became the leading spokesman for religious liberty among English Catholics and was much admired by others participating in the same struggle, including James Duke of York—who had granted a full liberty of conscience to New Yorkers since the 1660s–and William Penn. Castlemaine would later serve on the council of James II in the 1680s, when this King tried to bring to England the same freedom of religion he had established in New York.

This paper will focus on Castlemaine's plea based on his "Bloody Catalogue" of Catholics who suffered and died for two Stuart kings during the Civil War and Interregnum. He argues that Catholics not only rescued the standard at Edge Hill but also helped Charles II escape from England in 1651: "There were *Priests*, there were *Trades-men*, there were *Labourers*, there were *old women*, there were *young*," Castlemaine observes, "death was proclaimed to the Concealer, and to the Discoverer a reward," yet no Catholic betrayed the king. After the Restoration, however, new laws were passed against Catholicism, so that those who had helped the king escape—Carlos, Gifford, Whitgrave and the Pendrels—were now punished for those very beliefs that had "obliged them to save their forlorn Prince." Castlemaine remarks that the more the crimes of the "Rebels" were forgotten in the 1660s, the more the "faults" of former English Catholics were remembered and their recent allegiance buried in "Oblivion." At the time of the London Fire, he laments, the "whole English World" turned on English Catholics and accused them of setting the Fire, so that "we became...a by-word among the greatest Enemies of the Nation."

The signal loyalty of Catholics during the Civil Wars was well known and sometimes acknowledged. Castlemaine cites one Anglican who exclaims, in *State of Christianity in England*: "The English Papist...for his Courage & Loyalty in the last war deserves to be recorded in the Annales of Fame & History." And he cites another who declares, in *Surest Establishment of the Royal Throne*:

> It is a truth beyond all question that there were a great many Noble, Brave, & Loyal Spirits of the Romish perswasion, who did with the greatest Integrity, & without any other Designs than satisfying Conscience, adventure their lives in the War for the King's service; & that several, if not all of those, were men of such Souls, that the greatest Temptations in the world could not have perverted, or made them desert their King in the height of his miseries."

Yet after the Restoration, "all the wonderfull Duty of the *English Catholiques*" was set aside, and they were left "not only in a far worse condition than the *Rebels*, but many of the *Regicides* also." Du Moulin, a Canon of Canterbury, kept reprinting a pamphlet in which he charged the Jesuits with having been the actual Regicides. This charge, based merely on rumor, was taken up as a serious matter by a parliamentary

committee. The Jesuits were supposed to have disguised themselves to infiltrate the ranks of the Independents and arrange the killing of the King. It was even alleged that Queen Henrietta's confessor had cheered at the king her husband's beheading. And so, despite their proven loyalty, Catholics were now made the prime suspects in the death of Charles I. No wonder Castlemaine decided to write the *Apology*.

At the end of the original 1666 edition, he printed in red ink a list of the "brave *Catholicks*" of rank who had died in the Civil Wars fighting on the side of the King, summoning all "Lords and Gentlemen" of the Church of England to view "this Bloody Catalogue, which contains the Names of your murthered Friends and Relations, who in the heat of Battail, saved perchance many of your Lives, even with the joyful loss of their own." Next to each name he gave the battlefield on which the hero died. While Catholics had sung their *Nunc dimittis* at the Restoration, he said, they were soon "grieved" to have "our Loyalty called into Question by you," "even at the instigation of our greatest Adversaries" who had "murthered their Prince."

In response, Dr. William Lloyd sneered at the "Bloody Catalogue" and declared that "a far greater number of Protestants" had died for Charles I. Little wonder, Castlemaine replies in 1674, seeing that English Catholics are "not the hundredth part of the Nation." He points out that the catalogue of Anglican war heroes, called the *Royal Martyrs*, names no more than "212 Protestant Lords, Knights, Commanders & Gentlemen" who died fighting for their king in the Civil Wars. Yet his "Bloody Catalogue" of 1666 lists 190 Catholic men "of quality" who died in that "glorious quarrel." In 1674, he not only reprints the list of 1666, but adds another list consisting of 17 names inadvertently omitted in the first catalogue, thus bringing the total of Catholic "royal martyrs" to 207.[1] In effect, English Catholics had lost nearly the same number of lords and gentlemen in defense of the monarch as the Church of England party had– 207 to 212. They were virtually on a par in terms of war heroes, though Catholics were vastly outnumbered in the population. This, then, was the basis of Castlemaine's most touching plea for toleration: "Let the world then judge, whether instead of Pity and Compassion, we ought thus to be calumniated, not only by my Adversary, but by every impertinent Scribler," and whether "all mankind" should be "encouraged to accuse us" by a "Manifesto" on the door of the House of Commons. He laments that after the London Fire, Parliament invited everyone to come forward and freely accuse the Catholic minority.

In reply, William Lloyd said that Papists deserved no credit for their Civil War dead, since they had no choice but to hide themselves "under the Royal covert." Besides, their services to the king were "not to be ascribed" to their religion. Castlemaine retorts that no "Necessity" forced us "to what we did." To prove it, he recounts how initially, when Sir Arthur Aston offered the king his service and that of other Catholics, Charles I refused, saying, by reason of their *Religion*, he durst not admit them into the Army: for the Rebels (that never omitted a pretence) would make use of it, to discredit him among the people.

Aston then traveled to London, offered his services to Parliament, and received a "formal Commission" from the "Cabal." He was warmly welcomed, Castlemaine explains, because Catholics trained in war, of high rank, and of great estate could be useful. For one thing, neighboring Catholic princes would be more likely to look favorably on Parliament's conduct if it had such support. With his "Commission" from Parliament in hand, Aston returned to King Charles I and now received from him a "considerable Command." From this point on, Catholics hurried to the royal standard "from every Quarter" with so much "zeal" that the words *Papist* and *Cavalier* became "synonymous"—"for there was no Papist that was not deemed a Cavalier, nor no Cavalier that was not call'd a Papist, or at least thought to be Popishly affected."

In his answer, Dr. Lloyd alleged that Papists had fallen off from loyalty when the king "declined" and had addressed petitions to the "Rebels." Castlemaine denies this vehemently and dares his "Adversary" to name "a Papist that was not for the King, even in the worst of times." When the royal party was gasping, he contends, Catholics were "some with the King, some about dispatches, some in the Tower, some sold to the Islands." And since they had "three times more Estates sold" by those "Rebels" than anyone else, it is a "frivolous accusation" to charge that Catholics flat-

tered and addressed them as "the Supream Power."

After the king's Restoration, Catholics were so far from receiving any "advantage" for their loyalty, Castlemaine says, that they were maligned from every side "out of *Envy*" or "*Revenge*." He notes that Edward Hyde, Lord Clarendon (to whom the *Apology* is dedicated) joined in this scapegoating and that Dr. Lloyd wrote to inflame the nation against them and have "the Lawes put in Execution" to remove them from all "employment, let them have suffer'd never so much for their Loyalty." Lloyd argued that Catholics did not deserve trust because they could be dispensed from oaths and were "lesse strict in private promisses between man & man, than other Christians." In reply to this line of defamation, Castlemaine declares that Catholics have refused the Oath of Allegiance for reasons of conscience and have "severely suffer'd in their Estates & Persons" for it. But Protestants have taken this Oath again and again when graduated in the Universities; when admitted into Orders; when Justices of Peace; when Parliament met; & in short when any Dignity either in Church or State was conferred. Yet for all the often repetition of it, halfe the Nation were in Rebellion against the *King*, directly contrary to what they had sworne; Whereas on the other side, there was no *Papist*, that declared not for his Majesty, though they refus'd (as I said) the *Oath*. In these lines we have a good example of Castlemaine's usual strategy in the *Apology*: first he will cite some misconduct of which his "Adversary" accuses the English Catholic minority, to justify their being used so severely. Then he shows that Protestants are even more guilty of that misconduct, so that, if judged by the same standard, they too would be severely used.

Oaths were imposed on Catholics from the start, Castlemaine argues, because it was known that for them "a *venial sin* must not be done let the Advantage be never so great." Catholics refused the Oath of Allegiance because it was "framed" by an apostate Jesuit on purpose to "entrap" them and the Pope had declared in a *Breve* that it could not "be taken with a safe Conscience." They had offered to compose an oath of allegiance which they could take, but this offer had been refused. The imposition of oaths to keep Catholics out of employment, however, had backfired and ended up debauching English Protestants: "in the whole World there's no place where Perjury is so common as here...& how can it be otherwise expected, when an Oath is the Test (& lately more than ever) of all things in Dispute among us." This "forcing" of men to swear for "their own Profit," causes "the Unprincipled to falter in the beginning, & having once broken the Ice, like whores they come at last altogether hardned in their Impiety." Once again, Castlemaine argues that the very misconduct that English Catholics are accused of—here, taking oaths lightly—is prevalent in the English Protestant majority.

Thus, Castlemaine presents Catholics as scapegoats: our enemies, he explains, are "perpetually charging us with the Crimes, that they themselves are guilty of in the highest degree imaginable." In particular, they charge Catholics with rebellion and persecution, yet "in all Countries where the Reformed Religion has bin preacht, as greate Rebellions have follow'd, as ever History mention'd. And as for Dissenters in Opinion, Protestants have been superlatively severe to them, & no where more than in England...." This charge, that Protestant Dissenters were treated worse in England than in other places, such as France or Poland, was something that Milton noted in his work of 1673, entitled, "Of True Religion."

In one line of attack on the *Catholique Apology*, Dr. Lloyd argued that since popes could "depose Kings, & discharge Subjects of their Allegiance," Catholics were "prone to Rebellion" and could not be trusted as subjects. Castlemaine replies that the pope's deposing power is not an article of faith, since no Catholic who has denied this power has ever been called a heretic for it, or forced to "recant" before receiving the Sacrament, "which sufficiently prov's .tis no part of our faith." Even if some Catholics have believed that popes had such a power, there have been far more who "rejected and censured" it, even entire "Universities & whole Bodies of famous men." Therefore, why should "the Opinions of some of our Divines" be turned into the "Doctrine of our Church"? After this, Castlemaine once again turns the tables. He demonstrates that Protestants, far more than Catholics, have held a deposing power both in theory and practice. First theory: Luther said that "the force of Conscience & Necessity may drive them to take weapons, & make a League in their own Defence" against the Emperor; Zwingli wrote that "when

Princes do against the Rule of Christ, they may be depos'd; and Calvin declared that when princes "erect themselves against God" they no longer have "Authority" and are "unworthy to be accounted in the number of men." As for practice, Castlemaine argues that where popes had given away, by word alone, two crowns since the start of the Reformation, Protestants had deposed by word and deed at least seven monarchs—the "Soveraigne Princes of England, Scotland, Denmarke, Swedland, the United Provinces, Transilvania, [and] Geneva." And while the Church of England might seem to deny the "rebellious Tenets" of other Protestants, he adds, many Anglicans turned against Charles I in the 1640s because they "thought him a Papist," and it was "common" to hear Anglicans in the Interregnum say that if the Papists should "pervert" Charles II, they would oppose his Restauration." He notes that "this very yeare [1674] .twas openly propos'd not by Laymen only (as all the publick Gazetts of Christendom proclam'd it every where) That Popery should by a positive Law be a Bar even to the [British] Crown." This law, proposed in 1674, was passed after the Revolution of 1688 and has never been repealed. And so, even though Catholics are always accused of wanting to depose kings, Castlemaine declares, "the common quarel & feare is, that we are too zealous for the Kings power & prerogative." They are charged with disloyalty because they are too loyal to lawful civil authority. Castlemaine exposes this line of defamation as insincere.

What kind of liberty of conscience did English Catholics want as a reward for their loyalty in the 1640s and 1650s? According to Castlemaine, they yearned for what they were briefly allowed by royal edict in 1672, the only year of peace since the Reformation. They desired liberty of conscience for all Englishmen, not just themselves, and were satisfied with a smaller measure of it than others:

> As for Liberty of Conscience, we never desir'd any particular Favour, but that every body should enjoy the blessing, even in an ampler manner than our selves.

During the toleration of 1672, English Catholics received the "*Liberty of our Chambers*, which the *Turk* never denyes any body in his Dominions," that is, they were permitted to celebrate Mass privately in their homes, a "grace" they used, he insists, with "Moderation & Respect." They were "fully contented" with this tiny measure of freedom and did not envy Protestant Dissenters their "larger privileges." But as soon as Catholics were allowed to worship, their enemies sounded the alarm and caused the toleration to be rescinded in 1673. Then the Test Act for public employment, with its oath against Transubstantiation, was swiftly imposed.

The *Catholique Apology* has many other arguments for liberty of conscience besides this plea based on the "Bloody Catalogue." In another line of argument, Castlemaine argues that all English Catholics have been tarred with the crimes of a few, as in the case of the Gunpowder Plot. He shows the Plot as an entrapment of a few Catholic men by Lord Cecil and his agents, a Plot devised immediately after King James I proposed a toleration of Catholics. Even though no other Catholics knew about the Plot, a collective guilt was imputed to them for generations thereafter. Englishmen still celebrate Guy Fawkes Day on November 5th. Sometimes, too, the Catholic minority would be tarred with the crimes of foreigners who had no connection with them, as in the case of the St. Bartholomew Massacre.

In yet another line of argument, Castlemaine shows how, historically, there were precedents for a "property right" to freedom of conscience. Constantine granted the Roman polytheists freedom of conscience because they were there first and practiced the "old religion." After his conversion, Ethelbert tolerated the Saxon polytheists on the same grounds. Castlemaine's point is that Catholics follow the "old religion" of England and have a similar historical "property right" to freedom of conscience.

Yet his line of argument based on the "Bloody Catalogue" is undoubtedly the most touching of all, in part because some of the war heroes he lists are his relatives and he knows the details of their deaths. When Dr Lloyd denied that Lord Carnavon, who stood at the head of the "Bloody Catalogue," was a Catholic, and alleged that this Lord had "refused a Priest" as he lay dying, Castlemaine replied with indignation that Carnavon was related to him (on the Herbert side) and he knew the details of his death from a living eyewitness: this Lord had died "in the

armes of a Priest still alive, that belonged both to my Lords Relations & mine." Moreover, he never marched without a Priest; & as soon as he receiv'd his death's wound he sent for his Brother in law the Lord *Herbert*, late Marq. Of *Worcester*, and desired him to tell the King, That he could do no more than die in his Quarrel; and if he would grant him this request, he would think his Majesty has sufficiently recompenced him for his life, viz. That his Mother might have the breeding up of his Son, to the end as he sayd, that the Child might be also educated in the Catholick Religion.

In this moving account of Carnavon's last words, as in the story of Sir Arthur Aston's posting to Parliament and back to King Charles I, Castlemaine shows the reader how deeply loyal the English Catholics have been–against incredible odds–both to their ancient religion and to their lawful king. And this is why, Castlemaine says, he cannot "in Justice omit the plea of the Catholiques in the last age." The blood they shed so freely for the late king surely calls for compassion from his royal son. But even though he wanted to bring about a toleration of Catholics, Charles II was unable to do so. All he could do to show his ongoing sympathy with their "wounded cause" was to be reconciled to the Church of Rome on his deathbed.

The Knowledge Society and Its Need for a Code of Ethics

By Wolfgang Bergsdorf
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Presentation for the 8th American-German colloquium
in the St. John-Center, Plymouth, Michigan

Developments in society and technology seem to be constantly in need of labels and at some point, a name for a particular epoch prevails over other competing terms. Nowadays the phrase "knowledge society" is on everyone's lips. Terms of this kind are always problematic because they single out one dimension from the complex multitude of possibilities within the context of social conditions in order to attain the status of a label to designate a particular period of time. Nevertheless, these labels are necessary because they reduce the changes, which are barely noticeable to contemporary consciousness during the passage of time, to one single common denominator. The man who coined this particular label is the American sociologist Robert E. Lane who wrote about the "knowledge society" in 1966. His colleague, Daniel Bell, adopted the term and popularised it in his book on the post-industrial society.[1)]

A term like "knowledge society" by no means implies that knowledge did not play an important role in earlier epochs. However, the constantly increasing frequency in the use of the term "knowledge society" indicates the centrality that is due to knowledge in our pluralistic, affluent society that is, on the one hand, troubled by fears stemming from the whole globalisation process and that is, on the other hand, full of high hopes from the very same phenomenon. Knowledge joins work and capital as the third source of wealth creation. Unlike the other two sources, knowledge can be applied to itself and thus become, as it were, an inexhaustible resource with the help of information technology. At least, this is what the euphoric pioneering thinkers of the knowledge society are hoping for.

Moreover, the concept "knowledge society" has a further dimension, which can be interpreted as a great double promise. The centrality of knowledge as an ultimate resource fosters the illusion that the area of conflict between knowledge and the public domain can be removed. Modern societies have created the public sphere as a method of problem reduction to give its members the opportunity to inform themselves about everything in those areas where they cannot form their own judgement from immediate experience.

Knowledge, however, is the systematic effort to expand available knowledge with regard to both

breadth and depth and then to create links in all possible areas. Knowledge needs internationality and interdisciplinarity as much as lungs need air to breathe. The public domain needs both locality and regionality. National media are the exception rather than the rule. Regional and local media are the rule. The public is highly selective. There are indeed selection criteria which determine what chance a subject has of becoming public. However, chance still plays a significant role. On the other hand knowledge is systematic, averse to any arbitrariness. Nevertheless, knowledge will always come up with something new if it has not already created a new area.

A journalist, who recently wrote that boys had more information available to them at the end of the twentieth century than Voltaire, Kant and Goethe put together, received high praise from a literary writer. This was, in fact, the Polish writer Adrzej Szczypiorski, now deceased, who described the originator of this comment with a certain amount of wily irony as "shrewd" because this journalist announced his observation without any show of triumph. He drew attention to a truism that we lose sight of in our everyday confusion, but which, nevertheless, acts as a dangerous, yet enigmatic warning.

We do, in fact, know much more today about the world than 200 or 100 years ago. Science and technology have caused an explosion in knowledge, the end of which is by no means in sight. 9 out of 10 scientists, who have ever lived, are our contemporaries. The consequence of this is that the store of knowledge in the various disciplines doubles every 10 years. Thus, a daily edition of any quality newspaper you may care to choose contains more information than the average 17th century European would have had available to him throughout his whole life. No one would, however, dare to claim—not even the journalist who was praised by Andrzej Szczypiorski - that we are cleverer than our fathers, grandfathers or great grandfathers. However, we do know more than our fathers and grandfathers and we have the ubiquity and omnipresence of the media to thank for this knowledge. The ubiquity of the media is the reason why the media can claim more than ever before to be the central nervous system of the up-and-coming knowledge society.[2]

The wildfire multiplication of information opportunities that are technically available demands a much greater amount of sovereign decision-making ability on the part of the media user. Enlightenment can, therefore, be understood today as liberation from the fetters of communication that are determined by external sources. The transparency of the media system and its regulation by means of minimal ethical standards is therefore the primary demand of the recipient on the media producers. The technical modernisation of the media together with their globalisation process is intensifying the tension created by journalistic practice on the one hand and by the demands of media ethics on the other.

The question that is now facing any one concerned with the media either as a consumer or as a producer is this: will the market alone decide what is moral and what is not, or, in other words, will the only message to reach the public be merely dependent on viewing figures and number of copies sold? This concerns both the opportunities and limitations for the producers of media as well as for the consumers' own responsible handling of the media.

Thus, these questions are in urgent need of being dealt with because our (almost) 20 years of experience with the dual system of broadcasting in Germany has planted seeds of doubt as to whether 'market' and quality can be congruent values.
This topic should be developed in two stages. Firstly, it must be explained what is meant by the expression "knowledge society". Secondly, the question should then be examined as to whether this knowledge society needs different or even new ethical standards. In this context, the following question deserves thorough investigation: can something like a special code of ethics for journalists be justified or should the ethics of communication as have been known for thousands of years be merely adapted to the communicators whose number has been dramatically increased by technology?

I.

In my opinion, this will be the most important effect of the knowledge society: the rejection of the relevance of everyday knowledge. Just as experience in the sense of passed-on experience will considerably lose its significance, life has to become a permanent process of relearning. We already know today the standard greeting for people starting a career: "Now forget everything that you learned at school or university".

The globalisation of the markets and—as its prerequisite—the globalisation of the information networks ensures, on the one hand, that the galaxy of western knowledge is expanding at the speed of light and, what is more, that this knowledge is available everywhere. On the other hand, the rapid pace of change determines our sensitivity to time differences with regard to opportunities in the market so that nobody can know today what s/he should know tomorrow in order to succeed in economic terms.

The "new" element of the knowledge society does not lie in a fundamentally altered quality with regard to modern mass communication, but rather in an altered *quantity* of information density confronting both the individual journalist and the individual recipient.

However, a qualitative alteration can be seen in the re-individualisation of the mass media. The technical possibilities of data compression, of digitalisation and of interactive access allow users of multimedia offerings to increase dramatically their sovereignty as a consumer. In future, everyone will be able to compile their own information, educational and entertainment programmes according to their own special requirements and interests.

The new basic law of mass communication is that one person prints or broadcasts, but many read, hear or see the same things. The new law of multimedia is that everyone will become their own programme director, everyone decides for themselves towards which particular subject matter they want to turn the limited resource of their attention.

The essence of this new technology is that it will incorporate all other media and communication forms into itself. Data streams of all kinds, under the caption of computer highways, are coming closer together and include television, radio, telephone, PC and electronic newspapers.

The exponential multiplication and the global availability of the range of information and entertainment products together with the necessity for selection are all sharpening our focus on this question: what is the nature of the information source and origin from which a social construction of reality is achieved? A whole battery of open questions is concealed behind what seems to be a mere academic question. One problem is, for example, the connection between presentations of violence on television on the one hand and criminality expectations of the public on the other.

What concrete political significance this question has, was already indicated years ago in an interesting investigation by George Gerbner and Larry Gross, two American communication researchers who discovered in their study on the presentation of violence on television and the public's concept of violence that people who watch a lot of television (heavy viewers) (more than 3 hours per day) were approximately ten times more afraid of becoming the victims of violence themselves than viewers who watched little or no television.[3]

Political scientists in America and Europe have found confirmation of this thesis regarding the reality-distortion effect of high television consumption. The willingness to commitment that extends beyond the individual, to trust institutions and other people and even to participate in elections, decreases as the duration of television consumption increases. Robert D. Putnam claims: the more one watches television, the less trust one has in institutions and people - the more one reads newspapers, the greater the overall trust becomes.[4]

If I may be so bold as to quote from our prince of German poets, the apt quotation for this state of affairs can be found in the Zahmen Xenien by Wolfgang von Goethe:

> Many foolish words are spilled,
> When written, preserved for never,
> Neither body nor soul will be killed,
> Everything stays the same as ever.
> But place foolishness before our eyes,
> Its magical right is engraved on us,
> Our senses are held in ties,
> And the spirit remains enslaved in us.

Goethe's warning of the enslavement produced by the image does not lose its justification despite the opportunities offered by the use of multimedia that are now increasing at a tremendous rate. The exponential multiplication of television choice will be at the forefront for the current majority of multimedia users. Individuals will only be able to manage by selecting just those programs that meet their individual interests. Multimedia will be able to read every wish from the users' lips, as it were, and provide them with the programme that they would want the most, which promises both an optimum and maximum of individual information and entertainment.

As the need to be entertained will be the main motive for the future media users, the fans of action or science fiction films will be able to watch more and more of the same thus, constantly learning more and more about what they already know. This results in an increased self-referentiality which Gerhard Schulze, a sociologist from Bamberg, named the 'Kasper Hauser' syndrome.

Passive users of the new multimedia come close to the totally isolated individual as far as communication is concerned. They only encounter themselves and have little reason to change this, if they start to feel comfortable with this situation over time or, in other words, to stay in the "warmth within the sty of one's own ego" (Gerhard Schulze). Passive users of the new media will find it hard to look at the constantly enticing view beyond the confines of their own reduced plates.

However, this also applies to a proportion of active users, who use the new possibilities in a selective way and who frequently communicate with each other via their computers. The communication purpose is the main area of interest, the knowledge stocks of which can be expanded so enormously. Multimedia brings distant partners so close that they actually seem to be within immediate proximity. This restructuring of close versus distant contact focuses on the main purpose and, simultaneously destroys the irrelevant aspects, which often provide that element of surprise in personal, face-to-face communication.

Firstly, multimedia will, however, confirm a theory that we have previously known from the science of communications: the knowledge gap theory. Heinz Bonfadelli and Ulrich Saxer, the Swiss initiators of knowledge gap research will be able to write some interesting papers on this topic.[5]

They have already discovered the following point regarding television consumption: television makes the clever, cleverer and the stupid, more stupid. Those who have an active intelligence will use the new information and communication opportunities to increase their head-start in knowledge.

Those who approach the new, perfected media more in a passive and self-orientated way will no longer know more, but, will merely know more of the same thing. In the foreseeable future, this knowledge gap will not only be a gap between the intelligent and the less intelligent, active and more passive users, but also a gap between the younger generation and the elderly.

For this reason, particular attention should be paid to the acquisition of competence in handling the whole multimedia product range.

Part of the acquisition of media competence must also be the laying bare of the fundaments of our cultural heritage, and that is the written word. Our culture and also our religion live off the written word. "You have to read, Celeste" Marcel Proust reminded his housekeeper. Only by reading can people encounter themselves, they can assure themselves and develop self-confidence and trust towards others. Problems of orientation can only be dismantled in this way in the post-modern society.

II.

Neophilia, in other words "curiosity" is (Otto B. Roegele[6] repeatedly draws our attention to this), as an anthropological fundamental constant, the most powerful motif of human communication. Man is the only living creature that has the ability to be conscious of his historical origins and is capable of shaping his future. For this reason, he is dependent on signals of stability such as the changing of his reality of life. In modern pluralistic societies, the task of informing citizens of that which could be of importance for the formation of their opinions falls upon the media. Journalism is therefore primarily the activity of a mediator.

Its task is therefore a public task. Its professional privileges, such as protection of sources and information rights are liberties that are perceived on trust. Therefore, journalists have a greater responsibility for the subject matter of their messages as the partners for personal communication, because they hold a key position in the network of the mass communication system. The journalistic profession is specialised in mediation. It must see its ambition as being in the establishment of information, orientation and public debate in the run up to a decision, as well as after a decision has been made. The more complex the reality, the greater the dependence of the consumer of media messages on the correct administration of his curiosity by the media in the areas that defy his immediate ability to make judgements. For this reason, the most important obligation of the journalist

is his efforts to maintain the accuracy and integrity of his information. Because the life span of the human being is limited, attention becomes the scarcest of all resources. This results in the separation of the important and the unimportant becoming a strict obligation of the journalist, which is so frequently infringed upon in our post-modern society of arbitrariness.

The ethical basic rules that have been established for the traditional mass media also apply on principle to the knowledge society. However, there are new problems,…the responsibility of the chief editor or of the director of a broadcasting institution that was previously clear has melted away under the impetus of the flood of information of digitalised data. Hierarchies in the media have the function of filtering and monitoring systems. Previously, news items underwent several stages, at which the credibility of the source and plausibility of the news items were checked before they were printed in the newspaper or broadcast by a broadcasting institution. In our digitalised world, the author alone decides on publication in very small editorial stages.

Producers and recipients will be made much more reliant on their own discernment than in the previous media organisation and must determine themselves which information they either offer or accept. Both skills in handling the new technology and the competence to classify information provided by this technology, as well as finally power of judgement to come to terms with the subject matter of the offerings the new technology will be in demand. The training required to attain the aforementioned skills, therefore mainly presents at first a huge challenge to our traditional education system.

Today, it does not suffice to acquire knowledge, the individual must rather develop the skill of organising the available knowledge in order to use it for his own purposes. This does not mean that an extensive education should be abandoned. On the contrary: he who exposes himself to the flood of information without having a sufficient education is in danger of drowning in it. The educated will come to terms with the sources of information, utilise it, select it and call upon it for a set objective.

Today it makes sense to raise one's gaze beyond the limited horizons of national observation and to occupy oneself with the advantages of other media traditions. We can learn the greater fact orientation and the organisation within the media of journalistic self-control from Anglo-Saxon journalism. The professional self-conception of English and American journalism is light years away from the customary dominance of opinion in Germany and is orientated towards the main task of the media system, i.e. that of supplying the public with reliable information. We Germans can learn from the French media organisation to what extent the quality of media content is increased when the rift between literature and journalism, between academe and media is made narrower than it is in Germany. Screen presence is very much less the prerequisite for bestseller success in France. The idea and style counts for much more there than it does in Germany. We can learn from the Italian press how the traditional canon of education of a country—ignoring the zeitgeist—is passed on while using such carefully cultivated language, which even bravely clings on to the subjunctive that is only used by very sophisticated newspapers in Germany.

Wolf Schneider, the former chief editor of "Stern" magazine and long-time head of the Hamburg Journalist School wrote in his reflections on journalistic cardinal virtues to his students and colleagues in the register:

"It is mainly these people who are scandal-hunters by profession, who like to stylise themselves to the Fourth Estate. However, they do not regard providing the citizen with the optimum of information as their central task. They are the ones who do not want what most of their colleagues cannot provide: unsoiled information.

Where does this incapability to provide clear information manifest itself? What is wrong with the majority of journalists—those who do not see themselves as the Fourth Estate, as scandal-hunters or as do-gooders and so should be able to provide the service to the citizen?

There are five things that they do not have: specialist knowledge, knowledge of the world, mistrust, a backbone—and love towards their readers or listeners." [7]

The first four keywords are self-explanatory as they are adaptations to journalism of the Christian cardinal virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice. Only the fifth of Schneider's journalistic cardinal virtues, the love towards the reader, listener

and viewer require some words of commentary. This virtue objects to journalists' apathy towards the limited absorption capacity of the public.

He recognises the journalistic original sin of arrogance both in the contempt of the recipients by journalists, which Schneider mainly pins down to incomprehensible or complicated language and equally in the assumed missionary role as in enthusiastic commentary without specialist knowledge. He demands of journalistic texts that they should be written with the most unostentatious words available in clearly constructed sentences. He thinks:

"A journalist who wants to be read and also fulfil his duty of information in this respect should either write like Luther or Brecht, i.e. simply and tightly or like Lessing, Lichtenberg or Büchner, brilliantly and transparently at the same time".[8]

Of course Wolf Schneider also knows that these objectives cannot be achieved in the day-to-day work of a journalist, but the journalist must not lose his ambition towards this goal or at any rate the effort to achieve clarity and transparency.

Christian cardinal virtues or even their adaptations relating to journalism offer instruments, by means of which reality can be seen as it is and this vision can also be accomplished communicatively. Truth does not just hover around somewhere. Truth is the manifestation and recognition of reality. Josef Pieper teaches, "to live and work from truth that is seized in this way—therein lies the goodness of man, therein lies meaningful human life. Every one who desires to live as a human being is dependent on the nourishment of truth. Even society lives from the truth that is publicly made present and kept present—and this applies of course directly to publicists."[9] The presence of truth is only made possible by the order of language (Josef Pieper). Order of language does not primarily mean its formal perfection. This formulation is rather to emphasise the necessity of speaking and writing in such a way that reality remains as far as possible undistorted and unabbreviated.

Therefore: we do not need a new set of ethics for the knowledge society, but a return to the cardinal virtues applied to journalism, which do not demonstrate anything other than basic demands that have been tried and tested by common-sense for the civil interaction of people within society.

III.

Erfurt has a course-work examination system. The graduation mark is based on the study work produced during the 6th semester, which is calculated by means of credit points.

- After primary graduation, it is possible to achieve a masters degree within three further semesters.
- The way is then clear to complete a doctorate according to suitability (two to three years).
- There is a mentor system at Erfurt which ensures individual supervision of every student by a lecturer from the first semester onwards.
- The Erfurt "Studium Fundementale" is mandatory for teachers and students. This course acquaints students from the very beginning with a multidisciplinary way of thinking. This is a speciality that is only offered in Erfurt. The students learn that every object must be illuminated from many angles. Specialisation at too early a stage is avoided in this way.
- Much emphasis is placed upon internationality, not just in the courses of study with a range of focal points that extend even beyond Europe in historical studies and linguistics.
- At least one semester should be spent at a foreign university during the course. This is not an obligation, but certainly a target requirement.
- Acquisition of competence in a foreign language and familiarity in handling the new media is particularly promoted.
- The University of Erfurt wants graduates who have learnt to look beyond the edge of the plate of their respective subject of study in order to secure a broad as possible opportunity of application.
- Professionally-orientated events supplement the programme of study. Not least of all, practical work placements ensure that close contact between the course of studies and the professional world is formed.

Cultural sciences form the focal point of the University of Erfurt. The Faculty of Economics, Law and Social Sciences also follows the associated integrative approach which goes beyond traditional courses in legal and economic studies. Students are not trained to be court judges or holders of a diploma in business administration in Erfurt.

Religious studies, for example, which is represented by five professorships in Erfurt and is not a training course for priests and teachers of religious studies

perceives itself as cultural studies and aims at teaching established knowledge and practical experience in the evaluation and analysis of religions, religiously motivated movements on the one hand and intercultural conflicts in modern societies on the other hand. And these conflicts will increase significantly in the 21st century.

Today's economy demands qualified graduates who possess key qualifications that have been taught in the way they are taught at Erfurt University. Communication skills, the ability to understand and handle complex issues. Media and computer competence, language competence, teamwork skills and readiness to learn throughout life. These qualifications lay the foundations to succeed in professional practice.

The University of Erfurt comprises three faculties. The philosophical faculty, the legal, economic and social faculty and a newly designed faculty for educational studies. In addition to these, there is the Max Weber College for Cultural and Social Studies, which awarded its first doctorates last year. A special centre is being set up for didactic learning and teaching research. Application orientated annex institutes will complete the University's range of services.

The library must not be forgotten, the heart of every academic university. The University and Research Library Erfurt with 700,000 volumes in open access will be available to teachers and students until midnight on workdays, which is also almost unique on the German university landscape.

The University of Erfurt has over 105 professors who currently supervise 2,800 students. Erfurt is a campus university with short paths and many contact opportunities between teachers and students.

The Erfurt reform project should allay the fears of the Weimar Prince of Poets, who remarked in *Wilhelm Meister's Apprentice Years*: "The Germans have the gift of making sciences inaccessible". The University of Erfurt wants to achieve the new departure into the knowledge society by organising curiosity for knowledge, whose true value is not least that it outlines our ignorance more clearly. Above all, the students of Erfurt should acquire the ability to lead a fruitful life and pursue a successful career, whilst keeping the common good in sight by means of a character-forming, vocational and cosmopolitan course of study.

Summary

Nowadays, the phrase "Knowledge Society" is on everyone's lips. Robert E. Lane's theory of 1966, (which had been adopted and developed by Daniel Bell in his book on the post-industrial society in 1973), sees knowledge, alongside work and capital, as the third source of wealth creation. The store of knowledge doubles every ten years. This wildfire multiplication of information opportunities created by technology demands a great amount of sovereign decision-making on the part of the media user. The graphic media are especially liable to affect their users in their role as conveyers of information: television makes the clever, cleverer and the stupid, more stupid.

It is therefore of great importance not only to consider how far traditional ethical demands on journalists and other conveyers of knowledge are still valid but also to apply them to the ever increasing opportunities created by the new technology. The example of Erfurt University shows how this can be done.

Endnotes

1. Robert E. Lane, The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society, in: American Sociological Review, 5/1966 p. 650 ff, cf also: Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, New York 1973, p. 212-265
2. cf.: Wolfgang Bergsdorf, Deutschland an der Jahrtausendwende, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B1-2/2000, p.21
3. Georg Gerbner/Larry Gross among others: The Mainstreaming of America: Violance Profil No. II. In: Journal of Communications 30 (1980) p. 10 ff
4. Robert D. Putnam, (ed) Gemeinschaft und Gemeinsinn, Sozialkapital im internationalen Vergleich, Gütersloh 2001
5. cf e.g.: Heinz Bonfadelli, Die Wissenkluft-Perspective. Medien und gesellschaftliche Information, Constance 1994.
Ulrich Saxer, Medieninnovation und Mediendistanz. In: Walter A. Mahle (ed) Medienangebot und Mediennutzung. (AKM-Studien, vol 31) Berlin 1989, p. 145
6. Otto B. Roegele, Verantwortung des Journalisten. In: *Peter Schiwy*, Walter J. Schütz (ed.), Medienrecht, Neuwied 1990, p. 337.
7. Wolf Schneider, *Über journalistische Kardinaltugend. In: Bertelsmann Briefe*, Juni 1955, pp. ff.
8. a.a.O. (=same place), p. 53.
9. Josef Pieper, *Berufsethos des christlichen Publizisten*, unpublished lecture (Münster 1995), p. 19.

On Testing the Test

On the Kind of "Work" Metaphysicians and Doctors of the Church Do

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Commencement address delivered to the graduating class, Ave Maria College, Ypsilanti, Michigan, May 2005

"The apostle Paul states that God has placed apostles, prophets and doctors in the Church.... He declares that there are different kinds of ministry and work, and that the same Holy Spirit is manifested in a variety of gifts for the good of all...."

—John Baptist de la Salle (1719).

"Philosophy is merely thought that has been thought out. It is often a great bore. But man has no alternative, except between being influenced by thought that has been thought out and being influenced by thought that has not been thought out. The latter is what we commonly call culture and enlightenment today. But man is always influenced by thought of some kind, his own or somebody else's' that of somebody he trusts or that of somebody he never heard of, thought at first, second or third hand;' thought from exploded legends or unverified rumous; but always something within the shadow of a system of values and a reason for preference. A man does test everything by something. The question here is whether he has ever tested the test."

—G. K. Chesterton, "The Revival of Philosophy —Why?" (1950).

I.

A recent study in *USAToday* (7 April '05) indicated that the percentage of CEO's of Fortune 1000 companies who have graduated from the Ivy League Schools is declining. Now, one can expect to find well-qualified candidates from almost any college, small or large, famous or unheralded. Even a number of famous CEO's, including Bill Gates himself, are college drop-outs. So the first point that I wish to make to you 36 graduates of this small college in Michigan is that, in a sense, it does not make much difference any more, either career-wise or intellectual-wise, where you went to college. It may be a huge place like Michigan or NYU, a medium-sized place like Catholic University or Colgate, or a rather small place like the hundreds of colleges scattered over the land, especially in the Midwest.

Indeed, being educated at famous colleges may be an impediment in many ways. Allan Bloom, in a famous remark twenty years ago, said that the most unhappy people in our society today are those students in the twenty or thirty so-called best and most expensive colleges. He thought them to be unhappy, because they were being educated, implicitly or explicitly, with a philosophy that claimed it to be true that there is no truth, a formula for despair if there ever was one. You assume or are told that you are getting the best education in the world. Then you find that that education, in turn, is based on nihilist premises. You will naturally think there are no alternatives, since this education is "the best." You will, if you are logical, be left with nothing, with emptiness as an explanation of all reality. Meanwhile, you have a mind that seeks to know all things, all that is.

However, I am under no illusions about modern liberal education or modern philosophy, for that matter. In this world, I think, with Belloc in The Path to Rome, that, at best, we can only have a modest and relative happiness. That is worth having no doubt, but not at any cost. A student can with little difficulty acquire a terrible education in any college, famous or infamous. Moreover, even in the best college, whatever that is and if such there be, a student still has to allow himself to be educated. Not all do. He needs the virtue called docilitas, the capacity to be taught, no easy virtue. He also needs to learn what is really important, what is true, even if it is not being presented in whatever college curriculum he chooses to engage himself.

The problem, mind you, is not so much that no ultimate truth is presented in the school of our choice. Rather it is the pervading academic thesis, implicitly or explicitly assumed, that all truth is presented, to recall Plato, as mere opinion or shadow. It

is presented as if, following Descartes, doubt were the basis of certitude. I came across the following parody that catches some of this irony that truth as truth we cannot hear in the schools we are likely to attend. It goes: "Now I sit me down in school / Where praying is against the rule / For this great nation under God / Finds mention of Him very odd. // If Scripture now the class recites, / It violates the Bill of rights. / And anytime my head I bow / Becomes a Federal matter now."

Of course, these amusing lines refer more to government control than to the school itself. But it must be said that the ideas that currently motivate the government with regard to what students can hear were once but minority opinions someplace in academia. Ideas, even bad ones, perhaps especially bad ones, do have consequences. This is why we must know the difference between an idea that corresponds to reality and one that does not. That too is an essential part, if not the essential part, of any education. We should, in the end, be taught to be "judgmental," to distinguish what is from what is not. As Chesterton once remarked, the very purpose of the mind is to make judgments. To use your mind to judge about nothing is implicitly not to use your mind at all. It is to try to give yourself comfort by denying that you even have a mind

II.

Though not ideal, I have long considered that a good education today must be more in the nature of private enterprise. Education is something every student has, to some extent, to pursue by himself. I have little sympathy with students who know that they are receiving an awful education, especially in terms of truth, but do not do anything on their own to counter-act it. That is what my book, *Another Sort of Learning*, was really about, to give some guidance to those lost in the nihilist forests of modern academia. If you can read, you can be educated, even if education is more than reading. Indeed, the unlettered are not necessarily the unwise, as Aristotle already indicated.

The famous essay of Dorothy Sayers, "The Lost Tools of Learning," which anyone can easily find and read on Google, was about this very point. This short essay is not to be missed even if you did miss it while in college or even in your middle or old age. Indeed, one of the main things that we gradually learn on leaving college at twenty one or twenty two, as Plato intimated in book seven of *The Republic*, is not just that we missed much already. Rather we learn how much more we were not capable of learning until we were older, with more experience.

Your education, in this sense, is not ending today, but just beginning. In the end, it is possible to know something of the truth of things. It is important even if we have to find this truth outside the schools, as we often do. I am not particularly an advocate of what is sometimes called "lifetime education," of the notion that we are always learners or students. I do not mean that we cannot always learn something new, but maturity means that we reach a point where we know, as Aristotle said in his famous discussion in the Parts of Animals, how to make our own judgments even about the wisdom of the wise.

I am going to continue with two striking citations from students I know, the one remark rather sharp, the other rather enthusiastic. Both are about the sort of education a student is receiving. I will begin with the one most critical. It comes from a young man I do not know personally, but with whom I have often corresponded via old-old fashioned letter or e-mail, that modern substitute for instant vision, that perplexing tool that makes it almost possible for a professor to teach at least something to anyone anyplace in the world.

The only thing I will suppress from this comment is the student's name and the university that this blunt and energetic student attends: "I can't resist commenting on your last exhortation that I 'keep the place alive.' Ha! This place will need more than me to keep itself on life-support," the student wrote.. The NIHILISM that saturates this place, nay, I will use a qualifier: the *'debonair nihilism'* (Flannery O'Connor) that permeates this place—that tender, warm emotion that says 'there is no truth; yet, there is a revolutionary truth' at the same time. Of course, that 'revolutionary truth' is always vague, always undefined, always confined to the realm of ideas, never enfleshed. All I know is that it involves accumulating a lot of community service hours, and repeating

the motto, 'Men and Women for Others.' Then, of course, we fill out the rubrics, carefully jotting down how many hours of service we have done.... When will this revolution happen? Perhaps at the same time when Sancho Panza finally gets his promised island, and when Don Quixote brings back the Golden Age. This young man hits pretty close, I think, to the heart of the practical ideology that governs many universities. There is "no truth," but we work hard for the revolution to "improve" the man whose being is what we are free to define, however we choose to define it.

Newman, in his Sermon Seven on Subjects of the Day, to follow this young man's perceived logic to its consequences, briefly observes, "The one peculiar and characteristic sin of the world is this, that whereas God would have us live for the life to come, the world would make us live for this life. This, I say, is the world's sin; it lives for this life, not for the next." The problem is not that we cannot save our souls without also effectively loving our neighbor in some concrete sense, which was the young man's Burkean point about "enfleshed," not vague, ideas. The point is rather that, since we have no souls and no truth to lodge in them, we have no grounded principle with which to oppose those who would, in revolutionary fashion, reconstruct us, even bodily, in the image of man no longer fashioned in the likeness of God, the real norm and measure of what we are.

A student in one of my classes, to come to the second instance, told me that his sister had enrolled in a master's program at St. John's College in Annapolis. I do not know where she went to undergraduate school or how she ever discovered the program at St. John's. But I asked my student how his sister was doing there. He replied: "My sister is doing very well. She has started the language component of her course work. She tells me daily that she could not imagine the great feast of ideas that was laid out, with table set, and her having never known it was there. She has made inroads on ideas and works that make me—in a good Augustinian sense—envious."

I am quite fond of this passage. It does three very useful things. First it reminds us that it is never too late. This young woman learned what ideas were after she finished college. Yet, before this young woman learned what she was missing, she had to have some prior inkling or unsettlement that she was missing something.

Secondly, the passage reminds us that we often do not know what we are missing. If we did, we would already take steps to find out. I have often had the experience of having students in a class where we were reading together say, Plato, or Aristotle, or Augustine, or Aquinas. As an aging clerical professor, I know what wonder can be found in these sources. But one day, I recall, I was in the same situation as this young woman. Not only had I never heard of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, or Aquinas, but I had no idea what they were about or how to go about finding out about them. For this we do need teachers, or at least, as Yves Simon says in a marvelous passage in A General Theory of Authority, find them useful.

The fact is, thirdly, that we cannot know what these ideas are about unless we have the good fortune to be introduced to them, even if, unhappily, we have to do it ourselves. Moreover, I think we should be, as my student said of his sister's studies, a bit "envious" of those who receive a better education than we do. There is nothing wrong with that "unrest" in our souls that arises from our being aware of how much we do not know. After all, this awareness is the beginning of that Augustinian quest that we find when we begin to learn anything, namely, that one truth leads to another, that we are never fully satisfied with what is in fact true because we sense that more is true than we know. What is always points to its origin. And this is an experience that is an intrinsic part of our very experience of the truth, any truth.

III.

I began this address with two citations, one from John Baptist de la Salle, the sixteenth century founder of the Brothers of the Christian Schools. The great saint of practical education pointed out that it is all right that there be a variety of talents and accomplishments among us. We are not all to do the same thing. To recall Plato, we cannot have a city in which there are only philosophers, but no farmers or craftsmen or, yea, politicians. We are to rejoice that others can know and do what we cannot or do not. We all need a certain humility before the man who can fix our car.

And there must be a hierarchy of duties, some are more important than others, but all, if they are real duties that must be done, are important. Without denying the existence of frivolous things – and I am a defender of a world in which frivolity can also exist – the least support the best and the best the least, and we all need "middling" things. While there may be such a thing as a "vocation" to be a teacher or a professor, there is, I think, no "vocation" to be a student. That is, a student is always someone in preparation for something else, for the myriad of things to be done without which the world cannot go on. Like childhood which is supposed to end, so being a student is supposed to end. The day is to come when we are "educated." This day does not mean that we now know everything, but rather that we know how to go about judging and learning what we can know of what is.

The purpose of education, then, is that we be educated. That is, we are finally to achieve those habits and talents whereby we can judge and act on our own in this world in the light of our awareness, as Newman said, that we are not only made for this world. The medieval guilds used to speak of the "master-craftsman," the man who had acquired the artistic and craft habits and skills whereby he could now, on his own, produce fine works, masterpieces. Analogously, this is where we are to arrive, as Plato intimated in book seven of *The Republic*, at the point of being educated. In a kind of foreshadowing way, this is in part what your graduation here today is designed to teach you.

My second citation was from Chesterton. This year, your graduation year, I might note, is the one hundredth anniversary of the publication of Chesterton's *Heretics*, a book that I dearly love, a book that, in its own amusing way, foresaw most of the aberrations that would come about and are still coming about in the century following its publication.

"Philosophy," he said, is merely thought "thought out." This is already Socrates's "examined life," isn't it? One of the blessings of your years of college life is that it provides us with the quiet opportunity to think things out ahead of time, as it were. Whether we like it or not, our lives will be confronted with the great issues of truth, good, beauty, power, death, suffering, salvation, eternity. Certain questions must be faced whether we like it or not, whether we think about them ahead of time or not. But it is one of the great things about human life that we can face them, think about them.

Moreover, as Chesterton again said, we do not have a choice of being only influenced by good ideas. The world is full of ideas that are not so good . We ought to know what these are and how they got that way. This is why we study the "heretics," as Chesterton called them, why we study the history of philosophy and political philosophy, as Leo Strauss remarked, as a series of "brilliant errors." We cannot know "errors" unless we have a philosophy based on what is, on the truth of things. I hope it is this latter that you have begun to learn here during your four years at the end of which, as those of us who are much older than you see, you are still young, but no longer without, we hope, intellectual tools and the moral habits with which to use them well.

We must, as Chesterton said, test things with something. We need to know the criterion or "test" by which things are rightly judged. Moreover, we are given minds in order that we make our souls luminous to ourselves. As Thomas Aquinas said in his famous *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle,* (#15), "But above experience, which belongs to particular reason, men have as their chief power a universal reason by means of which they live." Notice that Aquinas said that it is by reason that we "live." What a striking idea or phrase. That is to say, unless we illuminate our lives with thought about what is going on so that we are aware of what we are about, we will not be living a human life. We are indeed the rational animals, the beings who proceed by using our minds.

IV.

Let me conclude. Little Sally is standing behind Charlie Brown, who is comfortably slouched in the bean-bag seat contentedly watching TV. She says to him, "'What's that supposed to mean?' That's my new philosophy." In the next scene, while Charlie continues to watch TV, she continues her explanation with some determination, "Whenever someone says something to me, I just say, 'What's that supposed to mean?'"

As you can imagine, Charlie thinks he must make some response to this new philosophy. With a kind of dull look, still watching TV, he replies, "I'm glad you told me. Not I won't say anything to you." While Charlie sinks into the bean-bag in despair at her logic, Sally responds, "What's that supposed to mean?"

As you leave here, I want to remind you that things do have meanings, that a meaning is merely our way of saying what a thing is. Things have, in a way, two existences, the one their own esse or being and the other our word that identifies what they are. The two are intended to go together.

We read in the Prologue to John, that the Word was made flesh. During your years here, as the great John Paul II remarked in his *Fides et Ratio*, you should have often asked yourselves what is the relation of word and flesh, not only in your lives but in the divine Life. You are to study all that is, and wonder, following my young student friend, why the nihilist explanation is not the right explanation.

But unless you are aware that philosophy is thought "thought out," you will not have taken the trouble, though in truth it is more of a delight than a trouble, to think things out for yourselves. And it won't be long before you become "envious" of those who have taken this trouble. "What's that supposed to mean?" It is supposed to mean that what is is what we think about. You have been to college in order to have begun to find out both what things mean and how to judge whether what you know corresponds to that reality that is.

Let me leave you with the following eleven observations that you might take with you for the rest of your lives:

1) "God has placed apostles, prophets, and doctors in the Church."
2) "A man does test everything by something. The question here is whether he has questioned the test."
3) "What's that supposed to mean?"
4) "The unhappiest people in our society are those students in the twenty or thirty best and most expensive universities."
5) "Now I sit me down to school / where praying is against the rule."
6) "Of course, that 'revolutionary truth' is always vague, always undefined, always confined to the realm of ideas, never enfleshed."
7) "The Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us."
8) "Men have as their chief power a universal reason by which they live."
9) "My sister has made inroads on ideas and works that has made me—in the good Augustinian sense—envious."
10) "This, I say, is the world's sin; it lives for this life, not for the next."
11) "Philosophy is merely thought that has been thought out."

Fellowship of
Catholic Scholars

Annual Meeting

Friday, September 23–Sunday, September 25, 2005
Washington, D.C.

Highlights of the meeting:
The participants will be welcomed by
members of the Board, *President* Bernard Dobranski, J.D.
and *Program Chairman*, William E. May, Ph.D.

Thomas Weinandy, OFM Cap,
Staff Theologian of the Doctrinal Committee, USCCB.
will keynote the conference with his address
Vatican II Today: 40 Years Later.

Peter J. Jugis, D.D., *Bishop of Charlotte*,
will celebrate the closing Mass.

Among the topics are:
Gaudium et Spes
Lumen Gentium
Dei Verbum
and Dignitatis Humanae

Culture and the Thomist Tradition After Vatican II, by Tracey Rowland, New York: Routledge, 2003

Reviewed by Daniel McInerny,
Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture

At the Chrism Mass of the archdiocese of Boston during Holy Week 2004, Archbishop Sean P. O'Malley compared the Catholic Church in the United States to "exiles in the midst of Babylon." Catholics, he declared, "find themselves in a hostile, alien environment where the overriding temptation is to assimilate, the cultural pull is to conform to a dominant cultural influence that is incongruous with our faith and our destiny."

Archbishop O'Malley's assessment of the cultural situation of contemporary Catholics in the United States serves as a neat summary of the central claim of Tracey Rowland's compelling new book, *Culture and the Thomist Tradition After Vatican II*. For Rowland, not only in the United States but also in the entirety of the West, the Church is at a crisis point in which it must recognize that the cultural structures surrounding it are either implicitly or explicitly inimical to her mission. To think that the Church can accommodate itself without compromise to the political, economic, and other cultural forces that characterize the post-Christian, liberal democracies of the West is for Rowland a naïve and dangerous illusion from which Catholics must liberate themselves. The chief resource in this work of liberation is, Rowland claims, the Thomist tradition, yet the ambivalence of this tradition vis-á-vis its attitude to modernity, she further claims, has jeopardized its ability to serve as the appropriate sign of contradiction to the times.

Rowland's argument takes its principal inspiration from two distinct though not entirely disparate sources: on the one hand, the moral and political writings of Alasdair MacIntyre, and on the other, the Communio circle of thinkers who have been deeply influenced by Henri de Lubac and Hans Urs von Balthasar, in particular, David Schindler, Kenneth Schmitz, and William Norris Clarke. What unites these sources, for Rowland, is their rejection of modern culture as an appropriate seedbed for Christianity. But Rowland also takes these sources as sufficiently united in their positive prescriptions for a renewal of Christian culture so as to claim them as members of what she calls the "Thomist" tradition.

The form of Rowland's overall argument borrows from MacIntyre's discussions, chiefly in *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* and *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry*, of "epistemological crises" within traditions. Put briefly, a tradition of inquiry finds itself in an epistemological crisis when it is no longer able to solve its problems with the conceptual resources available to it. The resolution of such a crisis is only found when richer conceptual resources are discovered that are capable of resolving the tradition's original problems. In taking up these ideas one might expect that, like MacIntyre, Rowland has in mind an epistemological crisis being suffered by the modern liberal tradition. But no. It is rather the crisis of the Thomistic tradition that is her concern, a crisis caused by that tradition's "undeveloped account of the role of culture in moral formation" (p. 3).

Rowland's first two chapters are thus devoted to identifying the Thomist tradition's epistemological crisis in regard to culture, a crisis that she sees as coming to a head in the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council. The Council was popularly interpreted as an accommodation to, or an updating to meet the requirements of, modern culture. The pitfalls of this popular interpretation, according to Rowland, are a result of the Council's failure, most notably in *Gaudium et spes*, to provide a systematic, theological hermeneutic of culture in general, and of the Church's relationship to modern culture, in particular. Hence, in Chapter 1, Rowland recounts how in various conciliar interventions and post-conciliar speculations an understanding of the autonomy of culture came more and more to be stressed—yet in such a way that any internal relationship between culture and the Church's salvific mission became increasingly ambiguous, if not absolutely severed. Rowland's main target here is "extrinsicism," which absolutely severs the internal relationship be-

tween the Church and culture, making culture autonomous in the Kantian sense of being absolutely self-governing. Extrinsicism is opposed to integralism, which also severs any internal relationship between the Church and culture, but which still reserves for the Church the prerogative of dictating terms to the so-called secular order (p. 29). Both extrinsicism and integralism are mistaken, on Rowland's view, because both make the mistake of severing, as opposed to merely distinguishing, the order of grace from the order of nature, thus leaving the arts and sciences which comprise the heart of secular culture essentially bereft of internal formation by Christian theology.

It is not the case, however, that for Rowland *Gaudium et spes* fails to provide any guidance for the understanding of the proper relationship between the Church and culture. For in assessing the treatment of culture within post-conciliar magisterial thought in Chapter 2, Rowland praises John Paul II's frequent references to paragraph 22 of *Gaudium et spes*, which states that 'only in the mystery of the incarnate Word does the mystery of man take on light." The Christocentrism of this statement has, according to Rowland, deep implications for a proper understanding of the autonomy of culture. "In effect, it means that, while the natural and social sciences and the arts may be 'autonomous' in the sense that they are not the subject of ecclesiastical governance, they are not 'autonomous' in the sense of having their own frames of reference external to the theology of the Incarnation" (p. 37). It is precisely this distinction that has enabled John Paul II to offer his trenchant critiques of liberal modernity, most especially in *Evangelium vitae*, to the point of referring to modern liberal culture as a "culture of death." Rowland avers that "John Paul II's publications lend weight to the argument that Liberalism, like Marxism, may be construed as a 'philosophical system, an ideology, a program for action and for the shaping of human behavior' which is hostile to theism in general, and the Thomist tradition in particular" (p. 49).

Rowland's defense of the claim that contemporary culture is deeply inimical to Christianity comprises Part II of the book. Each one of the three chapters of Part II focuses on one aspect of liberal culture: the *ethos* of modern institutions (Chapter 3); liberal culture's understanding of self-formation (Chapter 4); and the inner form or logic of modern liberal culture, in particular its claim to theological neutrality (Chapter 5).

Chapter 3 draws heavily upon MacIntyre's critiques of the emotivist *ethos* of bureaucratized, liberal institutions. Chapter 4 rejects the liberal notion of self-formation—i.e., what it means to develop oneself culturally—insofar as it defines itself against a Christian account of an "aristocratic" formation of the soul, one that is essentially normative and perfective in character. Here Rowland makes some nice distinctions between the Christian, aristocratic form of self-formation, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the self-formation of the aristocratic liberal (MacIntyre's "aesthete"), the bourgeois ("mass man") liberal, and the Nietzschean man's quest for authenticity. Finally, in Chapter 5, Rowland argues against the modern understanding of an extrinsic relationship between the Gospel and culture. Here she upholds an intrinsic relationship between the same by relying on de Lubac's account of the grace-nature distinction. Rowland follows de Lubac in warning that "the idea of a pure nature" tends toward extrinsicism, the severance of the supernatural realm from the rest of culture. The order of grace is thus relegated to the level of one's private concerns, and the so-called natural order, which includes the domain of culture, is allowed to trundle forward as an autonomous machine of self-assertion, control and manipulation (p. 109). The antidote, according to Rowland, can only be found in the taking on by social practices of a new form, the "form of love." Such cultural transformation "would require a rejection of the autonomy of the spheres of culture in relation one another, and in particular the idea of their autonomy in relation to theology. It would also require that priority be given to doxology over work, to being over doing" (p. 107).

Part II of Rowland's book is thus devoted to the hostility of contemporary culture to Thomist principles, a hostility Rowland believes the Thomist tradition has insufficiently attended to, let alone addressed. Hence the "epistemological crisis" suffered by the tradition in the face of liberal modernity and Nietzschean postmodernity. What the Thomist tradition needs to do in order to resolve its crisis, Rowland contends, is above all to learn from MacIntyre and to recover the idea of "a narrative tradition and its associate concept of a tradition-constituted rationality" (p. 115). Only

this idea will enable the Thomist tradition to affirm *both* the sense of transhistorical truth so attractive in Enlightenment conceptions of rationality, *and* the sense of historical consciousness that marks the Genealogical tradition inspired by Nietzsche, while still rejecting the errors that bedevil each of these rival traditions.

Chapter 6, accordingly, lays emphasis upon the ways in which authentic rational inquiry into truth is always embedded within the social practices of a living tradition, and preeminently within Christianity. Chapter 7 then takes up the objection that such tradition-constituted inquiry undermines the traditional bulwark of the Thomist conception of natural law, namely, the self-evident grasp, by virtually all plain persons, of the first principles of practical reason. Rowland does not at all deny the importance of the self-evidency of the first principles of practical reason. But she does argue against the new natural law theory held by what she calls the "Whig Thomists" (i.e., John Finnis and his followers), which attempts to accommodate Thomist natural law theory to liberal conceptions of rationality. Her dispute takes special aim at the new theory's incommensurability thesis, underscoring the diminished role the thesis accords to the erstwhile architectonic good of religion, as well as the new theory's espousal of liberalism's dubious idiom and rhetoric about rights.

The moral of Rowland's narrative might then be summed up this way: any account of Christian moral and intellectual formation is not complete without an account of cultural practices and institutions which open themselves up to the transcendentals of truth, beauty and goodness and above all to the revelation of Christ witnessed to by the Church. Genuine moral and intellectual formation, in other words, must always be seen as formation in Christian culture. Any such account of culture, moreover, must be the fruit of a tradition-constituted inquiry, inspired by the principles of Thomist philosophy and theology, which overcomes the deficiencies of both the liberal and genealogical strains of modern culture.

These central claims are unassailable, and Rowland's arguments for them are impressive in many respects. Yet one major strand of her narrative of epistemological crisis and dialectical resolution remains ambiguous, and that is her account of the role of nature and of philosophy in cultural formation.

To begin with what is clear: Rowland believes there is an intrinsic relationship between nature and grace, between philosophy and theology. Each member of these pairs is to be distinguished, though not separated, from the other. Hence Rowland's claim that the realm of culture, however outside the reach of direct ecclesial governance, is never completely autonomous from specifically Christian formation.

What is less clear, however, is to what extent Rowland thinks that nature can effectively be appealed to philosophically, i.e., independently of appeals to Christian revelation. Within the debates of our present cultural institutions and practices, whether religious, political, economic, artistic, can nature serve as a source of common ground—indeed, as a source of transcendent principle—for those approaching issues from a plurality of often conflicting viewpoints?

In certain passages Rowland's understanding of the grace-nature distinction seems to diminish the importance of the purely philosophical approach to the transcendent. She invokes, for example, de Lubac's criticism of the neo-scholastic conception of the relationship between nature and grace, "according to which the natural and the supernatural each constituted a complete and distinct order" (p. 102). The point of the neo-scholastic construal of the distinction was undoubtedly noble. It was to "facilitate general agreement between theists and atheists about the natural order. The two could work together on the front of 'natural' or 'humanist' projects, while the more socially contentious supernatural aspirations could be relegated to the privacy of the individual soul." But Rowland finally agrees with de Lubac that the cumulative effect of the neo-scholastic construal of the nature-grace distinction is "'a total secularization that would banish God not only from social life but from culture and even from the relationships of private life'" (p. 102).

This is not the place to get into the niceties of de Lubac's criticisms of neo-scholasticism on the grace-nature distinction. But it is the place to question how, on the cultural level, the forces of secularism can be contained if we do not have a language to speak to liberal secularists that they actually have ears to hear. To smudge the boundaries between philosophy and theology, as Rowland likes to put it, would seem to demand that secular interlocutors assent to propositions of faith: no doubt a conversation stopper in most instances.

Now, Rowland is absolutely right that, ideally, cultural practices and institutions must be open to the transcendent, and ultimately be Christocentric in character. And there is no doubt that the best way to introduce a sense of the transcendent into culture is through the active participation of Christians in the central institutions of culture. But it is not always the case that the best way for Christians to Christianize culture is by explicitly invoking elements of Christian revelation. Many cultural institutions in the pluralistic societies of the West will simply not be influenced by direct evangelization. They will only be influenced by arguments that are philosophical in nature, and which by an astute exercise in dialectical persuasion open up rival interlocutors to the transcendent principles Rowland rightly judges to be the life's blood of genuine culture. Such arguments will be a propadeutic to the faith, not a direct transmission of it.

In another passage, Rowland addresses the supposed neutrality of philosophy. She claims that "one's philosophical standpoint cannot be neutral in relation to the claims of revelation, even though no specific reference to the claims of revelation need ever be made in the formulation of a philosophical virtue ethic" (p. 127). What Rowland seems to be arguing is the following: Insofar as we regard the material condition of the Christian philosopher, then it is true to say that his philosophical viewpoint is not neutral to his faith. His philosophical inquiries will always be inspired and guided by the dogmas of his faith. But insofar we regard a Christian's philosophical standpoint formally, i.e., precisely *as philosophy*, then his philosophy will be neutral to the specific claims of Christian revelation, in the sense of not being able to pass judgment upon them. What Rowland does not state firmly enough, however, is that philosophy can never be neutral to *theism*, i.e., a philosophical theology that we can come to know through the natural light of human reason. Nor will such philosophy be neutral to the transcendentals, considered as naturally knowable aspects of reality. It is because no human intellect is neutral to the claims of theism and the transcendentals that conversation between conflicting viewpoints, sacred and secular, is possible within the various institutions and practices of culture. This does not to make culture autonomous, in the sense of making Christian revelation extrinsic to it. For the nature that serves as the foundation of human culture is made to be fulfilled by the graces offered to us by Christ through His Church.

The issue of nature arises again, finally, in Rowland's discussion of natural law. Here she approvingly quotes Ernest Fortin's view that "a Thomist theory of natural law requires 'not only that the content of the natural law be naturally known to all human beings,' but that it be known precisely as 'belonging to a law which is both promulgated and enforced by God as the author of nature'" (p. 144). Does this mean that in order to grasp the obligatory reasonableness of an elemental rule of justice, such as the rule against not physically harming an innocent person, one must also have an understanding of God as a providential lawgiver, which is to say, a revealed understanding of God? If so, then Rowland's argument undermines the force of natural law as a common ground for rational discussion between Christian believers and non-believers. The ambiguity remains when Rowland later quotes David Schindler to the effect that "there can be a universal appeal to ethics in the sense of natural law; however, any such universal appeal must be oriented, in its beginning and all along the way, to the concrete form that the universal takes in the personal life of Christ and the sacramental life of the Church" (p. 146). Again, if the point of the passage is to confirm the point that the ultimate *telos* of the natural law is to be found in living the Christian virtues of faith, hope and charity, then it is an appropriate confirmation of the intrinsic relationship between nature and grace. But if the point of the passage is to say that the natural law cannot be appealed to without reference to the sacramental life of the Church, then the natural law as a force for cultural formation, at least within the pluralist cultures of the West, is neutralized.

Yet this request for greater clarification on the role of nature and of philosophy in Rowland's narrative is meant to appreciate by way of joining her effort to engage contemporary culture with the Thomist tradition. For second only to the witness of a new generation of saints, what the modern age most requires is a renewed sense that talk of the transcendent is not a mere matter of subjective desire or of religious faith, but a discourse that is available to all human intellects *by nature*. This conception of nature is perhaps the greatest contribution of the Thomist tradition to the question of culture.

Schillebeeckx, Phenomenology, and Vatican II

A Review of Eric Borgman's *Edward Schillebeeckx: A Theologian in His History: Vol. 1, A Catholic Theology of Culture (1914-1965)* Trans. by John Bowden.
Reviewed by John Francis Kobler, C.P.,
author of *Vatican II and Phenomenology: Reflections of the Life-World of the Church*

Since 1985 I have been insisting that the mindstyle used to express the teachings of Vatican II is a fusion of Thomism and phenomenology, of conceptualism and existentialism. The only other prominent theologian I know who entertains a comparable opinion is Fr. René Latourelle, SJ, formerly head of the theology department at the Gregorian University in Rome. A new book has now been published which lends credence to this position and its wider historical Catholic context. I refer to Eric Borgman's *Edward Schillebeeckx: A Theologian in His History: Vol. 1, A Catholic Theology of Culture (1914-1965)* Trans. by John Bowden. (New York: Continuum, 2003).

Erik Borgman is a Dutch layman and member of the Dominican Third Order. As a former student of Schillebeeckx, he is a great admirer of his former teacher. The book is so meticulous in detailed perception that it can only be acknowledged as a labor of love. While Borgman wants to see Schillebeeckx's reform and renewal program carried on, he does not hesitate to criticize important facets of his teacher's intentions in a serene and clear-headed way. If anything, Borgman is more "progressive" than Schillebeeckx. himself.

Why am I focusing on Schillebeeckx as a classic case of a 1960s European theologian using phenomenology for his religious purposes? For the simple reason that most Catholic intellectuals in Northern Europe had been using this variegated methodology since the 1920s. Most American Catholics, however, had little or no acquaintance with this style of thought or its implications. Perhaps the best known of the early users of phenomenology were Erich Przywara, Romano Guardini, Karl Adam, Edith Stein, and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. These thinkers were influenced by the pioneers of phenomenology: i. e., Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, Rudolf Otto, and Martin Heidegger. The next generation of Catholic intellectuals using this mindstyle included Dietrich von Hildebrand, Edward Schillebeeckx, Karl Rahner, Jean Danielou, Yves Congar, and Karol Wojtyla. Some of these thinkers were also influenced by the thought of secular phenomenologists: e. g., Schillebeeckx by Merleau-Ponty and Rahner by Heidegger.

What these Catholic intellectuals have in common is the "Problem of Being *in History* (i.e., in the dynamics of the concrete field of human consciousness, whether individual or corporate). The starting-point for this inquiry, as Edith Stein mentions, is "The Fact of Our Own Being." This is a renewed quest for a *metaphysics via a philosophical anthropology*.

In *Crossing the Threshold of Hope* Pope John Paul II spells out the religious implications of this new methodology:

> For contemporary thought the *philosophy of religion* is very important—for example the work of Mircea Eliade and, for us in Poland, that of Archbishop Marian Jaworski and the school of Lublin. *We are witnesses of a symptomatic return to metaphysics (the philosophy of being) through an integral anthropology*. One cannot think adequately about man without reference, which for man is constitutive, to God. Saint Thomas defined this as *actus essendi* (essential act), in the language of the *philosophy of existence*. The philosophy of religion expresses this with the categories of *anthropological experience*.

The *philosophers of dialogue*, such as Martin Buber and the aforementioned Lévinas, have contributed greatly to this experience. And we find ourselves by now very close to Saint Thomas, but the path passes not so much through being and existence as through people and their meeting each other, through the "I" and the "Thou." *This is a fundamental dimension of man's existence, which is always coexistence*.

Where did the philosophers of dialogue learn this? Foremost, they learned it from their experience of the Bible. In the *sphere of the everyday* man's entire life is one of "coexistence"—"thou" and "I"—and

also in the *sphere of the absolute and definitive*: "I" and "THOU." The Biblical tradition revolves around this "THOU," who is first the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the God of the Fathers, and then the God of Jesus Christ and the apostles, the God of our faith..

Our faith is profoundly anthropological, rooted constitutively in coexistence, in the community of God's people, and in *communion with this eternal "THOU."* Such coexistence is essential to our Judeo-Christian tradition and comes from God's initiative. This initiative is connected with and leads to creation, and is at the same time—as St. Paul teaches—"the eternal election of man in the Word who is the Son" (cf. Eph. 1:4).

What the Holy Father is describing here is man's internal "world" (*lebenswelt*) of experienced truths and values which shape the religious culture of his life in the community of the Church. Since this psychic complex constitutes a Christocentric anthropology, it necessarily has a *sacramental* structure, much like that described by Pope Innocent III in 1202. *In Lumen Gentium*, for example, the Light of Christ is posited as the *sacramentum et res* along with its inherent grace-dynamis *(res et non sacramentum)* in order to discern those empirical religious human experiences *(sacramentum et non res)* which are compatible with the truths and moral values of Christ. What is projected here in human consciousness is an *eidetic vision*: i.e., a Transfiguration of Humanity or *Totus Homo Phaenomenicus* (the Whole Man as a phenomenological reality), as Paul VI said in his last talk to the bishops at Vatican II. What the council fathers have done here in an *artistic, iconographical way* is to project the Church, the Mystical Body, as a Great People-Sacrament of Christ.

In Schillebeeckx's thought (as well as that of Vatican II) the theme of the sacraments as dimensions or facets of *mystery* plays an important role. Although originally stimulated by Odo Casel's phenomenological analysis of Greek mystery religions and Christian liturgy, Schillebeeckx—more focused on the bible and the church fathers—concluded that the significance of the liturgy lay in the way in which it pointed to something that lay outside the ritual: i. e., the mystery of Christ is the primordial sacrament whereby all the other sacraments are understood. This style of reflection, essentially that used to formulate *Lumen Gentium*, is a fusion of Casel's existential phenomenology with Aquinas' theology of the sacraments. Thus, there are nine sacraments: the well-known seven, the Church as the Sacrament of Christ, and Christ as the Sacrament of God. (I can only assume he is speaking analogically here.) Schillebeeckx advances his argument somewhat lyrically by pointing out that God had truly become man in Christ and that He is pre-eminently a human God, a *Deus humanissimus*. Yet more, a "humanization of God" took place in Christ: "God himself is man" and allows himself to be known as God in the form of a concrete human life. Christ, then, is the *primordial sacrament* of the encounter with God, a "hypostatic sacrament," the manifestation and revelation of God, the supreme representative of mankind. In this type of incarnational spirituality Christ functions as a *concrete universal,* the paradigm of a new humanity, exemplifying the dynamic interaction of divinity and humanity.

Even though such stylistics were incorporated into the constitution *Lumen Gentium*, I find it hard to believe that such a radical theological attitude shift originally inspired the mind of John XXIII when he convoked the council. *In Humanae Salutis* (1961) he wrote: "The Christian community is ... in great part transformed and renewed." Due to the Signs of the Times his major concerns were focused on the danger of nuclear war, the corruption of moral values by atheistic materialism and the conspicuous consumption by the wealthy, and the critical need to ameliorate poverty on a global basis. It seems, in short, that John XXIII was not looking for a great speculative development in Christian humanism but a down-to earth demonstration model of the Church as the Good Samaritan trying to remedy the problems of a world in crisis. The Pope's lasting heritage regarding such issues is his final encyclical *Pacem in Terris* (1963), a phenomenological reflection largely the work of Pietro Pavan.

The above ideas were not the priorities of Northern European theologians, such as Schillebeeckx, who had been working with the phenomenological tradition for over a half-century. In their minds the Church was *not* "transformed and renewed." Its style of doctrinal and moral reflections was locked into a neoscholastic conceptualism

which modern intellectuals neither understood nor respected. Its rigid doctrinal and moral system made little allowance for cultural adaptation and dialogical openness. The authority structure of pope and curia needed to be more respectful of the local bishop's authority. And certainly, a more open attitude had to be developed regarding birth control and the decisions of personal conscience. In such a socio-cultural context theologians like Schillebeeckx were intent on transforming the Council from being a handbook of doctrinal statements into a great historical EVENT, a liberating EXODUS leaving behind forever the antiquated authoritarianism and rigid conceptualism of the past.

We are now into some very serious business on a slippery slope. Schillebeeckx never appreciated the infectious dynamic of the Council as resident in its concrete documents. In his opinion the very composition of the Council's membership forestalled any return to the theology of the past: 63% of the bishops thought in existentialist terms whereas 37% thought in essentialist terms. This had an important impact on the achievements and meaning of Vatican II. In 1964 Schillebeeckx said:

> [T]his Council ... in all kinds of areas [produces] such openness that after it the church can begin to live at an accelerated pace: so much will burst out that—and this seems to me to be the wonderful thing about this Council—in *fifteen years it will already seem antiquated*, though compared with the time before the Council it represents a greater step forward than to my knowledge any Council has ever taken [emphasis added].

Schillebeeckx considered the main achievement of the Council to be the rediscovery of Christianity as an EVENT. This insight regarding the salvation-historical character of the Christian faith—developed by theologians in the 1950s—became a living dynamism in the Church by way of Vatican II. This dynamic, as a theology of culture, swept people up into the Council as a pastoral reality experienced by way of a new doctrinal sensitivity.

It was in this frame of mind that Schillebeeckx opined that the Council would stand or fall on what was to become the Pastoral Constitution *Gaudium et Spes*. The bishops had finally gotten around to dealing with the concrete pastoral problems which John XXIII had outlined in *Humanae Salutis* and *Pacem in Terris*. Rather than seeing this document as an attempt to confront would problems in a creative way, Schillebeeckx pointed to "the sanctifying tendency towards secularization in the church," and a tendency of the world *to become the church*. However ambiguous these ideas may be, they are rooted in a psychological change in Schillebeeckx's outlook on religion itself:

> Religion now is none other than the experience of the depth-dimension of our life, but at the same time as a relief of our existence-in-the-world. Religion is thus a depth meaning, a fine sense of the deepest and most silent in all things, in ourselves and in others: God's ultimate presence which is a giving and getting, attractive, ever-active presence. Prayer is none other than the meaningful experience of this situation.

Spoken like a true phenomenologist...

Toward the end of this first volume Borgman makes a very good point: the biography of a theologian has to be a biography of thinking, seeking and finding God, of living-as-a-theologian, and one's own biography must take the form of a *theological autobiography*. This type of biography can be implicitly stated in one's preaching, writing, or actions. In Schillebeeckx's case his reflections on human experiences would project his individual biography or personhood. At Vatican II the Council's group reflections on human experiences, both *ad intra* and *ad extra*, project the *corporate biography* or personhood of the Church. In both cases the finalized hermeneutics serve as a mirror of the true image being reflected. In Vatican II's case where human experience reflects the Glorified Christ, we have a Transfiguration of Humanity. In Schillebeeckx's case, due to his shifting mindstyle, I have no firm grasp of his inner vision. Borgman gives us some hints about this when he briefly discusses Schillebeeckx's apostolate after the Council. In my opinion, however, his shift to theology as a historical enterprise is a most precarious one. This shift does not betoken the technocratic hermeneutics of scripture studies but the philosophical hermeneutics of intellectuals such as Hans-Georg Gadamer.

After the Council, according to Borgman, Schillebeeckx began to detach himself from his earlier theology due to his reflections on secularization and the cultural dominance of pluralism. He got himself enmeshed in the phenomenological problem of the "presence and absence" of God. While in the grip of

this rethinking of his starting-point, he not only abandoned the phenomenological teachings of his teacher Dominicus De Petter, OP, but also the Thomistic principles which had guided his thought up to the Council. Eventually he ended up focusing on the bible within the ambit of biblical scholarship. Borgman seems to think that scriptural hermeneutics replaced the role that De Petter's philosophy exercised on the early Schillebeeckx. It may profit us to remember a basic principle of hermeneutics: *no single interpretation* exhausts the significance of texts, things, events or happenings. This principle launches us into the Age of Dialogue (Relativism?) with a vengeance, and foreshadows the Church as a democracy. In such a context Vatican II could easily be "the last of the Councils." We must await the second volume of Borgman's superlative biography to find out how such principles impacted on Schillebeeckx's mind and actions.

Book Reviews

Priest: Portraits of Ten Good Men Serving the Church Today, by Michael S. Rose, Manchester, NH.: Sophia Institute Press, 2003. x + 185, softcover $14.95

Reviewed by John Adam Moreau, Ph.D, Richmond, VA

I closed this fine book grateful for its power to humble and to inspire and more than ever starkly aware of the decline and confusion of Roman Catholicism

Author Rose is widely respected for his pungent essays and for books such as *Goodbye, Good Men,* about the scandalous state of North American seminaries, and *Ugly as Sin: Why They Changed Our Churches from Sacred Places to Meeting Spaces—And How We Can Change Them Back Again.*
The context I bring to this review is that of a WASP (white Anglo Saxon Papist) cradle Catholic,66, who as a Tridentine Latin mass advocate has joined with those who have circled the wagons in the face of liturgical and other wreckage since Vatican II.

Like many I tend to see the worst in the current crisis of Roman Catholicism. If these 10 priests do, they disguise such unease by slogging through each day with a routine of self-effacement,offering the sacraments and trying to help their sheep be good.

I read these priests as both chagrined and humiliated by the sins of disgraced priests. To a man they are convinced that those who have crashed and burned did so because both they and their superiors grew indifferent to their spiritual lives.

Repeatedly these 10 priests are, without sneering or self-congratulation, convinced the ruin of the fallen priests is related to a fondness for comfort; avidity for career advancement in the church; to what one of Rose's priests calls a priest's self-parody of himself; to having suffered too little; being too busy with nonessentials, and to laziness and indifference. That is, they were like many of us laymen.

A compelling aspect of the book is how distinctive his subjects are in their accomplishments and how interesting and likeable they are in their fine points and shortcomings. Fr Albert E. Lauer, for instance, overcame all sorts of obstacles in the Cincinnati slums and obstacles set up at diocesan headquarters. When his car conked out for good one day he hitch hiked the rest of the way to visit the hospitalized. Before he could buy another car he found that he was routinely and easily getting rides and so he never got another car. Father already had embraced poverty of the soul and rather than seeing him as a flake we recognize in him the priests in our lives we have loved and love today for being not only good priests but being better prople than most of us. Cleric Lauer is kind but not touchy-feely and he is a tough guy about serious things. "The presentation of the Gospel message," says he, "is not an optional contribution for the Church. It's the duty incumbent on her by the command of Jesus, so that people can believe. It is the truth." I rather liked to think of him growing into wise old age, puffing on a pipe, elbow patches on his sweater, visited by admirers, called on to conduct retreats, reading late into the night, playing his favoite CDs, hearing confessions. Wrong. As I write this review I am as I was when I got to that page—my heart is in my throat. Fr Lauer died a young man, of cancer, in mean digs, saying mass in his bed almost to the end. From that page I went back to one of Rose's themes. Rose writes: "It has taken a series of formidable sex scandals, unprecedented in modern times, to bring many of the well-meaning to their senses, to acknowledge the stark reality. The priesthood is more than worth defending. But it's worth defending for what it is and ought to be." Even knowing there are many splendid priests beyond Fr Lauer and Rose's other nine, it is obvious how over-all they are a scarce breed amid the decline and confusion of our belovedchurch. It won't spoil

this book for you as a good read if I give you some snapshots of some of the writer's other chapters. Think of a priest who:

—Was run out of Princeton because of his orthodoxy and who makes a good case that college is the most important chaplaincy nowadays.

—Was just one of two clerics sent after the collapse of the USSR to minister to Catholics in the Russian Far East, in size larger than the USA.

—Lives in the skin of a soldier because he once was himself a soldier. So he knows he must be aleader. He is not a psychologist or sociologist, he says, but a priest. A priest who leads, he says, gives mlitary men the "love of Christ, the medicine of Christ." Such a leader, he says, helps Catholic soldiers "understand the teachings of the Catholic Church and assists them in every wayto accept those teachings and to live by them."

—Was exiled to the sticks for his orthodoxy and there revived physically and spiritually a despoiled parish, and later in Detroit befriended a literally stinking street bum. As it turned out the derelict had a history of performing opera and helped make the pianist priest's music program exceptional.

—Simply doesn't pal around and get all folksy with his parishioners but pours out himself in service to their needs, screwups, joys, fears.

—Because he was a 7/24/365 chaplain in Covington, KY, who never went without wearing his collar, brought police officers into or back to the church.

—Balks at the slightest suggestion that a priest at mass should be a talk show host or anentertainment czar.

And, finally, who:

—Finds it a curious idea that any priest would think his opinions would be considered more important than his being an obedient priest. As I read *Priests,* I was surprised by many of these men saying that often the empty of heart come home to Rome because they are captured by "the beauty of Catholic worship." I had to think hard and stare earnestly at my own habitual peevishness about New Order liturgy ut it. There is considerable anecdoctal evidence on how very much marginalized, how very much likeceremonial parsley many priests, even with the shortage, have come to feel themselves to be inthe wake an often ravaged liturgy and the gaggle of showoff laymen trotting around thesanctuary. Light bulb time. Bingo! The very lives Rose's priests lead automatically keep them from beingmarginalized. We aren't told what they think of present day liturgy and liturgial quarrels. Weonly know they believe and preach and teach what the church teaches about what happens atmass and they ferventlty want their lambs to have that food. I conclude that somemthing extra is happening and it is that when these good priests say masstheir exceptionalness makes the liturgy beautiful to the people they are serving. For us laymen, for clergy, and especially for teenagers, this book is an implicit handbook onhow to be a priest. It also is a treatise on why we laymen must be ever more vigilent in esteeming our priests, supporting them, understanding them, and obeying them when it is right to do so. Seen this way we can rejoice that there are men like the Dominican, James Mary Sullivan, whohas no puzzlement about his vows. He says poverty, chastity and obedience have given him a happy life. We can rejoice also in Fr Eduard (yes, editor, that spelling) Perrone, who tells a wouldbe to notseek the priesthood if he is a "wimp." He says of wannabe's: "This is a time for fighters."

The Roots of Science and its Fruits, by Peter E. Hodgson, London: The Saint Austin Press, 2002. 222pp.

Reviewed by Joseph M. De Torre, University Professor Emeritus, Social and Political Philosophy, University of Asia and the Pacific, Philippines

Little did Aquinas suspect, when he wrote *In librum Boethii de Trinitate* in mid-13th century that he was providing the "magic formula" or theoretical formulation of the scientific method for the breakthrough in modern physics in all its ever multiplying branches. In a lengthy discussion on the classification of all the sciences (q.5, aa. I and 3), he came to the conclusion that mathematics, applied to empirical observation and experimentation, was the key to open the human mind to all the secrets of the physical or "natural" world, namely what Newton would later call "natural philosophy" in his epoch-making *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica* (1687).

Aquinas was not however, alone in reaching this insight: his contemporaries Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon in Oxford were also on the move in the beginnings of modern mathematical physics, with an earlier pioneer in John Philoponus. Thus science received a notable thrust in the following centuries with Richard of Middleton, John Buridan and Nicolas Oresme in Paris, hence-forward reaching up to Nicolas of Cusa, Leonardo da Vinci, Nicholas Copernicus, Johann Kepler, Tycho Brahe, Gaileo Galilei, and so forth, in a dazzling escalation of discoveries. But not for nothing did Newton affirm that in the field of science, and its interaction with technology, "we are standing on the shoulders of giants".

Two outstanding scholars of our time, Stanley L. Jaki and Peter E. Hodgson, have both of them based

their parallel works on the research of the French historian of science, Pierre Duhem. In the book under review, Prof. Hodgson, a prestigious nuclear physicist from Oxford University and member of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, reports:

"Duhem was born in Paris in 1861 and studied at the Ecole Normale. He soon established his scientific reputation by studies of thermodynamics and is widely known through his derivation of the Gibbs-Duhem equation. He also had a long standing interest in the history of mechanics, and was invited to write a series of articles on the subject. He followed the story from the Renaissance back to its medieval roots, and became aware of a continuous development through the Middle Ages. He studied the works of Leonardo da Vinci, and found that he obtained many of his ideas from medieval thinkers. Delving into dusty manuscripts in the Sorbonne, he found evidence of intense intellectual activity during the Middle Ages, and a leading part was played by the masters of the Paris schools, particularly John Buridan and Nicholas Oresme.

"Making use of the earlier work, and taking into account the Catholic doctrine of creation, Buridan criticized Aristotle's ideas about motion and developed his impetus theory. His ideas were widely published and strongly influenced the subsequent development of mechanics.

"Duhem told this story in a series of books: *The Evolution of Mechanics* (1903), *The Origin of Statics* (1905), *Studies of Leonardo da Vinci* in three volumes (1906-13) and finally the ten monumental volumes of *The Structure of the World* (1906-59). All this was done in addition to his main activity as a professor of physics.

"Duhem's demonstration of the importance of medieval thought, and particularly of the close connection between the rise of science and Catholic Theology, was not welcomed by the anti-clerical establishment of the Third Republic, or by the rationalist and secularists who dominated at he historiography of science and they saw to it that his work was virtually ignored. Tragically, Duhem died in 1916 at the age of 55, leaving the last five volumes of *The Structure of the World* in manuscript. The publishers and the secularists were determined to prevent their publication because they knew that it demolished their beliefs about the Middle Ages. There followed a long battle, and it was not until 1954 that Duhem's daughter Hél ne and some of his friends finally succeed in forcing their publication.

"Duhem is considered to be the founder of the history of science, and in the years since his death there have been many studies of the medieval science by Alastrair Crombie, Anneliese Maier, Marshall Clagett, Edward Grant, Ernest Moody and others that have substantially confirmed his work, though naturally correcting it in some details.

"Duhem also worked on the philosophy of science and his book on The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory is well known. He maintained that the principal task of a scientific theory is to represent in mathematical terms and experimental laws as simply and exactly as possible, while insisting on the need for common sense to provide assurance about the reality of the world." (pp. 82-83)

For his part, Prof. Jaki, aside from his *Uneasy Genius: The Life and Work of Pierre Duhem* (Matinus Nijhoff, 1984) has not failed to mention in his various works the debt owed to Etienne Gilson for the abundant scholarly evidence of the astonishing creativity of the Middle Ages in all the branches of learning, including modern science. And in addition to historians of science mentioned by Hodgson in the quote, another important work ought to be cited, J. F. C. Hearnshaw (ed.), *Medieval Contributions to Modern Civilization* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1921).

The subtitle of the book under review explicates the title: *The Christian Origin of Modern Science and its Impact on Human Society.* The author tackles this central theme, which he has been demonstrating since the 70's, in CH. 18: "How did Science begin?"

"Are there beliefs about the world," he writes, "that must be held before science can begin? Introspection suggests that the would-be scientist must believe that the world is interesting and that it is worthwhile trying to understand it. For science to be possible, the world must behave in a consistent way, for otherwise what we find out one day world not be true on the next. Thus it must be rational and orderly, but not in the same way as mathematics, for then we would try to find out about it by pure thought. We need to believe that the order in the world is not unique; it could be otherwise, so that to find out how it actually is we must make experiments. These are some of the beliefs it seems must be held before science can begin.

"It is generally believed that modern science began during the Renaissance, but the French physicist-historian Pierre Duhem found that there is a continuous development going back much earlier, into the High Middle Ages. At that time the fundamental beliefs were those of Christian theology, and it is notable that these beliefs are just those listed above as necessary for the development of science. They believed that the world is good and therefore worthy of study because it was made by God. The world is orderly because it shares His rationality, but it is not a necessary order. They also believed that we must try to understand the

world, and then use our knowledge to improve our conditions of life.

"Thus people in the Middle Ages had all the beliefs about the material world that are necessary for science to grow and develop. The most basic science is physics, and the most basic problem in physics is the motion of particles. A philosopher in Paris, John Buridan, was thinking about the motion of projectiles and why they continue to move even after they have left the thrower. The Christian belief in the creation of the world from nothing gave him the idea that in the beginning God gave the projectiles a certain impetus that remained in the projectiles and kept them going. This is the concept that we now know as momentum, and eventually Buridan's idea became Newton"s First Law of Motion. Thus we see the detailed connection between the Christian beliefs about the material world and the origin of science.

"The ideas of Buridan and his pupil Oresme spread to other universities and were familiar to the Rennaissance scientists who finally succeeded in showing how motions could be described mathematically in a consistent way. This culminated in the work of Newton, who combined the rationalism of Descartes with the empiricism of Bacon to develop his theory of motion. With his three laws, together with the principle of gravitational attraction, he showed how terrestrial and celestial motions can be treated in a unified way, and the motions of the moon and the planets calculated to high accuracy. This established science as a self-sustaining enterprise that is still growing today. As we do our scientific work, we can remember the origin of the beliefs on which it is based." (pp. 47-48).

Prof. Hodgson goes on to display an impressive parade of scientists up to out time. Two dozen scientists are reviewed quite in detail, followed by a long section on the development of nuclear physics (his specialty) and its impact on society with its ethical and cultural implications. This is followed by a section on "the philosophy of science,",and a final one on "the Church and Science".

One point I would like to take issue on is regarding the way Prof. Hodgson claims that Newton synthesized the rationalism of Descartes with the empiricism of Francis Bacon. The fact is that Descartes had started discrediting the senses (empiria) as they way for the mind to contact reality, while Bacon (not to be confused with Roger Bacon) regarded the senses as the only avenue to reality. Newton was wise enough to follow the Scholastic doctrine that knowledge begins with the senses but goes beyond into abstractions, both mathematical (physics) and transsensible (metaphysical). Newton's position moved Kant to criticize both pure rationalism and pure empiricism. Be that as it may, the real scientific method, formulated by Aquinas as explained above, ignored both Descartes (affirming the senses) and Bacon (affirming mathematics), and ensured the breakthrough of modern science. I have explained this point at length in Contemporary Philosophical Issues in Historical Perspective (Pasig City, Philippines: University of Asia and the Pacific, 2001), Ch. 13. By accepting both mathematics (rejected by Bacon) and empirical observation (rejected by Descartes), Aquinas had both secured the breakthrough in physics and the metaphysical knowledge of the human person as the basis for ethics. Thus, be secured the foundation of the unique dignity of both the human person and the nobility of the natural sciences at the service of both the human person, without falling into the subsequent scientism or "positivism" of the Vienna Circle. Thus, he reaffirmed the nobility of science and technology without falling into the worship of either.

We can conclude the review of this very valuable book with a quotation of John Paul II:

> "Scientists today often recognize the need to maintain a distinction between the mind and the brain, or between the person acting with free will and the biological factors which sustain his intellect and capacity to learn. In this distinction, which need not be a separation, we can see the foundation of that spiritual dimension proper to the human person which biblical Revelation explains as a special relationship with God the Creator (cf. Genesis 2:7) in whose image and likeness every man and woman is made."
> (cf. Genesis 1:26-27).
>
> *Address to Pontifical Academy of Sciences, November 10, 2003.*

An Introduction to the Love of Wisdom: An Essential and Existential Approach to Philosophy. By James A. Harold. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 2004.

Review by D. Q. McInerny, Professor of Philosophy, Our Lady of Guadalupe Seminary, Lincoln, NE

There is always a need for a good textbook which can be used in an introductory course in philosophy, and Professor James Harold's An Introduction to the Love of Wisdom succeeds in meeting that need in many significant ways. The book seeks to be comprehensive in its treatment of philosophy; it provides the student with an impressive overview of the discipline as a whole, but gives special emphasis to the fields of metaphysics and ethics. The guiding purpose of the book is to present the fundamentals of philosophy, both the ideas and the methodology, in a way that brings the discipline into immediate contact with everyday life. This is the mark of the author's "ex-

istential approach." One of the signal strengths of the book is to be found in the clarity and straightforwardness of its style, a most happy feature, and one which is not always to be found, unfortunately, in philosophical writing. There are any number of topics in the book which are handled especially well, such as, for example, Professor Harold's treatments of the principle of identity and of ethical relativism. His critique of sociology is crisp and perspicacious. His detailed presentation of two of the traditional proofs for the existence of God, the proof from contingent being and the proof from finality in nature (the Third and Fifth Ways of St. Thomas) is in the main competently and even forcefully done.

The "Dictionary of Terms" at the back of the book is a helpful addendum, especially for students who are tyros in philosophy. Another addendum which would be of no little aid to such students is an essay entitled, "How to Write a Philosophy Paper." In it Professor Harold lays out a sound set of directives for the beginner, providing advice relating to the basic mechanics of writing a good paper, but also, and more importantly, showing the student what it means to think philosophically. Each chapter in the book is followed by a list of "Discussion Questions" which are particularly noteworthy for their comprehensiveness and rich suggestiveness. They are "challenging" in all the best ways, provocative of genuinely productive lines of thought. Through these question Professor Harold provides his readers with an object lesson in the art of philosophical inquiry. Students are invited to examine critically a wide variety of positions and points of view, not excluding those proposed by the author himself.

Perhaps the focal chapter in the book is the third, "The Basics of Being," in which Professor Harold delineates the fundamental principles of metaphysics. There are, in my view, in this chapter and beyond, some rather serious problems that are integral to arguments on which the book centrally depends, and I would like, in the spirit of fraternal philosophical dialogue, address them here. If in what follows I may at times appear to get a bit overly rambunctious, it is not because I seek to be contentious simply for the sake of being contentious. Philosophy, after all, is serious business, and it should be take seriously, and the ideas under discussion here are far from trivial, going to the very heart, as I believe, of what constitutes a sound philosophy.

Professor Harold is willing to attribute more worth, and success, to the philosophy of Rene Descartes than it deserves. A specific and, needless to say, crucially important issue which is dealt with in the book is the question of the real existence of the external world. Is there a real world out there, or is it all in my head? The real existence of the external world was, of course, one of the things Descartes brought himself to doubt. Professor Harold writes: "What Descartes ends up destroying with his methodological doubt is the absolute certitude we have of the objectivity of the external world. Oddly enough, however much sympathy we have for St. Thomas's position, it seems very difficult to refute Descartes' argument." In point of fact, what Descartes ends up destroying with his methodological doubt is nothing else than the philosophical efficacy of methodological doubt. He could properly be said to have destroyed absolute certitude regarding the objectivity of the external world only for those who are prepared to deny that the self-evident is in fact self-evident. It is by no means difficult to refute Descartes, for he offers nothing demanding refutation. There is no argument. Systematically to doubt things that one once accepted without doubt is not to demonstrate that those things are in fact doubtful. More precisely, simply to deny that the self-evident is such in no way demonstrates that the self-evident is anything other than the self-evident. What we have here is a situation in which a doubter does nothing more than make public certain private mental exercises he has engaged in.

Descartes' point of departure for his methodological doubt is his almost gratuitous contention that sense knowledge is untrustworthy. I say "almost gratuitous" because in this case he does at least make an attempt to offer something like proofs in support of his contention. But they are anything but compelling. Indeed, they backfire on him, and end by showing the essential trustworthiness of his senses, for he must rely on his senses to show the senses are supposedly unreliable. You cannot kick against the goad. And as for Descartes's apparently serious concern over whether he was awake or dreaming, about which much has been made, there is no effort on Descartes' part to employ anything like philosophic demonstration to settle the issue. One would have supposed that, if a person had serious doubts as to whether, here and now, he was awake or dreaming, he would take pains to resolve the doubt philosophically. For example, he might say: "Let me suppose that I am dreaming right now. What would follow, or what would also have to be the case, if my dreaming were to be the case?" And then he would attempt systematically to work out some satisfactory answers to that question. What success such an effort might yield is itself an interesting question, but the point is Descartes made no such effort. He simply poses a question–How do I know I am not

dreaming right now?–and expects the question to be accepted as reflecting a serious philosophical position. It is nothing of the kind. A question is not an argument. The only proper response to the question is, How do you know you are not awake right now? The confusion should work both ways. Arguments deserve argumentative responses, silly questions should be responded to with silly questions.

Professor Harold seems sufficiently persuaded by Cartesian reasoning to allow him to aver that, "We only have a practical certainty with respect to the existence of the external world." A practical certainty, he explains, is one with respect to which "a skeptical doubt is theoretically possible." Nonetheless, the certainty in question is just that, and one for which we can thank Rene Descartes. The supposition behind the claim made here is that Descartes succeeded in executing a critical move in his reasoning, a move that was intended by him to eradicate doubt and to restore to him an external world that need no longer be doubted. Let us recall that critical move. Descartes eventually came to see that the morass of doubt into which he had plunged himself as the result of the relentless application of his method was something from which he was powerless to extricate himself. He needed outside help. He had succeeded in doubting, among a raft of other things, his own body, the external world of course, and–rather amazingly, given the formidable mathematician that he was–even the seemingly perfect invulnerability of simple arithmetical statements. He convinced himself that he could, with a straight face, even doubt that 2 + 2 = 4, for how did he know that his mind was not being manipulated by a malign spirit, who was convincing him that 2 + 2 = 4 when in fact 2 + 2 = 5. Thus the father of modern philosophy at work.

What Descartes did, to free himself from the prison house of doubt in which he had incarcerated himself, was to appeal to divine assistance. He had to be assured that he was not a helpless pawn in the hands of a malign spirit, but rather that he lived in a friendly universe which was the creation, along with himself, of an all good and benevolent God who could neither deceive nor be deceived. Descartes had to call upon God for assistance, as the single antidote against the poison of doubt. (It was concerning this point that Blaise Pascal accused Descartes of effectively using God as a deus ex machina, simply a means by which he attempted to salvage his philosophy.) But before he could call upon God for assistance he had to prove that there was a God to call upon. And here is the critical move in his philosophy, upon which, by his own admission, the success or the failure of that philosophy would absolutely depend. Everything rested on the success of his attempt to prove the existence of God. Actually, he made two attempts, both of which are to be found in his Meditations. One of them is his version of the classical "ontological argument," which finds its most powerful expression in St. Anselm's Proslogion.. The other is very much like the ontological argument, in the salient fact that both of them start in the same place: in the mind of Rene Descartes. As philosophical arguments they fail, and with them Cartesian philosophy fails. Why do they fail? In a word, because they do not demonstrate. Any true philosophical demonstration must begin in the public arena, with data, facts, which are self-evidently true for all parties to the argument. Both of Descartes' putative demonstrations for the existence of God begin with an idea in Descartes' mind, to which he alone has access. If Descartes offers us no real demonstration, then he leaves us without the critical certitude we would need regarding the existence of an all good, non-deceiving God, and without that pivotal certitude we could have no certitude, practical or otherwise, of the existence of the external world. Cartesianism, as a philosophy, offers no relief for those who think that the reality of the external world constitutes a real problem. It first manufactures the problem, then exacerbates it. Far from providing us with an efficacious beginning for philosophizing, Cartesianism spells the end of all philosophy. As Etienne Gilson repeatedly and tellingly argued, the philosopher who begins with doubt inevitably ends with doubt.

And yet Professor Harold would seem to believe that there is something to be said in favor of the cogito. For him, among other things, it "demonstrates real existence," and is a source "of a theoretical, absolute certainty." More generally, he acknowledges what he calls the "the reasonability of Descartes' position." It must be stressed that Professor Harold takes great pains in the book to establish what he takes to be a sound case for the real existence of the objective world, and that his favoring of Cartesian reasoning is in no way to be construed as a capitulation to scepticism. But what does not seem to be sufficiently appreciated is that Cartesianism, rather than being a remedy for scepticism, is a recipe for it. He contends that, "It is this cogito ("I think") which enables him [Descartes] to overcome his methodological doubt and constitutes his reply to the skeptics." But how might this be so? All that the cogito "proves" is (a) the existence of Descartes, and (b) for Descartes alone. Why should a purely subjective exercise impress any serious-minded sceptic, whose doubts, if he enjoys reasonable psychological health, are directed, not at his own

existence, but at the existence of external things? I wrote "proves" rather than proves above to indicate that there is something deeply disconcerting, from both a psychological and philosophical point of view, in the need that any person might feel to convince himself, by argument, that he exists. The emperor is naked, and the self-evident self needs no proof. Anything can be doubted, just as anything can be denied. The question is, Is it rational to do so?

While there are many commendable things to be found in those parts of the book that are dedicated to ethical matters, certain obscurities and uncertainties which are found there could have been avoided, it seems to me, by a more steady reliance on those modes of reasoning, and on the tried and true terminology, which are associated with the classical way of doing ethics that comes out of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. Ethics, as we know, is a science which, given its subject matter, is able to gain only a certain degree of precision, not with regard to its first principles, to be sure, but with regard to the application of those principles to specific cases. This being true, we should, in ethics, opt for the most precise terminology available to us. The key term favored by Professor Harold, "values," around which his ethical thought is built, is freighted with an ambiguity which hangs heavily over his discussions despite his earnest and commendable attempts to dissipate it. He writes that "ethics is a discipline grounded in values and principles known a priori." Though certainly not intended as such, this is a formula which could easily serve the purposes of a purely subjectivistic ethics.

Besides those treated above, there are a number of additional issues raised by the book which merit extended discussion, but so as not unduly to prolong an already lengthy review, in what follows I will simply set down several quotations from the author and then offer brief responses to them. Each quotation may be taken to be representative of patterns of thought that receive developed treatment in the book.

–"The existence of the world does not overcome Descartes's methodological doubt." Descartes' methodological doubt overcomes itself, in the sense that, as a method, it is a philosophical non-starter. The existence of the world can rest easy. It is under no threat; it need feel no obligation to overcome anything.

–"Rather, the claim is that because the existence of the spatio-temporal world is not grounded in its essence it is not, strictly speaking, absurd to doubt its existence."

On what basis is one entitled to make the (quite true) claim that the spatio-temporal world is not grounded in its essence? It is only by comparing that world, and its mode of existence, with the existence of something whose existence is of an entirely different kind, that is, whose existence is grounded in its essence. That kind of existence would, of course, apply only to God, of whom we know that His essence is "to be," or, to put it differently, that His essence and existence are one. But how do we come by such knowledge? Only through revelation. That is the sort of knowledge which philosophy could never arrive at just as philosophy, that is, through the exercise of natural reason alone. The philosopher, then, just as philosopher, cannot know that the spatio-temporal world is not grounded in its essence. For all he knows, as philosopher, the spatio-temporal world could be grounded in its own essence, and therefore he has no reason to doubt its existence. The ancient Greeks had no problem with an external world which was not only indubitably there, but eternal as well.

–"On the other hand, this does not imply that St. Thomas's assumption about the existence of the world is all that inappropriate, especially in those cultural circumstances where skepticism is not an issue."

I think it safe to say that St. Thomas did not assume the existence of the world; he took it as self-evident. This historicist way of looking at things makes it sound as if St. Thomas's unhesitant and eminently sane recognition of the real existence of the world was somehow culturally conditioned, a reflex response peculiar to the citizens of the 13th century. And is it suggested that had St. Thomas lived in the 17th century he perhaps would have looked at things differently, and even have adopted the cogito? St. Thomas was no stranger to the reality and dangers of scepticism. And might we say, with Descartes in mind, that scepticism becomes an "issue" for a philosopher only when he succumbs to it?

—"I am going to explain and defend the thesis that the soul is substantially distinct from the body."

The soul is not substantially distinct from the body in the sense that it is an independent substance, with the body being regarded as another independent substance. This was the position taken by Descartes. A human being is a single substance, composed of the incomplete substances of body and soul. The rational soul is the substantial form of a human being; as such it establishes the human being's individuality and unique identity. If body and soul were distinct substances, then there would be, for the human being, insuperable problems relating to individual identity.

—"Perhaps the animal soul is nothing but a certain property of the body, without there being a substantial dif-

ference between the two."

To assume that the animal soul is a property of the body is in effect to adopt the position of mechanistic materialism, a position that seeks to discount immaterial reality (such as the animal soul) and to reduce everything to matter. The animal soul is the substantial form of the body, determining it as a live thing. (Professor Harold has the practice of employing the term "property" where "accident" would serve him better. All properties are accidents, but not all accidents are properties. Property is a specific type of accident. In any event, the soul could be considered neither an accident nor a property of the body.)

—"If the logical positivists are right, and all knowledge really is given to us by the senses, then philosophy becomes subservient to the empirical sciences and in the end becomes disconnected from reality."

As it turns out, on this point the logical posivitists have it right, for all human knowledge begins with the senses. In a very important respect, philosophy should be considered to be neither subservient, nor superior, to the empirical sciences, for, as to their beginnings, they find themselves on precisely the same level. They both begin with sense knowledge. The surest way for philosophy to become disconnected from reality is to begin with ideas, rather than with things in the external world that ideas represent, things our initial encounter with which is through sense knowledge.

—"I claim that people can achieve a direct, intellectual intuition into the structure of these essences or natures. Since all these essence structures are known on the basis of an intellectual intuition, as opposed to sense perception, they are all known a priori."

This would seem to be more a description of an angelic rather than a human mode of knowing. All human knowledge can be said to be by way of indirection, in that we come to know the essences of things through abstraction, an abstraction entirely dependent upon sense knowledge. Professor Harold describes intellectual intuition as "prior to sense experience," and a priori knowledge as "not independent of all experience, but merely of empirical, sense experience." It is rather audacious to qualify sense experience with "merely," in that, without it, we human beings would be incapable of the highest kind of knowledge. Sense knowledge precedes intellectual knowledge. Pace Herr Professor Kant and all the other dedicated members of the fraternity of philosophical idealism, there is not for us human beings any a priori knowledge, if by that we mean, as did Kant, that we have knowledge which is not dependent upon sense knowledge. Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius furerit in sensu ("There is nothing in the intellect which is not first in the senses") is not an empty slogan; it is the very foundation stone of all realist epistemology. (The "essence structures" which are central to Professor Harold's thought are very much reminiscent of Platonic Forms.)

—"Rather he [the philosopher] goes into himself, into his own mind, to get at the general essence of the thing he is studying."

Reflective thought is one of the preeminent powers of the human intellect, and no man could be counted a serious philosopher who did not spend a lot of time turning over the ideas nesting in his mind. But those ideas, very much of the mind, do not have their originating source in the mind. The philosopher's first, and habitually repeated, regard must be for the external, not the internal world. He comes to know the essences of things principally by attending to those real existents that have essences. The human mind, darkened as it is by the effects of original sin, shows itself to be all too adept at constructing essences that are no more than things of the mind.

"When I come to see these ideas in my mind they are given to me as ideal and abstract and the being that grounds them is not given to me in the intuition of ideas. It is only on the basis of metaphysical reasoning that I see that everything that exists must be grounded in real being."

It would count as a critical misemphasis to speak of ideas as "given" to us. What is given to the mind is the data of sense experience, and from that the mind actively conceives ideas. It might be said that we give our ideas to ourselves. The being that grounds our ideas is indeed not given to us in the intuition of ideas, for the being in question here is real being, extra-mental being, our knowledge of which does not begin, but ends, with ideas. The implication behind the assertion that it is only through reasoning that we arrive at real being seems to be that we begin with ideas (which we gain through an intuition that circumvents sense knowledge), and end with real being. But this, epistemologically speaking, is to have the cart before the horse. We do not start with an idea, and then try to discover the real being that grounds the idea, i.e., the existent that the idea represents. It is real being which is the proper object of the human intellect. That is what we confront, or what confronts us, immediately; then, in response to real being, we conceive ideas about real being.

—"Thus, things like peace and happpiness are realities that cannot be directly willed as ends."

If this is so, then it would appear as if human action would have to

remain ultimately inexplicable. Concerning happiness in particular, if that cannot be willed as an end, the very possibility of living a moral life would be put in jeopardy.

—"No person can directly see his own moral character." "The author asserts that we cannot rightly judge the moral standing of anyone else, much less ourselves."

If these claims are true, it would seem that an efficacious examination of conscience would be rendered nugatory.

An *Introduction to the Love of Wisdom* is a book possessed of considerable virtues. That those virtues have their effectiveness hampered by the problems with which the book is beset is a state of affairs that could be remedied, I would like to suggest, by the insertion into the book of three additional chapters. Chapters on the philosophy of nature and epistemology would serve as immensely helpful lead-ins to the chapter on metaphysics, and a chapter on philosophical psychology would be very beneficial in lending sharper focus and more structural stability to the book's treatments of various ethical themes.

Getting it Straight: What Research Shows about Homosexuality, eds. Peter Sprigg and Timothy Dailey, Washington DC: Family Research Council, 2004, 143pp.

Review by Marie I. George, St. John's University, NY

Getting it Straight: What Research Shows about Homosexuality does exactly what the title promises to do. Rather than presenting us with the opinions of pro- or anti- homosexual groups, it informs us of the contents of research studies on a variety of questions concerning homosexuality, studies that have been published in professional journals and books. It does not make claims about morality, nor does it advocate positions on public policy. However, as the authors themselves observe, it is obvious that factual claims about homosexuality as substantiated by research often indicate moral and political stances that should be taken in its regard. For example, if it were true that homosexuality is harmless, "it would support the notion that government has no reason to penalize or otherwise disadvantage people who engage in homosexual behavior" (p. vii).

The book is very readable, and the authors are to be thanked for putting the references right under the quotations, sparing us the need to be continually searching for footnotes. If one was inclined to carp, there is a place or two where one might question the comparison was being made, e.g., one study speaks of 16% of HIV-positive homosexual men within a six month period failing at least once to inform an unaware partner of their HIV status. Is this failure rate peculiar to homosexual men or to HIV-positive promiscuous males in general? Overall, however, the authors are fair-minded in their use of statistics. Male homosexuality receives more extensive coverage, but this is not surprising since fewer studies have been done on female homosexuality (which is less common, and poses fewer serious health risks).

This book is a needed eye-opener for many people. So often I hear Christians reject the biblical condemnation of sodomy because of not wanting to appear judgmental. They know some "nice" gay couple, and feel who are they to speak against something that they do not really understand. This book will help such people better understand the true nature of homosexuality. Another group of people who would profit from this book are health care providers. I was amazed that a young doctor friend of mine, a good Christian, disputed my claim that many homosexual practices were harmful to one's health. Apparently, this was not something that was taught in medical school. A biologist friend of mine, too, blew off the notion that homosexuality carries with it serious health risks. Again, he knew the "nice" gay couple. If he is open to evidence, this book certainly provides it—thirty pages of facts like "most instances of anal cancer are caused by a cancer-causing strain of HPV [Human Papillomavirus] through receptive anal intercourse" (Dr. Andrew Grulich, p. 76) and "homosexuals acquired syphilis at a rate ten times that of heterosexuals" (Archive of Internal Medicine, p. 77). In case you didn't know, syphilis can cause "serious heart abnormalities, mental disorders, blindness, and death" if left untreated (p. 77).

I do not intend to comment on every chapter. However, to give you an overall idea of the content, here are the myths that the book intends to dispel: People are born gay; 10 percent of the population is gay; homosexuals are seriously disadvantaged by discrimination; homosexuality is healthy; children raised by homosexual suffer no harm; homosexuals are no more likely to molest children than heterosexuals.

Here are some of the points that particularly caught my attention. The first chapter presents studies concerning the causes of homosexuality. I was glad to see a more nuanced position than usual concerning the nature-nurture debate surrounding homosexuality. After the authors show that there is no convincing evidence so far of a "gay gene," they go on to consider a study concerning the effects on sexual behavior of increased or diminished exposure to

testosterone in the womb. This study showed that female rats exposed to a greater than ordinary amount of testosterone and male rats exposed to a less than ordinary amount were more likely to manifest homosexual behavior (p. 14). However, as the authors point out, human sexuality involves a far greater psychological component than does the mating of rodents. While another study concluded that what was true of rats did not hold for humans (p. 16), others indicated that human females with a chronic endocrine disorder that results in their being exposed to more male sex hormones in the womb were more likely to have a homosexual orientation (p. 15). It does not appear, however, that the exposure to the excessive amount of male sex hormones directly determines orientation. Rather, it results in the girls in question being more aggressive in late childhood, with the result that they prefer male-typical activities and male playmates, which in turn tends to make them regard themselves as different from other girls (p. 15). A similar line of reasoning is presented by other researchers who think it plausible that genes responsible for a child's temperament increase the likelihood that certain individuals experience same sex attractions, e.g., a boy who is physically weak, and of artistic temperament, may shun rough and tumble boys' play. This may lead him to regard members of his sex as unfamiliar and exotic, which subsequently becomes the basis for erotic attraction (p. 27). It is commonly thought that there are diseases that result from the interplay of genetic disposition and mental states elicited by consciously perceived events (e.g., it is thought that some individuals are pre-disposed to schizophrenia, but that its onset is triggered by extreme mental stress ensuing upon serious misfortunes), and so it would not be not surprising if the same was true of some cases of homosexual orientation. The latter way of thinking runs counter to the view of some conservatives who think it necessary at all costs to deny that any genetic factor is involved in homosexuality, for fear that then it would have to be considered natural. But this fear is unfounded, for just because something is caused by genes, does not necessarily mean that it is natural, in the sense of being the desired state of the organism. Genes also cause diseases, such as cystic fibrosis.

It is often the case that the same sort of human behavior is due to different underlying causes. Thus, it is not surprising that in addition to the explanations above which emphasize nature, there are other non-competing theories of why individuals are same-sex attracted that focus primarily on psychological factors. One theory is that normal sexual development for males requires that boys detach themselves from their mothers and identify themselves with their fathers. "Overly intimate mothers plus a detached, hostile or weak father is beyond doubt related to the development of male homosexuality" (Daniel Brown quoted p. 26). Another type of theory notes the high correlation between being sexually abused as a child and being homosexual, and hypothesizes that there is a causal connection. Yet another theory starts from an observed correlation between urbanization and homosexuality. Living in an urban area makes it easier to have contact with other homosexuals, and this in turn makes it easier to be aware of the gay lifestyle and to experiment with it. Homosexuality also correlates with being more educated. One suggested explanation is that people who go to college tend to engage in more sexual experimentation and be more liberal about sexual matters.

It was a breath of fresh air to see personal choice, and not just nature and/or nurture, recognized for the role it plays in a person's homosexuality: "Debates over homosexuality are often presented in terms of a false dichotomy--either a person is 'born gay,' or a person 'chooses to be gay.' The truth lies between these two extremes. For the most part, people do not choose what sexual feelings or attractions they experience. Each of us does, however, choose the sexual behaviors in which we engage...." (p. 34). While the authors could have pointed out that "being gay" is generally understood to indicate that a person engages in homosexual acts, whereas "having a homosexual orientation" simply indicates that a person is attracted to members of the same sex, still, they are right on target in asserting that a gay lifestyle is not automatic, but ultimately a matter of free choice.

One thing in chapter 1 which I found questionable is the view that homosexuality would have died out if it was genetic, since those who engage in exclusively homosexual sex do not reproduce. For there exist sex-linked diseases that affect male offspring to a greater extent than female offspring, some of which generally result in death before the age of sexual maturity (e.g., Duchenne's muscular dystrophy). These diseases are passed on by a heterozygous female carrier who does not have the disease. I fail to see why the same could not obtain in the case of male homosexuality.

Chapter 1 got me thinking about why homosexuality correlates inversely with belief in the afterlife (see World Congress of Families Online, 31 August 2004). This brought to mind the epistle to the Romans which speaks of atheists turning to unnatural sexual practices. Having recently read psychologist Paul Vitz's insightful book on the causes of athe-

ism, *Faith of the Fatherless*, I could not help noticing that a common factor offered to explain a number of cases of both atheism and homosexuality are an absent, distant, weak, or abusive father.

Chapter 2 discusses which individuals should be categorized as homosexual: Should homosexuality be determined on the basis of self-identification, desire, or behavior or other? One can get really different figures for the number of homosexuals in a population if one counts people who have had a single isolated homosexual experience. Whether one uses self-identification or behavior as criterion, approximately 2.4% of men and 1.3% of women in America are homosexuals. Why is an accurate count of the number of homosexuals important? If 10% of the population were homosexual, it would constitute circumstantial evidence that it was simply a normal natural variation.

Chapter 4 discusses the numerous health risks of homosexual activity. Included are observations concerning mental health and addictions. It is a curious and sad fact that a high percentage of homosexuals abuse drugs and alcohol. Homosexuals are also more prone to depression and attempt suicide more frequently. The gay community generally attributes these things to rejection by parents and by society at large, and there is no doubt that this is an important factor in many cases. However, these correlations occur even in places where homosexuality is widely accepted, such as the Netherlands. It is very unfortunate that political correctness discourages researchers from investigating the causes of the self-destructive tendencies so widespread among homosexuals. I fail to see how any objective person can continue to regard homosexual sex as a biologically normal and healthy behavior upon learning that: "In a major Canadian centre, life expectancy at age twenty for gay and bisexual men is eight to twenty years less than for all men." (Robert S. Hogg et al, quoted on p. 89)

As troubling as the health risks to homosexual individuals are, even more troubling is the number of innocent victims preyed on by homosexuals. One study found that 29% of the children of homosexual parents have been molested by their parent, as opposed to 0.6% of children of heterosexual parents (p. 112). Another fact that has bearing on whether homosexuals should be allowed to adopt children is the extremely high infidelity rate among homosexuals in "committed" relationships. Moreover, there is evidence that "monogamous" homosexuals are even more likely than other homosexual to engage in risky sexual behavior. How fair is it to entrust a child to gay parents, given their increased likelihood of separating, dying prematurely, or engaging in child abuse?

The final chapter is also distressing. Studies are cited showing that "although heterosexuals outnumber homosexuals by a ratio of at least 20 to 1, homosexual pedophiles commit about one-third of the total number of child sex offenses" (p. 126). This means that a homosexual is ten times more likely to be a pedophile than a heterosexual. Compounding the tragedy is that children who are sexually abused by a person of the same sex are more likely themselves to become homosexual, creating a repeating cycle of abused-abuser.

Getting it Straight has performed the important task of showing that a negative verdict on homosexual activity is not merely an opinion promoted by some on religious grounds, but is the conclusion any objective person arrives at by looking at the facts. *Getting it Straight* provides overwhelming documented evidence that male homosexual activity is neither healthy nor normal. The case of female homosexuality has been less studied, but what evidence there is points in the same direction. People who want to show compassion towards sexually active homosexual individuals need to tell them the truth about their lifestyle, instead of looking benignly on behavior that carries with it serious health risks and as well as being conducive of moral evil.

Introduction to Catholicism, A Complete Course and ***Our Moral Life in Christ, A Complete Course,*** both from **The Didache High School Textbook Series**, Midwest Theological Forum: Chicago, IL, (2003), 380 and 326 pp. Cloth, $30 each.

Review by (Rev.) Leonard Kennedy, C.S.B., The Academy of Our Lady Seat of Wisdom Barry's Bay, ON, Canada

The *Didache*, or *The Teaching of the Apostles*, was an anonymous but very important work written most probably before 100 A.D. It is not a large work, but it deals with many matters such as Christian morality, baptism, the Eucharist, prayer and fasting, missionaries and catechists, the Sunday observance, and the Last Days. Christian dogma is not imparted as such, but is, of course, implied in several precepts.

The two books reviewed here are two volumes of a four-volume high school religion course which has been named after this famous book of the early Church. The message in this is that, as the early *Didache* gave the teaching of the Apostles, this new *Didache* continues that same teaching; it accepts all the teaching which Christ gave to the Apostles to be safeguarded and developed throughout the ages, the teaching authenticated by the Magisterium of the Catholic

Church. The two remaining volumes (*The History of the Church: A Complete Course*, and *Understanding the Scriptures: A Complete Course on Bible Study)* will be available probably by the time this review is being read.

There is no differentiation between these books in relation to the grades of high school. It is left to school authorities to decide which book is suitable for which grade. But the *Introduction* will no doubt always be for grade nine.

The books are large, with strong binding and rich paper. They have hundreds of pictures in color, half of them religious pictures. The titles of the chapters of the *Introduction* are The Call to Holiness, Prayer, The Trinity, The Church, the Blessed Virgin, Revelation, The Old Testament, The New Testament, The Sacraments (in general and in particular), Freedom (Sin, Grace, Conscience), The Moral Virtues, The Commandments (in general and in particular), The Beatitudes.

The titles of the chapters of *Our Moral Life in Christ* are: Preliminary Notions, Moral Theology, Freedom and the Moral Act, The Moral Conscience, Ethical Norms and Law, Morality and Action, Sin and Conversion, The Ten Commandments and the Eight Beatitudes, The Social Teaching of the Church, and finally each of The Commandments.

At the end of each chapter are special sections titled Vocabulary (explaining the technical words in the chapter), Supplementary Readings (sometimes dealing with a saint or other holy person illustrating the topic), Study Questions, Practical Exercises, and From the Catechism (a page or more of relevant quotations from the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*). Occasionally there is an *Advanced Concepts* section also.

The books in the Series have the *Nihil Obstat* and *Imprimatur* of the Archdiocese of Chicago. And one cannot do better than to quote from the back of each book the nature of the Series: "The focus of the *Didache Series* is to sufficiently present, in a manner that is both comprehensive and accessible, the basic tenets of the doctrinal, scriptural, moral, and sacramental life of the Church. Accordingly, the books of this series rely on sources such as Sacred Scripture, the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, the lives of the saints, the Fathers of the Church, the *General Directory for Catechesis*, and the teaching of Vatican II as witnessed by the pontificate of John Paul II."

And a quotation from Cardinal George, Archbishop of Chicago, is reassuring: "These two books of the Series respond well to a request I made three years ago for high school texts that would set out clearly and adequately the teaching of the Catholic Church. They offer an approach to that teaching substantial enough to win the respect and interest of students…I warmly recommend these two books to high school teachers and students, to those responsible for the RCIA, and to all who serve in positions of lay ecclesial ministry." And Dr. Scott Hahn, who is on the *Didache's* Editorial Board, writes: "…this Series should be a great asset to those concerned with teaching Catholicism in its richness and entirety. There is a definite need for textbooks that adequately present the Catholic Faith to young people. The *Didache Series* responds to that need."

Bishop Jerome Listecki, Auxiliary Bishop of Chicago, has written: "I have had the privilege of using this text in class and found it to be thoughtful, concise, and timely. Students enjoyed the examples, and the moral content always reflected a fidelity to the Magisterium of the Church."

Some high schools may judge that the books are too complete or too difficult for high school students, especially in the lower grades. Indeed, it is true that this series would be excellent for certain university classes. But, for the younger or the less intelligent high school students, adjustments can be made. But one will not find a better catechism series, or probably one nearly as good.

Recently I wrote a book critical of the teaching of religion in some Catholic elementary and high schools in Canada (*The Catholic School in an Age of Dissent*, 2002). I had information from parents and grandparents of students, from teachers, from school-board members, from school administrators, from clergy, from teachers' unions, from catechisms, and from sex education books. There was also quite a bit of literature on the subject already in print which I was able into incorporate in the book.

Let me limit myself here to one Canadian province alone: Ontario. There are about 350 *fully-funded* Catholic public elementary and high schools in Ontario. Yet, in my opinion, which I know is shared by innumerable others, the teaching of religion in these schools, on the whole, is lamentable. Most of the students do not go to Sunday Mass. Most graduate knowing very little of the faith. The schools have lost the connection with the neighboring parishes which they used to have. The religion textbooks, especially the sex education textbooks, are severely criticized. Many parents are willing to make great sacrifices to home-school their children rather than send them to Catholic public schools. I will illustrate, in regard to just one religion textbook, how woeful the situation is, and illustrate how superior the *Didache Series* is to Ontario textbooks.

It must be kept in mind that in Canada the religion textbooks, including the sex education textbooks, are chosen (and usually published) by the Canadian bishops. Now, the bishops have just published a grade

twelve textbook entitled *In Search of the Good*. It is the same size as the corresponding *Didache Series* book but is very different in many other ways. Whereas the *Didache* has 13 pages on the Ten Commandments in general and 150 pages on the Commandments in particular, *In Search of the Good* has 4 pages on the Commandments in general and no pages on them in particular. Whereas the *Didache* has 27 pages on chastity, *In Search of the Good* has 2 pages, with no mention of the specific forms of unchastity. Whereas the *Didache* has a 16-page chapter on The Social Teaching of the Church, *In Search of the Good* lists 63 pages under the word "political" in the book's index, one indication that, in this book, social morality, important as it is, eclipses personal morality by a wide margin, the personal morality which is the foundation of social morality.

Advertising for *In Search of the Good* says that "strong connections with students' daily lives" is "a key feature" of the book. But one is struck by the lack of reference to some of the most important aspects of students' lives. One can be frustrated looking for references to drugs; sexually transmitted diseases, particular sexual matters such as pornography, masturbation, fornication, or homosexuality; intrinsically evil actions; praying, or going to Sunday Mass.

I must make a specific reference to the treatment of two extremely important aspects of life which grade twelve students should be aware of: contraception and natural family planning; and abortion. The *Didache* is quite clear and thorough on Catholic teaching concerning these matters, whereas in *In Search of the Good* one might say that this teaching is damned with faint praise. The words "birth control" and 'contraception" and "abortion" are not to be found in the book's index.

It is likely that the soft touch on contraception is a result of the Statement of the Canadian Bishops' Conference made in Winnipeg, Manitoba, in September, 1968, a statement which has never been revoked. It says that, under certain conditions, husband and wife may practice contraception. The Statement was reaffirmed by the bishops when Pope John Paul II, in his encyclical *Evangelium Vitae* reaffirmed the teaching of Pope Paul VI in his earlier encyclical *Humanae Vitae* that contraception is intrinsically evil.

I contrast the *Didache* with a Canadian counterpart to show the tremendous superiority of the former.

Same-Sex Attraction: A Parents' Guide, by John F. Harvey and Gerard V. Bradley**,** St. Augustine's Press, South Bend, Indiana, 2003, 227 pp., $25 (USD)

Review by (Rev.) Leonard Kennedy, C.S.B.,

This is a most sympathetic and helpful book. Father Harvey is the founder of *Courage*, a fully Catholic organization for persons with same-sex attraction. He has also founded *Encourage*, an organization for the family or friends of these persons. Professor Bradley is in the Law Faculty of Notre Dame University, Indiana, and was for many years the President of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars.

The book has four sections: (1) Science, (2) Morality, (3) Law, (4) Pastoral considerations.

1. Dr. Jeffrey Satinover deals with the causes of same-sex attraction and shows that the causes of it can be multiple, and in particular that there is solid evidence against it being genetically determined. Dr. Joseph Nicolosi holds that being satisfied with remaining gay is clinging to "a compromise identity" in order to resolve emotional conflicts, but that facing an interior struggle for growth and change is the only true solution to the problem, a soul-searing struggle because it challenges an identity rooted in one's earliest years. In the "science" of Canon Law, Msgr. Cormac Burke explains what type or degree of same-sex attraction invalidates a marriage.

(1) Dr. Kevin E. Miller explains that Scripture teaches that homosexual sexual activity is against the divine law: ". . . arguments that Scripture does not condemn homosexual acts (or even supports them) are unfounded." Father Benedict Ashley, O.P., explains the theology of sexuality and of marriage and shows why homosexual sexual activity is sinful. Dr. John Finnis shows that natural sexual intercourse is not simply heterosexual but is also marital. "That is, it is sexually complementary, and in every sexual act is expressive—physically, emotionally, and intellectually—of both the essential marital goods: procreation, and a friendship which is exclusive and permanently committed."

(2) Cardinal Bevilaqua, Archbishop of Philadelphia, before the Philadelphia City Council, speaks against legislation currently before the Council which communicated "to the whole of society, but especially to our youth, that extramarital and homosexual relationships are the natural, moral, and legal equivalent of marriage and the family. They endeavour to nullify the fact that traditional, committed marriages and stable families constitute the foundation on which a lasting and civilized society is built." Cardinal O'Connor, Archbishop of New York, also speaks out on the same matter. Professor Bradley shows that judges and governments are changing

marriage from a clearly defined relationship to something else only incidentally connected with it, something left largely to the control of the parties involved. He shows that the position that a right to same-sex marriage based on the "equality argument" is invalid. Marriage is a type of friendship but "a unique type of friendship, specified by the capacity to engage in reproductive type acts, which is simply unavailable to same-sex couples."

(3) Helen Hull Hitchcock sounds an alarm: "As the family goes, so goes the world…Can we rebuild the collapsing social institutions of the culture?…Where are our leaders, who may help repair the crumbling moral structure of our world? Or is it too late to prevent 'calamity and disaster'? What can we do? Can we help these families in trouble, heal the broken hearts of parents and the emotional anguish of their afflicted children? Can we relieve their suffering?" Alan P. Mediger, who is Director of Regeneration, a Christian ministry for men and women seeking to overcome homosexuality, writes from his own life experience when he says that to call oneself gay is to accept a false identity; it is to accept one characteristic of oneself as the whole of oneself. And he describes the elements of the life-change that are required so as not to define oneself by one's sexuality at all. And the parents also must undergo this change in thinking of their child. Finally, Father Harvey answers twenty-one questions that parents of homosexual persons ask, including which are the best books to read.

His Excellency: George Washington, Ellis, J.J. (2004) NY: Alfred A. Knopf. Pp 278. BP. 26.95

Review by Rev. Michael P. Orsi, Ave Maria School of Law, Ann Arbor, MI

George Washington is perhaps the most enigmatic of our nation's Founding Fathers. There are three major reasons. First, Washington, sensitive to his legacy, instructed his wife, Martha, to burn all of their personal correspondence after his death. Second, with a sense of his place in history, Washington continually edited his reminiscences and official records. And, finally his apotheosis in the minds and hearts of his countrymen caused truth and fiction to mix, making the real person fade in to the mist of history.

In Joseph Ellis *His Excellency, George Washington*, much of the hagiography is deleted. It is replaced with the principles and real life situations which Washington used to fulfill what he believed to be his personal destiny. A confluence of events, the drivenness of his personality and his physical stature all lent themselves to the studied production of His Excellency, an honorific title and appropriate description used for Washington from the earliest days of the Revolution. While providing us with the causes and results of Washington's monumental achievements, the book still leaves us despairing of ever really knowing the Father of our Country. Perhaps admiring His Excellency and not George Washington is the best we can hope for and, in the end, it seems to be what Washington wanted. This being the case, Ellis nevertheless has done an outstanding job.

What sets Washington apart from the other Founders is that while they were for the most part men of letters—schooled in Enlightenment theory of a representative government—Washington learned by experience. An early frustration with his English agent "Cary and Company" over what he incorrectly perceived to be an unfair consignment exchange between Mount Vernon's tobacco crops and his directed purchases roused two of Washington's primary emotional needs—first to be in control and second his sense of justice. In light of his personal financial setbacks and his frustration with Britain's abuse of colonial rights, a revolutionary spark was inflamed in him. Although Washington's actions were scripted to be altruistic, and at times he no doubt believed them to be so, Ellis suggests that a good deal of self-interest motivated him. Two examples illustrate the point: Washington's calculated marriage to Martha, which raised his status among the Virginia gentry; and his participation in the French and Indian War, which provided him with the opportunity to enhance not only his public persona but his real-estate holdings in the western lands.

Washington had a firm belief that he was chosen by destiny for greatness. This for example, Ellis says, made him impervious to fear during battles. To fulfill this role and enhance its required gravitas, Washington continually worked on developing Roman virtues to curb his strong emotions and assumed a stoic character which made him seem aloof. Nevertheless, he was not an impractical idealist. He met the world as it was and not how he wished it to be. This is especially obvious in his moral dilemma concerning his ownership of slaves. Although he knew slavery was wrong—for economic reasons he did not release his slaves in his own lifetime. However, for the sake of his legacy he granted them manumission upon his death. Alas, to his advantage!

Washington was gifted with a

prescient vision for America. He foresaw the future greatness of America, especially in its westward expansion. He also anticipated the importance of a strong central government for the country to thrive. His advice to avoid foreign entanglements demonstrated his sense of realpolitik which grew from his insight into human nature and how nations operate. Time proved him correct on all accounts. It is fair to say that were it not for Washington, the United States of America as we know it would not exist today.

America has always been deemed the land of opportunity. George Washington is the exemplar and maybe the embodiment of this belief. He took his natural gifts of raw intelligence, strong will, physique, and bravery and used them to excel as a warrior, gentleman, a living national icon, and the Father of our Country. Through his example, he showed us how we as individuals and as a country can reach our potential through personal effort and talent. Perhaps the greatest evidence of these beliefs can be found in his Last Will and Testament. Instead of setting up his family as an inherited aristocracy, he divided up his estate into small parcels so that his descendents would have to rely on their own merit to achieve success in life. The fact is that, after reading Ellis, one gets the sense that he bequeathed to all future generations these same possibilities. For this Washington shall always remain "His Excellency" in the heart of his countrymen.

Exegetical Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, prepared under the Responsibility of the Faculty of Canon Law, University of Navarre, English edition edited by Ernest Caparros, (Wilson & Lafleur / Midwest Theological Forum, 2004). Five volumes bound as eight, approx 9,000 pages. List price US $1,200. Contact: **www.wilsonlafleur.com** or **mail@mwtf.org**.

Review by Edward Peters, JD, JCD, Institute for Canon Law, Ann Arbor, MI, www.canonlaw.info.

Reflected in the very name of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars is the idea that no single scholarly discipline represents the totality of the Church's contribution to man's welfare, nor can an individual scholar within a discipline speak comprehensively for his or her field, let alone for the Church. In canon law, recognition that many minds are needed to describe the sweep of ecclesiastical legislation has been quietly gaining ground for decades. Once, say, Bachofen, Cappello, Coronata, and Jone, passed from the scene, no lone lawyers remained who could attempt the great multi-volume, pan-textual commentaries that dominated canonistics before the Second World War. Instead, what began to appear in canonical circles were encouraging experiments in scholarly collaboration. The pre-conciliar *Dictionnaire de Droit Canonique and the Comentarios al Código de Derecho Canónico* come readily to mind, as do some famous canonical pairings such as Abbo-Hannon, Bouscaren-Ellis, and Vermeersch-Creusen.

Since the Second Vatican Council, this collaborative methodology in canon law (applied even to the drafting of what eventually became the 1983 Code) has blossomed into impressive coordinated efforts by teams of experts to produce respectable commentaries on the whole of the 1983 Code. The British commentary (1995), for example, used 15 scholars to treat the revised law. The first American commentary (1985) represented 24 authors, and the second (2000) drew on an impressive 36 canonists. Similar works in Italian (29 contributors) and Spanish (6 in one, 11 for another, 22 in a third) could be cited.

Prescinding, though, from whether every contributing author's opinion on every canon in each of these works is entirely sound, and notwithstanding the obvious achievement that such pan-textual tomes undoubtedly represent, some in canon law (perhaps especially those who could look at their yellowing sets of Bachofen in eight volumes or Blat or Coronata in five) quietly reminded a new generation of canon lawyers that the canonistics behind most of the norms in the 1983 Code were not being adequately sounded by, in too many cases, a few paragraphs here or a couple pages there between the boards of a thick monograph.

Onto this stage strides the stunning *Exegetical Commentary on the Code of Canon Law.*

At five volumes bound as eight, encompassing approximately 9,000 pages of commentary and apparatus, the *Exegetical Commentary* dwarfs all other treatises on the 1983 Code. Moreover, an astounding 115 experts (hailing from some dozen nations) directly contributed to this project, more than triple the number authors contributing to any of the individual works mentioned above. Of course, however impressive, sheer quantity in a commentary is not the dispositive factor in assessing its scholarly worth; there is, of course, also quality.

I am not on the extremely short list of beati who can claim (say, in the course of editing this massive set) to have read the entire manuscript yet. Indeed, my present reading schedule suggests eligibility for that fraternity only about the year 2012. Instead, I begin an assessment of scholarly potential by examining the

List of Collaborators for the *Exegetical Commentary*. There one sees that something over half the authors are Spanish (see below), a fact that still left room for dozens of other canonists from throughout Europe and the Americas. Generously scattered through the predictable designations of faculty members, moreover, one sees listed many Vatican officials, tribunal judges, sitting diocesan bishops, and officials of or consultants to many particular churches. In short, academe and the chancery have come together in this work.

The plurality of Spanish contributors to the *Exegetical Commentary* is explained thus: the present English edition grew out of and largely represents a translation of and updating to the original *Comentario Exegético al Código de Derecho Canónico* published by the University of Navarre in 1996 (a project it took on in addition to producing and continually updating its Código de Derecho Canónico edición biling e y anotada, albeit in only 2,000 pages.) But, notwithstanding Spain's rich tradition in canonical sciences (second only to Italy's) and despite the fact that Spanish remains a primary reference language in canon law, too few researchers outside of Spain knew of its latest canonical accomplishment. The decision to move the Comentario Exegético into English assures, of course, a world-wide distribution—and bolsters the claim I have made elsewhere that English has become the leading modern language in canonical studies. Finally, concerns among non-Spaniards that a mere translation of the original Comentario would import excessively Iberian issues or approaches into a treatise proposed for universal consultation were anticipated—and as far as I can tell, were admirably resolved—by the editorial decisions made in producing the English text of the Exegetical Commentary.

Producing the English version required more than six years of labor, and even that speed was possible only because the task of directing this project was accepted by one of the few men in the world today who could carry it off, Dr. Ernest Caparros, emeritus of the Faculty of Law, University of Montreal. With dual doctorates in canon and civil law, pentalingual, and with an astounding array of juridic publications and legal leadership positions to his credit, Caparros' early commitment to the project (even amid several other major canonical publications he was overseeing for the Series Gratianus) assured the many others who be would needed to bring this massive project to fruition of eventual success. And so it has happened. The Exegetical Commentary is now complete; it rightly takes its place as the most extensive study of the 1983 Code of Canon Law available today.

There remains but to sketch the straight-forward structure of the work. Each canon is set out first in Latin, then in English (using the Great Britain & Ireland translation, but following mostly American spelling). Rome's vitally important footnotes (fontes) immediately follow, and unofficial but quite useful cross-references within the 1983 Code are suggested. Then begins the scholarly comment (each article is signed). Observations might run less than a page if the material warrants no more, but often cover several pages if such is needed to paint a sufficiently detailed picture of the norm and its referents. Additional footnotes vary by scholar, but they tend to be "European" in style, i.e., lighter and less frequent than North American lawyers are inclined to use. The actual commentary is clearly ordered toward the great task of applying canon law within the Church today and in that sense it seems to avoid extended historical treatments of topics. Those who need that kind of information (and in complex cases the best canonical answers might well require such understandings) do best to master the law as given us today with the help of resources such as the Exegetical Commentary, and then follow the fontes supplied by the Legislator back to Pio-Benedictine predecessors, and even to decretal law where that is appropriate.

The Exegetical Commentary is a gift to the Church. These beautifully printed and bound pages, offering competent and faithful explanations of modern canon law, will be consulted for centuries, inspiring others to deepen their own appreciation of and cooperation with the laws of Christ and His Church.

Catholic for a Reason III: Scripture and the Mystery of the Mass, edited by Scott Hahn and Regis J. Flaherty. Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Road Publishing, 2004. Pp. xiv + 203, softcover $15.95

Review by Daniel G. Van Slyke, S.T.L., Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Theology at Ave Maria College, Ypsilanti, MI

This volume contains twelve well-written and clearly organized essays or "chapters" authored by a group of the most energetic and talented lay catechists and apologists in North America. Dedicated to elaborating the connection between the Mass and Sacred Scripture, this collection follows two previous Catholic for a Reason volumes: the first, sub-titled Scripture and the Mystery of the Family of God, covering a broad range of topics; the second, Scripture and the Mystery of the Mother of God, being, like the third, more focused. Nine of the twelve authors who contribute

to this third volume also wrote for the first and the second, so continuity characterizes the series.

Editors Scott Hahn and Regis J. Flaherty divide the topics very well; there is little repetition among the various essays, and they complement one another splendidly. The tone is pastoral, and the authors make their pieces accessible to contemporary readers with imagery, analogy, and a warm, familiar style. Emmaus Road Publishing lists the work among a series of titles dedicated to "forming lay Catholics." The projected audience includes Catholics rediscovering or seeking to deepen their faith, along with Protestants showing interest in the Catholic Church or having already entered it. While the tone is consistently upbeat and positive, a more or less subtle response to Protestant criticisms of the Mass underlies several essays.

Scott Hahn's pioneering approach and thought permeates this collection. Four of the contributors are Hahn's students, at least insofar as their formal theological training includes an M.A. degree from Steubenville. Moreover, Hahn has devoted considerable energy to exploring the sacraments in books such as *The Lamb's Supper: The Mass as Heaven on Earth* (Doubleday, 1999), *Lord Have Mercy: The Healing Power of Confession* (Doubleday, 2003), and S*wear to God: The Promise and Power of the Sacraments* (Doubleday 2004). Despite his popular style and predilection for puns, Hahn makes numerous insightful contributions to catechesis and sacramental theology in these works. The same can be said of his essay in this volume: "Come Again? The Real Presence as Parousia." Here he presents the thesis that the "the Eucharist is the parousia" (35). For the New Testament authors, the Greek word can indicate presence as well as a dramatic future coming. Hahn demonstrates that, for the earliest Christians, "the Eucharistic parousia is a real presence—Christ coming in power to judge" (44).

Edward P. Sri contributes the volume's first essay, entitled "A Biblical Walk through the Mass." He uncovers the scriptural roots and significance of several familiar formulae in the Mass, from the sign of the cross and "The Lord be with you" to "Happy are those who are called to his supper." Sri follows a rather forced historical theory of liturgical development by linking the eucharistic prayers to the Jewish todah sacrifice. His purpose is to demonstrate that the eucharistic prayers "stand in continuity with the biblical, Jewish tradition of thanksgiving" (12). Following Sri's focus on the Old Testament, Curtis J. Mitch continues the "biblical walk" by addressing "The Mass and the Synoptic Gospels." Properly highlighting how the synoptic Gospels link Christ's Last Supper to the Passover, Mitch also simplifies his account by following a certain historical theory regarding the relationship between Jewish ritual and the Eucharist. In this case, mountains of debate concerning the form(s) of Passover celebrations during the first century are leveled in favor of a vision of the Seder meal "during the time of Jesus" entailing four cups of wine, that is really impossible to substantiate given the state of the evidence (24). Mitch is on firmer ground, and pastorally more helpful, when he goes on to emphasis how Jesus changes the significance of the Passover by placing himself at its center, and by establishing a new covenant in his blood. In a chapter entitled "From Jewish Passover to Christian Eucharist: The Todah Sacrifice as Backdrop for the Last Supper," Tim Gray demonstrates how broadly a concept such as todah or "thanksgiving" can be applied, arguing that the Passover "is a concrete example of the todah sacrifice" (74). He ends with a salutary observation on the link between thankfulness or gratitude and worship.

For the first time Thomas J. Nash, Stephen Pimentel, and Michael Barber appear in the Catholic for a Reason series. Nash, a prominent member of Catholics United for the Faith (CUF), contributes a very fine chapter on "The Mass as Sacrifice," drawing especially from Hebrews and 1 Corinthians. In "The Eucharist in the Apostolic Church," Pimentel dwells for the most part on the covenantal dimension of the Eucharist. He also relates the sacraments of the New Testament to the events of the Old by the use of typology, and addresses the allegorical and moral interpretation of Old Testament passages. In "The Mass and the Apocalypse," Barber indicates how thoroughly the book of Revelation is imbued with images and themes from the Mass, following Hahn's The Lamb's Supper. "In the Mass," Barber writes, "we are not merely imitating the heavenly liturgy – we are participating in it" (117).

Sean Innerst, in "Time for Liturgy: Appointed Times in Judaism and Christianity," illustrates how Christ and Christian worship, especially in the Holy Triduum, fulfill the yearly cycle of feasts commanded in the Old Testament. Curtis Martin, founding president of the Fellowship of Catholic University Students, begins "The Mass and Evangelization" by elaborating how the Eucharist is both the source and the summit of evangelistic efforts. He then digresses from the topic of the Mass to address at length why Catholics do not evangelize, and how to go about doing so. Kimberly Hahn, in the final chapter of the volume, walks through the Rite for Celebrating Marriage During Mass, expounding various ways in which matrimony and the Eucharist illuminate one another.

Two of the most impressive essays in the volume are contributed by CUF president Leon J. Suprenant and familiar Catholic radio personality Jeff Cavins. Suprenant's chapter, titled "The Difference Jesus Makes: The Eucharist and Christian Living," carries much of the weight of traditional concepts in the volume – including transubstantiation, sacramental efficacy ex opere operato, and the proper disposition of the recipient. Engaging the documents of the Second Vatican Council and various works by Pope John Paul II, Suprenant deftly negotiates a number of topics that are often radically interpreted by liturgists and theologians pushing their own agendas: the priesthood of the laity, active participation, the modes of Christ's presence, and the relationship between the Mass and work in the world. The result is an inspirational essay that strikes a delicate balance between prayer and action. "If we truly want to live authentic Christian lives," Suprenant concludes, "we do well to return, frequently and with much love and devotion, to the Source: Jesus, our Eucharistic Lord" (137). Cavins' chapter, "Suffering and the Mass: The Great Exchange," addresses "how Christ's suffering can transform our lives in the Mass" and give redemptive meaning to our own suffering (158). Cavins beautifully integrates the story of human suffering with the fall of the first Adam in the Garden of Eden and the triumph of the second Adam in the Garden of Gethsemane, in a manner reflective of John Paul II's catechesis on Genesis.

The contributors to this volume stay very close to the sources of authority: in addition to the Bible, each cites the Catechism at least once, and many draw from recent papal teachings. Moreover, these authors make no claim to be a "second magisterium" or a "magisterium of scholars," as do those radical theologians and biblical scholars now confidently entrenched in the academy. Nonetheless, the egregious lack of clerical contributors to this volume – with the exception of Bishop Robert C. Morlino of Madison, who writes a brief foreword – reflects a crisis of authority. These lay apologists and catechists are in fact taking on the office or responsibility of teaching which, according to the Second Vatican Council, "is conspicuous among the principal duties of bishops" (Christus Dominus 12) and of priests "as co-workers with their bishops" (Presbyterorum ordinis 4). Sincere Catholics increasingly turn to this prominent set of lay teachers for the spiritual nourishment they do not get from many parish pulpits and diocesan offices.

Certainly these authors astutely avoid controversy. They charitably gloss over the abuses and glaring bad taste that characterize the typical parish Mass and its accoutrements, along with the increasingly divisive debates surrounding the revised liturgy, its translation, and the environment of its celebration. Yet the target audience of this volume is often quite sensitive to the problems with the typical parish liturgy. The beautiful truths expounded in these pages are sometimes flatly contracted by the words or actions of those conducting eucharistic celebrations. Listening to any call-in show on Catholic radio, one quickly learns that a primary source of confusion and temptation vexing the faithful who turn to the personalities represented in this volume for answers is precisely what happens in their parish churches on Sundays. The collection might better serve its audience with the addition of an essay openly acknowledging and addressing such problems, if only to provide solidarity, comfort, or even hope for improvement.

Catholic for a Reason III is not the place to turn for a dogmatic treatise on the Mass or a detailed scholarly analysis of various biblical passages relating to the liturgy. But such observations do not vitiate the merits of the essays therein.
This volume is a welcome and effective resource for those seeking to understand and pray the Mass more deeply, and indeed to more fully participate in it. Just about any well-disposed Catholic or non-Catholic will walk away from this collection with a deeper appreciation for the mystery of the Mass and its relation to Sacred Scripture.

Our Lady of Guadalupe. History and Meaning of the Apparitions, Manuela Testoni.

Review by Boguslaw Lipinski, Ph.D., Harvard School of Medicine, Boston, MA

The author has done excellent scholarly work on the apparitions of Our Lady of Guadalupe, the "Queen of Americas." I am particularly impressed by depth of her knowledge of historical documents on this subject. It is also of special importance that Manuela Testoni presented views of not only those who believe that the apparition was a historical fact, but those who do not as well. I have only reservations about the author's repeated argument that the truth behind the apparition can only be attained by "objective" historical findings. Being an experimental scientist, I do not agree that any branch of a science, especially a historical one, can deliver objective truth. Whether we like it or not, an inescapable conclusion is that scientific ideas are constructs of our minds, and that they become objective reality after we all agree on them. I am fully aware that this kind of philosophy may lead to a very dangerous concept of relativism, but only when we reject the notion that Truth is at-

tainable only by Revelation.

The concept of Absolute Truth is particularly relevant to the proper understanding the book under the review. My impression is that Manuela Testoni is torn between the will to become a scholar accepted and recognized by her peers, and a believer in Almighty God. As to the truth behind the apparition of Our Lady of Guadalupe, this dichotomy led the author to assume a middleground position. I understand that she might have been impressed, and even intimidated, by the well documented fact that only 7 percent of leading american scientists (members of the US National Academy of Science) believe in a personal God. Yet none of them has ever disclosed what it is that they know, that the believer scientists do not. It is therefore obvious, and it is unfortunate that it is not for Manuela Testoni, that "truth" delivered by scientists is determined by their personal system of belief. Thus, is the apparition of Our Lady of Guadalupe real or not?

The answer to this question can, in my opinion, be only found outside of a scientific realm. First of all, as accurately described by the author, unknown type of pigments, remarkable and unprecedented resistance of the image to fading and destruction by time and various noxious agents, should be sufficient proof for the supernatural origin of the image of Our Lady on tilma. In addition, and perhaps even more importantly, we have to remember that amongst all approved apparitions of Our Lady, in no case a permanent material record has ever been made available for humanity. The only other instance in which is a similar inexplicable image of Our Lady is that in Czestochowa, known otherwise as Black Madonna, that appeared in Poland over a half century ago. Although this image was not accompanied by a physical apparition of Our Lady, it is associated with innumerable miraculous healings, conversions and signs of Her love and protection of Poland. Despite the lack of any historical accounts on the origin of the Black Madonna image and the means by which it arrived at Jasna Gora, its presence is considered by the believers as a supernatural sign from God.

However, for those who are still looking for a scientific proof of the authenticity of the apparitions of Our Lady of Guadalupe I bring to their attention a very important fact only briefly mentioned by Manuela Testoni in a description of a picture of Juan Diego presenting to the bishop flowers that he gathered at the command of the Madonna of Tepeyac. The author says: " The scene, painted by Manuel Cabrera towards the middle of the 1700's is extraordinarily similar to that reflected in the eyes of the image, discovered by means of electronic instruments at the beginning of the 1980's." It is unfortunate that the author did not devote more space for this so important phenomenon described in details in the book by Francis Johnston that is, curiously enough, listed in Bibliography of Testoni's book under the heading " English-language Studies "(p.110). According to Johnston, starting from as early as 1929 a series of observations were made showing a scene reflected in the eyes of Our Lady depicting Juan Diego presenting roses to Bishop Zumarraga. In 1956 Dr. Lavoignet undertook examination of these reflection using ophtalmoscope and concluded that Our Lady's eyes on the tilma behaved as they were alive. Dr. C. Wahlig and his wife Isabelle, an optician, continued scientific investigations of the reflections in the eyes of on the tilma and concluded that " the sacred image is truly a portrait from heaven ". It remains a mystery for me why Mauela Testoni decided not to include these so important findings in her book. Should she do it, it might bring her, and other skeptical readers, from the position of uncertainty to that of a firm believer that the event of 1531 at Tepeyac was a real albeit supernatural phenomenon.

Moral Issues in Catholic Health Care: Proceedings of a Symposium Sponsored by The John Cardinal Krol Chair of Moral Theology Wynnewood, Pennsylvania*, April 19-21, 2002***,** Kevin T. McMahon, editor. Wynnewood, PA: Saint Charles Borromeo Seminary, 2004, x+182 pp., paper 0-9753171-0-5.

Review by William E. May, Michael J. McGivney Professor of Moral Theology, John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family at The Catholic University of America.

With a Foreword by Cardinal Justin Rigali, *Moral Issues* embraces 10 chapters whose titles indicate its scope: Edmund D. Pellegrino's "The Present and Future Importance of Catholic Health Care in the United States"; Msgr. James J. Mulligan's "Catholic Identity and the Rationale for the *Ethical and Religious Directives*"; Eugene F. Diamond's "Post-Rape Medications"; Helen Watt's "Ethical Problems in Assisted Conception"; John S. Grabowski's "Contraception, Sterilization, and Abortion and *The Ethical and Religious Directives*"; Richard M. Doerflinger's "Experimentation on Human Subjects and Stem Cell Research"; Debra Day-Salvatore's "Genetic Medicine: The Practice of Personalized Health Care"; Romanus Cessario's "Conditional Stewardship of Life: A Moral Principle of John Paul II"; Andrew T. Putnam's "Pain Management and Palliative Care";

and Benedict Ashley's "Organ Donation and Implantation."

Pellegrino addresses the forces threatening the extinction of Catholic hospitals in the US, examines options for their survival, and evaluates these alternatives. Among external causes are economic viability in the market-driven health care system operative today and a secularistic, relativistic view of "bioethics." Among internal causes is a willingness of some Catholic institutions to compromise their principles and enter Faustian "mergers" with secular facilities in order to survive. Options include being "realistic," accommodating to contemporary culture, and giving up on some principles on the one hand and getting out of the work of health care to invest energy and money in other good purposes on the other. Pellegrino rejects these as morally and spiritually unacceptable. He advocates providing care in accord with Catholic principles and argues that this can be done if we make creative adjustments, attract good laypeople faithful to Church teaching and competent to do the work formerly done by religious communities, organize regionally, close some facilities, refurbish others and focus efforts where we are strong, perhaps emphasizing long-term, palliative care etc.

Mulligan seeks to explain the twofold purpose of the *ERDs*—(1) to affirm the ethical standards flowing from Church teaching on the dignity of the human person and (2) to provide authoritative guidance for certain issues in health care. He shows clearly how the Catholic understanding of the dignity of the human person is rooted in the very *being* of the human person as created in the image and likeness of God and called to eternal life and how this understanding differs profoundly from the secularist understanding of human dignity as rooted in the individual's *autonomy* to control his or her life, an understanding at the heart of the culture of death. Mulligan emphasizes that the understanding of the dignity of the human person operative in the *ERDs* is grounded in Catholic faith in divine revelation. I wish he had, at least briefly, stressed that this teaching is fully compatible with a sound philosophical anthropology that recognizes how radically human beings differ from non-human animals.

Diamond takes up a critically important issue: the care to be given women who have been raped. He notes quite properly that contraceptive measures to *prevent* conception can legitimately be used. A woman who has been raped is under no obligation to allow the rapist's sperm to penetrate her ovum. The act chosen here is definitely not to impede procreation resulting from freely chosen genital sex (which is what contraception is) but is rather an act of legitimate self defense. Diamond likewise shows that one cannot use means to "prevent" conception that in truth do not do so but rather act as early abortifacients, preventing the implanting of life already conceived in the womb. He concludes his essay with a "practical and morally acceptable rape protocol" (it is in fact the so-called "Peoria Protocol" although surprisingly Diamond does not note this) according to which it is morally permissible, *IF* it has been determined that a woman in the preovulatory phase of her cycle, to administer Ovral as the "most effective contraceptive intervention in the dosage of two pills at the present time and two in twelve hours." However, earlier in his essay Diamond cited experimental data provided by the manufacturer of Ovral inferring that its use to suppress ovulation is "meager and inconclusive" and that its manufacturer "does not claim such an effect." I thus find it difficult to justify the protocol proposed as "morally acceptable" insofar as use of Ovral seems not to inhibit ovulation but rather to prevent implantation and thus to act as an abortifacient. My difficulty may be due to ignorance, and I have the highest respect for Dr. Diamond, but I am seriously perplexed by his logic. On the one hand, he admits that there is little evidence that use of Ovral in the preovulatory phase inhibits ovulation but on the other hand recommends its use for this purpose.

Watt's essay is an excellent presentation of the *reasons* why the Church teaches that human life can be rightly generated *only* in and through the conjugal act and why new "reproductive" techniques such as *in vitro* fertilization transform procreation to "reproduction," treating a child, as least in the initial stages of its existence, as a "product."

Grabowski similarly presents *reasons* why the Church teaches that contraception and contraceptive sterilization violate the moral order and the nature of marital love and self-giving. In presenting reasons why it is wrong for married persons to contracept he follows closely the reasoning developed by John Paul II—that contraception by married couples falsifies the meaning of the conjugal act as one of self-giving and distorts the language of the body. This is, of course, true, but I wish Grabowski had at least noted the long Catholic tradition—rooted in the Fathers of the Church, articulated in the *Si Aliquis* canon, and explicitly taught by the *Roman Catechism*—that contraception is not only anti-love but anti-life and analogous to homicide.

Doerflinger's essay on stem cell research is a superb presentation of the truth that respect for human dignity absolutely prohibits using human beings as experimental animals, a truth proclaimed not only by the Church

but at the heart of the Nuremberg Code developed in reaction to the horrors of Nazi medicine and of good medical ethics. As he shows, this truth has been lost in the wake of *Roe v. Wade*, leading to demands to treat tiny human beings, those in the embryonic stage, as if they were guinea pigs. He also gives reasons to question seriously President Bush's decision to grant federal funds for research on stem cell lines already developed from aborted embryos.

Day-Salvatore's contribution offers an excellent overview of genetic medicine—the nature of chromosomal disorders (Down syndrome, Turner syndrome), monogenic (Down syndrome) and polygenic disorders (spina bifida), cumulative or somatic cell disorders (cancer), etc. and the meaning of the human genome project.

In the introduction to his essay Cessario focuses on recent papal teaching on euthanasia and then, most importantly, show that the moral underpinnings of *Evangelium vitae* (1995) had been brilliantly set forth by John Paul II in his great 1993 encyclical *Veritatis splendor.* Cessario then centers on three themes governing Church teaching on euthanasia: human freedom, the moral good, and prudence, emphasizing the our freedom is ordered to the truth about the human person, that the moral good requires respect and love for the good of human life, and that prudence, a virtue characteristic of the person who loves the truth and the goods perfective of persons, is required if one is steadfastly to make true moral judgments and good moral choice. His essay is quite thoughtful; at times, however, there is a tendency to "reify" virtues and to speak as if a virtue "does" something, whereas it is, as Cessario well knows, the *person* who judges, chooses, and acts, and the virtues, either divinely infused or acquired by habitually making good moral choices, are qualities or "habitus" of the person.

Putnam contributes a fine essay on the nature and need today of palliative medicine. In it he shows how palliative care specialists can help both patients and their families prepare for a good death and to help families afterwards. Providing a "good" death involves not only treating pain but also taking into account the psychic, spiritual and more emotional elements that cause suffering for patient and family. He likewise shows how palliative care differs radically from an ethic of euthanasia.

Ashley is concerned with organ transplants from the deceased, and in his essay he provides a concise overview of the ethical issues that this raises, among which the most important is to make sure that a person is dead before one harvests vital organs such as the heart. Ashley accepts the view that an adequate criterion for determining that a person has died is the irreversible cessation of the functioning of the entire brain. Ashley accepts this as the criterion because he is convinced that the brain is the central integrating organ accounting for the unity of one's bodily life. He rejects the claim made recently by Dr. Alan Shewmon that this is simply not true and that another criterion must be adopted. In my opinion Ashley too peremptorily dismisses the evidence and arguments advanced by Shewmon to falsify the "total brain death" criterion. I know that at present the Holy See is closely studying this issue.

This is helpful book.

Books Received

If you would like to receive a complimentary copy of one of the books below in order to review it for a future issue, please email your request to Alice Osberger at osberger.1@nd.edu

Light on Light: Illuminations of the Gospel of Jesus Christ from the Mystical Visions of the Venerable Anne Catherine Emmerich, by Hurd Baruch, MaxKol Communications (2004), 259pp. Paper.

The Spirit of Jesus in Scripture and Prayer, James W. Kinn, Rowman and Littlefield Publishing, Lanham, MD, (2004) 231pp. Paper.

The Heretic, A Novel, William Baer, PublishAmerica, Baltimore, (2004), 211pp., Paper.

Our Lady and the Church, Hugo Rahner, S.J., Zaccheus Press: Bethesda, MD, (2004), 149 pp. Paper.

Christian Courtship in an Over Sexed World: A Guide for Catholics, T. G. Morrow, Our Sunday Visitor: Huntington, IN, 296pp, Paper

The Works of Mercy: The Heart of Catholicism, James F. Keenan, S.J., Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group: Lanham, MD, Paper, 128pp.

Home-Alone America: The Hidden Toll of Day Care, Behavioral Drugs, and Other Parent Substitutes, Mary Eberstadt, Sentinel: New York, (2004) Cloth. 218 pp.

Peace Talks: Who Will Listen?, Fred Dallmayr, University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, IN, (2004) Paper. 288pp.

The Triumph of Practice over Theory in Ethics, James P. Sterba, Oxford University Press: Oxford, (2005), Paper, 206pp.

Morals and Politics, by Vittorio Hösle, trans. By Steven Rendall, University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, IN, (2004), cloth, 1,016 pp.

Caring for a Dying Loved One, Bob Fischer, MSN, RN, Alba House: New York, (2001), Paper, 97pp.

The Rapture Trap: A Catholic Response to "End Times" Fever, Paul Thigpen, Ascension Press: West Chester, PA, (2001), Paper, 262pp.

Figures Around the Crib: Preparing for Christmas with Isaiah, John the Baptizer, Joseph, and Mary, Rev. William F. Maestri, Alba House: New York, (2001), Paper, 144pp.

I Am: Eucharistic Meditations on the Gospel, Concepcion Cabrera de Armida, Alba House, New York, (2001), Paper, 101pp.

Have You Heard the Good News?: Reflections on the Sunday Gospels, Cycle A, Edward T. Dowling, SJ, Alba House: New York, (2001), Paper, 180pp.

Faith Facts: Answers to Catholic Questions, Vol. II, Eds. Leon J. Suprenant, Jr. & Philip C. L. Gray, Emmaus Road Publishing, Steubenville, OH, (2004), Paper, 186pp.

Daily Readings in Catholic Classics, Ed. Rawley Myers, Ignatius Press: San Francisco, (1992), Paper, 332.

Exploring the Catholic Church: An Introduction to Catholic Teaching and Practice, Marcellino D'Ambrosio, Ph.D., Servant Publications: Ann Arbor, MI, (2001), Paper, 136pp.

Praying the Sunday Psalms: Reflections on the Responsorial Psalms, Years A, B, C, Michael Goonan, SSP, Alba House, New York, (2001), Alba House, New York, Paper, 204pp.

Rationality and Religious Experience: The Continuing Relevance of the World's Spiritual Traditions, The First Master Hsuan Hua Memorial Lecture, Henry Rosemont, Jr., Open Court, Chicago, (2001), Paper, 111pp.

No One Else Can Sing My Song, Edward J. Farrell, Alba House, New York, (2001), Paper, 204pp.

Figures Around the Cross: A Lenten Journey from Death to Life, Rev. William F. Maestri, Alba House: New York, (2002), Paper, 233pp.

Healing: Questions and Answers for Those Who Mourn, Rev. Terence P. Curley, D.Min., Alba House: New York, (2002), Paper, 109pp.

Daisys Will Grow Anywhere: A (Victim Abuse) Survivor's Story, Elizabeth Ammons, Xlibris, (2001), Paper, 520pp.

Letter

Dear Dr. McInerny:

It has been brought to my attention that the obituary that was included in my memorial of Msgr. George A. Kelly (Fellowship of Catholic Scholars Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4, Winter 2004) did not mention that Msgr. Michael Wrenn funded and organized the 1999 colloquy in Msgr. Kelly's honor. My apologies go to Msgr. Wrenn. I ask that the omission be remedied by publication of this letter.

Yours faithfully,

Patrick G.D. Riley
Wauwatosa, WI 53222

Membership Matters

FCS Member Luz G. Gabriel, M.D. published "What is the Roman Catholic Church's Stance on the Science of Psychiatry?" in the *Social Justice Review*, March -April, 2005 issue #3-4

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TEXTUAL ATTRACTION

A few weeks ago, my colleague Otto Bird astounded me by plunking down on the luncheon table in the University Club a 1591 edition of St. Thomas Aquinas's commentaries on the epistles of St. Paul. It turned out that he was giving it to me. Needless to say, I was overwhelmed.

A little later I received from my daughter Cathy as a birthday present an 1871 edition of Anthony Trollope's Ralph the Heir, in beautiful condition. The novel is one of my favorite Trollope's.

The common denominator here is the printed book as artifact, as collectible, as a precious reminder of an earlier time. We live in an era when one can with the flick of a few keys bring up on the screen the text of any classic work and indeed sometimes facsimiles of original manuscripts or printed editions. The primary point of writing is to be read and in some possible world it matters little whether what is read is an electronic text or a printed page. But there is undeniably a Kleenex feel to the downloaded text. I have friends who carry around on their palm tops the collected works of Aristotle with something of the proprietary attitude of Andronicus of Rhodes. Perhaps the person next to you on the plane is listening to a recording of Plato.

What doe sit all mean? (As we ask in Philosophy 101.) St. Thomas's speedwriting is known as the litera inintelligibilis, the unreadable hand. And yet, all these years later, a 16th century printing of his commentaries on St. Paul is enshrined in my study. I will go on reading the text in the Marietti edition, I will go on consulting the electronic versions of Thomas, but it is nice to run one's hand over a book that is as much an artifact as an instrument. I once had put into my hands at the Biblioteca Ambrosiana a portion of Thomas's own manuscript of Book III of the Summa contra gentiles. As a relic, I suppose it would be called third class. But try to get that kind of thrill from words on your computer screen. ✠

Ralph McInerny

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