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ARTICLES

The Cardinal and the Neo-Darwinians: *A Question of Analogy*

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In the Thomistic tradition Jacques Maritain more than once remarked that intelligence, like being, is analogous.[1] Not only do God, angels, and men think analogously but also men, sentient beings bound to knowledge by abstraction, approach various sciences in ways that are complementary rather than opposed. Had the editors at the *New York Times* been aware of that simple insight, doubtless they would not have recently raised the specter of past debates between science and religion in response to Cardinal Schönborn's op-ed clarification of the question of evolution (7/7/05, p. A27 and 7/9/07, p. A1). Whether their myopia is due to a univocal notion of intelligence inherited from the Enlightenment, a journalistic rush for a sensational story, or the *Times*' usual anti-religious bias only God and the editors know for sure. But their intervention into questions beyond their ken provides a welcome opportunity for some clarifications. Without doubt it is possible to combine a neo-Darwinian theory with Catholic faith, as many scientists do. The difficulty emerges when evolutionary theorists go beyond the evidence to deny a providential plan for all reality. Our essay intends to indicate that evolutionary theory finds an intellectual justification only if God's providence rules.

Not Chaos but Mystery

Against the prevalent journalistic opinion that the Catholic faith is compatible with evolution, the cardinal made the qualification that while "evolution in the sense of common ancestry might be true,…evolution in the neo-Darwinian sense—an unguided, unplanned process of random variation and natural selection—is not." That should be fairly obvious to anyone believing in a creator God. Since God made everything from nothing, nothing can be outside His control. He is a good, omnipotent, omniscient God, who remains in control of His creation,

over which He will pronounce ultimate judgment. Otherwise evil might win out as in the Germanic myths, Zoroastrianism, and all secular thinking. The biblical assurance that nothing is impossible to God (Gen. 18:14; Job 42:2; Lk. 1:37; Mk. 10:27) rests upon belief in a creator God. Because God can give life to the dead and make existent what does not exist faith in God is always possible and nothing created can separate the believer from God's love (Rom. 4:17-25; 8:31-39). Believers in such a God cannot acknowledge that the world is "an unguided, unplanned process of random variation and natural selection" without contradicting their faith.

That basic article of faith does not however imply that human beings know God's plan. Quite to the contrary! "'My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways,' says the Lord" (Is. 55:8). That hard truth Job learned to his humiliation after his vain insistence that God appear before the tribunal of his intelligence. Faced with the wonders of God's salvation, St. Paul cited Isaiah and Job in writing: "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and how inscrutable His ways! 'For who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been His counselor?' 'Or who has given a gift to Him that he might be repaid?' For from Him and through Him and to Him are all things. To Him be glory for ever. Amen" (Rom. 11:33-36). God remains a mystery that creates salvation.

That God's transcendent mystery is not utterly beyond man's ken is implied in the fact of revelation. Addressing man, God presupposes that man can somehow understand Him. The God of Sinai wrapped Himself in dense cloud, thunder, and lightning, but He made known His will to Moses and His people. The forty-fifth chapter of Isaiah expresses the vital tension between the hidden and the revealed God that pervades the Bible. After Israel's confession, "Truly, you are a God who hides yourself, O God of Israel, the Savior," God responds, "I am the Lord and there is no other. I did not speak in secret, in a land of darkness; I did not say to the offspring of Jacob, 'Seek me in chaos.' I, the Lord, speak the truth, I declare what is right" (45:15-19). The New Testament heightens the paradox, "No one has ever seen God; the only Son, who is in the Father's bosom, has made Him known" (Jn. 1:18).

Between Chance and Determinism

That the believer should be caught in the oscillation between knowledge and ignorance of God does not surprise the philosopher. Not only is God known analogously in relation to the world but also God's knowledge is analogous to man's knowledge. To non-believers analogy must appear to be a contradiction since it affirms both similarity and dissimilarity. The Enlightenment never understood this type of thought because it simplistically insisted on a science that would banish all mystery, just as Newtonian physics allegedly did. But for believers and true philosophers it is clear that God does not think as humans do. Whereas God knows directly the individuals that He creates, humans know by abstraction, seeking the universal in the multifarious variation of sensible experience. There is obviously a difference between God's exhaustive knowledge and man's a posteriori groping toward truth.[2] Although human abstraction aims at the essential and universal amidst sensible data, it often misses the mark. Erring seems almost congenital to scientists as well as to horse players, stock market experts, and weather forecasters. Countless scientific theories have been shown inadequate and surpassed. Something was overlooked or a general theory was pushed beyond the evidence, which a later generation of scientists discover to the chagrin of their predecessors.[3] The Enlightenment's battle with religion wished to exclude God because the deterministic laws of Newtonian physics rendered Him superfluous; of course such determinism also abolished human freedom. Today neo-Darwinians postulate chance and randomness, not determinism at the basis of their hypotheses. In their fundamental assumptions the positions of "scientists" now and then are radically opposed.

The opposition is not just between then and now nor between physicists and evolutionary biologists. At the present time a conflict still rages in modern physics between Heisenberg and Einstein. In dealing with sub-atomic particles Heisenberg claimed that human science at best attains probabili-

ties. Einstein rejected that theory, "God does not play dice." He recognized that some absolute is necessary as a standard of measurement for all probabilities. In simple terms, unless he knows what 100% purity is, no Ivory soap salesman can claim that his product is 99.44% pure. Similarly a crapshooter knows the odds for a certain number at any single throw of the dice since each die is constructed with a limited number of faces. Consequently Einstein postulated the speed of light as his absolute constant in terms of which everything else, including space and time, is measured. Neil Bohr's rejoinder to Einstein was just as simple, "Nor is it our business to prescribe to God how He should run the world."[4] Indeed, if the speed of light is postulated as an absolute, how can it be measured? Since in Newtonian physics time and space were considered absolute objective schemas of reference, it was possible to measure motion's speed in terms of so many miles per hour or feet per second. Newton postulated the existence of space and time in God's sensorium, but when later physicists like Laplace found God "an unnecessary hypothesis," they neglected to explain where or how spatial and temporal absolutes exist and how absolute continuums might be divisible, as seems necessary for the measurement of particular, or partial, motions. [5] Einstein avoided those conundrums. But once light's speed becomes the norm of measurement, in terms of what might speed itself be measured? Clearly a norm must have something in common with what is measured, yet at the same time it transcends what is measured. The same problem emerged from Augustine's considerations of time: God's eternity has to be postulated to explain the unity of past, present, and future—without some communality they cannot be distinguished from and compared to each other—yet God's eternity cannot be measured by man's mind.[6] In all these "physical" problems, dealing with the stuff of this world, analogy is clearly involved. But analogy seems paradoxical since it affirms both similarity and dissimilarity.

Paradox and Analogy

These reflections recall the limitations of human knowledge which constantly arrives at or produces paradoxes. Space and time seem continuous and discontinuous from Zeno's paradoxes until current debates about the reality of electrons and photons: are they (continuous) waves or (discrete) particles? Yet more is involved. On the one hand human thought presupposes universally valid laws; otherwise it could wind up with contradictions or basic incomprehensibility. On the other hand the human mind cannot establish itself in its finitude and contingency as the ultimate judge of reality. Hence, human knowing oscillates between determinism and contingency. Man's cognition thereby corresponds to the hylomorphic structure of reality. Lest human inquiry be frustrated in its root, knowing presupposes a correspondence between itself and reality in one way or another. Such is the classical definition of truth. Classical philosophy understands man and all sensible reality as a combination of form and matter. Form is an intelligible universal, what can be abstracted from the hylomorphic composite. But matter is the principle of individuality, which the abstracting human mind cannot grasp in itself . Since truth involves the conformity between mind and being, i.e., reality, and "matter" cannot be understood, matter must be "non-being." Paradoxically "non-being" exists because it contributes to the constitution of the sensible world around us.

Matter is the equivalent of chaos, that which is without intelligibility. But chaos cannot be recognized unless it is contrasted with order. If everything were chaotic, language and intelligence would not exist. Inversely, if everything in sensible creation were reduced to deterministic order, no one would recognize it . The very act of recognition withdraws the subject from the object being observed and analyzed. On this basis existentialist philosophers revolted against the deterministic philosophical theories which dominated a great deal of thought at the end of the nineteenth century. By emphasizing the "alienation" of the subject, the pour-soi, from the object, the en-soi, such philosophers as Sartre and Camus arrived at the conclusion that reality is absurd. For Sartre "existence" denotes the individual and is the equivalent of "non-being." His celebrated saying that existence precedes essence, once it is translated into classical terms, means only that non-being precedes the essences formally constructed by human thought. When nothingness is king, no laws hold and absurdity rules.[7]

Such existentialism in many ways resuscitates medieval nominalism. The late medievals, however, were more pious than their twentieth century heirs. They arrived at their nominalism precisely because an infinite creator God existed, whose mind could not be fathomed. Material individuals are real and they are known by the God who created them. But the human mind can grasp neither the reality of individuals nor the mind of God. At best by approaching individuals from without the human mind can establish provisional categories permitting some pragmatic generalizations to guide action. But the nominalists trusted that a good God upheld the universe and for that reason their intellectual probings were not completely vain. Nonetheless their distrust of universals went a long way toward undercutting the analogy which instills confidence into human thought and supplies the presupposition for biblical revelation.

Freedom and Analogy

The unintelligibility of the world not only destroys the root of science but it also deprives man of any meaningful freedom. Sartre understood freedom as the arbitrary postulation of values which are created by their very choice . Not only does man suffer "anxiety" because he has no objective reason for any choice, but also the values are mortal, perishing with their "creator." [8] Sartre was doubtless revolting against the determinism of scientists like Laplace and Freud . Pushing Newtonian determinism to the extreme, the former wrote, "We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future." Freud denied human freedom lest it introduce irrationality into the world. He insisted on a necessary causal link between every choice and its determining precedents; otherwise "science" would be overthrown and with it all hope for humanity. In practice, however, Freud presupposed that his patients would be able to change their lives once they became aware of the sources of the psychological mechanisms disrupting their behavior. [9] As so often happens, theory and practice do not coincide. Abstractions do not completely cover real individuals.

Human freedom presupposes some intelligibility in the world; otherwise man would have no reason for his choice and would thus be reduced to the state of the brute beasts. Yet the intelligibility available to him cannot be exhaustive and determining. He must leave some room for indetermination or chance. Classical philosophy allowed for chance because, despite all its insistence on intelligible causes, it recognized that the coincidence of several causal series in the "here and now" cannot be totally foreseen. One can amusingly expand upon Maritain's version of Aristotle's explanation by recounting the story of the Athenian traveling from Athens to Megara.[10] Upon his departure his friends presented him with a spicy sausage. Its consumption along the journey left him thirsty. Seeing some water dripping down the side of a rock, he climbed up to its source in a pool hollowed out by time. A band of robbers, however, had selected a nearby cave for a hideaway because of its proximity to water. Emerging from their hidden den to perpetrate another crime, they were seen by the Athenian traveler. To prevent their discovery to the authorities the bandits killed the traveler. Were his friends then responsible for his death because they had given him the sausage? Certainly without the donated sausage the Athenian would not have died, but much more was involved than a sausage. One might assign causes, or reasons, for the dripping water, the position of the pool near the road, the choice of the cave, the emergence of the bandits, the presence of the Athenian, the decision to kill him, etc., but his death resulted from the coincidence of many causal series in the "here and now" or "there and then" of his murder. Since the "here and now" indicates unique position in space and time, it is equivalently "matter." Thus the presence of matter does not explain, but allows for the chance or contingency of many events. Since free acts all occur in individual "heres and nows" matter prevents history from being reduced to a determined series of events and, without denying causality, leaves room for freedom. In this way classical philosophy effects the reconciliation in theory of freedom and intelligibility. While the individual instance is not equated to the universal law or abstraction, it does not destroy the relative intelligibility required for freedom but permits the application of reason to free choice.[11]

Analogy and God

In protesting against random natural selection as the universe's guiding principle Cardinal Schönborn was defending intelligibility and ultimately science itself against the neo-Darwinians who preach randomness. Pure randomness is chaotic and meaningless. But the cardinal was also defending the Catholic position that God can be known through created works (Rom. 1:20). Naturally all the rational proofs of God's existence have to employ analogy whether they appeal to man's interior experience of knowing and loving or to his understanding of the external world. St. Anselm best synthesized the first method, arguing that the mind's necessary grounding in truth must surpass all contingency to arrive at a Being whose existence is necessary. Since the truth grounding knowledge cannot be arbitrary or contingent, yet nothing finite can ground its own existence, there must be a Being, than which noting greater can be thought, who supplies the final necessity for all thought.[12] The argument is brilliant and powerful. Its difficulty, however, resides in this dilemma. If, on the one hand, the human mind really knows by necessity, it need not go outside itself for the grounding of its thought; but that would be to absolutize the finite, rendering it necessary. If, on the other hand, the human mind belongs to a rational animal, whose being is contingent, all its arguments are laced through and through with contingency; they cannot prove necessarily. Anselm was clearly seeking to uphold the balance of analogy between Infinite and finite because he did not want to refer all human meaning to nothingness. He realized that intelligence illuminates reality, but to be consistent with itself it has to point beyond itself; the mind must turn upward if its quest for greater illumination is to be fulfilled, even if final fulfillment does not come in this life.

Analogously in their Aristotelian appeal to the sensate order of the external world St. Thomas' five ways rely on the insufficiency of the universe to explain itself. The human mind seeks causes, be they final, efficient, or formal. A formal cause responds to the question why a being is such as it is; a final cause explains why or for what purpose something acts or exists; an efficient cause seeks the why or reason for a perceived motion from without. Since regression in an infinite series of causes explains nothing—the human mind cannot comprehend the infinite, be its extension temporal, spatial, or spiritual—there must be, so goes the argument, a First Cause.[13] This First Cause must be similar to the other causes, since He is a First *Cause;* yet He is also dissimilar since as *First* Cause, He is uncaused. Analogy must be employed if the universe has an ultimate intelligibility, an answer to man's basic question "why?" The employment of analogous language is all the more indispensable if God is recognized as infinite; an infinite Cause is in His transcendence unlike all finite causes which can be opposed to their effects. Agnostics and atheists refute the "proofs" by insisting on the dissimilarity between the First Cause and all other causes; they reject the leap from the series of relative causes to an absolute First Cause. By doing so, they ultimately preclude a final intelligibility of the universe or at least one that can be affirmed by men.

Similar conundrums also arise in modern physics. In Newtonian physics an infinitely extended space and time allow for infinite causal series. But series of efficient causes in space or time are unintelligible; one never arrives at a final answer explaining the origin and goal of motion. Similarly a spatial universe infinitely extended is inconceivable. Without any center nothing can be objectively measured. Moreover since an infinitely extended universe must contain an infinite number of bodies, each exerting a gravitational attraction upon the others, the infinite force exerted must result in the splintering of finite bodies subject to their attraction. But the earth and other bodies maintain their solidity.[14] Einstein avoided such conundrums by postulating a curved space turned back upon itself.[15] There results a finite, self-contained universe apparently hanging on nothing in space. What limits it from without cannot be answered any more satisfactorily than the Hindu philosopher's postulation of an elephant standing upon a turtle standing upon a serpent, etc., to explain why the universe maintains its position in space.[16] Analogously regarding time, the Big Bang theory hypothesizes an original moment when a minute speck of reality exploded into the energy-mass continuum constituting our universe. How so much comes from next to nothing presents a problem.[17] The human mind cannot explain something from nothing nor

imagine a beginning time without a previous time. For that reason most ancient pagan philosophers rejected the Christian Creator.[18] Perhaps a similar dissatisfaction with the apparent production of something from nothing leads to string theory which tries to go behind the Big Bang's initial moment. In either case the mind is faced with a conundrum: an endless regress without possibility of finding a First Efficient Cause, or ultimate reason, on the one hand, or an absolute beginning without necessity, on the other. At all events the physicist and the philosopher have a choice: either the infinite supporting the finite structures of intelligibility is material and hence meaningless or there is a personal Infinite, whose intelligibility surpasses human intelligibility even while supporting its analogous understanding.

The Mystery of God's Love

Precisely because the Catholic Church believes in a good creator God on the basis of Jesus' resurrection, it affirms a supra-intelligibility and a supra-intelligence for the universe. Because it knows that God appeals to human freedom, human freedom can find intelligible signs indicating God's existence and will for men. Insofar as this finite world cannot explain itself in terms of itself, the reason for its being and intelligibility must lie beyond it. The finite human mind cannot comprehend God's infinite mystery, but it can have some awareness of God, reading the signs of His presence and activity in the world. The world is a parable of God for those who have he eyes to see. Just as God's infinity does not crush or exclude but create and support finitude, just as God's omnipotence does not destroy but empowers human freedom, so also God's knowledge does not render human knowledge void or superfluous but gives it its source, ground, and goal. The finite is grounded in the Infinite in its being, knowing, and acting.[19]

If the biblical God is a God of love—Christianity draws the ultimate conclusion about that in affirming a Trinity of self-giving divine persons—the human response to God should occur in freedom. Knowledge does not exist for its own sake but in order to point to the objective mystery surpassing it. Hence there must be reasons for obedience and love which cannot force the consent of faith but help to motivate and support the choice of love in return for love. In a paradisiacal world where God's goodness was readily experienced in created things, it would have been relatively easy to affirm God's existence with certitude. But in a fallen world, tainted by sin, where selfishness, suffering, and death deface the primordial goodness of the world, further signs are needed for man's sake. That is why God initiated a history of salvific revelation aimed at liberating human freedom. The great deeds done for the fathers and the people of Israel bear witness to the concrete reality of God's protective love for His people. Christians see the supreme sign of love in Jesus' death and resurrection. There, as John Paul II frequently pointed out, they learn that love is stronger than sin and death.[20] Love is not a theory excogitated by a philosopher in an easy chair. It is a reality realized on the altar of the cross, a reality rooted in the deepest depths of God. For in Jesus Love became incarnate and was lived in a human nature to the end, and that end was just the beginning for the rest of mankind. However vigorously the Catholic Church defends human reason, a necessary presupposition of freedom for love, even defining that reason can know with certitude God's existence, the reason envisaged cannot be a deterministic reason that would banish all ambiguity and freedom. For the Church simultaneously insists that faith's certitude surpasses the certitude of reason.[21] It has done so not just because de facto not many people would be willing to give their lives for the principle of contradiction while countless believers have sacrificed their lives for Jesus Christ. More profoundly, it recognizes that by accepting Jesus Christ in faith and loving Him, that choice is grounded in God Himself. Because Jesus died freely for sinners, His initiative broke their hardened hearts and converted them to Himself. In that love the greatest unity is combined with the greatest diversity. The lover seeks the greatest union with the beloved but does not seek the beloved's absorption; he wants the beloved to remain different in unity. That is the deepest truth of the Trinity which is applied analogously to man for his salvation.

In the freedom of love unity and diversity, similarity and dissimilarity are both preserved and elevated to a divine level. Thus the ultimate grounding

of analogy is love. Man is the image of God, i.e., the analogy of God, for in loving each other men love God. Only God can ground the absolute commitment and fidelity inherent in love. No finite creature dare say to another, "You have to love me; you have to give your life for me." Love happens because one is pulled out of oneself to acknowledge the goodness of another. That is the attraction of God working originally in marriage, which John Paul II identified as the primordial sacrament.[22] Once that image of love was desecrated by sin, it had to be recast in the furnace of divine love. The Incarnation marks the moment when the image of the invisible God became man, renewing man's image in a new creation so that men might become in Him who they were forever intended to be in God's eyes, the image of the God who is love (Eph. 1:3-10). Jesus is then the living analogy of God, and it is not by chance that He expressed His message in parables and gave Himself in finite symbols.[23]

Biblical religion holds that man was made in love for love. Human reason cannot explain itself, it cannot absolutize itself. In the mystery of matter, or corporeal individuality, it strikes a limit to its knowing. It is then forced in freedom to choose either to postulate a fundamental nothingness or absurdity in existence, thus denying intelligibility and destroying itself, or to transcend itself toward the infinite God of love who has made Himself known through the finite, visible structures of this world. God's love is mediated, however imperfectly, to the newborn child in and through the frail vessel of matrimony. Because humans are so weak in their love, so easily distracted, so fearful of love's sacrifice, God Himself had to strengthen the weak vessel of flesh by taking flesh upon Himself and showing of what it is capable. He demonstrated the goodness that created flesh can bear in sacrificing itself for love. Thus Christian faith presupposes and deepens faith in a creator God, and Jesus Christ is truly, in the words of Stanley Jaki, "the savior of science" as well as the redeemer of man.[24]

Back to the Neo-Darwinians

A developed notion of analogy easily resolves the difficulty invented by the *Times*' editors. Neo-Darwinians start with sensible experience. They study individual relics of bygone eras remote from themselves in time . They apply great ingenuity in teasing out similarities or connections among their "finds." But there is no straightforward line of ascent or decline. Evolutionary theories have changed so much in the thirty-five years since I first studied cultural anthropology that the assured "facts" which I learned have been superseded by new theories. There are many gaps in the record, and the relics, as befits the dead, tell no unambiguous tales. Even as new discoveries close some of the physical gaps, the riddles are not necessarily more easily deciphered. Sometimes they become even more incomprehensible, almost mysteries. The eye either sees or serves no imaginable purpose. How then did its immense complexity evolve so quickly? Similarly the enormous skeletal changes between upright man and his buckled-over simian ancestor have to be explained. How could some intermediate "link" survive if it could neither swing away in the trees from proximate danger nor see a distant peril in time for flight? How did language ever develop without teachers when a child's window of linguistic receptivity is so very limited? Why does a quantitative augmentation of cranium capacity imply a qualitative increase in intelligence? Do we really know what constitutes life? Efforts to reproduce it in laboratories have repeatedly failed, although not so long ago scientists confidently predicted the achievement of that milestone.[25]

The students of evolution have to postulate a progression toward mankind since all but the most obtuse recognize a qualitative difference between man and the beasts. But they do not understand the inherent intelligibility of that movement. God stands outside the parameters of their science since He cannot be exhumed or measured. Like many other post-Enlightenment scientists, they are wary of final causes. Like Hume, since they are limited by sensible experience, they cannot uncover a necessity connecting the various data of their discoveries. They have become more humble or at least more hypothetical in propounding their theories. That advance is to be applauded. But when any scientist "explains" any event or series of event by appeal to randomness or chance, he is not doing science. Randomness has no inherent intelligibility. At most the scientist may employ that word to indicate the limitations of his

knowledge, but to make a universal statement about the development of the human race in terms of randomness far transcends the evidence. All science deals with hypotheses since no "fact" can be recognized without a wider horizon of meaning, and that meaning does not let itself be deduced from any higher fact or proposition. All the more hypothetical must be a science whose field of experimentation consists of partial tokens of remote events.[26]

For all that neo-Darwinian evolutionists can look upon their science as the study of a random progression. They are close to material remains and, as noted above, there is no final human intelligibility in material individuals. Individual instances apparently happen at random. It is the role of intelligence to make sense out of those instances. Analogies among them are discovered in the elaboration of hypotheses, and a greater intelligence can discover wider and deeper analogies, more comprehensive theories. In that sense the study of evolution is grounded in randomness. But to insist that evolution itself is random transgresses the limits inherent to any science restricted to material instances. Were evolution ultimately random, there would be no intelligibility in the universe and all study of it would be doomed to the frustration of post-modern hypothesizing. If evolutionists wish to preserve their science as "knowledge," they might describe their method as concerned with the collection, comparison, and ordering of apparently random mutations and events, but they can never give chaos as the final explanation of the reality studied. Ultimate explanations rest with God, whose ways surpass our ways. His mysterious judgments—the mysteries of His love—have to be accepted if there is to be any hope at all for human intelligence. In his defense of design Cardinal Schönborn did evolutionists a favor. He was defending their science, encouraging them to look for intelligible signs in the universe. Admittedly the best attempts to read the signs of design in creation remain human hypotheses, subject to criticism and revision, but without divine design there would be neither analogous intelligence nor analogous science. Finally, without God there would be no resurrection, the divine sign illuminating the ambiguity of fallen existence. If that illumination empowers believers to find signs of design in creation, who can affirm that their insight is less scientific than the neo-Darwinian hypotheses? Of course the mere complexity of creation and/or the inability of a theory to explain certain "gaps" does not allow anyone to conclude immediately to God's existence. Complexity depends upon human analysis, which implies intelligibility, while the lack of intelligibility allows no conclusion whatever. Some "intelligent design" proponents are overhasty in joining the intelligibility of the one to the unintelligibility of the other in order to find God in creation.[27] The material evidence itself is ambivalent because it is offered to human freedom, but only those who find design in creation, a providential design surpassing all human reconstructions, can uphold the final meaningfulness of human reason. ✠

Endnotes

1. J. Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge,* tr. G. Phelan et alii (1959; rpt. Notre Dame: U. of Notre Dame, 1995), pp. ix-xii, 57-64, 70-72, 214-270; ----, *Sept leçons sur l'Ltre* (Paris: Tequi, 1934), pp. 23-34; ----, *Science et sagesse* (Paris: Labergerie, 1935), pp. 42-55, 63-65; ----, "On Human Knowledge," in *The Range of Reason* (New York: Scribner's, 1952), pp. 6-18.

2. In *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 16 St. Thomas indicates the analogous meanings of truth. Things are true insofar as they conform to the *species* in the mind of God on whom their very being depends (a. 1). God is the "supreme and first truth"; in accord with Scripture (Jn. 14:6), however, truth is appropriated to the Son insofar as he is conformed to His "principle," the Father (a. 5c and ad 2). In considering human truth Thomas holds that the being of things precedes the truth recognized in the human intellect (a. 3, ad 3). Indeed human truth is caught in the oscillation between the abstracted form's conformity with reality and the explicit recognition of truth's conformity with reality in judgment (a. 2). Moreover, its ultimate norm is the "first truth," which is greater than the soul, being eternal and immutable (a. 6-8), whereas the abstractions attained by the human intellect are not eternal (a. 7, ad 2). Hence truth is applied analogously to divine and human knowing but the prime analogate is God, the first truth , whose knowing is one with His being without the need of judgment (a. 5-6).

3 Cf. T. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,* 2nd ed. (Chicago: U. of Chicago, 1970), esp. pp. 92-110.

4 W. Heisenberg, "Fresh Fields (1926-1927)," in *Physics and Beyond: Encounters and Conversations*, tr. A. Pomerans (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 79-81.

5 Cf. E. Burtt, The *Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science*, 2nd ed. (1932; rpt. Garden City: Doubleday, 1954), pp. 244-264, 284-297. In response to Leibnitz's criticism Clarke defended Newton by claiming that God did not need an organ to perceive and that the sensorium was only a "similitude." (cf. A. Jammer, *Concepts of Space: The History of Theories of Space in Physics* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1957), pp. 112f. The unanswered question remains how an infinite absolute can subsist alongside God. Whether Laplace's remark in his *Système du Monde* refers to Newton's God, necessary to explain physical

problems, or to God *tout court*, can be debated since Laplace's religious convictions were not very prominent and may have been as labile as his political loyalties: cp. J. Hagen, "Laplace, Pierre-Simon," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, ed. C. Herbermann et alii, VIII, (New York: Appleton, 1910), 797, and D. Brouwer, "Laplace, Pierre Simon de," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, ed. W. McDonald et alii (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), VIII, 383. On Einstein's awareness of Newtonian problems with absolute time and space cf. his 1933 Spencer lecture "On the Method of Theoretical Physics," cited in A. Pais, "Einstein, Newton, and success," *Einstein: A Centenary Volume*, ed. A. French (Cambridge: Harvard, 1979), 35; also his popular *Relativity: The Special and General Theory,* 15th ed., tr. R. Lawson (1952; rpt. New York: Crown, 1961), pp. 9-24, 105-107. At least through Poincaré's writings Einstein was aware, previous to his special relativity insight, of problems with Newton's absolute time: cf. A. Pais, *'Subtle is the Lord…': The Science and the Life of Albert Einstein* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), pp. 133f.

6. Cf. Augustine, *Confessiones*, XI, 15-31 (18-41).

7. A. Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*, tr. J. O'Brien (New York: Random House, 1955), pp. 12-16; J. Sartre, *Existentialism*, tr. B. Frechtman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947), pp. 15-28, 56-61; ----, *Being and Nothingness*, tr. H. Barnes (1953; rpt. New York: Washington Square, 1966), pp. 9-85, 784-798.

8. Sartre, *Existentialism*, pp. 21-28, 46f.

9. The Laplace quote is from *Oeuvres Complètes* (Paris: Gautier Villars, 1878-1912), VIII, p. 144, as cited in T. Williams, *The Idea of the Miraculous: The Challenge to Science and Religion* (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 141. On Laplace's "demon" or "superhuman intelligence" to which "nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes," cf. R. Harré, "Laplace, Simon Pierre de," *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* ed. P. Edwards, VI (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 392. On Freud cf. H. Ruppelt, "Das Freiheitsverständnis in Psychologie und Ethik," *Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie 99* (1977), 25-46.

10. Maritain, *Sept leçons,* pp. 153-155; cp. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VI, 3, 1027b 1-5.

11. For the pragmatic complementarity of law and freedom (spontaneity) cf. C. Peirce, "The Doctrine of Necessity Examined," in *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1934-1935), VI, 28-45 (par. 35-64), and V. Potter, S.J., *Charles S. Peirce on Norms and Ideals* (Worcester: U. of Massachusetts, 1967), esp. pp. 133-147; in pp. 151-203 Potter shows the intimate connection of Peirce's epistemology with his evolutionary theory. Peirce held that mechanical determinism and evolutionism were incompatible (ibid., p. 151). Though our view is similar to Peirce's, we do not see evolution as a necessary consequence of the tensions uncovered. The tensions preserve the room for freedom and allow for evolution but—contrary to Peirce—do not demand it.

12. Anslem, *Proslogion*, I, 1-5.

13. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 2, a. 3.

14. S. Hawkins, *A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes* (Toronto: Bantam, 1988), p. 5, cites a letter of Newton to Bentley in favor of a universe infinitely extended; the universe would not crunch together because infinity has no center. But Einstein, pp. 105f., sees that the infinite lines of force on any body would result in a field of infinite intensity, which is impossible; hence he argues that Newton had to postulate for his universe "a kind of center in which the density of the stars is a maximum, and that as we proceed outwards from this centre the group-density of the stars would diminish, until finally, at great distances, it is succeeded by an infinite region of emptiness." This postulation, however, he also found insufficient.

15. Einstein, pp. 105-114. As Hawkins points out, pp. 40, 151, to explain why the universe would not collapse upon itself Einstein postulated a "cosmological constant" whereby the space-time continuum has "an inbuilt tendency to expand," and this constant would "balance exactly the attraction of all the matter in the universe" so that a stable, static universe results. Hubble's discovery of an expanding universe showed the superfluousness of this constant which Einstein called "the biggest mistake of his life."

16. Although upholders of general relativity theory try to maintain the unintelligibility of such questions, the questions are unintelligible only within their system. The mathematical construction of Riemannian space depends for basic concepts upon Euclidean geometry, which is then transcended. But the origin of transcendence, be it Euclidean geometry or ordinary experience, can never be obliterated by later speculative constructions. Precisely because Euclid employed abstractions—a dimensionless point does not exist in the real world—his geometry falls short of reality and thus leaves room for other explanations. But all other geometries likewise fall short of reality. They employ abstractions. Hence it is permissible to ask in what space or on what a finite universe stands. W. Heisenberg, *Physics and Philosophy* (1958; rpt. New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 56, 175-176, 200-2002, recognized the validity of Euclidean geometry in its sphere and noted that the concepts of ordinary language are more stable than scientific concepts because the former are closer to reality whereas the latter are "idealizations." In particular "the concept of infinity leads to contradictions that have been analyzed, but it would be practically impossible to construct the main parts of mathematics without this concept." One might add, because abstractions from ordinary experience fall short of reality, they break down at the edges, the infinitely small and the enormously large, but the language developed to explain the edges must refer to the primary concepts to which they are complementary. Cf. ibid., p. 125: "Every word or concept, clear as it may seem to be, has only a limited range of applicability." Man's self-conscious, reflective unity-in-duality, means that metaphysics complements physics, metalanguage complements language, statistical analyses and classical laws complement each other, and various physical theories complement Newton's. Maritain, *Degrees*, pp. 43f., n. 30, 175-179, relying on Gonseth, defends Euclidean geometry as the basis of non-Euclidean geometries: though non-Euclidean geometries contain Euclidean geometry as a limit case, they "can themselves, however, be constructed with the aid of Euclidean material"; paradoxically "each appears in turn to be contained in the other, or to contain it." We disagree, however, with the early Maritain by seeing Euclidean geometry as only an abstraction that falls short of reality: Cf. J. McDermott, S.J., "Maritain: Natural Science, Philosophy and Theology," in *Teologia e scienze nel mondo contemporaneo*, ed. D. Mongillo (Milan: Massimo, 1989), 227-244, where we note how the late Maritain approaches our position.

17. Hawkins, p. 46, notes that at the Big Bang moment "the density of the universe and the curvature of space-time would have been infinite," yet "because mathematics cannot really handle infinite numbers, … the general theory of relativity … itself breaks down."

18. Cf. Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, XI, 4; R. Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995), pp. 102f. For Aristotle's position cf. *Phy.* VIII, 1f. 250b11-253a21; 6-8 258b10-265a12; *De caelo* III, 2 302a1-9; *Metaphy.* III, 4 999b4-16; VII, 7; 1032b30f.; XII, 6 1071b6-11; for Plotinus cf. *Enneads* II, 4, 5; III, 2, 1; V, 8, 14; 18, 9. Most of

Plato's ancient interpreters understood the *Timaeus' arche* to regard a metaphysical, not a temporal, principle: Wallis, pp. 20, 65, 68, 77, 102f.

19. For the metaphysical grounding of these statements cf. J. McDermott, S.J., "Faith, Reason, and Freedom," *Irish Theological Quarterly 67* (2002), 307-332.

20. Cf. *Redemptor Hominis* 9; *Dives in Misericordia* 8; *Evangelium Vitae* 51, 81, 86.

21. In claiming that "nothing is more certain nor more secure than our faith" Pius IX referred to external signs of credibility (DS 2780). Yet the previous tradition referred faith to God's freely given grace (DS 375, 378, 396-400, 1525, 1553, 2813) with which man must cooperate for salvation (DS 1525, 1554f.). Faithful to it, Vatican I recognized that faith involves a free act which cannot "be produced necessarily by arguments of human reason" (DS 3035, 3010); consequently the Council Fathers added to those external signs the "internal helps of the Holy Spirit" so that the former might be "most certain signs of divine revelation adapted to every intelligence" (DS 3009f., 3033f.); as a result faith relies on "a most firm foundation" and "none can ever have a just reason for changing or doubting that same faith" (DS 3014, 3036; 2119-2121). Cf. also Pius XII (DS 3876).

22. *Mulieris Dignitatem* 29; *The Theology of the Body: Human Love in the Divine Plan* (Boston: Pauline, 1997), pp. 76, 333-336, 341-354.

23. "Parable" properly understood finds its deepest grounding in "sacrament": cf. J. McDermott, S.J., "Jesus: Parable or Sacrament of God? An Ecumenical Discussion on Analogy and Freedom with E. Schweizer, K. Barth, and R. Bultmann," *Gregorianum* 78 (1997), 477-499; 79 (1998), 543-564.

24. S. Jaki, O.S.B., *The Savior of Science* (Washington: Regnery Gateway, 1988).

25. In his discourse to the Pontifical Academy of the Sciences, August 22, 1996, John Paul II spoke of "an ontological jump" that occurs when man is considered. But he found the discontinuity to depend upon a different point of view from "the sciences of observation" dealing with the "experimental level" since man's spiritual moral conscience and freedom are not caught by them (*Insegnamenti di Giovanni Paolo II*, XIX/2-1996 (Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1998), 574f. The discontinuities, or "gaps," to which our text refers, however, are problems to sciences of observation. Modern studies in DNA may reveal how an apparently small change in regulatory genes can effect momentous changes in morphological and physiological aspects of the organisms involved. But why the changes should occur at all and at the time that they do and why they should advantageously adapt the organisms to their environment and not produce monstrosities so different from their environmentally adapted parents, monstrosities which would normally be condemned to a quick extinction, that is a mystery. Here the appeal to randomness means that human science has hit an obstacle. But such successful adaptations of complex organisms to complex environments open up the possibility of other explanations. As C. Peirce noted, when mechanistic explanations break down, as break down they must, final causality can enter into play, indeed must enter into play if there is to be any hope of an intelligible explanation of the phenomena in question: cf. Potter, pp. 110-122, 126f., 132f., 136, 140-146, 173-190.

26. K. Miller, *Finding Darwin's God: A Scientist's Search for Common Ground Between God and Evolution* (New York: HarperColliins, 1999), pp. 53f., distinguishes the "fact" of evolution, grounded on so much evidence, from various theories of evolution dealing with the mechanisms of change. But evolution is more than change, and every theory accepts as evidence only what fits the theory. In the nineteenth century physicists considered gravitation a fact, but their understanding of gravitation was to be very much altered by Einstein; likewise Aristotle's gravitation was very different from Newton's. New questions may provide new parameters and change the biologist's understanding of evidence. Cf. following note.

27. K. Miller, pp. 57-164, well uncovers the inconsistencies and difficulties in major proponents of "intelligent design." His own reliance upon Darwinian biological mechanism to explain evolution does not admit final causes. Yet he realizes that quantum physics excludes pure determinism and so opens the way to a reconciliation of evolution with human freedom and divine providence. A point very well made. But once randomness is introduced into an explanatory science, "mechanism," understood as a necessitating chain of efficient causes, can no longer suffice as an explanation. Room is left for other types of causes. Common sense teaches that the body is not a machine but has an implanted teleology. Biological laws are not simply reduced to laws of physics. Why should not final cause also be admitted as a complementary way of explaining biological processes and "evolution"? Admittedly such an approach does not fit present biological methodology, so influenced by nineteenth century mechanism. Nonetheless, just as quantitative analyses cannot deny qualitative differences, so efficient causality cannot exclude final causality. Precisely because neither approach can be reduced to the other, they should be complementary. If there were no final causes in nature, man's freedom, which acts for purposes, would be entirely unnatural, opposed to nature. Finally, in considering natural selection an automatic mechanism, a conflict, and evolution's "driving force" (pp. 7f., 48-51, 107), biologists mix metaphors. Mechanisms do not fight, selection implies a choice, and a dynamism requires a goal in order to be intelligible. Otherwise the term is more a tautology than an explanation: the fittest survive because those who survive are considered fittest (cf. K. Gallagher, "'Natural Selection': A Tautology?" *International Philosophical Quarterly* 29 (1989), 17-31.)

Cardinal Ratzinger on What Is Behind the Proposed Constitution of the European Union

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The ever growing complexity of the collaboration of the different states composing the European Union, questions of competence, of representation, of the division of the burdens to be imposed on the individual countries and the compensation payments each of them should receive has led to the idea of working out a sort of constitution which for the next years would regulate and even partly determine the economic, social and political life in the union states. On April 1, 2005, at Subiaco, the cradle of the Benedictine order, just a few weeks before his election as Pope, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger held an important conference on the spiritual problems of Europe today, which textually refers to the proposed constitution.[1] Meanwhile, the citizens of France and The Netherlands voted this project down. Juridically it is finished, but nevertheless the Commission in Brussels, which never cared very much about the feelings of the people, who—so it thought—could not understand anyhow the complexity of things, seems inclined to go on as if nothing ever happened. It is precisely this arrogance which made many citizens of the above two countries vote against the text. Other factors which led to the negative vote were the fear of losing one's national prerogatives, juridical system, educational policy, social protection, fear of globalization and delocalizations, an enormous increase in bureaucratic administration, and for some voters, their opposition against the refusal of the promoters of the text, to acknowledge the Christian roots of our European culture. This question was often seen as connected with the attempts of the Commission, probably prodded by large companies and some government leaders, to let Turkey with its 80,000,000 people enter into the community, very much against the will of the majority of the population in several countries.

Now earlier already Cardinal Ratzinger had issued a warning that Turkey is not a European country and that, at best, a sort of economic association should be proposed to it. In this difficult situation the conference of the Cardinal who had been until the death of John-Paul II the Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, is of importance and may foreshadow the future stand of the Holy See in this question. Besides being an in-depth analysis of our modern Western laicist culture, it indirectly is an invitation to Christians to fight for the preservation of the Christian heritage in Western culture over and against a pervasive secularist culture.

At the beginning of his conference, the Cardinal depicts the spiritual situation of contemporary Western Europe: moral strength has not kept pace with the growth in economic prosperity, although one could say that in our new cultural situation a certain new morality has emerged: human rights are on the lips of all, as is the cause of peace and the preservation of our natural environment. But this new morality is above all a morality addressed to others, of far too little appeal, however, to ourselves. This new morality is in several ways deprived of a serene rationality and comes close to being a utopia. However, Europe had once been Christian. Not that Christianity originated in Europe, but in Europe it has received its cultural and intellectual characteristics, and so it remains related in a very special way to Europe. It is also true, the Cardinal goes on, that the same Europe developed a scientific rationality which made possible the rise of the sciences and technology and brought about a certain unification of the world. However, precisely in the line of this rationality "Europe has developed a culture which, in a way hitherto unknown to man, excludes God or is felt to belong to the domain of private choice". The Cardinal notes that this exclusion of God from public life has led to profound changes in people's views about morality. The morality of our actions is now measured and calculated by the yardstick of the results obtained and the amount of freedom we act with. Actions are no longer good or bad by themselves, but

only because of their consequences. "If on the one hand Christianity has found its most efficacious form in Europe, we must admit that, on the other hand, in Europe a culture has developed which is the most radical contradiction not only of Christianity but also of the religious traditions of mankind". This shows the urgency of taking part in the discussion about Europe: the issue is not that of some nostalgic feelings about the past or a sort of battle of the rearguard, but one of the greatest responsibilities of mankind today.

Cardinal Ratzinger points out that, although the new constitution guarantees the institutional rights of the churches, in the text about the foundations of Europe, no mention is made of them. It was argued that recalling the Christian roots of Europe would hurt the feelings of many non-Christians now living in Europe. But he brushes aside this argument: in the first place these Christian roots are a historical fact. Who can reasonably deny it? Whose identity would be threatened by such a reference? The Moslems do not feel threatened by the moral doctrine of Christianity but by the cynical mentality of a secularized culture. Our Jewish citizens could hardly feel offended by such a reference which in the last analysis points back to the Decalogue. It is not the reference to God in the text which would offend the members of other religions but rather the attempt to construct a human society without God.

The refusal of the protagonists of this text to include these references is apparently based on the assumption that only the culture of the Age of Reason which seems to have reached its apex in our time, is the real soul of our civilization. Religions may co-exist with it, provided they respect the criteria of this enlightened culture and remain subordinated to it. Next, Cardinal Ratzinger points out that freedom occupies the center of this new vision, so that everything else is subordinated to it, to such a point that the insistence of the right to freedom may be turned into a weapon against the Church under the pretext of discrimination, e.g. when Christianity is attacked because it teaches that homosexual behavior is, objectively, a serious disturbance of the natural order or when the Magisterium says that the Church does not have the right and the power to admit women to the sacred orders—a doctrine considered by some as being at variance with the spirit of the new constitution.

Furthermore, every country which subscribes to the culture of the Enlightenment can become a member of the European Union, since there no longer is any other criterion of identity, besides perhaps a certain level of prosperity and, of course, the acceptance of this culture of the Enlightenment. However, it is far from certain that the thought and doctrine behind this culture is suited to all nations with their different histories and cultures, just as one dos not find in every society the sociological prerequisites for democracy. Likewise, the complete neutrality of the state with regard to religions must be considered an illusion in most historical contexts.

In the following section of his conference the Cardinal gives a fine analysis of certain aspects of this modern culture one can approve of: religion cannot be imposed by the state, but is a matter of free choice of the citizens; respect of man's fundamental rights; separation of the powers in the state and the control of these powers. Leaving aside the fact that these aspects cannot always be transplanted in totally different cultural areas, it is another question whether this culture of the Enlightenment can be considered the last world of human reason as common to all men. Its philosophical orientation is positivist and even anti-metaphysical, so that in the last analysis God finds no place in it. It is based on a self-imposed restriction of reason to a positivist dimension, adapted to the sciences and technology, but which leads to a maiming of man. Man no longer acknowledges any moral authority other than his own reason.

Outwardly this culture seems to be universal, but in reality it is connected to the particular situation of the West. It cuts itself loose from its roots, and so is in danger of losing its vitality and purposiveness. It leads to the use of people as warehouses of organs, it provokes the phenomenon of terrorism. The protagonists of the sciences even go so far as to say that man is not really free and is not much better than the other forms of living beings on our planet. Cardinal Ratzinger concludes stating that this culture is not sufficient. It is of the expression of an adequate reasonableness; it cannot relegate its historical roots to an irretrievably lost past, for a tree without roots dries out.

The refusal to give God a place in the new constitution is not just a sign of tolerance in respect of other religions or of atheism. Rather it is the expression of a mentality which wants to wipe the thought of God out from the public life of mankind and shut it up in the restricted area of relics of the past, since it asserts that religion belongs to a stage of history we have now definitively left behind. The Cardinal next dwells on the fact that Christianity is the religion of reason, of the *logos*, of reasonableness. It refused to accept that the state brought religions under its power; it proclaimed the equality of all men, who share the same dignity for having been created after the image of God. In fact, Christianity has always cherished philosophy and promoted the sciences. In this respect it agrees with the thought of the Enlightenment, but it differs in that it teaches that the world owes its origin to the divine Logos, not to irrationality.

The Cardinal invites the Christians to remain faithful to this vision of the Creative Logos and to be open-minded to whatever is supremely reasonable. He appeals to non-believers reminding them of the argument of Kant and Pascal: since without God mankind comes closer to an abysmal disaster, it would be wise for them to live and act *veluti si Deus daretur*, as if God did exist. Christians who professed their faith in words, but denied God by their deeds, have caused much harm. Only through men touched by God can God come back to us. We need people such as Benedict of Norcia, who in an era of decadence, withdrew into solitude to come back into the open, after a period of purification, to propose the elements of a new order. ✠

FOOTNOTE

1. For the text, see the quarterly *Culture e Fede—Cultures and Faith,* Vol. XIII, No. 2, Vatican City 2005, pp. 88-98: "L'Europa nella crisi della culture."

For the occasion of the centenary of his birth: 1905-2005

A Historical Correction and an Introduction to Cardinal Jean Daniélou's *Carnets Spirituels*

(Paris: Cerf, 1993)

Brian van Hove, S.J., White House Retreat, St. Louis

First of all this must be a correction. In 1978 I was the translator for the article "Jean Daniélou" by Marie-Josèphe Rondeau which later appeared in the *New Catholic Encyclopedia / Supplement: Change in the Church* (vol. 17; Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1979, 172-173 / 5 cols.). The announcement of the publication of the *Carnets Spirituels* ("spiritual notebooks") went out by means of this encyclopedia entry in English, and the book was prematurely advertised in France, when at the last minute the family of the late Jesuit cardinal prevented the publication of the book. They felt it was too private and personal to be read by the general public. The galleys circulated privately among a small circle, but the efforts to have it published were successful only in late 1993. The updated 2002 second edition of the New Catholic Encyclopedia is accurate on this particular point (vol. 4; 514-516), though the unabridged version of that article, minus the bibliography, appears only in the *Fellowship of Catholic Scholars Quarterly* (28:2; Summer 2005; 26-29).

A year following publication of the *Carnets Spirituels*, Cardinal Paul Poupard reviewed Daniélou's posthumous book in L'Osservatore Romano under the title "Il grande oceano tranquillo della preghiera" (Wednesday, 23 February 1994, 16). Of course some attention was given to the work in France. But let it not be forgotten that 1994 was the twentieth anniversary of the death of Daniélou who died suddenly in Paris in 1974. A memorial Mass was held there in

the Church of St. Ignatius. Attending were Cardinal Jean-Marie Lustiger and Father Jacques Orgebin, S.J., the Jesuit provincial of France. It was a belated but happy moment to see the Carnets Spirituels at last in print, though today there is still no translation from the French into other languages.

There were unjust rumors and newspaper reports which circulated at the time of the cardinal's death. The full details of this painful episode have been published and are available in the *Bulletin des Amis du Cardinal Daniélou* in the article "Le Père de Lubac et le Père Daniélou" (19; October 1993; 49-65, especially 52-54).

The *Carnets Spirituels* are notes taken during his annual retreats between 1936 and 1957, with the bulk represented by his tertianship or "school of the heart" period in 1940. Europe had changed and was at war in 1940, and France was one of the casualties of that war. The French Jesuits making their tertianship or "third probation" were beset by anxieties. Yet Daniélou had an unshakeable faith in God, and a thirst for His grace. He is hard on himself, and reproaches himself often for his failures and self-centeredness, for being distracted, for not being wholly centered on the Lord. The notes are filled with references to scripture, the Fathers, poetry, and theology. But especially he cites the liturgy—he loved the rich liturgy of the Church, and was steeped in its prayers. Though the world around him was disturbed, there is a serenity found in this kind of spiritual writing, something rare today, perhaps no longer possible. Someone once observed that he had almost a monastic trait, a contemplative's serenity. He wrote: "Spiritualité de la Compagnie: non le dénouement effectif de Jean de la Croix, mais la désappropriation entière et Dieu trouvé dans toutes les créatures; l'entière, délicate docilité à l'Esprit." (CS, 359) We become what we devote ourselves to, and from his attachment to the ancient Fathers he had assimilated some of their qualities.

Jean Daniélou was ordained a priest in 1938, and made a bishop and a cardinal in 1969, probably over his initial protest. But his defense of the honor of Paul VI in the remaining five years of his life is rooted in the notes he interiorized from tertianship when he pleaded for the grace of apostolic zeal. (CS, 241). The likely cause of his death was from exertion in the warm outdoors during the exhausting procession celebrated in the little town of Tréguier in Brittany the day before he died. He was known for not taking care of his health. Ever himself the Bréton, the cardinal wanted to be close to the simple folk who were the Church. Folk piety was not for him superstition, as the rationalists would have it, but the symbolic world whereby the humble, God's little ones, express their deepest faith in the Living God.

Some of his contemporary academics criticized the professional career of Daniélou and said that in his latter years his work was done in haste and that he engaged in mere popularization. For these particular writings, see the *FCS Quarterly* article mentioned above (29, col. 2). Be that as it may, his motivation was still the same—love of the cross, love of the Catholic Church, love of Divine Love incarnate in Jesus.

Even though these notes do not include his retreats during and after the Second Vatican Council, we get a view of the fresh idealism that was Daniélou's as a young Jesuit. These journal entries are not abstract or polemical. In fact, often they are personal informal jottings. This is why his family objected to their publication. But taken as a whole they are the type of spiritual diary known to be kept by saints, the journal of the soul, the record of success and failure in following Christ, the search for grace—and the joy of the Holy Spirit. Though they appeared in book form some years later than first anticipated, no reader will be disappointed in these meditations. For those too young to have been familiar with an older type of religious formation, or for those unacquainted with Daniélou's dense literary references, Professor M.-J. Rondeau has provided hundreds of explanatory footnotes.

The younger generation may well be inspired by the life of this superb patristics scholar who was a faithful Religious and priest. His launching of the collection *Sources Chrétiennes* merits special attention and this project alone would assure him a place in church history. But the *Carnets Spirituels* reveal both the source of his productivity and what was working in his soul. ✠

St. Bernard Commencement Address

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May 29, 2005

A friend of mine tells the story of a German diplomat who called informally upon the home of a ranking officer of the U.S. Navy. The German ambassador was appalled to find the admiral on a stepladder taking down screens and replacing them with storm windows. That should be the lot of a workman, not that of a naval officer. Most of us would recognize, as the aristocratic German did not, that such is the American way. It is also the Benedictine way. The motto of the Benedictine Order may be summarized in three words: *Ora et Labora*. The distinguished historian Lynn White, Jr. has said of the Benedictines that they were the first intellectuals in the history of the West to get dirt under their fingernails. In the ancient world of Greece and Rome, manual labor was the lot of the slave, but Benedict prescribed for his followers both work and prayer. In an agricultural society, that work necessarily entailed dirt under the fingernails or something similar. You who are graduating from St. Bernard are faced, if not with the prospect of dirt under your fingernails, then with some other form of labor. You know you will have to work to earn a living. You will have to choose, if not immediately a career, at least a field of further study, and you may have yet to choose where to study. Like the Benedictine you are not exempt from work, and like the Benedictine you are not exempt from *Ora*, that is, from the cultivation of the interior life, a life of intellect and spirituality.

One of Benedict's earliest disciples was Cassiodorus, one of the most learned men of his day. He lived from 490 to 585. Cassiodorus in advanced age was himself to found the Monastery of Vivarium on the family estate at Squillace. As a classicist, Cassiodorus saw the need for the preservation of the ancient literature of Greece and Rome, texts which formed the minds of Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, and Clement of Alexander, early Fathers of the Church, as they employed the philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics in their efforts to elucidate the teaching of the Gospels. Cassiodorus set his monks to copying those ancient texts. Though Benedict did not intend it, within his own lifetime, monasteries became centers of learning and were soon famous for their scriptoria where the classics of antiquity were copied for posterity. The Rule of St. Benedict specifically enjoins the monastic librarian to acquire new works, so the copying of manuscripts was well within the spirit of the Rule. By the thirteenth century there were more than 700 Benedictine monasteries spread across Europe. Some were to be numbered among the great cultural centers of Europe. Independent schools emerged in the abbeys, each seeking to outrival the others by increasing its library, by attracting professors of renown, and by drawing students to its intellectual tournaments. These schools promoted the study of the sciences and were to create a legion of remarkable theologians, philosophers, lawyers, and scientists. We need but cite the schools of Cluny, Citeau, Bec, Aurillac, St. Martin, and St. Omer. A roll call of the leading scholars of the age, from Gregory through Bede, Lanfranc and Anselm, would name the abbots of many of those monasteries. The twelfth-century Benedictine, Bernard of Clairvaux, became an author almost against his will. His books and monographs grew out of lectures recorded by fellow monks who circulated them, sometimes without his knowledge and often without his editorial scrutiny. A Brother Godfrey asks him to write about the virtue of humility, and the result is *De Gradibus Humilitatis*. Thus did St. Bernard's works become part of our intellectual and spiritual heritage.

As fascinating as it is, the point to this historical excursion is the recognition of an obligation we owe to ourselves, summed up in those three words, *Ora et Labora*. *Who are We?* is the title of last summer's best-selling book by Harvard University's Professor Samuel P. Huntington. Part of the answer is to be found by examining the history of Western civilization. We are at once children of Jerusalem, Athens, and Monte Cassino. Our contact with the past is in part the result of those medieval scriptoria that preserved for us the Hellenic and Christian sources of our culture. We are enjoined to master the past in order to understand the present, a life-long endeavor. Professional and technical proficiency must be complemented by the component we call a liberal education. Tutored within the ambience of a Benedictine community you have been launched intellectually to appreciate the permanent things. Material success will not alone satisfy you. To know one's

self is to know the goods of the soul, to know one's place in the divine schema of things, to know God Himself, through His works and through Revelation. So equipped one is able to confront the vicissitudes of life. But let me add a footnote or two.

It is with reason that St. Benedict has been called "The Father of Western civilization." It is with reason that the Church has named him patron saint of Europe. And it is with reason that our new pope has called himself Benedict. Some years ago, the American philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, taking the measure of Europe's cultural decline and its repudiation of its Christian roots, compared the present state of Europe with the decline of the late Roman empire. Not without hope, he wrote, "We are waiting not for Godot but for another—doubtless very different—St. Benedict." In Benedict XVI we will find a clear voice calling upon Europe in the interest of self-preservation to acknowledge its classical and Christian roots.

Most of you recognize the name of Tony Hillerman, the writer whose mystery stories you may have read or seem dramatized in a PBS television series. It is little known that Tony Hillerman began an important part of his education as a result of his contact with the Benedictines at Sacred Heart, Oklahoma. While Hillerman was still a youngster, the Benedictines found it necessary to close their school at Sacred Heart in order to establish St. Gregory's College at Shawnee Mission. After the move, Hillerman chanced upon in a rectory storeroom a stack of boxes containing books that were somehow left behind. One day after Mass, Hillerman told the young pastor, Fr. Bernard, that he would be pleased to sort the books and make a list for him. Sort and making a list entailed sampling their content. The books were in Greek, Latin, French, and German. The works in metaphysics and theology eluded him at the time, but there were others that commanded his interest: *Plutarch's Lives*, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Tom Brown's School Days, Post Bellum Cotton Economy on the Mississippi Delta*, the *Lives of the Saints*, Prescott's *Conquest of Mexico*, Washington Irving's *Conquest of Granada*, Darwin's *The Origin of Species*. Such reading brought forth from the "founder and sole patron" of the newly created library an endless source of questions put to Fr. Bernard, who became a sort of philosophical/spiritual advisor. Fr. Bernard was to assure him that "the evolutionary theory (of Darwin) was simply a brilliant scientist's explanation to help us understand the dazzling complexity of God's creation." I have little doubt that Hillerman's treasure trove of books helped to launch him on what was to become his career as a successful journalist and writer.

And now a prediction. I predict that, like Tony Hillerman, you who are graduating today, in the years to come will cherish the insights and wisdom you have gained from your Benedictine experience.

Congratulations to both you and your parents. ✠

Relativity and Religion

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The year 2005, which is the centenary of Einstein's formulation of special relativity, had not yet started when the world already resounded with encomiums of Einstein's greatness, as if it had no limits. Such presumption must have been strong for some time, otherwise *TIME* would not have advertised itself with a reference to Einstein on September 24, 1979. The ad, which claimed that *TIME* was the most colorful coverage of the week, showed the pensive face of Einstein on the top and under it the line in bold-faced letters: "Everything is relative." Then there followed the proof: "In the cool, beautiful language of mathematics Einstein demonstrated that we live in a world of relative values." What this suggested was that everything was relative.

This ad was followed on November 12 with another full page ad. This time the picture of two ballet celebrities served to catch the eye and blind the intellect. The text began: "News, like beauty, is often in the eye of the beholder." Since such is the case almost all the time, implicitly it was also claimed that the subject defined truth. And this is full fledged relativism. Did Einstein ever prove relativism? Or can it be proved by relativity?

Relativism has received renewed endorsements ever since the year 2005 got under way. Since exactly a hundred years earlier Einstein also published two other and equally important papers, the year has become the "annus mirabilis" of physics. In the paper on the photoelectric effect Einstein argued that it can be explained if atoms

emit and absorb energy in quanta, a most revolutionary notion at that time. In the other he showed that the so-called Brownian motion implies discontinuities on the atomic level. For each of the three papers Einstein could have deserved the Nobel Prize, which came to him only in 1922 for his explanation of the photoelectric effect.

By then Einstein had presented his relativity theory also in a general form in five papers published between 1913 and 1917. In one of them Einstein predicted that light would bend around very heavy objects such as our sun. When in connection with the total solar eclipse visible in West Africa this prediction was verified by a group of British astronomers, Einstein's name became a household word. Some began to speak of him as the greatest man who had ever lived on our planet, a cliché expressive of journalistic hype. Einstein, for one, never failed to speak of Newton as the greatest physicist ever.

Einstein the man is a different story, especially if one considers him in the light of his statements relating to religion. Two years after Einstein catapulted into world fame, he made a statement on science and religion which remains his most incisive as well as most ignored utterance on the subject. The circumstances deserve to be told in some detail, because they bear very much on poorly articulated notions and unfounded apprehensions as to what science can do to religion and what men of religion may expect or should not expect from science.

The circumstances have much to do with Viscount Haldane, a lawyer and also an MP from East Lothian from 1885 on for twenty six years. Haldane eventually became a member of various cabinets, and a reformer of the British military system just before World War I. His real interest lay, however, with philosophizing. He was a champion of "a sort of Neo-Hegelianism which he expounded with much energy and little clarity." So goes a statement in the article on Haldane in the *British Encyclopedia*.

Haldane gained repute as a philosopher after the University of St. Andrews invited him 1899 to deliver two series of Gifford Lectures. These Haldane published in 1903 under the title *Pathways to Reality*, in which as a Neo-Hegelian he emphasized ideas and slighted data. In that two-volume work references to science could be counted on one's fingers. Worse, Haldane failed to define what he meant by religion or by science. He kept writing philosophy during all the turmoils, political and military, of World War I. Otherwise, his book *The Reign of Relativity* would not have been ready for printing by the end of that terrible slaughter of mankind. One wonders whether its victims, more than twenty million, would have found comfort in the message that provisionally at least, all was relative. Eventually, however, science would make all clear—a statement worthy of a non-scientist unaware of the perplexities felt on occasion by scientists about their craft.

In the wake of World War I, Haldane was keen to re-establish cultural relations with Germany and he seized on the world fame accrued to Einstein through the eclipse observation in 1919 as a welcome means of promoting that aim. On learning that Einstein was on a lecture tour in the United States in May 1921, Haldane asked him that on his return to Germany he stop in London and deliver a lecture on relativity. Haldane played host to Einstein and saw to it that Einstein met some of the leading British minds, among them Bernard Shaw and Whitehead.

As a devout evangelical Haldane involved also Randall Thomas Davidson, Archbishop of Canterbury, who was most eager to meet Einstein and fathom his views on the bearing of relativity on religion. To bring Einstein and the Archbishop together needed only a gala dinner at which Haldane made the Archbishop sit next to Einstein. By then the Archbishop had received two conflicting views on that bearing. One was from Haldane himself who held the theory of relativity to be of great importance to religion. The opposite view came from J. J. Thomson, then the grand old man of British science. Now the Archbishop wanted to learn the truth from Einstein himself. During the dinner with Haldane sitting close to the two, the Archbishop turned to Einstein: "Lord Haldane tells us that your theory ought to make a great difference to our morals." Einstein replied: "Do not believe a word of it. It makes no difference. It is purely abstract—science." So it is reported in the Archbishop's standard biography. According to another version, which is in Philipp Frank's *Einstein. His Life and Times*, the Archbishop asked, "What effect would relativity have on religion?" Einstein's replied, "None. Relativity is a purely scientific matter and has nothing to do with religion."

Of the two versions, with essentially the same message, the first may seem to be the more authentic. At any rate, by 1921 Einstein had made statements which had a heavy bearing on religion, if one takes for religion's starting point belief in "the Maker of heaven and earth," the standard form of belief in the Creator of the Universe. Einstein held the universe to be the ultimate entity, and as such essentially immutable. In the ultimate installment of his papers on general relativity, a paper on its cosmological consequences (1917), he presented a finite and static universe which being static had to be

immutable in its broad features. Later he spoke of his general theory of relativity as being so perfect that even God would not be able to improve on it.

Einstein was not enough of a philosopher to see that his four-dimensional world model, with a finite mass which could be computed in terms of that model, had the kind of "suchness," which in all other respects, too, prompts intellectual curiosity for a satisfactory answer. With everyday things the suchness of one object can be traced to that of another, and so on, a procedure which can be continued indefinitely as long as one ignores the fatuity of regressing to infinity. In philosophy as in politics, the buck must stop somewhere. Postponing problems endlessly will only land one in endless perplexities. Had Einstein noticed this he might have said, as Leibniz had done long before him, that the suchness of things and especially of their totality forces one to postulate an ultimate in intelligibility and being, or God, in brief.

Though a very great scientist, Einstein was far from being a great philosopher, in spite of his being greatly committed to philosophizing in his non-scientific hours. One of his philosophical idols was Spinoza, who held that the universe, infinite in the Euclidean sense, was the ultimate entity. But then the question arose: how within such an ultimate infinity could finite things arise, indeed the fact that all things observed are finite. The question was posed to Spinoza by Tschirnhausen, a gentleman philosopher from Heidelberg. Spinoza was taken aback by the question, to which he promised an answer but never gave one. To make the irony complete or to reveal in full something of Spinoza's philosophical myopia, it may also be recalled that Spinoza presented his views on the cosmos in a book which had for its title, *Ethica, more geometrico demonstrata*. In that ethics there could be no room for free will, the very basis of ethics, or for purpose. Neither free will nor purpose can be spoken of in terms of geometry, whether three-dimensional, four-dimensional, multi-dimensional or even more esoterically complex for mere mortals who have no Ph. D. in string theories.

Geometry is a manipulation of spatial notions that can be transposed into numbers. As such, geometry can deliver only quantitative relations and nothing more. Therein lies the clue to the relation of religion and science, provided scientists and theologians are ready to take that clue in its utter seriousness. If they are reluctant to do so, they will keep dishing out pleasing platitudes of which the vast literature on science and religion is becoming chock full. It is a cultural curse that some contributors to that literature receive prestigious awards although they fail to give their definition of religion and even of science, even when they boast of a Nobel Prize in physics. As to religion their dicta on it often boil down to the admiration of a sunset or a bouquet of flowers. No reference in their answers to the tree that served as the cross of Christ, which remains a scandal for agnostics and a laughing stock for atheists.

Einstein was a Spinozist in his denial of the existence of a personal Creator who was free to create, that is, to bring into existence this or that of an infinite number of possible universes. He was Spinozist also in his denial of free will. "Objectively, there is, after all, no free will," he wrote to a friend, O. Juliusburger, on April 11, 1946. Four years later, he wrote the same to a 19-year-old student who turned to him in desperation for advice on the purpose of life. He received the advice of a Stoic.

Still Einstein had several moments of perplexity that relate very much to religion. When a few years after the observation of the bending of light, word came about the fact that most galaxies seem to be running away from one another, Einstein was visibly disturbed. He may have perceived that the red-shift in the spectrum of galaxies, a proof of their recessional velocity, was eerily reminiscent of what most middle-aged men notice when they look in the mirror. On finding that their hairlines keep receding they are reminded of their mortality, the strongest indication of human transitoriness. In the same way the expansion of the universe, as implied in that red-shift, bespeaks the ageing of the universe and its eventual demise into a nondescript energy field. But here, too, the end conjures up a beginning, which in the case of the universe can only be its creation. Then logic would demand that one should worship not nature, by authoring learned papers about it for *Science* and *Nature*, but the Author of Nature.

Still another reflection, strictly scientific, has to be considered, although Einstein eschewed it. The former remark that galaxies run away from one another and the space among them expands was made advisedly. The hallowed custom is, of course, to speak of the expansion of the universe. But science, including Einstein's science, is absolutely powerless to demonstrate the existence of the universe, when taken for the totality of consistently interacting things, the only definition useful for science, in spite of the latest fantasies about multiple universes. These will appeal only to the type of theologian who, like the present Regius professor of divinity in Oxford, speak of the Incarnation as the descent of Christ through a wormhole in multidimensional cosmic multiplicities. Einstein championed the idea and real-

ity of causally consistent interactions which he rightly saw to be denied in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. He championed cause in order to safeguard not so much the continuity implied in the use of differential equation as the continuity within a cosmic determinism. Within such a determinism the universe is what it is and could not have been anything else. This preoccupation with strictly ideological or pseudo-religious aspects of determinism, prevented Einstein from seeing the philosophical grounds for departing from the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. His sole strength in that respect was his gut feeling that reality could not have hiatuses within it. On behalf of that gut feeling of his he sought some "scientific" proof, that is, proof by measurements. But as long as one worked with quanta and with matrix mechanics, the prospects of an absolutely exact measurement of physical interactions remain nil while Heisenberg's uncertainty principle retains its validity.

No wonder that Einstein repeatedly failed with his thought experiments to prove the possibility of exact measurements even in quantum mechanics. In the fact that Einstein remained adamant, his peers, such as Born, Stern, and Pauli—all Nobel laureates—saw something outright nonsensical. Or as Pauli told Born about Stern's remark, Einstein's preoccupation with continuity was not different from the concern of medievals about the number of angels that could fit on a pinhead. They, and especially Pauli, should have pondered the question which Einstein actually posed to Pauli, whether the moon was there only when one looked at it.

Here we come to the core of the relation of science and religion, a core which remained hidden to Einstein. The core is the continuity which is implied in ontology, or even, for that matter, in its scientific version, the principle of the conservation of energy and matter. Without ontology human discourse becomes a chain of disconnected events, fragmented into syllables or even into their further fractions. The real ground beneath Husserl's phenomenology remains hidden as long as his flat dismissal of ontology is not kept in focus. Ontology, however, should seem the very foundation of a religion which has a God, who gave His name as "I am Who is," for its object of worship. Dispensing with ontology leaves one with pragmatism, a dubious guide for action. Indeed, Einstein's hesitation had to be overcome before he yielded to the request of some scientists to sign a letter to President Roosevelt, asking that America should move ahead with the making of the atomic bomb. Years later he disclaimed responsibility by saying that he acted merely as a mailbox.

All this has to be recalled in order to create some credence for dismissing as a series of hollow metaphors Einstein's lecture on science and religion, given at the Princeton Theological Seminary in 1939, and widely available in print. The lecture contains the catchy phrase, "without science religion is blind, without religion science is lame." But what science and what religion? The fact tht Einstein left both science and religion undefined should make one dubious of the merit of statements such as that Einstein "symbolized the height of human intellect." So stated Joseph Rotblat on the op-ed page of *The New York Times* (May 17, 2005) in the context of his reminiscences about some scientists' reaction to the American hydrogen bomb test on Bikini in 1954, urging an absolute end to further testing. Fifty years later it should have behooved Rotblat to ponder that had President Reagan failed to go ahead with Star Wars, today there would be little room for liberal intellectuals who use their freedom to denounce liberally the strength needed to maintain it.

In many ways Einstein was anything but a great intellect, and much less a great humanist. The unsavory picture of Einstein as given in *The Private Lives of Albert Einstein*, whose material is taken from the Einstein Archives, should make any decent humanist shudder. Reading that book should certainly make one most dubious about the merit of an often quoted dictum of Einstein's that it is the character that makes the scientist. Apart from the broad subject of humanism, Einstein was not a reliable guide on that narrower aspect of it which is the relation of science and religion. His only valuable statement on that subject remains what he said to the Archbishop of Canterbury.

Einstein would have done better if he had simply said that science, exact science, has nothing to do with philosophy and ethics, in addition to religion. He did not care to publish his remark to the logical positivist Carnap that the experience of the *now*, this most central and decisive of all human experiences, can never be handled by science. Science proves something insofar as it measures, but the most important as well as most numerous facets of human experience cannot be stated in numbers. Theologians who desperately look for support in science, should pause and turn to philosophers who seriously care for ontology. Unfortunately the number of these has drastically decreased in recent decades even in Catholic circles.

On being reminded about that pithy dictum of Einstein's those theologians would be just as unimpressed as was Viscount Haldane. He did not take note when in 1922 Einstein publicly mused that relativity theory should have been called the Theory of Invariance. Indeed it was

the most absolutist physical theory ever proposed. The Theory of Relativity claims that the speed of light remains invariant regardless of the speed of its source or of its observer. It is a theory born out of Einstein's conviction, much more philosophical than scientific, that the major laws of physics, especially Maxwell's laws of electromagnetism, should remain invariant irrespective of their transformation into any other reference system.

Would the world of culture have taken note if Einstein had started a crusade in terms of relativity physics against cultural relativism? For one thing, he was not a crusader. While still in Germany he said not a word in public against the antisemitic tirades of the Brown Shirts. While this might be forgiven to a point, Einstein's silence was wholly unforgivable when the Roosevelt administration forbade a big ocean liner full of Jewish refugees to put in at Boston, then at New York, and then at Baltimore. The ship had to take them to South America. Einstein never made a noise about Soviet dictatorship and death camps. In fact he time and again came close to equating the Soviet Union and the United States.

By the time relativity theory was formulated, relativism had for some time been the climate of thought, or rather the atmosphere of perverse thinking. Few scientists cared to clear the air. Few of them uttered warnings comparable to the words of Maxwell: "The most difficult test of the scientific mind is to discern the limits of the legitimate applications of the scientific method." Yet the test would seem enormously easy to apply. Heinrich Hertz, who spent years finding out what electricity and magnetism were in terms of Maxwell's theory, had to reach the apparent tautology: "Maxwell's theory is Maxwell's system of equation." Hertz came very close to the heart of the matter, which lies at the core of the relation of science and religion, and of science and the humanities in general. He should have focused on the fact that those equations count for little until their letters and symbols are replaced by numbers obtained via experiments and measurements.

In sum, science, exact science, is and remains the quantitative study of the quantitative aspects of things in motion. Nothing less and nothing more. Religionists should rejoice. As long as they do not state something measurable in the name of the Creed, they are at safe remove from objections from science, though not from philosophies grafted on science, whose number is sickeningly great. In their own defense those religionists should merely ask those who want to invigorate religion by science, whether they can measure the entirety and the components of elementary statements such as "this pen is here," or that "lying is sin."

Einstein could have provided an unfailing compass to the Archbishop of Canterbury had he called his Grace's attention and also his own to the bearing of such elementary statements. He failed to rise to the occasion. Whether the Archbishop, or most religionists for that matter, should have sensed their moment of liberation from the shackles of scientism, is another matter. Then as now many of them were lured by the mirage of a unitary method of explanation allegedly delivered by science. Descartes and Hegel were notable champions of this fallacy. In their different ways both made a mess of science. About Descartes' pontifications on science already Huygens said that they were a mere romance. As for Hegel's lengthy lucubrations on science, they are obscurantism incarnate. Kant's relevant dicta are not far behind.

It may trouble bold spirits that, at least for the human mind, quantities and everything else are mutually irreducible. Good old Aristotle noted this, though only passingly, in his *Categories,* but he left it at that. Galileo was still to come with the first formulation of a quantitatively exact law of motion, that of the free fall of bodies. But in his admiration for quantitative laws he went on to denying the reality of all secondary qualities, including colors. Evolutionists would do well not follow him as they discuss the role of colors in natural selection.

So much about a very wide subject conjured up by Einstein when he said that relativity had nothing to do with the betterment of morals, nor with humanities insofar as they stand for more than mere patterns of behavior, all to be rendered by polls and statistics. Contrary to a once famous book, *Relativity a Richer Truth*, relativity as science can enrich only exact science. It will impoverish any and all who expect from science more than it can ever deliver as long as it wants to remain exact and therefore rest its own truth with quantities, the only "exact" concepts, though they are such only in their abstractness. Hence the truth of Einstein's remark to the Archbishop of Canterbury, that the science of relativity has nothing to do with moral betterment which, let it be recalled, forms the gist of genuine religion. Einstein certainly offered something most momentous when he said in another context that he could not distill a drop of morality from his science. The author of the *Pensées* might now say, "I told you so." ✠

The Triumph of Practice Over Theory in Ethics, by James P. Sterba, Oxford Univ. Press 2005, 201 pp.

Review by Oswald Sobrino, M.A. (Econ.), J.D.

The title and thesis are promising, but the results are quite bizarre. First, the good news. Notre Dame philosophy professor James P. Sterba claims that Kantian ethics, Aristotelian ethics, and utilitarian ethics "*at least in their most morally defensible formulations* . . . no longer differ in the practical requirements they endorse" (p. 1; see also p. 57; emphasis added). Hence the title of the book celebrating the supposed triumph of practice over theory in ethics. Of course, the great condition on this whole well-meaning enterprise is that someone, in this case Prof. Sterba, decides what is the "most morally defensible" formulation of each ethical school. After that move is made, the professor has cleared the way for his own preferred conclusions.

And *some* conclusions they are. Here is a partial list of Sterba's practical ethical conclusions, most of which is quite bizarre, all of which is highly controversial. Let me make clear that I disagree vehemently and passionately with *all* of the following conclusions by Sterba. I will comment briefly on each of his conclusions:

1. Sterba contends that, under certain conditions, suicide bombings against innocent civilians are justifiable. He specifically points to Palestinian suicide bombings against Israeli civilians as morally justified (p. 138). His rationale for this conclusion is that the Palestinians have no other effective way to resist Israeli occupation (p. 138). Yet, the author does, to the reader's relief, at least say that the September 11th attacks are not morally justified (p. 139). But the same rationale that he has, in my view, improperly used to justify Palestinian terrorism would allow, on its face, for Al Qaeda to justify the 9/11 attacks—all Al Qaeda would have to say, under Sterba's moral analysis, is that the Sept. 11 attacks were the only way that Al Qaeda could effectively resist the presence of American troops in the Middle East. Sterba tries to reconcile his approval of Palestinian suicide bombings of civilians and his disapproval of Al Qaeda's suicide bombing of civilians by claiming that Al Qaeda has proven its effectiveness in the past by bombing military targets—but, unfortunately, Al Qaeda has made a different tactical and strategic assessment which Sterba's faulty analysis cannot definitively rule out (see Sterba's discussion at footnote 27 on pp. 188-89; note especially the last paragraph of the footnote in which Sterba claims that Al Qaeda, to its credit, "gave nonbelligerent correctives some chance to work").

2. "[H]uman reproduction needs to be limited to the legitimate exercise of the basic human need to procreate, which roughly means one child per family" (p. 67; see also p. 85). I saw no hint in the book of how such a policy would be enforced. The professor is uncomfortably silent on the current Chinese method of enforcing the very same policy through forced sterilization.

3. While approving of Palestinian suicide bombings, Sterba nevertheless views the current Iraq War as unjust and as the product of deliberate lying by the Bush administration (pp. 148, 152, 154). I submit that Sterba's conclusion is based on a pervasive anti-Israel bias evident in the book (see, for example, pp. 137-39). Israel is always wrong, and the Palestinians are just innocent victims of Israeli occupation. Sterba fails to mention that the common Arab reaction to the birth of Israel in 1948 was to push the Jews into the sea. For decades, the PLO charter proclaimed the destruction of Israel as its goal. Once you grant that strong anti-Israel bias, you can see how Sterba's condemnation of the current Iraq War follows: if, as in Sterba's mind, Israel is the most egregious aggressor in the Middle East and as such is generously back by the United States, then the United States has no business taking military action against any other Middle Eastern country until it first severs its relationship with Israel (see p. 153). That anti-Israel bias and, I submit, falsification of history—is in my view the basis of Sterba's analysis of the current Iraq War. In addition, there is no mention of Saddam Hussein's genocidal policy toward the Kurds. Sterba fails to discuss the overthrow of genocidal regimes as the basis for a just war. How an ethicist discussing just war can bracket out the entire issue of genocidal regimes in the aftermath of the Jewish Holocaust and more recent holocausts such as that in Cambodia and now in the Sudan is beyond me.

4. Sterba recognizes the theoretical possibility that killing human beings for the sake of protecting an endangered species could be morally justified (pp. 83-84). Just as in the case of his approval of suicide bombings, this conclusion derives from Sterba's ironclad assumption that "any defensible moral theory" must justify "doing harm to innocents in order to secure a greater benefit for others" (p. 42). In other words, Sterba views the Caiaphas Principle that it is "expedient that one man should die for the people" (Jn 18:14) as foundational for any defensible moral theory and extends it, theoretically, to include dying for non-humans. I will say more about this particular principle later.

5. Sterba also favors the adoption of "a more vegetarian diet of the sort that animal liberationists recommend" (p. 72). Thus, although Sterba has no problem with the intentional killing of innocent humans in certain circum-

stances, he is adamant about protecting the "basic needs of individual animals and plants" when human luxuries are at issue (p. 65). In Sterba's view, one of those human luxuries is a non-vegetarian diet; and, as noted before, another such luxury is that of human families having more than one child.

6. Finally, Sterba favors gay marriage because, in his eyes, there is no difference between a non-procreative homosexual couple and a heterosexual couple in which at least one of the parties is sterile (p. 108). Not surprisingly, Sterba gives no hint of appreciating the view that the heterosexual marital act even when naturally sterile does not involve the intention to rule out procreation. In contrast, homosexual couples intend to rule out procreation precisely by choosing to engage in homosexual acts.

Recall Sterba's thesis that he can reconcile Aristotelian, Kantian, and utilitarian ethics and yield agreement on controversial ethical issues. The above conclusions are on their face so controversial that it is a fantasy to think that all morally defensible formulations of ethics will accept them. And, interestingly, Sterba makes no mention, that I can recall, in the entire book of abortion or of the destruction of human embryos in experimentation. My guess, based on reading this one book by Sterba, is that, given his attachment to the Caiaphas Principle, Sterba considers those life issues philosophically non-controversial.

At the end of the day, Sterba has written a fantasy which he views as a philosophical utopia but which for many others is a clear dystopia. I can recommend this book only as an exercise in fallacy spotting much as I would recommend to a math student a book containing defective mathematical proofs intended to test a student's skill in spotting defective reasoning and unwarranted conclusions. Sterba's thesis is that all reasonable ethicists, if only they would practice a "peace-making" style of debate in which all would seek common ground, will end up agreeing in practice (pp. 156, 158). Sterba's own radically controversial conclusions disprove that thesis.

Christian Courtship in an Over Sexed World: A Guide for Catholics, Morrow, T.G. (2003). Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor Publishing. Pp. 299.

Review by Oswald Sobrino, MA, JD, graduate student, Sacred Heart Major Seminary, Detroit, MI, www.catholicanalysis.blogspot.com

Father T.G. Morrow of Washington, D.C., gives us a truly Catholic guide to the sexual counterrevolution sparked by the chaos created by the sexual free-for-all that is now the mainstream in Western societies. Father Morrow, who holds a doctorate in Sacred Theology from the Pope John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family, carries on an innovative apostolate for single Catholics in the D.C. area. Fr. Morrow's theological mentor is Dr. William E. May, who teaches at the same institute. The John Paul institute is surely bearing fruit.

The clear goal of the book is "to start over to build a new system for courtship" (p. 9). You can see the extent of the paradigm shift with the surprising revival of the practice "among the devout and the polite, for the man to ask permission from his sweetheart's father to propose to his daughter" (p. 264). This old practice—which I, for one, had only previously heard about from my grandfather—carries many messages. One of the messages of this practice is that marriage is in effect an old-fashioned alliance of families—making the big assumption today that there are indeed two intact and functional families involved. This practice also encourages the man proposing to think of his intended as the cherished daughter of a particular family and even encourages the father, and the rest of the family, to take a more active role in helping his daughter screen her suitors. One of the worst things that happens in courtship is for family members to keep quiet about apparent problems out of a misguided sense of minding their own business. The marriage of their daughter and sister is indeed their business.

In his first chapter, Morrow gives an overview of his advice. The best choice for a mate is a truly "solid, practicing Catholic" who attends Sunday Mass, goes to confession, prays regularly, and is willing to talk about his or her own spirituality (pp. 18-19). Morrow rightly warns that there are many who claim to be good Catholics who have a very low threshold for that label. You need to look for someone who is serious about spiritual growth and is willing to join you and support you on that journey. Just coming from a Catholic background or having attended watered-down Catholic schools is not going to be enough.

In our age of irrational marriages followed by the inevitable divorces, the Catholic must also make sure that the intended has an annulment in hand. Morrow's advice is: no annulment in hand, no courtship (p. 23). Morrow also emphasizes, throughout the book, the idea of friendship: the "person you marry should be your best friend" (p. 25; see also p. 29). In fact, a key part of Morrow's system of finding a mate is chaste friendship—what he calls initial "friendship dating," as a prelude for actual courtship. In friendship dating, couples focus on becoming spiritually and emotionally intimate, as opposed to sexually intimate.

Chapter eight on "Christian Courtship Strategies" gives the nuts and bolts of this new system. Friendship dating is non-exclusive and involves "no kissing goodnight, or even holding hands," just "warm, chaste hugs" (p. 123). The emphasis is on being "low

key and low pressure" (p. 123). Eventually, if there is indeed compatibility and real interest in commitment, the couple moves on to actual courtship. Based on his observations, Morrow favors at least a two year courtship (p. 130). Morrow even points to research favoring age 28 as the ideal age for marriage, although he makes clear that he has seen many couples successfully marrying in their thirties (pp. 142-143).

Yet, even in courtship, it is important that truly chaste interactions, and not merely the absence of sexual intercourse, persist. And Morrow is again blessedly specific. He even gives the reader the suggested actual lines to use at the start of courtship: "I propose that we just stick to affection, that is, hugs, touches, holding hands. Kisses would be only for saying goodnight. Will that be acceptable to you?" (p. 94). And the kisses are supposed to be very gentle and tender, not furious and aggressive (pp. 52-53).

Morrow also finds it understandably necessary to include a chapter on modest dress. He makes the point that males must also seek to dress modestly (p. 101). He also notes what other observers can also affirm, namely, that many, even devout Catholic women "never make the religious connection about clothing" (p. 104). Morrow again gives suggested actual lines for telling someone that a fashion adjustment needs to be made. At another point in the book, Morrow refers to these cultural blind spots arising from our sex-soaked culture as "remnants of hedonism" (p. 136). Another remnant of hedonism that he points out is the tendency of some to take in stride non-sexual sleeping together in a hotel room while vacationing or even in the unmarried couple's new house, without giving a thought to the public scandal involved (pp. 136-40). By the way, Morrow also points out that it is a bad idea for a couple to buy a house prior to the actual marriage (p. 141). And sadly, but absolutely, necessary is the highly sensitive chapter dedicated to disclosing past sins against chastity. It is a chapter that must be read quite carefully. In general, Morrow advises disclosing these sins if they will affect the relationship. A clear example is a sexually transmitted disease. But Morrow cautions against disclosing *details* that can destroy an otherwise promising courtship. He recommends just giving a general idea that sins against chastity have been committed, but he also gives specific attention to handling matters such as a past abortion, issues of homosexuality, and children born out of wedlock (pp. 204-205). If not disclosed, some of these issues could become grounds for annulment. In my view, given the trends now emerging and gaining legitimacy in American society, the issue of past homosexual experimentation will likely haunt future generations.

There is much more practical and quite specific advice in the book. You would do well to give the book as a gift to teenagers and single adults. In fact, I can think of virtually no one who could not profit greatly from the book: parents, grandparents, married couples (there are even specific chapters on the art of communication, on living the married life, and on raising children), and, of course, all those involved in educating the young.

But even the Catholic scholar and academic will find the book quite refreshing. Morrow sketches a philosophy of sexual attraction and mating based on the theology of the body of John Paul the Great and on C.S. Lewis's classic book *The Four Loves*. Here, in my view, is the crucial philosophical move: to go beyond our hopelessly confused English word "love" and go back to the four Greek terms for love that Lewis so masterfully analyzed in his book. If there is one word that can capture the paradigm shift that Morrow is assisting, it is *philia*, the love of friendship. And so I close with the author's own words: "St. Augustine held friendship to be the highest of the three human loves (*agape* being divine) [the other two human loves are affection and *eros*]. Indeed, which of the human loves could be more important to a marriage? To share the same faith, the same education, the same values, the same recreational interests, the same tastes—these are the things on which good marriages are built and without which they may suffer" (p. 49). Pre-marital sex and its now conventional incarnation in sexual cohabitation are the great destroyers of that love of friendship whose birth and development are so essential.

The Garden by Elsie V. Aidinoff, New York: HarperTempest (a division of HarperCollins Publishers), 2004, 403 pages.

reviewed by Sister Mary Jeremiah, OP
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The Garden by Elsie V. Aidinoff is like a lightning bolt between the eyes. When I offered to review the book, I innocently envisioned a scriptural or patristic study, or perhaps even an artistic or literary examination, of the primordial accounts of Genesis 1-3. Instead, to my surprise and later horror, it turned out to be an easy-reading, radical, blasphemous, "diatribic" novel of one woman's re-invention of Creation and Eden. There is no need for a Redeemer because the great prize, her vision of redemption, is one's personal freedom; especially freedom from a malicious God (sounds like an oxymoron).

The author relates that the initial idea for the book came to her "in church." (p. 401) I cannot imagine what kind of church, certainly not a Christian one. She also admits, "Like the Manicheans, I view the world as a struggle between the forces of good and the forces of evil…" (p. 403)

There are definitely manichean tendencies, even gnostic.

God and the Serpent are practically on a par. God is a ghoulish bully who always appears foolish before the brave self-sacrificing serpent. Although God has more power as the Creator, the Serpent, appears as the personification of Wisdom. This hearkens back to the gnostic idea of demiurges and aeons. Many primitive cultures worshiped the Serpent has the god of wisdom and fertility; for example, the Aztecs reverenced Queztecoatl in Mexico.

The Serpent is presented as a kind of alternative to God—a competitive deity, but the relationship between the Serpent and God is never explained satisfactorily. Did God create the Serpent? If not, what is the Serpent? Why did God entrust Eve to this creature? Aidinoff's portrayal of God is reminiscent of Zeus or some other god of the pagan pantheon. He uses his powers to show off. I wondered if Aidinoff intended God to be the Demiurge, the creator of the evil material world in the Gnostic tradition, while the Serpent might be the aeon Sophia, whose interference in creation caused souls to be imprisoned in mortal bodies. This might explain the uneasy relationship between God and the Serpent. At one point the Serpent explains, "My role on earth: to counterbalance the excesses of a jealous god." (p. 106)

The Serpent, a symbol of freedom and independence, calls itself Nachash, meaning a mythical animal deity, a rival or competitive god. The author sees her Serpent fostering human reason, comparable to Prometheus, a Greek god who stole fire and gave it to humans whom the capricious and jealous Zeus had planned to destroy. The Serpent saves Adam and Eve from God by leading them to independence and freedom. Thus, although Aidinoff identifies Eve as the hero, it is actually the Serpent.

The Garden is one of many re-interpretations of the creation story, airing the "humanist manifesto." Humanism denies the existence of God. It holds that all of creation evolved from some kind of matter. It holds that humans are bodies and only bodies—thinking animals at best. They seek to create a value system in a world which of itself has no purpose. Hence, the opposition of humanism to Christianity. The author seems to find it very difficult not to show her own intense dislike for God and all things Christian, especially the moral code. As in the Genesis account, the characters are four:

- Serpent, the divine figure, equated with Wisdom, reason and Justice;
- God, a creator with the weakness, ignorance and caprice of a 7 or 8 year old child. He has the power to create but not the power or interest to control it. He starts creation much like a clock that is wound and runs by itself (deisim). God is depicted as selfish, arrogant and uninterested in anything but Himself and His own ideas. He is an angry, controlling tyrant.
- Adam, an innocent, yet weak, clean slate of a man; handsome, lackadaisical, a stupid strong slave-boy;
- Eve, an empowered woman not afraid to speak her mind. The narrative unfolds through the eyes of Eve who is instructed and enlightened by her ever-present guardian, the Serpent (her alter ego?).

With this dreary cast before us, let us press on with our analysis of the book. The story begins with the awakening of Eve after her creation. God has provided a magnificently beautiful and wise Serpent as her "teacher, Friend, companion, mentor, guide," who is attractive and ever solicitous to Eve's needs, which often entails humoring, placating, manipulating and correcting God. Adam is under the tutelage of God Himself.

In this novel, the garden becomes a kind of luxurious prison which they must escape in order to reach full maturity and self-actualization. Of course, we know very little about the garden proper from the book of Genesis, but it does seem clear that certain things—pain, disordered sexuality, shame, hard work, et cetera—are all consequences of the Fall, and did not exist in the garden. In Aidinoff's garden, all of these are there. The only things missing are sickness and death.

The Temptation presented in this book is not pride, lust, or even disobedience (which they do by eating the apple). The greatest desire is *freedom* from an oppressive God. God is the villain of the story as the stereotypical, white-haired old man. It is better to be free from a monstrous God and have to labor and suffer, than to be enslaved io an obedient relationship with Him. God is "selfish, egotistical, insensitive" (p. 311) and a veritable tyrant in a near-constant rage. At one point the Serpent confides to Eve, "God is capable of inflicting a great deal of harm." (p. 312)

For Aidinoff, redemption is freedom from God and reliance on oneself as a guide. There is no such thing as an immortal soul; this world is the only thing there is. Anyone who takes God seriously is asking to be hurt very badly. With a God like this in charge, it's not surprising that Eve makes the decision to eat the apple and leave the garden:

> "If we stay in the Garden," I said, pausing between words to find my way. "We'll be like the animals, obeying God, turning to the right and the left as he moves his hands... Comfortable, but not free. Always we'll be under God's control... I'd rather be like the eagle... He defied God, to do what was right... I want to be one of the things that gets away from God and takes on its own spirit." (p.373)

The Serpent's reassurance to Adam and Eve that they should not feel guilty for the Fall, reminds me of those who ludicrously extol abortion as a "brave and noble choice."

For those who value absolute independence, crime is worth the choice (freedom).

"You and Adam chose freely, both of you, and it was brave. Never doubt that it was the right choice: In the Garden you would have been God's chattels forever. This—[the Serpent] nodded at the chaos around us—is not your doing. It is God's… It is not suffering, or injustice, or evil that you have brought into the world—though they have come. It is freedom… Don't cry. Stand proud! Because of your choice, all humans are free, now and forevermore…" (pp. 396-397)

It tells Adam and Eve that they have made the right choice and because of them all of humankind will be free. It states that chaos, suffering, injustice and evil are God's doing not man's. Eve wants to know how to reach the Serpent outside the garden. The Serpent replies in diabolical blasphemy that it dwells in her inmost heart and soul. Eve wants its physical presence. The Serpent answers that it will be around from time to time.

> "You will find me, even, within yourself: in the deepest regions of your soul." Tragically, this is all too true. I was disturbed by the radical hatred of man and woman underlying the identification of God with man and the Serpent with woman. Not only is there disdain for man who is "just like" the goal-oriented, insensitive, "all brawn and no brain" God; but the woman seems to become a personification of the Serpent, which is, strangely, what feminism has supposedly been fighting misogynist idea of the woman as the Temptress.

The Serpent "courageously and self-lessly" prefers the loss of Its strength, stature, lustrous skin and feathers, and to be withered into a vile ugly snake, in order to be in solidarity with Adam and Eve against the vengeful God. The Serpent explains, "Adam … I would have lost the right to help you, and Eve, and all the others to come. Intervene for the good of humankind, put up a small defense against evil and chaos." (p. 391)

Eve tells us of her trust in the "truthfulness" of her captivating guide. "In all the Serpent had ever said and in its every act, its belief in the individual rang out, clear, overpowering." (p. 356) This is the Garden/Fall account of post-modern, freedom-loving individualism that distorts any concept of objective truth. It is a contemporary pagan myth.

Aidinoff clearly has deep-seated problems with the Christian faith; I get the impression she was somehow betrayed herself and now wants to excise her pain with this book. For her sake, I hope it worked. There is a distinct resemblance between this book and a wound being drained.

The Garden is a very readable and engaging book; captivating in the sense of peaking one's curiosity as to what further distortion the author can propose. It clearly shows the power of stories. The book is filled with distorted Biblical and Christian theological errors. One Sister to whom I gave it, had more than enough just reading the blurb on the cover. She could see immediately its seductiveness and blatant errors. It is certainly thought-provoking, and clearly depicts the thinking and attitudes of our post-Christian secular, humanist society. The Library of Congress notes on the back of the title page lists this book as "juvenile fiction," twice!! This is an example of how the culture of death is destroying young minds and hearts. I pray that no one else ever read The Garden. It is best left to mildew in a warehouse.

From Jewish Magic to Gnosticism,
Attilio Mastrocinque, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005, 244 p.

Review by Dr. Riccardo Pozzo
Universit of Verona, Italy

This work is based on a historical approach, not on a theological or philosophical approach. It uses historiography, epigraphy, archeology and related disciplines in order to expand and clarify the field of research. It is nonetheless highly relevant for philosophy, for it involves the relation between Hellenistic philosophy, Jewish magic, and the emerging Christian faith. Mastrocinque's main objectives are (a) to understand the condemnation of the Creator by the heretics described by Irenaeus, namely the Gnostics, (b) to evaluate the importance of the doctrines of the Chaldeans and Magi in the development of Gnosis, and (c) to learn more about a central figure in Gnostic doctrines, the divine snake (of Genesis 3). Among the relevant passages from the Holy Scripture are the *Hymn of the Pearl* in the *Acts of St. Thomas* 108-113 as well as the allegations in the *Acts of St. John* 94 and in the *Acts of St. Peter* 8 that Jesus was captured "by lawless Jews, who were governed by a lawless snake". To all schools of Gnosticism, Marcionites included, the biblical creator was the architect of evil, while the supreme deity, incorporeal and remote from creation, was considered as pre-existing and immutable; the spiritual person was to strive to reach him, and avoid the temptations of the created world. Perhaps, then, argues Mastrocinque, the figure of the snake devouring its tail in the *Hymn of the Pearl* did not represent the devil, as it did in Apocalypse 19-20. It could instead have been the manifestation or emanation of the creator God, the Hebrew God, as perceived by the Gnostics.

Indeed, the Marcionites revered Jesus in the form of a snake. Besides, various Gnostic sects in Syria had come close or had merged with Marcionism, which was the only movement with a solid ecclesiastical organization (with churches, bishops, presbyteres, and deacons) able to oppose the great Roman Church.

The Hebraic notion of the Son of Man, the manifestation of God in human form, is fundamental to the Gnostic doctrine of the *Anthropos* and to Hebraic apocalyptic literature. It is closely connected to Assyrian notions of the *isten etlu*, the perfect Divine Man, who manifested himself to humankind in storms or dreams. Given the chronology, argues Mastrocinque, it is likely that the Jewish concepts came from Mesopotamian thinking, rather than viceversa. It seems that the dialogue with Mesopotamian culture continued during the Hellenistic Age, when the Books of Daniel, the Apocalypse of Esra, and the Books of Enoch, in which the vision of the celestial Divine Man are particularly important, were written. Christianity's triumph—concludes Mastrocinque—swept aside beliefs in gods that are immanent in nature. There was no more religious dread of offending animals, plants, stones, rivers, or lakes. It is difficult, to enter into the ancients' way of thinking, and to comprehend the stormy conflicts between pagans and Christians. Here lies the essential difference between our notion of magic and the notion of magic of the late empire.

Joseph Conrad: His Moral Vision. by George A. Panichas, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 2005. pp. xviii + 165. Cloth, $35.00.

One does not normally think of Conrad as a moral philosopher, but it does not take Panichas long to convince the reader that, indeed, he was one. In successive chapters the book explores Conrad's "moral vision" as exemplified in *The Secret Agent*, *Lord Jim, Victory*, *Nostromo*, *Under Western Eyes*, *Chance*, and *The Rover*. This by no means exhausts Conrad's oeuvre, but it is in these imaginative novels that Conrad records the enigmatic spectacle of human existence, with all its rhythms and fluctuations, its tragedies and triumphs, hopes and fears, "Conrad's novels," writes Panichas, "are in the end great meditations on the conditions of life." Although one could not call him a philosopher, Conrad"s descriptions of evil would rival that of any phenomenologist, and his teleological conception of nature and society could not be gainsaid by any student of Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics*. Few authors have better described the human condition. In *Nostromo*, Holrod is described as "a frightful phenomenon—a will haunted by a fixed idea." Emilia, in *The Rover*, as "a woman with the genius of sympathetic intuition." And Decond in *Nostromo*, as a man of thought, "incorrigible in his skepticism." Yet acute observation does not necessarily make one wise. To see things as they are does not tell us how they ought to be, but to see them from a divine perspective, as did Conrad, is a different matter. Conrad was not a religious person. As a matter of fact, he professed a dislike of Christianity for "its doctrines, ceremonies, and festivals." He had more than intuitive grasp of nature and nature's order, symbolically represented throughout his novels. Human frailty—evil, if you will—is presented against the backdrop of an ordered universe that includes the spiritual as well as the material. Stability in the social order entails a respect for tradition, the recognition of which is a necessary condition for growth and fulfillment. Evil is seen as disorder, the absence of what ought to be, the absence of stability.

In the decades since his death in 1924, Conrad has elicited analyses and commentaries from some of the great literary figures of the twentieth century, including T.S. Eliot, Henry James, George Orwell and Virginia Woolf. George Panichas, a distinguished professor of comparative literature at the University of Maryland, is second to none in his appreciation of Conrad for both his prose and his moral vision. One cannot put this book down without wanting to reread Conrad's greatest novels or enjoy them first hand if somehow they have escaped the reader's attention

The Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas: Happiness, Natural Law and the Virtues, by Leo Elders, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2005. Pp 313. Cloth, $49.95

Reviewed by Jude P. Dougherty, Dean Emeritus, The Catholic University of America

As an expositor of the moral philosophy of Aquinas, Leo Elders's credentials are impeccable. He is the author of thirty-one books on the philosophy of Aristotle and on the philosophy and theology of St. Thomas. Elders writes and lectures, in addition to his native Dutch, in French, German, Spanish, Italian and English, and his books have been translated into all of those languages The present work is his own translation of a previously published work in Dutch, *De ethick van Thomas van Aquino* (2000). There are chapters on free will, on the passions, on habits

in general, on virtues, on natural law and the common good, on happiness, and on love and friendship. The book follows Thomas's own order of the subject as given in the I-II part of the *Summa Theologiae*. One of the merits of the book is Elders's rendering of the historical context of the various topics under discussion. In elucidating the difference between biblical morality and that of the Greek ethical theorists, he writes, "The Church Fathers adopted a considerable portion of the ethical teachings of the Greek and Roman classical authors. Despite their fundamental criticism of the pagan way of life and its widespread immorality, many Christian theologians were convinced that there is a fundamental correspondence between much of what the great classical authors taught and Christian moral doctrine." He finds this especially true of doctrines concerting the virtues and natural law.

Early on in the volume, Elders acknowledges the methodological difficulty of talking about the moral philosophy of Aquinas, given that St. Thomas is first of all a theologian. Yet, as a theologian in addressing moral issues, Thomas works within the framework of natural reason, much in the manner of Aristotle and the Stoics. Elders finds it impossible to render faithfully the ethics of Aquinas without delving into of his philosophical anthropology, and even deeper into his metaphysics.

Elders brings to his study an almost encyclopedic knowledge of the history of philosophy. Although he advises his readers not to look for any novel interpretations of Thomas, the book is full of surprises. Time and again, he offers a concise history of the moral issue under consideration, frequently discussing the issue as found in the thought of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics , Ambrose and Augustine, among others. He points out that until the second half of the 13th century, only two of the ten books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* were known in the Latin West. Around 1240, Robert Grossteste translated the entire work, a translation used by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas.

In discussing Thomas's use of Aristotle and the Stoics, Elders notes that when Thomas finds a difference between the two, he usually comes down on the side of the peripatetics. In discussing the relation of positive law to natural law, we find an enlightening comparison of Thomas with Suarez, Grotius, and Prufendorf.. In his treatment of the relation between intellect and will, he provides a rare in-depth discussion of the origin of a free-will act. The volume is replete with commentary and analysis that could be provided only by someone with as much experience and learning as Elders. A more authoritative introduction to the moral philosophy of Aquinas is not likely to be found. In fact, it is a delight to read.

***Light on Light: Illuminations of the Gospel of Jesus Christ from the Mystical Visions of the Venerable Anne Catherine Emmerich*, by Hurd Baruch, MaxKol Communications (2004), 259pp. Paper.**

Review by Clodagh Weldon, D.Phil., Assistant Professor and Director of Theology, Dominican University, River Forest, IL.

Fascinated by his own Lenten reading of Ann Catherine Emmerich's *The Dolorous Passion of Our Lord Jesus Christ*, and stirred by a curiosity about Jesus, Hurd Baruch undertakes an investigation into the visions of this remarkable nun and mystic, a woman cast into the limelight by Mel Gibson's movie *The Passion of the Christ* and beatified by John Paul II in 2004. A fasting stigmatic who survived for months on the Holy Eucharist and beef tea, Emmerich (1774-1824) perceived it to be her vocation to suffer for Christ and His Church. But it is the visions attributed to Emmerich, at once profound and quirky, transcribed by the poet Clement Maria Brentano, which form the basis of this very readable exposition and commentary from Hurd Baruch.

A lawyer by training, Baruch examines "thousands of pages of testimony" (p. 258)—testimony of Emmerich, the gospels, biblical scholars—in an attempt to determine their authenticity. He writes not as a theologian but as an attorney and a person of faith drawn to the visions because, he argues, they "employ . . . a wealth of information," they allow us "to comprehend with new eyes"and they "fully confirm the Gospels' depiction of Jesus" (p.4). A skeptical prosecutor might question 'which gospel?' and proceed to cross-examine with examples of conflicting gospel accounts such as the Temple scene which appears at the beginning of Jesus' ministry in John and the end in the synoptics. But Baruch has little time for such questions. Indeed he goes on to make the assertion that "No one who meditates on her revelations will fall prey to the current portrayals of Jesus," thereby implying that Emmerich's visions are at once a safeguard against and an antidote to much of contemporary historical Jesus study seen in the works of scholars such as John Dominic Crossan and Marcus Borg. Emmerich's Jesus warns Jairus' daughter (after raising her for the second time) "against concupiscence of the eyes and sin" and speaks repeatedly about him making satisfaction for the sins of the world; her Jesus is not the wandering Galilean peasant but one who vacillates between the lenses of saints Augustine and Anselm. Were the prosecution in this case to call upon witnesses from the Jesus Seminar they

would no doubt recognize the criterion of dissimilarity here! This being said, Baruch does an excellent job of drawing our attention to the fact that Emmerich's Jesus draws us away from an overemphasis on an historical Jesus separated from a Christ of faith, a separation which all too often neglects the Chalcedonian affirmation of Jesus as fully human and fully divine. Further, the jury is left in little doubt that Emmerich's Jesus had a deep awareness that he was divine, "'true God from true God' as the Nicene Creed states" (p.14), a sharp contrast to N.T. Wright's Jesus who sees himself not in the categories of Nicea, writing for example in *The Meaning of Jesus: Two Visions* (HarperSanFrancisco, 2000), "[Jesus] did not sit back and say to himself, 'Well, I never! I'm the second person of the Trinity'" (p. 166), but in the context of first century Judaism. For Baruch, it is the fact that Emmerich's visions are in accordance with the teachings of the Church which convinces him of their authenticity over and against many contemporary biblical and historical Jesus scholars.

Baruch's conclusion - his "verdict," if you will, - is that although Emmerich's visions are in places "untenably bizarre," contain "a handful of infelicitously worded observations about Jewish people" and contain some "trivial inconsistencies and errors," they have "the aura of authenticity" (p.258). One can almost picture Baruch on the stand making his closing argument: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, Emmerich's revelations were "neither fraudulent" nor were they false (p.258). They give us "a reasonable approximation of actual events in the life of Jesus" (p.258), they are consonant with the magisterium and "they illuminate the gospels" (p.259).

Is this juror convinced? Almost. I have two quibbles in particular with the case as presented. First, Baruch states that "in the main" the source of these visions "could only have been divine revelation" (p.3). Pleas for insanity, starvation induced hallucinations or an overly active imagination are not brought into testimony, and he dismisses as irrelevant to this conclusion the probability that some of the visions were penned by Brentano. And yet Cardinal Walter Kasper recently deemed the authorship of these visions "most dubious" on account of Brentano's often elaborate translations of Emmerich's dictations and the difficulties in distinguishing between her revelations and his commentary, in fact reaffirming the stance taken by the Catholic Church since 1916. Furthermore, the writings attributed to Ann Catherine Emmerich were not even considered in the beatification process which reached its culmination on October 3rd 2004.

Second, in his consideration of the evidence Baruch dismisses as insignificant Emmerich's "infelicitously worded observations about Jewish people" (p.258). To his credit, he stresses that the Catholic Church abnegates the claim that the Jews were responsible for the death of Jesus. But Baruch's quotation of Emmerich's observation of the high priest Caiaphas acting "as if inspired by hell" (p.187) can hardly be dismissed as "infelicitously worded," especially given the long history of atrocities committed against our Jewish brothers and sisters. Arguments certainly could and have been made in defense of Emmerich within her historical context and the lawyer could probably have better defended his client. Furthermore, although Baruch quotes *extensively* from Brentano's mediation of Emmerich, he chooses *not* to include some of the most "infelicitously worded" pages of testimony from *The Dolorous Passion of Our Lord Jesus Christ* (North Bay Books, 2004). In this text, for example, Emmerich observes the "suppressed rage and sinister intentions"(p.87) of Caiaphas the high priest:

> "...I perceived the yawning abyss of hell like a fiery meteor at the feet of Caiaphas; it was filled with horrible devils . . . I could see the demonical fury with which his heart was overflowing, and the whole house looked to me like hell" (p.92)

Perhaps Baruch deemed some of the evidence too inflammatory to be admitted as evidence. In fact there are countless other "observations of the Jewish people" made by Emmerich that are nowhere admitted into evidence by Baruch. Consider for example Emmerich's vision of "the wicked Jews" (p.101) at once an "insolent mob" and "the most vile and wicked miscreants from among the dregs of the people" (p.132). Or her vision of "numbers of Jews standing about talking in an angry excited manner" (p.85), with "horrible phantoms"and "numerous devils" (pp. 92-93) "exciting and encouraging the Jews, whispering in their ears, entering their mouths, inciting them still more against Jesus" (p.149) They are, she says, "the very scum of the people" who surround Jesus "like a swarm of infuriated wasps" (p.94) "devouring the victim with their eyes" (p.152), full of "anger hatred and envy"(p.153). Finally, as Jesus is condemned to death, Emmerich observes the blood curse of Matthew 27:25:

> "I imagine I hear that frightful cry of the Jews, 'His blood be upon us, and upon our children', visions of a wonderful and terrible description display before my eyes at the same moment the effect of that solemn curse. I fancy I see a gloomy sky covered with clouds, of the colour of blood, from which issue fiery swords and darts, lowering over the vociferating multitude; and this curse, which they have entailed upon themselves,

> appears to me to penetrate even to the very marrow of their bones, - even to the unborn infants. They appear to me encompassed on all sides by darkness; the words they utter take, in my eyes, the form of black flames, which recoil upon them, penetrating the bodies of some, and only playing around others." (pp. 148-149)

Infelicitously worded observations? Though clearly a defense strategy on the part of Baruch, this is quite the lawyer's euphemism. Does this make her visions fraudulent or false? No, of course not, but *if* Baruch's claim is that the source of these visions is divine revelation and that they are consistent with Church teaching, then a better strategy than dismissal or omission is needed lest God is seen as the source of, and the Church seen as condoning, such "infelicitous" wording.

The verdict? Despite these quibbles Baruch has written a riveting book which this juror found very hard to put down. These private revelations give us, in Baruch's beautifully chosen title, "Light on Light."

Daily Readings in Catholic Classics.
Rawley Myers, Ed. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992. 332 pp.

Reviewed by Tim Weldon, Ph.D., Associate Professor and Chair of Philosophy, University of St. Francis, Joliet, Illinois

"Don't read good books—read the best books," advises Mother Bernadette, a high school teacher of the editor Fr. Rawley Myers. To our benefit, he took her advice.

Fr. Myers's collection of some of the greatest philosophical and theological thoughts from some of the greatest philosophers and theologians represents a very worthy introduction to our faith and an incisive supplement to any scholarship. The book is organized so that each calendar day offers insight and inspiration on three hundred and sixty-five subjects ranging from the dispositions of happiness and humility to theological reflections on God as the first principle and the suffering of Mary to commentary upon the contemporary situation. Myers's choice of topics is made even more interesting by his choice of authors. From St. Ambrose to Archbishop Fulton Sheen, from St. Augustine to G. K. Chesterton, few works could offer such accessibility to a variety of thinkers.

In his arrangement, Fr. Myers allows us to discover and re-discover timely and timeless mediations of Catholics such as Malcolm Muggeridge and Jacques Maritain. From an entry by Muggeridge entitled "The Power of Words," we are treated to one of the more interesting selections in the book. "Jesus himself said that heaven and earth would pass away, but his words would not pass away," writes Muggeridge as he proceeds to elaborate with the example of quoting *King Lear* to a hospitalized blind man:

> He got the point immediately. As I left the ward, I could hear him saying them over and over to himself: "I stumbled when I saw." That is what I mean by the marvelous power of words when they are used with true force in their true meaning.

The words of Maritain are equally enlightening as in one entry he shares with us the necessarily bold decree that:

> What is demanded of Christians is to intervene in the destiny of the world, winning at great pains and at the risk of a thousand dangers-through science and through social and political action- a power over nature and a power over history, but remaining, whatever he does, more than ever a subordinate agent: servant of divine Providence….

Perhaps the greatest strength of Fr. Myers's collection is his inclusion of equally important thoughts by perhaps lesser known thinkers such as the English Dominican Vincent McNabb (1868-1943) and the former Archbishop of Westminster, Basil Cardinal Hume (1923-1999). Fr. McNabb's impassioned reflection on Jesus and Mary, entitled "Beneath the Cross," is one of the more memorable entries and the words of Cardinal Hume, selected to close the year, are more memorable still:

We have to hang on to the fact of God's love for us. That

> demands courage and tenacity. There is so much in the world that seems to contradict the whole idea of a loving God; there is enough in our own lives to make us doubt it…God asks us, sometimes often, to go on with the pilgrimage through life in the dark, but always trusting. Trust is proof of love.

Through the hectic pace, the trivial, and the hype of the every day, all of which seem to overwhelm, the daily readings found in this book provide an inspired calendar for the ages.

The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason,
by Sam Harris, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004)
Reviewed by Reverend Brian Van Hove, SJ White House Retreat, St. Louis, Missouri

Mr. Sam Harris (www.samharris,org) wrote a new book about something old. In the long history of philosophy we have encountered his thesis before. His is a naïve enthusiasm for the power of reason and rational verification, which really means that he has rediscovered the 18th century and its Age of Reason. Perhaps as an undergraduate he never read William

Barrett's *Irrational Man*. Does the author appreciate light to the exclusion of heat?—after all, love is famously irrational. But for Sam Harris, love is a pleasurable state of mind (189). He picks the "happiness and suffering" of sentient beings to ground his rationalist ethics, which he calls "realist ethics", but "happiness and suffering" are described materialistically (171). "Reason is nothing less than the guardian of love" (190). Does he have less courage than Ayn Rand (1905-1982) who wrote that "love is the root of all evil"?

Harris advocates something akin to a Neo-Enlightenment. His skepticism about any truth outside the mind and reason, narrowly conceived, is used to dismantle the architecture of our historic Western worldview (Jewish, Christian, and Muslim), yet he offers nothing in replacement except Buddhist meditation (288 n. 16) and old-fashioned rationalism updated by neuroscience. "How can we encourage other human beings to extend their moral sympathies beyond a narrow locus? How can we learn to be mere human beings, shorn of any more compelling national, ethnic, or religious identity? We can be reasonable" (190). *The End of Faith* is his first book, and it is short—227 pages of text and 62 pages of notes.

The End of Faith is a caricature of organized Western religion and faith. He says "Our enemy is nothing other than faith itself" (131). And again "Indeed, we know enough at this moment to say that the God of Abraham is not only unworthy of the immensity of creation; he is unworthy even of man" (226). The tone of the book is contemptuous in the extreme. Harris's work rejects the contribution of Western-inspired (= Semitic) world religions to civilization and to our times. For the author, religion is a liability, political and social. His philosophical materialism has drawn him to work on a doctorate in neuroscience. He thinks anything that was good in religion can be found elsewhere. He thinks mystical states and religious impulses are located in the brain, not in a transcendent "totaliter aliter." Hence his admiration for Buddhism and other Asian non-dualist systems of consciousness training (215-216; 283 n. 12). Now he is studying belief, disbelief, and uncertainty by way of fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging).

Harris claims that intuition is a respectable first step for the inquirer en route to realism grounded in scientific truth, and so he rejects the position of relativists and pragmatists and pluralists who can never get to certitude. There is here a relationship with 19th century mechanism, determinism, and the "inevitable laws of history". He accepts a materialist conception of certitude in the philosophy of science, while explaining that he has spent many years practicing Eastern meditation (283 n. 12).

Harris has a practical agenda. He thinks that, unless we coherently apply reason to all human endeavor, including ethics, we will be destroyed. Surely this is noble. Harris is looking out for you and me. He believes that the threat from Islam is of the greatest urgency, and that there is likelihood it will go nuclear. Fellowship readers can assume Harris's opposition to orthodox Jews, Muslims, or Christians. But what comes as a surprise is his withering attack upon the moderates and the liberals among them—indeed, quite a surprise. This book is implicitly more against the Küngs and the Bultmanns (although he seems to write approvingly of Paul Tillich) than it is against the Grand Ayatollah or the pope who are, for him, obviously indefensible. Although he would not like to welcome back the Christians of the 14th century, he thinks their revisionist heirs are the ones who keep propping up the unjustified myths and unprovable assertions of outdated biblical religion. He says "We will see that the greatest problem confronting civilization is not merely religious extremism: rather, it is the larger set of cultural and intellectual accommodations we have made to faith itself. Religious moderates are, in large part, responsible for the religious conflict in our world, because their beliefs provide the context in which scriptural literalism and religious violence can never be adequately opposed" (45).

The End of Faith is studded with the usual examples to illustrate his thesis. The discussion of the Paris Plague of June 1348 A.D. would interest Catholics (70-71), and even more so his portrayal of the Mass (72-73). He likes to refer to the Holy Eucharist as "a cracker". The Mass is one of the best examples he can find of a preposterous belief. He quotes, without source or exact reference, "The Roman Profession of Faith of the Roman Catholic Church" to show what he means (241 n. 30).

However, when it comes to the Inquisition and the Holocaust, he admits that he has treated these thorny subjects cursorily, and he refers readers to some literature on these subjects (107)—without giving them any authors who might disagree with him. None of the best historians of the inquisitions are cited (Kamen, Peters, Shannon, Netanyahu), even though they are well published and they may have some pretty sympathetic things to say about the church. For the Holocaust, he relies on Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, for one, but never mentions Rabbi David G. Dalin or Father Neuhaus. Harris is blissfully innocent of the serious criticism Goldhagen received from Richard John Neuhaus in *First Things*. (See http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9608/articles/review_essay.html). Harris refers to Pacelli as "Pious XII" and on the

same page (106) he reveals a complete misunderstanding—another caricature—of papal infallibility.

Probably Harris considers post-conciliar Catholicism rather tame, yet he opposes it by saying "… even the most docile forms of Christianity currently present insuperable obstacles to AIDS prevention and family planning in the developing world, to medical research, and to the development of a rational drug policy—and these contributions to human misery alone constitute some of the most appalling failures of reasonableness in any age." (150; esp. 167-169).

The End of Faith is as much about the culture wars as anything else. His attacks upon an alleged irrationality of Mr. Justice Scalia and American anti-marijuana and anti-sodomy laws (156-164) seem unprofessional for an academic and more suited to an angry ACLU activist. Thus, Harris reveals himself as a popularizer who is especially annoyed at restraints on stem cell research (165-167).

Harris's philosophical hero is likely Bertrand Russell, who comes in for praise in places (esp. 173). Russell was a peace activist, and a man who accepted spirituality in some sense, but scrupulously subjected it to reason and science. Noam Chomsky gets a beating because he does not see that the real problem in the world is religion. Wittgenstein is dismissed (288-289 n. 19). Harris states plainly that *faith is the mother of hatred* (30). He can say something good about Rousseau and Schelling (283 n. 11). Generally, though, he is against Greek wisdom or Western philosophy because of its dualism, though he credits Pyrrho with some innovation, probably because he learned something when he traveled to the border of India (282 n. 9).

Basically, Harris thinks that science will solve nearly everything in this life, including matters of morality. He trusts the human mind unfailingly, thus implicitly rejecting Kant and his legacy (172). Ethics is located in the physical brain, not in the will or the intellect as classically conceived, by Kantians or by Thomists.

He joins a long line of those who have idolized modernity. People used to think this way before the sinking of the Titanic gave them pause, not to mention the pause given more recently after the demise of the Challenger and the Columbia. The Myth of Progress thrives in this book. Just escape from our obscurantist past and its odious survival in the present via faith, and the future will surely be bright.

Mr. Harris and my retired cardiologist may have something in common. *The End of Faith* could have been written only by a very young man. Harris is cocky and not very modest in his claims. He spreads the net of his discourse too widely. He is a trenchant mega-scoffer and a hot-shot currently on the lecture circuit. My retired cardiologist also began his career as an atheist, moved on to spend many years as an agnostic, and recently (like the venerable Anthony Flew) announced he was a Deist as the arguments from intelligent design theory were so compelling. Perhaps at the end of his academic journey Sam Harris's final thought might echo St. Augustine—"Too late have I loved Thee."

The historical Voltaire received the last sacraments on his deathbed. It was reported that Jean-Paul Sartre was moving in the direction of theism at the time of his death. Harris sympathizes with those who would enjoy the sacred, especially as death approaches (232 n. 20), but for him spirituality must be deeply rational (43) and divested of unreasonable faith-tenets. Spirituality is in the brain, and it is a state of consciousness, not a relationship with the *Other*—the *Thou* of Martin Buber. For Harris, that would be mere religion and he says "No personal God need be worshipped for us to live in awe at the beauty and immensity of creation" (227).

For now, Sam Harris is tightly locked in a universe knowable only to the most rigorous 18th and 19th century methodological empiricism united to the newest technology. Unlike Jacques and Raïssa Maritain a century ago, who discovered Henri Bergson to help them out of this particular philosophical dead-end, the young Dr. Harris has found no similar rescuer. He would minimize the saints whom Bergson revered, while offering no real antidote to despair, a common problem in post-Christian Western scholarship and its nihilist heirs.

We await his second book to learn if he has evolved in any worthwhile direction. *The End of Faith* breaks no new ground, nor does it rework old ground seriously. Neuroscience is fine, but it is not the tool to answer ultimate questions. We may already be frightened by reckless Islamism, but we did not require Dr. Harris's analysis of Islamism to do this for us (203). His proposal for a world government is so tiresome. His particular solution to the deeper problems of the human situation has already been explored (he denies this by saying religion prevents us from exploring *anything* since religion rejects all new evidence—176) in the first Enlightenment. Perhaps due to his youthfulness, Harris's philosophy is flashy and facile—or lacking in erudition, as when he wrongly ascribes a famed Scholastic adage to Christopher Hitchens (176). He confidently looks to the future of reason when he is recommending its worn past. He would definitely dislike World Youth Day in Cologne 2005, when these lines were written.

Books Received

If you would like to receive a complimentary copy of one of the books below in order to review it for a future issue, please email your request to Alice Osberger at osberger.1@nd.edu

Figures Around the Cross: A Lenten Journey from Death to Life, Rev William F. Maestri, Alba House: New York (2002), 234 pp. Paper.

No One Else Can Sing My Song, Fr. Edward J. Farrell, Alba House: New York (2001), 204 pp. Paper.

Daisys Will Grow Anywhere: A Survivor's Story, Elizabeth Ammons, Xlibris unknown (2001) 519pp.Paper.

Praying the Sunday Psalms: Reflections on the Responsorial Psalm Years A-B-C, Michael Goonan, SSP Alba House, Staten Island, NY (2001), 203pp. Paper.

Exploring the Catholic Church: An Introduction to Catholic Teaching and Practice, Marcellino D'Ambrosio, Ph.D., Servant Publications: Ann Arbor, MI, (2001), 137pp, Paper.

Rationality and Religious Experience: The Continuing Relevance of the Wolrld's Spiritual Traditions, The First Master Hsiian Hua Memorial Lecture, Henry Rosemont, Jr. Open Court: Chicago, (2001) 111pp. Paper.

I Am: Eucharistic Meditations on the Gospel, Concepcion Cabrera de Armida (Conchita), Alba House, NY (2001) 102 pp. Paper.

Have You Heard the Good News?: Reflections on the Sunday Gospels, Cycle A, Edward T. Dowling, SJ, Alba House, Staten Island, NY (2001) 180pp. Paper

The Spirit of Jesus in Scripture and Prayer, James W. Kinn, Rowman and Littlefield Publishing, Lanham, MD, (2004) 231pp. Paper.

The Works of Mercy: The Heart of Catholicism, James F. Keenan, S.J., Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group:Lanham, MD, Paper, 128pp.

Peace Talks: Who Will Listen?, Fred Dallmayr, University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, IN, (2004) Paper. 288pp. Marriage and Christian Life: A Theology of Christian Marriage, Daniel Hauser, Roman and Littlefield Group, Lanham, MD (2005)

Seasons of the Soul, Concepcion Cabrera de Armida, Alba House, Society of St. Paul, Staten Island, NY (2005), 50pp.

Trial by Fury: *Christian Social Thought Series,* Ronald J. Rychlak, Acton Institute: Grand Rapids, MI (2004), 87pp.

Many Faces, One Church: Cultural Diversity and the American Catholic Experience, eds. Peter Phan and Diana Hayes, Sheed & Ward Catholic Studies, Roman and Littlefield: Lanham, MD, (2005), 146pp.

Living the Catholic Social Tradition: Cases and Commentary, eds. Kathleen Maas Weigert and Alexia K. Kelley, Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham, MD (2005)

Breatstfeeding and Catholic Motherhood: God's Plan for You and Your Baby, Sheila M. Kippley, Sophia Institute Press: Manchester, NH, (2005) Paper, 107pp.

The Soul of Wit: Some Poems, Ralph McInerny, St. Augustine's Press: South Bend, IN (2005), Paper, 96pp.

The Truth You Know You Know: Jesus Verified in Our Global Culture, N. Kenneth Rideout, NDX Press: Nashville, TN, (2005), Paper, 235 pp.

Engrafted into Christ: A Critique of the Joint Declaration, Christopher J. Malloy, American University Studies, Peter Lang, New York, (2005), Paper. 408 pp.

The World of Catholic Renewal 1540-1770, R. Po-Chia Hsia, 2nd Edition New Approaches to European History: Cambridge University Press (2005) Paper. 268pp.

Aquinas: Disputed Questions on the Virtues, ed. E. M. Atkins and Thomas Williams, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, (2005) Cloth. 330pp.

The Second One Thousand Years: Ten People Who Defined a Millennium, Richard John Neuhaus, ed., Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co: Grand Rapids, (2001) Paper. 126 pp.

John Henry Newman: A View of the Catholic Faith for the New Millennium, John R. Connolly, Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham, MD (2005) Paper. 256 pp.

Called and Chosen: Toward a Spirituality for Lay Leaders, ed. Zeni Fox and Regina Bechtle, SC, Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham, MD (2005) Paper. 216 pp.

Writing for Publication: Road to Academic Advancement, Kenneth T. Henson, Pearson Education: Boston (2005), Paper. 305 pp.

Grant Writing I Higher Education: A Step-by-Step Guide, Kenneth T. Henson, Pearson Education: Boston (2005), Paper, 226.

New Wine, New Wineskins: A Next Generation Reflects on Key Issues in Catholic Moral Theology, ed. By William C. Mattison III, Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group: Lanham, MD, (2005) Paper. 190 pp.

Meditation Without Myth: What I Wish They's Taught Me in Church about Prayer, Meditation, and the Quest for Peace, Daniel A. Helminiak, Crossroads Publishing Co: New York, (2005) Paper. 169 pp.

Being is Person: Personalism and Human Transcendence in Socio-Economic and Political Philosophy, Joseph M. De Torre, University of Asia and the Pacific Foundation, Inc: Metro Manila, Philippines (2005), Paper. 290 pp.

Regular and Perpetual member **Eugene Keating** passed away on April 6, 2005 after a bout with cancer. Gene graduated from the University of Minnesota Law School and was long a partner at the firm of Lindquist & Vennum. When the Fellowship met in Saint Paul in 1995 to examine the state of Catholic universities Gene was a generous local sponsor, and largely responsible for the splendid publicity our meeting received. He and his wife Marilyn attended—along with some number of their six children—almost all our conventions after that.

Marilyn and the children survive.

Monsignor Alfred F. Horrigan, the founding president of Bellarmine College, died on August 23rd at the age of 90. Born in Wilmington, Delaware, Horrigan was ordained a priest for the Archdiocese of Louisville in 1940, his family having moved to Kentucky when he was five years old.. Under the Episcopal leadership of Archbishop John A. Floersh, he was called to found a college for men, something the archdiocese did not have until 1949 when Bellarmine opened with a class of 115. With Msgr. Raymond Treece as his vice-president, Horrigan assembled a faculty composed largely of professionally competent, young Louisvillians who had earned their doctorates in North America and abroad. Horrigan himself held his PhD in philosophy from The Catholic University of America, having completed his doctoral dissertation, "Metaphysics as a Principle of Order in the University Curriculum," under the direction of Charles A. Hart, longtime secretary of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. Horrigan's vision of Catholic higher education was translated into a curriculum that successfully formed a generation of Catholic men whose liberal education has led them to positions of authority in the academic world and beyond. His own leadership no doubt inspired many who later became deans and college presidents elsewhere.

As president of Bellarmine College, Horrigan was called to positions of civic leadership, among others, by becoming president of Louisville's Human Rights Commission. He was recognized as an important local media personality, making frequent appearances on radio and television. Shortly after his retirement as president of Bellarmine College, a position he held for 23 years, he was appointed pastor of St. James, the church he attended as a child. *Jude P. Dougherty*

From member **Peter Hodgson**
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Peter Hodgson publishes a Bulletin called the *"Secretariat for Scientific Questions: Pax Romana."* It provides news of relations between science and theology and is a forum for the exchange of views. He welcomes reports of conferences, short articles and book reviews as well as material from your own writing and reading. He welcomes new material.

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AUTUMN LEAVES

In his *De Senectute*, Cicero remarks on the peace that comes with the dimming of concupiscence in old age. Perhaps he was influenced by a similar remark attributed to one of Socrates' interlocutors. Well, virtue may master desire, but desire seems always there to be mastered. I remember a story about St. Jerome on his deathbed sending his aged sister from the room, lest in *ictu mortis*... In the Age of Viagra, it is noteworthy that the chest-thumping males who appear in the interminable television ads for this and similar products all seem relatively young. In any case, the peace praised by Cicero is to be avoided at all costs. How joyless it all seems. "If sex were all then any hand could make us squeak like dolls the wished for words." (Wallace Stevens)

The news of the day brings home the truth that there is no age limit to the folly of illicit desires. I had been taking comfort from Cicero, but now he seems a slender reed. How silly to think mere age would make me good. Reminders of the fragility of character and the ever present possibility for doing a two-step out of the habits of a lifetime are salutary, however accompanied by a sense of dread. Perhaps most misdeeds remain unknown, but from time to time publicity and scandal magnify the wrong. I used to pray that, should my life end in tragedy, sobeit, but please don't let it end in farce. Well, I'd like to skip the tragedy too. And go on praying for all us sinners, now and at the hour of our death, Amen. ✠

Ralph McInerny

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