

FELLOWSHIP OF CATHOLIC SCHOLARS QUARTERLY

28

NUMBER 4
WINTER 2005

ISSN 1084-3035

Fellowship of Catholic Scholars
P.O. Box 495
Notre Dame, IN 46556
(574) 631-5825
www.catholicscholars.org
Ralph McInerny, Editor
mcinerny.1@nd.edu

ARTICLES

- President's Letter** Dr. Bernard Dobranski
Pope John Paul II and Bioethics William E. May
**Christianity: From a Corner Into
Many Others, and Yet Not Cornered** Fr. Stanley L. Jaki
**The Principle of Double Effect May Apply to Scalpels,
Never to Abortion Votes by Politicians** Damian P. Fedoryka
The Human Being as Believer and Citizen... by Vittorio Possenti
-

BOOK REVIEW ESSAY

- Which Pope Benedict XVI
is the Real One?** Kenneth D. Whitehead
-

BOOK REVIEWS

- Retrying Galileo: 1633-1992**
by Maurice A. Finocchiaro Jude Dougherty,
Equality, Decadence and Modernity
by Stephen J. Tonsor Jude Dougherty
**Ugly as Sin: Why They Changed Our Churches from Sacred
Places to Meeting Spaces—and How We Can Change Them
Back Again** by Michael S. Rose Edmund W. Majewski
**The One in the Many: A Contemporary
Reconstruction of the God-World Relationship**
by Joseph A. Bracken, S.J. Edmund W. Majewski, S.J.
**George G. Higgins and the Quest for Worker Justice:
The Evolution of Catholic Social Thought in America**
by John J. O'Brien Rev. James F. Garneau
**Mother Angelica: The Remarkable Story of a Nun,
Her Nerve, and a Network of Miracles**
by Raymond Arroyo Reverend Brian Van Hove, S.J.
The Church and Galileo
edited by Ernan McMullin Glenn Statile
**The Truth You Know You Know:
Jesus Verified in our Global Culture**
by N. Kenneth Rideout Richard J. Rolwing,
Aristotle on Truth, by Paolo Crivelli Marco Sgarbi
-

MEMBERSHIP MATTERS

BOOKS RECEIVED

OBITUARY

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

- EX CATHEDRA** Ralph McInerny



Fellowship of Catholic Scholars

Scholarship Inspired by the Holy Spirit,
in Service to the Church

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

President's Letter	2
Pope John Paul II and Bioethics.....	3
Christianity: From a Corner Into Many Others, and Yet Not Cornered	6
The Principle of Double Effect.....	13
The Human Being as Believer and Citizen.....	20

BOOK REVIEW ESSAYS

Which Pope Benedict XVI is the Real One?.....	27
--	----

BOOK REVIEWS

Retrying Galileo: 1633-1992.....	36
Equality, Decadence and Modernity	37
Ugly as Sin: Why They Changed Our Churches from Sacred Places to Meeting Spaces	38
The One in the Many: A Contemporary Reconstruction of the God-World Relationship.....	40
George G. Higgins and the Quest for Worker Justice.....	44
Mother Angelica.....	46
The Church and Galileo	46
The Truth You Know You Know: Jesus Verified in our Global Culture.....	48
Aristotle on Truth.....	49

MEMBERSHIP MATTERS.....	50
-------------------------	----

BOOKS RECEIVED.....	54
---------------------	----

OBITUARY	54
----------------	----

BOARD OF DIRECTORS.....	55
-------------------------	----

EX CATHEDRA	56
-------------------	----

Reminder: Membership dues will be mailed out the first of the year and are based on a calendar (not academic) year.

PRESIDENT'S LETTER

by Dr. Bernard Dobranski
Dean, Ave Maria School of Law

Not too long ago we mourned the passing of Pope John Paul II. His was a life well lived and a death well met. The outpouring of affection from the huge crowds gathered at St. Peter's Square and the worldwide acclaim for him as a statesman and religious leader stand as testimony to the impact of his ministry. Only a short while before his election as Supreme Pontiff in 1978, The Fellowship of Catholic Scholars was formed. John Paul's reign as chief teacher of the Church not only buoyed our founders' vision but supplied the intellectual fare that has propelled our mission and helped us to achieve so many of our goals throughout the years. His emphasis on the need for faithful witnesses to teach the Faith in Catholic schools of higher learning proclaimed in *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* affirmed the rightness of our cause and has since produced in our own country a renaissance of a truly Catholic academy. New schools have been established, the young desirous of the truth have flocked to them, and orthodox Catholic scholars have flourished. John Paul's promotion of scholarship and his constant proclamation of *The Gospel Life* (1995) are potent reminders to us of a particular purpose of our fellowship—to form minds that will combat an encroaching culture of death and encourage a culture of life. Nothing can highlight the importance of our witness more than the horrific starvation of Terri Schiavo even as the great Pope of life lay dying. The contrasting message between the two deaths could not be more stark.

After the death of John Paul, I recalled the words that Jesus said to his disciples: "I will not leave you orphans." (Jn. 14:18). These words have been marvelously fulfilled for us in the election of Pope Benedict XVI. His long career as Prefect for The Congregation of The Doctrine of The Faith and his reputation for adherence to authentic Catholic teaching are affirmation by The Holy Spirit of the rightness John Paul's great teaching pontificate. Further, both Karol Wojtyla and Joseph Ratzinger were prominent participants in the work of the Second Vatican Council. Their insights as to the true meaning of the official texts that emanated from that gathering are for us a guarantee of a correct interpretation of the truths that the Holy Spirit wished to communicate to the Church.

Before Ave Maria School of Law opened more than five years ago, I had the privilege of meeting with the then Cardinal Ratzinger. His interest in a new law school based on the natural law caused our conference to last much longer than the appointment time allotted. This interest was borne by his concern for the rampant relativism which is causing a dying

of the light in Western societies. The expurgation from the European Union's Constitution of Europe's Christian heritage is a glaring example of both hostility and ignorance to the role Christianity has played in Europe's past. It is also obvious that the framers of the document want Christianity to play no role in the future. I know that Pope Benedict sees projects like the Fellowship as vital in re-evangelization efforts. A starting point for us has been and should continue to be the late Pope's encyclical *Fides et Ratio* (1998). It is commonly known that Pope Benedict was instrumental in its writing. In this philosophical and theological gem, we have a blueprint for proposing to the world the truth as it is revealed to us in the natural law, which is God's nature and by divine revelation. I do not say this with hubris, but who better than we, the members of the Fellowship, to take on this task? Our love of the Church, our quest for knowledge, our desire to grow spiritually, and our vocation to communicate these great values to others remind me of the thrilling verse in the Prologue of John's Gospel, "a light shines in the dark, a light that darkness could not overpower." (Jn. 1:4-5). Having said this I do not see America's future to be the fate of Europe. The last presidential election is evidence of the goodwill on the part of the majority of our fellow citizens for a society based on traditional values. I am also optimistic at the nomination of Judge Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court. If he is confirmed by the Senate, from what we know of him, we will have another valuable ally in our cause. It will continue to be our job to instruct politicians and judges and all those responsible for crafting social policy of the moral principles so well presented in the great encyclical *The Splendor of Truth* (1993) in order to build the civilization of love that John Paul preached to his dying breath.

The events of the past almost 30 years since our Fellowship's founding are nothing short of a verification for our cause. Just as the monasteries of the Dark Ages preserved civilization, so too can we offer reason informed by faith to our nation at a time when so many are held captive not by physical threat but by intellectual and spiritual darkness. The motto of Pope Benedict is a reminder of the importance of our mission as "Co-workers of the truth." (Jn. 3:8). ✠

Pope John Paul II and Bioethics: *Bodily Life As Integral to the Human Person*

by William E. May¹

October 7, 1979 is one of the most memorable days in my life. It was the day that Pope John Paul II, on his first apostolic visit to the United States, celebrated Mass on the Capitol Mall in Washington, D.C. He called his homily, one of the most eloquent and powerful he ever gave, "'Stand Up' for Human Life." Its key theme, the preciousness of all human life as a great and surpassing gift of God was a major one of his entire pontificate. In this inspiring homily John Paul II declared:

all human life from the moment of conception and through all subsequent stages is created in the image and likeness of God. Nothing surpasses the greatness or dignity of a human person. Human life is not just an idea or an abstraction; human life is the concrete reality of a being that lives, that acts, that grows and develops; human life is the concrete reality of a being that is capable of love and of service to humanity.²

As this text shows, John Paul II vigorously affirmed the truth that bodily life is integral to the being of the human person; and I think that his insistence on this truth and his identification of a dualistic anthropology as the root of the "culture of death" is his greatest contribution to bioethics. It is worth noting that Leon Kass, the chairman of President Bush's Council on Bioethics, pointedly observed, in a passage echoing John Paul's homily, that the kind of human "dignity" associated with the new biology and its underlying anthropology is "inhuman," because it "dualistically sets up the concept of 'personhood' in opposition to nature and the body" and thus "fails to do justice to the concrete reality of our embodied lives."³

John Paul II clearly identified a dualistic

understanding of the human person as a major root of the “culture of death.” Thus in his 1995 *Encyclical Evangelium vitae* he wrote that the culture of death is rooted in the “mentality which tends to *equate personal dignity* with the capacity for verbal and explicit, or at least perceptible *communication*” (no. 19). But long before 1995 John Paul had emphasized the bodily character of the human person’s existence. In his mind-opening audiences on the “theology of the body” which he initiated on September 5, 1979 and continued through November 28, 1984 he time and again insisted that the human body “reveals” or “expresses” the person and that it is, as it were, the sacrament of the person an outward sign not only pointing to and signifying a person but inwardly participating in the being of the person.⁴

Moreover, in his apostolic exhortation on the role of the Christian family in the world today, *Familiaris consortio* (1981), he boldly declared: “the difference, both *anthropological* and *moral*, between contraception and recourse to the rhythm of the cycle, is much wider and deeper than is usually thought. It is a difference which, in final analysis, is based on irreconcilable concepts of the human person and of human sexuality” (no. 32). By this John Paul II meant that the acceptance and practice of contraception was based on a dualistic anthropology, one separating the person from his/her body, whereas “recourse to the rhythm of the cycle” is grounded in a wholistic anthropology that recognizes that the human person is a unity of *body* and *soul*.

The truth John Paul here affirmed was demonstrated by Germain Grisez in an essay written four years before Karol Wojtyła was elected pope. His brilliant analysis of the “working paper” of the Majority members of the papal commission⁵ shows that for its authors human biological fecundity, of itself, is *subpersonal* and *subhuman*, a part of the world of impersonal nature over which man has been given dominion. The clearest evidence of this dualism is the claim that “biological fertility is not continuous and is subject to many irregularities; therefore it must be assumed into the human sphere and be regulated within it” (“foecunditas biologica non est continua et est subiecta multis irregularitatibus, ideo in sphaeram humanam assumi et in ea regulari debet”). As Grisez says,

if the biological fecundity of human persons is *per se* human, it does not need to be assumed into the human sphere. Nothing assumes what it already is or what it has of itself. Thus the majority theologians of the Commission clearly, although implicitly, asserted dualism...; sexuality in and of itself is a physiological process belonging to the physical world; the body in and of itself is not the person; the goods of the body are altogether subordinate to “personal” values.⁶

Moreover, as Grisez notes, “if the person really is not his body, then the destruction of the life of the body is not directly and in itself an attack on a value intrinsic to the human person.”⁷ Thus:

Christian moral thought must remain grounded in a sound anthropology which maintains the bodiliness of the person. Such moral thought sees personal biological, not merely generically animal biological, meaning and value in human sexuality. The bodies which become one flesh in sexual intercourse are persons; their unity in a certain sense forms a single person, the potential procreator from whom the personal, bodily reality of a new human individual flows in material, bodily, personal continuity. An attack on this biological process is an attack on the personal value of life, not always, indeed, on an existing individual’s life, but on human life in its moment of tradition [=handing on].⁸

John Paul II vehemently rejected this dualistic anthropology in his great Encyclical of 1993, *Veritatis splendor*. In it he faced head-on the charge, commonly made by revisionist theologians, that the Magisterium’s understanding of natural law is “physicalistic” or “biologistic” (n. 47). He declares that this claim “does not correspond to the truth about man and his freedom,” and that it “*contradicts the Church’s teachings on the unity of the human person*,” who, “in the unity of body and soul...is the subject of his own moral acts” (n. 48). Since the definitive teaching of the Church (cf. Council of Vienne, const. *Fidei Catholicae*, Fifth Lateran Council, papal bull *Apostolici Regimini*, and Vatican Council II, *Gaudium et spes*, n. 14) maintains that the human person “entails a particular spiritual and bodily structure,” it follows that “the primordial moral requirement of loving and respecting the person as an end and never as a mere means also implies, by its very nature, respect for certain fundamental goods” (n. 48), goods such as bodily life and marital communion (cf. n. 13).

He explicitly repudiated as “*contrary to the teaching of Scripture and Tradition*” (n. 49) the view of those who “reduce the human person to a ‘spiritual’ and purely formal freedom” and thus misunderstand the moral meaning of the body and human acts involving it. Likening this view to “certain ancient errors... always...opposed by the Church” (e.g., Manicheism), he then appealed to the teaching of Paul in 1 Cor 6.9-19) on the gravity of such sins as fornication and adultery and to the teaching of the Council of Trent which “lists as ‘mortal sins’ or ‘immoral practices’ certain specific kinds of behavior the willful acceptance of which prevents believers from sharing in the inheritance promised to them” (n. 49).

Another remarkable witness to John Paul II’s vigorous presentation of the preciousness of human bodily life and the truth that the human body is integral to the human person is provided by his December 1989 “Discourse to the Participants of the Working Group [on the Determination of Brain Death and Its Relationship to Human Death].” John Paul II began by emphasizing that the value of human life “springs from what is spiritual in man,” and that the body

receives from the spiritual principle which inhabits it and makes it what it is—a supreme dignity, a kind of reflection of the Absolute. The body is that of a person, a being which is open to superior values, a being capable of fulfillment in the knowledge and love of God (cf. *Gaudium et spes*, 12, 15). When we consider that every individual is a living expression of unity and that the human body is not just an instrument or item of property, but shares in the individual’s value as a human being, then it follows that the body cannot under any circumstances be treated as something to be disposed of at will (cf. *ibid.*, 14).⁹

Throughout his pontificate John Paul II unequivocally affirmed the intrinsic goodness of the human body and human bodily life. He in effect said: “a living human body is a living human person.” Hence, so long as we have in our midst, a living human body, we have in our midst a living human person, and we have such a body in our midst from conception/fertilization until death, until the body is no longer *living*.

This truth is not only crucial for sound philosophy and morality;¹⁰ it is central to Catholic faith.

Unlike modern dualists, who claim that to be a person one must have minimally exercisable cognitive abilities and that the body is instrumental to this conscious subject, the Church teaches us and reminds us that when God created man (a person like himself) he did not create a conscious subject to whom he added a body as an afterthought; rather “male and female he created them” (Gen 1:28), i.e., as living flesh and blood. Moreover, when his Uncreated Word became man, as it were, God’s “created word,” he became flesh: *logos sarx egeneto* (John 1:14). ✠

1. William E. May is Michael J. McGivney Professor of Moral Theology at the John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family at The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.

2. I use the text of “‘Stand Up’ for Human Life” found in *Enchiridion Familiae*, eds. Augusto Sarmiento and Javier Escrivá Ivars (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 1992) 3.2378-2387. Toward the conclusion of the homily John Paul II committed himself to the defense of human life and challenged all those present to “‘Stand Up’ for Human Life.” In an especially eloquent passage he declared: “...we will stand up every time that human life is threatened. When the sacredness of life before birth is attacked, we will stand up and proclaim that no one ever has the authority to destroy unborn life. When a child is described as a burden or is looked upon only as a means to satisfy an emotional need, we will stand up and insist that every child is a unique and unrepeatable gift of God, with the right to a loving and united family... When the sick, the aged, or the dying are abandoned on in loneliness, we will stand up and proclaim that they are worthy of love, care, and respect.”

3. Leon Kass, *Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002), p. 17; emphasis added.

4. See the following General Audiences: October 31, 1979; November 14, 1979; January 9, 1980; May 28, 1980.

5. The “working paper, popularly known as the “Majority” Report, was called in *Latin Documentum Syntheticum de paternitate responsabili*.

6. Germain Grisez, “Dualism and the New Morality,” in *Atti del Congresso Internazionale (Roma-Napoli, 12-17 aprile 1974)*: Tommaso d’Aquino nel suo Settimo Centenario, Vol. 5, *L’Agire Morale*. Napoli: Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, 1975, pp. 328-329.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 325.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 330

9. “Discourse of John Paul II to the Participants of the Working Group,” in *Working Group on the Determination of Brain Death and Its Relationship to Human Death (10-14 December 1989)* (Pontificiae Academiae Scientiarum Scripta Varia, 83), eds. R. J. White, H. Angstwurm, and I. Carrasco de Paula (Vatican City: Pontifical Academy of Sciences, 1992), no. 2, p. xxiv.

10. Two superb philosophical works showing the errors of dualism and giving good arguments in support of a wholistic anthropology are: Germain Grisez, “When Do People Begin?” *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 63 (1989) 27-47; and Patrick Lee, *Abortion and Unborn Human Life* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997).

Christianity: From a Corner Into Many Others, and Yet Not Cornered

Fr. Stanley L. Jaki

Distinguished University Professor at Seton Hall University

www.sljaki.com

It was a punishment for a Roman official to serve as procurator in Palestine, a position to which perpetual fame accrued through Pontius Pilate. Though the procurator had for his official residence Caesarea, a splendid city with a newly built port, he often had to be in Jerusalem, the center of a much despised race, the Jews. Scattered all over the Empire, they kept to themselves as much as possible. Unwilling to attend public baths, a favorite pastime for Romans and Greeks, the Jews had the reputation of having an unpleasant smell, a strong reason to stay in a corner and in ghettos all too often. As to their principal habitat, Jerusalem, it was an overcrowded city and the flashpoint of conflicts that were senseless, indeed incomprehensible, for the Romans. They readily accommodated all gods of all religions, provided the Emperor, or at least the genius of Rome, was given divine honors. But for the Jews, and for them alone in the whole Empire, it was an abomination to worship anyone except the only one God, their own, whom they steadfastly refused to represent in any form.

It was in Jerusalem that a universally practiced idol worship came into conflict with a religion which as an organization existed only there. Jerusalem was the capital of a small province, Judaea, a puny corner, which lay off the only main overland route between Alexandria and Antioch, the capital of Syria. Jerusalem itself did not command among non-Jews wide attention even though Herod vastly embellished the Temple there. It was Herod's unusual measure of cruelty that provoked the most memorable comment on him from Rome. It was Caesar Augustus' remark, a pun on the similarity of the Greek words *huios* and *hus*, standing, respectively, for son and pig, that Herod treated his pigs better than his sons, to say nothing of his daughters and wives. An unusual murderer Herod was in a human history

which began with a fratricide tied to the name of Cain. It continued with mass murders on an ever increasing scale up to the just expired twentieth century, which has surpassed all previous centuries in that horrid craft.

If the Jews cared for Herod it was because Herod, as their king appointed by Rome, could create the illusion that there was still a throne of David. The illusion was greatly enhanced by Herod's work on the Temple to which Jews from all over the Empire sent their annual tax, the amount of which made pagans jealous as we know this from Strabo. But this fact did not change the remoteness of Judea, nor did it alter its capital's status as an uncultured place from the Roman or Greek viewpoint. Jerusalem had no baths, no forums, no schools, except schools of rabbinical lore. Important as Jerusalem could be for the Jews, it was in a land north to it, in "heathen Galilee," that the Son of God chose to become man and even there in just a corner.

Humanly speaking he should have chosen Athens, or Alexandria, or Rome, but he chose a corner where Rome's legions cared little about local cruelties provided their perpetrators did not infringe on the larger interests of the Empire. Rome would not have taken notice had Herod succeeded in cornering the Babe born in Bethlehem. As far as this is known, Herod got away with murdering all infants under two in the environs of Bethlehem after the Babe escaped his reach.

Herod's henchmen may have searched a cave-like stable carved into the hillside, where the Babe's birth took place, as presumably they searched everything in Bethlehem. By then to that little corner, a few miles south of Jerusalem, did the Magi go after they had consulted with Herod, who sought information from the priests. They told him that according to a prophecy by Micah, the great king of Jews, their Messiah, was to be born in a village, and far from being the largest among villages of Judaea.

Herod's surprise would have been even greater had he learned some particulars about that cave. It remained smelly even after Joseph had swept it clean of manure, hardly a proper reception for the birth of one who was to occupy David's throne, let alone for the Son of God. Herod was not, of course, the kind of human who would have thought of what that smell meant for Mary, the child's mother, for whom Joseph found no room in the hostel, a mere flop house by modern standards.

On fleeing to Egypt with his wife and the Babe, Joseph had to find a corner for them that was safe, and therefore unnoticed. Very likely he chose a Jewish enclave somewhere to the east of the Nile delta. On returning from there he chose to live in Nazareth, his wife's birthplace. Mary could hardly be proud of Nazareth whose mere mention prompted the remark, preserved in John's Gospel, that little good if any could come from there.

Yet God chose to deliver to that backwater village his message about the greatest good ever to be given to mankind. But when the message was delivered only one human being heard it, Mary, a maiden of perhaps fifteen years of age. As such she was hardly to be paid any attention had she spoken of her news. For obvious human reasons she was not to trumpet the news. She would have been held up to utmost ridicule or something far worse, had she started speaking about her being with a child, though she was resolved not to know man.

Not that she was not overjoyed on finding that on entering the house of her kinsfolk, Zachariah and Elizabeth, the latter had gained a clear knowledge of what had happened to her, just by having heard her greeting. Mary's Magnificat was in part triggered by her instinctive realization that the Spirit of God, to whom she owed the child, was at work even in Ain Karem, a week's journey from Nazareth. She most likely traveled on foot, possibly in the company of acquaintances, to whom she could not even tell that she had learned from an Angel that her kinswoman Elizabeth, whom she went to visit, was with a child, though well past the childbearing age.

Many a learned exegete would frown on this recital of data from the Nativity story, but they do this by cornering themselves into a box. It is the worst kind of black box ever constructed. Its alleged

rationality is predicated on the grim resolve that it is reasonable to slight the massive reality of the truth of Mary's prophecy about herself, even at a total disregard of her son. Instead of being gradually forgotten, she, a mere nobody, though a very real body, is called blessed by an ever larger number of human beings, ranging from simpletons to first-rate intellects. Mary did not start out as a mythical figure, like Anahita or Artemis, the former being an Iranian goddess of water.

These two deities are mentioned here out of a very large number of similar products of wishful thinking, for a purely literary reason. Those two goddesses were the ones referred to at the end of the Postscript to *Alone of All Her Sex*, as it came out in a paperback edition in 1989, thirteen years after it first appeared in 1976. The book's subject was, according to its subtitle, "The Myth and the Cult of the Virgin Mary," a laboriously thwarted research by Marina Warner. Those thirteen years were not enough for her to suspect the fatuity of her erstwhile expectation that her research would achieve what two thousand far more trying years could not bring about. Like so many others who were in their twenties during those thirteen years Ms Warner, too, thought that nothing worse than Watergate could ever hit mankind.

She undertook and completed that research of hers in the firm belief that the Virgin Mary would "become a historical goddess one day." Thirteen years later during which a Pope, who had M as the sole decor in his coat-of-arms, started making history, Ms Warner conceded only that the day in question might be "far off." But during those thirteen years she grew from thirty to forty-three, an advancement in years which may spark more realism in a woman than in a man. Yet even so she failed to appreciate the age-old Catholic tenet that a single person's shipwreck in faith, such as hers, fails to undermine faith as a set of propositions about real beings and things. In an interview which she, a convent-educated Catholic, gave still ten more years later (May 24, 1999) to *TIME*, she spoke of Catholic faith as a set of beliefs in ideas and not a set of assertions about facts.

Facts connected with human history cannot be proved like facts of natural history. Human facts come and go with time and can only be asserted though not again observed. Many of those assertions vanish in memory but some others ruggedly maintain

themselves as generations follow generations. The assertion of none of those facts demanded more heroism on the part of the human mind and will than the ones related to the fact which happened to Mary two thousand years ago in a remote corner of the world. Mary did not conceive an idea, she rather conceived a son, and confronted thereby with a fact. It was most heroic on her part to live with that fact, including its culmination which made her witness the crucifixion of the one whom she had conceived thirty-three years earlier. Both events may have taken place on the same day of the year, March 25, according to our calendar, if one combines a remark of Tertullian with one by Augustine. The coincidence of those two dates could mean enormously much to a woman whose life was riveted on facts before she had developed any ideas about them.

Anyone who even for the sake of argument is not pleased with this emphasis on facts over ideas may just as well stop reading a line more of this essay. The fact remains that Mary's prophecy about herself rings true even after two millennia. Even those who like Ms Warner would prefer to see that prophecy vanish, find their hopes unrealized. Mary remains "alone in her sex," a phrase of the Christian poet Sedulius, which is the motto of Ms Warner book. She could have just as well added some words of Wordsworth, who fifteen hundred years after Sedulius came forward with a no less quotable phrase, in speaking of Mary as "our tainted nature's solitary boast." Clearly, Mary was memorably remembered, in proof of her prophecy that all generations would call her blessed, that is, alone really blessed among all women.

Mary is not vanishing into a myth, because her Son does not do this either. To appreciate this one does not have to believe that her son was the Son of God. It is enough to keep one's eyes open as did the late Bernard Levin, who editorialized in *The Times* (London) following the announcement, made in a pamphlet by A. N. Wilson, a fallen-away Catholic like Ms Warner, that he would soon come out with a book on Jesus. Levin, a Jew, who now said it "for the fourteen thousandth time" that he was not a Christian, felt the need to unmask the latest in sophisticated skullduggery: "Come; let us suppose that Christ was born neither in Bethlehem, as the Christians believe, nor in Nazareth as Mr Wilson

believes, but in Tunbridge Wells. Suppose, even, that Mr Wilson, rather than Christian religion, is right about virgin births and resurrections; will those tremendous metaphors is there anything in all history to touch them? wither and die? Is not the nature of Christ, in the words of the New Testament, enough to pierce to the soul anyone with a soul to be pierced? . . . I suppose the pamphlet was a herald of the forthcoming book, which will knock down Christianity and bury it. Well, its founder was very thoroughly knocked down and ever so buried, and, whether he rose from the grave or whether he was playing possum, he still looms over the world, his message still clear, his pity still infinite, his words still full of glory, wisdom and love" (*Times*, June 6, 1991).

No need for lengthy studies in comparative religion and morality if a good journalist can make the point in a mere hundred words. But no such nuggets for Ms Warner, who mentioned neither Mr Wilson, nor Mr Levin, but who pointedly referred to John Henry Newman. The latter was one of three Catholic authors whose writings on Mary Ms Warner found very instructive though not to the extent of gaining the proper point of view on Mary. The view is the priority of facts over mere ideas and the priority of good thoughts over their bad counterparts. Otherwise one will box oneself into that dark corner where even Stalin or Hitler or Mao cannot be denounced as plain monsters. They remain gigantic figures for historians who part with their common sense and basic decency, in order to appear with "impeccable" academic credentials, free of "prejudices."

Not for them facts, however gigantic, that are a continual moral judgment over their self-imposed myopia about the difference between corners and continents, and much less about a corner whose impact proved eventually far greater than all impact made on all continents whose number doubled during the last five hundred years. In the two Americas as well as in Australia countless people, ranging again from simpletons to best-selling authors, proclaim Mary blessed in a superlative sense as set forth in inimitable phrases by Sedulius and Wordsworth.

They do so because just as Mary was real so was, and in an incomparably higher sense, her son, who palpably proves himself to be the greatest fact of history, now known to the farthest corners of the world.

One need not study the history of religions to notice this. It is enough to see the significance of the fact that more than a hundred and fifty heads of state from all over the world came to the funeral of John Paul II. Many of them would have been reluctant to admit that John Paul II could not be great if Christ, the Son of Mary, were not immensely greater. But by their coming to the funeral of the Polish Pope, they could not help voting, with their feet at least, on behalf of Christ, born from a woman, Mary, and real mainly for that very reason.

Mary had no inkling whatever of the true span of the generations to follow. Her world was a puny corner in which all knowledge about distant lands and other people was largely a hearsay. Though the learned in her race knew about many other nations and of lands beyond Judea and Galilee, they would have given, if asked, no answer different from the one Mary would have offered, to the question about what the earth was like to. For them it was a flat disk floating on water, though in all appearance, a most central disk in the universe as they imagined it. To human imagination the universe, as recorded everywhere in the Bible, was a big tent, with the earth as its ground and the sky as its roof. It was a terribly primitive picture, even when compared with the world picture of the Greeks, whose learned men had by then well established that the earth was a sphere and the sky, if there was a sky at all, itself spherical all around a globe-like earth.

Those learned Greeks also could evaluate with startling accuracy the size of the earth, and even the size of the moon and its distance from the earth. As to the size of the sun and its distance from the earth and the moon, the calculations fell short of the true value by a factor of about ten. As to the distance from the earth to the sphere of the fixed stars, their calculations were conjectural and the sphere of the fixed stars also proved to be, in the long run, a mere conjecture. But compared with the dimensions of the biblical world, the universe of Ptolemy, who systematized the Greeks' scientific world picture, was mind-bogglingly large.

And the universe grew, so to speak, ever larger and the earth ever smaller in comparison. While Kepler still hoped to retain a sort of a sphere of stars within a Copernican universe, the telescope soon

began to make an illusion of a closed world. Ever more stars were spotted with each improvement of the telescope. The earth appeared more and more what it really is, a mere speck in an ever vaster universe, full, so it was believed, with many other earths or "worlds." For it was readily assumed that since Jupiter was surrounded by a set of moons, the stars were similar to our sun, all surrounded with planets. The fact that Galileo's telescope showed mountains on the moon, made the inference irresistible that there were two major kinds of celestial bodies: the stars, similar to our sun, all fiery bodies, and the planets similar to our moon, itself similar to the earth. From this purely scientific inference imagination rushed forward to claiming that on all planets life and intelligence also thrived as on our earth.

Before long the question was widely spoken of whether those human-like beings, extraterrestrials in modern parlance, had a story similar to our race. Did they fall as we did in Adam and Eve, and were they rescued by precisely a message similar to the one given to Mary, who was told by the Angel to call her son Jehoshua, a name that means "Yahweh saves." Was salvation history confined to a mere corner, a most puny corner in an infinite universe? Or was the son of Mary, the savior of mankind, a planet-hopping savior?

Naturally, if Jesus was the Son of God, he could travel faster than light, if necessary, but in order to do his work of redemption, he would have had to stay for thirty-three years on each of an immensely large number of planets. Had the theory of relativity been formulated by then, some over-eager believers might have used it as an "explanation" of that problem. After all, in our days recourse to the space-time of relativity was taken for the only explanation of Christ's resurrection, if science was to be satisfied.

Underlying all those fears and phantasies about a planet-hopping savior was the presumption that life was not, indeed could not, be confined to a puny corner of the world even in its intelligent form. Believers, who were told that all was created for them and that they, and only they in the vast realm of the living, were created in the image of God, were greatly embarrassed and did not know what to say. They clearly felt being pushed in a corner. They surely found it difficult to find arguments against an

ever more thickening climate of opinion. For there is no arguing against fads and fashions, which generally shared opinions all too often are. These prove to be especially irresistible when proposed in the garb of science, though with no scientific credentials to boot.

For though he was the Perpetual Secretary of the French Academy for almost fifty years, Bernard de Fontenelle had no right to appear in the mantle of scientists as he came out in 1686 with his *Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes*, an immense success in science popularization. As most such works, the *Entretiens* was full of popular phantasies and very short on hard thinking about what could be said on the basis of the science of the day. People who then as now loved to thrive on imagination lapped up Fontenelle's brave conjectures about the inhabitants of the planets, from Venus to Saturn.

By not even the wildest stretch of imagination could Fontenelle appear as a rigorous thinker, whether in his *Entretiens* or in other writings of his. But the reputation of such a thinker, in fact that of the most critical thinker ever, did accrue to Immanuel Kant. Twenty-five years before he came out with his *Critique of Pure Reason* in 1781, Kant published a most uncritical work, his *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*. There he claimed not only sundry details about the physical and moral characteristics of Mercurians, Venusians, Martians, Jovians, and Saturnians, but also something far more relevant to hard science. He, who knew but the elements of algebra, boasted that, if challenged, he could give a mathematical account of the formation of the planetary system, a task which defied Newton, the co-discoverer of infinitesimal calculus. When years later Kant was basking in his glory as one who had put critical reason on an unassailably solid basis, he never repudiated that hollow boast of his.

Being honest was not necessarily equivalent to be critical. One may indeed rightly wonder about the honesty of those many illustrious figures of modern Western intellectual history, who having adopted the Kantian basis, parted with their Christian faith (Tolstoy was one of them). Kant allowed faith in God (revelation he roundly dismissed as being a most uncritical proposition), only on a purely emotive basis which few with a head on their shoulder were willing to espouse.

But there have been other motivations, too, at play already in Kant's case. It is well to recall that Kant discovered his intellectual mission only when at the age of forty, a critical age for most males, he read Rousseau's *Julie*, a novel where sentiments ruled supreme over any moral obligation in matters marital. Early in the twentieth century young Aldous Huxley felt that he spoke in the name of his contemporaries when he said that they espoused Darwinism because it seemed to justify sexual licentiousness, the very point where revelation corners man most.

But back to the times of old Kant, who kept claiming that he was God. And right he was as long as one trapped oneself into the notional cobwebs of the *Critique*. Man who thematically rejects God can only make himself a god, and lose control of his reasoning as well. This threatens even such who retain some nominal attachment to the God, the "god" Kant rejected. A case in point is the great scientist Herschel, the observer of countless galaxies. Few remember nowadays that Herschel held our sun to be populated with living beings. The sun's fiery appearance was due, according to Herschel, to the fact that its huge body was surrounded by a layer of fire, which radiated heat only outward. The idea was not much better than the one guiding some mythical astronauts who hoped to land on the sun during night time.

How could Herschel let his reason be carried away to such an extent? The answer, proved all too well by the history of modern Western thought, is that whenever man does not hold his mind to be a special creature of God, he will lose respect for his mind and see it replicated everywhere in the universe as a mere product of matter. This kind of argument does not, of course, cut ice with modern man, who may, however, be impressed by the argument which John Henry Newman set forth about the fatuous character of believing in extraterrestrials. In his *Grammar of Assent*, where he dealt with various forms of proofs, he listed that belief as an instance of gratuitous assumption, which as such was useless to argue with. He made this remark introductory to the principal argument of the second half of the *Grammar* that salvation history was an improbably unique event in the history of mankind, including the continuation of that history in the Church. That

Church was for Newman either Catholic and Roman, or there was no Church at all and no salvation history either. In arguing in such a fashion Newman could be seen to be pushing himself into a corner in the eyes of champions of the “new” theology.

The mere possibility of this should make uneasy Christian minds lesser than Newman. His dismissal of extraterrestrials as being wholly gratuitous did not cut ice with some of his own who should have known better. They should have known that Laplace’s theory of the formation of the solar system which assured planets around every star, had already revealed major faultlines. Why worry about the spiritual destiny of extraterrestrials if there is little ground for speaking about abodes for them? Today there is just as little reason for conjuring up earth-like planets. Yet in a book, *Brother Astronomer*, by a non-priest Jesuit, who works in the Vatican Observatory, the question was discussed a few years ago whether extraterrestrials should be baptized. He should have known that for our earth to be what it is, it must have a very special moon around it, a requirement which appears most improbable as far as science is concerned.

Today there would be plenty of reason to bring out with an additional chapter the book, *The Great Chain of Being* (1936), about the principle of plenitude. Its author, Arthur Lovejoy of Harvard, showed that the principle which implies that the universe is chock-full of life, is a very hollow idea that never had any foundation in facts, although superior intellects, such as Leibniz, swore by it. In our times addicts to belief in an inevitable march of mankind toward a noosphere are a case of similar hollowness.

Wishful thinking could not be tamed. It was to see life protrude, like a hydra, ever new heads at every new opportunity. Once radio telescopes were built on a large scale, the idea was born that they could detect radio signals which superior humans in other planets keep sending to the earth. In the forty or so years since that view has been bandied about and turned into an expensive scientific research, nothing has been heard from outer space that would count as something remotely similar to symbols, of which words are but one kind. No messages in terms of Morse codes have been detected, although the listening has been done on a colossal scale. Millions of computer hours have been donated by enthusiastic

aficionados of SETI, or Search for ExtraTerrestrial Intelligence.

This enthusiasm was not dampened by the fact that astronauts returned from the moon without being contaminated with bacteria against which the human immune system would have been defenseless. Enthusiasm was not dampened after the Mars probes turned up no evidence of life there, not even of death. The finding of ever more moons around the planets of the solar system has not come up with anything similar to our earth-moon system, although without a moon around the earth the evolution of life would have been very different, and perhaps would not have happened at all.

Statements of this type remain stubbornly disregarded in very wide circles. There nothing is feared so much as evidence that life, as far as we know it, may be very much restricted to a corner of our galaxy, just to speak of this galaxy alone in which SETI people claimed that there would be at least ten thousand civilizations that are technologically superior to ours. The media are wholly on the side of such phantasies. When there appeared the book *Rare Earth* in 2000, *The New York Times* came out with a headline, “Maybe alone in the universe, after all,” but it did not recall that its chief science reporter, Walter Sullivan, had kept preaching for thirty years the message that “We are not alone,” even in the form of a book with that title.

The message of *Rare Earth*, written by two professors of the University of Seattle, one of them a member of the National Academy of Science, is that even primitive forms of life may be very much restricted to a narrow corner of our galaxy! Such is the verdict of science, of all major branches of exact science, from astronomy through geology to biology. The verdict is frightening to those who have rested their dreams about the purpose of human existence on the notion that we are a mere happenstance in the universe, therefore we can do whatever we want to do with ourselves. But the verdict should be a reassurance for those who have held that man was created for a purpose by a benevolent God. By far the largest proportion of such are those who stake even today everything on an event that took place two thousand years ago in a corner of a little world called Mediterranean, but which proved to be the cradle of Western

civilization. They have been cornered many times, but never really cornered. Fallacies in the arguments of their opponents do not fail to show up. And in view of what was presented in *Rare Earth*, whose authors do not seem to be believers at all, those who plead for the overthrow of narrow biblical views and of all supernatural, should find themselves in a bind.

They would never admit this. They would not even remember that Voltaire, one of their chief patron saints in the art of scoffing at everything sacred, could even scoff at the free will of man, though he did it freely. In his *Philosophical Dictionary* Voltaire opined that it was most presumptuous for man, a puny being, to attribute free will to himself, if he at the same time denied free will to such gigantic bodies as Sirius and other stars. Those who set the tone of “learned” discourse had a good laugh without sensing that the last laugh belonged to the camp they opposed, indeed wanted to crush. Corners are confining places but full of freethinkers, whereas the air of freedom, intellectual and spiritual, breathes on those whom the world tries to corner but invariably fails to keep cornered.

For secularists the prospect of encountering extraterrestrials should be frightening. In that case they would be just another species, all of which are ready to devour any other in the great struggle for life. For secularists, intelligence can only be a blind force. Only for believers in the facts of salvation history is intelligence something better, because it is a divinely spiritual gift, which alone can shed light into some very dark corners of material existence. The stark cruelties of that existence can only be mitigated by the consideration that altruism and love are not an illusion, proper to man alone in the universe of living, where, whether one likes it or not, all is inexorably “red in tooth and claw.” The sole exception is the corner occupied by man, who strangely enough can act altruistically, though all too often he does not.

To account for this difference there is still no better means than to take seriously what happened in a mere corner of a still very puny world by comparison with the universe of Copernicus, let alone with a universe of billions of galaxies. To heed this may be

punishing for the human intellect, which wants to thrive on the *a priori*. Yet if accepted all other punishments, real and imaginary, will appear puny. For nothing is more confining than the straitjacket of the *a priori* which lures man to dictate to the universe what it ought to be at a total disregard of what it actually is and he with it. From that dilemma there remains no escape route except through *the* event which, contrary to all prognostications, keeps resisting being cornered, while the far corners of the universe move immensely farther away from one another and do this ever faster.

The event, for all we know, was restricted to our earth, and on this earth it has been really appreciated only by the Catholic Church. Like its Founder, Jesus, and Mary its Mother, the Church has been repeatedly pushed into a corner, but was never cornered. Popes had to flee to remote strongholds, Gregory (Hildebrand) to Monte Cassino, Pius IX to Gaeta. While the former could return to Rome, Gregory had to die, because he loved truth and hated iniquity. Pius VII was kept by Napoleon in incommunicado for more than a year.

Yet while John Paul II could not be cornered as he visited the faithful in all five continents, the Church is no longer a Church of continents. Faith in Europe is in shambles as well as in the two Americas. Today the Church looks more and more as a vast set of islands that form an archipelago so to speak as waves and currents of materialism flow from all directions. But this makes it even more difficult to corner the Church. Forces of secularism are far more effective, to use a political analogy to influence presidential and senatorial election than elections within congressional districts. Even *The New York Times* (which is now laying off hundreds of employees) fails to be distributed in every county. The new archipelago Church is a formation that stands out boldly with its many peaks in the general flood. While the Church has lost continents, it gained countless islands. There are no single corners left to which it could be pushed. The real danger for it comes from the measure in which the faithful fail to hold that they have no permanent city here. ✠

The Principle of Double Effect May Apply to Scalpels, Never to Abortion Votes by Politicians

by Damian P. Fedoryka, Ph.D.

I.

In his “Reflections on Catholics in Political Life and the reception of Holy Communion” (Origins, July 1, 2004, Vol. 34, no. 7), Archbishop William J. Levada addresses positions of the 48 Catholic legislators as expressed in their letter to Theodore Cardinal McCarrick. Archbishop Levada quotes one of their positions, namely, that “*we live in a nation of laws and the Supreme Court has declared that our Constitution provides women with a right to abortion. Members who vote for legislation consistent with that mandate are not acting contrary to our position as faithful members of the Catholic Church.*”

Addressing the position, Archbishop Levada correctly notes that Supreme Court decisions can be changed and that judgments about the application of the Constitution should be guided by principles of moral law. But then, in presenting a “deeper understanding” of these principles and their application, Archbishop Levada asserts that one cannot always deal with “ideal or perfect solutions.” He refers to the often quoted passage in which St. Thomas speaks of God permitting some evil as to occur in the universe and then asserts that those “who rule properly should tolerate certain evils lest other good things should be lost and even worse evils come about” (ST, II.II q 10, art. 11c).

What is surprising is the Archbishop’s application of the principle of *toleration* of evil to the position of the “48” on voting consistently with the “mandate” of a woman’s right to abortion. The “48” are not talking about toleration. They are speaking of the legislation and regulation of a woman’s right to abortion. In other words, they are claiming that their *active support of evil* is consistent with their status as faithful members of the Catholic Church! St. Thomas can hardly be invoked as justification for such a position.

Apparently Archbishop Levada thinks that he can. In offering guidance for Catholic in political life, the Archbishop introduces the complex moral analysis of the moral liceity of material cooperation in evil. In the Catholic tradition, there is a difference between “material” and “formal” cooperation in an evil act. The Archbishop correctly notes that formal cooperation involves intending the evil (as an end). We might add that it may also involve intending a means that is intrinsically evil. Thus, when an individual intends the evil as an end or a means, he “formally” cooperates and becomes morally guilty. When such a formal cooperation is not the case, the individual is said to be materially cooperative when he or she performs an act that is causally connected to the evil involved. Under some circumstances, such a material cooperation may be licit.

Thus, the moral analysis of material cooperation is proposed by the Archbishop for the purpose of evaluating a “vote consistent with that mandate” of a woman’s right to abortion. He writes, “*Is the person’s right intention known sufficiently? Will scandal be avoided? Does the cooperation aim at lessening the bad effects of the cooperation?*”

It is true that the *intention* of the cooperating subject enters into the evaluation of the liceity of material cooperation. There are other factors to be taken into consideration. But notice what Archbishop Levada does in his “Reflections.” Immediately after raising the possibility that some degree of material cooperation may be justified, he turns to the question of the reception of Holy Communion. I abstract here from the point he makes, namely, that “only” the fear of scandal would convince a bishop that he must prohibit the reception of communion in a specific case. To this effect, he refers to Canon #915, which says that manifest obstinate sinners “are not to be admitted to holy communion.” The point that interests me is that both the Canon in question and the Archbishop are talking about what in the Catholic tradition is known as the *external* forum. Yet in the very

next paragraph, after quoting Canon #915, Archbishop Levada explains the practice of the Church. The impression is clearly given, or at least can be received, that the practice in question refers to the matter of Canon #915, the non-admission to holy communion. Archbishop Levada says, “The practice of the church is to accept the *conscientious self-appraisal* of each person” (emphasis added). The focus on the *intention* of the agent that was introduced into the “complex moral analysis” of material cooperation has been retained in the consideration of the admission of obstinate manifest sinners (OMS) which, in Canon #915, deals with the *external* not the internal forum. The Archbishop continues with this shift to the internal forum in his citation of Canon #916 which begins as follows, “A person who is conscious of grave sin is not to celebrate Mass or receive the body of the Lord without prior sacramental confession...” The Archbishop stresses that the “examination of conscience implied in this church law is a serious obligation.” In all of this he is perfectly correct. But the shift from the public forum of the OMS to the inner forum of the examination of conscience has radical consequence for the interpretation of Canon #915, which addresses the *ministers* of the Eucharist. As a consequence of this shift, Canon #915 is now *explained* in terms of #916, that is, in terms of the internal forum of the examination of conscience and sacramental confession on the part of the *sinner*. Thus, the “practice of the Church,” is, in the end, explained by Archbishop Levada as follows,

“Rather, the church *invites* such persons to a *fuller understanding* of truth and a *conversion of mind and heart* to embrace the fullness of Christ’s teaching. In this case the bishop will want to use the virtue of prudence in judging how best to ensure the Catholic person’s understanding of the situation for their Catholic faith.”

The Archbishop is quite correct in his analysis of the situation. He is speaking about those who do not accept some teaching infallibly taught as connected with divine revelation but expressly set forth as divinely revealed. Notice, he is not talking about the specific category of Catholic politicians, nor of the obstinate manifest (public) sinner but only about those who do not accept some teaching of the church. It is with respect to these, and only these, that

Archbishop explains the “practice of the church,” of which he says that it does not *per se* exclude the person from the reception of the sacraments.

But notice, again, that the issue has shifted from Canon #915 to Canon #916. This takes the burden off the shoulders of the bishop and places it directly on the “conscientious self-appraisal.” Archbishop Levada is in apparent full agreement with Roger Cardinal Mahony’s statement of June 18, 2004 about “church teaching, which places the duty [on] each Catholic to examine their [sic] conscience as to their worthiness to receive holy communion. This is not the role of the person distributing the body and blood of Christ.”

Once this shift has occurred, logical consistency demands that the “conversion of mind and heart” be sought by means of teaching that addresses the *inner* dimension rather than by disciplinary measures in the *external* forum. The latter are even identified by Archbishop Levada at one point as “the application of restrictive practice regarding the reception of holy communion.” Archbishop Levada himself is quite clear in recognizing the validity of the latter, but only “in rare cases.” The classic instance of this is the divorced and remarried Catholic known to be in this situation but insistently presenting himself for holy communion. As for the Catholic politician cooperating with an abortion law, he seems to be even rarer.

It appears that such a Catholic politician more often than not falls into the category of permitted material cooperation with evil. Let it be recalled, that cooperation is merely material and not formal when the intention is not the evil involved. With the shift from the *external* or public forum of Canon #915 to the internal forum of Canon #916, the following passage from Archbishop Levada is put into perspective:

Can a politician be guilty of formal cooperation in evil? If the person intends to promote the killing of innocent life, s/he would be guilty of such sinful cooperation. If such an intention were present, even a voter could be guilty of such a cooperation. But this seems unlikely as a general rule. Should every Catholic politician who has voted for an unjust law favoring abortion be judged to have this intention? I hope not.”

With the question of moral guilt we are squarely in the interior dimension of the individual.

Archbishop Levada reminds us of this with the question, “Who is to judge the state of a Catholic communicant’s soul?” [105] Earlier, he raised another question, whether a politician could be guilty of formal cooperation in evil. He indicates that this involves intending to kill the innocents and states that he hopes that not every Catholic politician can be judged to have such intentions. [103] After stating this, he notes that the “public nature of such votes” does raise the question. He goes on to give the example of a divorced and civilly remarried Catholic, as someone who may be refused Holy Communion. But, manifestly, the *intentions* of such an individual play no role in the minister’s decision to refuse Communion. Yet, when it comes to the politician publicly known to vote for pro-abortion laws, The Archbishop returns to intentions and the pastoral task of teaching, leaving to the politician’s conscience his approach to the sacrament.

II.

In my judgment, the Archbishop, with all due respect, is mistaken in his handling of formal cooperation. His own quotation from *Evangelium vitae* (#74) contains two criteria for formal cooperation. One criterion is: “an action, either by its very nature or by the form it takes in a concrete situation, [which] can be defined as a direct participation” in the evil. The second is: a “sharing in the immoral intention of the person committing it.” However, the Archbishop shifts to the *intentions* of the politician and even of the voters and advises the pastor to show solicitude for the members of his flock by way of inquiry about their intentions. At this point he completely ignores the first criterion, the *nature of the action* in question, even though, again, earlier he quoted John Paul II’s teaching about the intrinsic evil of abortion willed as an end or a means.

I suggest that the reason for the difficulty is the application of the principle of double effect, whether implicitly or implicitly, to the legislative act and to the *politician* who performs it. Related to this is the question of the *voter* and his cooperation, [by virtue of voting for a Catholic pro-choice politician in to office,] with an eventual pro-choice legislation voted by pro-choice Catholic legislators. In what follows, I

intend to argue the thesis that the authentic legislative act, unlike a rational action that has its own *finis operis*, already includes an intention independent of the personal intention, the *finis operantis* of the legislator. Thus, in the case of an intrinsically unjust law, the legislator shares responsibility for the intent of the law even if his own personal motivation is not in accord with that intent. This means that not only the legislator or political candidate who personally intends the direct killing protected by an abortion law is excluded from support by the voter, but also the legislator who is personally opposed to the intent of the abortion law but supports it as a part of “his or her promotion of morally good practices.”

A. A brief statement of the principle of double effect

In the Catholic tradition the principle of double effect allowed, under several conditions, the performance of an action that had two effects, one good, the other evil.

The *first* and most important condition was a negative one. The action itself, could *not* be what the tradition identified as intrinsically evil. This means that even if there were no evil but only good consequences of that activity, it was still morally prohibited. *Thus, for it even to be a candidate for consideration under the principle of double effect, the action could not be intrinsically evil.* Such an action is morally forbidden also regardless of the intentions of the agent.

This point is crucial when the action in question is a *public* one. If it is intrinsically evil, then the *intentions* of an eventual agent are irrelevant for the question of a legislative protection of the action. *Such acts ought never, without exception, be legislatively authorized or protected.* Neither the possible good consequences of such an act nor the subject’s intentions change the categorical exclusion of intrinsically evil actions from legislative protection. This being the case, there is no need to consider the further conditions for an action to be permitted under the principle of double effect.

One such intrinsically evil action is abortion. This is the teaching of the Catholic Church. We need not pursue here the claims of the so-called dissidents that there are no intrinsically evil actions in the external dimension involving the body and the world and that *only intentions*, such as hatred of God and of

neighbor, can be evil. It is enough to note that the “dissidents” claim that no action is intrinsically evil. If that is the case, the other criteria for evaluating an action under the principle of double effect come into play.

The tradition does hold that if an action is not intrinsically evil then, and only then, are the other criteria to be applied in the evaluation. Thus, a *second* criterion is that if an action that is not intrinsically evil has good and evil as consequences, these must be weighed. If the proportion between them is such that the evil is greater, the action must not be done.

A *third* criterion is the requirement that the evil effect *not be a means* to the intended good effect. This criterion no longer allows us to speak of consequences in general since some consequences are means and others merely or simply consequences which “follow” but are not intended or used as means. The reason for this is clear. In using something as a means, the person exercises a certain mastery and dominion over the means. If one, therefore, treats an evil as a means, one assumes mastery and dominion over it in order to bring about the good consequences. But in doing this, one necessarily, even if implicitly, assumes mastery and dominion over the good he tries to bring about. But this radically distorts the normative relation between the good and the human person: *the person should serve the good, not be its master*.

The above establishes also the ground for the *fourth* criterion. Of the two consequences, one good, one evil, only the good can be intended as an end. This is the aspect of intentions. Once it has been determined that the action is *not* intrinsically evil, the intention of the agent becomes an important criterion. When, in such an act, the agent intends the good as his end, the evil consequence is not a part of his act, even if it is an effect that causally “follows” his action. The individual then is not guilty or responsible or for the evil. But, it must be stressed here, the good as the intended end implies an inner attitude of serving the good rather than mastering it. One may respect the formal criteria of the principle of double effect and still “do the good” but do so from the perspective of being the master of or lord over the good that comes about. This is immoral.

The second, third and fourth criteria are not

relevant in an intrinsically evil action such as abortion. Under no conditions is such an action morally permissible. Archbishop Levada agrees with this. But we have a new and distinct act in the case of a law or bill that authorizes and protects an intrinsically evil action. My thesis is that the principle of double effect cannot apply to the act of legislatively protecting, even if with heavy regulations, an intrinsically evil act. The principle does apply to actions that have direct *causal effects in the external world*, the use of knives or scalpels, the prescription of medicines, etc. It can also apply to acts by virtue of consequences that are not effects in the strict sense. *But the principle of double effect cannot apply to a legislative vote, given its very nature*. I note several of its elements relevant to my thesis.

B. The legislative act as distinct from rational actions that have their *finis operis* distinct from a *finis operantis*

First, a positive law does not as such have causal effects. In traditional language, the causal effects of an action that entered into the specification of it as a rational action are called the *finis operis*. Those causal effects that did not enter into the specification of the rational action, were the secondary or side effects that are considered in the application of the principle of double effect. The legislative act, in contrast, expresses a “Thou shalt,” that has the nature of an *imperium*, an imperative or command with regard to some behavior in the external world and is addressed to the *free* subject of the law who is the eventual agent of that behavior. Such a behavior may be a consequence, but it should not be construed as an effect, in the strict sense, of the law. An example would be a law that requires a full stop to allow children safe passage at a school crossing. The behavior prescribed by the law is the matter of the law, *what* it prescribes. Compliance is an expected consequence.

Second, the positive law, as such, has what is called the *intent of the law*. The rational subject must be given a reason *why* the law demands certain actions. The law cannot simply prescribe stopping at a school crossing. The reason it does so is to protect the child from unjustly caused harm. Here, the intent of the law is some right of the child. With regard to the driver’s intentions—his reasons why he engages in

the prohibited behavior or fails in the performance of the required behavior—he may hate children, born and unborn and intend to run them down; or he may intend to use them for his own purposes. Yet, the law has its own intent and is not directly concerned with the subjective intentions of those subject to the law. In the context of traditional terminology, the law specifically proposes its intent as the *finis operantis*, as the intention to be had by the subject of the law.

Third, because there are individuals who either intend to harm or disregard the safety of the children, the law attaches *sanctions* in order to secure its intent. Whatever the inner intentions of the drivers, the law attaches a punishment to its infraction. If the driver is not motivated by respect for the rights of the child, it is hoped that he will be motivated by the fear of punishment. By providing sanction, the law provides a secondary possible *finis operantis* for the subject of the law, namely, the avoidance of the punishment for the infraction of the law. The intent of the law is not the punishment but precisely because it governs free subjects who may ignore the rights of protected innocents, the law must intend the sanction if its primary intent is to have any “force.”

Fourth, a legitimate positive law that protects rights is “impersonal,” that is, independent of the *personal intentions of the legislator*. The latter may be the owner of a sign making company and votes for a law mandating full stops at school crossing in the hope of making a killing selling signs. That is a matter of conscience. Regardless of the good or bad conscience of the legislator, the intent of the law must be objectively grounded. In this case, it is the legitimate sovereignty of the child at the school crossing that grounds the traffic regulations aimed at protecting the child’s legitimate ownership of his life and bodily integrity.

C. The principle of double effect cannot apply to an authentic legislative act

We are now in a better position to make the case for the thesis that a vote for legislative protection of an intrinsically evil act cannot possibly be permitted under the principle of double effect.

Because a legitimate positive law has to have what we called the intent of the law, a *law whose in-*

tent is to protect an abortion and to treat it as a right, is intrinsically evil not by virtue of some effect but by virtue of its intent. As we have noted, this intent of the law is independent of the personal intention of the legislator. Therefore, the legislator’s “personal opposition to abortion” is absolutely irrelevant, no matter how publicly and how often he proclaims it. At the same time, precisely because the intent of such a law is intrinsically evil, there is no proportionate reason, namely, some possible good or even great good resulting from such a law that can justify support for it. The principle of double effect cannot apply here.

The reason for this is *the nature of a legislative act*, particularly when it deals with objective rights. In legislating positive laws, the legislator does not simply legislate either his own will or that of the people. He does so by virtue of an authority that is ultimately grounded in the authority of God. By virtue of his participation in this authority, he bears responsibility for the intent of the law. It is *his* enactment of a law that binds and commits the executive dimension of civil authority to enforce or sanction the legislative intent of the law.

Regardless of his personal motivation or intentions, by his vote to give legislative protection for an intrinsically evil act, *he has committed himself to the intent of the law*. This is implied in the very nature of the act of positive legislation. If, in the case of an abortion law, the legislator exercises his prerogative consciously, he is *formally* guilty of moral evil. If he does not understand the nature of civil authority and its ground in divine authority, he is not qualified for public office. Cardinal McCarrick is right in his affirmation of the need for educating Catholic “pro-choice” or even “pro-life” politicians, and specifically, we add, about the nature and foundations of legitimate political acts.

When such politicians are ignorant of the nature of a legislative act under natural law, two things have to be noted as a part of their education.

First, Catholic *politicians [whether “pro-choice” or “pro-life], who vote for intrinsically unjust laws and therefore publicly act against God and his divine authority, should not be admitted to Communion, the sacrament of unity, regardless of their intentions. The subjective intentions of such politicians, at the time*

of their vote, are perforce revealed: *they necessarily intend to stand above the good which they are willing to do by means of the evil.*

Second, because politicians reject divine authority as the basis for civil authority whenever they affirm a “right to abortion,” they lack the basic qualification to serve in public office. When they vote for a law whose intent is the protection of the “right to abortion,” and guarantee that intent, they violate the very meaning of public authority. When they express their intent to do so, even as candidates, they go against the very foundations of the state and the civil order as well as against the dignity and rights of individuals victimized by such laws. Such politicians are not to be admitted to public office. This means that the *voters*, as citizens, who know the candidate’s position in this matter, are prohibited, from the moral perspective, to vote these candidates into office. A qualification to this prohibition, namely, the practical impossibility of the candidate to act on his position on baoriton, will be noted in the concluding reflection below.

Whenever one votes for a politician who publicly affirms his intention to give legislative protection to an intrinsic evil—such as right to abortion—one directly participates in two evils. First, he affirms the intentions of such politicians, which, as shown above, are necessarily unjust and immoral when he participates in the intent of unjust laws.

Second, he participates, through his “representatives” in political acts which not only protect intrinsic evil but mock the objective nature of civil authority as something that “comes from on high.” Nothing, not even the expectation of “friends” in Congress and “support” for Catholic schools, justifies this.

III.

In conclusion, a legislative act may not be subject to the principle of double effect for two reasons. First, a true legislative act, by its very structure, has an intention, a *finis legis*, as its integral part. In this respect it differs from all those behavioral structures called “actions,” which have their own *finis operis* that is distinct from a *finis operantis* to which they may be subordinated. By

virtue of the fact that the authentic legislative act must have an intention as its integral act, if this intention is evil, the legislation is in principle excluded from consideration under the principle of double effect. (I leave out of consideration an implicit understanding of the traditional identification of an intrinsically evil act in terms of its end or *finis*: an intrinsically evil act is one whose performance *a priori* indicates that the *finis operantis* cannot possibly be a “good intention,” whatever the expression of his subjective motives. This means that one who, for example, performs an abortion necessarily has an evil intention regardless of his protestations of any “intended” goods as proportionately greater than the evil. This evil intention is to become the master and source of the good that he intends to realize through his act.) The principle of double effect is applicable only to those actions which are *not intrinsically evil* and do *not have an intention* of an agent as their integral part. Such would be an operation, such as an appendectomy or a hysterectomy. Each action has its own specific end, but does not indicate the intentions or motives of a subject who might undertake them. I do not pursue at this point the implication that an authentic legislative act necessarily presupposes an “intention” that is in principle independent of the *human* legislators that enact it. This means that the legislative act participates metaphysically in the act of a law giver that transcends the human dimension. It is in this sense that the law has to be “impersonal” and cannot be grounded in the “will of the people” as represented by the legislators.

Second, when a legislative act authorizes or protects an intrinsically evil or unjust act, such as abortion, its legislative intent is also intrinsically evil. Here it is not the essential structure of a legislative act that makes it not subject to the principle of double effect, but rather its specific content and intention. In this context, it is important to stress that there may be a “discrepancy” between the law that intends to protect an abortion and is therefore an intrinsically unjust or evil law and the *subjective intention* of the legislator who does not intend the abortions but some aspect of the law that can bring about a so-called good “effect.” Since in question is an intrinsically unjust law, such discrepancy does not justify support of the law by the legislator. Furthermore, the voter may

not support a legislator who commits to voting for such laws. Thus, as forceful and excellent as is Archbishop Burke's letter to the faithful of his archdiocese, "Our Civic Responsibility for the Common Good," it justifies [#38, 41] as licit material cooperation in voting for a candidate who supports some immoral practices. The conditions for such support are implicitly based on the principle of double effect and ignore that the pro abortion law has a built in evil intent that that excludes it from support regardless of the good consequences. A candidate's commitment to support such a law, also excludes him from licit support, regardless of "his or her promotion of morally good practices"

However, having stated the principles involved, we need to make a qualification required by concrete circumstances. A pro-choice politician is excluded as a legitimate candidate from public office when the *nature of the office* is such that he can translate his pro-choice position into political acts that will violate the right to life. This carries with it an implication that constitutes the proper context for interpreting Cardinal Ratzinger's *Nota Bene* in his letter to the American Bishops. If a candidate for public office, let us say, the Presidency of the US, has a pro-choice

position that would allow abortion in the case of rape or incest but is much more limited than the actual "abortion on demand" legislation currently in force, his position is in a practical sense irrelevant, since legislation prohibiting abortion even in the case of rape or incest is highly unlikely to come across his desk. Such a candidate is pro-choice, although in a restricted sense. A proportionate reason allowing a citizen to vote for him would be the actual good he can accomplish by restricting abortions, for example, in military facilities. The political situation precludes him from acting on his restricted pro-choice position. At the same time, his positive intent to restrict abortions may even positively recommend him, especially when his opponent has made a public commitment to extend abortion "rights" even beyond their current scope.

When all available viable candidates are pro-choice, citizens who respect the nature and origin of civil authority have been effectively disenfranchised from the political process in the U.S. At that point, they participate in the formalities of the political process as a matter of practical moral requirements to defend the innocents rather than as citizens of a just order. But that is matter for a new discussion. ✠

S A V E T H E D A T E



THE FELLOWSHIP OF CATHOLIC SCHOLARS
ANNUAL CONVENTION 2006

SEPTEMBER 22 – 24, 2006

KANSAS CITY

STATE AND HOST HOTEL TO BE ANNOUNCED

MORE DETAILS TO FOLLOW

The Human Being as Believer and Citizen: *A Christian Point of View*

by Vittorio Possenti,
Department of Philosophy and Theory
University of Venice

A short premise on religion

To speak of human being as believer means to enter the field of religion, for which we need to fix a sufficiently defined meaning, since the term has for a long time been subject to disagreement, changes of content, and re-interpretation. According to the fundamental meaning of the term as traditionally elaborated, religion is the place of relationship between man and God, not a symbol of interests or important aims. Religion is *re-ligio*, that is something that links infinity and the finite, transcendence and man, the indication of a nexus for which man appears as a being turned upwards. The liberating powers of religion are rooted in the following characteristics: its capacity for reconciliation; its recognition of the lordship of God; its interest in real dialogue; its capacity to produce new practices in favour of mankind; the importance attributed to values in comparison with purely power-seeking strategies, are some of these aspects. If, as the Iranian jurist and scholar Ostad Elahi puts it, 'The fulcrum of Knowledge is that man understands why he has come into the world, what his duties of existence are, and what his final destiny is'¹, then it is in religion that we encounter a fundamental understanding of what is necessary for us. Individuals and civilisations are in relationship with God in many different ways, and from this relationship they draw the essentials of their value systems. There are periods of intense religiosity, and others more profane, but all periods stay 'in front of God', in His presence.

A believer and a citizen, or religion and politics. Some starting points

Following the title of this paper, I intend to describe a Christian point of view on the individual human being as believer and citizen, drawing inspiration from the Scriptures and the teaching of the Catholic Church, such as that, for example, expressed during the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965). To think about the individual human being as a believer and as a citizen means to call into question the link between religion and politics. I will point to some nuclei which appear to me to be of major importance, but which are not the whole picture. Even though the Christian religion has a universal value and is diffused over five continents, most of the countries with the most ancient Christian civilizations belongs generally to the West, where the relationship between the believer and the citizen has been and is still being more widely worked out. If we first take a look at the books of the Old Testament (OT), we find in them the figure of the believer, but not that of the citizen/*citoyen*, of later use: but they are not silent on the condition of man in the world and in political life. In the Wisdom literature one sees a progressive affirmation of the idea that the wisdom of God is sown not only by revelation, but also in creation and in earthly things. It is the beginning of the overcoming of the idea that God manifests Himself in the world only through prodigious acts and the history of salvation: even worldly things come from God, and intelligence is given to us in order that we understand this. The perspective of biblical creationism does not consist only in the assumption that God created everything from nothing, but also that He gave order to the cosmos, is the origin of creation, sustains it, and gives it meaning (*Genesis* 1, 1-2,4).

Then it is affirmed the possibility of knowing the Transcendent ('... since through the grandeur and beauty of the creatures we may, by analogy, con-

template their Author', *Wisdom*, 13,5). Everything that exists is under the lordship of God: an assumption which is found as much in the Old Testament as in the New (NT), and which is a long way from that dualism which wants to relegate worldly things, and even man himself, outside divine dominion and the story of salvation. If we consider Jacob's dream at Bethel, when he awakes and exclaims: 'Truly, the Lord is in this place and I never knew it!' (*Genesis* 28, 16), the episode means that God is not the prisoner of any specific holy place and can be encountered by man everywhere, even in social and political life.

In the Gospels and in the Epistles, the salvation which is offered to mankind involves everything affecting him and his life, right up to the final resurrection of the dead (cf. *I Corinthians* 15), and is extended to the whole of creation (cf. *Romans* 8, 19-22). In one of the high points of Christian Revelation, the evangelist John expresses the Incarnation of the Word in Jesus Christ in particularly significant terms, writing that 'the Word was made flesh and came to dwell among us': flesh here means that He not only became fully human, but that He also shared fully in the human condition with its fragility, weakness, and pain, etc., but with the exception of sin.

In connection with the *link between religion and politics* (related with the question of *secular State*, as it came to be called later, term which does not mean that in a secular state the society is heavily secularized, but that there is a distinction between the two powers), the teaching of Jesus Christ is truly novel insofar as it concerns the difference between God and Caesar, and whether political power is invested with a sacred, divine, theocratic character, such as is largely found in the OT.² The attitude of the NT, where the Christian teaching—or better, the teaching of Christ Himself, since it comes in His own words—is summed up in the famous phrase, 'Give back to Caesar that which belongs to Caesar and to God what belongs to God.' (*Matthew* 22, 21; *Mark* 12,17; *Luke* 20,25). It is a phrase which establishes the beginning of a new way of looking at the difference between civil and religious powers, and marks a step forward in the spiritual and political experience of humanity.

With the aforesaid *logion*, the understanding of which was progressively developed, a duplicity of

representation (spiritual and temporal) was introduced, in place of the previous ieropolitical unity of the ancient city, in which the spiritual power and the political one were conjoined in a single summit in the person of the emperor, who was also the pontiff. Christian diversity appears to have been an attempt of conspicuous dimensions on political life since, by introducing the idea of the difference between the two powers, previously unknown in ancient cultures, it opened possibilities for dissension. It is almost superfluous here to recall the struggles between Christianity and the Roman Empire, between the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire—for the right of investiture, and the variable relationships between states and the Church in modern times, coming down finally to the totalitarian ideologies of the last century.

Here I would like to stop and think awhile about what Jesus actually said, in that Caesar was politics, not only the state. In the first part of the phrase, in which Jesus said 'give back to Caesar', the value, dignity and autonomy of political life is affirmed: while 'every power comes from God' (*omnis potestas a Deo*), the difference between Caesar and God sets the central diversity between political and spiritual duties and responsibilities. In the second part, the fact that Caesar is not God is upheld—thus ending every political idolatry which seeks to elevate Caesar to God - and the requirement set that something should be given back to God. The phrase thus underlines not only what is needed to mark the boundary between God and Caesar, but that it is necessary to *give back* or *render*. The repeating of this verb changes the perspective of a simple separation between God and Caesar. The rendering to Caesar of as much as is necessary: justice, peace, rights, respect, is something fine. But Caesar is not God, and God is above Caesar. Caesar can be one's native land, but it is the definitive homeland for no men. It is implied that for the giving back to Caesar to be full and genuine, there must also be a giving back to God of what is necessary and salutary. To give back only to Caesar without giving back to God is an error. The quotation from the Gospels requires a double rendering, and the one cannot be without the other.

What exactly does the phrase 'give back to God' mean? Various things, among which I will highlight two aspects:

A) The phrase of Jesus was spoken in reply to a question put about a coin on which the effigy of Caesar was impressed as the expression of political authority. Now, something on which someone's image is impressed belongs to that someone. But if the image of Caesar belongs to Caesar, we can say that man, whose essential character is being made 'in the image of God' (cf. *Genesis* 1,27), belongs to God, and not to the state. Like the coin and the image of Caesar both belong to Caesar, so every human being belongs to God. To open oneself to God means to recognise the dignity of man as a free being, endowed with reason and capable of reaching the truth. The state and political power cannot for that reason deprive him of rights which belong to him, which are rooted in human dignity and which come from the hand of God.

B) In second place in the Gospel quotation, which has eliminated the idea of a political theocracy and grounded the just secularity of the state, the possibility of the influence of religion in the public sphere is included, since God is above Caesar, differently from the liberal canon which holds that faith is a mere private fact. Whoever denies the ties which exist between religion and politics has not really understood well what is meant by religion, Gandhi wrote at the end of his autobiography. The then Cardinal Ratzinger observed: 'Christian faith makes a distinction between this secular form [of the state] and the Kingdom of God, which does not and cannot exist as a political reality on this earth, but lives in faith, hope and charity and *must transform this world from within* ... the secular state is the result of fundamental Christian decision, even if a long struggle was necessary to understand all its consequences'.³

It is necessary to search for the best model of difference between religion and politics, and the results are varied (Professor Ferrari will develop this further). Tocqueville observed that in America, within the constitutional separation between Church and State, religion is an independent grounding and inspiration of politics and that this 'contributes powerfully to the conserving of the democratic republic in America.' (*Democracy in America*, I, II, c. 9). Put as the fertile animating force of democratic life, religion does not become an instrument of government, but a nursery for civilisation and a force for enlivening

and inspiration, so long as it is able to avoid intolerance and discrimination.

The Christian idea of the link between religion and politics, between the believer and the citizen, is a long way from two notable and concrete risks which have been put forward in various ways in the course of history and in many different contexts, well beyond the West:

—the risk of a forced or coerced marriage between religion and society, in a way that does not respect the distinction between God and Caesar. Then it follows that it is the followers of a particular religion—that which at the time is recognised by the state—who have the right to be citizens in the full sense of the word, while the believers of other religions, and non-believers, are discriminated against in various ways: this problematic solution develops easily into discrimination and the adoption of religious laws as civil law and rights, and in its most extreme forms is changed into a political theocracy;

—the opposite risk is one of complete separation between religion and politics, which leaves religion without influence and in the end tolerated by society, in the sense that it is confined to the private sphere of conscience. In this case, only Caesar exists and God is absent and a stranger in the public place.

In these two cases, believers are not citizens in the usual sense of the word, as forms of inequality are introduced: in the first case because some believers are more citizens than others, and in the other because in fact it would make believers less important citizens than agnostics.

Three problems

We must now put to ourselves certain questions:

A) the link between believers and citizens in a way that, while maintaining their religious diversity, they can co-operate, and believers in sociologically minority religions are allowed to give their collaboration on an equal footing with believers of more numerous religions. Here one enters into the idea of the secular state, a state capable of guaranteeing substantial equality of rights and duties for all its citizens. B) the support and improvement religion offers to social life; C) The co-operation between political and spiritual authorities in civil life.

A) The rights and duties of citizens in a 'secular' state. Religious freedom

The question of religious freedom constitutes a fundamental nucleus of the problem of the believer and the citizen and their nexus: on the base of it the state safeguards the right of individuals to follow their own religion on equal terms with other citizens, neither does it intervene to impose a particular religion by law, but rather leaves space for various religions and allows them to be positive and fertile factors in the building of social life. The theme is immense, and in this place a good starting point for briefly explaining Catholic doctrine on the meaning and range of religious freedom can be found in the 'Declaration on religious freedom' with the title *Dignitatis humanae*, promulgated by the Second Vatican Council on 19 November 1965. Of this text, which consists of fifteen paragraphs, I will not present an analytical comment, which would require a great deal of space, but only the principal assertions in which revelation and reason work together fruitfully. Central is the idea of the dignity of the human person, increasingly better understood as the years pass by (cf. para. 9, *Dignitatis humanae*).

a) The sense of religious freedom is in the idea for which men, in the fulfilling of their duty to honour God, are immune from coercion by civil society (n. 1), and are considered to be on an equal footing. It is under the joined lights of Revelation and the dignity of man that it becomes necessary as a civil progress that no-one can be constrained by force to embrace a religion (n. 10). This also has the purpose of providing a juridical limit on public authorities, in order that they do not abuse their powers.

The religious freedom, connected directly to the *human person as such*, is a fundamental human right: it does not depend from the condition of citizen but, as said, is related to man as such. The right to religious freedom must be acknowledged by civil law, but properly speaking it is not a 'civil right' which concerns only the citizens in a full sense of a society.

b) Religious freedom is founded on the idea that the act of faith is a free act (n. 10) and its content "is that human beings must be immune from coercion by individuals, social groups and whatsoever human authority, so that in religious matters nobody is forced to act against his or her own conscience

nor be stopped, within certain limits, from acting in accordance with them: privately or publicly, as an individual or as a group ... This right of the human person to religious freedom must be ratified as a civil right in the juridical arrangements of society" (n. 2), also with the aim of consolidating relations of concord and peace between all men and women within the single human family (n. 15). One can add that the civil right to religious freedom includes the possibility of changing religion without being subject to pressure or discrimination;

c) The civil authority "exceeds its competence if it presumes to direct or impede religious acts" (n. 3);

d) The right to religious freedom means that no-one can be discriminated against in civil life because of their religion (n. 6); this also concerns men when they act in common (n. 4). Consequently this right does not concern simply the individuals, but the religions and the religious communities, which can acquire juridical status and obtain recognition from the state. In the case of the Church this includes the freedom to fulfil its mission (n. 13);

e) The content of religious freedom does not, therefore, concern itself with the truth or lack of truth in this or that religion or of all religions, and thus it has nothing to do with relativism or the idea that all religions are equivalent. It relates, as I have said, to the *civil law*, which recognises that every person has the right to embrace, without impediment from political powers, whatever religion that tradition or well-informed individual conscience indicates as the one to follow.

Three other aspects can be read into the idea of religious freedom:

1) the difference between Caesar and God implies the diversity between civil law and religious law, as it seems a scarce solution to adopt as civil law the religious law;

2) the difference between the paradigm of force and that of justice: genuine religion refuses the paradigm of force and the power that crushes, and uses the paradigm of justice and reciprocity (justice in fact looks towards the other and reciprocity is one of its laws), which puts the bond between religion and politics on a new base;

3) the idea of tolerance, which knows how to

distinguish between the sin and the sinner, and which refuses to consider recourse to violence because it is a way without hope: there can never be happiness while men are ranked the one against the other. To be able to distinguish between the person and his ideas marks a noble feeling: the ideas that we retain groundless must be eliminated with arguments, not through violence. J. Maritain has expressed this position well: "True and genuine tolerance does not exist where a man is not firmly and absolutely convinced of a truth, or of what he holds to be truth, and where, at the same time, recognises that those who deny this truth have the right to exist and to contradict him, to express their own thinking, not because they are free before the truth, but because they are seeking the truth in their own way and because he respects their human nature and human dignity, and these springs and resources of intelligence and conscience, which renders them, in power, capable of drawing, they too, to the beloved truth, if the day arrives when they will see it."⁴ The outlined position puts forward a solution under the aegis of which it is possible to gather all citizens, since they are all assigned equal dignity, rights, and duties, within a fundamental human equality, avoiding the situation where someone is treated as a second or third class citizen, and put in a position of not being able to participate fully in the life of the civil society around him.

B) Religion's contribution to civil life

Christian and Muslims can work together fruitfully in the building of a just and free society, profiting from their common religious roots, from the light of reason and from the natural law which is a carrier of the Divine intention. This last element merits a comment for the influence which it exercises on the production of civil law: that this is understood as the expression of a mere agreement between citizens is not a sound solution, since the ruling majority from time to time could decide any ignominious act, if there were not criteria which precede positive law. Then civil law cannot contradict natural law: on the contrary fundamental human rights flow from natural law and are rooted in it. This is even more true if one takes into account that the state and more widely the whole society rests on moral founda-

tions which cannot be guaranteed, and which can be guaranteed only if a robust ethical sap and a culture of respect, justice and liberty are circulating in society. Both Muslims and Christians are called here to respectful dialogue and to the search for shared solutions, in the light of the idea that religion has a most important contribution to make to society: this assumption, which seems to me to be shared by both traditions, establishes a common base of particular importance, notwithstanding possible differences in the understanding of it.

Among the many different ways in which religion can contribute to the improvement of society, I would like to highlight one. Aiming at the vigour of moral life and virtue, religion reaches society at its nerve centre. In fact, contrary to the assertion of Marxist historical materialism, the anatomy of civil life is ethics, not political economy. Whoever manages to improve people's moral behaviour fulfils the most important task in society. However much may be endowed by very elaborate institutions, no society can exist in a decent manner and have an acceptable civil life, if its citizens surrender too much to vices and the unchaining of passions. If the state is subject to an excess of hedonistical demands, and it cannot guarantee its own moral foundations, it must find these bases elsewhere, in society.

In the relationship between religion and society it is advisable not to limit to institutional agreements, but to work among and with the people, attentive to the pluralistic structure of social formations intermediating between citizens and the state, so that a democracy of citizens results, something which is a long way from the mirage of a democracy without citizens and without people. In this way centres of social activity and diffused counter-powers are created.

If we turn our glance to the historical-political situation of the world, we see that various religious movements have more than once entered the public domain in pursuit of fundamental objectives: 1) to protect not only their own rights and liberties, but those of all; 2) to protect the person and his fundamental expression, determined by questions of life (abortion, euthanasia, genetic manipulations), and by the natural structure of the family; 3) to take part in the formation of the agenda of public questions. It is

worthwhile recalling the shifting perspectives operating in the Christian churches, passed from institutions tied to the state to institutions centred on society.

In my opinion the most politically active expression of religions today launches challenges to the powers of the globalised world at very sensitive points: the promotion of human rights, of civil liberties and of respect for the person against aggression which can come as much from intolerance, violence, terrorism and religious discrimination, as from the ideology of the free market; the outlawing of nuclear arms and war; the confirmation of a system of bioethics for the defence of life and family (the issue of family and the new problems concerning the supposed new forms of family such as the homosexual partnership, should attract a great deal of attention from Christian and Muslim side, as family is the basic cell of society, and if it is destroyed the issue of society will likely be dark). Thus today social and political movements inspired by religion raise important questions about the legitimacy and autonomy of two important secular spheres: the state with its myth of absolute sovereignty and the market as an untouchable reality.

C) Co-operation between temporal and spiritual authorities

With the distinction between religion and civil society, between Church and State, the conditions to achieve their collaboration are set, which involve the two entities as institutions, and which draw on freedom and conscience of the citizens. Co-operation represents a fertile model of political government in view of the greater well-being of society and the promotion of man. I would like to offer, by way of example, that such a model can be found in the revision of the Concordat, in February 1984, between the Italian Republic and the Holy See. The Concordat (1929) replaced a period of disagreement between the Church and the modern State with a reciprocal agreement for collaboration for the common good and religious peace. The revision occurred in 1984, overcoming the idea of a complete reciprocal extraneousness between Church and State, which could be drawn by an extremist interpretation of the difference between temporal and spiritual power, finds adequate formulation in the following extract: “The Italian

Republic and the Holy See reaffirm that the State and the Catholic Church are, each in its own way, independent and sovereign, and commit themselves... to reciprocal collaboration for the promotion of man and the good of the country”.

The relationship between civil government and religious authority was set up on a new basis, as the politics is treated not as a power, but as an action in service of mankind and common good. And religious conscience offers fertile support to this action.

Conclusions

Rethinking the nexus between religion and society. Men of good will cannot free themselves from the need to put forward more humane solutions and to inform with the spirit of brotherly love, peace and justice the social life of individuals and of peoples, going beyond the disenchantment of *Qohelet* according to which there is never progress or novelty under the sun. For this it is necessary to rethink the nexus between religion and society after the terrible events caused by the totalitarianism of the XXth century and in front of new events such as: a) the slowness in the recognition of fundamental human rights, among which is that of religious freedom, and the recurrence of intolerance based on religion; b) the presence in the West of a secularism which wants to marginalise the religion from the public and to make it a private concern enclosed by a double mandate within individual conscience. How can we rectify the path towards justice and peace, and safeguard the unity of mankind as a divine mission?

The Muslim faith in God and the idea that we are all under the judgement of God, is a positive challenge for the secularised West. The difference between religious law and civil law, with the link of substantial equality of rights and duties for all citizens, and also for different religions and cultures, is a positive challenge for the area which makes reference to Islam.

Promoting inter-religious dialogue. One of the most urgent needs of our time consists in avoiding the clash of cultures and this requires dialogue, mutual understanding, a refusal to trivialise the respective identities. Those responsible for nations and religions are called to overcome the temptation to enter into conflict

with anything that is different, belonging to another ethnic group or religion. People and religions need to find the best values in their spiritual and cultural heritage, in order to meet the other without fear, in the attempt to create a fair sharing which is to everyone's advantage. Giorgio La Pira often used to invite us to look at the events of history from the 'Abraham's terrace' (la 'terrazza di Abramo'), as he called it in his language made of concepts and images. The believers of the three monotheistic religions can find a particularly important point of encounter in the common root represented by Abraham. ✕

NOTES

1. Ostad Elahi, *Pensieri di luce*, trad. a cura di M. Luzi, Mondadori, Milano 2000.
2. According to biblical scholars, "the political scene in the Old Testament seems to have had a sacred character from the very earliest times. The political structure was theocratic", B. Maggioni, *La fondazione della laicità nella Bibbia*, p. 54, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1977.
3. J. Ratzinger, "L'Occidente, l'Islam e i fondamenti della pace", Vita e Pensiero, n. 5, ottobre 2004, p. 29 (il corsivo è mio).
4. J. Maritain, *Il filosofo nella società*, Morcelliana, Brescia 1976, p. 64.

Annexe: The Enlightenment and the foundations of the secular state

The culture of Enlightenment is defined, particularly today, by the rights of freedom: a freedom not rarely understood as something by which everything else is measured. While the two great modern revolutions—scientific and political—follow their irregular paths, an important change could be on the way suggesting that in the West the development of freedom can no longer be the ultimate political end. The fundamental question concerns the primary human need, and on the reply to this question many events along the road to civilisation and about the form civilisation takes, depend. Modernity has replied that freedom (freedom of choice, freedom from fear, from want, etc.) is the basic need and consequently it has been built up more on claims for freedom than on fraternity or solidarity. The road has been travelled with merit, but it was limited if it is true that the fundamental anthropological need is not mainly or only that of freedom, but of meaning, of identity, of recognition. To find a meaning in oneself and in others, to reach an understanding of who we are, to know ourselves

as accepted by others: individuals and peoples ask themselves who they are, and seek to answer by making reference to things which for them are invested with the greatest importance. These elements produce satisfaction and a peaceful life far more than an exclusive claim to freedom of choice¹.

In present historical-spiritual situation arises again the well known sentence by Böckenförde on the modern state that rests on foundations that it cannot guarantee². Such a state cannot guarantee its own foundations, since they rest ultimately on natural law, which is a *moral* law and which only a notable oversight can confuse with naturalistic or cosmological law. It is not enough to recall Kantian autonomy, which consists of respecting those laws which we freely give us: in fact, what fundamental law can we give ourselves if not that already written within us? The solution of Kantian autonomy, expression of a secularised Christianity, was able to function in the time in which the accepted moral code was almost identical to the Christian ethic and held to be universal (see Voltaire and the Enlightenment in general). But today, when the ethical uni-verse is shattered into a moral pluri-verse, where everyone lays down the law for himself? When only single individuals exist, ready to think of themselves as absolutes?

Several elements can be mentioned pro and contra the idea that a clash of civilizations is on the way between Western world and Islam, but perhaps the range of this clash is a bit exaggerated on the ground of political assumptions by Western secularism. On the contrary more attention should be given to another dialectics, which is internal to Western countries: the dialectics between faith in God and secularized perspective, in which very sensitive nuclei concerning the basis of civilization are involved.

1. "Men have need of something more than rights and money in order to live a full and satisfying life. They need methods of giving meaning to their lives, directions for their way ... All of us have need of links and relationships which stop us from sliding into a position of 'anonymity'", R. Dahrendorf, *Per un nuovo liberalismo*, Laterza, Bari 1988, p. 182. These links and relationships together are often called 'bindings' by the author.

2. Cfr. W. Böckenförde, *Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisation und Utopie, in Säkularisation und Utopie. Ebracher Studien. Ernst Forsthoff zum 65. Geburtstag*, Stuttgart-Berlin-Köln 1967, p. 93.

Which Pope Benedict XVI is the Real One?

by Kenneth D. Whitehead

Allen, John L., Jr., *The Rise of Benedict XVI: The Inside Story of How the Pope Was Elected and Where He Will Take the Catholic Church*. New York: Doubleday, 2005. ISBN 0-385-51320-8. 249 pages HB. U.S. \$19.95/ Canada \$27.95.

Allen, John L., Jr., *Pope Benedict XVI: A Biography of Joseph Ratzinger*. New York: Continuum, 2005. ISBN 08264-1787-6. 340 pages. HB. U.S. \$29.95.

Among a number of studies and biographies of Pope Benedict XVI suddenly on the market, prospective readers may be confused at finding that *two* of them are written by the same author, John L. Allen, Jr., the Vatican correspondent for the *National Catholic Reporter* and a regular Vatican “expert” on CNN and National Public Radio. One of these books is entitled the *Rise of Benedict XVI*, and was published by Doubleday in 2005. The other book is entitled simply *Pope Benedict XVI* and was published by Continuum, also in 2005. The inside cover of this second book, however, mysteriously bears the notation: “Copyright © 2000 by John L. Allen, Jr.,” indicating that it was actually written and published five years earlier.

Both book jackets show a newly elected and smiling Pope Benedict XVI clad in his white papal robes, and both appear at first glance to be straightforward “biographies” of the new pope written for readers interested in learning more about him following his election to fill the chair of Peter. A bookstore buyer or public library browser, perhaps seeing both books together side by side on the shelf, however, would be hard pressed either to decide which one of them to select, or to understand why there should be two different books on the new pope written by the same author coming out at the same time.

Upon closer examination, however, it turns out that the second of these two “biographies,” the one

published by Continuum, was indeed originally published five years earlier, in 2000, but under a different title: *Cardinal Ratzinger: The Vatican’s Enforcer of the Faith*. Upon the election of Cardinal Ratzinger as the 265th Roman pontiff, the publisher simply re-issued this book without explanation and with only a brief Publisher’s Preface of less than a page informing the reader that “John L. Allen’s masterly biography throws clear light on the character of the Holy Father.”

Actually, *Pope Benedict XVI* published by Continuum is quite a substantial biography: it consists of 340 densely printed pages in fairly small print, with Notes, Bibliography, and Index. The Doubleday *Rise of Benedict XVI*, by contrast, is a much thinner 249-page volume issued in larger print and with no index or other scholarly apparatus. As the subtitle of this latter book indicates—“The Inside Story of How the Pope Was Elected and Where He Will Take the Catholic Church”—it does not really purport to be a “biography” at all, but rather appears to consist mostly of the author’s newspaper reporting on the death of Pope John Paul II and on the conclave and the election of Pope Benedict XVI. It also appears to contain some material which has been reworked from the author’s 2004 book, also published by Doubleday, *All the Pope’s Men: The Inside Story of How the Vatican Really Thinks*.

Taken for what it is, a journalistic once-over of the events of world-interest which it covers, this Doubleday volume is a fast-paced, readable, and useful review of those events, and it has the advantage of having been written by a competent reporter who was there reporting on all the relevant events as they unfolded; and who, having written the earlier biography, obviously had a special knowledge of the one who turned out to be the major subject of his book by virtue of being elected pope. The book certainly attempts—and in fact largely succeeds—in being fair and even-handed towards the new pope, whom the author has obviously come to appreciate as the formidable contemporary figure that he is. Thus, the book goes beyond what one might normally expect to encounter in a reporter’s book on a conclave and a papal election; it definitely profits from the author’s

special knowledge of his subject based on the extensive research and reading of the former Cardinal Ratzinger's theological works that he evidently carried out when preparing the earlier biography. Faced with the two books on bookstore or library shelves, however, the prospective reader truly would have a hard time deciding which book to buy in order to get the story of the new pope's life and background; and, depending upon which one he did select, he would get a very different picture of Pope Benedict XVI. For although the two books are by the same author and are being presented to the public at the same time, they are in fact so different from one another that at times they almost seem to be about two different men—or perhaps to have been written by two different authors. For anyone reading both books, it would be hard to tell which Benedict XVI presented is the real one.

Doubleday's *Rise of Benedict XVI* depicts a prominent contemporary churchman who, before his accession to the papacy, was second in the worldwide Catholic Church in importance, responsibilities, accomplishments, and even fame only to Pope John Paul II himself. If his election to succeed the latter was not strictly inevitable, it is described in retrospect as a choice which the college of cardinals was very likely to have made in view of all the factors and of the obviously superlative qualifications of the candidate.

Continuum's *Pope Benedict XVI*, by contrast, is mostly about a subject who appears to be nothing less than an "evil genius," who over many years as a professor, prelate, and Curia cardinal employed what were his admittedly extraordinary personal gifts in the service of, in the author's words, "investigations without consultations, silencings, excommunications, censures, revoked imprimaturs and burned books, the threat of joblessness and public accusations as an enemy of the faith." This list of only some of the blameworthy activities of Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger chronicled in the book obviously relates to his nearly a quarter of a century as prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF).

In his position as CDF prefect, the cardinal was what the author in his original subtitle called the Vatican's "enforcer of the faith." But in order to "enforce" the faith, he was sometimes obliged to correct

theologians judged to have diverged from the faith as taught by the Church. Yet the fact that he sometimes actually did enforce the faith by disciplining some theologians is what seems to have provoked the author's extraordinary list of the cardinal's sins and faults which we have just quoted. The average person might assume that the correction of theologians whose works deviated from the faith of the Church, although in no way a pleasant or easy for anyone, was nevertheless a necessary and inevitable part of the task of being the CDF prefect. In this book, however, the very act of being involved in the correction of practically anybody at all for anything is seen as reprehensible.

Thus, while he perhaps does not deny in so many words the Church's right and duty to require theologians who teach and write in her name to hold and expound the authentic faith of the Church, John Allen in this book does not find many instances where the disciplining of theologians by the CDF was ever really justified. He waxes indignant at the penalties meted out in such well-known if not notorious cases as those of Fathers Hans Küng and Charles Curran, although in both cases the CDF spent *years* engaged in patient inquiry and attempts at dialogue with the two theologians in question before finally being obliged to apply disciplinary measures against them; nor did these measures include either excommunication or removal of their priestly faculties. Both theologians eventually *had* to be disciplined, though, because both obstinately and, most especially, publicly, continued to maintain that *their* positions, not those of the teaching Church, should guide the faithful in forming their consciences. Both of these theologians, moreover, proved to be highly skilled at exploiting the modern mass media so that not only did their dissident views become widely disseminated among the faithful; they themselves in the meantime got firmly established in the popular mind as victims of unjust ecclesiastical oppression if not as martyrs.

Just as Martin Luther rejected any possible judgment by pope or council on the positions he had adopted, so these modern theologians rejected any possible judgment on their positions except, in effect, by the modern media. And, in the forum of the modern media, they tended to win hands down against Church authority easily presented as hide-

bound and out of date.

Referring to the speculation of another theologian, Hans Urs von Balthasar, that perhaps all men might ultimately be saved in spite of what the Church has pretty firmly taught to the contrary, John Allen asks, querulously: “If Balthasar could hold a differing position on such fundamental articles of the faith as hell, salvation, and the meaning of Christ’s passion, and still be celebrated as a fully Catholic theologian, why cannot figures such as Edward Schillebeeckx, Hans Küng, and Charles Curran get the same treatment”?

Perhaps one answer to this question might lie in the fact that Father von Balthasar, in the very title of his book, merely asked the question of whether we might dare to hope that all men might be saved. He did not assert that this should henceforth be the teaching which the faithful should adopt in place of the Church’s teaching. Whatever the ultimate truth or validity of von Balthasar’s views on the question, he at least remained in a questioning mode, subject to the ultimate judgment of the Church’s teaching authority. The contrast of his stance with the defiant, aggressive public stances of Fathers Küng and Curran could not be greater. They consistently exhibited neither moderation nor modesty in advancing their own views in place of those of the Church. The Church was quite patently *wrong*, in their view, as both at various times explicitly stated, calling upon the faithful to follow *them*.

For a reporter who is supposedly an expert on the Catholic and the Vatican scenes, John Allen in the Continuum *Pope Benedict XVI* not only shows himself to be agnostic on the question of whether what the Catholic Church authoritatively teaches is true or not; he frequently shows himself to be ignorant and clueless concerning the necessary implications of the fact that the Church at least *claims* to be the teacher of truth, whether he and his ilk credit it or not. He generally seems to take the modern liberal theological position that Catholic doctrine is pretty much up for grabs, subject to modification in the light of the latest liberal theological opinion; and that it is really all just a question of who has the power to establish what views are to prevail—theologians able to exploit the media to get their views before the faithful (already influenced by the decadent secu-

lar culture that surrounds them in any case) or rigid Church authorities trying to hold back the modern tide by imposing discipline on honest and sincere theologians who happen to be under their control. In this situation, the question of what is actually true or not becomes almost irrelevant. At one point John Allen actually remarks: “Imagine the cultural revolution that would follow if the Catholic Church were to declare unambiguously that homosexuality is moral and acceptable.”

But there is a problem here. It is this: homosexuality—or, rather, engaging in homosexual acts—is *not* “moral and acceptable.” Homosexuality is a disorder; homosexual acts are immoral. The Church could never declare unambiguously or in any other way these acts to be “moral and acceptable” because *that would not be true!* The Church is never going to declare any such falsehood, no matter what the current cultural pressures might be, nor could she ever do so. “The Catholic Church,” Vatican Council II declared, “is by the will of Christ the teacher of truth. It is her duty to proclaim and teach with authority the truth which is Christ and, at the same time, to declare and confirm by her authority, the principles of the moral order which spring from human nature itself” (Declaration on Religious Liberty, *Dignitatis Humanae*, #14).

In the same paragraph from which this quotation comes, Vatican II also taught that “in forming their consciences the faithful must pay careful attention to the *sacred* and *certain* teaching of the Church” (*Ibid*; emphasis added.). Yet perhaps the key assertion of today’s Curran-type theological dissenters, now widely accepted among Catholics if polls are to be believed, is precisely that the Catholic faithful may “in conscience” elect to disregard Church teaching. The Church’s teaching is no longer “sacred and certain,” according to today’s counter-magisterium of theological dissenters. But this idea, of course, is in *direct contradiction* to the actual teaching of Vatican II that we have just quoted.

Yet no idea has done more to undermine the faith of Catholics today than the idea disseminated by the counter-magisterium of dissenting theologians that deciding to drop unwelcome Church teachings is somehow a matter of “conscience.” No greater harm has been done to the faith today than

has been done by this truly pernicious idea. Its proponents have unfortunately successfully persuaded large numbers of the faithful that some teachings of the Church are *optional* (always at the discretion of the individual, “in conscience”). According to the counter-magisterium of dissident theologians now followed by so many, one no longer necessarily has to believe and follow all the Church’s teachings in order to remain a “good Catholic.” According to a CBS poll issued in April, 2005, 76 percent of today’s Catholics favor the use of contraception, while 60 percent believe that women should be ordained to the priesthood, even though the moral condemnation of contraception, like the ban on female ordination, represent questions that have been definitively decided by the teaching authority of the Church. Yet according to the same CBS poll, 72 percent of modern Catholics believe they may follow their own decisions over those of the Church in moral decision making. The dissident theologians have done their work thoroughly and well, according to their own standpoint.

In this book, John Allen is seemingly oblivious to what it would mean for the faith if this “optional” view of Church teachings were actually accepted by the Church. He writes very favorably about Father Charles Curran, still the foremost proponent of the idea that dissent from the authentic teaching of the Church is not only permissible but is sometimes required. The Church is *not*, in other words, in Curran’s view “the teacher of truth,” as Vatican II specified. Father Curran himself is described by John Allen as someone who “is regarded by all sides as one of the nicest men in the academy. Whatever one makes of his theological views, virtually no one who knows him could construe Charlie Curran as an enemy of the faith. To this day, he remains well connected at Catholic University, even among faculty.”

If he remains so “well connected,” it is because others besides himself in today’s now well-established “culture of dissent” within the Church—which Charles Curran did so much to help get established—similarly find it possible to disregard the official and solemn judgments of the CDF—in this case to the effect that the same Father Charles Curran can no longer be considered a “Catholic theologian” or function as such. He himself, before any formal

and official judgment was ever lodged against him by the CDF, had of course long since departed from the fullness of the faith found in the Catholic Church; he departed from it when he embraced his dissenting views and brought them forward in opposition to the teachings of the Church.

Nevertheless, the Catholic Church does still consider herself to be the teacher of truth, as Vatican II so clearly taught. But precisely because of the success of Father Curran and his colleagues in establishing their counter-magisterium of theologians, dissenting theological opinions are now accepted by huge numbers of Catholics as being on the same level as the teachings of the Church, as we have just seen. The Catholic faithful in massive numbers apparently now feel able to disregard the Church’s teachings in their lives in such areas as conjugal chastity, birth control, remarriage after divorce, and even abortion, where various polls and statistics show that self-identified Catholics today are virtually indistinguishable in their moral behavior from their non-Catholic contemporaries.

For the moment at least, today’s dissenting theologians have largely won their case in the court of “public opinion” in the Church. The CDF’s belated action in imposing discipline on Father Charles Curran—only after eighteen years!—has scarcely been followed up on in any effective way by, for instance, the American bishops, who have never exhibited any stomach for going after any of the still fairly large number of Catholic theologians holding the same or similar views as those of Father Curran. These theologians remain “in good standing” in the Church, and, as likely as not, one of them might even appear as a supposedly representative “Catholic” face or voice in the media today—a Father Richard McBrien on network television, for example; or a Father Andrew Greeley in his syndicated newspaper column; or a Garry Wills in some of his books purporting to be “Catholic” while trashing so much of authentic Catholicism.

That a Father Charles Curran, who did so much to help bring about this state of affairs—undermining the faith of so many in the authentic teachings of the Church—could nevertheless be characterized by a John Allen as no “enemy of the faith,” just because he is one of “the nicest men in the academy,” is surely

one more piece of evidence of just how thoroughly the authentic Catholic faith *has* been undermined in our day. And surely nobody has done more to undermine it than Father Charles Curran—except, probably, the editors of the *National Catholic Reporter*, the employers of John Allen, who throughout the entire post-conciliar period have purveyed a steady drum-beat of dissident viewpoints that tend to undermine the faith. The main problem with this journal, by the way, is not just that it is “leftist” (which it is). The main problem is that it is *not* Catholic, in spite of its name. That it continues to carry the name “Catholic” on its masthead remains a serious “truth in advertising” issue. Those of us who have been around for awhile remember back when the bishop of Kansas City, where the newspaper is published, actually tried to get the editors to drop the word “Catholic.” This judgment of the bishop at that time reflected a wholly accurate appraisal of what the NCR has represented and represents.

But the bishop of Kansas City was rebuffed and disregarded by the journal, exactly as most of the other efforts of bishops to re-impose discipline in the post-conciliar era, few as they have been in fact, have so largely been rebuffed and disregarded by the still dominant theological class. They have been disregarded as thoroughly as Vatican II’s teaching that the Catholic Church is the teacher of truth has been disregarded—or as the CDF’s solemn official judgment that Father Curran is no longer a Catholic theologian has been and is being regularly disregarded in so many quarters that nevertheless still call themselves “Catholic.” Father Curran himself actually serves on the Board of Directors of the NCR at the present time. Church authorities may have naïvely imagined that the Church was competent to decide whether a theologian was a “Catholic theologian” or not; but they failed to reckon with the influence of the “counter-magisterium” of the NCR which evidently applies a different set of criteria concerning who might be a true Catholic theologian.

For Catholics loyal to the Church’s magisterium, the fact that the principal reporter writing in English from Rome on Vatican affairs today is employed by the *National Catholic Reporter* is sadly emblematic of the degree to which dissent continues to be accepted generally in the Church today, in spite of the peri-

odic efforts of the CDF to put a stop to it. This situation is not a new one, of course, since before John Allen came upon the scene, the NCR employed the late Peter Hebblethwaite, ex-Jesuit and biographer of Blessed Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI, in the same capacity. Hebblethwaite was a good writer with excellent Vatican sources, but his understanding of and sympathy for the authentic Catholic faith as expounded by the Church’s magisterium left a good deal to be desired.

The same thing appears to be true of John Allen on the evidence of the Continuum *Pope Benedict XVI*. Allen too, like his predecessor, seems to have developed excellent Vatican sources, which means that his reporting is usually quite interesting and informative. It is yet another commentary on how the culture of dissent still reigns pretty much unchallenged in the contemporary Church, however, that so many Roman cardinals and Curia officials are willing to give interviews to Allen, as they did to Hebblethwaite, even though their employer, the NCR, has been the most consistent dissident muck-raking journal critical of the Church and her teachings throughout the entire post-conciliar era. The sheer venom against the Church and some of her teachings and much of her leadership that is regularly encountered in the NCR often exceeds that of hostile secular journals. Yet this fact seems never to have bothered Roman Curia officials or disadvantaged the NCR’s Vatican reporters in the slightest, as it never seems to have bothered more than a few American bishops.

One can only wonder whether such Vatican officials, as well as American bishops visiting Rome, would ever be quite so liberal with their comments and interviews if the questioning reporter came, for example, from the *Wanderer*. As soon as this question is posed, of course, the answer becomes immediately and automatically clear, namely, that they would *not*. Yet another one of the mysteries about the current prevailing culture of dissent in the Church resides in the fact that the putative upholders of the faith, the bishops, generally much prefer respectability to the actual primary task assigned to them by Vatican II, namely, the upholding of the truths of the faith. The NCR may well, quite regularly and even notoriously, denigrate the Church, her teachings, and her leadership; but at least it is not a “right-wing extremist”

journal like the *Wanderer!* It would be quite simply unthinkable for any respectable contemporary prelate to be quoted *there*.

Although in the later of his two books, the Doubleday *Rise of Benedict XVI*, John Allen shows signs of trying to get out of the anti-hierarchical and anti-magisterium rut in which his newspaper has been stuck for approximately the past forty years, in his Continuum *Pope Benedict XVI* he remains very decidedly in that rut. The book is almost a caricature of the ideologically liberal version of Catholicism that is so familiar from the pages of journals such as *Commonweal* as well as in the NCR. At times it reads almost like a screed or a rant. The unwary reader unused to the NCR view of the Church is likely to be shocked by what he reads on not a few pages of this book.

Even so, the author no doubt intended the book to be a serious study of the man who was Pope John Paul II's prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith; on the evidence, he certainly read both widely and carefully in the works of Cardinal Ratzinger in order to write it. Also, he is a trained reporter, and in certain stretches he thus accurately presents the cardinal's actual views and positions. Probably because of the ideological blinkers he had on at the time, however, he usually remains curiously unconvinced and unmoved by the cardinal's facts and arguments.

This is seen, for example, in the entire chapter which John Allen devotes to the CDF prefect's sustained (and successful) campaign against liberation theology in the 1980s. This chapter is actually quite a good summary of what liberation theology was all about. "Ratzinger came into office convinced that liberation theology was a menace to the faith," Allen writes, and most readers would have to conclude from the material that Allen himself provides that liberation theology *was* a menace to the faith, and that the cardinal's original conviction was only too well founded, and that he was only too amply justified in combating it. Rather romantically, though, Allen nevertheless tends to favor the liberation theologians; after all, they were for "justice" and for "the poor" (as if the Church were not for "justice" and for "the poor").

There are other instances in the book of the same kind of treatment of many of the people and issues that came within the purview of the CDF. John

Allen in this book seems quite blissfully unaware, for example, that some of the tenets of today's radical feminism just might be incompatible with the Catholic faith. Quite uncritically he adopts the feminist line, as when he writes: "If the Catholic Church were to reverse itself and open the door to women in all positions of leadership—if Catholicism had female priests, female bishops, female cardinals, even some day a female pope—the impact on women's self-understanding, and on social attitudes towards women would be revolutionary"—as if, again, women's "self-understanding" and the "social attitudes towards them" trumped the truths of the faith.

This passage endorsing female ordination was composed more than five years after the supreme authority in the Church, Pope John Paul II, in his 1994 *motu proprio* entitled *Ordinatio Sacerdotalis*, had solemnly announced to the world the Church's *inability* to ordain women, a judgment which the pope declared to be "definitive" and binding upon the faithful, and which was confirmed as such by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. There was no way the Church *could* "reverse itself" here, and that fact should have been part of what was reported to the large public by any knowledgeable journalist. Once again for this Vatican reporter, however, what the Church might actually *say* on a given topic is apparently of no moment; it is all apparently just a matter of what the Church *ought* to be saying, according to the liberal line.

Again, in spite of the carefully reasoned text and amply justified arguments of the CDF's 1990 Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian, *Donum Veritatis*—the magisterial document which finally and at long last excluded theological dissent as possibly licit—John Allen again seems to favor automatically the position of the dissenters holding that Catholics "for good reason could dissent from official Church teaching and remain good Catholics." Pope John Paul II, however, had expressly stated the contrary even before the CDF finally got around to doing it when he spoke to the American bishops in San Francisco in 1987 and told them plainly that Catholics could *not* dissent from Church teachings and remain good Catholics. That this rule is hardly ever effectively enforced does not make it any less a rule of the Church—which a Vatican reporter at least

ought to know about and understand, whether or not he agrees with it.

While treating of such issues in the course of his book, John Allen from time to time delivers himself of characterizations of the subject of his study which sometimes verge on the slanderous. Cardinal Ratzinger, it seems, “believe[d]...[in] ecclesial totalitarianism”; according to an unsympathetic German colleague, he had “withdrawn from modern thought”; “his life story would make a script worthy of George Lucas: the young Jedi Knight who went over to the Dark Side of the Force”; “the claim that Ratzinger ‘switched sides’ [on Vatican II] does appear to be fairly well grounded”; his efforts to carry out his duties as CDF prefect in disciplining erring theologians sometimes exhibited “a mean streak that is at odds with his reputation for courtesy and fair play.”

In typical liberal fashion, such characterizations are tossed out as if they were the most obvious things in the world. Nor are they always limited to Cardinal Ratzinger alone. Bishop Fabian Bruskewitz of Lincoln, Nebraska, a bishop who comes as close as any bishop in the world to being and doing what *Lumen Gentium* and *Christus Dominus* say a Catholic bishop ought to be and do, is casually and in passing characterized as an “extremist,” with no reasons given or evidence cited as to why he should be so characterized.

There is more, but enough has been said to make clear that this is hardly the kind of book to introduce Pope Benedict XVI properly to the larger audience now interested in him as a result of his election to the papacy. Apparently the author himself has come—or has been made—to realize this, at least to some extent. According to his “Word from Rome” column, he was stung by a review in *Commonweal*, of all places, describing his original book, *Cardinal Ratzinger: The Vatican’s Enforcer of the Faith*, as “Manichean journalism.” Even a *Commonweal* reviewer couldn’t help but notice! As a result, Allen came to see that, in his own words, the book was “written in a ‘good guys and bad guys’ style that vilifies the cardinal.” Since then, he says he has been trying as a journalist to “appreciate...shades of grey.”

The problem, however, is greater than merely appreciating “shades of grey.” As a Vatican reporter, he needs to return to the basic position of maintaining a respect for *truth*. Is the Catholic Church the teacher

of truth or not? Vatican II teaches that she is. Whether or not a John Allen personally believes this is not the point; the point is that the Catholic Church does believe this, and in reporting on her activities, he needs to locate these activities within the framework of the Church’s own sincere belief that she is indeed the teacher of truth. When the Church teaches something, it is necessary to credit that the Church believes it to be true, not possibly “optional.” When the Church finds it necessary to discipline a theologian for false teaching, this is because what the theologian is teaching *is* false teaching, and the Church is committed to what she believes are her true teachings, which are not up for grabs.

It is, of course, legitimate for a journalist to question how effectively the Church may be serving the truths she claims to be serving. But is not legitimate for a journalist to assume that the Church must not be serious about what she teaches because it seems to be so obviously contrary to what practically everybody else today may have come to believe. Moreover, as long as a journalist goes on reporting the Church’s pronouncements and activities simply in terms of liberal versus conservative, progressive versus traditionalist, conciliar versus pre-conciliar, and so on, there will be no real escape from “Manichean journalism.” (Manichean journalism, of course, is a longtime staple of NCR’s, quite apart from what John Allen himself writes.)

Meanwhile, this very bad book which “vilifies” its subject by the present admission of the author himself is still out there in the public domain being presented as a legitimate “biography” of the new pope. I first got wind of it when a friend said that she was reading “John Allen’s biography of the new pope” and then remarked with some surprise how “negative” the author seemed to be. I was able to verify this impression when the public library in the town where I live acquired this book as the current papal biography that would grace its shelves. Similarly, this was the book that immediately leaped to the eye on the shelves of the Borders near my house.

This book, *Pope Benedict XVI*, published by Continuum, should be withdrawn from circulation. The author is said to have disapproved of its publication. However, the inside cover page of the book shows that he himself is the holder of the copyright on it.

Surely as the copyright holder he had some say in whether it should be republished or not. Presumably too he is also being paid royalties on its sales. At the very least, if not withdrawn, the book should be thoroughly rewritten if only to place the rather considerable results of the research carried out by the author within a more objective and less biased framework.

When we turn to the same author's *Rise of Benedict XVI* published by Doubleday, we find that the author *has* to a large extent produced a book that is not only quite fair and objective; it is actually even somewhat laudatory, although not excessively so. The author seems to have come to appreciate and perhaps even admire his subject since completing his earlier book; and at one point he even speaks of Pope Benedict as having been the "victim of an unfair type of character assassination in the broader public discussion" (without mentioning his own past role in that very department).

As noted earlier, this second book is generally a good and occasionally a riveting account of the passing of the late pope and the coming of the new one, based on the author's knowledge of these developments acquired while reporting on them in print and on the air as they were taking place. As such it is worth reading and perhaps may even serve as one of the sources on the history of the papal conclave and election of 2005.

It cannot be said, however, that the author has entirely shed his liberal ideological skin. Here and there more than a few traces of the old liberal-conservative dichotomy appear. To cite only one example, near the end of the book listed among the "challenges" for the new pope are two brief sections in which the author recommends conciliatory gestures which the new pope might make towards "professional theologians" and "progressive Catholic women." Actually, these two sections are themselves somewhat remarkable by comparison with the author's earlier methodology in that, in addition to airing the typical grievances of the groups in question, they also do attempt to state fairly and accurately the Church's positions, as well as positions taken earlier by Cardinal Ratzinger vis-à-vis the two groups. Evidently John Allen would genuinely like to see a reconciliation of these two groups with the Church.

Nevertheless, the text quotes sympathetically a statement of the Board of Directors of the Catholic Theological Society of America (CTSA) protesting the CDF's removal from teaching theology, in February, 2005, of a Father Roger Haight, S.J. This removal of Father Haight came about on account of his book, *Jesus: Symbol of God*. The CTSA complained that the CDF's action "will most likely discourage debates over the book, effectively stifling further criticism and undermining our ability as Catholic theologians to openly critique our colleagues"—as if the CTSA had distinguished itself in that department in recent years.

It should be noted that the Roger Haight book in question directly challenges the truth of such basic teachings of the Church as the divinity of Christ, the truth of the Trinity, the salvific nature of Christ's death, his resurrection, and the universality of his redemptive act. Yet it was only after some five years of discussion that the CDF ever got around to condemning the book. And while it is true that the CTSA is now talking about possibly criticizing such aberrant theology—an activity hardly ever if at all engaged in by the CTSA during the "anything goes" era in the post-conciliar Church—that the *necessary* condemnation of a book truly as *extreme* as Father Haight's book should continue to elicit belligerent defensive reactions from within the theological community shows how far away we still are from the idea that the faith taught by the magisterium of the Church just might be *true*.

As for "progressive Catholic women," John Allen describes his NCR colleague, Benedictine Sister Joan Chittister—she is a regular NCR columnist—as "unfailingly positive" in greeting the election of the new pope, "stressing that she wanted to give the pope a chance." This description comes right after the author has quoted her in opposition to the 2004 CDF "Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men and Women in the Church and in the World." Years in preparation, this document evidences the Church's keen desire to be reconciled with modern women (the whole question of female non-ordination having presumably now been settled as far as the Church is concerned). How this "unfailingly positive" religious sister greeted the CDF's sincere and labored effort, however, was

simply to dismiss it airily with the charge that the document “demonstrates a basic lack of understanding about feminism, feminist theory, and feminist development,” and that “both the terms used and the theory appealed to in the argument is pitifully out of date and embarrassingly partial in its analysis of the nature of feminism.” She is simply right; the CDF is wrong. Feminism always trumps; the Catholic Church must simply be mistaken if feminist ideology is ever in any way questioned. It would appear that Pope Benedict is certainly not likely to get much of a “chance” on such terms as these!

This is the same religious woman who for years has defied the Church’s and Vatican II’s decisions and rulings about the Catholic religious life. This was most recently the case, perhaps, when a couple of years ago she disobediently insisted on traveling to Dublin, accompanied by the usual plaudits from the liberal press, in order to address a conference on women’s ordination in the face of a formal and public request by the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments that she not do so. Since she is an NCR colleague of John Allen’s, however—just as Charles Curran is “one of the nicest men in the academy”—she presumably has to go on being considered and cited as a legitimate voice and example within the contemporary Church (even though it remains a requirement since Vatican II that consecrated religious take vows of poverty, chastity, and *obedience*).

In reality, many “progressive Catholic women,” like many “professional theologians” today, have probably long since separated themselves from the Catholic Church in what they hold and believe and do. For the most part this sad fact has generally not been officially taken note of by the Church but has simply been passed over in silence by Church authority. So far from instituting a program involving “the suppression of theologians, the rollback of Vatican II reforms, and the steady recentralization of authority,” as John Allen describes the situation at one point in the *Continuum Pope Benedict XVI*, the Catholic Church has actually been quite remarkably

lenient in attempting to correct dissent and disobedience in the ranks in the post-conciliar era, especially considering some of the provocations the Church has encountered. The idea that theologians (or women religious) are being hounded and persecuted today is liberal mythology. Considering the number of open dissenters from Catholic teaching who continue “in good standing” in the Church even today, it is surely an incontestable fact that the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in its years under Cardinal Ratzinger has only gone after the most notorious and egregious cases—the Küngs and Currans, in particular, and only a very few of the Roger Haight.

Nor is it likely that the reign of Pope Benedict XVI will see any notable increase in the number of such cases. As prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Cardinal Ratzinger was simply doing his *job* in proceeding against the most pertinacious and public of today’s many theological dissenters. As pope, his job is no longer as narrowly focused on correcting error. We can expect that his attention is going to be focused on a much broader range of issues—as, indeed, as a theologian, Cardinal Ratzinger’s attention was always focused on a much broader range of issues than merely correcting errors. This has already been shown to be the case since the new pope’s installation, in fact, as can even be gathered especially from John Allen’s second book, the Doubleday *Rise of Benedict XVI*. This second book is thus the one on the market which tells us most accurately *which* of the two men depicted by John Allen is the real Pope Benedict XVI. ☩

Kenneth D. Whitehead is a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Education, who now works as a writer, editor, and translator in Falls Church, Virginia. He has published many articles on subjects of Catholic interest and is the author, among other books, of One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic: The Early Church Was the Catholic Church (Ignatius Press, 2000). His new book, What Vatican II Did Right: Forty Years after the Council and Counting, is forthcoming from Ignatius Press.

catholicsscholars.org

Retrying Galileo: 1633–1992, by Finocchiaro, Maurice A. Berkeley, University of California Press, 2005. pp. xii + 485. Cloth, \$50.

Reviewed by Jude Dougherty,
Emeritus Dean, School of Philosophy,
The Catholic University of America

A fascinating survey of what the author calls “The Galileo Affair,” from Descartes to John Paul II, that is, from Galileo’s condemnation in 1633 to his alleged rehabilitation 1992. The fruit of decades of research (the notes and bibliography comprise 100 pages of the volume), this is not Finocchiaro’s first book-length study of the Galileo affair. He is the author of *Galileo and the Art of Reasoning* (1980), *The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History* (1989), and *Galileo on the World Systems: A New Abridged Translation and Guide* (1997). The present work is a historical and critical account of the various interpretations and evaluations of the Galileo trial.

Without doubt the Galileo affair is one of the most studied events in the history of Western culture. The past four centuries have produced vast amounts of commentaries, countless interpretations and evaluations advanced by physicists, astronomers, theologians, philosophers, churchmen, historians, and even playwrights. Although the literature on the original affair is enormous, the story of the aftermath, says Finocchiaro, has never been told: “The reflective commentary has never been systematically examined, and the subsequent controversy has never been anchored in the textual sources.”

The Galileo affair remains something of a Rorschach test for the historically curious, yet what one makes of it has nothing to do with whether one is clerical or anticlerical.

The basic facts are well known. Galileo subscribed to and defended the Copernican heliocentric worldview, a view that seemed contrary to the Hebrew scriptures and centuries of Church teaching. Although subsequent inquiry by the early 19th century was to prove conclusively that the earth is not the center of the solar system, Galileo at the time was not able to demonstrate the truth of his position. Absent demonstration, Galileo was enjoined to teach his position only as a hypothetical explanation. At this point the story becomes murky. Immersed in the theological debate about how Scripture is to be interpreted, Galileo made no friends and unnecessarily engendered some of the animosity toward him. Belarmine understood that from an Aristotelian point of view, Galileo had not demonstrated his conclusion although Galileo himself thought that the motion of the tides proved his thesis. The record indicates that absent proof, Galileo agreed to teach the heliocentric view of the world only as a hypothesis. Whether he complied is a matter of dispute. In subsequent years, Galileo pressed his case. The record is complex, but the case culminated in the trial of 1633 and his condemnation. Nothing new here, but what is new is Finocchiaro’s painstaking account of contemporary reactions to Galileo’s difficulties, primarily as a result of his study of the correspondence between Galileo and others, some of which is translated into English for the first time.

Descartes may have been the first to use the expression “l’affaire Galileo.” Although Descartes regarded the Copernican view of the universe to be “certain and evident,” he also knew that Galileo had not demonstrated the heliocentric view. Descartes thought that he himself could provide the evidence, but he was

reluctant to become entangled with ecclesiastical authorities and withheld the publication of his *Le monde*. In correspondence with Mersenne, Descartes was anxious to know whether the geokinetic idea had been condemned merely by a congregation of Roman cardinals or by the pope speaking *ex cathedra*. Descartes was aware that the former did not have the binding status of an *ex cathedra* pronouncement or that of an ecumenical council of the Church universal. Clearly Galileo was not regarded as a heretic.

Readers may be fascinated by Napoleon Bonaparte’s personal interest in l’affaire Galileo. On February 2, 1810, when the French army still occupied Rome, Napoleon ordered everything in Rome pertaining to the papal government to be moved to France. Thus 3,239 cases were subsequently transported to Paris. A special convoy was assigned to transport the Inquisition archives. Napoleon’s primary interest may have been the papal bull that excommunicated him, but he authorized his personal librarian to translate and publish the original proceedings of Galileo trial into French side by side with the original Italian and Latin. The first twenty-five folios were published, although the project was never completed.

Interest in the Galileo affair was widespread. It may be expected that scientists and men of letters, such as Pascal, Newton, and Leibniz, would be curious. By Finocchiaro’s count, almost 60 books were written about the trial during the period 1633–1651. The episode was seized on by D’Alembert, Voltaire, and other Enlightenment figures to bash the Church. Domenico Bernini, for one, contributed to the invention and diffusion of myths about the affair when he maliciously asserted that Galileo was held in an Inquisition

prison for five years. Voltaire picked up the theme and either in ignorance or hatred wrote that Galileo was thrown into prison and made to fast on bread and water. Of course, Galileo was never imprisoned in any usual sense. When detained in Rome, his “prison” was the palace of the Duke of Tuscany where he was treated as an honored guest; so too when he endured confinement as the guest of the Archbishop of Sienna.

Finocchiaro concludes his study with John Paul II, who, in November 1979 at a celebration to commemorate the centennial of Einstein’s birth, called for a reopening of the Galileo affair. A Vatican commission was subsequently appointed with a view to the rehabilitation of Galileo. Paul Cardinal Poupard, thirteen years later in 1992 made the formal report of the commission at a meeting of the Pontifical Academy of the Sciences, with John Paul II in attendance. In his own speech after receiving the report, John Paul II seemed to be admitting not only that Church authorities had been in error but had acted unjustly, something Descartes in his day would not have conceded. As subsequently reported the condemnation of Galileo was itself seemingly condemned. Whatever his intent, John Paul II’s speech has not ended the centuries-old controversy. Galileo’s apparent rehabilitation has merely started a new episode of Galileo studies. Bellarmine has his defenders even in the secular academy.

In Finocchiaro’s telling, the history of the *cause célèbre* is a veritable page turner but not one that can be absorbed in a single sitting. Clearly for anyone tempted to venture an opinion on the Galileo affair this book is required reading.

Equality, Decadence and Modernity, by Stephen J. Tonsor, Wilmington, Delaware: ISI Books 2005. pp. xviii + 357.

*Reviewed by Jude Dougherty,
Emeritus Dean, School of Philosophy,
The Catholic University of America*

Those schooled in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy have for the most part abandoned the notion that philosophy is the pursuit of wisdom. Philosophy since Kant has rejected the claim that there is a fixed body of truth waiting to be known and passed to succeeding generations. Yet historians are there to remind us that there is meaning to the phrase, “the wisdom of the past,” and furthermore that man cannot long remain adrift in a sea of ignorance and uncertainty. Old truths may be periodically erased from social memory, but societies, like nature, remain subject to universal, irreversible laws. Writing in the mode of Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee, Stephen J. Tonsor, long time professor of history at the University of Michigan, reminds us that ideas have consequences. The picture he paints is not a pretty one. “Societies,” he writes in the first section of the volume, “do not decay and fall into ruin because of what happens to them from the outside but rather as a result of an internal process.” One of the most important indicators of social decadence, Tonsor thinks, is the breakdown of traditional political forms, which is itself the result of the decay of aristocratic norms and republican virtue. The contemporary secular, anti-Christian culture promoted by our academic and media elites, in Tonsor’s judgment, has replaced its traditional calling of providing uplifting intellectual and artistic standards. In providing evidence of decadence, Tonsor hardly

needs to call attention to the breakdown of the family, the dissolution of conventional morality, the increase in crime and use of addictive drugs, and a declining birth rate. Troubling, he thinks, is the transformation of the army from a citizen body to a professional army of paid mercenaries and the propensity of the government to radiate its power outward to world conquest and domination. Above all, Tonsor is concerned about the nation’s loss of the moral tradition represented in the country’s founding documents. Can a civilization survive, he asks, without the unity provided by a common core of values? The crisis of Western civilization, detected early in the last century and addressed by philosophers as different as Husserl, Heidegger, and Santayana, remains. The denial of the Christian and classical sources of Western civilization and the cultural hostility to religion as found among our governing elites has created a moral vacuum. When a consensus with respect to the desired goals of society disappears, there is no basis for an ordered civic life. Tonsor fears that absent virtue in the people, it is inevitable that a dictator or authoritarian regime will arise to impose order from without. Tonsor tries to avoid the outright pessimism of Spengler and Toynbee by pointing out that man is not fated but chooses his own life. There is, he believes, a parallel between the personal and the social. Of the twenty-six essays collected for the volume, only three in the first part are devoted to the topic of “decadence.” Others are organized under such headings as “Equality,” “Historiography,” “Intellectual History,” and “Politics.” Throughout the volume we find a highly informed, philosophical mind at work, one fully equipped to address the pressing issues of the day.

Ugly as Sin: Why They Changed Our Churches from Sacred Places to Meeting Spaces—and How We Can Change Them Back Again, by Michael S. Rose, Sophia Institute Press, Manchester, New Hampshire, 2001, viii + 239, hardcover, \$ 24.95.

Reviewed by Edmund W. Majewski, S.J., St. Peter's College, Jersey City, N.J.

Some of the most common questions raised by contemporary Catholics after they have seen a new or renovated Church are: “Why do our churches no longer look like a church?” or “Why have liturgists and architects destroyed a once beautiful church?” Millions of dollars have been spent to build churches that seem very ugly. Additional millions have been spent on renovation projects of traditional churches that destroyed much of the original beauty; in fact, many beautiful churches have been secularized and stripped of art works of great beauty. Why has this occurred? Michael Rose describes the theology and ideology behind these two processes that have resulted in a loss of the sense of the sacred in so many Catholic churches.

He explains three fundamental principles of Catholic architecture—verticality, permanence, and iconography—and provides many examples in different styles of church architecture through the centuries. The church building is seen as the “new Jerusalem” which is a reminder of the heavenly kingdom and the heavenly liturgy which is celebrated by the saints and angels in the presence of God. Great stress was traditionally placed by architects and artists on God’s glory and transcendence. Rose takes the reader on a pilgrimage to the church envisioned as the house of the Lord. He explains the importance of the facade, bell tower, spire, and dome which focus atten-

tion upon the house of God even from a great distance. The reader is then drawn gradually into the sacred space through the narthex, baptistry, nave, and sanctuary and eventually to the altar and the tabernacle. Rose explains the symbolism of the pulpit, altar, and baldacchino and demonstrates how sacred art evangelizes the faithful. He then takes the reader on a journey inside a modern church where the focus shifts from the presence of the Lord to the community’s celebration of itself and a loss of the sense of the sacred. Among the more questionable examples of modern liturgical art is a tabernacle which resembles a bird feeder standing on a pillar and a tower tabernacle that resembles a tall, narrow fish tank. Whereas the visitor to the more traditional church is overwhelmed with awe before the beauty and symbolism of the house of God, the visitor to the modern church experiences a series of shocks and wonders why anyone would want to design a building in this manner and call it a Catholic church. This pilgrim’s final question echos the question of the Gospel narrative, “They have taken my Lord and I do not know where they have placed him.”

Rose devotes an entire chapter to discussing the bad theology that is the basis for ugly and secularized churches. He examines the influence of the theories of Edward Sovik, an American Evangelical Lutheran architect upon Protestant church architecture and later Catholic architects. Sovik is critical of both medieval Catholic and later Protestant church architecture that can be described as a “house of God”; instead, he advocates the construction of multi-purpose churches that are best described as a “house of the people.” Sovik’s ideal church would be the Puritan and early Methodist meetinghouses which were consciously secular in form and detail. Slovak

rejects the use of pews, the practice of decorating the church with strictly sacred artwork such as paintings, icons, crucifixes, and statues and the reservation of the Eucharist within the meetinghouse area for ideological reasons.

Unfortunately, Slovik’s ideology influenced Catholic liturgists such as Fr. Robert Hovda and others who incorporated his theories into the controversial and defective document *Environment and Art in Catholic Worship*, a document issued by a bishops’ committee on the liturgy of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops but never actually approved by the body of bishops. Nevertheless, this unofficial document has had tremendous influence on the construction of new Catholic churches and the renovation of existing churches and cathedrals throughout the United States. Fr. Richard Vosko, a Catholic priest responsible for the radical renovation of many beautiful churches and cathedrals in the United States was also strongly influenced by Slovik’s theories. Rose gives numerous examples of beautiful high altars that were removed by brute force and jackhammers supposedly in the name of Vatican II, although by the 1970s the Holy See actually began to warn against such innovations. Rose’s thesis is simple to grasp: “Because the modern non-church implies a false theology, it’s theologically ugly—literally, as ugly as sin.” (174)

Reading about the principles behind many modern churches and surveying the destruction of so many beautiful churches makes for depressing reading. Fortunately, Rose also provides hope. He devotes an entire chapter to how we can make our churches Catholic again based upon a genuine understanding of Catholic architecture and liturgy. He gives examples of how once beautiful churches which were tarnished by

misguided alternations in the 1960s and 1970s have been renovated in recent years to restore a sense of the sacred. We can rejoice that Catholics are slowly beginning to rediscover their rich heritage of liturgical art and architecture. This chapter can be useful for parishes which want to undo the damage caused by poor renovations done immediately after Vatican II.

An appendix provides a bibliography of books and articles on sacred architecture and art as well as a list of architects and liturgical artists with their addresses and phone numbers who are committed to the revival of Catholic architecture and art based upon Catholic tradition and sound liturgical principles. Most Catholics are probably unaware that there is a new group of architects and artists who are committed to building beautiful churches. The book also includes numerous black and white photographs which are used to support the text.

This reviewer does have one question for Rose: Are there any modern churches which do reflect the three principles of Catholic architecture? The soaring Air Force Academy Cadet Chapel in Colorado Springs, Colorado embodies a certain degree of transcendence and majesty but is overly abstract and devoid of religious symbolism. Could such a building be made into a place of beauty? Are there any examples of modern architecture which would serve the needs of Catholic liturgy?

Ugly as Sin should be read along with Rose's more recent work, *In Tiers of Glory: The Organic Development of Catholic Church Architecture Through the Ages*, Aquinas Publishing Ltd., Cincinnati, Ohio, 2004, 135, paperback, \$29.95. This new work includes many superb photos in full color and it would make an excellent gift for Christmas. Whereas *Ugly as Sin* focuses more on the various ele-

ments of Catholic churches such as the baptistry, altar, sanctuary, pulpit, and various ornaments, *In Tiers of Glory* is more concerned with the church building as a totality and the different architectural styles. And whereas *Ugly as Sin* concentrates on the defects of much of contemporary Church architecture, *In Tiers of Glory* looks back to the great heritage of Catholic architecture and to the future embodied by a new generation of young Catholic architects who are trying to revive elements of the past for new churches.

This book traces the development of Catholic sacred architecture beginning with its roots in the Old Testament and progressing through early Roman basilicas and Byzantine architecture to the Romanesque and Gothic cathedrals and finally to the Renaissance and Baroque masterpieces. Rose also examines the revivalist movement of the 19th century which turned to earlier classical, Gothic, and Baroque periods for inspiration for churches which were sometimes rather eclectic in blending different styles and principles of construction in the same building. Rose notes the shortcomings of this revival. Many architects tried to duplicate a certain historical look, but for the most part lacked the technical and artistic skills to recreate the great churches of previous periods. Rose seems to be critical of architects who turned to the past as archeology and instead seems to prefer using the past to inspire buildings of the present and future. Many American churches and cathedrals were built during this period; Rose regards some as successful and others as inadequate imitations. An entire chapter is devoted to the rise of modernism and its new churches which broke with the past and the return of iconoclasm which resulted in the destruction of many beautiful churches and religious art. The

Church is going through its third stage of iconoclasm: the first occurred under the Byzantine Emperor Leo III and was repudiated by the Holy See and the Second Council of Nicaea which restored the veneration of sacred images; the second period was the Protestant Reformation which resulted in the destruction of many priceless works of art. We are clearly in the middle of a new age of iconoclasm and banality. The last chapter examines contemporary a small group of Catholic architects who want to produce beautiful churches which are inspired by the past. These architects want to be faithful to present liturgical norms as well as build churches that are based upon the rich Catholic architectural and artistic heritage.

Rose does not raise the possibility that some styles may no longer be appropriate for the liturgy of Vatican II. Several examples come to mind, mainly Episcopalian Gothic churches. Washington National Cathedral (Episcopal) is a perfect reproduction of the classic English Gothic Cathedral with its very long choir with choir stalls and altar screens. These long choirs were built for the chanting of the office by canons or monks. The Anglican Church later gave an important role to Evensong or Vespers often sung by schoolboy choirs; the celebration of the Eucharist often was secondary until the Oxford Movement in the 19th century. However, this style places the altar at a great distance from the faithful. The French Gothic seems more appropriate to present liturgical norms, because the altar would be more visible to the people. Many Romanesque and Byzantine style Catholic Churches built prior to the Council require few renovations, because the high altar and sanctuary are clearly visible to the congregation. These are some issues that Rose should address in the future.

Also, Rose might examine ways in which Catholic churches built during

the Gothic revival period of the 19th century which have architectural and artistic defects might be improved and renovated so that they might better serve the needs of Catholics today and become more faithful to the historical period which inspired them.

Finally, we note that Michael Rose has developed a superb web site, www.dellachiesa.com which is updated with articles about renovations that are damaging existing churches as well as new designs for new churches which are in continuity with the past. All the resources are useful for bishops, diocesan liturgical committees, pastors, and parishes about to renovate existing churches. Sadly, there will be much resistance from a certain segment of the liturgical establishment in the United States because it has a vested interest in expensive projects which wreck once beautiful churches.

The One in the Many: A Contemporary Reconstruction of the God-World Relationship, by Joseph A. Bracken, S.J., William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, Michigan, 2001, xii + 234, paperback.

Reviewed by Edmund W. Majewski, S.J., St. Peter's College.

Rev. Joseph A. Bracken, S.J. is professor of theology at Xavier University and has written extensively on the Trinity and process theology. His previous books include *What are they saying about the Trinity*, *The Triune Symbol: Persons, Process, and Community*, *The Divine Matrix* and *Society and Spirit: A Trinitarian Cosmology* and he is the author of numerous articles. He is also the coeditor of *Trinity in Process: A Relational Theology of God*. In his earlier writings he attempted to

express a Christian understanding of God in the categories of process thought; in his latest work he enters into dialogue with non-Christian religious and philosophical traditions, in particular those of the East.

The One in the Many is not written for readers unacquainted with process philosophy and theology, although the author does provide a glossary of process terminology. Many readers may find it difficult to comprehend the language and categories of process thought which radically differ from those of the classical tradition and scholasticism. The categories of process thought tend to be highly abstract and technical and removed from everyday language and the language of Scripture. It should also be noted that Bracken has been critical of some process thinkers and has tried to relate their understanding of God to a more Trinitarian vision of God. His latest work also addresses concerns which go beyond his previous interests, including his desire to find a common language for a dialogue between religion and science, and he tries to link together a number of themes including the turn to subjectivity and in modern philosophy and theology.

Bracken notes that there has been a shift to subjectivity and intersubjectivity in Catholic theology beginning with Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan. He contrasts the Thomistic and Whiteheadian worldviews and maintains that St. Thomas Aquinas relied excessively upon Aristotle's view of God as the Unmoved Mover resulting in a static view of God and a theological determinism that makes it difficult to account for human freedom. According to Whitehead individual creatures are self-constituting and free so that God does not know the decision of an actual entity or finite reality until it actually comes to a decision about

its future. However, Bracken's view calls into question the doctrines of divine providence and omniscience. At best, God is forced to continuously revise his plan due to the failure of finite creatures to carry out his original plan for them. Bracken is also critical of the major role played by Aristotle's concept of *substance* in speaking about God and prefers to think of God in terms of *process*. However, is he correct that *substance* alone has been the primary category for our understanding of God? Have not the categories of *person* and *relation* become increasingly important concepts in discussing God due to a more profound reflection on the doctrine of the Trinity?

Bracken also reflects upon Jean-Luc Marion's *God Without Being* which seeks to understand God in terms of pure Gift or love rather than in terms of the classical metaphysics of Being. Marion holds that the classical discussion of God has a danger of reducing God to an idol rather than an icon. Bracken also draws upon the work of the French sacramental theologian Louis-Marie Chauvet who offers us a more symbolic concept of God. Bracken then reflects upon the Trinitarian theology of Catherine LaCugna and Elizabeth Johnson. He is critical of LaCugna for downplaying the importance of the Immanent Trinity and of standing midway between the Thomistic metaphysics of Being and the new process metaphysics of intersubjectivity. He is also somewhat critical of Elizabeth Johnson's *She Who Is* for characterizing God in terms of a feminist critique of classical theology rather than in terms of intersubjectivity and placing excessive stress on individuality rather than the three-fold aspect of God. He suggests that Whitehead's category of actual entity which sees subjectivity as prior to actuality and stresses becoming as opposed to being might be useful for

carrying forward the insights of these contemporary theologians.

Bracken then delves into the nature of language and the interrelation of subjectivity and objectivity. He enters into a dialogue with thinkers such as Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, Jurgen Habermas, Bernard Lonergan, and Whitehead about the use of language, the nature of truth and objectivity, and the role of the subject in creating a world mediated by meaning. Man is certainly a being who must express who he is in language. He believes that Habermas is correct when he claims with his theory of “communicative rationality” that human beings enter into a dialogue to arrive at a consensus or mutual understanding of their differing positions on a given issue. However, Bracken’s position raises a number of questions about the nature of truth. Is truth simply based upon a consensus or compromise between sharply differing positions? How is it possible to attain genuine objectivity? Bracken then discusses different understandings of *metaphor* and *symbol* and the symbolic nature of language. We question whether Bracken has fully explored Lonergan’s theory of the interaction between the subject and the object. The subject does create a symbolic world of meaning, but this meaning as Lonergan points out must also remain objective in some sense, since the subject’s understanding of the world should be based upon the world that is.

Bracken concludes the first part of his book with his treatment of the question of the one and the many based upon various insights of Jacques Derrida who stresses the importance of the difference between beings and otherness. He compares Derrida with Whitehead. Both thinkers avoid associating their respective concepts of difference or creativity with a Supreme Being. One problem with Bracken’s use of

process categories is that creativity becomes the ultimate principle of reality and God himself seems to be reduced to yet one more example of creativity. Bracken admits that “within God creativity is the *underlying* principle for the existence and interrelated activity of the three divine persons. Likewise, within creation, creativity is the *underlying* principle for the existence and interrelated activity of all creatures.” (p. 84) But is this theory compatible with revelation? Is the principle of creativity a superior reality that lies beyond the three divine persons of the Trinity? Is Ultimate Reality a quaternity that lies beyond and transcends the three persons of the Trinity? One detects here a similarity with the mysticism of Meister Eckart and his notion of the Godhead which lies beyond the three divine persons. Do the three divine persons use the principle of creativity to become one God? Clearly, this is problematic. It is clear that Bracken wants to emphasize multiplicity and plurality and the dimension of *otherness* rather than the unity of reality. Modern thinkers and culture have stressed the importance of pluralism and diversity. But this emphasis raises a number of problems. My respect for the *otherness* of the other cannot be so radical that all communication is rendered impossible due to our total *otherness*. Furthermore, there are also implications for ethical and moral discourse. How can I impose my moral norms on the other, if his *otherness* includes a radically different set of moral norms. How do we avoid a moral relativism which characterizes so much of contemporary thought? How do I remain both distinct from and yet profoundly related to the other? We suggest that there are elements in the thought of Hans Urs von Balthasar which provide a more balanced approach to the problem of the one and the many. This balance

is found within the very life of the Trinity. The Father is Father by giving himself entirely to the Son and respecting the otherness of the Son. On the other hand, this distinction does not destroy their unity.

The second part of *The One and the Many* begins with a chapter on the vertical dimension of intersubjectivity which deals with the relationship of the self to ultimate reality and draws upon the insights of the Japanese Buddhist philosopher Kitano Nishida who attempts to ground all communication between subjects, including man and God, in an all-encompassing space called Absolute Nothingness which is the universal context for all experience and particular entities and a lack of reality in and for itself. Bracken attempts to reinterpret Nishida’s and Whitehead’s philosophies into a vision that makes room for both an interpersonal and transpersonal God. Bracken sees a similarity between Nishida’s concept of Absolute Nothingness and Whitehead’s principle of creativity since both are the ontological ground for the becoming and being of all actual entities. Absolute Nothingness is an indeterminate reality or energy which takes on the characteristics of determinate entities it enables to exist.

However, we note a number of problems in Nishida’s and Whitehead’s philosophies. First, is this ultimate ground an impersonal force? Does God himself arise out of this more ultimate or primordial force or energy? Also, do they maintain a clear distinction between the Creator and creature or is all reality blurred into a pantheistic unity? A more fruitful dialogue among Christian, Buddhist, and process thinkers might occur if the insights of Martin Buber and the key role of the I-Thou interpersonal encounter were explored more fully in the context of Negative Theology. We also wonder

whether the insights of some of the Greek Fathers and Nicholas of Cusa would offer a more suitable point of departure for interreligious dialogue. Bracken insists on the central role of revelation for the Christian understanding of Ultimate Reality and has explored here and in his other writings the importance of the doctrine of the Trinity for theology. Indeed, he grounds the intersubjectivity of finite entities in the interpersonal relations of the three divine persons with one another. However, one wonders whether Bracken has insisted enough on the need for Eastern thinkers to move beyond the negation of the self and negative theology to a philosophy of affirmation. Dialogue with other regions and philosophers cannot proceed along a one way street. Bracken discusses how individual entities constitute themselves by a process of self-affirmation through self-negation by which one allows oneself to be defined as a self only by relating to other individuals or social groups. Clearly, he touches upon the doctrine of the Trinity as important to understanding intersubjectivity and reality as such. Each of the persons constitutes the self only by going out of himself and relating to others. God includes both unity and plurality; each dimension is equally primordial. Therefore, all reality and all individuals beings are open to both unity and diversity. However, are the impersonal categories of *field*, *process*, or *society* really an advance over the categories of classical theology which stress the primacy of the person, the subject, and the free intentional agent in speaking about the divine? Are we not reducing God to an impersonal force or energy?

Bracken draws upon insights from those who study systems and groups. Certainly, such analyses may offer interesting insights into how groups and societies function. How-

ever, we also detect a subtle danger here in subsuming the person into a higher ontological reality. The person as person can never lose his self-identity and simply merge with the identity of the social group. A person is unique and transcendent or open to a relation with God and that identity and relationship can never be replaced by the identity or relationship of the group.

Bracken next explores the horizontal dimension of intersubjectivity and focuses on the work of Ervin Lazlo and his study of systems and social groups and Jurgen Habermas and his theory of communicative action to account for how human beings and social groups rationally interact within society. Bracken believes it is important to examine not only how individuals interact with one another but also to develop a social ontology to explain how groups interact with each other and engage in a mutual process of interpretation. For Whiteheadians, reality consists of actual occasions or event-like moments or subjects of experience which are constituting themselves into larger entities or societies. Habermas is interested in studying how social groups constitute themselves and rationally interact with each other. The theory must be able to account for the reality and actions of a system once a certain level of complexity is attained without allowing systems analysis to predominate and call into question genuine interpersonal values and relationships at lower levels. Habermas describes how egalitarian primitive societies gradually develop into more complex hierarchical and politically-stratified class societies that become so highly organized that ordinary people feel they have lost control over their own lives and the common good. Money and power become dominant and the basis for decision-making and replace the

need for genuine interpersonal communication and decisions based on discussion and consensus. Once again we confront the problem of the one and the many, this time in social groups. Much of what Habermas says has implications for sociology and political science. Bracken maintains that in order to sustain communicative rationality among persons and transcend narrow self-interest of the individual and subgroup society must turn to some religious inspired vision that looks to the common good. Bracken correctly insists that such a worldview must integrate the vertical and horizontal dimensions of intersubjectivity. He envisions a universal ground or transcendent context understood as a type of all-encompassing, dynamic energy-field out of which are constituted all particular individual entities. In Whiteheadian terms, all actual occasions (moments of experience) and actual entities exist not in isolation but in interdependence with other entities, subsocieties, and society as a whole. We have to ask how individual entities and smaller societies fit into the scheme of Ultimate Reality or an all-encompassing energy-field. Unfortunately, Bracken seems unable to move beyond the limitations and jargon of Whitehead's philosophy. What is the real nature of Ultimate Reality? A Force or a Person? Does that Person have a design, a plan, goals for finite rational creatures and the rest of creation? How do "I" fit into society and this goal that is offered to each person and to humanity? We also note that process philosophy does not offer an adequate explanation of evil, especially moral evil. Is evil simply a byproduct of the evolutionary process or the wilful and deliberate rejection of the greater good? Can the vertical and horizontal dimensions of intersubjectivity be integrated harmoniously or will there be a clash and disrupt-

tion if such an attempt is made due to the disruption caused by original and actual sin? In the Christian vision of reality and the redemptive process the coming-together of the vertical and horizontal dimensions of intersubjectivity occur in the Incarnation and on the Cross. All of this is lacking in process philosophy. For all its concern that Being must be understood in terms of Becoming, that the static must be replaced by the dynamic, process thought seems to lack a sense of the process of history, especially concrete human history as a process that involves the drama of subjects interacting with each other and the Ultimate Subject. Bracken has attempted to integrate the doctrine of the Trinity, but here he does not pursue the discussion. He lacks an adequate appreciation of the drama of salvation history.

Bracken's final chapter deals with the need to find common ground in the debate between religion and science. He maintains that a metaphysics of intersubjectivity and a "field-oriented interpretation of Whiteheadian societies may carry forward our contemporary reinterpretation of the God-world relationship. Certainly, this is a fascinating area in which scientists and theologians are beginning to listen and learn from one another in a new spirit of openness and humility. Bracken discusses issues such as the direction and finality of the cosmos and the divine and human causality. He wants to avoid deism which maintains that God plays no real role in the world after creation and seeks to explain how God can remain active in the world without destroying the harmony established by the laws of nature as discovered by human science. He notes that some scientists and philosophers are raising questions about the interaction between the physical and mental or spiritual realms and then offering that rela-

tionship as a model to explain the God-world relationship. Bracken examines the theory of emergent properties or "supervenience" in the natural world which explains how complex and higher-level systems possess emergent properties that transcend the characteristics of their components. This theory might be used to deal with the problem of how the human brain works and the relationship between the body and the intellect. Bracken is searching for concepts which can be used by theologians and scientists who enter into a dialogue about the nature of the cosmos and the God-world relationship. He maintains that the concept of *substance* is discredited and prefers the term *field*. Certainly, there has been a divergence between classical physics and quantum physics which raises questions about previous mechanistic understandings of the universe and the emergence of probability and even freedom from within its structure. But are Whiteheadian societies conceived as "enduring structured fields of dynamically interrelated actual occasions or momentary subjects of experience" (p. 165) really adequate to explain how beings maintain their self-identity through time even as they change. We also have the problem of the disappearing subject in process thought. What or who is the ultimate subject of a being's actions? Bracken holds that the mind should be seen "as an enduring intentional field of activity constituted by the ordered succession of those same mental actual occasions" (p. 168). Bracken seems to envision the mind as providing a context for the succession of mental actual occasions. He affirms that there is a mutual interdependence between the spiritual and the physical. However, is a *context* sufficiently strong enough to account for human mental and spiritual activity? Bracken clearly

wants to affirm God's transcendence in relation to the world. But one wonders whether process categories are adequate to uphold the distinction between Creator and creation. Charles Hartshorne understands God as the soul of the world and the world as the body of God. This comes close to classical pantheism. Bracken seems to envision the Big Bang as occurring within the field of activity of the three divine persons of the Trinity and accepts pantheism which holds that all beings must exist within God but also possess their own autonomy. However, it is not always clear that this distinction is maintained in Bracken's system.

Bracken finally offers some proposals for future research and dialogue between theologians or philosophers and scientists. His suggestions are open-ended and will be pursued in different ways.

He correctly points out that barriers of language and misconceptions often separate those working in these two disciplines. On the other hand, we wonder whether his efforts to bridge that gap also destroy the proper distinction between the two disciplines. The physical sciences are concerned with physical reality and the quantifiable. But God clearly cannot be reduced to such an object. Nor can God and the cosmos be somehow placed in a larger system that transcends both the world and God.

How should we evaluate Bracken's proposals? It is important that theologians and scientists try to understand and learn from each other and find some common ground for their discussions. But one wonders whether process thinkers sometimes confuse metaphysics and physics in their attempt to find categories that can account for both material and spiritual reality. The foundation for Bracken's system is Whitehead's cosmology rather than Revelation.

It a cosmology which tends towards deism and pantheism; is such a system adequate for Christian theology which deals with a personal God who is three persons? A number of objections can be raised to Bracken's reliance on Process Thought. First, does Process Theology uphold God's transcendence and the distinction between the Creator and creation. Is God simply another agent acting within a larger system? Is God so much a part of the universe that he is subject to its laws and only differs from us in degree rather than in a qualitative manner? Does the dipolar nature of God preserve the divine unity? God's *primordial* nature includes all possibilities which are not yet realized. His consequent nature includes all reality as achieved by creatures; does this not render God radically dependent upon creation and the decisions of creatures? Secondly, in his effort to find common categories to speak about God and the world does Bracken blur the distinction between spirit and matter? Thirdly, are the categories of Buddhism adequate to affirm the existence of interpersonal relations among human persons and between man and a personal God? Fourthly, is God or the principle of creativity the ultimate principle of reality? God seems forced to create in order to be the supreme instance of creativity. Does this not call into question the Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo as a free and personal act? Although his dialogue with philosophers, scientists, and other religions is important, one wonders if his thought does justice to Revelation and has fully explored the riches of classical theology to pursue such a dialogue. Clearly, theologians must be willing to listen to scientists; at the same time, scientists must be open to theological insights. Above all, theologians should not uncriti-

cally accept all philosophical conclusions of particular scientists regarding the nature of the universe and the meaning of reality. Fifthly, does he adequately distinguish between creation itself and salvation history.

There recent discussion over the significance of Cardinal Schonborn's brief essay on evolution in the *New York Times* bears some relation to the issues we have discussed. Many scientists opt for a process understanding of God due to their understanding of the history of the universe involving billions of years and of the evolution of life on earth. However, we must make a clear distinction between the Infinite and Absolute and finite and contingent reality and between the material and spiritual realms. God as the Creator and source and ultimate goal of the universe and its long history cannot be reduced to another mere actor within the cosmos but as someone who transcends the entire universe. Furthermore, science alone and even philosophy by itself cannot answer the question of *why* the universe exists or why human beings who have intellects, free will, emotions, feelings, and the ability to love and to receive love have appeared on the scene at the end of this long process of evolution. Are we here by *chance* or a *divine plan*? Do all contemporary scientists regard a simplistic Darwinism as an adequate explanation of the evolution of the universe and life? Furthermore, has Bracken adequately distinguished the different types of causality at work in the universe. If God is envisioned as yet another actor among others, then it seems that God is interfering in the process of nature and the operation of the natural law. However, if God transcends the entire cosmos as its creator, sustainer, and final goal, then his relations cannot be seen as a form of interference.

The relationship between neces-

sity and freedom must also be considered. God seems to allow a certain amount of freedom in the evolutionary process, but this does not mean that there is no real direction or goal. Theologians such as Balthasar and Adrienne von Speyr stress that within God there is no conflict between necessity and freedom, although we find it hard to reconcile them at the physical and human level. Bracken's description of various beings as societies and subsocieties seems to be an attempt to give various entities or beings in the universe a certain amount of self-determination and freedom. However, his opposition to a metaphysics of substance makes it difficult to grasp the reality of the subject and the person who seems to disintegrate into discrete moments of reality that come and go. Therefore, the process approach as a means of explaining all reality raises more questions and problems than it solves for philosophers and theologians.

George G. Higgins and the Quest for Worker Justice: The Evolution of Catholic Social Thought in America, by John J. O'Brien. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2005. Pp. xv, 397. Paper. \$32.95. 0-7425-3208-9.

Reviewed by Rev. James F. Garneau, Ph.D., Pastor of St. Mary Church, Mount Olive, NC, and adjunct professor at Mount Olive College

Passionist Father John J. O'Brien has provided a significant synthesis of the writings and thought of Monsignor George G. Higgins, who served as an important link between the American Labor movement and the Catholic Church for more than fifty years, beginning with his assignment to the Social Action Department (SAD) of

the National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC) in 1944. In what appears to be his doctoral dissertation, O'Brien delineates and extols the theology and work of Higgins as viewed primarily through the lens of the annual *Labor Day Statements* (of the SAD), which he authored between 1955 and 1980, and his weekly *Yardstick* columns (1945-1994), distributed by the NCWC News Service to Catholic newspapers, as well as selected sermons, eulogies and other statements. Textual analysis is O'Brien's path to explaining what he believes to be Higgins's contribution to the development of Catholic social thought.

The book is presented in five chapters, the first of which is a brief overview of "The Movement from Civil Religion to Public Theology," in which O'Brien relies largely on Robert N. Bellah and Martin E. Marty for the definitions of these concepts. It is within this context that Higgins is described as a great contributor to American public theology by means of his insistence on "economic citizenship" as fundamental to human dignity and for the success of democracy. The second chapter is a broad study of "The Historical Development of American Catholic Social Teaching," of which Higgins is recognized as a most worthy heir. This chapter might serve as a helpful introduction for undergraduates, though it might also be judged by some readers as trying to summarize too much, and so, in places, devolves into over-broad generalizations and staccato-like summations. There are also several references to labor law and historical movements that are not explained, as there are elsewhere in the text, where the author occasionally mentions some persons without identifying them.

The following three chapters

treat of Higgins's "early," "mature," and "later" years. Despite this chronological approach, the book is not a biography. Significant details about his life (e.g., where and with whom he lived) are almost never provided. While some biographical information is provided, it is the matrix of writings that support the argument that Higgins was an important contributor to both "public theology" and to the spirituality of the laity in the American context. Little examined or tested, in this writer's opinion, is the question of the extent or effectiveness of Higgins's work on the community of the American Catholic Church or in national life. Moreover, because of the lack of biography, this book does not demonstrate much of the non-literary aspects of Higgins's work. For example, while reference is made to a column written in support of the Polish Solidarity movement and of visits to Poland in 1981 and on the tenth anniversary of the union (with Lane Kirkland, president of the AFL-CIO), no mention is made of Monsignor's "shuttle diplomacy" between Washington, Rome, and Warsaw during the crucial years of the movement's formation. (I was a witness to these travels while a graduate student of Monsignor Higgins at The Catholic University of America in the early 1980s.)

There is an extensive survey of Higgins's involvement with Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers Association. In these matters, as in nearly all others, O'Brien is quick to come to the defense of Higgins against those who disagreed with or criticized him and the positions he adopted. Their criticisms, however, are rarely recognized as substantive by O'Brien, and thus, an opportunity for deeper analysis is lost.

Higgins was indeed an important and respected voice within the

Church and the labor movements of his time. Moreover, he was involved in a host of other issues, including racial prejudice and Catholic-Jewish relations. He was, perhaps, most influenced by family, especially his father, and by the theological formation provided by the Church in Chicago, for which he was ordained a priest, as well as by his professors at the Catholic University in Washington, DC, from which he obtained his doctorate. O'Brien argues that a significant change in Higgins's theological method, from a deductive to more inductive approach, can be noted at the time of the Second Vatican Council. O'Brien consistently appears as a sympathetic conveyor of Higgins's criticism of "Reaganomics" and of most Republican and conservative initiatives and movements.

Following the more than two hundred pages of text, there are nearly as many pages of bibliography (34 pages), detailed notes (40), and a helpful index (12), as well as nine appendices. These demonstrate O'Brien's excellent use of the archives of The Catholic University of America, wherein Higgins's papers were deposited long before his death (May 1, 2002). "Appendix I" provides the reader with a chronological listing (including titles) of all of the *Yardstick* columns written by Higgins and the occasional guest columnists. This is a helpful book which assembles much important information for both the beginning and serious student of these times and movements. But scholars will not, I imagine, consider it a definitive work on the life of George Higgins or of the social apostolate or of the development of American Catholic social teaching in the twentieth century. O'Brien is an unabashed admirer of Higgins, and in the end, there is, I believe, too little critical analysis of the subject and his work.

Mother Angelica: The Remarkable Story of a Nun, Her Nerve, and a Network of Miracles, by Raymond Arroyo, (New York: Doubleday, 2005)

Reviewed by Reverend Brian Van Hove,
S.J. White House Retreat
Saint Louis, Missouri

The following remarks do not constitute a book review. Rather, this is a short notice of a book well worth reading.

Not since the death of Fulton Sheen has the United States enjoyed a genuine popularizer of the faith. Mother Angelica in a creative way filled the niche left empty by Sheen. However, she reached more people than Sheen could have imagined.

The episcopal conference of this country lost fourteen million dollars with the collapse of their effort called the Catholic Telecommunications Network of America (CTNA). With nothing but faith and raw nerve Mother Mary Angelica of the Annunciation, PCPA, supervised the construction of the largest religious broadcasting system in the world before resigning to return to the contemplative life of her monastery. Whereas the Evangelicals may have more airtime, the Eternal Word Television Network (EWTN) owns its own studio and equipment and thus complete freedom. That freedom includes a freedom from episcopal control and input. EWTN is a civil and lay entity responsible to its own board of governors (and to its faithful audiences around the world).

Academics may not like some of what EWTN has had to offer. EWTN is for the common man, the simple person, the ordinary viewer. At the same time, personalities such as George Weigel, Father Benedict Groeschel, C.F.R., Father Mitch Pacwa, S.J., and Father Richard John Neuhaus are erudite and degreed,

and they appear regularly on EWTN.

This book is not a hagiography. It is a brutally realistic and historical account of how a “nobody from Canton, Ohio” became the Mother Angelica of the airwaves. Above all, Mother Angelica represents the mystery of hope and the mystery of redemptive suffering. In her own life she has borne the Cross, and the author has magnificently brought out the spiritual dimension of her life.

Doubleday is a respectable publishing house. Mr. Arroyo writes well and he spent five years carefully researching his sources. If Mother Angelica is canonized in the future, readers of this biography will know why.

The Church and Galileo, edited by Ernan McMullin, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005.

Reviewed by Glenn Statile,
St. John's University

The history of science is by no means immune to the well worn cliché. Edited by Ernan McMullin, *The Church and Galileo* is a work of Galilean scholarship long overdue, but, as with all good things, well worth the wait. Benedict Spinoza, not exactly known for his subordination to religious tradition, was nonetheless right in observing that excellence is a rare commodity. This excellent new book comfortably surpasses the disappointing efforts of the Galileo Commission, which had been charged by Pope John Paul II with the responsibility of inquiring into Galileo's treatment at the hands of the Church. In addition to a more rigorous inquiry into the issue of culpability, the Holy Father was hoping that a new scholarly probe into the Galileo affair would help to pacify the growing hostilities

between the adherents of science and faith in the modern world. McMullin's book is a well-pondered step in the right direction. In his penultimate encyclical Pope John Paul II would poetically rise to the occasion, referring to faith and reason, which includes the ascendancy of science, as “two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth.” Published in the year of John Paul's death, *The Church and Galileo* is a significant contribution to the contemplation of what happened prior to, during, and after the most sensational trial of the 17th century.

The thirteen essays included within the book are divided into three major sections, each of which revolves around the central metaphor of a storm. Part One is entitled “The Storm Gathers,” in which essays by Michel-Pierre Lerner and Irving Kelter entertain issues pertaining to the reception of Copernicanism prior to the maelstrom which would eventually land Galileo in the dock. In Part Two, entitled “The Storm Breaks,” both the writings and person of Galileo are subjected to the scalpel of scrutiny wielded by the Offices of the Index and the Inquisition. Part Two, understandably the longest of the three sections, includes essays by Michael Shank, Ernan McMullin (2), Annibale Fantoli, Francesco Beretta (2), as well as a joint article by Mariano Artigas, Rafael Martinez, and William Shea. Finally, essays by Stéphane Garcia, John Heilbron, Michael Sharratt, and George Coyne consider “The Aftermath” of the Galileo Affair. While there is much food for thought in the book, I will limit my comments to but three areas that are of particular interest to me and which roughly, if not exactly, correspond to the triad of temporal mindsets (Before/During/After) with which McMullin has framed the anthology: 1) The anthropological meaning of Coper-

nicanism; 2) Galileo's atomism and transubstantiation; 3) The work of the Galileo Commission.

1) The Anthropological Meaning of Copernicanism:

In one of his contributions to Part 2 McMullin describes an historical faux pas (ch. 6, pp. 165–166) that can serve as a corrective to many of us in the educational community who may have on occasion unintentionally perpetuated a falsehood which has come to have the ring of truth. McMullin, reinforced by the research of a Canadian professor of English literature named Dennis Danielson, debunks the Copernican cliché that the relegation of the earth to orbital status was tantamount to an anthropological dethronement or demotion in the prideful self-evaluation of humans, since we no longer occupied the center of creation. To make a long story short, the Christian-Aristotelian cosmology, in tandem with Aristotelian physics, as presented, for example, by Dante in the *Divine Comedy*, aptly illustrates that the position occupied by a geocentric earth was, to put it mildly, no prime soteriological location. Of all celestial bodies the geocentric earth was located furthest from the heavenly sphere or Empyrean. Moreover, Dante's journey toward the lower parts of the infernal region brought him closer and closer to the icy center of the earth where Satan dwelled. The conception of Copernicanism as a slap in the face of our human vanity was a later invention of the anti-ecclesial Enlightenment and not part of the original discourse of the Copernican controversy.

2) Galileo's Atomism and Transubstantiation:

Chapter 8, coauthored by Artigas, Martinez, and Shea, represents an attempt to shed new light on the Galileo Affair. Dealing with the discovery of a new Galileo document (EE291) and the extent to which

Galileo's distinction between primary and secondary qualities in *Il Saggiatore* (1623) may have been at odds with the Tridentine teaching on transubstantiation, not even Chesterton's Father Brown could have gotten himself embroiled in a much more intellectually riveting detective story. It makes for a fascinating sequel if not conclusion to the can of worms first opened up by Pietro Redondi, whose discovery of the G3 document and interpretation of its implications, in favor of an ulterior transubstantiation-based motive in bringing Galileo to trial, were made available for public consumption in *Galileo eretico* in 1983.

It is true that Galileo's commitment to Copernicanism was not the pivotal factor which precipitated the trial of 1633. That dubious honor goes to Galileo's own insubordination in having disobeyed Cardinal Bellarmine's admonition of 1616 not to openly defend the Copernican hypothesis. The best book I know of dealing with this topic is Richard Blackwell's *Galileo, Bellarmine, and the Bible* (1991). But, even though I agree that the textual evidence of these recently discovered documents (G3, EE291) does not support any thesis that would indict Galilean atomism, and its formulation in terms of a primary/secondary quality distinction, as the underlying cause of his hounding by the Inquisition, I do believe that the distinction would have raised more than a few eyebrows in the corridors of Church power at that time. Even in the libertine Holland of the 1640's debate over whether Cartesian corpuscularity was at odds with transubstantiation became a major point of contention in several of the Dutch universities. In the Fourth of the *Replies* to his *Meditations* Antoine Arnauld would challenge Descartes on the fidelity of his scientific philosophy to a realistic understanding

of Eucharistic consecration. While, in my view, a case can be made that none of the exponents of the primary/secondary quality distinction in the 17th century (Galileo, Descartes, Gassendi, Boyle, Locke) wrote about it in exactly the same way; nevertheless the Galilean treatment of the distinction would have been just as much a target for possible Counter Reformational hostility as that of Descartes. If the appearance of the accidental features of bread and wine are preserved miraculously after the transubstantiation of species, then how can they still be the secondarily qualitative result of the mind's normal interaction with the primary qualities of bodies? They cannot. The solution to what seemed like such a knotty problem to so many at the time however appears quite simple to me from the perspective of the faith. After sacramental conversion the accidental features of bread and wine retain the appearance of secondary qualities without actually being so. This solves the problem; for otherwise the "atoms" of Christ's body and blood would have to appear to be what they truly and sacramentally are – notwithstanding anything that could stand in the way to alter our perception. Those interested in this topic would do well to consult this chapter in the book as a starting point for further research.

3) The Work of the Galileo Commission:

George Coyne S.J., the well known and highly respected Director of the Vatican Observatory in Arizona is given the last word. As a Jesuit, an astronomer, and a former member of the Galileo commission, one might easily say that he is competent in every respect to assess the success of the Church's most recent attempt to dispel the uncertainties which still linger on in relation to the Galileo affair. His personal involvement in the work of the Com-

mission has not rendered him in any way partial.

The McMullin anthology is in effect an effort to unofficially bring a proper degree of closure to the work of the unsuccessful Commission. Nevertheless, for better or for worse, and despite its scholarly accomplishments and shedding of new light upon one of the most problematic moments in the history of the Church's relationship with science, the last rites have yet to be performed upon this most fascinating of episodes in which the Church first made its acquaintance with the many headed dragon of modernity. Coyne takes the results of the Commission to task in four areas: 1) Galileo's overestimation of the still hypothetical status of Copernicanism at the time; 2) The theologians' impoverished understanding of Scriptural interpretation at the time; 3) The view that Cardinal Bellarmine understood what was really at stake; 4) The Church's quick acceptance of Copernicanism once valid scientific proofs became available. Let us briefly focus on #4.

While Pope John Paul II declared that the Galileo affair had taught the Church to better understand the limits of its competency and infallibility, Coyne sees the Commission as at least in part trying to establish the Church as a self-correcting institution. By so doing the impression is given that the weight of history properly understood will always exonerate the Church even if it appeared to be wrong at the time and even in subsequent times. Thus a scholarly task that was meant to properly augment a pope's public confession of a miscarriage of justice towards Galileo by the Church was somehow perverted and transformed into a deeper attempt to allow hindsight to come to the defense of the Church.

The *Church and Galileo* is, as far as I can tell, a book without any real weaknesses. Not only a work on Gali-

leo, it is also universal in its attempt to contemplate the complex set of issues that link science to religion. Robert Frost once wrote that a poem begins in delight and ends in wisdom. If true, then McMullin and his collaborators should be congratulated in having written a work of sheer poetry.

The Truth You Know You Know: Jesus Verified in our Global Culture,
by N. Kenneth Rideout, NDX Press:
Nashville, TN (2005)

Reviewed by Richard J. Rolwing, a retired theologian

On their face, the Hebrew Scriptures begin, carry through, and end with the same basic conviction: Hear Oh Israel, the Lord our God is One. But contextualized, those writings reveal a thousand years from original polytheism, to henotheism, to a god of history, to a god also of nature, to finally a transcendent Creator.

Like the prefaces of most books, the first chapters of Genesis were created last. Along their developmental way the Hebrews progressively abandoned most of the paraphernalia of primitive religion—amulets, household images, blood rituals, traffic with the dead, and mythological hosts of heaven. Post scripturally, the Hebrews dropped animal sacrifices and even temples with altars, all for the sake of Yahweh.

A current respectable theological view among Christians is that all the world's religions in God's providence are designed to lead up to, and to lead people to, the Christian faith and church (Islam, as an offshoot of Judaism and Christianity, might be an exception). So what better way, Rideout (a far eastern missionary) assumes, for a Christian to deal with non biblical religions, than to treat

them somewhat the way the New Testament deals with the Old Testament, i.e., both positively and negatively, with a Yes, But—, Our New Testament provides us the greatest paradigm for thinking and acting so.

Rideout has found an additional reason for this approach, that of the (universality of the) natural law. In his missionary experience he has noted that people everywhere admit they know, without needing to be taught, that lying, stealing and killing are wrong. A conference on the natural law at Calvin College led largely by Catholics helped to confirm Rideout's appreciation of St. Paul's few references to natural law.

In this book he tells some stories and tries to explain both his theology and his missionary approach. However, the title is a poor choice. For one thing, anything and everything which you know, you know you know. It cannot be otherwise, even if what you think you know to be true is not.

The title is also ambiguous. He means to refer to that much of the natural law which is self-evident, so that you know it always already. But it also, even primarily, refers to the certainty given by the Holy Spirit when someone accepts the Gospel that is simply preached without any historical proofs included as that is simply preached without any historical proofs included as backup, or even any written Scripture being available and readable.

Christians have supplied, especially in the last century, millions of Bibles or New Testaments among non-Christian peoples, remarkably the Chinese people, but most conversions to Christianity throughout history, even the magnificent missionary history of Protestantism, have not come primarily from people reading the Bible. That is usually secondary. Contemporary living human faith witnessing is primary. And Rideout

emphasizes this over and over. Faith comes through hearing. Historical critical knowledge of the Bible is only remotely relevant. Apologetics is rarely mentioned.

Both the emphasis upon natural law and upon the testimony of the Holy Spirit are quite deserved. But then things fall off a bit. The author adopts a traditional Lutheran typology of Law and Gospel for categorizing religious phenomena and realities that simply is inadequate for even the simplified synthesis he tries to present.

There is much insight and value in applying Luther's twofold typology of Law and Gospel. Luther used it to relate the New Testament to the Old, and to relate some few Christian truths to all the rest and to most Christian practices. What is Law commands what is, because of Original Sin, never fully possible. So it condemns us with guilt. The Gospel believed gives us pardon, unites us with Christ, and helps us to fulfill Law.

There is much in non-biblical religion which is illumined by this set of categories. The categories basically come from Saint, Paul, although they are certainly not his only ones or the most comprehensive ones when comparing his Judaism with his Christianity.

The problem is the limitations of the categories. Not all in the Old Testament or dispensation was law, and not all in the Old Testament or dispensation, and not all in the New is only Gospel or good news. Much in both cannot be coherently included in an attempt to explain it all so easily. Human life, thought, and feeling is far too rich and complex. It is simply not possible to construct a comprehensive and coherent synthesis of even New Testament teachings under those two rubrics. And Rideout's persistent and shallow efforts to do so won't do. Not even Tillich could pull that off.

Nevertheless, it is insightful to explain Karma as Law that needs the Gospel. It is insightful to take the New Testament's treatment of the Old as paradigmatic for treating even monotheistic religions. And from reading this remarkable missionary's stories and reflections all Christians could imbibe a greater faith in the power God's Word can have without an props. That spoke to me.

Aristotle on Truth, by Paolo Crivelli, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, xi + 340, \$85.00, ISBN 0521823285.

*Reviewed by Marco Sgarbi,
University of Verona*

Paolo Crivelli, a fellow and tutor in classical philosophy at Oxford's New College, aims at offering "a precise reconstruction of all of Aristotle's most significant views on truth and falsehood and to gain a philosophical understanding of them." His book—which is no collection of essays, but a true systematic work—fills indeed a gap insofar as it provides an exhaustive taxonomy of truth in Aristotle's philosophy. It is addressed to Aristotle scholars as well as to historians of logic, with plenty of reference to most recent logical theories.

The first part of Crivelli's book, "Bearers of truth or falsehood," embraces three chapters. The first chapter focuses on the items that have the term "true" applied to them, which are objects (including states of affairs), mental items (beliefs, acquaintances, perceptions, images, etc.), and linguistic items (sentences). The second chapter examines in general which truth conditions for predicative assertions Aristotle is committed to. Crivelli delves first into Aristotle's conception of universals, he analyzes the discussion of truth and falsehood

in *De Interpretatione* 1, and he addresses Aristotle's theory of assertions. He then looks at the difference among predicative assertions whose subjects signify individuals, and predicative assertions that signify universals. A consideration of the relations among predicative assertions and categories concludes the chapter. The third chapter focuses on the truth conditions of existential assertions that involve simple items, incorporeal substances, and material substances.

The two chapters of the second part of the book are dedicated to "Empty Terms." The first chapter considers two topics. The first is that Aristotle's theory of truth can be regarded as a correspondence theory of truth insofar as it takes the truth of an assertion to be as much as an isomorphism relation to reality. The second is Aristotle's reaction to the Cretan Liar. The second chapter deals with vacuous terms and empty terms.

The last part, "Truth and Time," is based on the analysis of the relationship between truth and change and truth and determinism. As regards truth and change, Crivelli examines how a bearer of truth or falsehood can be true at one time and false at another. As regards truth and determinism, Crivelli considers Aristotle's conception of necessity as ineluctability, the thesis of necessity of the present and the past, and Aristotle's rejection of determinism in *De Interpretatione* 9. The book concludes with six appendixes, the fifth of which contains a formal presentation of Aristotle's theory of truth for predicative assertions. An index of the passages in which Aristotle and his commentators speak about truth is included.

With its commendable display of topics connected with Aristotle's and ancient conceptions of truth, Crivelli's book will provide useful reference for future works. Unaddressed, however, remains the issue of practical truth. Aware of the gap, Crivelli has promised another study to fill it. ❧

At the annual meeting in September, in Charlotte, the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars was pleased to honor the following individuals for their example of courage, perseverance, and faith:

The **Cardinal Wright Award** is given annually to a Catholic adjudged to have done an outstanding service for the Church. **Gerard V. Bradley** is a professor of law at the University of Notre Dame Law School. He holds a J.D. degree from Cornell University. He was formerly an assistant district attorney in New York City. He is co-editor of the *American Journal of Jurisprudence*, and has authored many articles in both scholarly and popular publications. He is the author of *Church-State Relations in America* (1987).

He is currently recognized as one of the national authorities on the question of so-called “same-sex marriage” and its implications for the law and society. He served as president of the Fellowship of

Catholic Scholars between 1995 and 2001 (and again, briefly in 2003). He and his wife Pam are the parents of eight children.

Previous Cardinal Wright Award Recipients:

Allen, M Prudence ‘04
 Canavan, SJ, Francis ‘91
 Connery, SJ, John ‘83
 DiNoia, OP, Augustine ‘02
 Dougherty, Jude ‘94
 Farraher, SJ, Joseph ‘87
 Fessio, SJ, Joseph ‘87
 Finnis, John ‘89
 George, Robert ‘99
 Glendon, Mary Ann ‘00
 Grisez, Germain ‘82
 Hardon, SJ, John ‘84
 Harvey, OSFS, John ‘88
 Hilgers, Thomas ‘01
 Hitchcock, Helen ‘05
 Hitchcock, James ‘81
 Keefe, SJ, Donald ‘92
 Kelly, Msgr. George ‘79
 Lawler, OFM Cap, Ron ‘90
 Martinez, Melquiades ‘03
 Martinez, Kathryn ‘03

May, William ‘80
 McNerny, Ralph ‘96
 Ratner, Herbert ‘85
 Schall, SJ, James ‘97
 Scottino, Joseph ‘86
 Smith, Janet ‘93
 Smith, Msgr William ‘95
 Whitehead, Kenneth ‘98
 Wrenn, Msgr. Michael ‘98

Helen Hull Hitchcock received the **Cardinal O’Boyle Award** which is given occasionally to an individual whose actions demonstrate courage and witness for the Catholic Church, in light of dissenting pressures in our society. Helen is the founding director of Women for Faith and Family and is editor of *Voice* and the *Adoremus Bulletin*. She is also the author/editor of *The Politics of Prayer: Feminist language and the worship of God*. She lectures widely in the U.S. and abroad, representing Catholic teaching on issues affecting Catholic women, families, and Catholic faith and worship. ☩

STEADY

Remarks on Receipt of The Cardinal Wright Award for 2005, By Gerard V. Bradley

I am profoundly grateful to the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars for this award. I am especially indebted to the Board of Directors. They elected me to a distinguished company of faithful Catholic men and women, all outstanding scholars whose published work reflected and enriched their faith. Just considering my immediate predecessors—Sister Mary Prudence Allen and Dr. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese—I am compelled to say that my humility outstrips even my gratitude. These

two great Catholic women have recently brought out truly pathbreaking works of scholarship. I have in mind Sister’s second volume of her magisterial treatment of the concept of woman in history, and Betsey’s huge volume—written with her husband Gene—on the mind of the slaveholding class in the ante-bellum South. Glancing further down the list of previous Cardinal Wright Award winners deepens my feelings of modesty.

Our President Bernie Dobranski furthered these feelings of humility by sharing the news that, in my case, the election was hotly contested and carried in the end by a slim margin. But, hey, who remembers that Al

Gore actually won the popular vote in 2000? Bush is President and Gore is lecturing in the wilderness. That’s all history will show.

Most specially of all I wish to recognize and thank my bride of 24 years, Pamela Vivolo Bradley, for her support and her love. She is my number one gal and I am so glad she is able to be here tonight.

I owe a different debt of thanks to His Eminence Ralph McNerny. Not only did he draw the short straw this evening, and come under an obligation to introduce me. He got me into this in the first place. It was Ralph who conspired with our founder of such happy memory—Monsignor George Kelly—to make

me President of our Fellowship in 1995. And it was Ralph who tabbed, or nabbed, me to speak at the Cardinal Wright Award Banquet for the very first time, way back in 1994.

I remember the occasion well. I do not well recall my remarks, which were (I think) a desultory mix of pieties and jabs at Ralph. And no text survives. In fact, there was none—and therein lies the tale.

Our 1994 meeting was in Corpus Christi, Texas. Our host was the servant of Christ, His Excellency Rene Gracida. Bishop Gracida invited the Board to a reception before the Banquet; I attended because I was then Vice-President. The reception was a well-watered one, in the upper room of a local Mexican restaurant. After about two hours of enjoying our host's Latin hospitality, it was time to move on to the Banquet. As I danced my way to the head table, Ralph McInerny—then our President—stopped me short and said: "I would like you to speak after dinner". I stammered something like, "But, er, Ralph, I haven't prepared anything. I don't really know." Ralph ever-so-cooly cut me short. He assured me that my remarks need not be too long or erudite, just a few remarks would do. I continued with ineffectual resistance to the idea. But Ralph cut that short, too. "There is just one thing", he said.. "What's that Ralph?" "Just be very, very funny."

I tried to be.

The next year was different. No surprises. In the interim I had succeeded Ralph as President. I knew I would host the Banquet, present the Cardinal Wright Award (to the redoubtable Monsignor William Smith, in fact), and say more than a little throughout the evening. I tried to be funny, again, but events nearly overwhelmed the effort. (So much

for no "surprises".)

We met in 1995 in Minneapolis to discuss the condition of Catholic colleges and universities. Then as now there was much to discuss: Catholic higher education is—and was—in a parlous state indeed. That meeting was extra-special for me because my wife Pamela was able to wrest herself from the duties of mothering five children to join at the convention. As we entered the dining room, Pam and I encountered our friend Germain Grisez. We had known Germain for years and we both had come to treasure him as friend and counselor. Because I had to emcee the proceedings from the main table, Pam had to find another seat. She took one next to Germain, at a table right down in front of the podium.

My dinner partner was our host, Archbishop Harry Flynn. It was time to call the assembly to order, then as now a task better accomplished with a bull horn and a German shepherd than with gentle pleas. Then it was time to introduce the Archbishop to give the blessing. At that precise moment, our friend Bill May walked up to the podium. Within eye- and ear-shot of the Archbishop, he declared (and I quote Bill, verbatim): "A man left this knife in my room". Professor May handed over a menacing look weapon. Bill wanted me to make a "lost knife" announcement to the crowd. No one claimed it.

[At the Charlotte Banquet when I delivered these remarks, Bill May spoke up at this point in the story. In more than a stage whisper Bill confirmed the story, and insisted it was "only" a Swiss Army knife. What a member of the Swiss Army was doing in Bill's Minneapolis hotel room that night in 1995 remains as an enduring mystery of our Fellowship.]

The Minneapolis banquet went downhill from there. After the knife announcement and the Archbishop's invocation, we sat to eat. I then noticed that Germain was engaged in animated conversation with a woman I did not know, a woman seated to his left. (Pam Bradley was to his right.) I later learned that his conversation partner was a former student of Germain's, Jo Horsy, then working for the Diocese of Fargo. Archbishop Flynn was also an old friend of Grisez'; in fact, Grisez holds the Harry Flynn Chair of Christian Ethics at Mount Saint Mary's because the Chair was established while Harry Flynn was Rector of that Seminary. I turned to Archbishop at this point and asked him: "Who is that woman sitting next to Germain?" He looked at me as if he were a deer caught in headlights, or maybe a cow which has been lobotomized. Archbishop Flynn said to me, very, very deliberately: "Professor Bradley, I believe that woman is your wife."

I am grateful to the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars not only for this award. And I am grateful to the Fellowship for the great help it has been to me. Because I served as President for several years, that last part might sound odd. It might seem that I am the one who has given, not received. It is true that often enough some of you have said thanks for my contributions to our Fellowship's activities. But I am the one in debt, and I am in debt to all of you. The help of which I speak is your example of faithful witness to the truth in your work as scholars. It is more than that, too: your work precisely as Catholic scholars has so often been unwelcome, controversial, a grounds for mistreatment or neglect—even in those institutions listed in the Kenedy Directory as

“Catholic” colleges and universities. Your Catholic scholarship is said, even at institutions allegedly within the household of faith, to be divisive. And your Catholic scholarship is, perhaps most sadly, ignored or even denounced by some of those we most earnestly wish to serve—the successors of the Apostles, the guardians of the faith in our time, the American episcopacy.

You deserve better. But you understand that on this earth it tends to be that no good deed goes unpunished in this vale of tears. Still, your work—our work—is, intrinsically, hard. It is made harder by the icy reception of it among those who should know better. Your example of patience and charity and, most of all, steadfastness is a great help to me. For it I am and shall forever be most thankful.

Steady. Steady was the key word last Year in Pittsburgh when Monsignor William Smith spoke of our dear Monsignor Kelly. Charity with patience was the key description of our first President, Father Ronald Lawler, when we were privileged to honor him in Pittsburgh, just before his death later that year. But Father Lawler was no lamb; at least he was not docile. He was always steadfast—firm, determined, even feisty—when it came to the faith. Steady have you all been in the face of contradiction. And this has been a great consolation to me.

We all have a greater example of steadiness. Our Holy Father Pope Benedict XVI addressed a group of about 140 Italian priests last July 25. They were all residents of the Valle d’Acosta region of Italy, where the Pope was vacationing at the time. His main text was the Parable of the Sower. It is, the Holy Father said, a parable of suffering, of courage, of consolation. But as he described the

deeper message of the parable it occurred to me that it was about being steady in faith.

“The Lord’s work had begun with great enthusiasm. The sick were visibly cured, everyone listened joyfully to the statement, ‘The kingdom of God is at hand’. It really seemed”, Pope Benedict said, “that at last the sorrow of the people of God would be changed into joy...[T]hey then saw that the sick were indeed cured, devils were expelled, the Gospel was proclaimed”.

But the “world stayed as it was. Nothing changed. The Romans still dominated it. Life was difficult every day”. What then are we to make of the power of the gospel? The gospel did not come as a thunderclap. It is not (as Benedict told the priests) that a “messenger of God whom they supposed would take the helm of history in his hand”. The power of the gospel was instead the “power” of the seed, “a really tiny thing in comparison with historical and political reality”. But in the seed, the Word, is the bread of life and thus the life of the future.

We too are sowers of the seed. We Catholic scholars know that the faith includes true propositions to which we assent, and that these truths can—and do—shape our whole intellectual horizon. These truths shape our world and our work. But the gospel seems to be almost nothing; much of it falls on barren or rocky soil. What falls on fertile ground might take years to bear fruit, and then we might be dead. The Parable of the Sower enables us to understand, the Pope concluded, that we must “be courageous, even if the word of God, the kingdom of God, seems to have no historical or political importance”.

We must hang in there, be strong, be steady. And we can help one an-

other to be strong, and courageous, to be steady. The Fellowship has done so for me. And I shall name here two examples—both very near at hand—of those who have shown me what it means to be steady.

One is Father John Harvey, OSFS. Father Harvey has labored more than most of us in the heat of the day. In his case it is not the sunlight that burns. It is, first, the intractability of his work. It is also the heat of criticism. Father John is widely criticized for his courageous work ministering to homosexual men and women. In our culture, that is no surprise. But the criticism comes from within the Church as well. Even some bishops refuse to permit Father to set up *Courage* chapters in their dioceses. A few of these men may oppose *Courage’s* goals. More commonly (I suppose) reluctant bishops prefer to avoid stirring the pot of controversy when it comes to this issue—as if one could save souls for Jesus without causing a little commotion.

Most of you know that Father John founded *Courage* many years ago to fill a void; he was the first to address in any organized way the pastoral needs peculiar to those with same-sex attractions. He remains the Director and guiding spirit of the group. Father John and *Courage* have done more for the cause of truth when it comes to homosexuality than anyone or anything else in the Catholic Church, at least during my lifetime.

It was my privilege to speak to the *Courage* annual meeting this past August. I spent several hours visiting with those attending. Most were *Courage* members, and thus experience same-sex attraction. But these were not “gay” men and women. They were gay; that is, well-adjusted and even happy. That is because they

are Christians. They did not identify themselves with their sexual disposition. They understood (because Father John and his collaborators taught them) that everyone has crosses to bear in life. One's struggle with one's particular cross imposed—and not the cross itself—defines the person. And struggling with the cross for Jesus' sake defines one as Christian.

Father John Harvey was the first person in the Church to identify ministry to homosexual men and women as a distinct kind of calling. But it was not a call of his own making. Father John was trained as a moral theologian and achieved renown as a scholar. Early in his career he wrote an article on homosexuality. He did not intend the article to be the launch of a career. Quite the contrary. But then Father John Ford, S.J., perhaps the greatest moral theologian in the Church at mid-century (and also a previous winner of the Cardinal Wright Award) spoke to Father Harvey. As Father Harvey tells it, Ford said to him, "John, I hope that you will continue to write on the subject. No one else is doing it. No one else will be able to do it as well as you already do anytime soon. The Church needs it". A few years later another great Jesuit theologian by the name of John Courtney Murray delivered much the same advice to Father Harvey. And then Terrence Cardinal Cooke asked him to found the group which we know as *Courage*.

The nub of it is that Father John Harvey never wanted to do what he has done. He always wanted to do what needed to be done for the Church—which means what Jesus wants for the sake of the Kingdom. He accepted the call, and has remained steady in it despite contradictions that would have soured the

faith of lesser men and women.

The second example is Bill May. This distinguished moral theologian is competent to do more than handle sharp instruments. He is, in fact, one of the most distinguished and most productive scholars within our membership. His scholarly work has been a great gift to the Church. The steadiness for which I mean to cite Bill occurred at our last meeting, in Pittsburgh. Actually, it was Bill's unsteadiness which is illustrative.

Our host last year, Bishop Donald Wuerl, is a long-time member of the Fellowship. He has known Bill May (and others among our stalwarts) for decades. He (Wuerl) hosted our meeting in 1992, too. Bishop Wuerl said Mass for us on Sunday morning, near the close of our gathering. He was ready for the final blessing. I happened to be looking right at him when he paused in his progress towards dismissing the assembly. He looked right at Bill May, kneeling there directly in front of him, as Bill struggled to his feet for the final blessing. Bill's legs are not what they once were; he hobbles. I could tell at that moment that Bishop Wuerl was (for lack of a more precise term) affected by Bill's struggle.

He was. Bill made it to his feet only to be motioned to sit. So were we all. Bishop Wuerl had decided on the spot to say something to us exactly as a fellowship of Catholic scholars, and Bill May triggered it. Those of you who were there in Pittsburgh may remember that Bishop Wuerl then said that Bill exemplified the witness, the spirit, the steadiness, of our group. He was, of course, quite right.

Ten minutes later I arrived at table to have breakfast with Bishop Wuerl. Before I was seated he broke into a narrative of how much it

meant to him to see Bill May, a man whom the Bishop had known through thick and thin and from a time when each was a young man, stay the course. And Bishop Wuerl proved it, in a way: when I returned to my office two days later there was already in the mail a check from Bishop Wuerl, for a perpetual membership in the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars. ☩

NOTICE

FCS member Dr. Judith Hughes spoke on "The Spiritual Life of the Child" at the Catholic Medical Association's 74th Annual Conference in Portland, Oregon, October 22–25, 2005, on *The Biological and Spiritual Development of the Child*. Conference papers will be published in the *Linacre Quarterly* at a later date.



BOOKS RECEIVED

If you would like to receive a complimentary copy of one of the books below in order to review it for a future issue, please email your request to Alice Osberger at osberger.1@nd.edu

If there are books you know of that should be reviewed, let Brian Benestad know at benestad1@scranton.edu

Sonnets, ed. by William Baer, University of Evansville Press: Evansville, IN. (2005) Cloth. 176pp.

Homosexuality: A Look at Catholic Teaching Based on the Catechism of the Catholic Church, Fr. Jeffrey T. Robideau, (2005), Paper. 45pp.

Sexing the Church: Gender, Power, and Ethics in Contemporary Catholicism, Aline H. Kalbian,

Indiana University Press: Bloomington, IN, (2005), Paper, 169pp.

In the Name of the Boss Upstairs: The Father Ray Brennan Story, Jerry Hopkins, Thomas J. Vincent Foundation: Honolulu, Hawaii, Cloth, 301pp.

From Witchery to Sanctity: The Religious Vicissitudes of the Hawthornes, Otto Bird and Katharine Bird, Saint Augustine's Press: South Bend, Indiana, (2005) Cloth, 150pp.

Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues, eds. Steven M. Cahn and Peter Markie, Oxford University Press: New York, (2005), Paper, 879 pp.

The Church and the World: Gaudium et Spes, Inter Mirifica, Norman Tanner, Paulist Press: New York, (2005), Paper. 131pp.

Ecumenism and Interreligious Dialogue: Rediscovering Vatican II: Unitatis Redintegratio, Nostra Aetate, (2005), Paper. 293pp.

Righteous Gentiles: How Pius XII and the Catholic Church Saved Half a Million Jews from the Nazis, Ronald J. Rychlak, Spence Publishing Co.: Dallas, (2005), Cloth, 349 pp.

Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues, Third Edition, Steven M. Cahn and Peter Markie, Oxford University Press: New York, (2006), Paper. 879 pp.

Real Prayer is Answered: The Proven Correct Way to Ask and Believe, John N. Heil, John N. Heil & E.T. Nedder Publishing Co.: Barnhart, MO, (2005) Paper, 346pp.

The Teachings of Modern Christianity on Law, Politics, & Human Nature, Volume II, ed by John Witte, Jr., and Frank S. Alexander, Columbia University Press: New York, (2006), Cloth. 582pp.

La Constitución de los Estados Unidos y su Dinámica Actual, Presentación y edición de Domingo García Belaunde, Robert S. Barker, Asociación Peruana de Derecho Constitucional: Lima (2005), Paper, 221 pp.

Theology in India: Essays on Christ, Church and Eucharist, Sebastian Athappilly, CMI, Dharmaram Publications: Bangalore (2005), Paper. 280pp.

Marriage and Christian Life: A Theology of Christian Marriage, Daniel Hauser, University Press of America: Lanham, MD (2005) Paper. 197pp.

OBITUARY

REV. JOSEPH OWENS, C.S.S.R., died at the Providence Health Centre, Toronto on Sunday, October 30, 2005, in his 98th year and the 77th year of his Religious Life. Father Owens was ordained in 1933. Born in Saint John, New Brunswick on April 17, 1908, son of Louis Owens and Josephine Quinn. Father Joseph is survived by two nieces, Anne (David) Cole, Katherine (Ralph) Furness and by his nephews, Bryson (Jacqueline) Eldridge, William (Trina) Eldridge, Robert Eldridge and Gerard (Susan)

Eldridge. He served in parishes in Saskatchewan and British Columbia and did graduate studies in Toronto at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, and taught philosophy to younger members of his Community, until he received his Licentiate in Mediaeval Studies in 1946. Father Owens then continued to study at the Institute while also lecturing in philosophy in Redemptorist houses of study. In 1951 he received his Doctorate in Mediaeval Studies summa cum laude from the Institute and became a professor of philosophy

at the Pontifical Institute in 1954. In medieval philosophy he taught and wrote extensively on the philosophy of St. Thomas, especially in the areas of metaphysics (the study of ultimate reality), the philosophy of the human person, the philosophy of knowledge, and ethics. Father Owens wrote nine philosophy books and almost a hundred and fifty articles and forty book reviews. In 1973, having passed the usual retirement age, he continued to publish and teach part-time for another twenty-five years. ✠

BOARD OF OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS

OFFICERS

President

DR. BERNARD DOBRANSKI
Ave Maria School of Law
3475 Plymouth Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48105
BDOBRANSKI@AVEMARIALAW.
EDU
(734) 827-8043

Vice-President

DR. J. BRIAN BENESTAD
University of Scranton
St. Thomas Hall #379
Scranton, PA 18510
benestadj1@uofs.edu
(570) 941-4359

Executive Secretary

**REV. MSGR. STUART
SWETLAND**
St. John's Newman
Foundation
604 East Armory Avenue
Champaign, IL 61820
msgrswetland@newmanfoun-
dation.org
(217) 344-1184 x305

Editor of FCS Quarterly

PROF. RALPH McINERNEY
Jacques Maritain Center
714 Hesburgh Library
Notre Dame, IN 46556
Ralph.M.McInerney.1@nd.edu
(574) 631-5825

PAST PRESIDENTS

DR. WILLIAM MAY
John Paul II Institute
415 Michigan Avenue, NE
- #290
Washington, DC 20017
wmay@johnpaulii.edu
(202) 526-9727

REV. MSGR. WILLIAM B. SMITH

St. Joseph's Seminary,
Dunwoodie
201 Seminary Avenue
Yonkers, NY 10704-1896
Sr.Mary.Mills@archny.org
(Sr. Mary Mills)
(914) 968-6200 x8248
Fax (914) 376-2019

REV. EARL A. WEIS, S.J.
Loyola University
6525 N. Sheridan Road
Chicago, IL 60626-5385
cnewson@luc.edu (Cheryl
Newson)
(773) 508-2344
Fax (773) 508-2098

DR. JAMES HITCHCOCK
St. Louis University
6158 Kingsbury Drive
St. Louis, MO 63112
hitchcpj@slu.edu

PROF. GERARD V. BRADLEY
University of Notre Dame
124 Law School
Notre Dame, IN 46556
Gerard.V.Bradley.16@nd.
edu
(574) 631-8385

ELECTED DIRECTORS

2002-2005

DR. STEVE SAFRANEK
Ave Maria School of Law
3475 Plymouth Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48105
ssafrane@avemarialaw.edu
(734) 827-8096

REV. JOSEPH KOTERSKI, S.J.

Fordham University
Philosophy Department
Bronx, NY 10458
koterski@fordham.edu
(718) 817-3291

PROF. GLENN OLSEN

University of Utah
300 S. 1400 E. Room 211
Salt Lake City, UT
84112-0311
Glenn.Olsen@m.cc.utah.edu
(801) 581-8026

2003-2006

DR. CAROL (SUE)

ABROMAITIS
Loyola College
4501 North Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21210
cabromaitis@loyola.edu
(410) 617-2254

DR. ELIZABETH

FOX-GENOVESE
Emory University
1487 Sheridan Walk
Atlanta, GA 30324
efoxgenovese@comcast.net
(404) 633-0242

DR. SOPHIA AGUIRRE

The Catholic University of
America
Department of Economics
and Business
Washington, DC 20064
Aguirre@cua.edu
(202) 319-4957

DR. GLADYS SWEENEY

Institute for the Psychological
Sciences
2001 Jefferson Davis Highway,
Suite 511
Arlington, VA 22202
gsweeney@ipsociences.edu
(703) 416-1441

2004-2007

PROF. STEPHEN BARR

University of Delaware
9 Wynwyd Drive
Newark, DE 19711
smbarr@bartol.udel.edu
(302) 831-6883

DR. STEPHEN MILETIC

Franciscan University of
Steubenville
1235 University Boulevard
Steubenville, OH 43952-1763
(740) 283-6245 x3319
Fax (740) 283-6363

MR. WILLIAM SAUNDERS

Family Research Council
801 G. Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
wls@frc.org
(202) 624-3038

DR. KENNETH WHITEHEAD

809 Ridge Place
Falls Church, VA 22046-3631
whiteheadz@msn.com
(703) 538-5085
Fax (703) 534-3015

OÙ SOMMES NOUS?

In graduate school I had a professor who having been tempted while lecturing down a tangent that led to yet other tangents would suddenly arrest himself, smile vaguely at us and ask, *Où sommes nous?* Always a good question, since life seems to involve us in a bewildering concatenation of causal lines we only imperfectly understand. C. S. Lewis observed that the Renaissance is the only historical period we have allowed to be defined by those who lived in it. The suggestion was that their self-description was self-deception, inaccurate, questionable. But then Lewis himself, in *De descriptione temporum* offered an account of our own times. However doomed the effort, it seems inevitable that we should ask: *Where are we?*

Things look pretty bad, there is little doubt of that. Recent events in France drew attention to dis-

cussions of Eurabia by Bat Ye'or and Oriana Fallaci. Recently I was on a panel in Palermo with Rocco Buttiglione who has come under fire for holding that homosexuality is unnatural and marriage is a union of man and woman. It reminds one of the song about Chicago: I saw a man dance with his wife. The obvious has become controversial. One sometimes longs for easeful death. But that is a mood. Christian optimism can accommodate a lot of counter-evidence. Of course hope does not require the immanentization of the eschaton, as your grandma never said.

I had a friend who, when asked, what do you think of the end of the world? thought a bit, then said, "Which end?" Are we there? As Tonto said to the Lone Ranger, "Who knows?" ☒

Ralph McInerney

**Fellowship of
Catholic Scholars
Quarterly**

Box 495

Notre Dame, IN 46556

Nonprofit Organization
U.S. Postage
PAID
Notre Dame, Indiana
Permit No. 10

Fellowship
of Catholic
Scholars
Quarterly