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THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER

Thinking with the Church—Liturgically!

by Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.
President, Fellowship of Catholic Scholars

There is need for great gratitude that the Vatican has held firm on the plan to use the first Sunday of Advent to inaugurate the revised translation of the liturgical texts for Masses celebrated in the English language according to the *novus ordo*. It is no surprise that there have already been scholarly discussions about some of the specific choices made for these revisions. But the calls to delay its implementation appear to be just delaying tactics on the part of some who see the 2011 version as an unfortunate return to a view of the liturgy with which they do not agree.

The importance of having an accurate English translation that reflects both the truly prayerful style and the theological precisions of the Latin *novus ordo* is of wider importance than we might at first suspect. It pertains not only to those countries like ours whose predominant language is English. Although the official language of the *novus ordo* texts remains Latin, any number of the smaller language groups tend to make their translations from English rather than directly from Latin, and so it is invaluable for these regions also to have a splendid English translation from which translations into their languages can be made.

The corrections and improvements provided by this revision occur at various levels. Lines from the *Gloria* and the *Credo* that have been missing since the introduction of the 1973 translation, or present only in some altered form, have now been restored. Many an adjective that had been dropped has now been restored to us. And yet this restoration of vanished words and phrases has been done without producing a text that would strike anyone as excessive, for the Roman style that produced the *novus ordo* was already sober and severe. Restoring its judicious choices of adverbs and adjectives does wonders for the collects and the orations. Best of all, the return of such deferential phrases as “we beg you” will put an end to a curious impression that one could perhaps get from some of the current version of these prayers. From the constant use of the imperative in the present translations, one might get the unfortunate idea that the priest is giving God orders about what to do. Some of the restorations have considerable theological importance—in the creed, for instance, we will return to the phrase “consubstantial” (rather than “one in being”), and in the consecration formula, *pro multis* will be rendered as “for many” rather than as “for all.” These points will need to be clarified in sermons, but this need will provide important opportunities for some badly needed catechesis about authentic Catholic doctrine.

Although there is no surprise to find resistance to these materials coming from some quarters, the delaying tactics are inexcusable. Among the arguments one hears is the ironical notion that the texts that have been in use for the last forty years or so are now “traditional” and are so deeply ensconced in people’s minds that changes will present grave difficulties for the faithful. But that argument simply underestimates the powers of the faithful to understand and appreciate appropriate explanations. It is, further, quite curious that those making such arguments did not find them persuasive during the far more massive change in liturgical practices in the late 1960s. Should one encounter such an argument, the proper reply, I think, is to affirm the inclination latent in this objection about the true need to respect authentic tradition, but to insist that it is genuine Catholic tradition that we need to preserve. The liturgy ought to provide a link between heaven and earth, and it would be wrong to destroy anyone’s footbridge to God. Happily, the changes here do not tear anything valuable down—rather, they should be likened to the repair and beautification of the very bridges to heaven that we need for our praying.

If the old adage is true, that *il traditore, traduttore*—that every translator is a traitor—then there is reason to hope that these revisions are intended as the needed restitution for anything about the truths of our faith that may have been inadvertently betrayed in earlier reforms. The revised English translation of the Roman missal is a marvelous accomplishment. It is doctrinally respectful, highly sensitive to the rhythms of the English language (especially in its recovery of certain triplet phrases), and a wonderful instance of the old principle *lex orandi, lex credendi*.

The careful work of those who have produced this revised translation has restored the reference in these prayers to many points of doctrine that were not so clearly evident in the 1973 version, the better to aid our prayer and our faith. We might consider one or two cases by way of example. There is, for instance, the change in the texts pertaining to the acclamation that comes directly after the consecration. The change here certainly reflects the Latin text more accurately, but in fact it also has significance of another kind. The revision in what the priest will say consists in moving from having him say “Let us proclaim the mystery of faith:” to saying “The Mystery of Faith.” Note the colon that appears in the present text, which suggests that what follows is the mystery of faith to be proclaimed. In the 2011 translation, happily, there is no colon, but a period,

for the Mystery of Faith to which these words refers is the Eucharistic Christ now present on the altar.

Joined with this correction to what the priest says is a revision in the acclamations that will be said by the faithful. The first revision here is the elimination of what had probably been the option that is most often used (“Christ has died, Christ is risen, Christ will come again”). That option had been listed first among those available in the 1973 English translation, despite the fact that there is nothing in the Latin text that corresponds to this option. The revised text of the three acclamations, which are present in the Latin *novus ordo* text, makes clear that they are prayers to Christ, and are beautiful expressions of the piety that we ought to have in our Lord’s presence.

Here a brief comparison with the Latin text of what Pope Benedict XVI has called the Extraordinary Form of the Liturgy may also be instructive. The Latin words *mysterium fidei* that the *novus ordo* shifts to a position just after the consecration formula are actually within the words of consecration, pronounced over the chalice in the traditional form of the rite. With this in mind, it may be easier to see that the acclamations (as is particularly evident in their revised translations) are actually prayers addressed to Christ. They occur at this point in the liturgy precisely because he is newly present on the altar.

Another point of importance is the shift from “all” to “many” in the prayer for the consecration over the chalice. The phrasing here actually includes a number of important revisions, but let us focus on just this one of them: “Take this, all of you, and drink from it, for this is the chalice of my Blood, the Blood of the new and eternal covenant, which will be poured out for you and for many for the forgiveness of sins. Do this in memory of me.” This change is likely to meet neuralgic resistance in some quarters. But, in fact, rendering *pro multis* (the Latin translation for the Greek words *pro pollois*) by “for many” seems to be exactly what is needed to remove the temptation to a faulty universalism that could be suggested by confusing redemption with salvation.

By his death Christ did indeed redeem everyone, but that fact does not imply that all are saved, for one must cooperate with the graces that Christ offers for any particular individual to be saved. In authentic Catholic doctrine, there is nothing automatic about salvation (whatever some overly sentimental funeral homilies might suggest to the contrary). At funerals, of course, we ought to be praying for the souls of the departed and not neglecting to do so on the basis of a presumption

about the salvation of the deceased, which is in fact entirely beyond our ability to know. But the point is not restricted to funeral liturgies. Something far more general and far more important about Catholic doctrine is at stake. When the new translation renders *pro vobis et pro multis* by “for you and for many,” this phrasing respects the wording that is found in the Greek text of the Sacred Scriptures and in the Latin text of the *novus ordo*. Theologically, it respects the distinction between salvation and redemption. Perhaps, as Hans Urs von Balthasar so delicately put the question in his rightly famous book *Dare We Hope?* (Ignatius Press, 1988), we may indeed hope that all will be saved, but we dare not presume that. The wording chosen here honors the fact that one must choose to accept the saving grace of Christ and that God chooses to respect the freedom of his creatures, even if some do not avail themselves of

the divine assistance he offers.

Another one of the blessings that comes with the revised translation is the recovery of certain parts of the *Confiteor*, the *Gloria*, and the *Credo* that were not adequately represented in the 1973 translation. We will, for instance, be directed to strike our breasts three times, and not just once, as we say “through my fault, through my fault, through my most grievous fault” as we recite the *Confiteor*. We will have the opportunity to say the Creed as a personal act of faith (the revised version renders the word *credo* as “I believe” rather than as “We believe” throughout). Finally, we can thank God that the rubrics have been translated just as carefully as the lines intended to be spoken, and in the rubrics there are careful indications about sitting and standing, and about genuflecting and kneeling. It is crucial, for if we truly believe, we believe on our knees. ✠

ARTICLES

Catholic Truth in the Apostolic Tradition: The Living Apostolic Magisterium

By Rev. Matthew Lamb
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“Anyone who wishes to discern the truth may see in every church in the whole world the apostolic tradition clear and manifest. . . . This apostolic tradition has been brought down to us by a succession of bishops in the greatest, most ancient, and well known Church, founded by the two most glorious Apostles, Peter and Paul at Rome. . . . For with this Church, because of its more effective leadership, all Churches must agree, that is to say, the faithful of all places, because in it the apostolic tradition has been always preserved.”

Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* III, 3, 1 and 3

The Magisterium of the Roman Catholic Church is properly understood within the theological and sapiential framework of apostolicity. St. Irenaeus of Lyons knew the martyred Bishop Polycarp of Smyrna. He had reported

to Irenaeus his conversations with the Apostle St. John, “eyewitness of the Word of Life,” Our Lord Jesus Christ. This is a powerful witness to the living faith handed on from one generation to the next down to our own day. Without faith human reason cannot *theologically* understand the fundamental importance St. Irenaeus attaches to the apostolic tradition with its preaching, teaching, sanctifying, and governing mission. This article will first present several important aspects of the theology of the apostolic tradition. Within that context, it will then provide an understanding of the Magisterium or teaching office of the Church.

The above quotation from St. Irenaeus, born in the second century (probably between 140 and 160 AD), has the vividness of living personal witness, intensified no doubt by the martyrdom of his friend and mentor, Bishop Polycarp. Jesus Christ as the Word of Life is not an abstraction for St. Irenaeus—nor can he be for those who know him in the faith-filled worship of the

Church. The very office of an apostle is defined by the initial “Follow me” that applies as well to all the successors of the Apostles since the same Lord promised, “and behold, I am with you always until the end of the world.”² Then—Professor Joseph Ratzinger expressed this interpersonal character of apostolic succession and tradition well:

First and foremost, it is clear that *successio* and *traditio*, as they were first used, meant practically the same reality, and indeed were expressed by the same word, *διαδοχη*, which meant both tradition and succession. “Tradition” is never a simple, anonymous passing on of doctrine, but is personal, is the living word, concretely realized in the faith. And “succession” is not a taking over of official powers, which then are at the disposal of their possessor, but is rather a dedication to the Word, an office of bearing witness to the treasure with which one has been entrusted. The office is superior to its holder, so that he is entirely overshadowed by that which he has received; he is, as it were—to adopt the image of Isaiah and John the Baptist—only a voice that renders the Word articulate in the world.³

This leads Professor Ratzinger to comment that it is not so much as readers of a book, but as hearers of the word preached by the Apostles and their successors, that the Word of God is encountered:

if true apostolic succession is bound up with the word, it cannot be bound up merely with a book, but must, as the succession of the Word, be a succession of preachers, which in turn cannot exist without a “mission,” i.e., a personal continuity reaching back to the apostles. . . . Apostolic succession is essentially the living presence of the Word in the person of witnesses. The unbroken continuity of witnesses follows from the nature of the Word as *auctoritas* and *viva vox*.⁴

The living word requires faith. Any theology of apostolicity and Magisterium can only be properly done with faith enlightening reason. If the light of faith is dimmed or extinguished, all that is left are texts as so many dead letters whose real truth is not grasped. The historical-critical scholarship on the texts has provided immense knowledge of manuscript traditions, monuments, etc. In St. Augustine’s terminology, we know far more today about the “*signa*,” the texts, buildings, etc., than was known in previous ages. Such historical-critical methods can be exercised without the light of faith. The evidence is empirical, verifiable by anyone

who can read the language or decipher archeological remains. Today when we speak of “discoveries” relative to early Christianity, we mean such empirical discoveries as the Dead Sea scrolls.

St. Augustine entitled the first three books of his *De doctrina christiana* a “*via inventionis*” or way of discovery. By that he meant a discovery of the realities referenced by the words (“*signa*”) of Scripture. In the Prologue Augustine warns the reader against pride, indicating that to truly understand the realities revealed in the Scriptures one must imitate Paul, who, although having heard a voice from heaven, “was nevertheless sent to a man that he might receive the sacraments and be united to the Church.”⁵ A charity-informed faith was essential to know and enjoy friendship with the supreme reality of the Triune God revealed by Jesus Christ, the Word Incarnate.⁶

Having studied St. Augustine’s ecclesiology, Professor Ratzinger indicates the inadequacy of a purely social view of apostolic succession as power and patriarchy. Instead, a theological attention to the realities signified in the early Fathers provides the following picture:

The Church is the living presence of the divine Word. This presence is made concrete in those persons (the bishops) whose basic function is to hold fast to the word, who are, then, the personal embodiment of “tradition” (*παραδοσις*) and to this extent are in the apostolic line of “succession” (*διαδοχη*). Conspicuous among the successors of the apostles is the line of the apostolic sees, which ultimately is concentrated in the See of Peter and Paul. This is the touchstone of all apostolic succession.⁷

This very cogent statement of the living presence of the divine Word in the Church mediated by apostolic succession can be known and understood by theologians only when the light of faith enlightens their minds and hearts.

Without the light of faith informing the light of reason, theology properly speaking disappears or dies. The scattered fragments are then parceled out to various exegetical or historical disciplines that replace theology with psychological or sociological categories to provide a secular hypothesis on the dead data. Theology proper is replaced with what could only be described as at best a comparative textology.

Alasdair MacIntyre has analyzed the loss of wisdom in contemporary cultures. The wisdom tradition associated with Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas is eclipsed in favor of the empiricist encyclopedists or the Nietzschean

genealogists of power. Mankind has benefited much from the vast expansion of empirical studies of nature, but without wisdom the specialization of the sciences leads to cultural and social fragmentation. The only order is the alphabet, with God filed under G with gold and gorillas. Then along come the genealogists of power to claim that all orders are arbitrary impositions by dominative power.⁸ Benedict XVI has shown that neither the relativism of those who limit reason to empirical science nor the nihilism of those who replace reasoned discourse with violent power are able to engage in the dialogue for the wisdom of truth that alone is needed at this stage of human history.⁹

Scholars whose studies are influenced by the Reformation break with the Catholic Church have not come to any empirically verifiable consensus, as B. H. Streeter remarked:

However great their reverence for scientific truth and historic fact, they have at least *hoped* that the result of their investigations would be to vindicate Apostolic authority for the type of Church Order to which they themselves were attached. The Episcopalian has sought to find episcopacy, the Presbyterian Presbyterianism, and the Independent a system of Independency, to be the form of Church Order in New Testament times.¹⁰

Some Catholic theologians have also kept the light of Catholic faith under a bushel basket in their writings on apostolic, papal, and episcopal authority.¹¹ *Dominus Jesus* called attention to the importance of Catholic historical continuity:

The Catholic faithful are required to profess that there is an historical continuity—rooted in the apostolic succession—between the Church founded by Christ and the Catholic Church: “This is the single Church of Christ . . . which our Savior, after his resurrection, entrusted to Peter’s pastoral care (cf. Jn 21:17), commissioning him and the other Apostles to extend and rule her (cf. Mt 28:18ff.), erected for all ages as “the pillar and mainstay of the truth” (1 Tim 3:15).¹²

Appeals to the empirical texts severed from the living apostolic tradition of the Church’s faith and worship of the Risen Lord stems from an historicist criticism that has its origins in Benedict de Spinoza’s *Theologico-Political Treatise*. There he identifies the voluntarist power of God with the power of nature, and asserts that the proper method of interpreting Scripture is the same as that used to interpret nature.¹³ As with natural studies, the first methodic step is to reject any notion of the

Bible or any book thereof as a whole; rather, the Bible is to be analyzed by breaking it up into discrete verses, where the meaning of one verse can only be determined by another verse. Only those meanings are to be accepted that anyone, including an unbeliever, could accept on purely empirical grounds. The second methodic step is to reject the “truth question.” The verses are not to be accepted as true when they refer to realities not perceptible to common human sense experience or rational deduction. Just as Newton’s mechanics sought only three-dimensional perceptible motions, so Spinoza’s canons of interpretation recognize only those perceptible textual meanings found in the Scriptures as a perceptible book.¹⁴ Faith is not a light enlightening the mind; it is a blind act of piety and obedience. Any theology founded on a blind obedience of revelation has no power ever to oppose reason. Naturalist and secularist reason definitely dethrones fideist theology in Spinoza’s Enlightenment, as his disciple Theodor Ludwig Lau clearly moved from empirical scholarship to the ideology of power: true religion is natural and rational; “revealed religion is merely a fraud and a political tool in the hands of Jewish, Catholic, or Protestant authorities.”¹⁵

Today Catholic higher education has the great responsibility to recover and cultivate the wisdom traditions of philosophy and theology that are fundamental to Catholic intellectual life. Recent popes have emphasized that this is for the sake of both the Church and the global cultures in need of moral and religious direction. The question of truth in matters moral and religious has to be raised within the context of the quest for wisdom, goodness, holiness. Truth cannot be consigned, as it was from the European Enlightenment onward, as if it were an instrument of social or state dominative power. Both nature and history are ordered to ends inscribed in their very existence by their Creator and Redeemer. Both metaphysics and theology have suffered from the eclipse of wisdom in modern and postmodern cultures.

Imagine an historian who would attempt to write a history of mathematics without acquiring a knowledge of the foundations and sciences operative in mathematics. Such an historian might well be able to do a passable job at comparing various mathematical texts, at dating and placing them more or less precisely, at working out certain social and/or cultural processes that were going on at the time the mathematical texts were being produced. He may be able to discern who used which text to get what advantage in this or that

situation, how such a text was used in the production of weapons, what the weapons did, etc. Undoubtedly, such a history would be very readable for those who are not interested in knowing the history of mathematics so much as in knowing what else was going on when such and such a mathematics was being done. But no one would claim that such a history would merit the name of a genuinely critical history of mathematics.

How many genuinely critical histories of theology are being done now? What passes for critical histories of religion and theology in modern secularist cultures are usually histories that are critical of (in the sense of negating) theology. They simply assume that what is really real is a secular horizon in which religion is at best a tribal prejudice or a private opinion, and at worst a neurotic delusion, or an ideology of oppression. In a secularist culture theology can become “public” only at the expense of negating its claim to be reflecting upon divine realities. So-called critical histories are histories ignorant of these realities that are transcendently immanent in human history. This is precisely the danger of empiricist relativism and historicist nihilism against which Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI have warned.¹⁶

Theologians must *know* the realities operative, the processes occurring, in living the moral life according to the teachings of the Catholic Church, in charity-informed faithful worship and prayer in the presence of Our Eucharistic Risen Lord. One cannot do theology in the full sapiential and scholarly (“*scientia*”) meaning of theology if one does not know in faith-enlightened reason the divinely revealed realities—without this, theology as a sapiential scholarly discipline ceases. Instead what results is a comparative textology that only recognizes as real what is admissible into a secularist horizon. It is as if the academy had lost any genuine knowledge of mathematics or science, and was limited to doing empirical and literary comparisons of mathematical and scientific texts.

Genuine theology is a “way of discovery” and a “way of teaching” that is informed with intellectual, moral, and theological virtues drawing upon both wisdom as achievement and wisdom as gift. As gift, wisdom is a participation in the very wisdom of God, the Holy Spirit. Such wisdom is the love of God poured forth in our hearts by the Spirit who is given us (Rom 5:5). It is this wisdom that guides the Church as it carries forward through history the missions of the Word and Spirit, cherishing the Word of the Father revealed in the Scriptures and worshipped in the liturgy. Such

gifted wisdom from above evokes a cultivation of wisdom as a task to be achieved. Divine gifts neither deny nor denigrate human abilities. For these human capacities are themselves the gifts of God’s creative love. So the theological virtues called forth, or evoked, the journey of acquiring the human intellectual excellence and moral virtues.

Drawing upon Greek and Latin Patristic theologies, especially that of St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas situates apostolicity and the Church as the carrying forward in history of the visible and invisible missions of the Word Incarnate and the Holy Spirit. In Question 43 of the Prima Pars of his *Summa theologiae* on the Divine Missions, Aquinas remarks on the fittingness of the mission of the Holy Spirit to be both invisible and visible for the founding of the Church:

Thus in a special sense, a mission of the Holy Spirit was directed to Christ, to the apostles, and to some of the early saints on whom the Church was in a way founded. . . . To the apostles the mission was directed in the form of breathing to show forth the power of their ministry in the dispensation of the sacraments; and hence it was said, “Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven” (John 20:23); and again under the sign of fiery tongues to show forth the office of teaching; whence it is said that, “they began to speak with divers tongues” (Acts 2:4).¹⁷

In his *Lectures on the Gospel of St. John*, Aquinas comments on the appearance of the Risen Christ to the Apostles. Having shown them the marks of his passion, he charges or lays upon them their office. The Latin “*iniungit officium*” indicates that this office or ministry is not something they choose; it is laid upon them. It is from God, not from their own will. “As the Father sent me, even so I send you.” This is an office, a mission, laid upon them by Christ sending them. Christ sends them to continue his mission from the Father.

This shows that he is the mediator between God and man: “There is one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus” (1 Tim. 2:5). This was to console the disciples; acknowledging the authority of Christ, they knew he was sending them by divine authority. They were also consoled that they were given a dignity, namely that they had the proper office (*officium*) of Apostles, for an Apostle is one who has been sent.¹⁸

Being sent as an Apostle is hardly a “power position.” Wisely, Aquinas envisages the Lord saying:

As the Father loving me sent me into the world to suffer for the salvation of the faithful—"For God sent the Son into the world, not to condemn the world, but that the world might be saved through him" (3:17)—so I loving you send you to undergo suffering in my name—"I send you as sheep in the midst of wolves." (Mt. 10:16).¹⁹

This apostolic participation in the salvific suffering mission of the Son is absolutely supernatural, and so Our Lord breathes upon them as a visible sign of his sending the Holy Spirit. To be configured to the crucified Christ the Apostles must be born again by the Holy Spirit.

Jesus makes them fit for the [apostolic] office by giving them the Holy Spirit, "God enables us to be ministers of the New Testament [given] not in letters but in the Spirit" (2 Cor. 3:6). In this giving of the Spirit, he first gives them a sign of this gift, that is "he breathed on them." There is something similar in Genesis (2:7) when God "breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life," when the first man corrupted his natural life, but Christ has repaired this by giving the Holy Spirit.²⁰

The Lord's breathing is a visible sign of the invisible sending of the Holy Spirit. Aquinas quotes Augustine that the truth of this descending of the Holy Spirit upon the Apostles indicates the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

The Risen Lord signifies by breath his sending the Holy Spirit to the Apostles for their sacramental mission of forgiveness and sanctification. The later Pentecostal tongues of fire signify the Holy Spirit's mission for the apostolic mission of teaching and preaching. It is clear that the apostolic sacramental "*officium*" is absolutely supernatural. Bishops and priests are only instruments of Christ.²¹ Our Lord founds the Church on the Apostles by sending them as he is sent.²² The apostolic mission embraces their successors until Christ returns. Aquinas sees the apostolic mission as foundational for the Church in her faith and sacraments:

The apostles and their successors are God's vicars in governing the Church that is built on faith and the sacraments of faith. Wherefore, just as they may not institute another Church, so neither may they deliver another faith, nor institute other sacraments: on the contrary, the Church is said to be built up with the sacraments "which flowed from the side of Christ while hanging on the Cross."²³

For Aquinas neither the apostolic succession nor the sacraments can be understood apart from the mission received by the Apostles from the Risen Lord. It is theologically foolish to imagine that Aquinas's confidence in the ongoing apostolic tradition in the Church results from a lack of historical-critical scholarship. While historical-critical scholarship may give us a more detailed knowledge of manuscript and other textual details, the realities referenced by the texts can only be properly understood and known by sapiential and speculative theology.²⁴

Apostolic tradition is grounded in the mission the Apostles and their successors receive from the Risen Lord. Guided by the Holy Spirit, the Apostles and their successors are within this living, worshipping *traditio* or handing on of the true faith. For the past two millennia the Roman Catholic Church has continued to preach, teach, sanctify, and govern Catholic faithful worldwide under the guidance of the Lord of history and the Holy Spirit.²⁵ The Church as the living presence of the Divine Word mediated by apostolic succession carrying forward in history the missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit is sacramentally embodied in the Eucharist. The threefold dimensions of the sacraments find their summit in the Eucharistic Sacrifice. The "*Sacramentum tantum*" or "sacramental sign alone" is the visible rite of confecting the Eucharist as the duly ordained priest or bishop takes bread and wine and, as an instrument of the Risen Lord, utters the words of consecration: This is my body, this is my blood. By the power of Christ these sacramental signs effect the reality they signify, the Body and Blood of the Risen Lord is present as the bread and wine are transubstantiated. This is the "*Res et Sacramentum*" or the "reality and sacramental sign." The real presence of the Risen Lord in the Eucharist itself effectively causes the "*res tantum*" or the "reality alone" that is the whole Christ, head and members. The Church militant on earth is united to the communion of saints in heaven.

Only within this sacramental worship in the unity of the Whole Christ can apostolicity be theologically understood as fulfilling the Word Incarnate's promise to be with the Church until the end of time. The bishops in union with the bishop of Rome, the pope, as successors of the Apostles, have the ordained power to sanctify, govern, preach, and teach the truth of Christ's gospel. As Aquinas remarks, drawing upon a constant teaching of the Fathers, the act of faith does not regard only the propositions of the creeds and Church dogmas. Through those propositions the act of faith ushers the

believer into the sacred realities themselves. We do not worship and pray to concepts, symbols, propositions; we worship, pray to, and believe in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and all of the sacred realities revealed by the Word Incarnate, Jesus Christ. A genuine theology of the Church's Magisterium indicates how it is in the service of the sacred realities revealed by the Triune God who creates and redeems mankind. ✠

ENDNOTES

- 1 Mt 4:19; 9:9; 28:20; cf. Mk 1:17; 2:14; Lk 5:27; 24:48; Jn 1:43; 17:18-21.
- 2 Joseph Ratzinger, "Primacy, Episcopate, and Apostolic Succession," in Karl Rahner and Joseph Ratzinger, *The Episcopate and the Primacy* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1962), 37-63; the quotation is from 46-47.
- 3 *Ibid.*, 53-54.
- 4 St. Augustine, *De doctrina Christiana*, Prologus, 6: "Caveamus tales temptationes superbissimas et periculosissimas magisque cogitemus et ipsum apostolum Paulum, licet divina et caelesti voce prostratum et instructum, ad hominem tamen missum esse ut sacramenta perciperet atque copularetur Ecclesiae." For Ratzinger's study of Augustine's ecclesiology, cf. his *Volk und Haus Gottes in Augustins Lehre von der Kirche* (Eos Verlag Erzabtei St. Ottilien, 1992).
- 5 St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, I, 2-36.
- 6 Joseph Ratzinger, "Primacy, Episcopate, and Apostolic Succession," 59.
- 7 Alasdair MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991).
- 8 See Matthew Lamb, "St. Augustine and Benedict XVI at Regensburg," in *Catholic World Report* (October 2006).
- 9 Burnett Hillman Streeter, *The Primitive Church* (London: Macmillan, 1929), viii. See Carlos A. Steger, *Apostolic Succession in the Writings of Yves Congar and Oscar Cullmann* (Berrien Springs, Mich.: Andrews University Press, 1995), 42-57.
- 10 James T. Burtchaell, *From Synagogue to Church: Public Services and Offices in the Earliest Christian Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 167-79; Giovanni Sala, S.J., *Kontroverse Theologie* (Bonn: Verlag Nova et Vetera, 2005), 237-86; and his *Essere Cristiani e essere nella Chiesa* (Editione Paolini, 1975). Eamonn Keane, *A Generation Betrayed* (New York: Hatherleigh Press, 2002). For a recent reductive historical-social study of ecclesiology from below downwards, cf. Roger Haight, *Christian Community in History* vols. 1 and 2 (New York: Continuum, 2004).
- 11 Declaration "Dominus Jesus" on the Unicity and Salvific Universality of Jesus Christ and the Church, August 6, 2000, #16.
- 12 Benedict de Spinoza, *A Theologico-Political Treatise and A Political Treatise* (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, Inc., 2004), 45 and 99. On the importance of Spinoza for the Enlightenment, cf. Jonathan Israel, *The Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity (1650-1750)* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
- 13 *A Theologico-Political Treatise and A Political Treatise*, 101: "We are to work not on the truth of passages, but solely on their meaning. We must take special care, when we are in search of the meaning of a text, not to be led away by our reason in so far as it is founded on principles of natural knowledge (to say nothing of prejudices): in order not to confound the meaning of a passage with its truth, we must examine it solely by means of the signification of the words, or by a reason acknowledging no foundation but the Scriptures themselves."
- 14 Cf. Israel, *The Radical Enlightenment*, 654.
- 15 John Paul II, *Fides et Ratio*, esp. #80-108; Benedict XVI, *Regensburg Lecture on Faith, Reason, and the University*.
- 16 *Summa theologiae* I, q. 43, a. 7 ad 6.
- 17 *Lectura super Evangelium S. Ioannis* (Rome: Marietti, 1952), XX, iv, n. 2537.
- 18 *Ibid.*
- 19 *Ibid.*, n. 2538.
- 20 *Ibid.*, nn. 2543, also 2538-2544.
- 21 On the succession of the apostles and the Petrine ministry, see Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Explorations in Theology, Volume IV; The Glory of the Lord, Volume VII; Paul Wrestles with His Community*; Joseph Ratzinger, "Primacy, Episcopate and Apostolic Succession," 37-63.
- 22 *Summa theologiae* III, q. 64, a. 2 ad 3.
- 23 Avery Dulles, *The Catholicity of the Church* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 68-146; also Hans Urs von Balthasar, *The Moment of Christian Witness* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1969).
- 24 Cf. *Dominus Jesus* # 2-4; Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 25, a. 3; his *Lectura Romana in primum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, ed. Leonard Boyle and John F. Boyle (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2006), 175-201.



Property as a Condition of Liberty

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Attitudes with respect to the acquisition, use, and protection of property are but a manifestation of an unexpressed philosophy of human nature. It goes without saying that absent personal property, be it real, intellectual, or monetary, one's scope of action is limited or nonexistent. But there is a deeper aspect to the holding of property that begs to be acknowledged. Ownership is closely tied to one's personal identity. A person is often known by his holdings, by the land that he owns, by the real estate or personal wealth that he has accumulated, and by the use he makes of it. Ownership is often an expression of taste and aspiration, of preferences tied to one's character. Property gives one a sense of independence and enables one to act in a multiplicity of ways otherwise impossible. Recreation, travel, the expansion of social contacts, the support of social and political activity, and the furtherance of one's education become possible. Absent appropriate financial resources, personal acumen is truncated.

If the advantages of property are so evident, how account, in Western societies, for public acquiescence to the myriad government takings, from taxation to currency debasement, that effectively limit personal property and its use? The answer in part is that affirmations of the necessity of personal property usually carry with them an acknowledgment that from a moral point of view property carries with it certain obligations to the other. Given that an individual flourishes only within a community, it is universally recognized that a reciprocal relationship is created thereby, one that entails personal responsibility to the whole. This is the moral basis of taxation that goes beyond ordinary public services, for example, roads, utilities, and public parks to alleviate the lot of the poor or the unfortunate. The concepts of "social justice" and "social market economy" build on this moral mandate, as does public policy which seeks to implement objectives demanded in their name.

Discussions of the rights and duties of property owners date to antiquity. Property is so bound to considerations of human nature that the ancients still speak to us across the ages. Aristotle in his criticism of Plato's communal society recognized that private property, from an economic point of view, is more highly

productive than communal ownership. Goods owned in common by a large number of people, Aristotle saw, will receive little attention since people will mainly pursue their own self-interest to the neglect of obligations they can pass off to others. Plato had argued in the *Republic* that communal ownership—or the leveling of property generally—would be conducive to peace since no one would then be envious of the other.¹ Aristotle responds to the contrary, noting that in general, living together and sharing in common all that matters is difficult, and most of all that which concerns property.² To impose communal property on society, he says, would be to disregard the record of human experience. In any communal effort, human nature being what it is, some people are likely to work less than others and yet claim the same entitlement as those who work harder. Such, Aristotle held, can only lead to discontent and to fractional conflict. Aristotle also advances a moral consideration. Only private property enables one to practice the virtues of benevolence and philanthropy. Communal ownership would abolish that opportunity.

Plato and Aristotle apart, the most famous treatise on property from antiquity is that of Cicero, who begins with the observation that there is no such thing as private ownership established by nature.

Property becomes private either through long occupancy (as in the case of those who long ago settled in unoccupied territory) or through conquest (as in the case of those who took it in war), or by due process of law, bargain, or purchase, or by allotment. . . . Therefore, inasmuch as in each case some of those things which by nature had been common property became the property of individuals, each one should retain possession of that which has fallen to his lot; and if anyone appropriates to himself anything beyond that, he will be violating the laws of human society.³

Property, however acquired, Cicero notes, is increased largely by wisdom, industry, and thrift and rightly belongs to its holder. Yet, says Cicero, as Plato reminds us, we are not born to ourselves alone. Our country and our friends make claims upon us. Fellowship requires that we help one another. "In this direction we ought to follow Nature as our guide, to contribute to the general good by an interchange of acts of kindness, by giving and receiving, and thus by our skill, our industry, and our talents to cement human society more

closely together, man to man.”⁴

Assistance to others must be rationally grounded, he continues, “for many people often do favors impulsively for everybody without discrimination, prompted by a morbid sort of benevolence or by a sudden impulse of the heart, shifting as the wind. Such acts of generosity are not to be so highly esteemed as those which are performed with judgment, deliberation, and mature consideration.”⁵

“The man in an administrative office, however, must make it his first care that everyone shall have what belongs to him and that private citizens suffer no invasion of their property rights by act of the state.”⁶ “For . . . it is the peculiar function of the state and the city to guarantee to every man the free and undisturbed control of his own particular property.”⁷ Cicero speaks of destroyed harmony when property is taken away from one party and given to another or when officials intervene to cancel debt.

Although he speaks of the obligations of property holders, Cicero is clear that need does not create entitlement. Even so, he says, “let [property] be made available for the use of as many as possible (if they are worthy) and be at the service of generosity and beneficence rather than sensuality and excess.”⁸ “Acquire, use, enjoy, and dispose, but rationally” is his time-transcending advice. Cicero’s concept of “deserving poor” will be adopted by St. Jerome and St. Augustine and other Fathers of the Church when they speak of obligation in charity. They commonly affirm that charity to be efficacious cannot be mindless.

Ancient theories of property cannot effortlessly serve as a guide to the formation of law affecting property rights today, especially intellectual property, in our age of undreamt of technological innovation. Even contemporary statutory law is hard pressed to resolve disputes over intellectual property rights.⁹ Yet abstract discussions, ancient or contemporary, are not without consequence.

The idea that private property is at the root of political and economic evil is the well-known cornerstone of theories advanced by Marx and Engels. In *The Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels proclaim that the basis of communism as a theory may be summed up in a single sentence: abolition of private property.¹⁰ The declared aim of Marx is the nationalization of economic assets for the common good. In a communist society, he tells us, everyone is to contribute according to his abilities and receive according to his needs. From this principle, the regulation of production is a *conditio sine qua non*.

John Stuart Mill, perhaps equally as influential as

Marx, infused his brand of liberalism with the same socialist goal by stressing the overriding importance of the equitable distribution of productive wealth. Many of our contemporary intellectuals find in Mill the moral authority for legislation which curtails the right of ownership in the interest of the common good.¹¹

Among the twentieth-century authors who treat property exclusively in moral terms, the most influential is undoubtedly John Rawls. In *A Theory of Justice* Rawls delineates what he believes to be the principles of a well-ordered society based on “fairness.”¹² Rawls proposes to reform or abolish laws and institutions, no matter how efficient and well arranged, if they are “unjust.” For Rawls, the essence of injustice is inequality. His ideal is perfect egalitarianism, a principle of equality that he applies not only to material goods but also to intelligence and inborn skills. The advantages afforded to the genetically favored ought not bring the fortunate possessor any special benefits. Why? Because they are unearned.¹³ From Rawls’s moral perspective, the allocation of talents and abilities must be regarded as “arbitrary.” Talents should be viewed as “a common asset,” and their possessors should profit from them “only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out.” This principle was contested in an academic debate occasioned by the U.S. Supreme Court’s consideration and subsequent ruling in *Eldred v. Ashcroft*.¹⁴ The Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of the Copyright Extension Act of 1998, which extended the limits of copyright beyond, it was contended, the constitutional specification of a limited time. The Court’s ruling is a matter of record, and it is not our intent to review that ruling but to address the question: Does the larger society or community which may benefit from the productivity of an author or inventor have a just claim to the fruits of his labor? Rawls would say, yes.

Marx himself might have been shocked, for Rawls goes far beyond even the most radical of communist theorists in wishing to socialize natural talents by denying to the talented the benefits their talents bring them. Rawls rejects “equality of opportunity” as inherently unfair since it means that the less gifted or less industrious will be left behind. Efficiency must be sacrificed in the name of equality.

It is to be noted that entitlements to what one has earned or otherwise legally acquired have a completely different status in *A Theory of Justice* than do freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of association, due process of law, and the rights to vote and to hold office. Property rights are excluded from protection. Economically significant property rights are valued not as conducive to liberty but as indispensable features of

an economic system which must be maintained for the benefit of all. Reliance on contracts, salary agreements, the payment of interest and dividends is economically essential, but its only moral justification is the good of the whole, not an individual's entitlement to what he has earned or otherwise acquired. What the individual is entitled to is determined by the overall system. Individual property rights are merely the consequence, not the foundation, of a just economic system.

Rawls, of course, is not the first in the history of political theory to take this extreme view. He acknowledges the influence of Rousseau and Hobbes, but his societal view of property is more akin to that of that of Pierre Joseph Proudhon. In his famous treatise, *What is Property?*, Proudhon answers his own question with the memorable declaration, "Property is theft." Proudhon reasoned, as Rawls was to reason more than a century later, "All capital, whether material or mental, being the result of collective labor, is in consequence, collective property."¹⁵

But is it realistic to speak of the distribution of talents and the fruit of sometimes extraordinary individual or cooperative effort as a common asset? How far should distribution go? In *The Law of Peoples*, Rawls proposes the extension of his principles of justice to the Society of Peoples under the Law of Peoples. "The Law of Peoples," he writes, "is an extension of the liberal conception of justice for a domestic regime to a Society of Peoples."¹⁶ It is not the intent of this brief presentation to offer a detailed critique of Rawls but to suggest that a seemingly benevolent theory of justice, viewed in terms of its consequence, can lead us to utopian ideals far removed from reality. In advancing his theory of justice, Rawls ignores psychological, political, and economic realities, as well as recorded history and the findings of anthropologists.

Without explicitly addressing Rawls, the French political theorist Pierre Manent meets Rawls's concept of a global "Society of Peoples" head on. In *Democracy without Nations: The Fate of Self-Government in Europe*, Manent argues that the democratic nation is the irreplaceable political context for human action, the instrument of self-government, the locus for deliberation, and the administration of justice.¹⁷ He shows that after Maastricht the European Union's bureaucratic contrivances have become more and more artificial, detached from the national political bodies that formed the Union, and have taken on a life of their own. Instead of increasing self-governance, Europe's new instruments of governance shackle it ever more with each passing day, promising an indefinite extension that no one wills and no one knows how to stop. In Manent's judgment, Europe's governing classes, without explicitly saying

so, hope to create a homogeneous and limitless human world. In fact, he continues, given its intellectual climate, what distinguishes Europeans from one another cannot be evaluated or even publicly named. The European value that seems to trump all others is "openness to the other," a universal political creed that relegates to the private sphere religious belief and cultural identity. "We (Europeans) do not possess any particular existence," Manent writes. "We do not want to possess any shape, manner or form, a distinctive character of our own, one that would necessarily be particular."¹⁸ To parry the threat of self-destruction, Manent is convinced that nothing is more important than to get a grip on our centuries-old development and that means first of all that we must become fully aware of the original Christian character of our nations.

Clearly ideas advanced within the academic sector are not without consequence in the social and political order. The effect of ideologically induced welfare programs adopted in the West in the 1930s and in the post-World War II period are now being felt on both sides of the Atlantic. All such programs required immense monetary outlays that could only be attained through taxation of one form or another. The cultural historian Richard Pipes, in his authoritative study *Property and Freedom*, dramatically shows how modern democratic governments have become giant mechanisms for the redistribution of private assets to the disadvantage of personal freedom.¹⁹ He shows that the United States, for example, in its desire to alleviate the lot of the poor has gone beyond that goal in its quest to "abolish poverty itself." In the pursuit of the latter objective, policy has moved from a guarantee of equality of opportunity to equality of results. Pipes dates this transformation to President Lyndon Johnson, whom he regards as the principal architect of the postwar welfare state in the United States. In an address at Howard University in June 1965, Johnson asserted, "Freedom is not enough. . . . [W]e seek not just freedom but opportunity. . . not just equality as a right and a theory but as a fact and as a result."²⁰ Pipes comments,

It is doubtful that either Johnson and his speech writers or the public at large had any inkling of what a break with the Western tradition these words represented. Social equality can be attained, if at all, only by coercion, that is at the expense of liberty. It necessarily requires the violation of property rights of those citizens who possess more wealth or enjoy higher societal status than the majority. Once the elimination of poverty becomes a state objective, the state is bound to treat property not as a fundamental right, which is its supreme obligation to protect, but as an obstacle to social justice.²¹

Pipes goes on to point out that “[l]iberty is by its nature inequalitarian, because living creatures differ in strength, intelligence, ambition, courage, perseverance and all else that makes for success.”²²

Economic historians tell us that those countries that have provided the firmest guarantees of economic independence, especially property rights, are virtually without exception the richest. For most economic historians the determinant of economic growth lies in the legal institutions which ensure to enterprising individuals the fruits of their labors. European history suggests that the rise of the West to the position of global economic preeminence lies in the institution of private property.²³

Romantic appeals to the common good, such as those of Mill and Rawls, may be fruitful under some conditions, but absent a sense of community, they are dangerous. As Richard Pipes reminds us, when one appeals to a common good separate from and superior to the private goods of individuals, the function of government (be it that of a legislative, executive, or judiciary body) becomes one of conflict management. Given our litigious society, opposing parties are likely to press for state-awarded privileges, bargaining and negotiating for advantage. Under such conditions the state is not likely to represent a common will, but rather it becomes the object of adversarial wills. Thus positioned, the state serves not by defining goals which members of society ought collectively to pursue but by removing obstacles to goods privately defined. The common good becomes the result of negotiations between private political actors. Such a situation can only lead to social and economic disaster. A compliant or weak judiciary is apt to rule in the light of a supposed common good against an individual claimant, perhaps settling the dispute but undermining other fundamental rights.

The issue before us remains: What claim does society have on the individual? Ancient notions of human nature are the foundation of the common-law tradition assumed in the English-speaking world, a tradition that informed the documents associated with the American founding. The U.S. Constitution took for granted that the right to private property is a condition of liberty. It was taken as evident that property rights adhere not only to the individual but also to the individual in his collective arrangements. If a man is entitled to the fruit of his labor, a corporation is entitled to the fruit of its investment. Apart from the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in *Eldred v. Ashcroft*²⁴ cited above, one is brought to the conclusion that Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution had it right when it declared its purpose “...to promote the

progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries.” The Constitution provides a prudential balance between the protection of property rights and social claims. There may always be a tension between property rights and reasonable communal claims. Resolution in the practical order cannot avoid an appeal to an undergirding philosophy of human nature. Ultimately the conflict may be between the common-sense philosophy of Aristotle and the Stoics and that of Karl Marx and others of the Enlightenment period. ✖

ENDNOTES

- 1 Plato modifies this position somewhat in the *Laws*, when he writes, “Let the citizens at once distribute their land and houses, and not till their land in common, since a community of goods goes beyond their proposed origin, and nurture and education” *The Dialogues of Plato, Laws*, 740, trans. B. Jowett, Vol. II, (New York: Random House, 1937).
- 2 Aristotle, *Politics*, 2263, a 15-16.
- 3 Marcus Tullius Cicero, *On Duties*, trans. Walter Miller (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), I, p. 21.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 22.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 49.
- 6 *Ibid.*, II, p. 73.
- 7 *Ibid.*, II, p. 78.
- 8 *Ibid.*, I, p. 92.
- 9 The complexity of adjudicating law governing intellectual property is seen in *Eldred v. Ashcroft*, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) also cited below.
- 10 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (New York: International Publishers, 1935), pp. 42-43.
- 11 John Stuart Mill, *Principles of Political Economy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), cf. Chaps. I, II.
- 12 John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).
- 13 *Ibid.*, pp. 101-102.
- 14 *Eldred v. Ashcroft*, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
- 15 Pierre Joseph Proudhon, *Q’est-ce qua la Propriété?* trans. Benjamin B.R. Tucker as *What is Property?* (New York: H. Fertio, 1966), p. 147.
- 16 John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples: With the Idea of Public Reason Revisited* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 9.
- 17 Pierre Manent, *Democracy without Nations? The Fate of Self-Government in Europe*, trans. Paul Seaton (Wilmington, Del., ISI Books, 2009).
- 18 *Ibid.*, p. 66.
- 19 Richard Pipes, *Property and Freedom* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999).
- 20 As quoted by Pipes, p. 229.
- 21 *Ibid.*
- 22 *Ibid.*, p. 283.
- 23 Cf. Douglas North and E.P. Thomas, *The Rise of the Western World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). Also Douglas North, *Structure and Change in Economic History* (New York: Norton, 1981); Tom Bethell, *The Noblest Triumph* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998).
- 24 *Eldred v. Ashcroft*, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).

What are the Doctrinal Impediments to the Reunion of the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches?

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[The following reflections regarding Reunion of the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches were delivered at an ecumenical Trialogos Conference held in Tallinn, Estonia, in 2008]

This is indeed a fascinating question and one that has received various answers from both Catholic and Eastern Orthodox prelates, theologians, and writers over the centuries and to our own day. Somewhat conflicting answers have been given by both Catholic and Orthodox theologians:

- 1) **There are but two major dogmatic issues** which keep the Churches apart, namely, the doctrines insisted on by the Catholic Church: the primacy of universal jurisdiction claimed by the pope, and the procession of the Holy Spirit as expressed in the famous 'Filioque' clause added to the Creed.
- 2) **There are many dogmatic and doctrinal issues** between Catholics and Orthodox which serve as obstacles to the unity of faith that must characterize the true Church.
- 3) **There are no real dogmatic issues** which prevent the Reunion of the Churches for even the two historical major dogmatic teachings of the Primacy and the Procession are more the result of misunderstanding and political, cultural, and linguistic estrangement. These teachings as well as other doctrines defined by the Catholic Church since 1054 cannot be termed heretical by the Orthodox for lack of any official definitive and binding pronouncements of an Ecumenical Council, and thus the way is open to dialogue and Reunion.

It is therefore important to examine each of these theses to grasp what is the actual doctrinal situation that Catholics and Orthodox are dealing with, in order to respond fully to the High-Priestly Prayer of Our Lord that "all be One, even as Thou, Father, in Me and I in Thee; that they also may be One in Us, that the world may believe that Thou hast sent Me. And the glory that Thou hast given Me, I have given to them, that they may be One, even as we are One: I in them, and Thou in Me; that they may be perfected in Unity, and that the world may know that Thou hast sent Me, and that Thou hast loved them even as Thou hast loved Me" (Jn. 17: 21-23).

No one can doubt that the scandal of doctrinal divisions among those who profess to be Christians is one of the most important factors inhibiting the spread of the Gospel of Christ among the peoples and nations of the world. This has been admitted by popes, patriarchs, the World Council of Churches, international committees involved in theological dialogues, and ordinary Christian believers. It is this fact that has certainly stimulated the twentieth century's modern ecumenical movement, wherein all Christians of good will and who love the Lord seek to restore the spiritual and visible bonds of unity which constitute the "one and only Church" that Christ founded. As Pope John Paul II noted in a homily delivered at the Basilica of St. Paul Outside the Walls on January 25, 1984: "Christ's work for mankind, His Cross and His Mission, entrusted by Him to His Church, to baptize and make disciples of all nations (cf. Mt. 28: 19-20), call upon all the baptized to strive for full unity in faith and sacramental life, overcoming every division and break." It would be easy to multiply similar pleas over many years from the Orthodox patriarchs of Constantinople, Moscow, Antioch, Alexandria, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, etc., and other important prelates calling for not only a greater collaboration of all Churches and communities to meet the social and economic needs of the world's peoples, but also to engage in the quest for the

restoration of that unity among Christians which is

required of us by God. . . . Indifference to this task or its rejection is a sin against God's commandment of unity. According to St. Basil the Great, 'all who are really and truly serving the Lord should have this one aim—to bring back into union the Churches that have been severed from one another' (Letters, 114).¹

What then, in the ecumenical atmosphere of our day, is the actual doctrinal situation between Catholics and Orthodox, necessary to understand in the present-day effort to restore full communion and Eucharistic fellowship? Is it true that there are only two major dogmatic issues that prevent the definitive healing of the Schism between them: the primacy and the 'Filioque'?

Certainly, for Catholics, there can be no doubt that the primacy of the pope is considered essential to the visible unity of the Church. This is a dogmatic given, as Vatican II solemnly reaffirmed (and concerning which there can be no illusions in the Catholic Church):

Christ willed that the successors [of the apostles], the bishops namely, should be the shepherds in his Church until the end of the world. In order that the episcopate itself, however, might be one and undivided, he put Peter at the head of the other apostles, and in him he set up a lasting and visible source and foundation of the unity both of faith and communion. This teaching concerning the institution, the permanence, the nature and import of the sacred primacy of the Roman Pontiff and his infallible teaching office, the Sacred Synod proposes anew to be firmly believed by all the faithful, and proceeding undeviatingly with this same undertaking, it proposes to proclaim publicly and enunciate clearly the doctrine concerning bishops, successors of the apostles, who together with Peter's successor, the Vicar of Christ and the visible head of the whole Church, direct the House of the Living God (*Lumen Gentium*, #18).

With regard to the centuries-old controversy over the procession of the Holy Spirit, Vatican II must be said to have also reaffirmed the teaching of the Church concerning the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and (or through) the Son which had been defined by the Reunion Council of Florence (1439). That council had sanctioned the use of the formula of the "Filioque" ("and the Son") which it regarded as equivalent to the expression "through the Son" familiar to the Greek Fathers of the Church. The Filioque simply gave expression to the traditional truth that the Son participates in the eternal breathing of the Spirit from the Father. Vatican II declared in conformity with the

teaching of the Fathers (both Greek and Latin) that the Father in the Trinity was "the principle without principle from whom the Son is generated and from whom the Holy Spirit proceeds through the Son."²

Observations on Answer #1—There are but two major dogmatic issues preventing reunion.

Historically, it is clear that *papal primacy understood as the supreme and universal authority in the Church* has not been accepted by the Churches of Byzantine Orthodoxy, which have followed the patriarchate of Constantinople in rejecting it, either in practice or in theory, to this very day. The same cannot be said, however, regarding a total rejection of the doctrine of the eternal procession from the Father and (or through) the Son, for there have been Eastern Orthodox theologians and prelates no longer willing to declare the Filioque doctrine heretical. The doctrine embodied in the Filioque addition to the Creed can be held as a theological opinion (*theologoumenon*). As Bishop Kallistos of Diokleia (who is attached to the Ecumenical patriarchate of Constantinople) has noted in a classic study, there are "hawks" and "doves" on this question.³

Among the hawks would be such writers as the Greek Orthodox theologian John Romanides, who has denounced the Filioque in the manner of his medieval forbears like Mark of Ephesus, who played a predominant role in the rejection of the Reunion Council of Florence (1439), and Dr. Joseph Farrell in the U.S., who repeated a standard objection: "The Filioque is the outward, efficacious symbol of an inward metaphysical depravity." But, as Bishop Kallistos has observed:

Among modern Orthodox theologians there are also "doves" who advocate a more lenient approach to the question. While they deplore the unilateral insertion of the "Filioque" into the text of the Creed on the part of the west, they do not consider that the Latin doctrine of the Double Procession is in itself heretical. It is, they argue, somewhat confused in its expression and potentially misleading, but it is capable of being interpreted in an Orthodox way; and so it may be accepted as a *theologoumenon*, a theological opinion, although not as a dogma.

... There is today a school of Orthodox theologians who believe that the "Filioque," while by no means unimportant, is not so fundamental as [Vladimir] Lossky and his [neo-Palamite] disciples maintain. The Roman Catholic understanding of the person and work of the Holy Spirit, so this second group of Orthodox theologians conclude, is not basically different from that of

the Christian east; and so we may conclude that in the present-day dialogue between Orthodox and Roman Catholics an understanding will eventually be reached on this thorny question.⁴

Such distinguished nineteenth-century Russian theologians as P. Sviatlov and Basil Bolotov rejected the prior teaching of Russian and Greek theologians that the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and (or through) the Son was unorthodox and heretical—a position that had become since the thirteenth century the principal dogmatic question between Latins, on the one hand, and Greeks and Russians, on the other.⁵

The Greek Orthodox theologian Rev. Dr. Theodore G. Stylianopoulos, professor at the Holy Cross School of Theology in Brookline, Massachusetts, has written:

The “Filioque” question does not signal a “great divide” between the Eastern and Western Churches. . . . The formula “who proceeds from the Father through the Son” is a sound theological resolution of the problem in the conciliatory spirit of Maximos the Confessor (who affirmed) the active participation of the Son in the eternal procession of the Spirit from the Father. . . . The well known critique (of some Orthodox) that the “Filioque” subordinates the Spirit to the Son and thereby “depersonalizes” the Spirit seems to express theological polemic rather than theological truth.⁶

The extreme charges of some Eastern Orthodox that “the ‘Filioque’ doctrine has led to ecclesiasticism, clericalism, and even the dogma of the Pope,” Stylianopoulos declared to be “wholly unconvincing.”⁷

For his part, the recently deceased Ukrainian Orthodox Bishop Vsevolod of Scopelos stated: “With many Orthodox theologians I consider this problem [the ‘Filioque’] a *theologoumenon* [respectable theologian opinion] which need not disturb us.”⁸

On October 25, 2003, The Orthodox members of the “Agreed Statement on Filioque” adopted by the North American Orthodox-Catholic Theological Consultation agreed that in the future the Orthodox “refrain from labelling as heretical” the Catholic teaching regarding the Filioque.⁹

Observations on Answer #2—There are many dogmatic and doctrinal issues serving as obstacles to the reunion of the Churches.

A reading of the polemical literature of past centuries reveals at times violent controversies taking place concerning:

- The primacy of universal authority of the pope and his infallibility*
- The procession of the Holy Spirit as expressed by the “Filioque”*
- The use of Azymes for the Holy Eucharist—a controversy begun by the patriarch Michael Cerularius, who regarded the Eucharist of the Latins as “dry mud”*
- The consecration of the “precious gifts” taking place at the epiclesis (invocation of the Holy Spirit) rather than with the narrative words of institution*
- Communion under one species*
- The validity of Catholic sacraments, such as Baptism lacking a trine immersion*
- Whether there is a particular judgment at death*
- Purgatorial fire*
- The Immaculate Conception of the Theotokos and the nature of original sin*
- A temporal debt of punishment for sin; and Indulgences*
- Rejection by some Orthodox of the seven deuterocanonical books of the Old Testament declared divinely inspired by the Catholic Church*
- Dispute over the addition of books to the Old Testament by some Orthodox: Prayer of Manasses, 3 Esdras, 3 and 4 Macabees.*
- The Eastern Orthodox sanctioning divorce-and-remarriage (which involves the denial of the indissolubility of sacramental marriage) and contraception*
- Mandated priestly celibacy*
- The serious expansion of new grievances by the insistence of certain modern neo-Palamite Orthodox theologians (followers of the fourteenth-century Byzantine Greek theologian Gregory Palamas) who teach the following theological innovations as dogma:*
 - a. a real distinction between the essence of God and His “uncreated energies”;
 - b. that God’s “uncreated light” can be seen in this life;
 - c. that it is the “uncreated energies” of God that indwells the soul of the Christian, not the Person of the Holy Spirit; and
 - d. that Heaven does not involve the Saints seeing the essence of God in the Beatific Vision.¹⁰

For example, the Metropolitan Hierotheos Vlachos of Nafpaktos in Greece, has written:

The basic distinction between the Orthodox Church and Papism is found in the doctrine concerning the uncreated nature and uncreated energy of God. Whereas we Orthodox believe that God possesses an uncreated nature and uncreated energy and that God comes into communion with the creation and with

man by means of His uncreated energy, the Papists believe that in God the uncreated nature is identified with His uncreated energy (*actus purus*) and that God holds communion with the creation and with man through his created energies, even asserting that in God there exist also created energies. So then the grace of God through which man is sanctified is seen as created energy. But given this, one cannot be sanctified. *From this basic doctrine proceeds the [heretical] teaching concerning the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and from the Son, the cleansing fire, the Primacy of the Pope, etc.*¹¹

It is important to stress that among all the sixteen or so autocephalous (self-governing) Orthodox Churches, there does not appear to be an “official” list of all the heretical “anti-evangelical innovations” constituting doctrinal obstacles to the reunion of the Churches. Some of the above listed alleged “heresies” of the Catholic Church may assuredly be considered liturgical and sacramental divergences rather than dogmatic or doctrinal ones.

Interestingly, the above theses of Gregory Palamas which were thoroughly ignored in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Russia did not even appear in two of the major anti-Roman responses to Popes Pius IX and Leo XIII’s overtures for reunion: the Encyclical of the Eastern Patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem (1848) and the Encyclical of Anthimus (VII), patriarch of Constantinople and the Holy Synod (1895). Both these encyclicals reaffirm the standard, traditional objections to the reunion of the Churches: the Roman primacy, the doctrine embodied in the Filioque, the “use of wafers instead of real bread” for the Eucharist, “sprinkling instead of immersion,” “disuse of the epiclesis,” and adding many other accusations such as that the Apostle Peter’s “apostolic action at Rome is totally unknown to history.”¹² It must be said that various historical errors mar both encyclicals by the patriarchate of Constantinople, including the 1848 encyclical’s reliance on a medieval forgery of a letter by Pope John VIII allegedly repudiating the Filioque.¹³

In examining these encyclicals, as well as the earlier confessions of faith by the Metropolitan of Kiev Peter Moghila (1640) and that of the patriarch of Jerusalem Dositheos (1672), one is puzzled in trying to determine the degree of authority they possess as setting forth the official teaching of the Orthodox Churches, since they do not possess the degree of authority that is ascribed to the dogmatic decisions of the first Seven Ecumenical Councils. Moreover, there is an unfortunate mixture of doctrinal and disciplinary accusations against the

Catholic Church which obscure for the sincere inquirer what constitute for the Orthodox the exact *dogmatic* obstacles to the reunion of the Churches. Then there is the acute problem that a number of doctrines expressed in the above encyclicals and confessions of faith evidence a lack of theological discrimination and have never received the approval of the early Councils. In addition, their doctrines have, in fact, been contradicted by various important theologians or were held merely as theological opinions, not dogmas. The doctrinal confusion and contradictions reflected in documents possessing only a relative authority among the Orthodox are evident, and they would demand resolution were it possible, say, for a Pan-Orthodox Synod to convene to clarify matters used to justify the accusation of a thousand years that Catholics in communion with the See of Peter were heretics.

Observations on Answer #3—There are no real dogmatic issues which prevent the reunion of the Churches.

In view of the above detailing of the doctrinal issues believed by many Orthodox to demonstrate that the Catholics are schismatical and heretical, it may be surprising to note that there are Catholics and Orthodox who have held that none of the doctrinal grievances (not to mention the many liturgical quarrels which fostered enmity between Latins and Greeks in the Middle Ages and to our own day) warrant the continuation of the separation of the Churches. This is because, to the mind of many of the Orthodox, only an Ecumenical Council can pronounce definitive doctrine. No dogma or doctrine can be declared as binding on all Orthodox by any other ecclesiastical authority than an Ecumenical Council wherein all the Churches of their communion are duly represented. As the Russian Orthodox Archbishop Gregory Afonsky has stated (not without a certain incoherence regarding the exact organ of infallibility):

The Church is indeed infallible. . . . The highest ecclesiastical authority in expressing the true faith of the Orthodox Church is the ecumenical council. Such councils are composed of all bishops of all Orthodox Churches. . . . The decisions of an ecumenical council, however, must be followed by reception by the people, who ratify the truth of these decisions.¹⁴

What is evident, however, is that since the separation from the Apostolic See of Rome, an Ecumenical Council has not been able to be convened among those in the Pan-Orthodox world for over 1200 years. Consequently, it is

apparent that none of the negations of Catholic doctrine which have historically served to keep the Churches apart can be said to have the support of an Ecumenical Council and thus be binding on the faithful of their Churches. This fact, noted by the Russian philosopher Vladimir Soloviev, has also been observed by a number of Catholic theologians who have also consequently inquired: *Where there exists no supreme authority that can dogmatize in the Name of Christ, who can be said to speak in matters of doctrine for all the Orthodox?* How then can the negations of Catholic doctrines by various authors, theologians, and even local Synods of Bishops be termed doctrines or dogmas at all? None of these could be said to be safeguarded from error in teaching a negation of Catholic doctrine. None could be said to possess the infallible authority which an infallible Church must have in order to teach with divine certainty. The conclusion would follow then that between the Catholic and autocephalous Churches of the Byzantine tradition there exists no real dogmatic divergence which prevents the restoration of the visible unity which characterized the period before 1054.

One of Soloviev's great contributions to ecumenism was precisely to engage in a profound study of Catholic and Orthodox polemical literature in order to grasp the true nature of the schism which had involved millions of Russian Orthodox "in good faith" in the separation from Rome, heralded by the Fathers, saints, and Byzantine emperors (e.g., Justinian) as "head of all the Churches of God."¹⁵ He observed

As there never had been (and according to our best theologians, never can be) any Ecumenical Councils in the East, since the separation of the Churches . . . our schism exists for us only "de facto," and by no means "de jure." What reveals even more clearly the uncertain position of our Church with reference to Catholicism, is that some individuals declare publicly that they believe the "new" Catholic dogmas to be the legitimate development of Orthodox doctrine.¹⁶

In 1887 Soloviev addressed the following nine questions to a theological opponent, and through him to the entire Russian Orthodox hierarchy, which created a sensation in Russia and intrigued Catholic theologians in France and Germany, and in Rome itself.

1. When the canons of the Ecumenical Councils require the Nicene faith to be intact, do they refer to the letter or the meaning of the Nicene Creed?
2. Does the word "Filioque," inserted into the primitive text of the Council of Nicaea-Constantinople,

necessarily involve heresy? If so, which Council has condemned this heresy?

3. This addition made its appearance in the Churches of the West in the sixth century and was known in the East towards the middle of the seventh century. If it contains a heresy, why did not the last two Ecumenical Councils (the sixth in 689 and the seventh in 787) condemn the heresy and anathematize those who accepted it, instead of remaining in communion with them?
4. If it is impossible to say with certainty that the addition of the "Filioque" constitutes a heresy, is not every Orthodox Christian free in this respect to follow St. Maximus the Confessor, who in his letter to Marinus, a priest, justifies this addition, and gives it an Orthodox meaning?
5. Besides the "Filioque," what other doctrines of the Roman Church are heretical, and what Ecumenical Councils have condemned them?
6. Is it possible that the Church of Rome should be pronounced guilty, not of heresy, but of schism? Now, schism, as defined by the Fathers, takes place when a portion of the Church (both clergy and laymen) cuts itself off from the lawful ecclesiastical authority on account of some question of ritual or discipline. This being so, we may ask from what lawful ecclesiastical authority the Roman Church cut herself off?
7. If the Church of Rome is not guilty of heresy, and if she cannot be in a state of schism, because there is no superior authority from which she could have separated, must we not recognize this Church as an integral part of the one Catholic Church of Christ, and acknowledge the separation between the Churches to have no truly religious and ecclesiastical justification, being merely the work of human politicians?
8. If our separation from the Church of Rome is based on no genuine principle, ought not we Orthodox Christians to lay more stress upon divine than human things? Is it not our duty to labour for the restoration of union between the Eastern and Western Churches, and thus to promote the welfare of the entire Church?
9. If the re-establishment of intercommunion between the East and West is for us a duty, have we any right to defer its accomplishment by pleading the sins and shortcomings of others?¹⁷

In his "Answer to Danilevski" (1885) Soloviev reduced his nine questions to three.

No matter who is to blame for it, the fact remains that the separation of the East and West was and is a worse misfortune to the universal Church, than the origin and development of Islam, which is, perhaps, the chastisement for the separation. Therefore surely no Christian should fail to seek an expiation for it. In asking my three questions I had no other object than to facilitate a peaceful settlement.

1. According to my Orthodox assailants, the supreme and final authority in the Church is the Church itself, the Church that is bound to tell me herself what the Church believes, for instance, regarding the “Filioque.” I ask therefore how the Church by herself can ratify and sanction the Councils.
2. The representatives of Orthodoxy are not agreed on the subject of Catholics. Some treat them as heathen, and even rebaptize them, whilst others, among whom are our greatest theologians, refuse to regard them as heretics. I ask, therefore, how am I to know what the Church herself teaches about Catholics and their Church.
3. As the various nationalities belonging to the Eastern Church are not agreed in their attitude to the Bulgarian Church [at the time, the Greek Church had declared the Bulgarian Church to be in schism], I ask how am I to know the opinion of the Church herself concerning the Bulgarians.¹⁸

For Soloviev, the separation between the Churches was not a formal schism but only an apparent one, since it was void of theological justification. He had the conviction that the Council of Florence which had brought about in 1439 the reunion of the Orthodox Churches (including the Russian) with Rome had not been formally abrogated and, in fact, continued to exist. The Council of Florence, at which the leading prelates and theologians of the Byzantine Church participated and agreed to the Union, was an Ecumenical Council and its decrees and decisions could not be repealed. To his mind, Catholics and Orthodox were one in the same orthodox faith being members of the two branches of the universal Church. This explains his conviction that Orthodox did not need to “formally convert” to the Catholic Church since they were already in full communion with the Catholic Church. He did not formally abjure the Orthodox faith, for he considered himself as being both Catholic and Orthodox. There can be no doubt that in the depth of his soul, he professed the Catholic doctrine of the divine institution of the Petrine primacy, a profession which he powerfully

expressed in his writings, especially in his masterpiece, *Russia and the Universal Church*.

Interestingly, Soloviev’s view, that not only spiritually but doctrinally the separation of the Churches was not an accomplished fact, was held by some of the most eminent Catholic theologians of Greek ancestry and education, such as Leon Allatius and Peter Arcudius. Distinguishing the immutable doctrines of the Ecumenical Councils that continued to be held by the mass of Orthodox faithful from the errors of individual bishops and theologians, Soloviev insisted:

We [Orthodox] are united with Catholicism by all that we ourselves recognize as absolute and unalterable truth, whereas the errors which separate us from Catholic unity are only opinions which have no higher authority even in the eyes of those writers who put them forward. As for the mass of the faithful of the Eastern Church, they cannot be accused of any definite error, since their faith is the same as the Catholic faith, apart from their ignorance of certain doctrinal definitions made in the West since the separation.¹⁹

It may be said that Soloviev helped prepare the way for the teaching of Vatican II which refrained from describing the separated Byzantine Churches either as “heretical Churches” or as “schismatic Churches,” but rather used the less pejorative nomenclature of “dissident Churches” to describe them. This was assuredly because the great mass of the faithful of those Churches bore no culpability or responsibility for the unhappy situation of separation from Catholic unity in which they find themselves.

Perhaps the greatest Catholic ecclesiologist of the twentieth century, and one who participated in Vatican II, was Cardinal Charles Journet, who in his great work *L’Eglise du Verbe Incarné* (1951) analyzed the state of a “pure schism.”²⁰ He pointed out that a separated ecclesiastical body may well have resulted from the schismatic activities of patriarchs or bishops causing a “pure schism.” However, the later generations affected, who were guilty of neither the sin of pertinacious heresy nor that of malicious schism, should not and cannot be regarded as “schismatics,” but simply as “dissidents.” When earlier Catholic theologians used the term “material schismatics,” they had taken care to describe the members of the separated Greek and Russian Churches who were in good faith and had no animus against the Catholic Church. They had attempted to acknowledge the lack of moral guilt in those who bore no personal responsibility for the separation, and could not be judged as bearing the moral guilt attributed to

formal schismatics lacking charity. At the same time, Cardinal Journet rejected (as indeed did Vatican II and later Church documents dealing with the nature of the Church) Soloviev's eccentric notion that the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Churches constituted two branches of the one universal Church. Cardinal Journet observed that it was a great illusion to declare, as some Catholic writers did following Soloviev, that "the Russian Orthodox Church being guilty neither of heresy or schism, was already united, already Catholic."²¹ Rather, Catholic doctrine has always emphasized the unicity of the Church as an undivided spiritual and visible organism across time and space.

Recent documents of the Holy See such as *Dominus Iesus* (2000) and *Responses to Some Questions Regarding Certain Aspects of the Doctrine on the Church* (2007) have had to reaffirm, against some revived errors of a "Branch Church," that there is only one Church founded by Christ, and it is that body whose members are in visible communion with the Successor of Peter. Dissident Christians possessing certain hierarchical and sacramental elements of the Catholic Church are assuredly joined to, linked to, and may be said to adhere to and to be attached to the Catholic Church, which is their true Mother. Nevertheless, they sadly remain separated from the visible unity of the Church. The task of genuine ecumenical dialogue is to clear away the misconceptions of both Catholics and Orthodox concerning "the other," and to determine the real obstacles (doctrinal, psychological, and cultural) which impede the disciples of Christ from sharing in the full communion of the one historic and indefectible Faith.

In his many overtures for dialogue and ecumenical discussions Pope John Paul II of holy memory sought to answer the question: How can the previous unity between East and West that existed in the First Millennium of the Church's history be restored? In his encyclical *Ut Unum Sint* (May 25, 1995), he asked all those professing to be Christians: How can you "refuse to do everything possible, with God's help to bring down the walls of division and distrust, to overcome obstacles and prejudices which thwart the proclamation of the Gospel of salvation in the Cross of Jesus, the one Redeemer of man, of every individual?"²² From all that has been noted above, it has appeared increasingly obvious that for the Orthodox whose other historic doctrinal objections appear to have fallen by the wayside, it is the Roman primacy of universal authority and jurisdiction over all particular Churches which may be said to remain the one seemingly insuperable barrier to the restoration of

unity between Catholics and Orthodox. Conscious of the fact that the doctrine of the Roman primacy as "the visible sign and guarantee of unity, constitutes a difficulty [for the Orthodox,] whose memory is marked by certain painful recollections," the pope joined his predecessor Paul VI "in asking for forgiveness" for the sins of Catholics which have impeded unity.²³ In the same encyclical he took care to explain the Roman primacy in the context of collegiality (or the traditional Eastern theology of conciliarity) and to heed "the request made of me to find a way of exercising the Primacy which, while in no way renouncing what is essential to its mission, is nonetheless open to a new situation."²⁴

It should be a matter for rejoicing that in the most recent dialogue taking place between Catholic and Orthodox theologians at Ravenna (resulting in the document *Ecclesial Communion, Conciliarity and Authority*, October 13, 2007), there is clear evidence of the willingness of some of the Orthodox Churches to reconsider the idea of a universal Petrine primacy in the Church. This development has shocked some of the anti-ecumenical elements among the Orthodox and revived "fears that the Orthodox are ceding to papal claims."²⁵ Actually, the document falls quite short of any acknowledgement of the Petrine primacy as of divine institution. Orthodoxy's possible incorporation of a universal primacy on the part of the pope would be the result only of a conciliar and canonical consensus and enactment. Moreover, the "Ravenna Document" has already suffered rejection by the patriarchal Russian Orthodox Church whose delegates walked out of the International Commission's meetings because of yet another jurisdictional dispute with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, this time over control of the Estonian Orthodox Church.²⁶

CONCLUSION

What is the conclusion to be drawn from all the foregoing? What is the answer to the fundamental question that is the title of this paper: "What are the Doctrinal Impediments to the Reunion of the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches?"

I would submit that in the practical order of the life of Orthodox Churches, the Roman primacy is the standing impediment. However, as far as any dogmatic/doctrinal issue is concerned in the theoretical order, there is *none*. For in Eastern Orthodoxy any denial of the Petrine primacy of universal authority and jurisdiction in the Church has never been sanctioned by an Ecumenical Council, and therefore cannot be regarded

as an immutable dogma by our Orthodox brethren.

Therefore, the way is open to a future Ecumenical Council wherein Catholic and Orthodox bishops will meet together and heal the dissidence between the Churches in a loving acknowledgement that the Roman primacy is of the essence of the hierarchical nature of the Church and instituted by the Savior for the necessary good and visible unity of all the particular Churches of God. Let us pray to the Father of lights that, through the powerful intercession of the Immaculate Mother of God, all her children be soon united in the one, holy, Catholic, and apostolic Church of God, to the edification of all the angels and Saints in heaven, and that “they be perfected in unity . . . that the world may believe” (Jn. 17: 21-23). May that day come. Marantha, Lord Jesus! ✠

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Quoted in the very important document *Basic Principles of the Attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church Toward the Other Christian Confessions*, adopted by the Jubilee Bishops' Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, August 14, 2000.
- ² *Ad Gentes Divinitus, Decree on the Church's Missionary Activity*, 2.
- ³ *The Orthodox Church*, 3rd ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 216.
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, 213, 218.
- ⁵ Martin Jugie, *Le Schisme Byzantine* (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1941), 363, 387.
- ⁶ *The Greek Orthodox Review* (Fall-Winter 1986): 288.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁸ *Eastern Churches Journal* (Summer 1998): 50.
- ⁹ *Eastern Churches Journal* (Autumn 2003): 129.
- ¹⁰ See James Likoudis, *The Divine Primacy of the Bishop of Rome and Modern Eastern Orthodoxy: Letters to a Greek Orthodox on the Unity of the Church* (New Hope, Ken.: St. Martin de Porres Dominican Community, 2002), 191-211. www.credobuffalo.com
- ¹¹ Carlton, Clark, *The Truth* (Salisbury, MA, Regina 1999), 218-219.
- ¹² Chrysostomos Stratman, *The Reply to Roman Catholic Overtures on Reunion* (New York: Orthodox Christian Movement of St. John the Baptist, 1958), 17.
- ¹³ Carlton, op. cit.
- ¹⁴ *Christ and the Church in Orthodox Teaching and Tradition* (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2001), 87, 89-90.
- ¹⁵ Jugie, 75.
- ¹⁶ Michael D'Herbigny, *Vladimir Soloviev: A Russian Newman (1853-1900)* (San Rafael, Calif.: Semantron Press, 2007), 170.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 165-167.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 168.
- ¹⁹ Mark Everitt, “Vladimir Soloviev: A Russian Newman,” *Sobornost* 1, no. 1 (1979): 34.
- ²⁰ See Charles Journet, *L'Eglise du Verbe Incarné* (Freiburg: Desclee De Brouwer, 1951), 708-60 for an extensive analysis.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, 739.
- ²² *Ut Unum Sint*, #2.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, #88.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, #95.
- ²⁵ Archimandrite George Kapsanis, Abbot of the Mt. Athos monastery of Gregoriou, quoted in “A Lesson from Byzantium for Patriarch Bartholomew,” www.orthodox-england.org.uk/a_lesson.htm. The Ravenna document itself is available from www.vatican.va. A fine article “Ravenna and the Roman Primacy: the Issues Joined,” by Msgr. Daniel Hamilton, Ph.D., appeared in *FCS Quarterly*, Summer 2008.
- ²⁶ See *CWNews*, May 20, 2008.

The *Habitus* and Content of the Seminary Curriculum

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INTRODUCTION

There have been a number of essays and books written in recent years regarding the particular character of intellectual formation in Catholic seminaries.¹ These essays and books focus on the development of a unique pedagogy that is necessary for professors who are charged with the formation of candidates for the priesthood. It is their task, by means of the art of teaching, to engage

the student actively so that through philosophy the student appreciates the order of the created world, the nature of man, and God. In addition, through the study of theology rooted in faith the student understands more deeply the mystery of the Triune God and enters deeply into the living and dynamic relationship with Christ. This important aspect of intellectual formation continues to be developed through scholarship, peer exchange, and engagement in the classroom.

Effective pedagogy, however, is one profile of the complex dynamic of intellectual formation in Catholic seminaries. Another essential profile in the context of intellectual formation is the organization of the curriculum itself. The organization of the curriculum normally involves consideration of duration and content.

The duration of a program is more than the number of semesters required to cover the necessary courses. The duration has the purpose of identifying a period of time during which students develop a *habitus*. Similarly, the content of the seminary curriculum is much more than a list of courses in philosophy and theology. It is the harmonious organization of courses (*ratio*) that lead students through foundational concepts to a deeper appropriation of specific principles so that effective application can occur in ministry (*telos*).² This essay explores the *habitus* and content of both the philosophical and theological curriculum in Catholic seminaries and seeks to identify internal, organizational aspects as well as the curriculum's goal.

PART I PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

In recent months the Congregation for Catholic Education presented the *Decree on the Reform of Ecclesiastical Studies of Philosophy*. In the preamble of the decree the Congregation clearly echoes *Fides et Ratio* by naming two dangerous trends that work against a coherent and meaningful exploration of the truth, namely, the lack of confidence in the natural capacity of the human person to know objective truth, and the influence of the technological sciences.³ The norms presented by the Congregation reinforce the need for ecclesiastical universities and seminaries to have a coherent philosophical curriculum that treats themes in perennial philosophy and forms students to understand clearly the internal unity of man, the capacity of man to know the truth, and the way in which man is uniquely created to receive the gift of Revelation.

Habitus and Content

The *Decree* highlights two components that are critical in the development of the philosophy curriculum: the philosophical *habitus* and the content.⁴ The first component considers the importance of developing a habit within the student, that is, the capacity to contemplate the natural world and the transcendent. By contemplation I do not mean simply a “technique” but, as Pieper expresses well, the silent engagement and perception of reality; knowing arrived at by intuition, and knowing accompanied by amazement and wonder.⁵ The

challenges of relativism, subjectivism, and other post-Enlightenment problems are only exacerbated by the current inability of contemporary students to contemplate. Many students arrive at seminaries having been formed by a secular, technologically driven society that places value on the immediacy of the response over the thoughtfulness and inner coherence of an idea. Students have difficulty exploring and understanding basic philosophical distinctions because of the inability to contemplate. Without sustained periods of contemplation that engage the use of reason and involve the exploration of ideas, students are left with nothing more than transitory notions that are soon forgotten. Thus, the ability to contemplate is a first step in forming an organized philosophical vision that gives students clarity in thought and confidence about arriving at objective truth.

The importance of forming the *habitus* cannot be underestimated, therefore the *Decree* states: “These ‘habitus’ make it possible to think, know and reason with precision, and also to dialogue with everyone incisively and fearlessly.”⁶ Prior to *Pastores dabo vobis, Fides et Ratio*, and the *Decree*, Robert Sokolowski already recognized this important aspect in philosophical formation. “In philosophical education, we do not aim simply at providing certain bits of information or systems of knowledge. We must try to inform, but we must also try to cultivate a habit of philosophical insight. To think philosophically is not to become skilled at following a method or to become trained in applying an algorithm. It is to exercise a habit that needs to become part of the way we are. Educating someone to this end, helping someone to acquire an intellectual habit, is not a matter of simply handing something over.”⁷

For this reason, the Congregation emphasizes that an appropriate amount of time be exclusively devoted to the formation of the philosophical habit so that an excessive superficiality or philosophical eclecticism can be avoided.⁸ Without a well-formed *habitus* rooted in contemplation, the content of the philosophy curriculum risks being reduced to a mere aggregate of points in the mind of the student rather than the understanding of the unity of truth.

While the development of the *habitus* is critical in the philosophy curriculum, attention does need to be given to the content as well.⁹ The *Decree* was not the first or the only response regarding the content of the philosophical curriculum on the part of the Church. The current organization of the philosophical curriculum in Catholic seminaries has been influenced by a variety of movements and responses.

The predominantly Thomistic curriculum in the first part of the twentieth century at times gave way to a more eclectic curriculum in the second half of the twentieth century. The causes for this change have their origin in the strong influence of contemporary philosophies as well as the reduction in the number of independent academic college seminaries. As college seminaries closed or were reduced to “houses of formation,” the development of the philosophy curriculum was left to the local university. Unfortunately, with the strong influence of contemporary philosophy alive in most universities, the seminary curriculum was subject to the same eclecticism in many cases. The philosophical eclecticism of secular (and even Catholic) universities damaged the natural, internal *ratio* of the philosophical curriculum. As a result, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, many seminaries did not have a coherent program for philosophical formation. The lack of a clearly identified *ratio* led to the diminished appreciation of the purpose of the philosophy curriculum.¹⁰

In the fourth edition of the *Program for Priestly Formation*, (1992) the bishops of the United States required seminaries to have a minimum of twenty-four credits in philosophy, outlined the areas to be treated, and added that “the perennial philosophy of St. Thomas should be given the recognition which Church teaching accords it.”¹¹ This was an increase in requirements for many seminaries, especially those that did not require philosophy as a major for seminarians and at times only required eighteen credit hours. Soon after in 1993 Blessed John Paul II presented the Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation *Pastores dabo vobis* in which he forcefully re-established the importance of philosophy as a foundational part of the seminary curriculum.¹² With great clarity he noted that “a proper philosophical training is vital, not only because of the links between the great philosophical questions and the mysteries of salvation which are studied in theology under the guidance of the higher light of faith, but also vis-à-vis an extremely widespread cultural situation which emphasizes subjectivism as a criterion and measure of truth.”¹³

Pastores dabo vobis and *Fides et Ratio* have had a direct impact on the development of the philosophy curriculum in the United States. The fifth edition of the *Program for Priestly Formation* increased the minimum requirement of philosophical credits to thirty and also addressed a lacuna from the fourth edition, which did not mention the philosophy of nature.¹⁴

The recent developments in the content of the philosophy curriculum should not be viewed as an increase

merely for the sake of quantity. At the heart of the development is the awareness that the content of these courses have an inner coherence and purpose for the seminarian. Through the *historical courses* and *logic*, seminarians come to understand the powerful influence that philosophical ideas have on culture. It is not enough, however, to recognize these problems. Priests must also help the faithful to navigate through the culture so that their own natural capacity to think, distinguish, and believe can be strengthened. Through increased exposure and contemplation of the created world and being, seminarians come to understand *nature* and the basic principles of *metaphysics* so that teaching the mysteries of the sacraments carries an intelligibility that assists the faithful in receiving from the wellspring itself. Through sustained reflection on the nature of the *human person*, seminarians come to appreciate the unity within the human person, the capacity to know, the body/soul composite, and the foundation of *ethics*. These principles are essential, not only for the future priest’s ability to understand human nature, but also for the ability to understand and preach the mysteries of the Incarnation and the Trinity, as well as the dynamics of the Christian moral life.

The current situation manifests sustained efforts on the part of the Church to establish firmly the importance of the philosophical formation for seminarians who are moving toward theological studies and priesthood. Why is this significant, especially in relation to theology? “Unless a pastor’s presentation of the Christian mysteries is infused with the light of natural wisdom attained through philosophy, his efforts will not fully achieve their purpose; his people will respond to what he offers with only a part of themselves—with their emotions—but not with their minds, as well.”¹⁵

The Council documents, encyclicals and decrees, then, are doing much more than increasing the quantity of philosophical courses. They are re-establishing the value and purpose of philosophy itself. They are reinforcing the importance for seminarians to develop the habit of well-ordered and contemplative thinking so that they can speak with clarity about the damaging effects of relativism and subjectivism and preach with compelling force about new life in the Gospel. These important principles cannot be lost or ignored because they point to the purpose of philosophical studies, to lead students to understand the natural capacity of man to know, the freedom inherent in man, and the internal harmony between faith and reason.

PART II THEOLOGICAL STUDIES

The content and structure of theological studies in seminaries today is influenced by a variety of sources. Sacred Scripture, the Code of Canon Law, Conciliar documents, Apostolic Exhortations, and documents issued by episcopal conferences all contribute to the formation of the curriculum as it currently exists. In each seminary, faculty members study these sources in order to develop a curriculum that will assist priests to proclaim the Gospel with clarity, boldness, and love. As with philosophy, the theology curriculum also includes the important aspect of a *habitus* that forms the foundation for a deeper engagement on the part of seminarians with the content of the curriculum. If the *habitus* in philosophy is the contemplation of truth in the natural order, then how can we describe the *habitus* in theology?

Habitus and Content

On September 30, 2010, Pope Benedict XVI issued the Post Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, *Verbum Domini*. The exhortation indicated the importance that Sacred Scripture has in the life of the Church.¹⁶ In addition, among many important themes the exhortation highlights the centrality of Sacred Scripture as “the soul of theology.”¹⁷ The exhortation, along with the norms articulated in the *Program for Priestly Formation*, gives substantial guidance in the development of the theology curriculum.

It is understood that Sacred Scripture must have a principal role in the development of the theology curriculum, but the proper engagement with Sacred Scripture is a preamble to the authentic study of theology.¹⁸ The *habitus* in the theology curriculum may be understood as faith.¹⁹ Faith is “the point of departure and the point of arrival for theology, [and] brings about a personal relationship between the believer and Jesus Christ in the Church.”²⁰ In this case, the object of contemplation is the Word himself, and the habit of contemplation is deeply enhanced by *lectio divina*. There is an increasing interest in the use of *lectio divina* in seminary formation programs, but its value is not limited to spiritual formation. Its value has a direct impact on the quality of intellectual formation as well.²¹

Lectio divina is an important aid for all theological studies because it places the person in a posture of

receiving and hearing in anticipation of understanding and proclaiming.²² For this reason, *Verbum Domini* notes: “Those aspiring to the ministerial priesthood are called to a profound personal relationship with God’s word, particularly in *lectio divina*, so that this relationship will in turn nurture their vocation.”²³ The exhortation notes that this prayerful approach to Sacred Scripture should not create a barrier between prayer and study, but rather should “lead to an increased awareness of the mystery of divine revelation and foster an attitude of prayerful response to the Lord who speaks.”²⁴

Moving forward from the *habitus* of theology, the content of the theology curriculum has the unique task of achieving the goal of incorporating the other three pillars of formation so that the theological content informs the human, spiritual, and pastoral pillars of formation. The theological content of a seminary curriculum is not one-dimensional or highly specialized. In the training of seminarians, it is essential to have a well-formed priestly identity that is deeply rooted in God’s revealed word. The theology curriculum in a seminary, then, is unique because it has the task of developing an authentic theological habit in the student as well as a deeply rooted priestly identity that leads to pastoral charity. The realization of these goals occurs in all areas of formation, but they are linked to intellectual formation.²⁵

How is the content organized? As noted above in the philosophy curriculum, the composition of the curriculum is much more than a list of courses. The curriculum should be able to point to an internal coherence and a progressive development not only of theological principles but also priestly identity.²⁶ To that end, the first year in a theology curriculum is characterized by a focus on the Word of God and the formation of the seminarian as one who proclaims the Word and teaches the faith.²⁷ Courses in the first year of theology are foundational and historical by nature.²⁸ These courses clarify and strengthen the identity of the priest as the *prophet* or the *teacher*, and the formation in the first year underlines the recognition that “priests, as co-workers with their bishops, have the primary duty of proclaiming the Gospel of God to all.”²⁹

The second year of theology is characterized by theological formation that leads to a deeper identity of the priest who sanctifies.³⁰ Courses in the second year of theology remain foundational, but also point toward the identity of the priest as *sanctifier*.³¹ Pastoral and spiritual formation components compliment theology courses so that the seminarian recognizes that

“God, who alone is holy and who alone bestows holiness, willed to take as his companions and helpers men who would humbly dedicate themselves to the work of sanctification.”³²

The third year of theology is characterized by a focus on the identity of the *Shepherd* or *Leader*. Courses in the third year of theology are more specialized and complement the focus on leadership and proclamation.³³ The priest is the shepherd for the local community and participates in the work of Christ the Good Shepherd. The goal of theological coursework in the third year leads the seminarians to understand that “priests, in the name of the bishop, gather the family of God together as a brotherhood enlivened by the Holy Spirit.”³⁴

The final year of theology is characterized by a thorough *integration of theology that leads to pastoral charity*.³⁵ The curriculum is designed so that students have advanced theology courses and also practicum courses that demand the application and integration of theology in pastoral settings.³⁶ In addition to practicum courses, students should have an integrating or summative exam in theology so that they are challenged to form a solid theological vision.

CONCLUSION

Among the many important aspects of the seminary curriculum, recent ecclesiastical documents related to seminary intellectual formation highlight the importance of forming a deeply rooted *habitus* in the student as well as the coherent presentation of content that leads to a unified philosophical and theological vision. A well formed *habitus* in both philosophy and theology permits seminarians to appropriate the material in a more authentic manner. It creates a philosophical person, rather than a person who knows philosophical ideas. And the *habitus* forms a seminarian into a true disciple of Christ who not only wants to know about Christ, but also has a deep desire to know Christ himself.

The content of the curriculum is always more than just a list of courses. For the content to be effective, it must be linked at all times with the purpose of the program; otherwise the content of the curriculum loses its force and direction, leading only to confusion and disengagement. A curriculum guided by its purpose permits the seminarian to understand the content that

is presented as a unified whole. And ultimately, if the content is truly integrated in the life of the seminarian, it leads to an outpouring of pastoral charity. ✠

ENDNOTES

- 1 James Keating, *Resting on the Heart of Christ* (Omaha: IPF Publications, 2009). *Seminary Theology: Teaching in a Contemplative Way*, ed. James Keating (Omaha: IPF Publications, 2010). Todd Lajiness, “A Passion for Christ: Pedagogical Considerations for Roman Catholic Seminary Intellectual Formation,” *Seminary Journal* 15, n. 2 (2009): 31–42. Larry Brennan, “Serpents and Doves: Being Smart in the Service of the Church Today,” *Seminary Journal* 15, n. 2 (2009): 43–52.
- 2 *Program of Priestly Formation* (hereafter *PPF*), 5th ed., 163.
- 3 “Among the changes of the predominant culture, some particularly profound ones regard the concept of truth. In fact, there is often mistrust in the capacity of human intelligence to arrive at objective truth and universal truth—a truth by which people can give direction to their lives.” Congregation for Catholic Education, *Decree on the Reform of the Ecclesiastical Studies of Philosophy* (2011).
- 4 “Within Ecclesiastical academic institutions, a suitable philosophical formation must involve both intellectual ‘habitus’ (plural) and contents.” *Decree*, 11.
- 5 Josef Pieper, *Happiness and Contemplation* (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 1998), 73–75.
- 6 *Decree*, 11.
- 7 Robert Sokolowski, “Acquiring the Philosophical Habit,” *Theology Today* 44, n. 3 (1987): 325–26.
- 8 *Decree*, 15.
- 9 “The ‘habitus’ are, though, connected with the assimilation of firmly acquired contents.” *Decree*, 11.
- 10 The Church was not unaware of these problems. In 1972 the Congregation for Catholic Education issued the circular letter *The Study of Philosophy in Seminaries*. At that time the Congregation already noticed the negative influences of an eclectic philosophy as well as the heavy influence of a scientifically/technologically driven society. These factors destabilized the fundamental direction and purpose of philosophical studies. In a secular climate that focused on immediate results, the utility of man, and the invalidity of objective truth, the letter noted “it is no wonder that in this context many no longer can find a place for a philosophy which is distinct from the positive sciences.”
- 11 *PPF*, 4th ed. (1992), 234.
- 12 *Pastores dabo vobis* (hereafter *PDV*), 52: “A crucial stage of intellectual formation is the study of philosophy, which leads to a deeper understanding and interpretation of the person, and of the person’s freedom and relationships with the world and with God.”
- 13 *PDV*, 52.
- 14 The most recent decree by the Congregation requires an additional area of study, political philosophy, and this will undoubtedly have an impact on the next edition of the *PPF*.
- 15 Allen Vigneron, “Philosophy Studies in the Program of Priestly Formation,” *Seminary Journal* 11 (Spring 2005): 10.
- 16 *Verbum Domini*, 31: “The Fathers [of the Synod] acknowledge with joy that study of the word of God in the Church has grown in recent decades, and they expressed *heartfelt gratitude to the many exegetes and theologians* who with dedication, commitment, and competence continue to make an essential contribution to the deeper understanding of the meaning of the Scriptures.”
- 17 *Dei Verbum*, 24.
- 18 *PPF*, 198: “The various theological disciplines should recognize Sacred

Scripture as foundational and as the point of departure and soul of theology.”

- 19 *PDV*, 53: “St. Thomas is extremely clear when he affirms that the faith is as it were the *habitus* of theology, that is, its permanent principle of operation, and that the whole of theology is ordered to nourishing the faith.”
- 20 *PDV*, 53.
- 21 *PPF*, 136.
- 22 *Dei Verbum*, 1.
- 23 *Verbum Domini*, 82.
- 24 *Ibid.*
- 25 *PPF*, 138: “In the seminary program, intellectual formation culminates in a deepened understanding of the mystery of faith that is pastorally oriented toward effective priestly ministry, especially preaching.”
- 26 *CIC*, 519. [CIC refers to what?]
- 27 *Pastores dabo vobis*, 51; *Program for Priestly Formation*, 163.
- 28 Courses could include (but not limited to): Historical Books, Fundamen-

tal Theology, Church History, Trinity, Christology, Patristics, Synoptics, and Evangelization/Catechetics.

- 29 *Presbyterorum Ordinis*, 4.
- 30 *PDV*, 57; *PPF*, 236.
- 31 Courses could include (but not limited to): Spirituality; Pauline Literature; Christian Anthropology; Fundamental Morals; Sacramental Theology and Eucharist; and Ecclesiology.
- 32 *PO*, 5.
- 33 Courses could include (but not limited to): Psalms and Wisdom literature; Ecumenism; Advanced Homiletics; Sacramental Law; Pastoral Counseling; Bioethics; Parish Administration and Leadership; Holy Orders; and Sacraments of Initiation.
- 34 *PO*, 6.
- 35 *PDV*, 51; *PPF*, 163.
- 36 Courses could include (but not limited to): Johannine Literature; Spiritual Direction; Penance and Anointing; Sexual and Social Teaching of the Church; and Marriage.

How Liturgy Transforms: Cult and the Renewal of Catholic Culture

The Mass of the Ages

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The best way to understand what an institution believes is to observe what its members do. Parents of young children instinctively know this. A mother who wishes to learn what her local elementary school thinks about discipline does not first ask to see a handbook, but a classroom. What does Miss Smith expect from her students during reading lesson? The surest way to find out is to watch her conduct one. The same is true for doctrine. Few people have a healthy appetite for academic theology, but most Catholics periodically do find themselves in a pew. What do they observe? It is here, in the church, in its architecture, its sacred images, its candles, its incense, its music, its priests, its people—in short, it is through all the stone, color, smell, sound, and movement which gives form to the liturgy—that believers and unbelievers alike discover what Catholics think about the glory of the Lord.

Unlike Protestant worship, Catholic liturgy never simply looks to the past. There is no lost golden age

for the Church. Through the sacraments Christ is present to the Church no less today than when he walked through Jerusalem. The Sacrifice of the Mass, whereby Christ’s continual presence through the liturgy is made present, is that action most highly regarded by Roman Catholics and at the same time the most severely scorned by unbelievers. To the incredulous the worship of a tiny wafer is just one more testament to how deep into darkness the religious imagination can sink. But to Catholics it is otherwise. Admit that there be a God, and it follows that he could visit the world; admit that he came once robed in flesh, and why not a thousand times more in bread. As John Dryden (1631–1700) has it in *The Hind and the Panther*, published one year after his conversion to Roman Catholicism in 1686:

Could he his god-head veil with flesh and blood
And not veil these again to be our food?
His grace both is equal in extent,
The first affords us life, the second nourishment.²

In the Roman empire Christians regularly had to defend themselves against the charge of cannibalism, as

Athenagoras did before Marcus Aurelius in 176 AD. (*Apology*, 31–36). Perhaps the earliest account of Christian worship is offered by St. Justin Martyr, who did so in a letter to the pagan emperor Antonius Pius around the year 155 AD. In Justin’s *First Apology* the basic structure of the Mass is already manifest. We have the reading of the Apostles’ writings, the homily, intercessory prayer, a kiss of peace, and then, “someone brings bread and a cup of water and wine mixed together to him who presides over the brethren.” The rite concludes with thanksgiving, with prayers, and with the bread and wine consumed.³ This haunting sacrifice has been a continual source of strength for Christians down the centuries. As Blessed John Henry Newman wrote of Catholic worship in his 1848 work *Loss and Gain*:

...to me nothing is so consoling, so piercing, so thrilling, so overcoming, as the Mass, said as it is among us. I could attend Masses for ever and not be tired. It is not a mere form of words, —it is a great action, the greatest action that can be on earth. It is, not the invocation merely, but, if I dare use the word, the evocation of the Eternal. He becomes present on the altar in flesh and blood, before whom angels bow and devils tremble. This is that awful event which is the scope, and is the interpretation, of every part of the solemnity.⁴

It is a fact not unrelated to the collapse of Catholic culture that few among us experience worship that answers to this description. For laypeople, perhaps the most disappointing effect of the liturgical reform has been a lessening of expectations as to what liturgy will accomplish for the life of a believer. Simply put, there are fewer and fewer Catholics who think it worth their while to show up on Sunday morning. In English-speaking Canada, for instance, in 1957 weekly attendance for Catholics was 75 percent; by 1975 that figure had fallen to 48 percent; as of 2005 29 percent of Catholics fulfilled their Sunday obligation.⁵ Weekly church attendance among Catholics in the United States follows a similar pattern, but remains higher at 38 percent; in the United Kingdom it sits at 17 percent, in France at 12 percent.⁶ Why this waning interest in Catholic ritual?

Among the several causes, I wish to focus on our deficit in understanding, and this in two senses. First, much contemporary debate over the liturgy often overlooks or misappropriates the contributions (positive and negative) of the modern liturgical movement, of which *Sacrosanctum Concilium* is a crowning achievement. Sec-

ondly, and perhaps equally unfortunate, the purpose and function of liturgy and its relation to other aspects of the Church’s mission have often been misunderstood. Liturgy and the sacraments are the continuation of Christ’s incarnation among us. Indeed, according to the *Catechism*, the Church most supremely acts for the salvation of the world in her worship. There is an ancient expression which says that the *lex orandi* (the rule of prayer) and the *lex credendi* (the rule of belief) are mutually informing. Said otherwise, “The Church believes as she prays” (CCC 1124). Inasmuch as our actions flow from our beliefs, then our rule of prayer has the power to shape culture as well. In what follows I hope to illuminate how this is true, and why, from the point of view of the near collapse of Catholic culture, it is crucial that we relearn how to defend that claim. Since liturgy, our immersion in the web of sacramental signs, transforms faith, every action that disturbs cult produces an equal and often disastrous effect on culture. Revive cult, and culture will eventually follow.

Liturgy since Vatican II

Both the theory and practice of Catholic worship have been the objects of experimentation in the decades since the Council. Any evaluation of the gains and losses that have attended Catholic worship since the reforms of Vatican II would have to take into account the larger Liturgical Movement of which the Council was in many respects the fruition. As a way into our discussion it will be useful to offer a brief history of the phases of this movement.

The modern Liturgical Movement can be divided into three phases. The first phase began in the eighteenth century; the second went from the late nineteenth up to Pius XII’s encyclical on liturgical reform, *Mediator Dei*, in 1947; and the third was from 1948 to the eve of the Second Vatican Council. Prominent in the nineteenth century were figures such as Dom Prosper Guéranger (1805–1875), the refounder and Abbot of the famous French Abbey of Solesmes, and, in the twentieth century, the Munich-based theologian Romano Guardini (1885–1968). The English liturgical scholar Alcuin Reid concludes in *The Organic Development of the Liturgy* (2005) that in general the movement aimed at restoring liturgical piety in the faithful. What did this mean? In practical terms, priests promoted active participation in the liturgy by distributing liturgical books among the laity. Throughout the nineteenth

century, publishing houses produced all manner of devotional materials: there were books to aid prayer in the home; during the 1860s congregational singing of Gregorian chant was encouraged in Italy; a Latin-French missal was published in 1882; and studies like Guéranger's fifteen-volume (unfinished) "L'Annee liturgique" and his 1885 collected conferences *On the Holy Mass* sought to bring the faithful closer to the prayers of the Church.⁷ The Church's pastors hoped that a more intelligent participation in the liturgy would help counteract the secularizing influence of the modern age.

Ironically the call for the "active participation of the faithful" has been deployed for opposite purposes. *Sacrosanctum Concilium*, the Second Vatican Council's constitution on the liturgy, and following this, the *Catechism*, certainly affirm that "Catholics should have full, conscious, active participation in the liturgy."⁸ However, *participatio actiosa* quickly became identified with external movement rather than an interior action, prayer. Where the older Liturgical Movement had sought to increase the participation of the faithful by a deepened understanding of the prayer of the Mass, the more recent trend simply encouraged people to become busy, and along the way to blur the distinction between priest and people. If laypeople are going to participate in the Mass, so the thinking goes, then not everything should be left to one man. To be involved is to *do* things like reading, welcoming, directing, and even distributing communion. In the name of the Council many have taken this tiny phrase to endorse everything from the destruction of church altar railings (so that everyone can see), to the exclusive reliance upon the vernacular (so that everyone can listen), to the call for women's ordination (so that everyone can consecrate). Rather than communicate a democratic impulse, what *participatio actiosa* urged was a deepening of the spirit of prayer.⁹

Grabbing hold again of the thread of our history, not every feature of the Liturgical Movement was unproblematic. Early on it was recognized that certain elements of the movement were congruous with Catholic tradition. In fact, parts of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liturgical renewal were less a reaction against the Enlightenment critique of revealed religion than a product of that critique. Some liturgists sought to rationalize the rites, adapting them as though they were merely "instruction and moral admonition."¹⁰ These wished to move Catholic liturgy closer to Protestant worship. Already in 1840 Guéranger cited twelve features of the growing antiliturgical heresy that threatened to undermine authentic renewal of Catholic worship.¹¹ Among

these include: a false archaeological excavation of the past which seeks to "reproduce divine worship in its original purity" while disregarding later liturgical tradition (no. 4); the removing of ceremonies that leads to a loss of the mystical element of the liturgy (no. 5); the exclusion of the cult of the Blessed Virgin Mary and the saints (no. 7); the insistence on the use of the vernacular (no. 8); the desire to shorten the liturgy (no. 9); and the downplaying of the distinction between the priesthood of believers and the ministerial priesthood (no. 11).¹²

Pope Pius XII's 1947 encyclical, *Mediator Dei*, and even the Second Vatican Council echoed many of these same concerns. For instance, Pius XII cautioned against "exaggerated and senseless antiquarianism" that had become attractive to some within the Liturgical Movement.¹³ Liturgy could not be reconstructed simply from looking at the past. He warned against innovations in liturgical art. It would be disastrous, for one, to hang crucifixes "so designed that the divine Redeemer's body shows no trace of His cruel sufferings."¹⁴ In terms of language, he held up the use of Latin as "a manifest and beautiful sign of unity" in the Church.¹⁵ With respect to piety, he encouraged devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, to the Virgin Mother of God, as well as pilgrimages and like traditional practices.¹⁶ Following this, the Council's Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy (1962) taught that although other forms of music could be admitted, Gregorian chant was to retain "the pride of place";¹⁷ while it would be of advantage to allow for a greater use of the vernacular especially in readings, prayers, and chants,¹⁸ Latin was "to be retained in Catholic liturgies."¹⁹ Finally, though some adaptations were desirable, "there must be no innovations" unless absolutely required. The chief criterion for revision was to be as follows: "any new forms adopted should in some way grow organically from forms already existing."²⁰ No doubt partly as a response to recent arbitrary innovations we find this principle articulated within the *Catechism* itself. Since liturgy is a constitutive element of holy living, "For this reason no sacramental rite may be modified or manipulated at the will of the minister or the community."²¹ Commenting on this text, Pope Benedict has called these "golden words" which "come from the depths of genuine liturgical understanding."²²

Having restated many of the principles of the Liturgical Movement, *Sacrosanctum Concilium* did not present itself as an innovative document. Some have argued, nonetheless, that there is a gap between the Council document and the liturgical texts that came out of it. Almost immediately after the liturgical commission be-

gan introducing texts of the new rite, alarms sounded. Some felt that what had been unleashed in the *Novus Ordo* was alien to the spirit and express intention of the Liturgical reform movement. Thus, in 1968 the Oratorian scholar Louis Bouyer (1913–2004), whose work had been influential at the Council, wrote that under the pretext of “adapting” the liturgy, the liturgy had been destroyed:

Perhaps in no other area is there as great a distance (and even a formal opposition) between what the Council worked out and what we actually have. Under the pretext of “adapting” the liturgy, people have simply forgotten that it is and can only be the traditional expression of the Christian mystery in all its spring-like fullness.²³

Others found it particularly baneful that the priest should have to face the people. In a correspondence to Evelyn Waugh, Cardinal Heenan of Westminster speculated rather sardonically as to what this new turn in direction might mean. “The Mass is no longer the Holy Sacrifice but the meal at which the priest is the waiter. The bishop, I suppose, is the Head Waiter and the Pope the Patron.”²⁴

These were not isolated protests. In 1988, in response to the dissatisfaction felt by many and in recognition of the twenty-fifth anniversary of *Sacrosantum Concilium*, Pope John Paul II issued the Apostolic Letter *Vicesimus Quintus Annus*. There he addressed some of the more egregious liturgical abuses that had become manifest. Apparently, a growing number of priests felt the need to be more responsive to their parishioners. In view of what were named as the pastoral needs of the people, some took to exercising creativity within the liturgy. John Paul II warned that “the right to compose Eucharistic prayers” and “to substitute profane readings” in place of Scripture did not belong to the authority of the priest (3). It did not belong to any individual, for that matter. Liturgical developments, he concluded, could only proceed as “the organic growth of a tree” which grows stronger “the deeper it sinks its roots into the soil of tradition” (23). Not only traditionalists have bemoaned this loss of reverence. More recently even the (former) Belgian primate Cardinal Daneels, an architect of the progressive movement within the Church since the 1960s, has acknowledged that liturgy has become an object of widespread clerical abuse. He has reflected on how in the past rubrics dominated everything. “For want of being enlightened,” priests formerly executed their actions with (in his view) a “puerile” obedience.

The Cardinal fears that today the reverse is the case: “it is the liturgy which must obey us and be adapted to our concerns, to the extent of becoming more like a political meeting or a ‘happening’.”²⁵ That description, of course, does not fit every priest or every liturgy. But it does describe the experience of many Catholics.

Just prior to his election Cardinal Ratzinger reflected on his own profound sense of disappointment at the subversion of the aims of the older Liturgical Movement. The Movement which gave birth to the Council’s liturgical reform sought not to remove mystery from ritual but heighten it, to offer it new breath. At its best, what the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century liturgists sought to overcome was a false reductionism, a false rationalism whereby ritual was simplified to an absolute minimum. In contrast, the Liturgical Movement had emphasized that ritual developed within a living network of Tradition. As Ratzinger wrote: “Anyone who, like me, was moved by this perception at the time of the Liturgical Movement on the eve of the Second Vatican Council can only stand, deeply sorrowing, before the ruins of the very things they were concerned for.”²⁶

Not only the words, but also the settings of worship have suffered. For reasons of pastoral concern or the desire to build community, liturgists through the 1970s and 1980s often uncritically adopted assumptions of modern philosophy and theories of art. First: instead of respecting the principle of the organic development of the liturgy, ritual was subject to sudden and dramatic alterations; and, as in the case of the priest’s turn toward the people, changes often were based on dubious historical research. Second: as already mentioned, instead of promoting a deeper spirit of prayer, active participation heightened activity and lessened the distinction between the priesthood of the baptized and the priesthood of the ordained. These disruptions in cult, it seems, go some distance toward explaining why worship has become less interesting for Catholics. Consider the loss of Latin. Instead of uniting us to the past, and so giving us a vantage for judging the future, a wholly vernacular liturgy sounds a lot like everyday life. It becomes more parochial. Instead of uniting us to the words and syllables spoken on the lips of St. Augustine and St. John of the Cross, St. Thomas More and St. Thérèse of Lisieux, our prayers sound like the conversation at the office, and lessens our communion with believers who speak foreign languages. If we use everyday language we should not be surprised when ritual becomes mundane.

Alongside the loss of the sense of the organic development of the liturgy, and of the proper dispositions of laypersons, we can mention one other. Many of us have forgotten why Catholics worship at all. We have forgotten not only the sacrificial nature of the Mass but also how the Mass relates to the soup kitchen. Hence, a third false conclusion about liturgy: the tacit assumption that good works or instruction are more valuable than ritual. With the shift, particularly to the latter, the priest's role tends to grow exponentially. Undoubtedly the casual approach of many priests to the liturgy has made the modern Church less dynamic. If you no longer see yourself as the servant of a tradition but its master, no longer believe that the rubrics veil a mystery, that the soul requires truth to be wrapped in the garment of beauty, then quite reasonably you are likely to treat the Mass more as a gathering of friends than as a sacrifice of God. Others catch on. Most move on. And, insofar as liturgy is mined for alien purposes, its capacity to excite as the source and summit of our salvation diminishes.

The story has not ended there, of course. For those communities and individuals that have remained attached to the older forms of Catholic liturgical piety—or are discovering them anew—the Pontificate of Benedict XVI has offered great encouragement. For a start, in most dioceses the worst of the liturgical experimentations appear to be over. In a growing number of parishes the *Novus Ordo* is said with faithful attention to the prescribed forms as set forth in the *General Instruction of the Roman Missal*. The International Committee on English in the Liturgy (ICEL) has recently approved an improved translation of the ordinary form of the Mass.²⁷ Additionally, if Benedict XVI's influence will be felt by young priests and seminarians, it will not be long before parishioners once again expect their clergy to read Latin and sing Gregorian chant.²⁸ And, since the Holy Father's 2007 *motu proprio*, *Summorum Pontificum*, there are no longer any canonical restrictions on Catholics who wish to celebrate Mass according to the 1962 Missal. That is to say, there remain only practical restrictions. Even though the Tridentine Mass has been restored and given once again “due honor for its venerable and ancient usage,”²⁹ finding a willing and able priest remains a barrier. Still, as the number of young people who wish to worship according to the extraordinary form of the Latin rite increases, as is particularly the case among university students, so too will access to it.

In what remains I wish to explore why it is that the *Catechism* regards worship as the Church's most im-

portant work. According to the *Catechism*, when priests (and laity for that matter) set aside the forms of the liturgy they not only display a lack of reverence, they undermine the foundation of the Church's mission. It is for this reason that among the most urgent tasks in the renewal of Catholic culture is what the Dominican theologian Fr. Aidan Nichols has called the “re-enchantment of the liturgy.”³⁰

Liturgy in the mission of the Church

After recounting some of the recent history of liturgical practice and theory, we have placed ourselves in a better position to consider why the Church takes liturgy to be at the heart of its mission. It will be useful to begin with a definition. In the ancient world a liturgy (*leitourgia*) was a public work, usually performed by a wealthy citizen on behalf of the community. So, for instance, when Athens prepared for war it was incumbent upon richer citizens to outfit the battleships. A *leitourgia* may also include the sponsoring of a dramatic festival or an athletic team, or the production of a chorus.³¹ In Christian usage this basic sense is retained and given a precise application. A liturgy is still a public service. Now, however, God is the primary actor. Sometimes you will hear it said that liturgy is the “work of the people.” This is a misunderstanding. It is the *Totus Christus* (the whole Christ) who acts in liturgy. The work of the Body is wholly dependent upon the work of Christ, our Head. According to the *Catechism*, liturgy is “the participation of the People of God in the ‘work of God’”; and, through liturgy “Christ, our redeemer and high priest, continues the work of our redemption in, with, and through his Church.”³² Christ is the primary actor, though he acts with and through us.

So, in Christian usage we might say that liturgy retains the form of the classical definition, as a work of the people, but the meaning of those words is inverted. We do not perform a service because we are witty, wealthy, or wise. Unlike in the classical sense, the work is Christ's, and our personal initiative is not required. This is why, in relation to the misapplied understanding of *active participation*, as Cardinal Ratzinger emphasized that the Council called not for external action, but for a greater spiritual attention to the action of God in the Mass. “The real ‘action’ in the liturgy in which we are all supposed to participate is the action of God himself.”³³ As Pope Benedict XVI has reiterated the same:

“It should be made clear that the word ‘participation’ does not refer to mere external activity during the celebration.”³⁴ We share in the work of God but in the way that a string shares in the flight of a kite, or in the way that a glove shares in the work of a hand. We do not take the lead. We are not asked to be creative. Our will must will to conform; there are genuflections to make and chants to sing. We can allow ourselves to be pulled by the twitch of the finger or the toss of the wind, but we cannot generate these motions. Our part in the work of God is essential, but it is secondary.

There is another feature to the definition of liturgy. We already saw that Christ works “in, with, and through his Church.” Further on we discover that this presence is manifest in some activities more than others. There exist degrees of presence. A friend is certainly present to you on your birthday when he sends a gift in the mail. After you open the card, see his script, and read his words, you smile. But that presence can intensify. Once John and Judy crash through your front door, sit down at your table and eat your cake, then you will laugh. The body makes a difference.

Like some noisy friend, God is forever banging on our door. He gave us birth, and then sent us an invitation to the birthday party of his Son. But as every host knows, celebration requires preparation; in this case it took a few thousand years to complete. The history of Jewish cult is the record of God’s setting the table, preparing the world for the vast feast that all the nations would attend. The ceremonial codes regulating Jewish worship told the people in a hundred ways that there were hot points, peaks along the vast and lonely plains where they might look for God in the desert. As we know, once the Jews finally did arrive in Jerusalem, one site was set apart, the Temple. Its inner precincts became, as it were, the rod which God established amidst the Jews so that they would have some way of anticipating when and where the lightening would strike.

In the transition between the two covenants Jesus’ body replaces the Temple. Few at his death understood the meaning of Christ’s words. As George Herbert imagines Christ to say,

Some said, that I the Temple to the floore
In three dayes raz’d, and raised as before.
Why, he that built the world can do much more . . .
(*The Sacrifice in The Temple*, 1633)

Christ is that conducting point. According to the traditional formula, once a person is baptized he or she shares in the triple “offices” of Christ. The offices describe the

means by which we participate in the divine life; they point to the threefold manner by which Jesus Christ fulfilled the Jews’ messianic expectations; and they are essential to understanding the purpose of liturgy.

The three offices are prefigured by the three modes of mediation in the Old Testament. First, God established the ministry of priesthood. This office or ministry was the means by which satisfaction and atonement for sin could be made. Everything about the priestly ministry—the times, the places, the material, and the manner of sacrifices—is revealed by God and legislated for the people (cf. Lev. 16). The sacrificial system was integral to Israel’s Law. What the Law taught the Jews was how to gather light and heat from the fire without being consumed, how to live in the midst of a holy God. Remember too that “Torah” (designating the five books revealed through Moses) means, above all, the *way of life*. What God revealed on Mount Sinai was how his people were to approach God; conduct followed cult. If you are to be a holy people, then you must do *this* and not do *that*. God reveals ethics so that the people can properly worship. You need only think of the structure of the Ten Commandments: by design the laws that regulate society come after the laws that satisfy God. In the Old and New Testaments cult comes first, then community.

The second mode by which God mediated his presence was by the ministry of the prophets. Unlike the priestly caste—which all came from the Levites—you never knew where prophets might arise. They appear in unexpected circumstances, in the midst of humiliating exile (as Isaiah did during the Babylonian captivity); or knocking on the king’s door (as Nathan did at King David’s palace); or speaking out of the lips of an ass (as Balaam discovered). They might wander in the desert or disappear in an explosion of fire; they might foretell judgment or promise mercy, but what is common to the prophets is this: with one voice they preached fidelity to the law. God would be faithful to his promises, if only his people would remain faithful to theirs. There is development in Israel’s understanding of the meaning of the Torah, certainly, but the prophets are forever at its service, threatening, warning, pleading, so that the people might come back to the covenant. Finally, there is the ministry of the kings. It was under doubtful circumstances that the Lord allowed Israel to have a king at all. The people, we are told, wished to have a king “so that they might be like the other nations” (cf. 1 Sam. 8: 5–18). As a concession God permitted them one. Then, bringing good out

of evil, the prophets began to foretell that God would send to the people a king who would also be a savior. The anointed one, this “Christ,” would be a king of the line of David, though one superior to him. In other words, a growing expectation developed in the last centuries before Christ that not only would God send a king, but that he would rule and serve like no other king. Somehow, God would make an appearance. He would arrive, as Isaiah said, as Emmanuel, God with us (cf. Mt. 1:23; Is. 7:14).

Now, the first disciples believed that Christ was this savior. They believed that in his own person Jesus fulfilled the hopes of the Old Testament: all the expectation the Jews had for a more intimate communion with God, for a more complete fidelity to the Law, and for a more perfect ruler. When Christ told the Jews that before Abraham was born “I AM,” he knew (as they also knew) precisely what he was saying. By that title Jesus identified himself with God (cf. Jn 8:58; Ex. 3:14). Which is why the leaders called him a blasphemer. What Christ was saying was not merely that he mediated God’s presence, not merely that he taught God’s word, not merely that he ruled by divine authority, but that he was all these things combined: he was the expected priest, the expected prophet, and the expected king. Jesus in his person literally was *God with us* to a degree that stretched beyond the imagination of some of the Jews; and so they hanged him.

Why does any of this history matter? It matters because God’s way with the Jews established certain lines of communication which would be continued in the age of the Church. Therefore when the Church teaches that Jesus fulfilled the triple offices of priest, prophet, and king, it asserts that he mediates God’s presence in a maximal way. Now, I think, we can answer why the Church elevates liturgy among its ministries. The pattern of God’s redemptive activity did not alter between the covenants. The triple offices of the Old Testament correspond to the three ministries within the Church. In worship the Church performs its priestly office; in proclamation the prophetic; and in service, the kingly.³⁵

Given this theological trajectory it is clear that each office is essential to the Church. You could hardly imagine that prayer was all that was required of Catholics, any more than you could think that you had only to read books, or serve at a soup kitchen. Each work is necessary. Still, there is an order. Herein lies a clue, I think, as to why much of contemporary Catholicism has lost its power over culture. We often fail to discriminate between the *types* of presence. God is indeed

everywhere present; but he is not present everywhere in the same manner or to the same degree. And as it happens he has taught us where we will maximally find his power acting in the world. There exists an objective ordering among the ministries of the Church. As the *Catechism* relates, it is in the Church’s priestly service that Christ acts most “efficaciously” and “in the highest degree.” This is traditional Catholic teaching. Lest anyone imagine it is antiquated, we note that the doctrine was expressed also at the Council. The *Catechism* quotes at length from the Second Vatican Council’s *Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy*:

The liturgy then is rightly seen as an exercise of the priestly office of Jesus Christ. It involves the presentation of man’s sanctification under the guise of signs perceptible by the senses and its accomplishment in ways appropriate to each of these signs. In its full public worship is performed by the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ, that is, by the Head and his members. From this it follows that every liturgical celebration, because it is an action of Christ the priest and of his Body which is the Church, is a sacred action surpassing all others. *No other action of the Church can equal its efficacy by the same title and to the same degree.*³⁶

Liturgy is an exercise of the priestly office of Christ, and it is through worship that Christ (through the Church) acts most powerfully in the world. We began by posing the question: Why do so many Catholics stay in bed on Sundays? Here is one answer. Having permitted indifference to rubrics, having perpetuated a new clericalism, having promoted a misguided activism, we have deployed the liturgy for alien purposes and now too often reap what some have sown. Since liturgy forms faith and is God’s favored means of dispensing grace, every act of disregard for the liturgy is an insult to or, rather, an assault upon the faith. The primary role that liturgy has in forming character and communicating God’s grace is one reason why Benedict XVI has dedicated much of his pontificate to restoring dignity in our corporate worship. The Church cares about sharing, but giving to charities is evidently not a believer’s highest act of worship. ✠

ENDNOTES

- 1 John Dryden, *The Hind and the Panther*, bk. 1, ll. 134–37.
- 2 CCC 1345; quoting from St. Justin Martyr’s *First Apology* 65–67.
- 3 Newman, *Loss and Gain: The Story of a Convert* (London: Longmans,

- Green and Co., 1906), 327–28 (part 2. chapter 20).
- 4 For these figures see Reginald Bibby, *Restless Gods: The Renaissance of Religion in Canada* (Toronto: Novalis, 2004), 20, and “The Catholic Situation in North America: Magnificent Opportunities, Breathtaking Responsibility,” *Journal of Mission Studies* 14 (2007): 69–84.
 - 5 These statistics are reported on the CARA website (the Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate) at Georgetown University, <http://cara.georgetown.edu>, accessed on 27 May 2011.
 - 6 Discussed in Reid, *The Organic Development of the Liturgy*, 62–67.
 - 7 CCC, 1030; citing SC, #23.
 - 8 On this see Ratzinger’s *The Spirit of the Liturgy*, 171–77, and *Sacramentum Caritatis* 52.
 - 9 See J. Jungmann, S.J., quoted by Reid, *The Organic Development of the Liturgy*, 53.
 - 10 Cf. *Institutiones liturgiques* 1:408–14.
 - 11 Reid, *Organic Development of the Liturgy*, 58–9
 - 12 MD, #64.
 - 13 MD, #63.
 - 14 MD, #59.
 - 15 MD, #55.
 - 16 SC, #21.
 - 17 SC, #16.
 - 18 SC, #24.
 - 19 SC, #23.
 - 20 CCC, 1125.
 - 21 Ratzinger, *On the Way to Jesus Christ*, 154.
 - 22 Louis Bouyer, *Decomposition of Catholicism*, trans. C. U. Quinn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1969), 105.
 - 23 John Carmel Cardinal Heenan, “Letter to Evelyn Waugh, August 28, 1964,” in *A Bitter Trial: Evelyn Waugh and Cardinal Heenan on the Liturgical Changes*, ed. S.M.P Reid (Curdrige: St. Austin Press, 1996), 48; cited in Rowland, *Ratzinger’s Faith*, 138.
 - 24 Quoted in Fr. Jonathan Robinson, *The Mass and Modernity: Walking to Heaven Backward* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), 31.
 - 25 See Ratzinger’s preface to Reid’s *Organic Development*, 11.
 - 26 The improvements exhibited within the new translation are, chiefly, threefold: a preference for a more elevated over a colloquial style (e.g. *Et cum spiritu tuo*, from “And also with you” is now, “And with your spirit”); a more accurate rendering of the text itself (e.g. the three-fold repetition *Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa* is preserved, as opposed to, formerly, the single line, “through my own fault”); the new translation is more faithful to the theological nuances present in the original (e.g. *Agnus Dei qui tollis peccata mundi*, is now “...you take away the sins [peccata] of the world” as opposed to, in the old version, merely *sin*—in the singular—which presumably intended to minimize the individual character of sin in favor of its collective nature. See the early comment on IECL’s revision given by Michael Gilchrist, “New Improved English Mass Translation Nears Completion” in *AD2000* 17, no. 6 (July 2004): 3.
 - 27 As in *Sacramentum Caritatis*, his Post Synodal Exhortation on the Eucharist: “Speaking more generally, I ask that future priests, from their time in seminary, receive the preparation needed to understand and to celebrate Mass in Latin, and also to use Latin texts and execute Gregorian chant.” (62).
 - 28 *Summorum Pontificum*, art. 1.
 - 29 Nichols, *Christendom Awake*, 21
 - 30 “Liturgy” in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* 3rd ed., eds. S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth (OUP 1996).
 - 31 CCC, 1069.
 - 32 Ratzinger, *The Spirit of the Liturgy*, 173.
 - 33 *Sacramentum Caritatis*, #52.
 - 34 CCC 1070, 1072.
 - 35 CCC, 1070; quoting SC, #7.2–3 (emphasis mine).

A Note on Some Misapplications of *Presbyterorum ordinis* 16

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In discussing the Western clerical obligation of perfect and perpetual continence (1983 CIC 277), some critics of continence for married clergy assert that the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council held for the “equality” of the sacraments of matrimony and holy orders among married priests and, based on this alleged conciliar recognition of sacramental “equality,” go on to argue that continence cannot be required of clerics who were married at the time of their ordination. These critics point to (among other texts) Article 16 of the conciliar decree “On the

Life and Ministry of Priests,” which states in part: “This holy synod . . . exhorts all those who have received the priesthood and marriage to persevere in their holy vocation.”¹ Article 16 of *Presbyterorum ordinis* is cited as a source for Canon 277 §1 and therefore warrants proper appreciation when interpreting the law; it does, I think, seem to lend some support to the claim that marriage and holy orders are “equally” important for married priests.

Several objections militate, however, against one’s accepting the claim that the Second Vatican Council was holding in *Presbyterorum ordinis* 16 for the equality of marriage and holy orders among Western married clerics and, based on this alleged equality, did away with

the obligation of continence for married clerics. I will discuss these objections below, but I think it important to recognize that the basic possibility of the Council's having mitigated the continence obligation for married clerics is reasonably put forward.

If there were ever a time in Western Church history favorable to relaxing the expectation of continence among married clerics, it was in the mid 1960s, that is, just when the Second Vatican Council was in session and when *Presbyterorum ordinis* (1965) was being drafted. The great Funk–Bickell debate of the 1870s seemed long settled with Funk, innocent of connivance with, but nevertheless taken in by, the Paphnuntius myth,² claiming victory against proponents of the apostolic origins of clerical continence, and leaving them, or so it seemed, with little more than medieval positive law, suspect cultic-rigorisms, and pious sentiments on their side for the next eighty or ninety years.³ As the conciliar Fathers began their formal considerations of clerical celibacy, *none* of the major historical and canonical studies demonstrating the ancient origins of clerical continence—save for a single article on diaconal continence by then Monsignor Alfons Stickler (1964)—was yet available, including Liotta (1971), Cochini (1981), Cholij (1989), Cardinal Stickler (1995), and Heid (2000). How the Council managed, then, to resist the strong and persistent calls, both from within the Church and from without, for reconsideration of the whole question of clerical celibacy, is difficult to explain in purely human terms.

Now, for those objections. They are three.

First, as a general comment, parsing conciliar statements too finely risks isolating from their proper contexts and saddling them with eisegetical conclusions. Here, to take but one example, one might, by reading PO 16 too literally, understand the conciliar Fathers to be assuming that all married men in holy orders must be in *sacramental* marriages, in which “holy” vocation they should persevere. As a basic question of fact, however, a conclusion for the sacramentality of all married clergy's marriages would have been outside the ken of the Council; as an assertion of canon law or pastoral practice, it is simply not required of Catholic men that they enter only marriages that are *sacramental* (as opposed to being *valid*), nor is it necessary that married men approaching holy orders be in a *sacramental* marriage.

Scholion One, *sacramental* marriage versus *valid* marriage. Canon law (1983 CIC 1055 § 2, *olim* 1917 CIC 1012 § 2) regards all, but only, those marriages between

two baptized persons as *sacramental*. The Church discourages (at least formally) marriages between Catholics and non-baptized persons, but insofar as marriage is a natural institution, she recognizes the effects of natural marriage (such as intrinsic indissolubility, discussed below) when one of her sons or daughters enters such a marriage *validly*, and demurs only in regard to those effects of marriage directly dependent on its *sacramentality* (such as extrinsic indissolubility, discussed below).

If one hesitates, and one should hesitate, to ascribe to the conciliar Fathers the assumption that all married men in holy orders were necessarily in *sacramental* marriages, then one should also hesitate to ascribe to the Fathers the claim that they regarded matrimony and holy orders as “equally” operative in a married cleric's ministry.

Second, and related to the importance of reading conciliar texts in their proper context, the passage from PO 16 cited above was written while the Pio-Benedictine Code was in force. Canon 132 §1 of 1917 Code imposed on married clerics (and by implication their wives) the obligation of “chastity” or what today would be called “perfect and perpetual continence.”⁴ This grave obligation was unanimously recognized by canonical commentators at the time,⁵ and it faithfully reflected the ancient and unbroken tradition in the Western Church.⁶ Unless one wants to defend, then, the position that the conciliar Fathers did not know what the 1917 Code said, or how it was understood by all commentators thereon, or what the Western tradition had long held in regard to married men admitted to holy orders, one should be reluctant to construe conciliar *silence* here in regard to the specific clerical obligation of perfect and perpetual continence other than as *agreement* to it. Qui tacit consentire videtur. *Regula Iuris* XLIII, in VI°.

Scholion Two, the *legal* effects of continence in marriage. Marriage comes into effect upon the legitimately manifested exchange of consent by persons capable in law (1983 CIC 1057 § 1, *olim* 1917 CIC 1081 §1). Such marriage is *intrinsically* indissoluble and remains so until the death of a party thereto. Upon consummation between baptized spouses, marriage becomes *extrinsically* indissoluble. (1983 CIC 1056, *olim* 1917 CIC 1013 § 2; 1983 CIC 1061, *olim* 1917 CIC 1015). Continence is, in short, irrelevant to the establishment of a true, *intrinsically* indissoluble marriage (witness Our Lady and St. Joseph); after consummation between baptized spouses, continence is irrelevant to the *extrinsic* indissolubility of a Christian marriage.

Third, and here we underscore the importance of having resort to what the Council *said* when attempting to understand what the Council *meant*, the English translation of *Presbyterorum ordinis* 16 cited above is incorrect. What is rendered in English as “This holy synod . . . exhorts all those who have received the priesthood and marriage to persevere in their holy vocation” reads in the official Latin: “Sacrosancta haec Synodus . . . omnesque illos . . . hortatur, qui in matrimonio presbyteratum receperunt, ut, in sancta vocatione perseverantes.”⁷ Plainly, the English translation proposes *two* grammatically equivalent direct objects of the verb “received,” namely, “priesthood and marriage,” while the Latin original proposes only *one* direct object for the verb “recepterunt,” namely, “presbyteratum,” while referring to marriage in a prepositional phrase “in matrimonio”. A correct English translation of the Latin original should read something like “This holy synod . . . exhorts all those who have received the priesthood in marriage [or ‘while married’ or ‘in the married state’ or ‘after marriage’] to persevere in their holy vocation.”⁸

Nothing in the official text of *Presbyterorum ordinis* 16 disparages marriage, of course, but neither does anything therein support treating the two sacraments as “equally” operative in a married cleric’s ministry. Indeed, knowing that the priesthood is, by definition, a “holy” vocation (as opposed to “marriage,” which might or might not be a “holy” vocation for certain married persons), and knowing of the grave obligation of continence obliging all men in holy orders, the passage from PO 16 cited above could just as easily—and indeed more consistently with tradition—have been the offering of a loving exhortation to married priests to preserve in their “holy vocation” of priesthood,⁹ in *all* of its demands, including that of surrendering a cherished right within marriage.

Arguments about the alleged sacramental “equality” of marriage and holy orders in the ministry of married clergy, and subsequent assertions against clerical continence based on that alleged “equality,” to the extent they rely on a flawed English translation of *Presbyterorum ordinis* 16, must be abandoned. ✕

ENDNOTES

- 1 This translation is offered at the Vatican website: http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decree_19651207_presbyterorum-ordinis_en.html.
- 2 Paphnuntius was alleged to have been an Egyptian hermit and/or bishop

and/or confessor and/or close friend of the Emperor who, so the story goes, spoke to great effect at the Council of Nicaea in dissuading the Council Fathers from legislating more expressly for clerical continence. To Paphnuntius, some Western writers in the Middle Ages (though not, curiously, Eastern authors, who have avoided the story) began to look for an explanation of the Eastern practice of temporary (as opposed to perfect) continence. The episode, though unknown to historians for more than one hundred years after Nicaea and openly questioned by Pope Gregory VII in 1077, provided Funk much fodder for his arguments against Bickell. Since the mid-1960s, however, following Winkelmann, most scholars have concluded that the entire Paphnuntius story was “a progressive hagiographical confabulation.” See Christian Cochini, *The Apostolic Origins of Priestly Celibacy*, trans. N. Marans (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990), 197. See also, e.g., Alfons Maria Stickler, *The Case for Clerical Celibacy*, trans. B. Ferme (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995), 62–65.

- 3 Thomas McGovern, *Priestly Celibacy Today* (Scepter/Four Courts, 1998), 34–35.
- 4 1917 CIC 132. § 1. Clerics constituted in major orders are prohibited from marriage and are bound by the obligation of observing chastity, so that those sinning against this are sacrilegious, with due regard for the prescription of can. 214 §1. My translation.
- 5 On the uncontested nature of the Pio-Benedictine obligation of continence for married clerics, see Edward Peters, “Canonical considerations on diaconal continence,” *Studia Canonica* 39 (2005): 147–180, available online at http://www.canonlaw.info/a_deacons.htm, esp. 156–162.
- 6 On the continuity between the 1917 Code and Western tradition here, see generally Alfons Maria Stickler (Austrian prelate, 1910–2007), *The Case for Clerical Celibacy*, trans. B. Ferme (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995), from Stickler’s *Seine Entwicklungsgeschichte und seine theologischen Grundlagen* (1993).
- 7 Sacrosanctum Oecumenicum Concilium Vaticanum II, Decretum de Presbyterorum Ministerio et Vita *Presbyterorum ordinis* (7 decembris 1965), *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 58 (1966): 991–1024, at 1015, or id., *Constitutiones, Decreta, Declarationes* (Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1966), 619–678, at 662–663.
- 8 The Vatican website is almost alone in using this flawed English translation. I find it elsewhere only in the collection of conciliar documents published by the Daughters of St. Paul in 1999 (though not in their 1967 edition). English translations offered in the well-known collections of conciliar documents assembled by Austin Flannery, O.P., and Walter Abbott, S.J., are more faithful to the Latin. The French, Spanish, Italian, and German translations of PO 16 as posted on the Vatican’s website (http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/index.htm) also seem more reflective of the Latin text than is the English translation posted there.

That there are serious mistranslations of important ecclesiastical texts, even on the Vatican website, provokes no crisis of faith, of course, nor even especial concerns for administrative competence. Mistranslations happen, and flawed texts will circulate. Indeed, the specific error outlined above is not the only significant mistranslation in this rendering of PO 16. Consider, for the Latin “Sacrosancta haec Synodus . . . omnesque illos peramanter hortatur, qui . . .,” the Vatican English translation reads, “This holy synod . . . permanently exhorts all those who . . .” The impression of a council, which takes place within a specific time period, trying “permanently” to exhort others to do something, is jarring. It is also unnecessary: the Latin adverb *peramanter* does not mean “permanently,” but rather “most lovingly” or “very kindly.” Thus, the English translation should read something like “This holy synod most lovingly exhorts all those who . . .”

- 9 That priesthood was, in fact, *the* vocation the Council Fathers had in mind in this phrase is taken as certain by Friedrich Wulf, in H. Vorglimmer, ed., *Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II*, 5 vols. (Herder and Herder, 1967–69), 4:183–297, at 285.

Missing the Forest for the Trees? Spousal Sacrament and Eucharist

by Marie P. Loehr
Free Lance Writer

This is my body, given up for you . . . this is my blood . . .
shed for you and for many . . .

—Consecration of the Mass, *St. Joseph Daily Missal* 1963

Both the man and his wife were naked, but they felt no shame.

—Genesis 2:25

Questions have been raised about the wisdom and propriety of linking the Eucharist and its communion with matrimony's conjugal union. It is not only liberals and modernists who recoil from John Paul II's theology of the body and its explication. Many otherwise staunchly orthodox Catholics have stated misgivings or even a sense of outraged piety at this juxtaposition. The Eucharist is sacred. The Eucharist is spiritual. How dare we intimate that conjugal union is linked to it, or equate conjugal union in the act of love with it? One is the apex of spirituality, the other is the epitome of physicality, however sanctified or qualified by the sacrament of matrimony. Do those who espouse this position really understand what they are saying?

If we are called to “restore all things in Christ,” and we are, and if Christ came to “make all things new,” and he did, then we need to take a second look at this issue. We need to step outside liberal or conservative, modernist or traditionalist, strident or shrinking viewpoints. We need to examine the issue from the new and deeper perspective John Paul opens to us in his theology of the body.

Some essential realities have been in danger of being ignored in the various controversies over John-Paul II's long-needed theology of the body. A full development of the nature of the body, its sexuality, and its relation to spirit and Spirit in man and woman was long overdue. It was a providential *kairos* when John Paul began his profound explication of the sacramentality of the human body.

A true theology of the body was necessary, is necessary, will always be necessary in order to defend matri-

mony and holy orders in their essence as spousal sacraments. The problem for us is simple. Human beings are neither pure body, merely animal, nor pure spirit, merely angel. We are amphibious creatures with one foot in the material and temporal, and the other in the spiritual and eternal, as Aquinas says. We are body fused with soul, infused with spirit. Part of our image and likeness to God is in that soul, an immortal spirit with intellect, free will, and the personality such attributes imply.

No matter how we try, we cannot avoid the fact of our bodies. They, like all Creation, come from God. Our bodies and all Creation, material and spiritual, are gifts of God, contained in God in some way, yet separate from him at the same time. There is nothing that exists that does not come from God, that is not held in being by him, save sin. That includes not only his Creation, but our own human creations as well. That includes our sex and sexuality. All our confusions and corruptions of sex, sexuality, and spirit are due to the original sin, and the essence of its actual temptation and consequences.

The original temptation was “to be as gods” or God. To “be as gods” means to be free in the angelic sense. It means to be rid of the limitations and constraints of material Creation, to shed the body and its exigencies. This freedom is akin to angelic movement and apprehension of essence directly, as well as a certain amount of power over material Creation and its plasticity. We still seek this freedom from the constraints of body in our own time.

Incarnate being is made to be a fusion of matter and spirit. Nothing more, nothing less. It cannot live as pure spirit, any more than a fish can live out of water. God warns man of this, at the beginning. If you eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, you will die. Is this an arbitrary punishment, a tyrannical burden?

Not at all. It is simple truth.

What is death? It is the separation of soul from body. The final separation is what we narrowly call death. The spirit leaves the body. The body collapses into its original amorphousness, as undifferentiated humus. But this is far too narrow a definition of death. God is not simply referring to *that* ultimate separation and dissolution.

Genesis reveals that sin *at its root* is the attempt to shed the limitations that body causes for spirit. From the beginning sin loosens all the God-ordained bonds between body and soul. Incarnate being loses its original integrity, its wholeness as a body/spirit unity. Thus sin truly darkens the mind and weakens the will, because it separates them, however partially, from the direction of in-forming spirit.

Because that bond of integrity and integration has been severed by sin, because we disdained the body in order to ape “pure spirit” at the beginning, sin inevitably provokes in us a perpetual animus against the body. Sin deforms and corrupts all our understanding and experience of body. We exalt the soul and dismiss the body in our mind and actions throughout history. Even Catholics often have the idea that in death we finally escape the prison of the body, as the pagans believed so often. Ascetic discipline is not seen as one means that can lead us to re-integrate body and soul. It is seen as an escape from, or control over, the incessant demands of the ever-nagging body, i.e., the original sin all over again.

But everything God made is good. He sees human being as very good, the apex of material Creation, the bridge between material and spiritual Creation. He so values incarnate being that he enters it. He pitches the tent of his body and his being among us—one with our flesh.

BODY is important to God. Most of humanity finds it difficult to accept this.

If original sin and our fall began in a secret contempt for body and its purpose, redemption proposes to restore the God-created integration of body with spirit, to “make . . . new” the *sacramentality* of body, its total integration and integrity with and in created spirit and the Spirit of God.

How can we know this?

We know it because Christ rubs our noses in the humus of humanity.

He enters Mary’s womb—so often regarded as an impurity and defect by pagan peoples. He empties himself of his glory, and puts on our flesh, becomes a man like us in all things save sin. This “save sin” is manifest in his refusing sin’s contempt for body, by his living in our flesh, by transfiguring it into a banner of glory in his passion, death, resurrection, and ascension.

Redemption is all about body. It is first and foremost Christ’s Incarnation—his becoming man, his putting on flesh and in so doing honoring it. This truth is seen and lived in the Eucharist, above all.

One of the great canards of the fempriest move-

ment was that women as well as men must be ordained—because we are all equal in God’s sight, they insisted. Spirit is not constrained by the philosophical accidents of flesh and its outward forms, they said. Therefore, since we are all one in the Spirit, since the Eucharist is spiritual, women can be ordained to the priesthood in the Roman Catholic Church, they asserted. Women, as well as men, must be ordained, they demanded.

They came to this conclusion because they were confused in their understanding of both spirit and Eucharist. Not at all coincidentally, this too is *déjà vu*, the original sin all over again: the refusal to be constrained by the body, in the name of spirit. This attitude is in fact denigration of the body itself, and the incarnate Christ especially.

Those pious Catholics, however learned and orthodox, lay or religious, who recoil from explications of the theology of the body that explicitly relate Eucharistic communion to matrimony’s conjugal union, the becoming two-in-one-flesh as partners and parents, are in danger of promoting the same error as the radical religious feminists. The Eucharist is spiritual. Conjugal union is physical. They claim it irreverent and disrespectful of Christ and Eucharist to associate them so closely with conjugal acts of love. This position is actually dangerous to the Church and its nuptial relation to Christ.

The Mass and the Eucharist are indeed spiritual. But they are almost embarrassingly bodily, as well. They are all about eating Christ’s flesh and drinking his blood so that we may have life in us—life that is a new creation, a re-integration of body/spirit union: in the Body of Christ himself. We cannot put this too strongly. Christ put it so bluntly that many left him crying, “This is a hard saying!” It is all about putting on Christ’s flesh, as he has put on ours.

When we receive communion, we receive the Body and Blood, Soul and Divinity of Jesus Christ, Word-made-flesh, Son of God, son of Mary, second Person of the Blessed Trinity.

We receive him in the *most intimate union* of all—his body enters our flesh as food. It is assimilated into our bloodstream. It flows into every cell of our body. His blood flows through our blood stream. This is mystical, yet absolutely real. The blood of all those who receive with us, all those who are part of his Body, the Church, are by this means all united, a single body in the intimacy of his own humanity and Divinity.

There is no more integral union and communion than in that deepest point of intimacy, the Eucharist—

and the pierced Eucharistic Heart of Christ.

This is the essence of redemption. Christ enters our flesh so we may enter his. He achieves his redemptive end as much by his Body and Blood, as by his Soul and Divinity. We cannot separate those elements. To do so is to fall into either the unredeemed carnality of body and the fertility rites of the ancient peoples, or the equally unredeemed gnosticism and jansenistic contempt for body that deforms the belief of some putatively devout baptized Catholics.

In this union of divinity and humanity in Christ, in the communion that is Eucharist, we see the essence of spousal sacrament—the total communion and communion of marriage in body and spirit. We cannot separate them and still remain Catholic.

The *Canticle*, part of the Scriptural canon inspired by the Holy Spirit, opens with the Bride sighing, let him kiss me with the kisses of his mouth. So all the great mystics of every era yearned in their passion for God. When we receive Christ in the Eucharist in holy communion, this is in fact Christ kissing us with the kisses of his mouth, entering our body/spirit as person.

The Eucharist is generative, in its integration and intimacy, in its union and communion, in its unitive and life-giving totality. It begets new life in each one of us, soul and body. This generative initiative and activity in us make it the template for what we may truly call spousal sacrament, whether matrimony or holy orders. If we do not defend the Eucharist in its bodily integrity and totality, if we do not see its spousal reality—“this is my body given up for you,” “this is my blood poured out for you,” we cannot defend either heterosexual marriage or male priesthood properly.

Why?

Because they are not rooted in the created order alone. They are rooted in Trinitarian commitment, communion, and creativity. Being itself, God, is the fountainhead and source of all life and love—and the union/communion that life and love presuppose.

In the current debate over how to present John Paul’s lucid and luminous explication of the sacramentality of the body, let us not be holier than the pope. Let us not be—God forbid!—more “spiritual” than God himself, as more than a few commentators are in danger of becoming. Christ in his humanity, i.e., his body, is always-already, now and forever, present in the Trinity. If we believe Mary was assumed bodily into heaven, as we are bound to, her human body, its flesh, is also beside her Son in God. She is also *in* her Son, in God, the Trinity, which *is* heaven, in fact.

This is not the damaged, sin-darkened, sin-weakened body we know in our own temporal lives.

Our bodies, however redeemed in Christ, must live out the penalty and purgation of sin. Our risen, glorified bodies will still be material bodies, in some transfigured manner, as Paul says. We will put on incorruptibility. We will know total integrity and integration of body/spirit. We will shine like stars. If we think about it, we know scientifically that our bodies are in fact always in the process of converting mass to energy, and energy to mass. Einstein’s formulation is a scientific statement of the Hebrew definition of *kabod* or *hevod*—glory. Glory is both weight and light for the Hebrew understanding, which translates into mass and energy in modern terms.

The glorified body in which we rise receives its full weight of glory, illuminated by its soul. And its soul is lit at its core by the Spirit. Because yes—Being in Parousia will be a true revelation of incarnate being’s intended nature as ark, tabernacle, temple of the Spirit. So our sexuality—our bodily and spiritual capacity for union—will be revealed in glory as an icon of the Trinity. In the Body of Christ, in Parousia, we too—with God, the angels and the saints—know “distinction in person, oneness in being, equality in majesty” in ourselves as well as in one another and the Trinity.

We do well to remember that the Pharisees were perpetually scandalized by Christ’s seeming irreverence and his apparent gluttonous, wine-bibbing, harlot-consorting behavior. They saw this as mere carnality, because they viewed Christ through carnal eyes.

If we are not careful, we may follow them down this mistaken path. We are quite capable of burning down the forest of John Paul’s great and providential theology of the body. We are capable of that in our petty attempts to prune what we see as weeds (without knowing weed from flower or fruit), i.e., methods of explication that offend our particular sensibilities.

In our zeal for reverence and propriety, let us not reduce John Paul’s teaching on the body and its sacramental reality to ashes. That plays into the hands of both gnostic modernism and jansenistic traditionalism—both in heresy and denial. Nothing would please those extremes of false piety more than to see the theology of the body go up in flames, consigned to the ashes of doctrinal history. Right now, the axe may not be laid to the root of the trees in this life-giving forest, but the matches appear to be lit! And those waving them appear all too ready to torch the theology of the body in this season of spiritual confusion. ✠

Broken Family Law *Guidelines and Fixes*

by Ron Grignol and Michael T. Ross

“The rights of man come not from the generosity of the state, but from the hand of God.”

John F. Kennedy, 1961

Since John F. Kennedy spoke these inaugural words, out-of-wedlock births skyrocketed from 5.3 percent to 40.6 percent of all births (by 2008) as society abandoned marriage. In just five decades, the United States has established laws and policy incentives that encourage low rates of marriage and high rates of cohabitation, non-marital birth, divorce, and broken families—less Mom and Dad and more government social services. “Same-sex marriage” now dominates modern discourse; but as important as this debate is, it obscures how the tragedy of the decline of marriage afflicts children and parents, spouses and families, and all of our society with profound consequences.

An interdisciplinary group of social scientists, scholars, and legal professionals wrote *Marriage and the Public Good: Ten Principles* to underscore the value of marriage in society today.² These encapsulate the rational foundation of protection that marriage provides for children, men, and women, and for the enduring economic, social, and legal integrity of a free society. Reason and empirical evidence tell us that the best and most cost effective social welfare agency is married parents raising their own children.

Preserving the natural family and its untold benefits to society should be a major priority for both law and public policy. Applying fundamental principles to reforms that support the protections marriage offers children, adults, and the common good is the most cogent way to reverse the negative trends of the past forty years, strengthen the economy long term, and safeguard civil liberties.

The goals of reform are to support marriage, reduce divorce and cohabitation, and assure next best outcomes for children who must grow up without the benefits of married parents. Rewarding responsible behavior is the means for accomplishing these goals.

Four Outcomes Of Divorce Law

Divorce law determines by agreement or judicial ruling these four outcomes:

- 1) Property settlement—division of property or assets accumulated during marriage;
- 2) Spousal support—a monthly sum paid by one spouse to another to make up for lost income after divorce;
- 3) Child custody—the percent of time a child is in one parent’s care; and
- 4) Child support—a monthly payment from one parent to another to support child rearing needs.

With the removal of fault-based divorce, each of these four outcomes required a new basis for legal adjudication, but rational guidelines serving everyone affected by the divorce outcomes, least of all the children, were not forthcoming. Custody and support adjudications no longer based on fault often rewarded irresponsible behavior. This now-intractable pattern has led to a rapid rise in divorce, devaluation of marriage, soaring rates of cohabitation and non-marital births, and children losing the substantive benefits of growing up with two parents.

Property settlement soon shifted to an equal 50–50 property split. Without fault, spousal support became harder to justify, and many states made it difficult to obtain. The effects of these substantive changes in marriage and divorce law heightened financial vulnerability for spouses who earn less and, particularly, for parents who limited their earning potential for the benefit of the family or worked only at home. These changes weakened the protections offered by marriage, particularly for women.

Child custody became the most difficult divorce outcome to adjudicate. When these changes were occurring forty years ago, marriage was more traditional, with a breadwinner father and a stay-at-home or part-time working mother. Replacing fault-based standards, vague custody guidelines emerged that measured Mom and Dad against each other in a contest of which parent was best. Evolving judicial practice assigned “primary”

custody to the parent who spent more time with the children, while granting the full-time working parent “visitation” on alternate weekends and two weeks in the summer.

Rising divorce and non-married birth rates resulted in rising single-parent families and a corresponding demand for government assistance. Political pressure mounted for taxpayer relief of the climbing costs of single parent families. Federal and state legislation designed to recover state welfare payments paid to single parents by collecting child support from absent parents, rapidly evolved into a publicly supported child support “assurance” policy for middle and upper income parents, whether married or not.

As millions of children populated one-parent homes, child support awards rose in middle and upper income levels. At the same time, total government assistance payments increased for lower income parents. Having kids outside of marriage became more doable and attractive. Today, child support often exceeds the costs of raising children. This might be justified if custody, which is linked to support, were granted to the more responsible parent. Adding inflated child support to arbitrary custody decisions, however, often subsidizes irresponsible behavior and family break-up.

Regardless of marital status, advantages in child custody and support offer powerful incentives for parents who expect the courts will give them custody, to decide against marriage with the children’s other parent. After a custody determination or divorce, the parent with custody expects to see the kids regularly and often receive high child support.

As families break-up, courts usually award primary custody to one parent. Typically, these children experience substantively diminished contact with their other parent. For millions of children growing up in the United States, their only contact with a parent is with the one who holds custody. Changes in American divorce law outcomes over the past four decades have removed incentives for parents to use marriage as the stabilizing anchor for family relationships. Modern family life has become increasingly characterized by children growing up without two parents at home. Cohabitation has increased seventeen fold since 1960³ and is gaining ground over marriage for adult relationships between men and women who conceive children together. Unfortunately, 90 percent of these relationships fail.

Children whose parents cohabit or divorce typically grow up in the custody of their mothers and have lim-

ited contact with their fathers. Women now file for over two-thirds of American divorces.⁴

Given the huge benefits for children of growing up with married parents, it is remarkable that America’s courts routinely adjudicate divorce and custody without recognizing any measure of responsible behavior among spouses and parents with respect to the outcome that is best for the children. The more responsible spouse is better equipped to handle the difficult challenges of single parenthood. The more responsible spouse needs and deserves protection with respect to property distribution and spousal support, to better balance work and child-care decisions based on what is best for the family. At the same time, children benefit from seeing fit parents a significant amount of time.

Outlined below are responsible spouse and fit parent guidelines that offer advantages in child custody, property settlement and spousal support including at least 50 percent of child custody and 60 percent of property settlement. Fit parents receive at least one-third of child custody.

Responsible Spouse Guidelines Improve Other Reforms

This solution achieves the goals of family law reform but may be combined creatively to improve the effectiveness of at least three major reform ideas: 1) Mutual Consent Divorce, 2) Mandatory Waiting Periods, 3) Shared Parenting.

Mutual Consent Divorce

No-Fault Divorce law in all fifty states empowers one spouse to impose divorce upon the other *unilaterally*. Mutual Consent law requires both spouses to agree to divorce terms before divorce may be granted (unless fault is proven) and thereby effectively reduces divorce. New York, for example, had a divorce rate of only 38.7 percent in 2008 under its former Mutual Consent statute; in 2010, it abandoned its Mutual Consent statute to adopt No-Fault Divorce like neighboring states with higher divorce rates, New Jersey (56 percent) and Connecticut (60 percent).

Rather than adopt No-Fault Divorce, New York could have enhanced its Mutual Consent law by adding guidelines that instead would have given responsible spouses an advantage by default on each of the four divorce outcomes. Two examples illustrate this point: Suppose a husband leaves his stay-at-home wife to live with another woman, or a wife takes a couple’s

children and moves in with another man. Under mutual consent divorce, the responsible spouses may divorce, but in the first case, the responsible mother may not get spousal support and is unlikely to receive more than 50 percent of the property settlement; in the second case, the court is unlikely to give the responsible father more child custody time. Providing an advantage by default strengthens the negotiating position of the more responsible spouse. This favors the possibility that the couple may choose to reconcile and the likelihood of a better parenting outcome for the children should they divorce.

Mandatory Waiting Periods

Another approach to reform requires spouses to wait a year or longer after filing for divorce before it is granted. Divorce rates in Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Illinois, which have waiting periods, are about half that of the highest divorce states. Reconciliations are more likely because waiting periods allow couples to understand they may be making a mistake.

Currently, the full effectiveness of waiting periods is limited because states with waiting periods decide custody and child support well before divorce is granted. Maryland, for example, requires couples to wait a year to get a divorce, and two if contested, but decides child custody within a few months, long before the waiting period expires.

If custody is decided unjustly, which is a common occurrence, the responsible spouse resents the legal system and his or her spouse, conditions hostile to reconciliation. The spouse granted custody and child support feels vindicated and will likely harden the position leading to the divorce action. In contrast, with a responsible spouse guideline, the better negotiating position of the responsible spouse would give the other spouse more incentive to reconcile. This would make waiting periods more effective in further reducing divorce.

Shared Parenting

Shared Parenting asserts that a child needs and does best with both Mom and Dad, even in cases of divorce and unmarried parents, but both parents must be fit. Shared parenting is consistent with empirical evidence on what's best for children.

Texas is the only state that provides children defined time with each parent in custody determinations. Mom and Dad, if fit, each get a minimum of approximately one-third custody time and the judge decides the remaining one-third. This is about twice the average time

given to non-custodial parents in other states, an outcome clearly much better for children. The Texas statute specifies in great detail how custody will be implemented, but has no provision for giving more custody to the responsible parent. As in other states, perverse incentives often cause children to spend less time with their more responsible parent. Although Texas children do better when married parents break up, the law does not significantly reduce divorce or cohabitation.

The responsible spouse guidelines below incorporate a simplified feature of Texas law, giving children a minimum of one-third time with each parent, but they increase the minimum to half-time for a fit parent who is also a responsible spouse. This achieves the guideline goals of:

- (1) reducing incentives for divorce and cohabitation; and
- (2) *in the tragedy of family break-up*, assuring that children spend most of their time with the more responsible parent but have significant time with the other parent.

Responsible Spouse Guidelines

The proposal outlined below provides custody and divorce guidelines based upon the simple legal concepts of *Responsible Spouse and Fit Parent* (See Tables I & II below). The *Responsible Spouse* designation in a divorce suit requires that a spouse must:

- 1) *Choose* to remain married if neither spouse has proven fault (*Fig. 1*);
- 2) Be without a proven fault. ‡

A *Fit Parent* is one who is not abusive or neglectful of his or her children. The guidelines acknowledge that property settlement and spousal support apply only to married couples.

FIG. 1 FAULTS PROVEN BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE

- 1) Adultery
- 2) Felony Activities
- 3) Abuse of spouse or minor children, neglect of minor children;
- 4) Abandonment
- 5) Alcohol or drug addiction
- 6) Knowingly providing false evidence or testimony against the other spouse

‡ *If one spouse has proven fault, the guideline allows the spouse without fault to seek divorce and still be designated the responsible spouse.*

Linking the definitions to ranges for each of the four divorce outcomes produces comprehensive yet manageable guidelines that still allow discretion in adjudicating unique circumstances of individual cases. Only two conditions apply:

- (1) a spousal or divorce agreement submitted to the court by mutual consent takes precedence over the guidelines; and
- (2) clear and convincing evidence must support all findings used in the tables.

Clear and convincing is a higher standard of proof used in civil cases involving high stakes, and is needed to combat false claims.

For married parents, the most common scenario is one parent that is responsible while the other parent is fit. In this case, the judge would be required to give the responsible parent from half to two-thirds child custody time (for example 7 to 9 of fourteen overnights)

and the other parent from one-third to half the child custody time (5 to 7 of fourteen overnights). The judge controls 17 percent of the custody time.

The responsible spouse designation is stronger than the fit parent designation, in that the judge can give less than one-third time if he explains in writing why. The responsible spouse receives at least 60 percent of the property settlement with the judge deciding the remaining 40 percent. Only the responsible spouse can receive spousal support if otherwise eligible.

When parents are unmarried or both married spouses commit fault, neither parent satisfies the responsible spouse designation. Provided both parents are fit, each is guaranteed one-third of child custody time. The judge decides the remaining one-third based upon the unique circumstances of the case. Neither at-fault spouse would be eligible for spousal support; the judge decides 100 percent of the property settlement.

Table I. Responsible Spouse Guidelines for Divorce Outcomes

	D I V O R C E O U T C O M E S B Y P A R E N T A L C A T E G O R Y			
Responsible-Spouse/Fit-Parent Categories	% Child Custody Time	% Property Settlement	Spousal Support Eligible	Child Support Eligible
Category M1 Parent A: Responsible and Fit Parent B: Not Responsible <i>but</i> Fit % Outcome decided by Judge	50-67 33-50 17	60-100 0-40 40	Yes No None	Yes No None
Category M2 Parent A: Not Responsible but Fit Parent B: Not Responsible but Fit % Outcome decided by Judge	33-67 33-67 33	0-100 0-100 100	No No None	Child Support Tables Applied to Final Custody Decision
Category M3 Parent A: Responsible and Fit Parent B: Not Responsible or Fit % Outcome decided by Judge	67-100 0-33 50	60-100 0-40 40	Yes No None	Yes No None
Category M4 Parent A: Not Responsible or Fit Parent B: Not Responsible or Fit % Outcome decided by Judge	Lose Custody Lose Custody 100	0-100 0-100 100	No No None	No No Parents Pay According to Child Support Tables

Table II. Custody Guidelines for Unwed Parents

CUSTODY OUTCOME BY PARENTAL CATEGORY		
Unwed Parent Categories	% Child Custody Time	Child Support Eligibility
Category U1 Parent A: Fit Parent B: Fit % Outcome decided by Judge	33-67 33-67 33	Child Support Tables Applied to Final Custody Decision
Category U2 Parent A: Fit Parent B: Not Fit* % Outcome decided by Judge	33-100 0-33 67%	Child Support Tables Applied to Final Custody Decision
Category U3 Parent A: Not Fit Parent B: Not Fit % Outcome decided by Judge	Lose Custody Lose Custody 100	No No Parents Pay According to Child Support Tables

**In this instance, judicial discretion would determine if parenting time is appropriate or if another relative or significant other may supervise or share this portion of custody time.*

These guidelines give advantages in divorce to responsible spouses. These advantages and their predictability favor choices for marriage over divorce. The guidelines discourage cohabitation because married couples benefit most. In the tragic circumstance of divorce, responsible spouse guidelines provide children next best outcomes to married family life because they will spend more time with a responsible parent while still spending significant time with both fit parents in most cases. Mom and Dad, though imperfect, offer their children far more than any social welfare system our huge, faceless government could ever expect to match. Implementing responsible spouse guidelines like these is one of the most critical imperatives for protecting children and empowering responsible parents in the twenty-first century. ✖

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ENDNOTES

- 1 President John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C., January 20, 1961 <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/Inaugural+Address+January+20+1961.htm>.
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- 4 Margaret F. Brinig and Douglas W. Allen, "These Boots are Made for Walking": Why Most Divorce Filers are Women," *American Law and Economics Review* 2 (2000): 126-169. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=713110/>.

And the Word became Flesh...

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We live in a time in which there is a saturation of words and methods of communication. It is said that some of the current high school and college age students think of email communication as archaic, and text messages are now being taken over by Facebook and Twitter. It is most interesting that each mode of communication develops its own nuances, with symbols, abbreviations, and innovative terms such as “de-friend.” Language changes, meaning shifts, and dialogue may become fragmented among those who speak the same “language” because they do not understand a word or phrase in the same way. There is a longing for relationship; for communion in community. However, for some, the use of the internet as a means of communication becomes the occasion for virtual pseudo-relationships, replacing dialogue with an imaginary monologue (e.g. avatar games, internet pornography).

One might consider an analogy between communication and the development of root systems in plants. When a plant is in an environment that supplies ready access to water and nutrients, the root system tends to be closer to the surface of the soil; it may proliferate in a horizontal pattern, and thus the plant would not be deeply rooted. If confronted with a storm of wind or rain, it is very susceptible to being uprooted, or at least easily damaged. In contrast, when a plant does not have resources supplied in abundance, it will expend energy to develop a deeper and fuller root system as the plant roots grow toward areas in the soil to access water and nutrients. The plant is more stable and able to sustain itself through wind and rain, since even if the “visible” aboveground portion of the plant is damaged, it will continue to grow if the root system is deep and stable.

The new English translation of the third edition of the Roman Missal has a relationship to that of a deep-rooted, stable plant. For the first time, those who do not understand Latin will have access to the theological depths and treasury of the liturgical celebration of the Mass, and in time, the prayers that accompany the rites of the sacraments. It may not be easy for those who are more accustomed to contemporary communication,

since it will require some expenditure of energy to look more deeply into the mystery of our faith in order to realize the full, active, and conscious participation that was so longed for by Saint (Pope) Pius X. For many, it will be a long awaited gift and provide them with words that will unite them in dialogue with God the Father through the one Mediator, Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit. There will be rejoicing in the renewed understanding that “the sacred liturgy is the public worship which our Redeemer as Head of the Church renders to the Father, as well as the worship which the community of the faithful renders to its Founder, and through Him to the heavenly Father. It is, in short, the worship rendered by the Mystical Body of Christ in the entirety of its Head and members” (*Mediator dei* [MD], 20). Others may find themselves discovering for the first time the meaning of the Holy Mass. This discovery will incite a desire to learn more in order to participate more fully in worship that is “in Spirit and truth” (John 4:24).

God willing, before November 27, 2011, many will have participated in workshops to assist in preparing for the implementation of the new English translation of the Roman Missal. Most of these conferences prepare the faithful by including some fundamental facts about the historical development of these “changes” in the Mass. We must recall that it is God who acts during the Mass, and we participate in this great mystery. The act of God has not changed; it is the way in which we are invited to participate that is modified. Thus, as we have the privilege to embrace the newly translated English texts, we would be in error to assert that sanctification was not possible with the initial translation of the prayers found in the Mass. God is greater than our human efforts or translational theories, and the initial translation was simply that: an initial translation. We may recall the words of Pope Pius the XII in the encyclical *Mediator Dei*, that have been echoed in various ways by both Blessed Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI: “the Church is without question a living organism, and as an organism, in respect of the sacred liturgy also, she grows, matures, develops, adapts and accommodates herself to temporal needs and circumstances, provided only that the integrity of her doctrine be safeguarded” (MD, 59).

The underlying reason for a new translation is to continue the work of the Second Vatican Council

to bring about the renewal of the liturgy of the Roman Rite. The use of formal equivalence instead of the translational theory of dynamic equivalence communicates more visibly that the liturgy is not merely a system of rubrics or external actions, but the integration of dogmatic teachings of the Church that are interwoven in the prayers of the Mass and have been handed on to us for centuries. The entire Liturgical Movement was motivated by the inspiration that the faithful needed to know what they were praying in order to participate more fully in this great mystery, and thus be more disposed to the grace of the Holy Spirit for the transformation of their lives and more enthusiastic about contributing toward building a civilization of love. The intention was not to replace so-called rubricism with “activity” during the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. The Holy Spirit guides the Church; we now have the gift of the complete reform of the liturgical books (the last to be reformed was the Rite of the Funeral of the Pontiff and the Rite of the Conclave); we have the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* and recently even *YouCat* (the catechism for young people) to guide and teach dogma, so we are better prepared to receive the “formal translation” of the prayers of the Mass. The *Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy* was the first document promulgated by Vatican Council II on December 4, 1963, because much work in this area had already occurred. Similarly, we might realize that we are better prepared to understand that “the sacred liturgy is intimately bound up with doctrinal propositions which the Church proposes to be perfectly true and certain, and must as a consequence conform to the decrees respecting Catholic faith issued by the supreme teaching authority of the Church with a view to safeguarding the integrity of the religion revealed by God” (MD, 59).

Many have been very involved with the preparation for the new translation of the Missal, and have offered conferences to assist the faithful in receiving it. However, this is only the beginning, since on November 27, 2011, when the faithful have the opportunity to more fully understand the prayers of the Mass, there will be a need for deepening catechesis. They will need to know that many of the prayers (85 percent) are from the first nine centuries of the Church. They will need formation to see that the prayers are rooted in Divine Revelation with direct quotations from Sacred Scripture or elaborations thereon. We have made progress in faith formation through the revised Lectionary and the many opportunities to study Sacred Scripture. Now, we will need to be prepared to teach that “Word and

Eucharist are so deeply bound together that we cannot understand one without the other: the word of God sacramentally takes flesh in the event of the Eucharist” (*Verbum domini*, 55).

Of course, this is a “*mysterium fidei*,” yet faith must always seek understanding (St. Anselm). In ways that are not always clear to us, the signs and symbols of the liturgy are most important in aiding our understanding. “The worship rendered by the Church to God must be, in its entirety, interior as well as exterior. It is exterior because the nature of man as a composite of body and soul requires it to be so” (MD, 45). If we change the symbol of the celebrations that have accompanied the Church for centuries, we change what they signify. There are many examples of how this new translation will help us to understand the symbols of the Mass; we will review only one example from the Exultet, the great Easter Proclamation.

Included in the Latin text of the Exultet are citations to bees. These were omitted from the initial English translation seemingly because the reference would not be understood by people of the twentieth century. The specific references in the Latin text are:

- 1) *In huius igitur noctis gratia, suscipe, sancte Pater, laudis huius sacrificium vespertinum, quod tibi in hac cerei oblatione sollempni, per ministrorum manus de operibus **apum**, sacrosancta reddit Ecclesia.*
- 2) *Qui licet sit divisus in partes, mutuati tamen luminis detrimenta non novit. Alitur enim liquantibus ceris, quas in substantiam pretiosae huius lampadis **apis** mater eduxit.*

The first text includes a request for the acceptance of the offering of the candle (a symbol of Christ himself, who is our light through the darkness), the work of bees and of the hands of servants, as a gift from the Church. The second text refers to the one flame that is divided yet remains undimmed by this sharing, for it (the flame) is fed by melting wax drawn out by mother bees to build a torch so precious. Now, consider the experience of prayer at the Easter Vigil, as we wait in the darkness of the Church for the “light of Christ.” Consider how after the first and second acclamations of “Lumen Christi” the candles of the celebrant and the faithful are lit from that one light. The whole of the cosmos rejoices and receives anew that light from Christ, our one True Light.

Honey bees are considered “social insects.” There is division of labor in the hive. They reproduce parthogenetically and thus provide an analogy to the Virgin-birth.

They produce the pure wax which is formed by human hands into the Pascal candle. Thus symbolically, there is a “virgin-birth” providing the wax for the candle which is the symbol of Christ, our light, the Word of God who took his human flesh in the womb of the Virgin Mother, Mary. The Blessed Virgin Mary is also the Mother of the Church. She is the mother of the same members of the Mystical Body of Christ who stand with their candles lit from the one flame that is undimmed by their participation in this great mystery of the Divine Nature (1 Pt 1:4).

This is only one example of what lies hidden the Latin texts of the prayers of the treasury of liturgical

prayers. If we knew this, would there be any market for the hard plastic Paschal “candles” with the refillable tubes for liquid paraffin? When the Exultet is solemnly chanted after dusk on April 7, 2012, the Vigil of Easter Sunday, we need to be prepared to explain that “the bees are back” and they will unite us with the centuries before us in this great proclamation of the mystery of our faith. Deeply rooted in the tradition, may this example, and the many more that we will discover through the new English translation, nourish the faith of all and bring about the new evangelization, which is so needed and longed for. ✠

BOOK REVIEWS

Chosen: How Christ Sent Twenty-Three Surprised Converts to Replant His Vineyard. Edited by Donna Steichen. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2009. PB. 495 pages. ISBN: 978-1-58617-340-1. \$18.95.

*Reviewed by Kenneth D. Whitehead
Retired U. S. Secretary of Education
who now works as a writer, editor, and
translator in Falls Church, Virginia*

This book is exactly what its title says it is: a collection of conversion stories. We have seen enough of such collections in recent years so that they practically now constitute a new literary *genre* by themselves. This book is one of the better collections in the *genre*.

Conversion stories of any kind are almost always interesting. Just as human persons are each one unique and unrepeatable, so the story of how each one finds a path to life in Christ in his Church turns out to be quite varied yet unique as well. Most of the time it turns out that the underlying search of the inquirer is almost always a search for truth, for the meaning of one’s existence. This is the case for virtually all of the conversion accounts narrated in this volume. Some of them are by well-known contemporary scholars or writers such as Joseph Pearce or Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, by prominent Catholic leaders in the current culture wars such as Stephen W. Mosher or Austin Ruse, or by today’s remarkable prison evangelist-apologist-catechist, Russell L. Ford, who following his own conversion helped bring about so many conversions among prisoners behind bars.

Most of the contributors are not necessarily well known; yet it is remarkable how many of them remain engaged in apostolate-type efforts to propagate, promote, teach, or hand on the faith that they came to recognize and embrace and now cherish. The book’s subtitle is correct in characterizing these converts as called by Christ to “replant his vineyard.” In one way or another almost all of them became engaged in the wake of their own conversions; having come to the fullness of Christ’s grace and truth in the Catholic Church, they find themselves compelled to try to pass it on in their turn. Moreover, they are nearly unanimous in understanding that what the Catholic Church represents in particular is the fullness of Christ’s truth and grace. Some of them were evangelical Christians before but came to realize that evangelism was not enough. Others came to the faith from the arid wastes of modern secularism and relativism. All of them were “born again,” precisely as Jesus told Nicodemus had to be the case (cf. Jn 3:3).

Among other things that become clear in the reading of these accounts is a vivid and vital sense of what Catholicism is and entails today. There is no trace in these accounts of today’s deficient “cafeteria Catholicism” or of a Father Andrew Greeley’s impoverished “cultural Catholicism.” For these serious and motivated converts the faith is not only true; it is real. They are worthy models for all Catholics. Among these converts who are married, it is remarkable to note too how large families prevail—contrary to the current cultural norm in America, even among too many Catholics.

Yes, the Catholic faith is alive and well and has a future; it does not fail to attract, as these conversion narratives attest. The Introduction to the book by the book’s editor, Donna Steichen, as well as a Foreword contributed by the editor of *The Catholic World Report*, George Neumayr, both remark on and strongly stress how all these particular conversions came about in spite of the chaos of the postconciliar crisis in the Church—the bad catechesis, the liturgical abuses, the widespread and uncorrected theological dissent, the clerical abuse scandals, and the collapse of authority among other things—conditions to which nearly all of these converts advert in some measure in their personal stories. Indeed the picture painted in the book’s Introduction and Foreword is so dreary and negative that the reader might well be tempted at the outset to wonder how anybody *could* actually convert to a Church such as the one described.

Yet it nevertheless is made clear, even in the Introduction, that it was “Christ who did the choosing,” and that the Church remains, as the Foreword notes, a “repository of truth and grace so powerful that not even the darkness of scandal can overcome it.” These truthful and heartfelt testimonials are, in fact, the antidote to today’s scandals.

You will be diverted, encouraged, and often edified by reading these twenty-three conversion stories. All of them bear witness to and verify what Christ solemnly said to Pilate: “For this I was born, and for this I have come into the world, to bear witness to the truth” (Jn 18:37).

Bob Drinan: The Controversial Life of the First Catholic Priest Elected to Congress by Raymond A. Schroth, S.J., New York: Fordham University Press, 2011. Pp 393+ xv. \$32.95.

Reviewed by Anne Barbeau Gardiner
Professor Emerita, John Jay College of the
City University of New York

In *Bob Drinan*, Raymond Schroth offers a well-documented biography of the Jesuit who voted in Congress for federal funding of abortions in the 1970s and who defended partial-birth abortions in the 1990s. Schroth bases his study not only on published books and articles related to Drinan, but also on archival material and interviews with more than seventy people who knew him. My review is in two parts: (1) Drinan's character, and (2) his stand on abortion.

Drinan's Character

Some who knew him described Drinan as "an intellectual snob" who cut people off abruptly if they bored, annoyed, or contradicted him. Yet he was no intellectual. As a student he averaged Bs and stood out only for publishing articles in the popular Catholic press. One Jesuit said he looked "cerebral," but acted from his "gut," while others called him a "popularizer." Schroth concedes that Drinan could not express his thoughts with "imagination, grace, felicity," that nearly all his books were polemical, not scholarly, and that Drinan's campaign speeches and later law lectures were "rambling and unfocused." Yet he possessed a "single-mindedness" that made him a "reliable political ally."

He also had dramatic flair—he "knew how to enter a room and become the immediate center of attention." He had "few, if any warm friendships," however, and was known among the Jesuits "as the man who ate his meals standing up. Always on the move. No time to sit and talk." In 1973, a reporter described him as "a restless man" who "twists around to add body English to his staccato laugh" and "jabs" his thin fingers "into the air for emphasis." A cousin of his said he "seemed to live in a world of his own."

Schroth portrays Drinan as driven by worldly ambition: "he was also ambitious and tried to answer the question of whether the priesthood and political power could be reconciled." Of his years as a Jesuit novice, Drinan said, "I couldn't wait to get out." The high point came in

1947, when he made "contact" with a visiting editor from *America*. Afterward, while studying law in Georgetown—something which "juiced his ambition"—he worked at "cultivating" the editors of *America* and finally got his first article published in 1949.

Early on, the greatest of his "ambitions" was to be president of Boston College. He was a dean there from 1955 to 1970, at a time when deans "had sweeping discretionary power," and used his power "to craft the school according to his hopes—and also according to his own ambitions." The older Jesuits did not share his "ambitions for the college or for himself"—indeed, he wanted to hand the college over to a lay-dominated board of trustees—so they did not pick him to be the next president. That's when he began to "rethink his future." The Leventmans, Drinan's Jewish supporters, knew that he "loved to be the center of attention and aspired to the college presidency. From their observations, when Drinan failed to gain the presidency in 1968 he began looking for alternatives."

Elected to the House of Representatives, Drinan "loved the role he was playing" as "a new moral and spiritual voice," a "moral exemplar," and a "moral architect." He wore his clerical collar in the halls of Congress, but admitted to the journalist Robert Cormier that he did it "to attract attention." At his first news conference on January 7, 1971, he said, forty reporters came to hear him, "because I'm a priest. . . . The white collar grabs their attention and they find themselves listening to what I have to say, and reporting it all over the country. That's what's important." Not everyone was impressed. In 1976, John Fenton and Donald Austern wrote that Drinan was playing the part of a "Puritan moral crusader" while at the same time "occupying much the same radical ground as Bella Abzug of New York." They observed that his eyes bulged when he scolded his adversaries and that his rhetoric proclaimed him "holier than almost anyone else in politics."

In the privacy of his office, Drinan wore "a Hawaiian shirt and took off his shoes." There he tried "to avoid being looked upon as a priest," never spoke about religion and, whenever asked, refused to say Mass. The reporter Jaime Rosenthal also noted that Drinan would make "patronizing comments about the people he had just charmed" and persistently utter "mildly lascivious comments," making it hard for her to stay "within

reach." Schroth neither denies nor comments on this unpriestly behavior.

Whenever Pedro Arrupe, the Jesuit general in Rome, urged him to step down, Drinan would send him a long letter explaining that had not compromised his "principles" and would list the honorary degrees he had received from Catholic universities. He assured him: "I am more influential in a moral and spiritual way now than I was during the dozen years that I was Dean of Boston College Law School." In 1979, he used the word "moral" six times on one page to assure Arrupe that he was "a very important moral influence." Although Arrupe said he "couldn't understand Drinan's position on the federal funding of abortion or how Drinan resolved in his conscience the scandal caused by his position," he was willing to let him run in 1980 for a sixth term. So the Pope had to intervene and order Drinan not to run again. On receiving that order, Drinan "wept." Reflecting on his political career, he exclaimed, "I can think of no other activities more worthy of the involvement of a priest and a Jesuit." When a reporter asked how he would be remembered, he answered, "Maybe it's been good for the church to have a priest who has brought some glory to the church." He could not imagine that he had brought her infamy instead.

Schroth laments that Drinan's defense of legalized abortion "brought on his forced retirement from Congress" and that the papal decision was part of a "pattern" of stifling "dissident voices." Richard McBrien is more specific: he says that Drinan's vote to fund abortions for poor women was "the decisive factor in his destruction" ("destruction" here = teaching law at Georgetown).

Drinan's Stand on Abortion

An article published in *Commonweal* in 1952 "prepared the way" for Drinan to "tolerate legalized abortion." In it he said that the Supreme Court in previous decades had followed the philosophy of Roscoe Pound, for whom the law was an "instrument" to accommodate conflicting interests in the area of religious liberty. Drinan found the Court's decisions "satisfactory," though he said Pound's jurisprudence was "perhaps underpinned by relativism in morals."

In 1964, the Jesuit Joseph Fuchs invited Drinan to a meeting organized by Sargent Shriver for Robert and Edward

Kennedy. Those present—including Andre Hellegers, Richard McCormick, and Charles Curran—were working up a stance on abortion “acceptable to both Catholic teaching and the public at large.” They finally agreed that while abortion was “immoral,” it should not be “rigorously” restricted by law, but permitted in cases of rape, incest, a woman’s health, and a defective child. Drinan disagreed and said it was better for “the law to withdraw its protection from all fetuses during the first twenty-six weeks.” From 1964 onward, though he sometimes contradicted himself, this was his basic position: “there should be no legal limits on abortion.” In 1967, at the International Conference on Abortion, he suggested it was better to have “abortion on request” than let the state be “involved in any way in determining the life or death of a fetus.”

In 1967, at the Harvard–Kennedy Conference on Abortion, Drinan argued that the law would be supporting the “institution” of the family if it allowed “parents to terminate an unplanned and unwanted pregnancy.” In 1968, at the American Catholic Theological Society, he defended his stand on abortion by contending that Vatican II’s Declaration on Religious Freedom “ruled out the use of coercion in imposing one’s religious views upon another.” In a *Commonweal* article two years later, he wanted to end “all criminal sanctions against abortions.” By 1969 his arguments had traveled to Hawaii: Vincent Yano, a state senator and “Catholic father of ten,” borrowed “Drinan’s logic” to repeal Hawaii’s anti-abortion law. Yano argued that to repeal was not “legalization,” but a choice “not to control or regulate this matter by law”; it was neither to “approve nor disapprove.” Four years before *Roe v. Wade*, then, Drinan was causing Catholics to embrace the new “autonomy.”

In 1972, Peter Steinfels contended that Drinan had “not rejected” the Church on abortion, but only spoken only about “abortion laws” in relation to “pluralism in society.” Then on January 2, 1973, three weeks before *Roe v. Wade* decision, *The New York Times* mentioned Drinan’s idea of abortion as a “totally private matter” on page one. This notion of privacy would soon be the basis of the *Roe* decision, which Schroth thinks Drinan probably “hoped for,” but which the legal scholar John Noonan calls “the most radical decision ever issued by the Supreme Court.”

In *Liberty and Sexuality* (1994), David Garrow traces “Drinan’s influence, through his writing and networking, on the developing consensus” that led to *Roe v. Wade*. Was he indeed the Pied Piper of Choice? In a lead article for *Commonweal* right after the *Roe* decision, Drinan wrote that he was pleased the Court had knocked down “legal restrictions and landed on privacy as a vehicle with which to do it.” He thought the decision would have “good results.”

From 1975 on, Drinan voted against not only a Human Life Amendment to protect a child from the moment of conception onward, but also the Hyde Amendment to ban the use of federal funds for abortion for indigent women. He received hundreds of letters, many from priests who could not “accept” that a fellow priest “would appear to be an abortion supporter.” He replied, “I am entirely opposed to abortion, but not certain that Catholics should try to amend the Constitution to reinstate criminal sanctions.” He told them to find flaws in *Roe* and “litigate them up the line.” An Omaha attorney answered that they could not wait twenty years for the Court to change its mind and that Drinan’s lack of “leadership” was “deplorable.”

In 1977, *National Right to Life News* published four articles based on interviews with Drinan, and four more pages documenting his voting record. They also printed “a catalogue of quotes from fellow congressmen, including several Catholics, who said they resisted a hearing on or had voted against the Human Life Amendments because Drinan had convinced them to do so.” Meanwhile, his Jesuit provincial, after receiving hundreds of letters from Catholics about Drinan’s pro-abortion stand, had a long talk with him. Drinan then wrote him a twelve-page account, dated May 20, 1976, of all he had written and said on abortion from 1959 to 1976 and “convinced” him that he was opposed to abortion for moral reasons, but also opposed to any “attempt to re-criminalize it or amend the Constitution to ban it.” He added that opponents of abortion needed to focus on educating health-care providers about the evils of abortion. Yet in his public life, Drinan never promoted such education.

In his last election campaign of 1978, his opponent was Norman Walker, a pro-life Catholic layman. That spring, the *National Catholic Register* noted that Dri-

nan had “never made a pro-life speech to educate his fellow congressmen,” and in fact had “tended to neutralize much pro-life activity.” In reaction, Drinan told staffers to “accentuate” his “Catholic activities,” especially the honorary doctorates he had received from Catholic universities. In a talk given on April 25, he claimed his stand on abortion was more consistent “with Vatican II and Catholic moral theology” than the Hyde Amendment, which “prohibited federal funding of abortion in any and every instance.” A staffer understood Drinan to say that the Catholic Church allowed abortions in “cases of rape, incest, [and] life of the mother,” which was untrue. The only way to reduce “fetal deaths,” he insisted, was to provide programs for pregnant women, but when asked to “enumerate his efforts” in this area, he could say nothing.

In 1996, Drinan entered the lists one last time in defense of abortion. He wrote two articles supporting Clinton’s veto of a bill that would have banned partial-birth abortions. One article was for the *National Catholic Reporter*, the other for *The New York Times*. In the first he stated that abortion opponents “cannot reasonably or responsibly fault Clinton for his April 10 veto of a bill that would have criminalized certain late abortions.” In the second, he said that Congress should sustain Clinton’s veto because the bill banning partial-birth abortions does not “provide an exception for women whose health is at risk.” He added that he wrote this “as a Jesuit priest who agrees with Vatican II” and thinks the government should do more “to make abortions rare.” For these two articles Drinan received an “avalanche of opprobrium,” including a rebuke from the *Boston Pilot* pointing out that Clinton’s “health risk” was meaningless, since the Court had defined “health” as “anything that might disturb one’s social, emotional, financial and familial ‘well being.’” Another rebuke came from Cardinal O’Connor, who said, “you could have raised your formidable voice for life, you have raised it for death. Hardly the role of a lawyer. Surely not the role of a priest.”

When his New England provincial, William Barry, “required him to retract his judgment” on partial-birth abortion, Drinan took an entire year to do it. When his statement was released on May 12, 1997, Schroth says it was “carefully worded in a way that would allow him to say he had been consistent all along; but

having to issue it was a humiliation.” Was it really a humiliation to retract his false teaching? Although Shroth empathizes with and exalts his subject right to the end, the lesson is plain: the life of Robert Drinan was tragic.

Crafting the Quantum: Arnold Sommerfeld and the Practice of Theory, 1890–1926 by Seth Suman. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2010. pp. viii + 371.

Reviewed by *Jude P. Dougherty*
The Catholic University of America

The book focuses upon Arnold Sommerfeld’s contribution to quantum mechanics, but it is more than that. It is a chronicle of one of the most interesting periods in the history of theoretical physics. Theoretical physics was but a young subdiscipline in 1906, the year that Arnold Sommerfeld (1868–1951) was called to Munich to fill the chair previously held by Ludwig Boltzmann. Max Planck’s textbooks on the subject did not appear until 1916; Sommerfeld’s own *Mechanics* did not see print until 1943. The author sets forth what he calls two visions of physics, that of Planck and Einstein and that of Sommerfeld, the “physics of principles” vs. the “physics of problems.”

Suman characterizes the work of Planck and Einstein as “subsuming all physical phenomena under a few abstract, generalized axioms.” Both attempted, he says, to found physics on principles that transcend particular data. For Planck, the place of experiment within theoretical practice was limited to testing conclusions. Sommerfeld, on the other hand, started with experimental data. His interest was in real-world engineering problems. Suman says of Planck that he was devoted to “abstract, de-anthromorphized, de-historicised, pure principles, with few references either to experimental data or to the application of his work.” Sommerfeld, by contrast, was a man who was interested only in problems for which he could get a solution. Unlike Planck and Einstein, he did not want to get into abstract theory and waste time disputing with philosophers. For Sommerfeld, experiment was the constructive element that yielded, in multiple stages, theoretical insight. Theoretical physics for Sommerfeld was an interdisciplinary creation

drawing upon mathematics, technical mechanics, and physics. His was a search for specific solutions to specific problems, “a search for a mechanism or a process, rather than a generalizing postulate.” His motto could have been: *praxis* provides problems for *theoria*.

In Seth Suman’s account, Sommerfeld in the 1920s abandoned theoretical explanations altogether, seeking rules for understanding and organizing atomic spectra from the direct study of empirical regularities in spectroscopic data. As a young man Sommerfeld considered himself to be a mathematician. His subsequent interest in physics was governed by his love of mathematics and resulted in his employment of the techniques of mathematical physics to engineering problems connected with heat radiation, wireless telegraphy, ship waves and turbulence in hydrodynamics, and other problems in electrodynamics.

Of the ten doctoral theses supervised or co-supervised by Sommerfeld in Munich between 1908 and 1931, eight discussed some aspect of electromagnetism. It was not without reason that Sommerfeld’s students became known during World War I as the “Kaiser’s physicists” because of their contribution to the German war effort. Their training in hydrodynamics and electromagnetism and their work on gyroscopes had military applications.

The two styles of pursuing physics proved to be mutually illuminating. Sommerfeld’s investigation of atomic spectra led him to suggest that elliptical orbits replace the circular orbits of the Bohr atom. From this idea, he postulated the azimuthal quantum number. He later introduced the magnetic quantum number as well. Sommerfeld also did detailed work on wave mechanics, and his theory of electrons in metals proved valuable in the study of thermoelectricity and metallic conduction. Four of his doctoral students (Werner Heisenberg, Wolfgang Pauli, Peter Debye, and Hans Beth) and two post-doctoral students (Linus Pauling and Isidor Rabi) were to become Nobel Laureates. Sommerfeld, like Planck, was not oblivious to the intellectual conflicts of his day. Planck was unalterably opposed to the positivism of Ernest Mach and that of the Vienna Circle. Sommerfeld, insofar as his early work eschewed theory, may have appeared to embrace a positivist approach to physics. It is worth noting that Sommerfeld rejected the notion that there occurred a

revolution in physics or a “paradigm shift,” later associated with the name of Thomas Kuhn. Sommerfeld in 1929, reflecting on the advances made in the previous decade, did not think of those events as a revolution but as “a joyful advancement of what was already in existence, with many fundamental clarifications and sharpenings.”

Seth Suman in *Crafting the Quantum* has captured the intellectual excitement that prevailed in European intellectual circles in the early decades of the twentieth century, and he has done so with admirable prose.

Helmholtz: From Enlightenment to Neuroscience by Michel Meulders. Translated and edited by Laurence Garvey. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2010. pp. xvii + 235.

Reviewed by *Jude P. Dougherty*
The Catholic University of America

Herman von Helmholtz (1821–1894) is remembered as one of the leading figures of German physiology in the nineteenth century, especially for his work on the perception of color, for his contribution to neurophysiology, and for his invention of the ophthalmoscope.

An empiricist to the core, he was convinced that physiology played an indispensable role in an understanding of major psychological functions such as vision and the perception of color and space. He was opposed to the idealists and *naturphilosophen* who interpreted those functions from a viewpoint based on presuppositions that were inaccessible to experimentation. He argued vigorously against any attempt to explain nature by recourse to metaphysics. In discussions of the phenomenon of color, he found it necessary to oppose some of the scientific research of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), who had written an influential book entitled *Theory of Color*. Goethe resisted any purely mechanistic interpretation of psychological phenomena.

The book, it should be noted, is not merely about Helmholtz. Michel Meulders, former Dean of the Medical School and Professor Emeritus of Neuroscience of the Catholic University of Louvain, provides an interesting sketch of the

scientific atmosphere and cultural milieu of the early nineteenth century. An entire chapter is devoted to a discussion of the natural philosophy of the day, an outlook he shows to be the indispensable background for an understanding of science and medicine in Germany in the early part of that century.

In subsequent chapters, Meulders summarizes and analyzes Helmholtz's principal scientific achievements. Two works of major importance are singled out for analysis—namely, *The Handbook of Physiological Optics, Vision and Perception*, and *Sensation of Tone as a Physiological Basis for the Theory of Music*. A significant part of *Helmholtz: From Enlightenment to Neuroscience* is devoted to a discussion of the scientific work of Goethe, given Helmholtz's opposition to much of Goethe's work on color and Goethe's rejection of Enlightenment philosophy in general. Goethe is quoted as saying, "If you show a red flag to a bull, it becomes angry, but a philosopher begins to rage as soon as you merely speak of color."

Helmholtz, in spite of his acknowledged achievements, was not himself immune to criticism from renowned contemporaries such as Wilhelm Wundt, a former student, Ernest Mach, and William James. Interesting, too, he was not viewed in a good light by Lenin, who accused him of Kantianism, subjectivism, and agnosticism. In mid-life Helmholtz abandoned his work in the life sciences to concentrate in physics, notably in areas such as electricity and thermodynamics. Always faithful to Kant, Helmholtz held that intuition meant seizing in a single act the raw results of sensory representation but in the context of the a priori forms of space and time. Fortified by this certainty of obtaining knowledge safely, the scientist could, through observation and inductive research, investigate the laws of nature. Those laws when expressed in words would be considered mere hypotheses in need of verification by further certification with facts. It is only by proceeding with careful observation that one can assume them to be correct and legitimate, at least under given experimental conditions. For Helmholtz the scientist is something like a prophet or magician insofar as he has acquired power over nature and is able to predict the occurrence of certain phenomena.

This is an insightful book, not exactly bedside reading, but a book that will give

the novice an insight into the conceptual opposition between the inherited natural philosophy of the nineteenth century and the empiricism of Locke and Hume, which seemed to account better for the remarkable achievements of what we know as modern science.

Avery Cardinal Dulles, SJ: A Model Theologian, 1918-2008 Patrick W. Carey. New York/ Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2010. 736 pp.

Reviewed by Steven J. Meyer, Adjunct Professor of Theology at the University of St. Thomas Houston, TX, and Theology Instructor at St. Thomas High School, Houston, TX.

Mr. Meyer recently submitted his doctoral dissertation in Dogmatic Theology titled "Faith in the Writings of Cardinal Avery Dulles, S.J." to the Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas in Rome, Italy.

Patrick W. Carey's latest book, *Avery Cardinal Dulles, SJ: A Model Theologian, 1918-2008*, is the first biography ever written about the life and writings of the late Cardinal Avery Dulles. Avery Dulles was born in 1918 to Janet Pomeroy Avery and John Foster Dulles (who was later Secretary of State to President Dwight Eisenhower). He was raised in the Presbyterian faith but, during adolescence, lost his Christian faith and rejected organized religion. During his studies at Harvard, however, he experienced a powerful spiritual reawakening that led him to ultimately join the Roman Catholic Church and the Jesuit priesthood. During his long, distinguished, and prolific career, Cardinal Dulles published twenty-five books and over 850 articles. His writing style would be noted for its clarity, thorough research, and balanced account of variant positions. He often sought to put opposed positions in dialogue.

Patrick W. Carey is the William J. Kelly, S.J. Chair in Catholic Theology at Marquette University. He specializes in United States Catholic and Christian theological history. In *Avery Cardinal Dulles, SJ: A Model Theologian, 1918-2008*, Carey presents a superabundance of sources to paint a picture of Dulles's personal intellectual development throughout his entire

life. Since much of Dulles's life is devoted to theology, the subtitle refers to Dulles's striving for truth in faith, literally his work as a theologian, and to his preferred method for doing theology, the method of models.

Carey writes about Dulles in an objective manner. In his own words, Carey says: "I hope to show how his (Dulles's) theological journey dealt with change, development, and continuity in the Catholic tradition" (xiii). Carey notes that others have had difficulty determining Dulles's true position on issues. For example, Dulles was labeled a liberal and a relativist in the years immediately after Vatican II, and called a reactionary and a conservative in his later years. Carey hopes that a biography on Dulles can assist the reader by giving a panoramic vision of the theological issues engaged by Dulles in his work. Carey writes: "Since he had one foot in the preconciliar Catholic Church and one in the postconciliar, and his head in both, his biography offers an entry point into much that has happened in American and worldwide Catholicism in the sixty years after his reception into the Catholic Church" (xiv).

The biography consists of sixteen chapters, the first of which gives a brief history of Dulles's family heritage. The last, chapter sixteen (also brief), recalls his final years of declining health. Chapters two through five recount Dulles's childhood, education, his conversion experience, his time in the U.S. Navy, and his years of Jesuit formation. Chapter six examines some of Dulles's earliest theological works from 1958, when Dulles completed his dissertation, to the closing of Vatican II in 1965. Chapters seven and eight together explore Dulles's theology of models during the turbulent theological times between 1966 and 1974. Chapters nine and ten together examine Dulles as a moderate in theology between 1974 and 1988. Chapter eleven surveys Dulles's ecumenical writings from 1971 until 1996. Chapters twelve and thirteen, taken together, depict Dulles's life and writings from 1988, the time of his appointment as the Laurence J. McGinley Chair at Fordham University, until 2000—prior to his being named a cardinal. Chapter fourteen examines Dulles's ad hoc writings on Vatican II and ecclesiology from 1988 until 2008. Chapter fifteen presents the various issues which concerned Dulles as

a cardinal from 2001 until 2008.

I discern three values in Carey's carefully written biography, all touched upon at the beginning of this review. First, *Avery Cardinal Dulles, SJ: Model Theologian, 1918-2008* gives the reader insights about Dulles's opinions. Some believe that Dulles rarely revealed his own opinions, especially in the books he wrote which were most widely read, for example, *Models of the Church*, and *Models of Revelation*. Carey places biographical information, utilizing personal correspondence, alongside Dulles's theological writings in order to give the reader a better understanding of Dulles's thinking. A second value of this volume is that it provides a starting point for understanding the wide variety of subjects that Dulles thoroughly treated. Dulles's theological corpus is huge. This book provides the reader with both a chronological and systematic overview of the various facets in Dulles's work. For example, themes addressed within doctoral dissertations and articles have treated Dulles's writings in the areas of models, revelation, faith, ecclesiology, apologetics, ecumenism, evangelization, and his

theological epistemology. Carey provides essential insights into all these areas in this biography. A third value of this book lies in the information one gathers about the many issues and challenges within the United States Catholic community from the mid-1940s until present times. In other words, the work offers unique snapshots of tremendous changes in U.S. Catholic intellectual thought and history through the lens of Dulles's life.

Given all of this, Carey's portrayal is not the final word. It is a great starting place for years to come. Because there are so many sources covered in one book, the reader may find that many of Dulles's pieces, at least ones most familiar to them, are treated somewhat meagerly. That is fine. The book gives a macro vision of Dulles, the person and the theologian. Also, because the book is comprehensive, detailed, and handles so many complex theological issues, it made me want to see a biography on Dulles aimed more at the "person in the pew." In other words, I think the time might be right for a work that introduces Dulles to the rank-and-file Catholic. Such is not the aim of this present volume.

The book is hardbound with an attractive cover. It has a detailed index, a foreword by Joseph A. O'Hare, S.J., and a substantial essay on the published and unpublished sources which Carey utilized. It contains an extensive chronological outline. It also contains many pictures of Dulles with family, friends, and colleagues interspersed throughout the volume. It is unfortunate that its \$50 price tag might put it out of reach for some of its intended audience of humble Catholics and educators.

To close, Carey has written a first-rate introduction to the entire spectrum of persons, places, and ideas to understand Cardinal Dulles properly. Professor Carey's biography is meticulously researched and highly informative. It presents Dulles with objective clarity and uses a calm descriptive tone. I would highly recommend the work for anyone interested in modern theology in general. More specifically, this book should be on the shelf of anyone interested in the life and writings of this modern, orthodox, and important American theological giant.

BOOKS RECEIVED

If you would like to receive a complimentary copy of one of the books below in order to review it for a future issue, please email your request to Alice Osberger at osberger.1@nd.edu

More Christianity: Finding the Fullness of the Faith. Fr. Dwight Longenecker. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, (2010), 275pp., paper.

Preach the Word: Homilies on the Sundays and Feasts of the Extraordinary Form of the Roman Rite. Kenneth Baker, S.J. Staten Island, NY: St. Paul's, (2010), paper.

The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism. Edward Feser. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, (2008), 291 pp., paper.

Both Sides of the Altar. Frank Morgan. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, (2011), 214 pp., paper.

The Platonic Myths. Josef Pieper. Introduction by James V. Schall. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, (2011), 75 pp., paper.

Clouds of Witnesses: Christian Voices from Africa and Asia. Mark A. Noll and Carolyn Nystrom. Downers Grove, IL, (2011), 286 pp., hardcover.

An Ocean Full of Angels. Peter Kreeft. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, (2011), 375 pp., hardcover.

Toward the Gleam: a novel. T. M. Doran. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, (2011), 467 pp., hardcover.

The Pope's Soldiers: A Military History of the Modern Vatican. David Alvarez, University Press of Kansas, (2011), 429 pp., hardcover.

The Appalling Strangeness of the Mercy of God: The Story of Ruth Pakaluk, Convert, Mother, Pro-Life Activist. Edited by Michael Pakaluk. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, (2011), 272 pp., paper.

Solzhenitsyn: A Soul in Exile: An intimate up-close portrait following extensive personal interviews with Joseph Pearce. Revised and updated edition. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, (2011), 382 pp., paper.

Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook, 2nd Edition. Edited by Joshua Parens and Joseph C. Macfarland. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, (2011) 443 pp., paper.

Into Your Hands, Father: Abandoning Ourselves to the God Who Loves Us. Wilfrid Stinissen. San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, (2011) 105 pp., paper.

Happiness, God & Man: "We Were Created to be happy." Christoph Cardinal Schönborn. San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, (2010) 189 pp., paper.

Padre Pio Under Investigation: The Secret Vatican Files. Francesco Castelli. San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, (2008) 311 pp., paper.

Fire of Love: A Historical Novel about Saint John of the Cross. José Luis Olaizola. San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, (2011) 217 pp., paper.

Holiness is Always In Season. Pope Benedict XVI. San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, (2009) 333 pp., hardcover.

SPEAKERS FUND

This past year the Fellowship was able to match an anonymous challenge grant of \$10,000 for the development of a special fund to support the travel and lodging expenses of the speakers at our annual conventions. So, I am happy to report that we now have some \$20,000 in this fund. Needless to say, such a fund could be easily exhausted, and so we need to continue to build it up.

If you would like to make a donation or suggest someone whom we could approach, please contact me at: koterski@fordham.edu

Rev. Joseph. W. Koterski, S.J.
President of the Fellowship

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2011 CONVENTION OF THE FELLOWSHIP OF CATHOLIC SCHOLARS

The 2011 convention of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars will take place on the weekend of September 23-25, 2011 on the theme of Catholic Social Teaching.

We will post a list of the speakers and their topics as soon as the information becomes available.

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The Good Samaritan Attends to Every Kind of Suffering

In his apostolic letter on the *Christian Meaning of Human Suffering* (*Salvifici doloris*, Feb. 11, 1984, the feast of Our Lady of Lourdes) Pope John Paul II revealingly entitles the chapter before his conclusion “The Good Samaritan.” The parable of the Good Samaritan in Luke 10:25-37 teaches us to attend to the suffering of our neighbors when **by chance** we have the opportunity to do so. “*Everyone who stops beside the suffering of another person, whatever form it may take, is a Good Samaritan*” (no. 28). The seven corporal and seven spiritual works of mercy are excellent examples of the ways by which a Good Samaritan might respectively relieve physical and moral suffering. It is noteworthy that three of the spiritual works of mercy (Counsel the doubtful, Instruct the ignorant, and Admonish sinners) pertain to the communication of truth, thereby implying that being in error is a form of suffering. So, leading people to the truth by way of evangelization, for example, is a work of the Good Samaritan.

Because he puts his whole heart into helping his neighbor, the Good Samaritan is the kind of person who is capable of making a gift of himself to another, the only way persons are able to find themselves, to use the language of *Gaudium et spes* (no. 24). Otherwise stated, people need to provide relief to others in order to practice solidarity, to fulfill Christ’s commandment to love one another – in short, to perfect their dignity as human persons.

As his first example of institutionalized Good Samaritan work, Blessed John Paul II mentions the professions of doctor, nurse, and related health care personnel. He implies that the ethic intrinsic to medicine can, at least, be partially described as that of the Good Samaritan. The work of doctors and nurses is then both a profession and a vocation. I recently came across a wonderful example of the profession of medicine in Good Samaritan mode. In the pages of the *National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly* Dr. Greg Burke wrote about the obligation of physicians vis-à-vis patients who check out of hospital against medical advice (AMA). When one of his patients prematurely left the hospital while being treated for a gastrointestinal hemorrhage, Dr. Burke called him on the phone and expressed con-

cern for his well-being. The patient returned for regular treatment following Dr. Burke’s Good Samaritan initiative. The doctor’s care prompted the patient to take better care of himself. Dr. Burke drew this conclusion: “[The doctor’s] devotion to the good of those entrusted to his care should not be compromised by an AMA discharge. The relationship does not end at the hospital door.” Could we not say that the devotion of physicians to their reluctant or recalcitrant patients provides a model for Catholic clergy and laity in the difficult work of evangelization?

After mentioning the Good Samaritan work of other unspecified institutions, Pope John Paul II says that the Gospel parable is really a kind of universal ethic. People of all religions and all points of view find the story of the Good Samaritan to be compelling. “In view of all this, we can say that the parable of the Good Samaritan of the Gospel has become *one of the essential elements of moral culture and universally human civilization*” (no. 29). In other words, all over the world non-Catholic individuals and institutions have acted like the Good Samaritan and thus have indirectly given their assent to the teaching of the famous Lucan parable.

John Paul II sees Good Samaritan work being carried out in three ways: by organizations (both religious and non-religious), by individuals toward strangers, and by family members. Part of the Church’s apostolate is to be a Good Samaritan to those in need. Sometimes, single individuals with particular qualities and/or skills are most suited to relieve suffering in a personal way. Family members may help one another within one family or deliver help to other families in need.

For Good Samaritan work to flourish, the right kind of education must be available in the family, the school, the Church, and other educational institutions. And that education must have a deep effect on individuals! “The institutions are very important and indispensable; nevertheless, no institution can by itself replace the human heart, human compassion, human love or human initiative when it is a question of dealing with” the physical or moral sufferings of others (no. 29). In other words, no “structural” change can be effective if the hearts of individuals are not transformed.

“[E]very individual must feel as if *called personally* to bear witness to love in suffering” (no. 29). This means that the love shown by the Good Samaritan will often entail acceptance of personal suffering in coming to the relief of another.

Not surprisingly, Blessed John Paul II compares the work of the Good Samaritan to that of Christ himself, whose good works “became especially evident in the face of human suffering” (no. 30). The pope further states that Good Samaritan work is necessary for the attainment of salvation. He makes this point by quoting Matthew 25 on the Last Judgment: “Come, O blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world; for I was hungry and you gave food, I was thirsty and you gave me to drink, I was a stranger and you welcomed me, I was in prison and you came to me” (no. 30). In order to attain eternal life everyone must come to the relief of suffering individuals, as the Good Samaritan did.

John Paul II goes so far as to say that “suffering is present in the world in order to release love, in order to give birth to works of love towards neighbor, in order to transform the whole of human civilization into a ‘civilization of love’” (no. 30). Otherwise stated, most people have to be moved by the suffering of others to attain the level of love required for salvation.

John Paul II concludes this chapter with a memorable formulation of Christ’s teaching on the meaning of suffering: He “taught man *to do good by his suffering* and *to do good to those who suffer*” (no. 30). By doing these two things, human beings participate in Christ’s salvific suffering. In other words, whether personally suffering or relieving the suffering of someone else, individuals “‘complete’ with their own suffering ‘what is lacking in Christ’s affliction’” (no. 31, quoting Col 1:24).

J. Brian Benestad
Editor

AN INVITATION TO MEMBERS OF THE FELLOWSHIP

Beginning in 2013, we will observe the fiftieth anniversary of the promulgation of the sixteen documents produced by the Second Vatican Council. One of the contributions that our organization can make would be to offer scholarly studies of various kinds on these documents. I would invite you to consider preparing a submission for the *Quarterly*. One might, for instance, want to write about the significance of one or another of these documents, especially in light of the reception they have received in the past half century. Or perhaps one might want to treat some important problem or issue, such as the proper understanding of the text or some issue of proper translation or implementation. Please consider undertaking the study of these important matters and sharing the fruits of your scholarship with the members of our association. Listed below are the sixteen documents from the Council and their dates of appearance.

1. *Sacrosanctum concilium*, Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, 1963.
2. *Inter Mirifica*, Decree On the Means of Social Communication, 1963.
3. *Lumen Gentium*, Dogmatic Constitution On the Church, 1964.
4. *Orientalium Ecclesiarum*, Decree On the Catholic Churches of the Eastern Rite, 1964.
5. *Unitatis Redintegratio*, Decree on Ecumenism, 1964.
6. *Christus Dominus*, Decree Concerning the Pastoral Office of Bishops In the Church, 1965.
7. *Perfectae Caritatis*, Decree On Renewal of Religious Life, 1965.
8. *Optatam Totius*, Decree On Priestly Training, 1965.
9. *Gravissimum Educationis*, Declaration On Christian Education, 1965.
10. *Nostra Aetate*, Declaration On the Relation Of the Church to Non-Christian Religions, 1965.
11. *Dei Verbum*, Dogmatic Constitution On Divine Revelation, 1965.
12. *Apostolicam Actuositatem*, Decree On the Apostolate of the Laity, 1965.
13. *Dignitatis Humanae*, Declaration On Religious Freedom, 1965.
14. *Ad Gentes*, Decree On the Mission Activity of the Church, 1965.
15. *Presbyterorum Ordinis*, Decree On the Ministry and Life of Priests, 1965.
16. *Gaudium et Spes*, Pastoral Constitution On the Church In the Modern World, 1965.

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