

FELLOWSHIP OF CATHOLIC SCHOLARS

NEWSLETTER

VOLUME 5, NUMBER 4

SEPTEMBER 1982

Letter from Father William B. Smith

Chesterton once wrote: "When a man concludes that any stick is good enough to beat his foe with — that is when he picks up a boomerang."

In the competent hands of native Australians, hard wood boomerangs used as missiles can be a thing of beauty. But in an untrained hand, reaching for relevance, they are often unguided missiles — dangerous and capable of inflicting all sorts of damage.

It may puzzle some but it should instruct all that the Catholic Church has much to say and to teach in many areas *provided* she speaks and teaches from the resources of her own Tradition. This is especially so in the realm of human ideology and political policy.

Such distinctions are more easily stated than sustained. There exists, today, almost atmospheric pressure in religious relevance-tests to canonize the inevitable. Thus, to achieve authenticity teachers and scholars are supposed to be on top of every trend, in tune with every survey, at home with the latest findings, in a word to be 'progressive', in step with ideologies and policies considered "progressive" at the moment.

Quite frequently this means adopting, uncritically, points of view and points of departure that are not only separate from but alien to the sources of Church Tradition.

It strikes me as particularly remarkable that the present Pope John Paul II is so contrary to this trend to be trendy. His teaching and preaching are always from the sources of the Church's own tradition. Indeed, his most consistent emphasis is on what is most consistently absent from so much religious or theological discussion; and that most repeated emphasis is the *truth*.

Constantly, from the Vatican and during all trips abroad, the Pope repeats in word, governance and ritual the basic Christian doctrines *as true*. I suspect that both his real attraction and his real opposition stem from this unvarying insistence that Christianity — in its received Scriptures, Creeds, Rites & Practices — is true.

In almost every country when speaking to teachers of the Faith, he reminds them that their first duty is to be teachers of the truth: "Faith in Christ, which sustains ecclesial life, as you well know, is not a fruit of human invention, nor is it the result of a group enthusiasm or experience. We preach the Son of God made Man on His Cross. ..." (9/25/79)

Speaking to our Bishops, in our country, he underlined this first papal priority: "This then is my deepest hope today for the pastors of the Church in America, and all pastors of the universal Church: that the sacred deposit of Christian doctrine should be more effectively guarded and taught" (Chicago; 10/5/79). This insistence is itself a job-description: this his successors and all successors of the apostles are to hold this true teaching unchanged until the Second Coming.

In the study, discussion or presentation of Catholic principles and their application today especially to human ideology and political policy, it remains crucial to attend first to the truth and to draw first from the true sources of Catholic tradition.

While not ignoring the latest findings of refined sampling techniques nor the most persistent editorial fixes, adherence to the truth and the true sources of the Church's own tradition has the great advantage of being boomerang-proof. For should the truth ever boomerang, we are all the better and wiser for it.

Fourth Cardinal Wright Award To Fr. Connery

On Sunday, September 19th Fr. John Connery S.J. will receive the 1982 Cardinal Wright Award for outstanding service to the Church. Established in 1979 in memory of the first prefect of Vatican II's Congregation for the Clergy, the award has become an annual ritual for the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, whose executive board chooses the recipient, after obtaining a sense of membership opinion. The reward will be presented in Chicago by Fr. William Smith at the conclusion of the annual Board meeting. John and Eileen Farrell, originators of the concept, will chair the forum, at which Fr. Connery will deliver a lecture.

Fr. Connery, one-time Jesuit provincial and professor of moral theology, is the author of *Abortion: The Development of the Roman Catholic Perspective*. For almost 40 years he has lectured on moral matters. Most recently he has been writing articles on morality and modern warfare. His latest assignment is to the United States Catholic Conference as theological consultant.

Former recipients of the Cardinal Wright Award are Msgr. George A. Kelly (1979, St. John's University, N.Y.C.), Professor William May (1980, Catholic University of America), Professor James Hitchcock (1981, University of St. Louis.)

The Latest Word on Jesuits

Peter Hebblethwaite, the ex-Jesuit who can be counted on to report the latest European gossip about goings-on at the highest levels of the Church as this is filtered through "reform" circles, is now convinced that the Pope implicitly has withdrawn the charges he leveled against Jesuits in his takeover of October 5, 1981. The huffing and puffing seems to have been to no avail. With the exception of Frs. Dezza and Pittau, the team at Jesuit headquarters remains what it was during the generalship of Fr. Pedro Arrupe. There have been neither ousters nor resignations. Jesuit headquarters are recovering their confidence and Fr. Arrupe's basic policies confirmed. John Paul II in his February 17 address, says Hebblethwaite, came as close as he could to

saying he had been misinformed about the Jesuits, he had acted hastily, and now withdraws his criticisms. The Jesuits had passed their "test" with flying colors, he claims. The credit for realizing that if the charges were made, then rejected by the pope, the Jesuits would emerge all the stronger, belongs to Fr. Dezza.

Fr. Dezza's letter to the whole Society, dated March 25, 1982, was a conservative document written to reassure the Vatican. When Fr. Dezza spoke of the fourth vow as a vow "to fulfill the missions that the Roman pontiff desires", his context clearly indicated that he was rejecting interpretations which would turn the fourth vow into an ultramontane blessing on every papal doctrine or initiative. It is expected now that the 33rd general congregation will be brief. It "will concentrate on the task of electing a successor to Arrupe. Then normal service will be resumed."

According to Hebblethwaite this is Jesuitry at its best — to keep dissent going with a papal blessing.

(*National Catholic Reporter*, July 16, 1982 p. 4)

Theologians At Work

• An interesting study of theological faculties was reported in *This World* (Summer 1982) with comments on the results by Everett Ladd, Donald Ferree, Richard Neuhaus, and Michael Novak. Among the judgments reported the following have unusual significance.

- Churches' public positions are nowadays politically "left", especially among the mainline Protestants and Catholic activists.
- Religious teachers think of themselves "liberally inclined", are "disproportionately Democratic", believe government expenditures are insufficient to solve social problems, generally critical of American institutions and values, largely think U.S. treats the Third World unfairly with too much domestic concern about defense.
- Their politics seems to flow less from their theology than from their academic surroundings. Only 17 percent of seminary faculties call themselves Republicans.

This World is a new magazine edited by Michael Scully of 210 East 86th Street, New York, New York 10028.

Requiescat in Pace: William A. Lynch, M.D.

"Ours too, is a life of commitment." In these words written in 1978 Dr. William A. Lynch epitomized his own life, a life of dedication to his family, his Church and his vocation. He was a fellow in the American College of Surgeons, International College of Surgeons and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. He served as a captain in the U.S. Army Medical Corps and received the Bronze Star Medal for bravery. He was on the staffs of Carney and St. Margaret's Hospitals, and Tufts Medical School. The teachings of the Church on life, marriage and the family found in him an untiring defender despite heavy demands on his time and energy. In upholding the Church's teaching, he experienced opposition, distrust, suspicion, even a subtle form of ostracism. The conferring of membership in the Knights of the Holy Sepulcher was a well deserved recognition of his devotion to the Church. For being a dynamic champion of human life, St. John's University, N.Y.C. conferred on him the degree of Doctor of Science. For fellow members of the National Federation of Catholic Physicians' Guilds he wrote:

"When two people marry they make a commitment to one another, they obligate themselves or bind themselves to take some moral or intellectual position or course of action. They assume an act of fidelity until death to one another and to those whom God sends to them. We as physicians, as Catholics, as those who walk with St. Luke in company with the Divine Physician — we have no choice. We must do everything in our power to defend and develop and nurture marriage and the family."

A charter member of the Fellowship, this devoted husband and father, scholarly and dedicated gynecologist, staunch defender of Catholic teaching began grand rounds with the Divine Physician March 14, 1982 and was buried in Milton, Massachusetts, March 17, 1982. Pray for this faithful doctor who lived a life indelibly stamped with earnest conviction and commitment. Pray for his widow, too.

Book Review

Janice Plunkett D'Avignon's *Psychological Influences in Modern Catholic Presentation of Sin and Redemption*. (Boston College)

This Ph.D. thesis is a most welcome and surprising breath of fresh air — let us hope that it reaches the stale bureaucratic world of today's Catholic religious education. What Janice D'Avignon does is to systematically compare the Sadlier religion texts, the Benzinger texts, and the Baltimore Catechism with respect to basic Catholic doctrine. Her primary focus is on the concepts of sin and redemption, and the clear conclusion is that contemporary psychology of the humanistic variety has substantially replaced much essential Catholic teaching. Here are a few of her observations:

omissions in presenting Catholic beliefs about sin appear in . . . both the Sadlier and Benzinger books. Neither series explains sin as a violation of God's justice . . . Neither the Sadlier nor the Benzinger books explain sins of thought (with the exception of one line found in Sadlier)."

She goes on:

The Benzinger books do not explain that Christ made satisfaction for the sins of man and acquired a superabundance of grace which is passed on to all mankind. The Benzinger books do not point out that salvation was a gift from God, not something owed to man.

A central cause of these omissions and distortions, concludes D'Avignon is "popular humanistic psychology" with its extreme position on man's basic goodness and its concern with values clarification, personal growth, self-concept formation and decision-making. "This emphasis on personality growth is such that it tends to overshadow doctrinal teachings and gives these books more of a psychological flavor than a religious one."

As a psychologist, a parent and a Catholic, I can only say "Amen!" — and "it's about time!" That such a thesis has come out of a Catholic college (Boston College) in educational psychology is certainly another good sign. It must have taken courage and perseverance, not just for Mrs. D'Avignon, but also for her committee, headed by Prof. William K. Kilpatrick.

(Cont'd on Page 24)

Items of Interest

- A preliminary revision of the Vatican Press English edition of *Laborem Exercens* is available from Nascent Life, 2532 W. Coyle Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60645. The contrast "subject-object" that runs throughout the encyclical is here rendered "master-materials", the meaning given two early (1925) German solidarity men, Frs. Pesch and Gundlach. It means mastery over your material and yourself, not over other people.

- David J. O'Brien of the College of the Holy Cross thinks a review of his article on Jesuit Higher Education which appeared in the March issue of the *Newsletter* misrepresented his views. He wishes *Newsletter* readers to know the article is available from him or the American Assistency Seminar, Fusz Memorial, St. Louis University, 3700 West Pine Blvd., St. Louis, MO. 63108.

- "Cardinal Jan Willebrands, Archbishop of Utrecht, has issued a pastoral letter stating that the Dutch hierarchy cannot sanction a decision taken by several Dutch parishes on the basis of their interpretation of the writings of the Rev. Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P., (on the ordained ministry) to appoint NON-ORDAINED PERSONS as parish priests in view of the decreasing number of ordained clergy in the Netherlands. Ageing that the problems posed by the lack of clergy are indeed urgent, the prelate, who is also president of the Holy See's Secretariat for the promotion of Christian Unity, stated that this fact cannot be used to justify hasty, self-deceptive solutions that contravene Church law. Cardinal Willebrands called for a careful distinction between examination of a theologian's views and their application in practice. Final decision on such questions, he said, rests with the bishops." (LIC July 7, 1982 p. 2)

- On June 12, the Catholic Theological Society of America (CTSA) endorsed the following resolution which:

"The Catholic Theological Society of America wishes to state publicly our conviction that the use of nuclear weapons, under any circumstances is contrary to the will of God. While there may have been just wars in the past, the inability to place traditional constraints on nuclear war now makes any moral justification impossible."

"We urge our colleagues in the academic institutions and faith communities of this nation to join us in condemning nuclear war in any form, and in calling for an immedaite, worldwide freeze

on the production of nuclear weapons, a staged reduction of present nuclear arsenals, and the eventual abolition of all nuclear arms."

One reporter made this comment: . . . "The members were placed in the position of agreeing or disagreeing with it without adequate reflection or discussion." of the 1,300 members of CTSA only 125 voting members attended the above meeting."

National Catholic Register July 2, 1982, p. 5

- The following interchange took place between Fr. Hesburgh and William McGurn of the *National Catholic Register* (July 18, 1982 p. 6)

Register: What do you think of the proposed change in the canon law code that would allow local bishops to decide what will be taught and who will teach in the university?

Hesburgh: I think it's absurd, and no one is going to do that as far as this university is concerned.

Register: What about when it has to do with theology and Catholic teaching?

Hesburgh: That's my judgment, the judgment of my peers, the judgment of the board of trustees and the judgment of the department.

It would seem to me that if we're not capable of making that kind of judgment about this kind of place, then we shouldn't have the kind of jobs we have."

- The Vatican is said to lack understanding of the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission, according to Anglican leaders. Church of England Archbishop Henry McAdoo of Dublin thinks the Roman reaction made the Holy See's position a criterion when the Commission was interested mainly in convergence. The Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith raised questions about the Eucharist as sacrifice, the Real Presence, Reservation and Adoration of the Eucharist, Holy Orders as Sacrament, the Ordination of women, the Primacy of Peter and the Jurisdiction of the Bishop of Rome, Infallibility and statements about General Councils that "sometimes have erred." (See *Origins*, May 6, 1982 pp. 752 ff) Fr. George Tavard, the Assumptionist priest who contributed to ARCIC, thought "there is a great deal of re-thinking to be done in Rome by Roman theologians." (LIC June 10, 1982 p. 4) One pungent line of Cardinal Ratzinger reads: "It is not possible for the Church to adopt as the effective norm for reading the scriptures only what historical criticism maintains."

The Catholic University of America

On December 21, 1981 the Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education approved "as an experiment" and for a period of three years the Canonical Statutes for the Ecclesiastical Faculties of CUA.

However, the Congregation also made significant observations on these Statutes, among which Cardinal Baum sent along the following:

4. . . . Art. 20 No. 2 of "Sapientia Christiana" asserts that in those cases where there is a conflict between canonical academic requirements and civil academic requirements within the same Catholic (i.e. non-Ecclesiastical) University that the canonical requirements will have precedence.
5. Furthermore, these draft statutes, because they lack some of the fundamental norms of "Sapientia Christiana", are not sufficiently adapted to the general principles and special norms of the Apostolic Constitution, such as collegiality, subsidiarity, cooperation between the groups involved, and notably the canonical requirements for teachers.
7. . . . It is quite difficult to understand why the Faculty of Theology should also be reduced to the status of a simple Dept. Within a non-canonical Faculty! the draft statutes reference is made not to a "Department" but merely to a "Program" (of theology) leading to Pontifical degrees. If this is the real situation there is neither a Faculty of *Sacred* Theology nor even a Dept of *Sacred* Theology at CUA. It would seem from these draft statutes that a bona fide Faculty of Theology as *Sapientia Christiana* understands the term, does not exist at Washington.
9. Within the two Ecclesiastical Faculties of CUA, then, there is a duplication of programs and curricula, one civil and the other canonical. It is also clear from the Statutes that greater emphasis is given, at least quantitatively, to the civil program, and hence the Church's academic legislation to play a subordinate role.

The ecclesiastical program would seem to be an exception rather than the normal course undertaken. It also seems therefore that the students are led to choose civil programs and degrees instead of canonical ones. It is praiseworthy

that there is a desire to offer students the possibility of obtaining civil degrees for these theological studies but it must be asked whether this choice is not made at the expense of a more thorough and more secure doctrinal formation such as *Sap. Chr.* calls for in respect to such studies.

In view of this situation would it not be better to set up Canonically a Faculty of Sacred Theology and to entrust to this Faculty the task of organizing the distinctly classical curriculum in three cycles as set out in *Sap. Chr.*, together with other programs or curricula designed for special purposes (Ord. art. 33) leading to degrees that have civil standing but are also canonically valid since they are conferred by a Canonical Faculty? . . .

The solution put forward in these statutes is to set up non-Ecclesiastical Faculty of Theology and to entrust to this same Faculty the responsibility of also offering "a program for Pontifical degrees". This arrangement does not seem appropriate considering the importance of the ecclesiastical faculties of CUA, Washington.

This very important issue must be resolved in a way that takes account of the particular objective of the Church at the national and universal levels. It will take some time to reach a solution but it is necessary to work towards this end weighing carefully all the various arguments.

In reporting to the faculty (May 3, 1982) concerning these events and Rome's observations, Msgr. Frederick R. McManus makes the point that the decree of approval does not impose conditions, requirements or final judgment on CUA's statutes. A faculty study of the observations is expected to be completed in the 1983-1984 academic year. Speaking for the Council of Ecclesiastical Faculties which met on April 30 with Archbishop Hickey to discuss the Roman approval, Msgr. McManus expresses this concern: "The Council is of course disturbed by some aspects of the observation: the errors of fact, misunderstanding of the text of the Statutes, failures to appreciate American policies and procedures for quality higher education, and indeed the general tone."

Good and Bad Pastors

A good pastor nourishes, guides, and protects his flock. He does this by: proclaiming the whole Gospel, omitting nothing less welcome, and reproofing errors, helping individuals to discern their personal vocations, accept them, and fulfill them; guiding people in prayer, especially in the appropriation of God's Word in Scripture and application of it to their lives; preparing people for and administering the sacraments validly and licitly; and, above all, inspiring people by his own humanly excellent and supernaturally holy life.

Such a pastor, of course, will be conscious of and adaptable to the special characteristics and problems of the individuals and groups in his care. This awareness will lead him to adapt the way he presents the truth, especially the order in which he tells people what they need to know. Moreover, he will encourage whatever is good and try to stimulate spiritual growth from whatever promising beginnings he finds. But the good pastor will not suppress truths; he will not falsely qualify norms. He will not condone sin, much less connive in sinful solutions to difficult problems.

There are some bad pastors today. I do not think they mean to be bad pastors. Rather, they are confused. They wrongly imagine that the moral truth proposed by the Church in the light of the Gospel is a body of laws or arbitrary rules. They imagine that a bishop is a mere government official and that a parish priest is a local administrator empowered to stretch, bend, and twist the general rules to make them work, more or less, in the actual, local situation. In other words, bad pastors simply fail to see that Jesus' teaching was not his own, and a fortiori not their own, to adapt and amend.

Many Catholics who have been pastored in recent years by bad pastors are in deep trouble. If they are not in bad faith, neither are they in good faith. They are uneasy in faith, yet they can hardly bring themselves to face the wrongness of kinds of sexual (and other) behavior they have been told are blameless. They tried to integrate these kinds of behavior into their Christian lives; still, the law written in their Christian hearts together with their consciences accuse them. Bad pastors mistakenly thought that telling people "You may" not only would encourage them to choose and follow the new morality but would free them from guilty consciences in doing so. The attempt has not entirely succeeded.

A bad pastor is like a physician who discovers that a patient who comes for consultation has a cancer which needs to be removed surgically. Not entirely believing in cancer and not wishing to make things difficult, the physician says: "Here are some pain pills; take them and you will feel much better." The patient does so, feels better for a while, but soon takes a turn for the worse and dies.

The good pastor is like a more competent and truly compassionate physician, who in the same situation breaks the bad news to the patient as gently as possible, uses a more radical and genuine therapy, and helps the patient do what is necessary to recover. Of course, the Catholic pastor is in a far better position than any physician, for he always can cure completely any soul who comes to him and truly wishes to be cured. The medicine of the sacrament of penance always is available and effective; it even raises dead souls to life.

Jerry Lindesmith

U.S. Bishops on War and Peace

The NCCB Committee on War and Peace had its beginnings in a lengthy discussion of the moral and religious dimensions of war which occurred at the 1980 General Meeting. Bishop Head proposed that the NCCB leadership accept responsibility for responding to the *varia*.

Archbishop Roach, President of the NCCB, established an ad-hoc committee to prepare a pastoral letter. The letter was to take into consideration what the NCCB/USCC had done on the question of modern war, the arms race, conscientious objection, and related issues, and it was then to use papal, conciliar, and other theological resources to develop a new policy statement.

Archbishop Roach asked Archbishop Bernardin (Cincinnati) to chair the ad-hoc committee and four other bishops were invited to join: Bishop Fulcher (Columbus), Bishop Gumbleton (Detroit), Bishop O'Connor (Military Ordinariate), and Bishop Reilly (Norwich). The Conference of Major Superiors of Men and the Leadership Conference of Women Religious were invited to appoint representatives as consultants to the committee: Rev. Richard Warner, C.S.C. and Sr. Juliana Casey, IHM. Bruce Martin Russett, Professor of Political Science at Yale University, was engaged as the principal author of the pastoral letter. The staff to the committee were Rev. J. Bryan Hehir, Director of the USCC Office of International Justice and Peace, and Mr. Edward Doherty, Adviser for Political-Military Affairs in the same office.

The committee formally began its work in July 1981. Between July 1981 and July 1982 it held 14 meetings receiving the views of a wide range of witnesses whose names appear at the end of the Appendix. The witnesses were selected to provide the committee with a spectrum of views and diverse forms of professional and pastoral experience. After several meetings with nongovernmental representatives, the committee met with members of the Administration.

The first draft of the pastoral went to the entire membership of the NCCB in June to solicit comments; in July the Committee met to consider the comments and revise the draft in light of them. The revised draft came before the Administrative Board in September and was approved for action by the General Meeting at the November 1982 meeting.

On August 2nd Archbishop Bernardin summarized the state of the question as follows:

"The pastoral, as you know, is considered one of the more important initiatives of our Conference and is being awaited with much interest by Catholics as well as the broader community. The volume of the response to the first draft is evidence of this. I wish to thank all those who so thoughtfully shared their ideas and recommendations with us. It has not been possible to acknowledge each response individually. We were pleased with the many positive reactions to the first draft; nonetheless, as expected many revisions are needed."

The Bishops' committee met for three days (July 28-30) and decided to extend the consultation period. The General Meeting of bishops in November 1982 will involve briefing and initial episcopal discussion, mainly because many bishops have indicated this is the way the project ought to go. Additionally, the issues are complex and the input thus far has been of surprising magnitude.

The present plan of the committee, therefore, is represented as follows:

- (1) The first draft will be used by the committee as the basis for developing a second draft which will take into account the responses received so far.
- (2) This new draft will be sent to the bishops approximately one month before the November meeting. This will enable them to prepare for the discussion. The draft will also be sent simultaneously to a wide spectrum of theologians and others for their comments.
- (3) The theologians will be asked to send their recommendations in writing by October 31. If possible, a synthesis of their comments/suggestions will be made available at the general meeting.
- (4) A plan will be developed by the committee, in conjunction with the General Secretary, to facilitate maximum participation by the bishops at the November meeting.
- (5) After the meeting, the committee will develop a third draft in light of the bishops' recommendations and the responses from the theologians and others.
- (6) It will be up to the bishops to decide whether they want to schedule a special meeting in the spring to approve a final text or wait until the regular meeting in November, 1983.

U.S. Bishops on War and Peace (continued)

Arthur Jones, the one-time editor and present correspondent for the *National Catholic Reporter* (July 16, 1982 p. 24) thinks the forthcoming pastoral statement is a major test of nerve for the U.S. Bishops. If they fail Jones' test the U.S. Catholic bishops may as well resign and move into the anonymous crowd." What is his test? An absolute ban on the manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons as a demand of God's divine law. Although *NCR* from its inception has been a leading force in relevelizing moral norms historically absolutized by the magisterium, in this instance Arthur Jones and *NCR* seek an absolute proclamation of moral oughtness. Not surprisingly, too, they will likely campaign against any Church teaching on war and peace which dissatisfies them.

As a matter of public record three traditions on war and peace vie for bishop attention, each of which have affected the other's prominence at different stages of history. First, there is the ancient and respectable pacifist party, which rejects violent defenses of freedom and justice; then there is the just war tradition, which attempts to identify the conditions under which military action is permissible even as it acknowledges that modern war is so terrible that it must be used only defensively; and finally there is what one author calls "the crusade current", which would justify offensive wars as a means of redeeming a sacred value or an oppressed community.

Each of these positions can be presented in a way that accords with Catholic moral teaching – and perhaps in singular accord with one selected Catholic principle. Though pacifism in its classical form, which claims that every military defense of human rights is immoral, has been ordinarily rejected by Catholic teachers, pacifism can be restructured to mean chiefly an insistence of the duty to seek out alternatives to modern war. Moreover the pacifist can draw heavily on the true Catholic teaching that one must never do evil that good may come of it. Meanwhile the crusader may speak earnestly of the real duty to labor effectively to prevent injustices, and the responsibility to be as nuanced and as firm as Catholic tradition in judging what would simply be the doing of evil. Even the just war theory, so favored by theologians through the centuries, has difficulties. For one thing, it has assumed countless forms and it has been notoriously difficult to apply its abstract conditions to concrete cases. Catholic leaders, if they propose a nuanced just war theory to support their judgments about our present conditions would have to do so in full recognition of well-known difficulties to apply such principles to complex historical situations.

Without question Catholic bishops should undertake the difficult but necessary task of guiding the faithful in applying principles to difficult but decisively important problems. However, mature American Catholics in their turn know that they have more moral options in questions of war and peace than they have in deciding doctrinal meaning or sexual preferences. Conscience formation on a particular issue cannot be effective unless Catholics have been socialized over a lifetime to live by moral principles *in toto*, however, they may fail from time to time. Today's bishops face a unique difficulty in the freedom of conscience granted to Catholics by contemporary dissenting theologians from compliance with the Church's authentic teaching. Catholics are not accustomed to choose their moral goods and without a sense of guilt if their choices disagree with the clear teaching of scripture and/or the Church.

There is an additional complication. It is fashionable, too, for self-proclaimed "advanced" thinkers to accent "freedom of conscience" against the demands of "love of country." Whatever varieties of political choices are available and proper to individual Catholics, bishops may not indiscriminately endorse the centrifugal forces in secular culture, especially at a time when elsewhere they speak of "building community."

In other words, discussion of nuclear weapons or nuclear deterrence, or nuclear war – apart from factual determinations – involves the interplay of important Catholic perspectives born of a long tradition of multiple responses to questions of war and peace as they arose century after century. Today's bishops surely move between a hard place and a rock as they prepare to guide their people through the controversies already going on about nuclear disarmament.

NCCB's First Draft Statement on War and Peace

On June 16th Archbishop Joseph Bernardian mailed to every bishop the first draft of a proposed pastoral letter on war and peace. An *ad hoc* committee of bishops, with himself as chairman, have worked for almost a year listening to witnesses. Official comments were received by July 15th for review prior to a September meeting of the NCCB's Administrative Committee. The expectation is that it will eventually be submitted to the Body of Bishops for approval at one of their meetings. Archbishop Bernardin counselled readers to examine the document as a whole when judging individual sections and sentences.

The 66 page document is composed of the following parts:

Introduction (Pp. 1-7) A summary of the biblical and Catholic tradition concerning peace, love, killing, violence:

I – Peace in the Modern World (Pp. 7-18)

- A. Non-Violence and Reconciliation. Christ's command of love is not an ideal but a precept. Non-violent response to evil is an option that calls powerfully to Christians now. Even so, public authorities are charged by law and conscience with defense of their people.
- B. The Right to Legitimate Self-Defense. Traditionally a part of Church teaching. Governments cannot be denied the right. Yet there are qualifications.
- C. The Just War Tradition which begins from the assessment that war is evil; the presumption of the teaching is in favor of peace. War may be carried out to prevent a "*real and certain injury*"; with the *right intention* (self-defense); as a *last resort*; with *reasonable prospect of success*; declared by *competent authority*; damage *proportionate* to the expected good effect; with discrimination (limiting attacks to military targets).

II War in the Modern World (Pp. 18-25)

Profound doubts about whether the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons can be reconciled with just war theory.

A. Paradox of Deterrence and Modern Weapons

The vast new fire-power requires thinking about war in a new way. The word "nuclear" generates terror.

B. Questions About Justice and Nuclear Weapons

Doubt about whether deterrence can always be effective, although it may have helped avoid war over the past 37 years. Some questions: Will there be time for conscientious decisions? To discriminate military targets? To be accurate?

C. The Content of Our Message. We cannot be content with merely restating general principles or making humanitarian recommendations. We offer here approximations to an ethically acceptable defense policy. Some views will be difficult to accept.

III – War and Peace: The Socio-Political and Moral Issues (Pp. 25-46) Progress to a world without weapons will not be easy; nor do we demand unilateral nuclear disarmament by the United States or its allies.

A. Immediate Requirements

1. (P. 25) Under no circumstances may nuclear weapons or other instruments of mass slaughter be used for the purpose of destroying population centers or other predominantly civilian targets.
2. (Pp. 26-27) We do not perceive any situation in which the deliberate initiation of nuclear warfare, on however restricted a scale, can be condoned. Non-nuclear attacks by another state must be deterred by other than nuclear means.
3. (Pp. 28-29) Our objections to the use of nuclear weapons against civilians and to the initiation of nuclear warfare apply equally to the threat of such use. We repeat the statement of our 1976 pastoral letter, "Not only is it wrong to attack civilian populations but it is also wrong to threaten to attack them as part of a strategy of deterrence." (To Live in Christ Jesus, p. 34)
4. (P. 30) Christians and others of goodwill may differ as to whether nuclear weapons may be employed under any circumstances.
5. (Pp. 31 ff) If we were to reject any conceivable use of nuclear weapons, we would face the very difficult question whether it is permissible even to continue

to possess nuclear weapons. The argument in favor of continued possession is the fundamental one of deterrence . . .

Abandonment of nuclear deterrence might invite an attack on the United States. Some people assert that nuclear weapons have provided, and will continue to provide, an essential deterrent to the loss of the freedom and way of life we cherish . . .

These are speculative matters. They are not subject to positive proof, and honest disagreement is possible. But because they are speculative, we cannot lightly demand abandonment of possession of all nuclear weapons at this moment . . .

6. (Pp. 33 ff) As unsatisfactory as the American deterrent posture is, we believe that a failure of deterrence would be even worse. We face here, then, the paradox of deterrence in the modern world . . .

. . . we use a traditional category of Catholic theology: toleration of moral evil as that applies to the problem of deterrence . . .

The bishops of the United States, living as we do in one of the nuclear powers in possession of the deterrent, have spoken to the morality of deterrence in more specific terms. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1979 on the SALT II agreements, Cardinal John Krol, speaking for the U.S. Catholic Conference, said:

“The moral judgment of this statement is that not only the use of strategic nuclear weapons, but also the declared intent to use them involved in our deterrence policy is wrong. This explains the Catholic dissatisfaction with nuclear deterrence and the urgency of the Catholic demand that the nuclear arms race be reversed. It is of the utmost importance that negotiations proceed to meaningful and continuing reductions in nuclear stockpiles, and eventually to the phasing out altogether of nuclear deterrence and the threat of mutual-assured destruction.

“As long as there is hope of this occurring, Catholic moral teaching is willing while negotiations proceed, to tolerate the possession of nuclear weapons for deterrence as the lesser of two evils. If that hope were to disappear, the moral attitude of the

Catholic Church would almost certainly have to shift to one of uncompromising condemnation of both use and possession of such weapons.” (Testimony to U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, September 9, 1979.)

Since this statement has attracted much attention in the last three years, it is important to be precise about the moral reasoning involved. Toleration is a technical term in Catholic moral theology; in the case of deterrence toleration is based on two judgments. First, as we have noted earlier in this letter, if nuclear weapons had never been made, we could not condone their creation, second, the role of the nuclear deterrent in preserving “peace of a sort” gives it a certain utility. Hence, the mixed nature of deterrence produces the moral judgment of toleration, a judgment that to deny the deterrent any moral legitimacy may bring about worse consequences than we presently live with under conditions of deterrence. The deterrence relationship which prevails between the United States, the Soviet Union and other powers is objectively a sinful situation because of the threats implied in it and the consequences it has in the world. Yet movement out of this objectively evil situation must be controlled lest we cause by accident what we would neither deliberately choose nor morally condone.

. . . For the present we reluctantly tolerate the American government’s reliance on nuclear deterrence, because unilateral withdrawal from this reliance has its obvious and grave risks.

. . . we recognize that, as in the case of war itself contending judgments exist in the Christian community. Some will find toleration of the deterrent too much of a concession; they will urge a posture of disengagement and vigorous protest. Others will find toleration as far as they can go. We do not think the facts are so clear, or the moral imperatives so compelling, that we can advance a judgment that is more stringent than toleration of the deterrent. But our toleration must be conditional upon sincere, substantial efforts to modify current policy as well as ultimately to eliminate these weapons.

B. Toward the Waging of Peace

1. The need for active and accelerated work for arms control, reduction and disarmament.

"We do not expect any government to accept the risks of large scale unilateral disarmament."

2. The need to face some extremely difficult questions posed by a decision to forego nuclear threats as a means of deterring nonnuclear attacks.

"A citizen may not casually disregard his country's conscientious decision to call its citizens to acts of legitimate defense . . . At the same time no state may demand blind obedience." Reference to NCCB's 1980 statement on selective conscientious objection.

3. The need to develop nonviolent means of conflict resolution.

4. The need for a compelling vision of peace, justice and a positive world order.

IV – The Pastoral Challenge and Response

A. The Church: A Community of Conscience, Prayer, and Penance

1. Formation of Conscience

The fact that war and peace involve politics "is no excuse for denying the Church's obligation to provide its members with the help they need in forming their consciences. We must learn together how to make correct and responsible moral judgments. We reject, therefore, criticism of the Church's concern with these issues on the grounds that it 'should not become involved in politics.' We are called to move from discussion to witness and action."

2. Reverence for Life in the Pursuit of Peace

3. Prayer

4. Penance

V – Christian Responsibility

A. Message of Encouragement and Hope to Certain Communities of Catholics.

1. To Catholic Educators: Priest, Religious and Lay Persons

We need to develop a true theology of peace. Excessive criticism of pacifists' means of avoiding war has moved some

critics to lose sight of the end of true pacifism, a just peace (not peace at any price).

2. To Catholics in the Armed Forces and Defense Activities

Certain actions in war are prohibited. Catholic military men must observe those prohibitions. The citizen does not lose basic rights through military service. Military personnel can be dehumanized by dulling their sensitivities and generating hatred toward adversaries. Combat forces should receive support if their lives are traumatized by their experience.

3. To Catholic Scientists, Doctors, Technicians, and Industrial Workers

. . . we have held that the possession of nuclear weapons may be tolerated as deterrents, while meaningful efforts are underway to achieve multilateral disarmament. Therefore, we cannot at this time require Catholics who manufacture nuclear weapons, sincerely believing they are enhancing a deterrent capability and reducing the likelihood of war, to leave such employment. Should we become convinced that even the temporary possession of such weapons may no longer be morally tolerated, we would logically be required to consider immoral any involvement in their manufacture. All Catholics in weapons industries should evaluate their activities on a continuing basis, forming their consciences in accordance with the general principles enunciated in this pastoral letter.

4. To Catholics in Communications Media

5. To Catholic Public Officials

. . . At the same time we ask you to be particularly sensitive to the consciences of those who sincerely believe that they may not morally support warfare in general, a given war, or the exercise of a particular role within the armed forces. Catholic public officials might well serve all of our fellow citizens by proposing and supporting legislation designed to give maximum protection to this precious freedom, true freedom of conscience.

6. To Catholic Youth

7. To Catholic Parents

8. To Catholics Who are Aged, Ill, or Military Veterans
 9. To Catholics in Special Peace Activities
- B. A Message to All Catholics as Citizens of the United States

... citizens wish to affirm their loyalty to their country and its ideals, yet must also hold to the universal principles proclaimed by the church. While some other countries also possess nuclear weapons, the United States was the first to build and to use them. Like the Soviet Union, this country now possesses so many weapons as to imperil the continuation of civilization. Americans share the responsibility for the current condition, and cannot evade responsibility for confronting it. The democratic American political system demands thoughtful and informed participation by all its citizens. Most Americans hold religious values that bear on these issues, and Catholics — bearing in mind Christ's teaching of love — can no less evade them.

As loyal citizens, Catholics love their country, but their very love and loyalty make them examine on a continuing basis their country's role in world affairs, asking that it live up to its full potential as a model and bearer of peace with justice for all humankind. "Citizens must cultivate a generous and loyal spirit of patriotism, but without being narrow-minded. This means that they will always direct their attention to the good of the whole human family, united by the different ties which bind together races, people, and nations."

Church in the Modern World, paragraph 75.

Informed understanding does not exclude the exercise of true Christian charity toward those with whom one may disagree. Their commitment to peace with justice may be no less honest simply because their perceptions of issues may differ. Our charity must include public officials who make awesome decisions about war and peace. While the Catholic citizen must not be politically naive, no society can endure if its public officials are treated only with cynicism or contempt. Again the Second Vatican Council provides guidance: Christians "must recognize the legitimacy of different opinions with regard to temporal solutions, and respect citizens, who, even as a group, defend their points of view by honest methods." (Ibid., paragraph 75)

Moral Theologian — Ethicist Consultants to War-Peace Draft

Listed in the Appendix to the NCCB draft are the following theological-ethical experts consulted by the Committee:

Dr. William O'Brien (Georgetown) who has devoted his scholarly life to the war-peace issue. He has given high praise to James Turner Johnson's *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War*, which argues for natural law principles and the rediscovery of the just war tradition.

Fr. Frank Winters, S.J. (Georgetown) who thinks the Church has already rejected the U.S. deterrent strategy "because it runs the risk of escaping human control." (*America* 145, 1981, pp. 26-30)

Dr. Gordon Zahn (*Pax Christi*) whose judgment is that the bishops' first draft is a disappointment, though not a disaster. Zahn is a pacifist.

Fr. Francis Meehan (Philadelphia, *Pax Christi*) who is generally sympathetic to the anti-war activist cause (*America*, 143-1980 pp. 423-426).

Dr. Ralph Potter (Harvard) and Dr. Alan Geyer (Public Policy Center) both non-Catholics. Potter is a disciple of Reinhold Niebuhr.

Mr. James Finn, one-time *Commonweal* writer and present editor of *Worldview*, is pleased with the dialogue Bishops are initiating with a pastoral on war and peace.

Dr. Paul Ramsey (Princeton), considered the central figure in the revival of the just war theory in ecumenical circles.

Fr. Charles Curran (CUA) who is pleased with the first draft's acceptance of toleration: "Toleration is an accepted concept in Catholic moral theology. Perhaps the most famous examples are the toleration of prostitution and the pre-Vatican II toleration of religious liberty or separation of Church or state." Curran here thinks the evil tolerated is "precisely the evil intention to threaten population centers." (*Commonweal*, August 13, 1982 pp. 438-439)

Fr. Joseph Fuchs, S.J. (Gregorian University) who a short time ago told a Georgetown University audience, where he presently lectures, that "it does not necessarily follow from the various basic concepts of man and ethics that there is such a problem as Christian ethics in the secular arena." He further argued: "Concrete ethical norms are not divine revelation; they do not become divine revelation by virtue of traditional or official teaching." (NC News, February 19, 1982)

(Cont'd on Page 18)

If the Present United States Nuclear Deterrent Is Evil, it's Maintenance Pending Mutual Disarmament Cannot Be Justified

by
German Grisez

Many people who take a position on the morality of nuclear deterrence think that the present United States deterrent is evil but its maintenance pending mutual disarmament somehow can be justified. This position goes beyond what every thinking person says — that the present U.S. deterrent policy is risky and its abandonment also would be risky — to some sort of moral criticism of this policy which tries to stop short of demanding unilateral disarmament.

I do not think that a position of this sort is compatible with the Catholic moral tradition. What the American bishops say about nuclear deterrence ought to be faithful to this tradition. Hence, I do not see how they can say that the deterrent is evil but somehow justifiable. Here I try to show this by doing two things. First, I articulate the case which can be made within the Catholic moral tradition against the present United States deterrent policy. Second, I show the rational indefensibility of calling the deterrent tolerable or justifiable as a lesser evil in an effort to avoid the implications of admitting it to be evil.

The Case of Traditional Catholic Morality against the Deterrent

The problem about the nuclear deterrent is not that it involves death-dealing weapons, nor that these are nuclear, nor that they are used to deter. The problem, rather, is the precise intent to kill included in the present U.S. deterrent threat.

It is clear that two or more parties can be using or threatening violence without any of them having a moral justification for its actions. In such a case, it is plain that all the contending parties are under a common moral obligation to stop their wrongdoing and disarm. Thus all agree with the sentiments expressed by saying: "No more war." and: "Let all involved in this madness lay down their arms!" But such sentiments do nothing to clarify the moral issue central to deterrence. I now turn to this issue, and first state and defend the relevant moral norm.

To choose to kill the innocent is always wrong. The reason for this is that human life is an intrinsic good of persons, and a choice to kill persons is a will closed to this good. But a morally good will

must be open to the full-being of persons. Thus, the antilife will present in the choice to kill an innocent person cannot be morally upright.

Why do I limit the norm to choices to kill the innocent, and what is meant by "innocent" here? Most Jews and Christians have thought that certain choices to kill are divinely authorized and hence justified. Among these are choices to execute certain types of criminals and to kill enemy soldiers in a justifiable war. For my present purpose, it is unnecessary to deal with these types of killing. Therefore, I set them aside by limiting the norm I state to the choice to kill the innocent.

"Innocent" here does not refer to the personal moral condition of those whose killing is excluded. Rather, it refers to those who are harmless, in contrast to the criminals and enemy soldiers who are involved in socially harmful, objectively unjust, violent behavior. Thus, the norm means that it is wrong to choose to kill anyone who neither has been or is engaged in such behavior.

Limited to the innocent, the norm which forbids the choice to kill persons has the support of the entire Christian moral tradition. It is the bare minimum which Christian teaching demands by way of reverence for human life.

The will to kill under conditions not in one's own power has the same moral quality as the will to kill unconditionally, even though one might never carry out one's murderous intent. For example, a robber armed with a gun and prepared to kill with it if necessary is morally a murderer, even though he or she hopes to do the robbery under cover of the threat of murder without actually killing. Of course, in maintaining the deterrent we wish that it not be used. We will execute the threat only very reluctantly and only if we are forced to do so. Yet this condition does not limit our willingness to kill. It only limits our execution of this willingness.

The threat which constitutes our nuclear deterrent has been expressed in various ways. During World War II, the U.S. engaged in terroristic obliteration bombing of both Germany and Japan, culminating in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The early form of the deterrent threat was that we would retaliate massively

against an enemy aggressor at a time and place of our own choosing, to do again what we had done to Japan. Later, as the U.S.S.R. acquired nuclear capability of its own, our threat was reformulated.

But the constant feature in U.S. nuclear deterrent policy has been the threat that no matter what damage an aggressor might inflict upon us, we are ready, willing, and able to respond by inflicting unacceptable damage — for example, the destruction of twenty million Soviet citizens or the destruction of twenty-five percent of the population of the U.S.S.R. and fifty percent of its industrial capacity. The official *United States Military Posture* statement, prepared by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for FY [fiscal year] 1983, p. 19, issues the threat which constitutes the deterrent in the following terms:

The prime objective of US strategic forces and supporting C³ [command, control, and communications] is deterrence of Soviet nuclear attack on the US and its allies. Deterrence depends on the assured capability and manifest will to inflict damage on the Soviet Union disproportionate to any goals that rational Soviet leaders might hope to achieve. Any US strategic retaliation must be controlled by and responsive to the NCA [National Command Authority(ies)], tailored to the nature of the Soviet attack, focused on Soviet values, and inevitably effective.

The word “values” here is used in a technical sense, familiar to readers of works on nuclear deterrence, to refer to persons and property as distinct from military forces. This official document and others like it constitute national policy by virtue of Congress’ reliance upon them in enacting the legislation which authorizes and funds the activities of the Department of Defense. Thus, in this and similar documents the U.S. issues the threat, which includes the choice, to kill persons innocent in the relevant sense under conditions not in our control. Hence, our choice of this policy is morally unjustifiable. The intent — that is, the manifest will — essential to the nuclear deterrent is murderous.

Someone might object that present U.S. policy does not include a clear and unambiguous threat to target cities. It seems to me that the phrase, “focused on Soviet values,” is a clear threat to target cities as such. But even if all our nuclear weapons were targeted on military objectives, it would not follow that the intent included in the deterrent does not encompass the death of millions of innocents. The object of our policy choice is deterrence, and the deaths of the millions of innocents are an essential part of the threatened harm. Hence, these deaths are included in what we choose; they are not merely an accepted

side-effect. When destruction which is a side-effect of one’s outward behavior is essential to the attainment of one’s purpose, such destruction is included in what one morally does. Hence, targeting is not the issue. The issue is the will to kill the innocent which is included in any real threat to bring about their deaths.

Some have tried to argue that the millions whose lives we threaten with our deterrent are not really innocent. They are part of a totalitarian society which is engaging in total war against us. Thus, the argument goes, those threatened somehow are participants in the unjust activities of their nation. This argument fails. In its traditional sense, as I have explained, “innocent” refers to those who have not been and are not involved in criminal or military action. The deterrent threatens many small children, elderly persons, and others who by no stretch of the imagination can be considered participants in any unjust harm.

What is even more important, the deterrent threat does not bear upon anyone insofar as he or she is engaged in unjust, harmful action. It bears upon a mass of persons indiscriminately just insofar as their lives are values — that is, are of some importance to their leaders — and their deaths disproportionate to any goals which these leaders, if they are rational, might hope to achieve. Even those who might have been justly killed in a battle will be unjustly killed if the deterrent is carried out, for they will be killed, not as agents of unjust violence, but as victims of an unjustifiable exchange of hostages.

If the deterrent fails and the time comes to carry out the threat we have been making, perhaps those in authority will not do so. Indeed, perhaps even now President Reagan and a few of those close to him have made up their minds that under no circumstances would they ever give the order to carry out the threat of the deterrent. Such a decision would make sense, for if the time ever comes to execute the deterrent, there will be nothing to gain by doing so.

If our leaders have made such a secret decision, their making it is to their personal moral credit. However, the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is only as credible as the apparent resolve to carry out the threat if deterrence fails. Deterrence requires not only assured capability but manifest will. Therefore, our public policy must remain a firm commitment to kill millions of innocent persons if the deterrent fails. Even if most of us were to reject and morally dissociate ourselves from this policy, as we can and should do, the public act of deterrence and the personal acts of those who sustain the public act will continue to

include the murderous intent which alone makes the deterrent effective.

One sometimes hears the suggestion that even if our present deterrent includes murderous intent, one can conceive a deterrent without such intent. A nation might have nuclear weapons, neither intend nor threaten to make any immoral use of them, yet by their potential alone frighten an unprincipled adversary who would assume that no other nation would respect any moral boundary.

This suggestion might have been helpful had it been offered before the present deterrent policy was adopted. But we are at present committed to an explicit deterrent including murderous intent. If the suggestion that some other, morally justifiable deterrent might be possible is to be anything more than idle speculation about what might have been, those who make this suggestion must explain how the United States can exchange its present deterrent for one free of murderous intent. If their explanation is to square with the Catholic moral tradition, they will have to project a deterrent whose threat could be carried out in a just war. Such a deterrent would be part of a capability to fight and win a large-scale nuclear war. Personally, I do not think the United States can acquire such a capacity. It could acquire the capacity, if at all, only through an all-out arms race. Both the war it would make possible and the arms race would need to be justified.

Some will argue that our persistence in the deterrent, even though it includes murderous intent, somehow is justified by the equally murderous intent of our adversaries. But this line of argument is mere rationalization. Two wrongs do not make a right. Rather, in the willingness to be as murderous as our adversaries, we abandon any claim to moral justification in our struggle against them.

Marxism, despite its rejection of the title, is a utopianism. If we were to dismantle our strategic deterrent, I do not doubt that the U.S.S.R. would reduce us and other Western nations to puppet status. The U.S.S.R. surely would take the steps necessary, even including wars of terrible destruction, to dominate both present and potential competitors, such as China. But what then? The Soviet leadership would be confronted with an unprecedented management problem. Without its antithesis, the inadequacy of Marxism would become apparent; it no longer would have any excuse for its inability to create heaven on earth. The U.S. and other powerful opponents provide the U.S.S.R. with the excuses without which its promises and aims for the world would be totally implausible.

Notice that I am not arguing: "Better red than dead." In the first place, the disvalues in the alternatives are noncommensurable; there is no common scale on which to weigh being red against being dead. In the second place, I believe that domination of the world by the U.S.S.R. and its Marxist ideology would be a frightful evil, and that to prevent it some persons — those able to help in the common defense — ought to be prepared to suffer death. But, in the third place, the issue is not our readiness to suffer evil, but rather our willingness to do it. The murderous intent of the deterrent is a moral evil which simply is unjustifiable. Not: "Better red than dead," but: "Better anything than mortal sin."

Many people find it hard to accept such a position. They are convinced that every problem one encounters in this world must have some acceptable solution, and that if one cannot solve a problem without doing evil, then one somehow becomes entitled to do it. However, the Christian injunction that we not answer evil with evil but rather with good is not an arbitrary and idealistic divine demand. Rather, it is wise and realistic advice for salvaging the human good possible in our fallen world.

If we use the evil of our adversaries as an excuse for our own murderous intent, we continue to expand and aggravate evil, mutilating ourselves first of all. For this reason, Plato also recognized that it is better to suffer evil than to do it. Thus, the injunction to respond to evil with good is neither a mere counsel for especially holy individuals nor other worldly advice for the private lives of Christians. The refusal to match others in evil is the only way for fallen humankind, individuals and societies alike, to stop compounding human misery and begin emerging into the light of decent human life and communion.

Why the Evil of the Deterrent Cannot Be Justified Pending Disarmament

Some who have made thoughtful statements, otherwise clearly formed in the light of traditional Catholic moral teaching, suggest that although the threat which constitutes the deterrent cannot be justified in principle, it can be tolerated, perhaps as a lesser evil, provided the deterrent framework is used to make progress on arms limitation, reduction, and eventual elimination. However, once one agrees that the intent to kill millions of innocent persons, which constitutes the deterrent, is immoral, one ought to say, not that it cannot be justified in principle, but rather that it cannot be justified at all. In the next paragraph I state in

summary form why this is so, and then proceed to argue the point more fully.

To say that maintaining the deterrent is a lesser evil is either to hold that a moral evil may be done to avoid some other evil or to make a proportionalist claim that the intent to kill included in the deterrent is morally acceptable. This claim would be that the will to kill millions of innocent persons is not immoral in this case, since its evil is outweighed by something else. But there is no scale on which to do the supposed weighing; those who use this approach first choose and then call what they have chosen "the lesser evil."

"Toleration" in ordinary language often means something different than it did in traditional moral theology. The two meanings must be distinguished.

In classical moral theology, "toleration" means permitting the moral wrongdoing of another without oneself choosing the other's action as a means or intending it as an end. According to this conception, an authority tolerated evil-doing within its jurisdiction when it permitted such evil-doing as a side-effect of its self-limitation – for example, a government might tolerate false religions as a side-effect of its protection of religious liberty.

In current language, not that of Catholic moral theology, "toleration" often means the reluctant willing of another's moral evil, not as an end but as a means to some good the evil-doing brings about. For example, many who support public funding of abortion say it is deplorable but must be tolerated; public funding, they argue, is necessary to make abortion available to the poor and to help ease the burden of public welfare payments. Here toleration is not merely permitting another's evil-doing, but choosing, however reluctantly, that evil be done.

The suggestion that the murderous intent which constitutes the deterrent is tolerable as a framework for disarmament efforts does not use the concept of tolerance found in the Catholic tradition. The traditional concept of toleration never was extended to excuse an authority's own immoral activity. It is impossible to put up with one's own wrongdoing, for an immoral will is active, not passive, with respect to what it wills. In the case of U.S. deterrence policy, the identity between the tolerator and doer of evil is clear. The policy is our own nation's; we the people share in it, unless we really reject and dissociate ourselves from it. Therefore, any suggestion that American Catholics might tolerate the deterrent pending mutual disarmament is senseless. It is a suggestion that we tolerate the evil we ourselves continue to choose.

At this point, those who have suggested that

the deterrent might be tolerated are likely to say: "We didn't mean that cooperation with this policy is a sin but that Catholics should commit this sin. Rather, our point is that the deterrent is very bad but not morally evil. Its admitted badness is outweighed by its good effects: it prevents the even greater evils which almost certainly would follow on unilateral disarmament. Thus, we only maintain that the (nonmoral) evil of the deterrent is a lesser (nonmoral) evil, and so the choice to maintain the deterrent is morally good." Probably, those who argue in this way also will claim that this position is nothing more than an extension of the principle of proportionality, which is part of the traditional theology's theory of just war.

This line of reasoning is unacceptable. A choice to maintain the deterrent is a choice to kill noncombatants. As explained above, the entire Christian tradition has held that it always is wrong to choose to kill the innocent. Thus, the choice to maintain the deterrent is intrinsically morally evil. The entire Catholic tradition held that such evil cannot be outweighed by anything whatsoever. Hence, it will not do to avoid saying that maintaining the deterrent is a sin one should commit by saying it is not a sin because it is a lesser evil. That would be to say that a choice to kill the innocent – condemned as sinful by the entire Christian tradition – is morally acceptable in this case.

Moreover, the principle of proportionality as it was traditionally understood was only one condition required for justice in warfare. Any Catholic author who stated this principle assumed that the requirement of noncombatant immunity also would be met. Hence, any claim that the traditional principle of proportionality might be extended to justify the choice to kill the innocent would be fallacious. If the principle of proportionality were "extended" in this way, one would be taking a step without any basis in the Catholic theological tradition.

Furthermore, the traditional principle of proportionality did not simply ask under what conditions going to war can rationally be considered a lesser evil than not doing so. In his article on war (*Summa theologiae*, 2-2, q.40, a.1) St. Thomas does not so much as mention a principle of proportionality. Some theologians include proportionality under just cause, suggesting that a war-maker has not just cause if the destruction involved in making war is pointless. Pius XII suggests that judgment of the proportion of good to bad effects might be made, but only in the light of moral principles. (On this point, see the

article, "War, Morality of," by Richard A. McCormick, S.J., *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 14, p. 804).

The fact is that during the past twenty years some theologians, unfortunately including McCormick, have adopted the position that there are no intrinsically evil acts in the sense the Catholic tradition teaches there are. They maintain that acts traditionally considered intrinsically evil are sometimes justifiable, if they are the lesser evil. Plainly, this position requires that one be able to weigh (supposedly "nonmoral") evils, such as choosing to kill the innocent and accepting the consequences of unilateral disarmament against one another, and that this weighing can determine that one evil is less than the other. This view was advanced in connection with the contraception controversy. It was criticized, and its proponents tried to defend it. Their attempt failed. This recent history is worth reviewing.

The theologians Charles E. Curran led in dissent from *Humanae Vitae's* reaffirmation of the received teaching on contraception subscribed to a statement saying that "spouses may responsibly decide according to their conscience that artificial contraception in some circumstances is permissible and indeed necessary to preserve and foster the values and sacredness of marriage." Generalized, the position is: Christians may responsibly decide according to their conscience that any sort of act, although formerly excluded by Christian teaching as intrinsically evil, in some circumstances is permissible and indeed necessary to preserve and foster important human values on which it bears.

This generalization is a form of proportionalism — the theory that in conflict situations it is right to choose the lesser evil. Proportionalism has been discussed by philosophers for more than a century, and it is notorious that there is no rational way, prior to a moral judgment, to measure values and disvalues against each other and calculate the lesser evil. Those defending received Catholic teaching advanced the argument of noncommensurability against their opponents. See, for example, my "Against Consequentialism," *American Journal of Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy*, 23 (1978), pp. 21-72.

Few dissenting theologians have made any serious attempt to defend proportionalism against this line of criticism. One who made such an attempt was Richard McCormick. However, McCormick himself has been forced to admit that the comparison of values and disvalues is not a rational process. See his "Commentary on the Commentaries," in Richard A. McCormick, S.J., and Paul

Ramsey, eds., *Doing Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict Situations* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978). With respect to the noncommensurability of values and disvalues, McCormick says (p. 227): "What do we do? Somehow or other, in fear and trembling, we commensurate. In a sense we *adopt* a hierarchy. We go to war to protect our freedom." Later McCormick returns to this adoption of a hierarchy and invokes (p. 251) a "moral instinct of faith" posited by Karl Rahner, and concludes that "even though our spontaneous and instinctive moral judgments can be affected by cultural distortions and can be confused with rather obvious but deeply ingrained conventional fears and biases, still they remain a more reliable test of the humanizing and dehumanizing, of the morally right and wrong, of proportion, than our discursive arguments."

Now, the trouble with this is that McCormick had set out to show that one could arrive rationally at a moral judgment of conscience at odds with received Catholic teaching. As a judgment of conscience, this conclusion of comparing values with disvalues was to be before choice, so that it could guide choice. But in the end McCormick has been forced to admit that the comparison is not a rational one. The conclusion comes only after one adopts a standard in the very making of the choice. The article of Rahner's McCormick cites — "The Problem of Genetic Manipulation," *Theological Investigations*, vol. 9 (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972) — leads to a conclusion one can agree with. But Rahner's argument for the conclusion falters, and so he invokes a "moral instinct of faith" and admits (p. 251) that "this 'instinct' justifiably has the courage to say *Stat pro ratione voluntas* because such a confession need not necessarily be overcautious in making a decision." Thus, the whole theoretical argument is based on "we do not *want* to manipulate."

In sum, after a great deal of effort to show that a rational comparison of values and disvalues could justify departures in conflict situations from received Christian moral norms, McCormick — the theologian who has tried hardest to make sense of proportionalism — admits that the choice precedes the judgment. In some cases we do not want to manipulate, and in such cases manipulation is wrong. In other cases we do not want to manipulate, and then manipulation is right. Or: We do not want abortion, and so abortion is wrong; we do want to maintain the nuclear deterrent, and so the nuclear deterrent is justifiable. The sought after rationale turns out to be mere rationalization.

Nevertheless, the principle of proportionality

can be included in a Catholic theory of just war. One can admit it if it requires no impossible weighing of costs against benefits to determine a "lesser evil." Following Pius XII's suggestion, one can take this principle to mean that even if the other conditions seem to be met, a war can be considered unjust in the light of various moral values.

Often, when lack of "proportionate reason" is discussed, what is really at stake is just cause or right intention. For instance, someone might say that a nation which continues to fight when defeat clearly is inevitable lacks a proportionate reason, because the damage from then on will accomplish no good. More accurately, the already-defeated nation lacks upright intent, since it cannot intend any good it considers impossible, and so must be acting for some illegitimate reason, such as desire to make its adversary's victory more costly. Again, if a government goes to war over some trivial issue to strengthen its own domestic political position (as some suggested the British government did in the Falkland Islands), one might say there is no proportionate reasons for the costs of the war. More accurately, there is no just cause.

Still, in some cases "proportionate reason" cannot be reduced to just cause and right intention. Even if there is just cause and right intention, the leaders of a nation might undertake a war unduly burdensome to many of their own fellow citizens or devastating to the bulk of the enemy population. In such cases, the issue is one of fairness. Leaders ought not to involve their nation in misery they themselves would not wish to endure if they were ordinary citizens instead of leaders. Likewise, they may not do to an enemy's population (even as a side-effect) what they would not have the other nation's leaders do to them and their people. In such cases, proportionality reduces to the Golden Rule.

All this can be summed up in three points. 1) If one admits that the deterrent includes a choice to kill the innocent, then the entire Christian tradition agrees in condemning it as evil, and nothing in traditional Catholic morality justifies choosing such an evil. 2) The principle of proportionality cannot be "extended" to cover this case. 3) Statements of the principle of proportionality often are seriously defective and likely to be abused. Whenever proportionality is used as a condition for moral acceptability, one should carefully add the proviso that the "lesser evil" must be judged by moral principles, such as

fairness to all who are likely to suffer the consequences of a war.

Christian moral principles are within the special competence and responsibility of bishops. Other aspects of the complex problem of nuclear deterrence are not. Principles are invoked in any attempt to justify a particular judgment on an issue such as deterrence. If what bishops say is even slightly erroneous or unclear in respect to principles, their statements will be abused by some theologians and will be a source of scandal to many of the faithful.

In conclusion, no matter what bishops say about nuclear deterrence, their statements are likely to have only a marginal influence upon U.S. strategic thinking. Thus, the arguments they use are far more important than the conclusion they reach. Therefore, I hope that Catholic bishops will be very careful in taking their position on the morality of the present United States deterrent. Whatever else they say or do not say, they simply must not admit that the deterrent is evil yet somehow justifiable.

CONSULTANTS TO DRAFT

(Cont'd from page 12)

Fr. John Langan, S.J. (Georgetown University) who works for the Woodstock Theological Institute, and George Weigel, scholar in residence at the World Without War Council of Greater Seattle. The latter recently observed: "Many churches have, for the past 15 years, taught that America is a force for evil in the world. We have thus been left with a so-called peace effort that is an attack upon the community rather than an expression of the best in it." (*Center Journal*, Summer, 1982, p. 82)

Among other moralists interviewed, although unmentioned in the Appendix, was Richard A. McCormick, S.J.

Friends of the Fellowship

Bishop Mark K. Carroll
 Archbishop Thomas A. Donnellan
 Bishop John J. Graham
 Bishop William J. McDonald
 Bishop John Paul

Fr. Ronald Lawler's Areas of Concern

The factual situation of war and peace is extremely complex. When moral principles are brought to bear, they must be stated precisely, because they are principles which affect all Christian morality. The positions of many Catholics include the following:

(1) A nuclear deterrence policy is a complex whole. The policy, as a complex created by human decision, can also be modified by human decisions. If the given form of a particular deterrence policy includes an immoral aspect, the Christian community should reject that aspect, and seek to have it eliminated from national policy. It would, for example, be immoral to have a deterrence policy that unambiguously includes a clear intention to kill innocent people (by destroying huge centers of population) if certain conditions are realized. The intention to do a grave evil under certain possible circumstances is itself a grave evil.

(2) But it is not evident that every form of nuclear deterrence must involve immoral elements. It is not clear, for example, that having weapons that the enemy cannot know we will not use in immoral ways necessarily involves the intention of doing evil, or that it is immoral for other reasons. Certainly it involves the danger that we or others may bring about unspeakable evils. But we are living now in the midst of so many kinds of terrible threatening evils that the fact that a policy makes one of these great evils more possible in some respect is not a decisive determinant of the morality of the policy. Given the present situation, abstention from that policy, or the choice of some other alternative, might make the same or other terrible evils more probable.

(3) The fact that some forms of nuclear deterrence may be temporarily acceptable does not at all remove the terrible dangers from that policy. We have referred above to the moral and physical dangers that seem inseparable from nuclear deterrence. As we obtain more powerful nuclear arsenals, and as more nations obtain nuclear weapons, and as the spiritual disorder of the world grows, the possibility of nuclear war can more easily become a decisive reality. There are dangers more terrible than the physical dangers: great masses of people can become hardened in their attitude toward unspeakable crimes, willing to participate in acts of genocidal destruction. To avoid a growing forgetfulness of indispensable Christian demands it is essential for pastoral leaders to speak clearly of the certain principles of faith

about the nuclear destruction of cities, and about the duty never to do evil, even to save lives.

(4) We must speak clearly of the evils involved in nuclear war, but not only of those evils. We must reflect also on the evils which led nations to accept the terror of nuclear weaponry in the hope of avoiding terrible and inhuman slavery. Christians do not question the sincerity or goodness of the Russian people. But since this government actively advocates atheistic and anti-personal positions which lead to disaster, it would be terrible for the free nations to be subjected to a communist regime, or even to the possibility. Leaders of the free world have a serious obligation to do all that they can morally do to prevent so great an evil as the triumph of this atheistic dictatorship on a world scale.

(5) Since nations have a duty to defend the freedom of persons and to possess realistic defenses of justice, and since nuclear deterrence is an extremely dangerous means of pursuing such ends, there is a grave duty to seek out other ways of preventing the evils that nuclear deterrence was intended to lessen, if not eliminate. We must find ways to guard justice and freedom less perilous than those presently invoked. Religious leaders should seek to move people toward that repentance that will make them more worthy of divine mercy, and able better to seek realistic ways of securing justice and peace simultaneously.

(6) A fundamental principle of Christian morality is that we must not do evil that good may come of it. The principle of discrimination teaches we must not intend to slay the noncombatant or the innocent, whether in war, or in euthanasia, or in abortion, whatever the reasons might persuade an a-moral pragmatist. St. Thomas More in his trial and death taught a lesson important in our days. We must serve God intelligently and faithfully. We have no duty to risk our lives and freedom foolishly. Nor is it our duty to risk the freedom of nations by asserting absolutely that deterrence is evil, if we have no certainty that it is. We must be determined ourselves to do no evil, to rely on God's providence rather than to do evil even in extreme circumstances. Thomas More had excellent reasons to affirm with an oath the document Henry VIII wished him to sign. To sign it would seem to do no harm, since most of the prestigious people of the nation had already signed it. His own life would be saved, and the King would have a respected counsellor. His wife would not be

widowed, nor his children orphaned. But he knew that no evil deed is justified, to save anything. In the difficult questions of modern times we must cultivate Christian intelligence and seek to achieve that wisdom which holiness makes accessible.

There is one nuance to the contemporary discussion of war and peace which receives little or no attention from many pacifist organizations, viz. the "threatening context" of a Communist dominated world. John Courtney Murray's "Reflections on the Moral Questions of War" (*Theological Studies* 1960) still is a classic treatment of this aspect of a still relevant question. What about the spectre of an inhuman dictatorship or ideology dominating the world? Even St. Francis of Assisi, so often used as a model of pacifism, was at one point a supporter of the Crusades — because there were other values a Christian must protect in addition to "keeping the peace".

Fr. William Smith on Theological and Political Reasoning

The underpinning of what is called authentic Catholic moral theological reasoning begins with St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans (3:8), wherein the Apostle "justly" condemns those who "do evil as a means to good."

The entire Catholic moral tradition is based upon this principle. The systematic index of Denziger-Schonmetzer's *Enchiridion Symbolorum Definitionum et Declarationum De Rebus Fidei et Morum* (K, 1, bc — finis non justificat media) gives four instances of how the principle in question has been applied by Church authority throughout history.

The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) threatened anathemas against those who would use illicit means to obtain health (DS 815).

Pope Martin V (1418) ordered an inquiry into the views of followers of both John Wycliffe and Jan Hus. One question asked whether they believed that perjury to save life, even in favor of the faith, was a mortal sin. (DS 1254)

The Holy Office in 1639 (July 23) decreed that it was illicit to baptize the children of unwilling Jewish parents because "though the objective was good, the means were illicit." (DS 1998)

The Holy Office in 1929 (August 2) ruled that the direct procural of seed by masturbation was impermissible, even if the intent was to cure a contagious disease. (DS 3684)

The Church has never taught in Christ's name that Catholics can do evil so that good (utility) comes about or to prevent worse evil. The *Principle of Double Effect* permits a choice which excludes making evil the direct object of a person's will. Some non-Catholics use a different principle called "the lesser of two evils" to justify doing a lesser evil. A lesser evil is nonetheless by definition evil. In the authentic Catholic theological tradition this is unacceptable.

Some current American authors propose radical revision of this teaching (i.e. its contradiction) under the name of "proportionism" or "consequentialism". They redefine moral evil (e.g. killing) as a pre-moral evil (such as "cancer" would be) or "ontic evil" or "non-moral evil" and then proceed to "justify" this redefined evil if a higher good is intended, if there is a proportionate reason for doing it, or if more and better good consequences result from the deed (e.g. saving more lives). These authors change the words without changing the reality (evil was done). The cardinal principle of Catholic moral theology is vitiated whenever a good end (proportionate reason) justifies evil means to achieve that end.

Another way these authors have of circumventing the Catholic moral position is to introduce the notion of "toleration". "Toleration" is a technical term in Catholic moral theology to indicate the respect, sympathy and charity Catholics should have for persons holding views on doing things different from our own norms. (For a popular presentation of this concept, see G. Dalcourt, *New Catholic Encyclopedia* vol. XIV, 1967 — pp. 192-193) Essentially, "toleration" is a *passive* notion, i.e. the error or evil of *another* may be tolerated. No approved author in the Catholic tradition has ever advanced the notion that *active* toleration is permissible i.e., I may tolerate my own evil if I have good reason for doing so. Such a notion is contrary to Catholic teaching, not a part of that teaching.

This effort to revolutionize the Catholic theological tradition is well under way in many areas of moral life. Dissenting moral theologians shift their analysis from the general principle "there exist . . . general norms of licit dissent" (NCCB Pastoral, "Human Life in Our Day" November 15, 1968 No. 49) to find reason to justify contraception, sterilization, abortion, all wrong to be sure but tolerable if there is a certain

utility or proportionate reason for doing it. These revisions have long since been in progress.

This dissent applied to subject of war and peace would declare the use of strategic (perhaps tactical also) nuclear weapons and/or the declared intent to use these as part of a national deterrence policy is intrinsically wrong but we may continue this evil policy because it has a certain utility. There is no precedent for such a position in the Catholic tradition.

Concerning the general issue of war and peace themselves, the following comments are possible at this time:

1. There is no consensus among the U.S. bishops or U.S. Catholics or U.S. Theologians that the present deterrent policy of the U.S. is morally evil. If there were such a consensus, the only logical conclusion would be the unilateral dismantling of any weapon of mass destruction.
2. There is no longer a consensus among the U.S. bishops that there is continuing moral justification for the deterrent force already in American possession.

This is not a sudden development. Early questions were raised in the NCCB Pastoral *To Live in Christ Jesus* (November 11, 1976 p. 34)

In view of the present situation, what can a theologian say about the politico-moral aspects of nuclear deterrence? He can say this much: There is no consensus that the present U.S. deterrent posture is immoral. This may be admitted without embarrassment because the issue is (1) relatively new (2) complex and (3) not easily solved by resort to tradition. We can say more: (1) any shift from destroying persons to destroying things instead should be encouraged; (2) the ambiguities in our present policy of deterrence should be clarified; (3) proposals for arms limitation and disarmament should be strengthened, although only technical experts (surely not theologians) can adequately assess the practical alternatives.

Those who think the deterrent policy is morally evil will accept nothing less than unilateral disarmament if this proves to be the only option. Yet, we cannot assert as certain a judgment which is not even probable. Only recently in a statement to a Special Session of the United Nations on Disarmament (June 11, 1982) John Paul II said the following: "In current conditions 'deterrence' based on balance, certainly not an end in itself but

as a step on the way toward disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable." (English *L'Osservatore Romano*, June 21, 1982 p. 4)

Whatever else may be said on this complicated subject, it is important to keep in mind that Vatican II speaks of citizens' duties as well as rights. For example, *Gaudium et Spes* (No. 79) says: "Government authorities and others who share public responsibility have the duty to protect the welfare of the people entrusted to their care and to conduct such grave matters soberly." Church spokesmen, priests particularly, must not be special pleaders for a political case unless there is solid moral grounds for so doing. Nor must they overstate Christian priorities. Some would make the threat of nuclear war the central problem of our age when for the present at least the existential reality is that 1.5 million American unborn are killed each year with no indication of surcease, while nuclear war is still a remote danger.

Some caution should also be exercised in discussing pacifism. Pacifists surely have right in American society, can and do serve their country with great loyalty, at times with great sacrifice. But the Church has always been cautious in this matter. As late as 1967 Fr. Richard McCormick wrote "Conscientious objection is morally indefensible". (*New Catholic Encyclopedia* Vol. XIV p. 804) Both he and John Courtney Murray cited Pius XII: "A Catholic citizen may not appeal to his own conscience as ground for refusing to give his service to the state and to fulfill duties affixed by law." (*AAS* 4a (1957) p. 19). According to Donald R. Campion, *Gaudium et Spes* (No. 79) made no judgment on the objective moral claim of the conscientious objector. It merely appealed for the humane treatment of those who for reason of conscience refuse to bear arms" providing, they accept some other form of service to the human community." (Abbot, *Documents of Vatican II*, pp. 292-293 footnote 256) This was the accepted moral teaching then, with the teaching on complete pacifism even more negative. Complete pacifism is not so easily located in any well developed Catholic moral teaching. Perhaps it should be. Perhaps some now think the case is self-evident. Surely it always remains a personal Christian option. But it should not be taken for granted that the subject can be discussed without a good many distinctions and lucid explanation of why the Catholic moral position in this area is so radically different from 1967.

Publications of Interest

- Joan Bland, SND de N. (ed.), *The Pastoral Vision of John Paul II*

Ronald D. Lawler, OFM Cap. *The Christian Personalism of John Paul II.*

James V. Schall, S.J., *The Church, the State and Society in the Thought of John Paul II*

These volumes, published by the Franciscan Herald Press in 1982, are the product of a Trinity College Symposium (Washington, D.C.) held in 1980, which attempted to deepen Catholic understanding of the present Pope's vision of Christianity. The first volume deals with his thought on family, priesthood, religious life, catechesis and social ministry. Fr. Lawler's contribution is more specific – confined to the Pope's humanism and its relation to faith. Fr. Schall tackles the thorny questions of Christianity's truth and its relation to social reform as understood by modern Catholic leaders. A very valuable triad.

- *Sacred Signs* is a little known quarterly review for liturgical arts. Subscriptions are \$10 annually payable at Box 577, Newport, R.I., 02840. The editorial board includes Helen Holland, Editor, Fr. Adrian Dabash, Fr. Giles Dimock, O.P., Brother Cademon Holmes, O.S.B. Not only is the content serious and of high quality but the editors take Catholic doctrine and liturgical laws seriously too.

- *Teaching the Catholic Faith Today: Twentieth Century Catechetical Documents of the Holy See* (1982)

The Daughters of St. Paul have done catechetical leaders a special favor in putting together seven important Papal documents on catechetics beginning with Pius X and Pius XI through Paul VI's Creed, GCD, *Evangeli Nuntiandi* and John Paul's *Catechesi Tradendae* and *Holy Thursday Letters on the Eucharist*.

Silvio Cardinal Oddi has written the Preface with Msgr. Eugene Kevane providing the Introduction and a topical index which makes the volume a handy reference work. 253 pp. \$12.00 cloth \$10.00 paper.

- Dr. Hanna Klaus has a review of natural family planning procedures and effectiveness (with comprehensive references) in reprint form. First printed in the *Obstetrical and Gynecological Survey*, it is now available from her at 8514 Bradmoor Drive, Bathesda, Maryland 20817

- *This World*, published by the Institute for Educational Affairs (210 East 86th Street, New York City 10028) has some interesting articles in the Summer 1982 issue. One deals with a survey conducted by the IEA/Roper Center analysing *What Theologians Believe*. Two others deal with Reinhold Niebuhr on pacificism and the Catholic bishops on Disarmament by Robert L Spaeth.

- Joseph F. Costanzo, S.J. has published two new volumes entitled *Political and Legal Studies* (Christopher Press), that commemorate his Golden Jubilee as a religious. Volume One deals with his writings on the general subject area *Politeia* (Plato, Augustine, Dante, Kant, etc.). Volume two deals with American Constitutional Law, the origins of American democracy, civil liberty and disobedience, public and private education, academic freedom, war and peace, pacificism, conscription, and conscientious objection. The latter volume has a special relevance to the present American scene.

The set of two volumes is available from Sr. Mary Ruth, P.O. Box 12546, Tuscon Arizona 85732-2546. \$35.00 including postage.

- Ronald P. McArthur, "The Natural Law: A Perennial Problem", republished from the *American Journal of Jurisprudence*, clarifies the notion of the natural law as it bears on modern American political problems. It is available from Thomas Aquinas College, Santa Paula, California 93060.

- *The Dawson Newsletter*, devoted to vitalizing the thought of Christopher Dawson, is published quarterly at 3835 Westminister Pl., St. Louis, MO. 63108.

- *Fidelity*, edited by E. Michael Jones (201 Ohio St., St. Paul, Mn. 55107), is a journal devoted to issues concerning marriage and family life from the perspective of Catholic faith. It is divided into editorials, commentary on current issues, feature articles, and book reviews. The initial December 1981 issues included an exceptionally perceptive and helpful essay by Rev. Richard M. Hogan, a priest of the Archdiocese of St. Paul, entitled, "A Theology of the Body." In it Hogan presented a superb analysis of the Wednesday conferences of Pope John Paul on sex, marriage, and the "body". Hogan's article, precisely by reason of its patient,

scholarly analysis of these profoundly thought-out papal addresses, is itself a magnificent theological synthesis. Anyone seeking to understand what John Paul II means by the "nuptial meaning of the body" is well advised to consult this excellent article. In subsequent issues *Fidelity* included important articles on marriage by Donald DeMarco and Joseph Cardinal Hoeffner and on *Familiaris Consortio* by the editor and James Hitchcock. The journal has thus made available some excellent material, and one trusts that it will continue to do so.

- A new publication of the Campaign for Human Development (CHD), "To Campaign for Justice," has been developed to achieve broad understanding of the Catholic Church's social teachings and to encourage implementation of those teachings in the lives of individual Catholics, editor James R. Jennings said in the introduction.

The 1971 Roman Synod, the NC released continued "placed action for justice at the heart of the Church's mission as central as the preaching of the Gospel and celebration of the sacraments." \$1.25

- Msgr. Eugene Kevane's Creed and Catechetics has been translated into French, with the title *Credo et Catechese*. Publisher Tequi in Paris (82, Rue Bonaparte).

- Fr. Marvin O'Connell, Notre Dame's premier professor of history, has an excellent article in the Summer 1982 *Center Journal* (pp. 89-103) entitled "Modernism in Retrospect."

- Derek Bok, *Beyond the Ivory Tower: Social Responsibilities of the Modern University* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press 318 pp. \$15.95

Mr. Bok, the President of Harvard, acknowledges, as Clark Kerr did not in 1963, that it is harder to claim autonomy for the multiversity of today—when its power over data and their use, over access to major professions and powerful offices, and its dependence on community funds, makes it a different institution than it was in days of its isolation and small size. Yet, Bok still makes the same claim more for pragmatic considerations than on principle. He does this because his university is research with only lip service to teaching. The weakness of his university flows out of his fundamental definition. Per se, his university stands for nothing except procedures to protect faculty. Here precisely is the trouble the Catholic

Church is having with its own colleges. They talk procedure, too, but their chief value or disvalue is in their teaching. And with no norm to determine bad teaching they imitate the worst of their American counterparts.

- Carl A. Anderson and William J. Gribbon, *The Family In the Modern World*, (Washington, D.C., 20003, The Family Life Institute, 114 Fifth Street S.E.) This booklet represents the conclusions of a Symposium on *Familiaris Consortio*, involving Fellowship members James Hitchcock, Fr. James V. Schall, S.J., Dr. Herbert Ratner.

- K.D. Whitehead, *Agenda for the Sexual Revolution*, (Chicago, Franciscan Herald Press 1982 187 pp. \$8.95) This is a summary of most of the recent controversies in and out of the Church about sex education, contraception and abortion. Mr. Whitehead is an old foe of Planned Parenthood and a dedicated supporter of magisterium.

- Bernard Haring, C.Ss.R., *The Healing Mission of the Church in the Coming Decades*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate, 1982.

Father Haring reveals to us in this brief pamphlet (23 pp.; \$2.50) his conviction that the authentic Catholic teaching on direct sterilization has to be wrong, "by the mere fact that most of the people cannot understand the underlying reasons." He feels that anything required by natural law must have "communicability" in the sense that most people will, despite the pressures of a world largely hostile to Catholic and to personal values, understand and approve them. When most people thought slavery was all right, presumably it was not against the natural law. If most people come to accept abortion and euthanasia, it will be insane for a prophetic minority to say that deeds of this sort are intrinsically wrong. This rhetorical begging or questions and a somewhat pious contempt for the immemorial teaching of the Church, presently taught as well by the magisterium, is familiar enough today. But it is surprising that it is fostered by C.A.R.A.

- *The Couple to Couple League* offers priests some reflections for homilies on *Humanae Vitae*. Write P.O. Box 11084, Cincinnati, Ohio 45211

D'AVIGNON REVIEW (Cont'd from Page 3)

If there were any criticism to make I would suggest that D'Avignon's analysis was, if anything, not hard enough on humanistic psychology, with its trendy but now fading ideas, and its scientific pretensions.

Putting aside any particular doctrinal issue, there is a very general problem with the Sadlier series, the Benzinger series and those like them — a problem noted by D'Avignon but one which should get more emphasis. It is not only that these books are filled with pop psychology, it is not just that the teachings of Rogers, Maslow, of Values Clarification and of Kohlberg replace the teachings of our Lord, the whole tone and world view of

these contemporary catechisms are disturbing. Their emphasis on goodness, on this world's happiness, on celebration, on personal growth, on wonderful ME, is so saccharine, so filled with sweetness and light as to make one gag. These catechisms present an artificial description of life more like a TV commercial or the cutesy secular world of Sesame Street than like any reality most of us have known. Life with its sufferings, its punishments; with its mystery, risk and challenge; life with its passion and joy — all this is missing. In contrast, we have, sentimental portrayals of the Faith, best characterized as cotton-candy catechisms. It is time to reject them as one major source of our children's spiritual malnutrition. Paul Vitz

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Saints Preserve Us

- Saint Francis, in praising all good, could be a more shouting optimist than Walt Whitman. St. Jerome, in denouncing all evil, could paint a world blacker than Schopenhauer. Both passions were free because both were kept in their place. The optimist could pour out all the praise he liked on the gay music of the march, the golden trumpets, and the purple banners going into battle. But he must not call the fight needless. The pessimist might draw as darkly as he chose the sickening marches or the sanguine wounds. But he must not call the fight hopeless. So it was with all the other moral problems, with pride, with protest, and with compassion. By defining its main doctrine, the Church not only kept seemingly inconsistent things side by side, but, what was more, allowed them to

break out in a sort of artistic violence otherwise possible only to anarchists.

G.K. Chesterton, *Orthodoxy* p. 177.

- Was St. Francis a pacifist? In his scholarly biography of St. Francis, Omar Englbert (*St. Francis of Assisi* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1950) points out the role of Francis in the Crusade he accompanied. The Franciscans "were charged with collecting funds for the crusade." (p. 185) Francis went along with the soldiers: "his courage and chivalrous behavior filled the warriors with enthusiasm." (p. 208) Never did he call fighting to regain the holy places wrong; though his own hopes and methods were different. He felt it better "to go into the enemy's camp in order to preach the faith." (p. 208)