Fellowship of Catholic Scholars

PROCEEDINGS

THE NEW EVANGELIZATION AND THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF EX CORDE ECCLESIAE

St. Paul, MN
23-25 October 2015

Elizabeth C. Shaw
Editor
THE NEW EVANGELIZATION
AND THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF
EX CORDE ECCLESIAE
THE NEW EVANGELIZATION AND THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF *EX CORDE ECCLESIAE*

Proceedings from the 38th Annual Convention of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars

October 23-25, 2015
Saint Paul, MN

Edited by Elizabeth C. Shaw
CONTENTS

Saints, Sinners, and Scholars: 
Eamon Duffy and the Return of Confessional History

Christopher Shannon ........................................................................................................ 3

Benedict XVI, the Lives of the Saints, 
and the Renewal of Catholic Intellectual Life

Christopher O. Blum .................................................................................................. 12

Past as Pilgrimage and the Difference Transcendence Makes 
for an Academic Discipline

David Foote .................................................................................................................. 21

The Apostolate of the Mind: Transformation of Culture 
through Rethinking the Secular Sciences

Max Bonilla .................................................................................................................. 32

World Changers: Responding to the New Evangelization 
through Encounter and Accompaniment

John Zimmer .................................................................................................................. 46

Heart Speaks to Heart: 
Ex Corde Ecclesiae Twenty-Five Years Later

Mark Newcomb ............................................................................................................. 57
Ex Corde Ecclesiae and the Family

Rose Mary Hayden Lemmons. ................................................................. 83

The Complementarity of Woman and Man
and the Mission of the Catholic University

Deborah Savage. ..................................................................................... 102

Appendix – Fellowship of Catholic Scholars............................................ 131
Instead of being a great theologian as you may be in France, you must reckon on being here a humble scholar, and then good God! with what masters — exposed to the laughter of all the savages. The Huron language will be your St. Thomas and your Aristotle. Glīb as you are, you must decide for a long time to be mute among the barbarians.

— Saint Jean de Brébeuf

These are, of course, the words of the great seventeenth-century Jesuit missionary to New France, Saint Jean de Brébeuf. They appear in a letter he wrote to his fellow Jesuits back in old France, inviting them humbly to set aside their theological erudition for the down-and-dirty work of evangelizing the natives of North America, a “barbarian” people blissfully ignorant of the philosophical and theological categories that had so long structured Catholic intellectual life. Anyone trying to assess the state of theological knowledge among the mass of American Catholics might be tempted to see the New Evangelization as facing a situation analogous to de Brébeuf among the Hurons.

In the half century since the close of the Second Vatican Council, Catholics have undoubtedly lost the common theological language that once linked the humble Baltimore Catechism to the sophisticated theology of Saint Thomas. The loss of a common language has, in turn, facilitated the loss of agreement on basic truths once understood as the starting point for more sophisticated inquiry. Those disturbed by these developments have responded most often
by doubling down on a commitment to revive the study of Thomas and Aristotle, as if the abandonment of these thinkers alone accounts for the mass apostasy that has afflicted the post-Vatican II Church, and the post-Vatican II Catholic academy in particular. It is easy enough to applaud the commitment to Thomas, but to hold up theology as the key to the New Evangelization is to misread the nature of our current situation. If the state of the Church today is, as Pope Francis has observed, “a field hospital after battle,” then theologians are brain surgeons – undoubtedly essential for extreme cases, but perhaps not best equipped to address the more basic wounds afflicting the mass of Christian soldiers.\(^1\)

In this talk I would like to offer history as a more appropriate, or at least heretofore neglected, instrument of the New Evangelization in Catholic higher education. In *The Past as Pilgrimage*, Chris Blum and I argue in part that the challenges facing the Church in the decades since Vatican II reflect as much a loss of peoplehood as of theological orthodoxy per se; moreover, history is the academic discipline best suited to recovering what it means to be a people, more specifically a people seeking to maintain fidelity to a timeless truth all the while squarely confronting the reality that we are temporal creatures who live amidst the flux of contingent and ever-changing circumstances. Academic history has of course been more than complicit in the wrong turns in Catholic higher education over the past generation. After briefly sketching out the role of Catholic historians in facilitating these wrong turns, I will then consider the work of Eamon Duffy as a model for the way in which Catholic historians might be able to incorporate the best of secular historical methods into a renewed Catholic history capable of serving the New Evangelization.

Western peoples have been writing history since the ancient Greeks, but the academic history I address in this talk traces its origins to only the nineteenth century. The key figure for this history is Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), whom historians credit with the development of scientific, objective history writing. The scientific character of Ranke’s history lay in his emphasis on bracketing the
“opinions” of all previous historians and investigating a historical problem by drawing on primary, archival sources. The scientific historian would, moreover, examine “critically” as many sources as possible with an eye to conflicting and contradictory accounts of a single event. Scientific historical reason would adjudicate these conflicting accounts based on the evidence alone, free from the biases of received traditions. Despite the often not-so-subtle anti-Catholicism of Ranke’s writing, the Church soon embraced these new principles for historical study. Echoing Saint Augustine, Leo XIII declared, “God does not want our lies,” and charged Catholic historians “to keep back nothing of the trials which she [the Church] has had to experience in the course of the ages through the frailty of her children and sometimes even of her ministers.”

As members of a minority religion in predominantly Protestant and anti-Catholic country, Catholic historians in America who rose to Leo’s challenge faced various class and cultural obstacles in their pursuit of professional legitimacy. The American Historical Association never explicitly refused to accept Catholics as members, but they were sufficiently unwelcoming to Catholics and uninterested in Catholic history that Catholics felt the need to found their own separate professional historical societies. John Gilmary Shea (1826-1892), the first significant Catholic historian in America, founded the U.S. Catholic Historical Society in 1884; the next great American Catholic historian, Fr. Peter Guilday (1884-1947), cofounded the American Catholic Historical Association in 1919. Though committed to objectivity and neutrality, both wrote history that was faithful and deferential to the teachings of the Church. Still, in their treatment of U.S. history, they augmented their conventional, orthodox Catholicism with what was at the time a much more contentious endorsement of the Catholic role in promoting the specifically American principle of religious liberty. This emphasis on religious liberty at times threatened to subordinate the story of Catholicism in America to the story of the triumph of the Constitution. Though this type of history never received official Church censure, parallel efforts to privilege the American over the
Catholic in theology led to the condemnation of “Americanism” by Leo XIII in his 1899 apostolic letter (to Cardinal Gibbons), *Testem benevolentiae*.

Contra Shea and Guilday, support for the abstract constitutional principle of religious freedom figured little in the lives of most American Catholics up to the middle of the twentieth century. Anti-Catholic prejudice and pro-Catholic parochialism combined to shape an American Catholic historical reality defined primarily in terms of the struggle a religious and ethnically diverse subculture to maintain its traditions against the assimilationist pressures of mainstream America – even as this subculture remained wildly patriotic and positive toward America. Prejudice and parochialism both started to break down after World War II, and appropriately it was a historian – Msgr. John Tracy Ellis, a student of Peter Guilday – who led the charge of intellectuals out of the Catholic ghetto. More than a decade before the infamous Land O'Lakes statement, Ellis wrote an essay, “American Catholics and the Intellectual Life” (1955), in which he accused Catholic colleges and universities of anti-intellectualism and demanded that they embrace secular standards of scholarship. Catholic historians were actually already much closer to Ellis’s ideal than his scolding suggests: despite professional marginalization, Catholic historians had long embraced mainstream scholarly standards in a way that Catholic theologians and philosophers had not.

As post-Land O'Lakes Catholic historians sought to implement Ellis’s vision, the assimilationist, Americanist tendencies of American Catholic history kicked into overdrive. In the work of leading historians such as Jay Dolan, the old celebration of religious liberty gave way to a privileging of historical moments in which the Church in America looked most distinctly American – that is to say, Protestant. The Revolutionary/Early National Church of John Carroll stands out for its embrace of toleration, its low liturgy, and most especially its strong lay leadership reflected in the trustee system. Dolan clearly presents this era as an anticipation of the liberal Catholicism that emerged in the decades after Vatican II, and writes a
useable past to inspire his own generation in the recreation of a distinctly American, democratic Catholicism. This story continues to dominate the writing of American Catholic history, most recently in James O'Toole's 2010 survey, The Faithful.6

Now, I do not mean to blame Jay Dolan for the problems of the post-Vatican II Church. That would be giving Dolan, and the historical profession, too much credit. Let's just say, his kind of history did not help matters. What it did do was deprive a generation of college-educated Catholics of a reliable guide for navigating the historical changes with respect to which Vatican II is as much a response as a cause. Catholic history, written from Catholic tradition, should not simply affirm old ways, but should help Catholics understand the ways in which the Church has reconciled continuity and change over time.

By this standard, Jay Dolan's style of history finds its antidote in the work of Eamon Duffy, an Irish-born historian of the English Reformation best known for his magisterial 1992 work, The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England, 1400-1580. A rough contemporary of Dolan, Duffy came of age at the high water mark of post-Vatican II liberalism, yet wrote a history that could be interpreted as in many ways a critique of many of the contemporary trends celebrated by the likes of Dolan. The title of his great work refers to the antiliturgical iconoclasm that characterized the English Reformation during the reign of Edward VI (1537-1553). I cannot help but also see it as a meditation on the antiliturgical iconoclasm that afflicted the Church in the decades after Vatican II. On this point, we have the words of Duffy himself, particularly in the very moving autobiographical essays contained in his 2004 collection of essays, Faith of Our Fathers: Reflections on Catholic Tradition; these essays were originally published in the British pastoral journal Priests and People. In these essays, Duffy writes of his emergence from a parochial, Irish-Catholic childhood and his success at the highest levels of the British university system. Unlike most of his generation, however, he actually credits his early Catholic education with ultimately stimulating his intellectual curiosity. His graduate years at
Cambridge University occasioned a deeper engagement with Catholic tradition through the study of philosophy and theology. This study actually gave him a greater appreciation for how his provincial Irish upbringing, despite its intellectual limitations, successfully embodied faith through its devotional and liturgical practices. *Stripping of the Altars* is thus, in a sense, a recovery of a lost world of pre-Reformation English Catholicism that stands also as a homage to the humbler, post-Tridentine versions of Catholic liturgy and devotionalism that survived up to the Second Vatican Council.

Let me be clear. *The Stripping of the Altars* is in no way a brief for a traditionalist rejection of Vatican II. Duffy’s Church politics are slippery. From reading him and hearing him speak, my sense is he adjusts his message to his audience: when speaking to liberals, he tends to celebrate tradition, when speaking to conservatives, he tends to critique clericalism. *The Stripping of the Altars*, and indeed Duffy’s work as a whole, provides no easy ammunition for Catholic culture warriors. That is one mark of its greatness as history. What it does do, aside from its brilliant anthropological recreation of the liturgical and devotional world of late-medieval English Catholicism, is offer a model of how Catholics in the past have creatively and faithfully reconciled theological continuity with historical change. Duffy begins his study in the fifteenth century with the Church in England in need of reform. The Wyclifite and Lollard revolts of the late fourteenth century, the outrage at clerical corruption found in a poem such as *Piers Plowman*, these all reflect real problems in the Church of late-medieval England. Contrary to the dominant historiography, they do not, however, mark the starting point of a straight line to the English Reformation. By Duffy’s account, the fifteenth century saw a tremendous reform and renewal in the Church, one that did not simply reestablish old practices, but created new ones designed to make the faith a more meaningful part of the life of the average Catholic lay person.

Like most sweeping histories that try to capture the grand shift from the premodern to the modern world, Duffy’s account reflects the enduring strength of conceptual categories rooted in German
sociology, particularly the work of Max Weber. This account, identified by John Milbank as “the liberal Protestant meta-narrative,” generally presents religion evolving toward greater rationality through a series of binary shifts: orthopraxis to orthodoxy, external to internal, public to private, orality to literacy, communal to individual. These shifts are as likely to be presented as decline or as progress. The great achievement of Duffy is to show how Catholicism transcends these dichotomies, rejecting the either/or for the both/and.8 The message for his readers in 1992? The Church should be able to foster a deeper inner spiritual life among the laity without offending the eye and ear through airplane-hanger church architecture and folk masses.

Is this confessional history? Not in the triumphalist, crusading sense of that term. Duffy does not write about the Reformation to refute Protestant error and affirm Catholic truth. In his account, theology factors far less than community in understanding the triumph of the Reformation in England. Faced with pressure from the top to conform, ordinary English people came to accept the new faith largely out of concern for maintaining local parish life – and the lives of local parishioners – as much as Protestant authorities would allow. For their part, authorities conceded the hold that traditional religion had on the mass of English people and thus tried to steer a middle path between traditional Catholicism and the more severe Continental expressions of Protestantism. This is, I suppose, continuity and change, Anglican-style. Still, for all of Duffy’s scholarly silence on the nature of the truth that triumphed in England, he has still had to respond to the charge of writing confessional history, most recently from no less a scholar than Diarmaid MacCulloch (whom one could just as easily accuse of being a confessional Protestant historian).9

Duffy himself flatly denies the charge of confessionalism. The fact that his sympathetic portrayal of premodern Catholicism elicits the charge reflects a continued anti-Catholic bias in the mainstream profession; the fact that Duffy rejects confessional history reflects, at best, a naïveté regarding the politics of academia, at worst, the old
Catholic inferiority complex. Liberals, feminists, Marxists, critical race theorists all write confessional histories in which they not only analyze the past but affirm transcendent principles regarding freedom, equality, and autonomy. Duffy is correct to point out that his scholarly work stops short of saying that Catholicism is true. The question is, would it be less scholarly if he took the final step? Would the prodigious scholarship of his exhaustive account of continuity and change over two centuries of English Catholicism all be nullified if he were, in the end, to judge that the Anglican Church of Elizabeth was in fact a false, or at least deficient, synthesis of continuity and change within the broader Christian tradition?

I think not. The insider voice of the pastoral essays that Duffy wrote for Priests and People is perfectly compatible with the detached, scholarly voice of The Stripping of the Altars. Bringing these two voices together remains the challenge for Catholic scholars seeking to bring history into the service of the New Evangelization.

Christopher Shannon is associate professor of history at Christendom College.

1 Quoted in Antonio Spadaro, S.J., “A Big Heart Open to God,” America (September 30, 2013), http://americamagazine.org/pope-interview.
3 Ibid., 66-68.
4 Ibid., 68-70.
5 Ibid., 73-74.
7 Shannon and Blum, Past as Pilgrimage, 110-11.
8 Ibid., 119-20.
A particularly clear lens through which to regard the pontificate of Benedict XVI is the homily at the Mass for the Election of a Roman Pontiff, which he delivered as Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger on April 18, 2005. This brief but stirring text is best known for the phrase “dictatorship of relativism,” by which he characterized some of the cultural tendencies of our time, but it also sounded the note that would come to be the general theme of his pontificate: “In Christ, truth and love coincide.” The homily is a reflection upon the drama being played out between a relativism in which men and women are reduced to having as their highest goal “one’s own ego and one’s own desires” and the friendship with Jesus Christ which involves bringing our own desires into conformity with the will of God. The homily rose to a crescendo in the cardinal’s closing exhortation: “We must be inspired by a holy restlessness: restlessness to bring to everyone the gift of faith, of friendship with Christ.” It was just such a holy restlessness that animated two of the central components of Benedict XVI’s teaching: his general audience addresses on the saints and his many speeches on the subject of Catholic education. When placed side by side, these two sets of statements together offer a comprehensive prescription for the renewal of Catholic intellectual life today.

From March 2006 to April 2011, Benedict XVI delivered over twelve dozen Wednesday general audience addresses on the saints. The lectures were brief, with an average length of 1,500 words, and were grouped in a handful of distinct series: the first thirty-one...
treated the apostles and their collaborators as described in the New Testament; the next forty-six covered the Fathers of the Church from Saint Clement of Rome to Maximus the Confessor; then twenty audiences were dedicated to Saint Paul during the Pauline Year of 2008-2009; thirty-seven additional lectures were devoted to the Fathers and exemplary medieval doctors, with a concurrent seven audiences on exemplary priests in observance of the Year for Priests; finally, the reflections were brought to a close with sixteen conferences on holy women, eight on the modern doctors of the Church, and a retrospective discussion entitled “Holiness.” Altogether these audiences were both an astonishing display of erudition and a remarkable use of the papal teaching office: we may well wonder at Benedict XVI’s decision to dedicate so much time and effort to what some may consider to have been an indulgence of personal piety and perhaps even nostalgia.

They were, of course, nothing of the sort. The avowed purpose of these addresses was evangelical: to invite his auditors and readers to “love the Church” so as to be able better to know and to love God. “We cannot have Jesus,” the Holy Father insisted, “without the reality he created and in which he communicates himself. Between the Son of God-made-flesh and his Church there is a profound, unbreakable, and mysterious continuity by which Christ is present today in his people.” To enunciate this principle, however, is to invite an objection: if Jesus can be encountered only in the Church, then the obstacles that stand in the way of people loving the Church must be contended with. The barriers of ignorance, prejudice, fear, and, tragically, personal injury that stand between many people and the Roman Catholic Church can be overcome only by the attractive and compelling examples of Christ himself and of the saints. “The Church lives in people,” Benedict explained,

and those who want to know the Church better, to understand her mystery, must consider the people who have seen and lived her message, her mystery. In the Wednesday Catechesis I have therefore been speaking for
some time of people from whom we can learn what the Church is.4

Within the corpus of these catechetical talks, some of the most celebrated teachers of the Catholic faith are prominently displayed. There are, to be sure, addresses treating apostles, missionaries, contemplative monks and nuns, and Christians devoted to the corporal works of mercy. Yet there are dozens of addresses on scholars and teachers, including six on the Cappadocian Fathers, five on Augustine alone, and three on Aquinas. To appreciate this emphasis, it helps to set these addresses against the background of Benedict XVI’s teaching on education. This task has been made much easier by the labors of Professor J. Steven Brown of the Catholic University of America, editor of the compendium A Reason Open to God: On Universities, Education & Culture (The Catholic University of America Press, 2013). This book includes the major speeches that any anthology of the pontificate ought to have, including the Regensburg, Bernardins, Catholic University, and Reichstag addresses, but it also gathers several dozen occasional speeches and letters, most of which were composed for audiences of university students and faculty in Europe.

The reader of these addresses cannot help but note the Holy Father’s urgency in the face of what may be characterized as a certain kind of sloth or perhaps mission fatigue. The university audiences he addressed were no different from Europe as a whole, which, to him, seemed “hollow” and, as it were, “internally paralyzed by a failure of its circulatory system that is endangering its life, subjecting it to transplants that erase its identity.”5 For Europe, that vitality is in the first place biological, and the transplants in question are non-Christian immigrants; for European universities, which live – or ought to live – on the spiritual plane, the vitality is one of commitment to the Christian vision that gave them birth and is alone capable of sustaining them as coherent institutions.

Benedict XVI’s statements on education, however, contained far more than exhortations to regain Catholic identity; they also included
an attempt to delineate the essential features of a vibrant Catholic intellectual life. Three representative passages will help to identify those characteristics. To the Pontifical Universities and Athenaeums of Rome, the Holy Father counseled that amidst the “specialized and compartmentalized” academic life of the modern university, “it is more necessary than ever to be open to the wisdom that comes from the gospel,” and he qualified the work of pursuing and communicating that wisdom as “part of the evangelizing mission that Christ has entrusted to the Church” and “an ecclesial service.” A year later, he asked another Roman audience to cultivate the “patience of ‘building,’” telling them that “[b]uilding your own lives and building society are not tasks that can be accomplished by distracted or superficial minds and hearts,” and recommending as a guide the “synthesis between intellectual formation, moral discipline, and religious commitment that Bl. John Henry Newman proposed in his *The Idea of a University.*” Speaking to a group of American bishops in 2012, he called attention to the need for “teachers who inspire others by their evident love of Christ, their witness of sound devotion and their commitment to that *sapientia Christiana* that integrates faith and life, intellectual passion and reverence for the splendor of truth, both human and divine.” The vision of Catholic intellectual life that emerges from these statements is strikingly foreign from the temper and habits of the modern university, secular or Catholic. Professional competence and ability in research are excellences that Benedict XVI presumed and affirmed, but they are not the end of the intellectual life, for they are instrumental goods. The twin ends of Catholic intellectual life are charity and truth, and Catholic faculty are called to be “bearers of wisdom” in the service of those transcendent goods.

The difficulty for us who are Catholic scholars is that we have been trained up in graduate school and habituated in our professional lives to pursuits that often fall short of the ends proposed by Benedict XVI. With our foreshortened habits tends also to come a narrower vision of the academic life. The danger is that we will be unable to profit from his exhortations because we are not able fully
to appreciate the ideal in view of which they were made. The general audience addresses on the great teachers of the faith, therefore, are to us Catholic scholars so many aids to understanding the bearing of the Holy Father’s speeches on intellectual life. They breathe life into phrases such as “sapientia Christiana” and “synthesis between intellectual formation, moral discipline, and religious commitment,” and help us better to grasp what it might mean for us to pursue the intellectual life as an “ecclesial service.” From the many addresses on holy teachers, we will briefly consider three: one to exemplify the ardor proper to the quest for truth, one to point to the virtues of the life lived for truth, and one to display the qualities of the teacher of truth.

In the third of his five addresses on Saint Augustine, Benedict XVI recommended “Augustine’s entire intellectual and spiritual development” as a “valid model today in the relationship between faith and reason.” The praise may surprise the reader, for the Holy Father had just acknowledged that Augustine had “abandoned the faith” as a youth because his “thirst for truth” had led him to “drift away” from a faith he could not understand as an answer to the questions he was asking. The resolution to the apparent contradiction comes in the next line, where Benedict XVI explained that what characterized Augustine’s search for truth was a “radicalism” that led him to be dissatisfied with “philosophies that did not go to the truth itself, that did not go to God and to a God who was not only the ultimate cosmological hypothesis but the true God, the God who gives life and enters into our lives.”10 Augustine’s conversion, then, illustrates the principle that the search for truth is a quest that ought to give shape to the whole life of a man or woman, a principle enunciated by Benedict XVI in an address to the Pontifical Lateran University: “to make the theme of truth central is not merely a speculative act, restricted to a small circle of thinkers; on the contrary, it is a vital question in order to give a more profound identity to personal life.”11

One of Benedict XVI’s most compelling examples of a life lived for truth’s sake is the unlikely one of Ambrose Autpert, an eighth-
century Provençal monk, whom the Holy Father admitted to being “a lesser known author” but nevertheless recommended for his teaching, which he called “a precious theological and spiritual treasure for our time.” Autpert was a stern critic of the “contradiction between the splendid external appearance of monasteries and the tepidity of the monks,” and he worried “that the acquisitive greed of the rich and powerful in the society of his time also exists within the souls of monks.” He therefore denounced greed in uncompromising terms: “In the earth’s soil various sharp thorns spring from different roots; in the human heart, on the other hand, the stings of all the vices sprout from a single root, greed.” Autpert’s contribution, however, was not merely an ascetic one directed toward detachment from material goods. Benedict XVI also praised him for his biblical studies, especially because in them Autpert so clearly communicated the “priority that must be given to love in all theological research.” The papal teaching in this sketch of a Carolingian monk – one of the most distinctive and personal of the general audience addresses – gave color and depth to exhortations like this one, delivered at a conference celebrating the tenth anniversary of the encyclical *Fides et Ratio*: “The quest for truth bears most fruit when it is sustained by love for the truth.” Or, again, to the plea the pope uttered to young university professors in Madrid in 2011: “the path to the fullness of truth calls for complete commitment: it is a path of understanding and love, of reason and faith.”

Among the saints chosen by Benedict XVI for his subjects, many were celebrated teachers of the faith, including notably Saint Francis de Sales and Saint Peter Canisius; perhaps the most illuminating and challenging discussion of teaching, however, he reserved for another little-known priest, Saint Joseph Cafasso, mentor to the great Don Bosco. Don Cafasso lived a hidden life as a spiritual director at the seminary in Turin, where he exemplified the gentle and generous wisdom that one hopes for – and so often finds – in Catholic priests who regularly offer the sacrament of reconciliation. Benedict XVI
praised Don Cafasso for his prudence and disinterested love as a teacher:

In all the fundamental decisions of his life St John Bosco had St Joseph Cafasso to advise him, but in a very specific way: Cafasso never sought to form Don Bosco as a disciple “in his own image and likeness,” and Don Bosco did not copy Cafasso; he imitated Cafasso’s human and priestly virtues, certainly and described him as “a model of priestly life” but according to his own personal disposition and his own specific vocation; a sign of the wisdom of the spiritual teacher and of the intelligence of the disciple: the former did not impose himself on the latter but respected his personality and helped him to interpret God’s will for him.15

As any veteran teacher can attest, the line between healthy personal influence – what Newman famously called “the means of propagating the truth” – and unhealthy attachment is a difficult one to walk.16 To find the right line, both purity of intention and experience are required of the teacher, in addition to the deep knowledge of “who the human person is” that Benedict XVI signaled as a necessary requirement “to educate in truth.”17

In his general audience addresses on the saints, and in particular in those dedicated to teachers of the Catholic faith, Benedict XVI offered a rich gift of reflection to Catholic scholars. These short lives point toward what may be called an “ecology of professional life,” a form of the life of study and teaching in which the scholar’s professional attainments are ordered to the common good of the Christian community.18 Together with his addresses on the subject of education, they call scholars to a holy restlessness about the present need for renewal in Catholic intellectual life through the pursuit of Christian wisdom and friendship with Christ. The prospect of such a life being newly chosen by Catholic scholars today should encourage us in our labors, for, as Benedict XVI said with reference to the first
Dominicans: “The truth studied and shared in charity with the brethren is the deepest foundation of joy.”

Christopher O. Blum is professor of history and philosophy and academic dean of the Augustine Institute.


2 “Germanus of Constantinople” (April 29, 2009). All of Benedict XVI’s general audience addresses may be found on the Vatican’s website through a search by title and date. Many of them have also been published by Ignatius Press.

3 “Christ and the Church” (March 15, 2006).

4 “Ambrose Autpert” (April 22, 2009).


7 Benedict XVI, “Homily at the Celebration of Vespers with University Students and Teachers of Rome in Preparation for Christmas” (December 16, 2010), in A Reason Open to God, 144.

8 Benedict XVI, “Address to the Bishops of the United States of America (Regions X-XIII) on their ‘Ad Límina’ Visit” (May 5, 2012), in A Reason Open to God, 47.

9 Benedict XVI, “Address to Catholic Educators at the Catholic University of America” (April 17, 2008), in A Reason Open to God, 52.


11 Benedict XVI, “Address to the Pontifical Lateran University” (October 21, 2006), in A Reason Open to God, 51.

13 Benedict XVI, “Address to Participants in a Congress Held on the Occasion of the 10th Anniversary of the Publication of Pope John Paul II’s Encyclical Fides et Ratio” (October 16, 2008), in A Reason Open to God, 33.

14 Benedict XVI, “Address to Young University Professors” (August 19, 2011), in A Reason Open to God, 39.


16 See Newman’s fourth University Sermon, “Personal Influence, the Means of Propagating the Truth” (1832); available at: www.newmanreader.org.


19 Benedict XVI, “St. Dominic” (February 3, 2010).
The Past as Pilgrimage and the Difference Transcendence Makes for an Academic Discipline

David Foote
University of St. Thomas, Minnesota

THE THEME FOR THIS THIRTY-EIGHTH CONVENTION of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars is the New Evangelization. The statement of purpose posted on the conference web page articulates the theme beautifully: “To mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of Ex Corde Ecclesiae, this convention will consider the New Evangelization in relation to colleges and universities. Our speakers will consider not only campus evangelization strategies that have been successful but the opportunities for the transformation of campus culture through re-thinking even such academic disciplines as the secular sciences.”

This is precisely what Christopher Blum and Christopher Shannon’s recent book, The Past as Pilgrimage, has done. It has taken up the challenge to rethink the practice and teaching of history ex corde ecclesiae. In doing so, the book calls us to visit anew certain questions, which are as difficult as they are critically important. Does it really make a difference whether one works ex corde ecclesiae? If taken seriously, Ex Corde entails a call to see a vital connection between the new evangelization and one’s work within an academic discipline. Doesn’t this constitute an egregious violation of the integrity and autonomy of the disciplines? Can I not – indeed, should I not – work exclusively from the heart of my discipline and its principles? These questions and the way in which Past as Pilgrimage helps us come to grips with them will be the substance of my paper today.

As I read it, the themes and arguments of Past as Pilgrimage unfold along three related lines. First, the authors pay particular attention to
define the proper function, form and object of history, as practiced by one who works within a Catholic worldview. In doing so, they situate their project to rethink history clearly within a larger project of critique and revision articulated by Alasdair MacIntyre in his famous trilogy of works, culminating in his book *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* (1990). In this work, MacIntyre roots his own project in Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical *Aeterni patris.* At the end of this paper I will suggest that seeing *Past as Pilgrimage* as the fruit of *Aeterni Patris* helps us appreciate the book’s significance for the New Evangelization.

The second line of enquiry in the book follows from the first. Having articulated history’s proper function and form, as practiced from within a Catholic worldview, the authors survey and critique several mainstream models of historical practice in the secular academy. In doing so, they give us a clear indication of what it would mean for a Catholic historian to try to practice history not from the heart of the Church, but exclusively from the heart of the historical discipline, as it has developed since the nineteenth century.

Finally, the authors offer us two prescriptive models for rethinking the practice of history – one drawn from the work of Eamon Duffy, the other from the writings of Pope Benedict XVI. Today I will focus on the first two lines of enquiry, since this third line of enquiry constitutes the substance of the papers presented by Professors Blum and Shannon.

*The Proper Form, Function, and Object of History.* What does *Past as Pilgrimage* have to say about the proper function, form, and object of history? I will begin with a selection of passages from the book. Then, based on these passages, I will venture a summary comment on their significance.

Concerning the function of history, the authors write, “the historian’s teaching . . . should always be a spur to conversation and debate about the good.” It is worth noting how this passage echoes Socrates’ famous words from the *Apology:* “I say that to talk every day about virtue and the other things about which you hear me talking
and examining myself and others is the greatest good to man, and that the unexamined life is not worth living.”

Closely related to the function of history, as understood from within a Catholic worldview, there is the question of audience. The authors identify two in particular. First, there is the Christian community. The authors write, “We contend that it is necessary to define the craft of the Catholic historian as the discussion and debate about, and the careful handing on of, the story of Christ’s people.” In addition to the Christian community, the Catholic historian writes, more generally, for the community of scholars as a whole. “[H]istorians, as custodians of narrative, have the duty to serve their colleagues by keeping that narrative in good order.” From the context of this passage, it is clear that the historian’s colleagues are those of all the other disciplines of the academy – literature, philosophy, political theory, theology, and so on. What interest do they have in history? Properly understood, all of the disciplines share a common function, namely, not to let a day pass without discussing the good. The historian’s particular role in this grand conversation is to keep the stories we tell about the good in good order.

The concept of “good order” leads us to the question of history’s proper form and object. According to our authors, the proper form of history is narrative. The historian’s craft is “the ability to compose historical narratives . . . that exhibit the virtue of right judgment by presenting past human actions dramatically and within the context of a true universal history or master narrative.” Moreover, this narrative should exhibit something of the quality of tragedy. In what way? The authors write, “[J]ust as the characters in a tragedy face decisions that are brought upon them by a confluence of circumstances . . . , so also are our lives enacted in a given historical setting.”

And so, let me draw this first part of the discussion together with three summary statements on the object, function, and form of history. The object which history studies is the temporal dimension of human existence and action. The dramatic quality of historical narrative derives from the fact that the historian is especially interested in the contingent circumstances in which actions take
place: on the one hand, how these circumstances constrain action; on the other, how actions change the circumstances in which subsequent actions take place.

Because the function of history is to recount the human quest for the good, the historian must articulate a view of the human person as that type of creature who possesses an appetite for the good and the intellectual powers to understand what it means to attain it. The historian must also articulate a “sense of the world” as that type of place where a quest for the good can meaningfully take place. In other words, the historian must be conscious that he is narrating a worldview. This is what I take the authors to mean when they refer to a universal master narrative. In other words, a universal master narrative is the worldview which gives shape to the narratives which historians tell.

This leads us to narrative as the proper form of history. Given that history’s proper object is the temporal dimension of human existence, it follows that history’s proper form is narrative. Because the function of history is to spur conversation about the good, the historical master narrative takes the form of a “quest narrative,” and all particular historical narratives will bear this stamp. If historians have done their task well, one could compile the countless narratives which have been told by and about people in the past, and this collection would not read like an unwieldy anthology of miscellanies. Rather, it would in some way read as if it were one grand universal story about the human quest to know the good and to fashion the world in accordance with this knowledge. These quest narratives are of service to those of us who live in the present, and to the Christian and academic communities to which we belong, for we too are on a quest for the good; and because we share both our humanity and the world with all human beings who have ever existed, regardless of their distance from us in time and space, our quest is, in some way entangled with theirs.

Survey and Critique. If this is in fact the form and function of history, how does history, as currently understood and practiced in
the academy, measure up? Not as well as one might hope. The authors write, “It seems all too plain that the narrative of Christian civilization has not been kept in good order over the past two generations.” What has gone wrong?

While historians have, by and large, preserved narrative as the form of history, they have lost sight of its proper function. In the book’s first two chapters the authors give us a beautiful and powerful framework for diagnosing the condition of historical narrative in contemporary practice.

In the book’s introductory chapter, “Stories to Uphold the Good,” the authors draw upon categories from Alasdair MacIntyre’s *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* to pose three rival accounts of the function of historical narrative. The three models of narrative are “Encyclopedia,” “Genealogy,” and “Tradition.” Recalling that the subtitle of *Past as Pilgrimage is Narrative, Tradition, and the Renewal of Catholic History*, it is clear that the authors argue for the third of these accounts – namely, Tradition – as the one most suitable to the proper function of history. This is the model I have described in the first part of the discussion.

As we turn to a survey and critique of the other two models, there are two important points to keep in mind. First, the models described are, in a sense, “ideal types.” In reality, they cross-fertilize and exist in hybrid forms. Second, and more important for our purposes, is the question of transcendence. Encyclopedia and Genealogy are what we might call narratives of the “immanent frame,” to borrow a phrase from Charles Taylor. In other words, they work within a worldview closed to transcendence. Conversely, the narrative strategy which MacIntyre and our authors call “Tradition” posits the objective existence of transcendental values (the good, the true, and the beautiful) and understands them to exert an instrumental causality upon human action.

And so, let’s begin with a look at the Encyclopedia model of historical practice. It is a rationalist/empiricist account, which claims that the historian’s craft involves the critical use of documents and physical evidence to arrive at a factually correct account of what
really happened. What does it mean for a historian working within this model to keep the narrative in good order? Here, the historian’s custodial function is, for the most part, limited to the factual content of the narrative. What’s to be gained by such an endeavor? Guarding the factual content of the narrative has the higher moral purpose of securing human freedom. How so? Here is where the epicurean current in Enlightenment thought flows into historiography. In antiquity, Epicureans taught “the facts” about the gods, namely, that the gods were nothing more than configurations of atoms like everything else in the cosmos. By teaching these “facts” about the gods, the Epicureans sought to free human activity from the fears and superstitions engendered by popular religion. In a similar fashion, the Encyclopedists were (and still are) convinced that empirically verifiable historical facts have their own story to tell, namely, how human beings, through the development and use of reason, gradually emancipated themselves from religious superstition and myth, and perhaps even from philosophy. Compiling this allegedly “factual” account is a service to human progress – a progress measured in terms of our ability to master the natural world and our freedom to determine our own destiny. In other words, history, according to the Encyclopedists, tells how man has finally learned to abandon the quixotic quest for the transcendent and settled down to cultivate his garden here on earth.

The second model of ethical enquiry, which MacIntyre calls “Genealogy,” finds a prominent place in the mainstream of historical practice as well. According to this model, the object of the historian’s task is culture, understood in Geertzian terms. In a passage from his classic book on symbolic anthropology, The Interpretation of Cultures, Geertz writes, “Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs.” In his famous interpretive essay on Balinese cockfights, Geertz described the cultural practice of the cockfight as “a story they [the Balinese] tell themselves about themselves.” In other words, culture is a text, and the job of the anthropologist or historian is to read that text and convey how people within a culture
produce their own self-understanding. Geertz writes, “The culture of a people is an ensemble of texts, . . . which the anthropologist strains to read over the shoulders of those to whom they properly belong.” And so, here too, the historian or the anthropologist is a custodian of narrative.

But to what does this narrative refer? Is there a transcendent object? It seems not. In another deeply Weberian moment, Geertz writes,

> There remains, of course, the hardly unimportant questions of whether this or that religious assertion is true, this or that religious experience genuine, or whether true religious assertions and genuine religious experiences are possible at all. But such questions cannot even be asked, much less answered, within the self-imposed limitations of the scientific interpreter.

And so, as our authors comment, this type of approach, “stalls at a kind of textual agnosticism that privileges the process of cultural production over the substance of the culture produced.”

It is important to note that to characterize Encyclopedia and Genealogy as “rival traditions” is not to deny there is much there to enrich the work of the historian who is Catholic. All the same, the authors make an important qualification. The degree to which a historian who is Catholic can work within these models is limited. History will be Catholic only to the degree to which historians understand historical facts and narratives within interpretive frameworks offered by the Church. This is an important claim. Historians who are Catholic can and should draw upon all that is true and good in these models; but because the Catholic worldview offers a richer, more expansive, and more dynamic understanding of God, the world, and the human person, models that work within the immanent frame will always be found wanting.

In our survey of Encyclopedia, Genealogy, and Tradition, haven’t we left out another alternative for the Catholic? Why not recognize
that religious commitments and academic enquiry belong to two autonomous spheres of activity? On the one hand, Catholic academics could, as good citizens, abide by the established norms of their disciplines. On the other hand, they could, as religious actors, hold a belief in a transcendent reality and act upon this belief in other spheres of activity where it might be more appropriate, without feeling compelled to impose this belief upon their academic work. This could even take place on campus in what we might call “para-academic” institutions like campus ministry or centers for ethical values and social engagement.

As is clear from the first chapter of Past as Pilgrimage, the chapter titled “Catholicism and that Noble Dream,” there has been a strong tendency among Catholic historians to adopt this strategy. It is equally clear from a reading of the book as a whole that this type of segregation is untenable. In conclusion, I will suggest two reasons why this is so.

First, a segregation of Church and academy does a disservice to both. Here I will draw upon a wonderful passage from Romano Guardini’s essay “Reflections on the Relation between Christianity and Culture.” Guardini writes, “[t]he task of Christian culture is twofold: on the one hand, to penetrate and transfigure nature by grace; on the other, to unlock revelation and take possession of it by means of nature.” Any attempt to restrict the freedom of this dialogue, however well intentioned, impoverished our understanding of nature and culture and diminishes our capacity for understanding revelation. This leads to my second reason, which goes to the very heart of the question before us today, that is, the connection between the New Evangelization and the necessity to rethink the academic disciplines.

The segregation of Church and academy shatters that sense of the fundamental unity of Christian existence, which lies at the very heart of Catholicism. For this reason this segregation has functioned as one of the most powerful forces for disconnecting Catholics from the Church. To illustrate this claim: If, from the time I enter kindergarten to the time I graduate from college, I am taught to
understand the world as if it were closed to transcendence, then the chances are fairly strong that I will think of the world in these terms. If I am also a believer, trying to integrate my faith with this worldview of the immanent frame will seem like a work of Sisyphus. As we know all too well, many a Catholic has simply given up this impossible task.

Here, I will turn to Pope Leo XIII for the last word. In the introduction to *Aeterni patris*, he writes,

> Whoso turns his attention to the bitter strifes of these days and seeks a reason for the troubles that vex public and private life must come to the conclusion that a fruitful cause of the evils which now afflict, as well as those which threaten us, lies in this: that false conclusions concerning divine and human things, which originated in the schools of philosophy, have now crept into all the orders of the State, and have been accepted by the common consent of the masses.¹⁸

*Aeterni patris* is no condemnation of secular learning. Rather, it is a critique of modernity’s metanarrative, and a call to recover a richer and fuller metanarrative in which to situate our understanding of the modern world and all its complexities.

Pope Leo’s call to recover the riches of the scholastic tradition spawned actions, reactions, debates, and schools of thought. As a result, we are now in a better position to understand what it means to rethink the disciplines from the heart of the Church with integrity and honesty and to recover that true and fundamental sense of the unity of Christian existence upon which the New Evangelization depends. To my mind, herein lies the significance of *Past as Pilgrimage*.

*David Foote is associate professor of Catholic studies at the University of St. Thomas, Minnesota.*
1 Christopher Shannon and Christopher O. Blum, The Past as Pilgrimage: Narrative, Tradition and the Renewal of Catholic History (Front Royal, Va.: Christendom Press, 2014).


3 Shannon and Blum, Past as Pilgrimage, 155.


5 Shannon and Blum, Past as Pilgrimage, 156; see also 35.

6 Ibid., 156.

7 As a brief aside, let me briefly note that, here, the autonomy of a discipline is imagined organically – analogous to the autonomy of a body part. The hand, for instance, has its unique form and function, which allows it to do only what a hand can do. At the same time, it is connected organically to the rest of the body. Apart from this organic connection, the hand’s form and function would be unthinkable.

8 Shannon and Blum, Past as Pilgrimage, 104. For an interesting reflection on the fundamental importance of narrative for history, see Christian Smith, Moral, Believing Animals: Human Personhood and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 63-94.

9 Shannon and Blum, Past as Pilgrimage, 105.

10 Ibid., 156.


12 Ibid., 448.

13 Ibid., 452.

14 Ibid., 123. It may surprise the reader to find Geertz classified among the Genealogists. The classification is, I think, justifiable based on this Weberian current, which runs consistently Geertz’s readings of culture as text. This “Weberian current,” in turn, finds its ultimate source in Nietzsche, who had a profound influence upon Weber. See, for example, Max Weber, “Science as Vocation,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,

15 Shannon and Blum, *Past as Pilgrimage*, 27.

16 Ibid., 28, 38.


18 *Aeterni patris*, 2.
The Apostolate of the Mind:  
Transformation of Culture through  
Rethinking the Secular Sciences

Max Bonilla  
*University Francisco de Vitoria, Madrid*

_Since the publication of* *Ex Corde Ecclesiae,* but mostly over much of the last two decades, I have had the great privilege of being able to visit and get acquainted with a large number of Catholic universities around the world, in particular many in the United States and Europe. This has given me firsthand experience regarding the debates that raged early on concerning the implementation of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae,* as well as knowledge of how Catholic universities have decided to implement their understanding of their identities as institutions affiliated with the Church.

Of course, the culture of any university – and the Catholic university has not been an exception – most often tracks the culture of society at large. In the Western world this has meant that the increasing secularization of society has greatly affected Catholic universities.

Thus it was not surprising that Pope John Paul II would have wanted to issue the apostolic exhortation at the time and in response to what was happening at Catholic universities.

*Before* *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*

What was happening was a cultural transformation aided in some measure by the well-known 1967 Land O'Lakes declaration. At a meeting in Land O'Lakes, Wisconsin, American members of the International Federation of Catholic Universities drafted a statement declaring that “the Catholic university must have a true autonomy
and academic freedom in the face of authority of whatever kind, lay or clerical, external to the academic community itself.”¹ This was generally understood as a declaration of independence by Catholic universities from whatever oversight bishops or religious congregations may have had until then. Over the next decades that independence gradually became more consolidated with many bishops and religious congregations willingly or unwillingly reducing or altogether eliminating their positions on the boards of trustees of many universities.

Catholic universities, imitating their secular counterparts, became increasingly secularized, as was happening within the general culture.

The Hope of Ex Corde Ecclesiae

In 1990 Pope John Paul II responded to this situation with the promulgation of the Apostolic Constitution Ex Corde Ecclesiae, which intended to clarify the relationship of the Church to Catholic universities, not by rejecting calls for autonomy and academic freedom, which Ex Corde Ecclesiæ maintains and supports, but by defining Catholic universities’ role within the Church as institutions dedicated to the search for truth and the good of humanity.

After Ex Corde Ecclesiæ

U.S. Battle for Its Implementation. Of course, anyone involved in Catholic higher education in the United States in the 1990s and early 2000s would recall how difficult the implementation of Ex Corde Ecclesiæ proved to be.² Much of the discussion, unfortunately, missed the richness of the document and dealt, instead, with a reference within the document to Canon 812, requiring that professors of theology receive the Mandatum from the local ordinary.³ It was not until almost eleven years later that the U.S. bishops were able to issue “The Application for Ex Corde Ecclesiæ for the United States.”⁴ With it the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops offered its commitment to Ex Corde as a national episcopal conference, but it was up to each
bishop himself to decide whether and how to enforce the norms of the apostolic constitution in his own diocese.5

The Unstoppable Movement toward Greater Secularism. Regardless of what the pope or bishops might have tried to do, society has continued unabated toward greater secularization, which in turn has meant that Catholic universities have also suffered the same fate, often unaware of the influences that affect their life and culture.

While many universities have, over the years, increased and developed their service and evangelistic efforts through campus ministry, the secular disciplines have most often simply continued to evolve according to their own independent standards. Most universities would correctly see such developments as generally positive, given the need for universities to foster research in such fields. Yet that very process has meant that most academic and professional disciplines would see themselves as far removed from any dialogue with theology and philosophy, and any questions raised by theology and philosophy would be perceived as unwelcome intrusions. The fragmentation of knowledge that prevents such dialogue is in practice an accepted reality within the culture of higher education. Even at universities that see and promote themselves as Catholic, such questions calling for interdisciplinary dialogue, or as we refer to it at my current institution, transdisciplinary dialogue with philosophy and theology, might be rejected by professors trained in the secular disciplines, even though they themselves may profess to be practicing Catholics. Such rejections may not surprise anyone. The following examples, however, clearly indicate real problems insofar as the secular intellectual endeavor has been divorced from the ideal of the all-encompassing pursuit of truth envisioned in Ex Corde.

Legal Education and Practice. For the teaching and practice of law, in Europe and America, legal education places great emphasis on process and questions of legality. So, for example, in Spain and the European Union in general and, one could argue, increasingly in the United States, what is just is that which is legal, and what is unjust is
that which is illegal. Under such a system, the government that enacts laws is the de facto determiner of what is just and unjust.

As political winds change and governments shift from party to party, laws can be enacted to undo what a previous government had done, and what is considered just one day may be considered unjust the next. Disturbingly, in some European countries people are educated as children to follow the lead of government in determining what is just and unjust simply by accepting as their standard what is legal or illegal. The philosophical anthropology that relegates questions of truth and justice and of the rights of the person to the powers of government is strongly embedded in the legal educational curriculum in Europe. Should not law students be given, instead, some formation concerning more foundational questions of justice and rights? And does that not require a better formation about what it means to be a human person?

Let me illustrate the problem of the rights of the person in this secularized mentality by giving a personal example. When I was first invited to spend my sabbatical year in Avila, I was flown in a few months earlier by the university inviting me so that they could introduce me to the project they wanted me to help develop. During that visit to Spain I also went looking for housing and for a school for my children. After visiting the local Catholic school, I was told that I needed to go to the municipal Commission for Education. There the lady who received me asked me who we were. I told her we were Americans who were going to spend a year in Spain while I was on sabbatical. She asked me where I wanted the children to study, and I told her I wanted them to go to the Catholic school in town, that I had already gone there, and that they had told me that it would not be a problem, as there was room for them. The lady then interrupted me and said it was not up to the school or up to us the parents to decide where the children would go. She said, “We decide where the children study. Sometimes the parents don’t agree with what we decide, but it is better if the parents begin to understand that what we decide is what is best for the children. Is that clear, sir?”
The Spaniard who accompanied me said nothing while the lady and I talked. Once outside he said this was a great example of the intrusion of government in people’s lives and why I should move to Spain to help them. It is the state that grants me the right to educate my children, and it is the state that decides how I do it. Fortunately, through the benevolence of the state, my children were allowed to study at the local Catholic school.

*Business Education.* Here’s another example I have seen play out frequently in business education. Even before the collapse of Enron and its associated scandals, and even more so afterward, business education at Catholic universities, especially those seeking to be truly Catholic, understandably has sought to give pride of place to the Church’s social doctrine. This is articulated in many instances from a standpoint that promotes ethics as much as possible. Yet the questions about the nature of the human person and about truth within the economic and business environment are seldom addressed.

One could ask: Under such conditions, even when ethics is considered to be very important, how does the understanding of ethics taught at Catholic business schools differ from an atheistic, or communist, or socialist vision of business ethics? Truly, it is not enough to be “ethical”; of even greater, more fundamental importance is an openness to the full truth of the human person, but that requires business formation “from within,” in dialogue with philosophy and theology. By saying “from within” I mean to say that it is not enough to have business classes taught with little regard for the Catholic mission of the university, while tacking on some philosophy or theology requirements to the core curriculum. “From within” means that the very nature of the businessperson has to be understood from a philosophical perspective that is in accord with the truth of Christianity. Otherwise, conflicts are bound to emerge. And dialogue does not mean that business education has to be somehow baptized as some kind of fundamentalist approach to
business. It means that there should be real dialogue among the various fields of study.

The Natural Sciences. Now consider this final example from the natural sciences. Even if you leave out Planned Parenthood and the current controversy that has been playing out recently here in the U.S., the use of human embryos is very common in scientific research. During a recent visit to one of the world's most prestigious universities for an international conference of the highest level, it became evident to me that questions about the use of embryos or other ethically fraught practices were to be engaged only when government funding and regulations were in question. But given free rein, scientists around the world seem not to be interested in what is ethical; they are interested in what is technically possible, and how to get there first. Many scientists want to solve the problems they see without the complications raised by ethicists. Such world-class scientists have trained many of our own professors at Catholic universities, who in turn often tend to care little about the ethical questions, and even less about anthropological or epistemological ones, that are relevant to their disciplines. This indifference to fundamental key questions is passed on as a legacy.

The pressure the secular mentality imposes on our thinking is not negligible. Not many years ago, I was told by a number of teaching faculty of biology at a Catholic university that their primary goal was to get undergraduates into medical school, and that any attempts to extend the reach of the university’s Catholic identity into their biology classes would be unwelcome until medical school acceptances had significantly increased. That was their explicit priority, which trumped all else.

Inadequate Responses

The Church has hoped that the engagement of Catholic universities with their peer institutions would bring about a reformulation of the dominant mentality toward a more humane
understanding of the goals of academia. That has not yet happened. In fact, the contrary seems to be the case. More and more our universities seek to imitate their secular counterparts in seemingly innocent ways, such as adding or taking away requirements for a particular major in order to make it more competitive, or by altogether avoiding fundamental questions of Catholic identity in the sciences and professional education.¹¹

Universities seeking to be identified as Catholic often confine their efforts in that regard to maintaining a core curriculum that includes some philosophy and theology. If an institution is to be Catholic, it will certainly have a strong and orthodox core curriculum and a vibrant campus ministry outreach. But quite often the vision of the human person that informs the secular disciplines remains limited by the formation that professors received as students, often at prestigious research universities that are in no way Catholic.

What can a Catholic professor in the sciences or professional programs do when he or she has received no philosophical or theological formation? Perhaps the most one can hope for is that such professors will not disseminate in their classrooms anything contrary to Church teaching; but that is probably too optimistic a hope, given that they very often have no understanding of what the Church teaches and why.

Under these circumstances, often the best that schools strive for is “theologically neutral” teaching. But the positive exclusion of religion is never a neutral act, for this itself necessarily means defining the human person in some way, insofar as it entails the quest for an understanding of humanity without any reference to God.

University Francisco de Vitoria

Just over fifteen years ago, the University Francisco de Vitoria in Madrid (UFV) began an educational project that seeks to address these kinds of problems. It is a project that from early on began to rethink what it means to be a university in the modern world, and
Max Bonilla

how, as Catholic, UFV can best serve the interests of truth and the common good.

Today, UFV serves over 7,000 students, and it includes a medical school, a nursing school, a law school, an architecture school, and many of the other majors commonly found at modern universities. Yet what truly distinguishes it is its approach to the secular disciplines. Instead of following the current trend of avoiding difficult questions within the sciences and professional programs, over ten years ago UFV began to ask departments in the various disciplines to explain how they relate to the overarching quest for truth that is the university mission, and to do so in a way that was methodologically appropriate to each discipline. To help them, the university created a series of documents, beginning with an expanded mission statement.12

_Apostolate of the Mind:
The Place of Academic Formation and Catholic Education_

Since the university by its very nature is a place for intellectual formation, UFV decided early on that its Catholic identity could not depend on hanging Catholic symbols on the walls; it could not depend on its pastoral ministry, however active it may be; and it could not depend even on how much theology and philosophy it teaches in its core curriculum. Most students do not go to Catholic universities for theological or philosophical education; in a very high proportion most students at our Catholic universities attend those institutions in order to receive professional formation. It is there, in that formation, that UFV sees the greatest challenge, and where I found the most intriguing response.

At UFV, each department and each professor is encouraged to answer four pivotal questions about their discipline:

(1) What does it mean to be a human within your discipline? That is, what is the human person as an object of study of the science, or as a practitioner or student of the discipline?
(2) What is truth within your discipline? If all human sciences and disciplines in some way seek the truth of something, what is that truth? And how does it relate to the human person?

(3) Given the answers to the two questions above, what ethical implications emerge from your discipline? It is often easy to answer that certain ethical obligations emerge from a particular field, but how are those obligations to be understood if one has a clear understanding of the person and the truth of the discipline?

(4) The final question is the question of meaning. What gives meaning to your discipline? Why do we pursue it? This can lead to ultimate questions and thus to theological ones.

Rethinking the Sciences: How It Is Done

When first engaged, professors were reluctant to answer these questions and frequently suggested that they were not the best qualified to address what seemed to be rather philosophical issues. It seemed easier and more appropriate in chemistry, for example, to teach the periodic table of elements than to engage questions about philosophical anthropology. (Let me make this clear: The goal of this exercise is never to have chemistry professors teaching philosophy; rather, it is to have chemistry professors teaching chemistry from a philosophically sound position that understands the human person, the quest for truth, and the ethical implications that derive from such understanding.)

When professors declined to answer on the basis that such questions were not relevant to the natural sciences as sciences, the university replied by asking them to explain how the human person is not relevant to science. “Of course,” the professors would explain, “it is not that the person is not relevant to science,” but at the same
time they would reiterate the position that they did not feel qualified to answer such questions.

With great perseverance on the part of the university, eventually an important dialogue between faith and reason began, which led a large number of professors in the sciences and professional programs to seek master's degrees in philosophy in order to be able adequately to answer the four questions. Professors in the sciences and professional programs also began to offer mini-courses throughout a semester in order to help philosophers better understand their fields.

Additionally, a program of mentoring for faculty began a few years ago, so any professor who wishes to work with a peer mentor can rethink his field of study and courses from the perspective of the four questions mentioned above. The system that guides the mentoring program is all written out in a little book titled *In Search of the Unity of Knowledge: A Proposal to Rethink University Disciplines*, which was written by a member of our faculty, Maria Lacalle. This book is basically a manual that walks faculty through the process of rethinking the disciplines, step by step, leading professors to rewrite their syllabi with a more explicit and yet still rigorous approach to truth and science.

The result now is that, in what I judge from my experience to be one of the very rare instances within the world of Catholic universities, UFV is developing a series of educational proposals across the entire university in order systematically to respond to the challenge Pope Benedict set before us to broaden the horizons of reason.

*Mentoring Students: Life as Vocation*

Clearly, these efforts do not end with the professor, but the ultimate goal is aimed at a transforming experience for students, one that goes beyond the typical understanding of a liberal arts education. Instead of simply exposing students to an array of disciplines in the sciences and the humanities, or going after what is currently popular, namely, training them in particular skills of thinking critically and
expressing themselves well – all important objectives – we want to integrate the whole educational experience through a strong commitment from the university to accompany students along the way of their education.

In addition to reapproaching the disciplines from a richer perspective that more fully engages deeper human questions, we have attempted to turn the typical student advising sessions into human encounters. We have invested hundreds of thousands of Euros each year to creating a first-year experience class that places heavy emphasis on a one-on-one component. Each of our 1,500 incoming freshmen have six hour-long sessions with a trained mentor who helps them to rethink and to broaden the horizon of their lives, from the goals of narrow professional formation, to a richer understanding of life and its meaning and purpose. Follow-up work, including more one-on-one sessions, is carried out in the students’ subsequent years at UFV.

Conclusion

Four years ago, at the end of that sabbatical year, I was asked to remain in Spain and to move from Avila to Madrid to help strengthen this project at UFV.

Two things I have learned in the process. The first is that despite the great efforts and achievements made at UFV, the project is still in need of much development. While this or something similar seems essential to confronting what Pope Benedict called the “dictatorship of relativism,” very few people in the Catholic world are sufficiently interested in systematically engaging the program of rethinking the secular disciplines, even though there are many supporters within departments of theology and philosophy, and even the humanities more broadly. In my perception the most receptive individuals within the natural sciences have been a subgroup of Protestant Evangelicals who are seeking a way to integrate faith and reason in a nonfundamentalist, scientifically rigorous manner that is still faithful to a Christian worldview.
The second thing I have learned is that the great divide that often afflicts American higher education, the constant distrust and tension between administrators and faculty, plays a devastating role in the flourishing of Catholic intellectual life at the level *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* envisions. Where I have found strongly committed administrators willing to promote this type of work as something important for the formation of students, I have also found uninterested or confrontational faculty (most often generally opposed to the administrator, not specifically to the proposal). Or where I have found willing faculty, I have found administrators unwilling to see the proposal’s relevance. Only in a very limited number of institutions – and generally very small ones – have I found faculty and administrators agreeing that deep intellectual renewal is essential for Catholic education.

Yet we keep searching for people who see that the transformation of the disciplines from the too-often anthropologically bankrupt contemporary reality in which we currently live is essential for the life of the Church and the well-being of Catholic higher education.

I have repeatedly made the case to my president and others at UFV that the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars represents a privileged grouping of Catholic intellectuals among whom the rethinking project would clearly resonate. Thus I am grateful to be here.

Thank you.

Max Bonilla is vice president for international relations at the University Francisco de Vitoria in Madrid, Spain.

---


2 There was great debate within, especially, departments of theology around the U.S., and, at least from my experience, the process was painful for many
who, fearing a stronger hand from the Vatican and the bishops, saw their hard-fought independence potentially declining.

3 Canon 812: ‘Those who teach theological disciplines in any institutes of higher studies whatsoever must have a mandate from the competent ecclesiastical authority.” See http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG1104/__P2O.HTM.


5 Since each bishop would decide whether and how to implement the norms, the fears of many theology departments likely subsided; ten years later, the implementation was declared a success. See http://www.ncregister.com/daily-news/ex-corde-implementation-review-nears-completion1.

6 Thus, for example, Hans Kelsen advocates that the concept of law and rights must be derived fully from basic norms, such as the Constitution, and never from metaphysics or anything separate from legal norms. See his works Pure Theory of Law (Clark, N.J.: The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 2009); General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1945); and What Is Justice: Justice, Law, and Politics in the Mirror of Science: Collected Essays (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957). Similarly, H. L. A. Hart famously advocated for the now widely accepted view of legal positivism. See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

7 Authors who reject the view that what is legal should be deemed just include Javier Herveda in his ¿Qué es el Derecho? (Pamplona, 2002); Consuelo Martínez-Sicluna in her Del Poder y la Justicia. El sentimiento de la Justicia (Madrid, 2002); and Michel Villey in his Philosophie du droit, Définition et fins du droit, Les moyens de droit (Paris, 2001).

8 There is a vast amount of literature on the subject. The reader may be interested in exploring the excellent work of the John A. Ryan Institute at the Center for Catholic Studies of the University of St. Thomas, Minnesota. Their multiple publications and bibliographies give ample evidence of the use of the social doctrine of the Church in business and business education. See http://www.stthomas.edu/cathstudies/cst/.

9 There are exceptions, of course, and the reader seeking examples may wish to research works by John D. Larrivee and Alejandro A. Cañadas of
Mount St. Mary’s University in Emmitsburg, Maryland.

10 Consider this example, unrelated to my aforementioned visit: “Once the technology works, he said, infertile women will be able to produce hundreds of eggs, and maybe hundreds of embryos. Using DNA sequencing to analyze their genes, they could pick among them for the healthiest ones.” Antonio Regalado, “Engineering the Perfect Baby,” *MIT Technology Review* (March 5, 2015), available at: http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/535661/engineering-the-perfect-baby/.

11 I recently heard the president of a prominent Catholic university say that the university had moved from seeking to assist in the integration of immigrants to a new mission: to compete with peer universities in research, presumably to improve its position in the rankings.


13 http://www.catholicscholars.org/_SpecialFiles/InSearchOfTheUnityOfKnowledge.pdf.
World Changers:
Responding to the New Evangelization through Encounter and Accompaniment

John Zimmer
Fellowship of Catholic University Students

In his Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Gaudium, Pope Francis writes about two concepts at the heart of his invitation to missionary discipleship: the concepts of encounter and accompaniment. These two concepts are very Franciscan (in the sense of Pope Francis), but they go back to the time of Jesus Christ himself and have been with us for the entire history of the Church. This paper will explore these two concepts and how embracing them in our lives can change the world, one soul at a time. My exploration of these terms is based upon the backdrop of my own personal study and the nearly seventeen years of experience I have working in FOCUS, an apostolate dedicated to evangelization.

Encounter

There are two aspects of encounter: (1) our own encounter with Jesus Christ, and (2) helping others to experience an encounter of their own.

Our Own Encounter with Jesus. One of my favorite papal teachings is from Pope Paul VI, who stated the following in an address to members of the laity on October 15, 1967: “It will suffice to tell you in a word: only your personal and profound union with Christ will assure the fruitfulness of your apostolate, whatever it may be.”

In training FOCUS missionaries for the last fifteen years, I have found that I cannot give an exhortation to our missionaries about
evangelization and discipleship without emphasizing to them the fundamental importance of knowing Jesus Christ first. It is based on a simple principle that we cannot give to others what we do not ourselves possess. If we are going to go out on the college campus and share the truth of Christ, the mercy of Christ, and the invitation into a relationship with Christ, then we must first have that relationship ourselves.

Knowing Jesus Christ goes beyond a simple intellectual acknowledgement of his redemptive life, death, and resurrection. The first sentence of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, in the passage which precedes paragraph one, is a direct quotation of John 17:3: “Father, this is eternal life that they would know you, the one true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent.” This term “know” is not simply an intellectual knowledge; rather, it is a deep, intimate, covenantal, and relational knowledge of God. Think back to Genesis 4:1, where we read that “Adam knew Eve his wife and she conceived and bore Cain.” That is the intimacy to which we are called with God: not just an intellectual accent to truths, but a deep, intimate, covenantal, and life-giving relationship with the God who created us. He created us in love, and he draws us to him in love. We need to encounter Jesus Christ as disciples if we are ever going to be able to share him as missionaries.

Pope Francis highlights this reality in the third paragraph of Evangelii gaudium: “I invite all Christians, everywhere, at this very moment, to a renewed personal encounter with Jesus Christ, or at least an openness to letting him encounter them; I ask all of you to do this unfailingly each day. No one should think that this invitation is not meant for him or her, since ‘no one is excluded from the joy brought by the Lord.’”

Thus, when we talk about encounter, we can never forget that the most critical encounter is the one we personally have with our Lord. It is this personal encounter which must touch us first before we begin to explore how to lead others into a relationship with Christ themselves.
Helping Others to Encounter Jesus Christ. When I tuck my daughters into bed at night, I will whisper quietly into their ears, “Who are you?” Their response is not “I’m Collette,” “I’m Julianna,” or “I’m Angela”; their response is this: “Dad, I’m an awesome daughter of God and a princess.” I emphasize this with my daughters because I want them to know that their identity is as a daughter of God. I want them to be rooted deeply in this most important of truths. Similarly, it is the responsibility of all the faithful that, when we experience a deep, intimate relationship with Christ, we in turn are to share the truth and joy of that relationship with others.

Curtis Martin, the founder of FOCUS, often shares a word picture which I in turn would like to repeat here. Imagine a teacher in a college classroom writing words on the board. The teacher realizes it is possible the students do not understand the definitions of these words, so she decides to make sure that the students understand clearly what the words mean. The teacher turns to the class and asks, “Can someone tell me the difference between ignorance and apathy?” No one answers, so the teacher asks again, “Can anyone tell me the difference?” Still she receives no answer. Finally the teacher turns to her best student and asks directly, “Sarah, can you please tell me the difference between ignorance and apathy?” Sarah looks up and blandly replies, “I don’t know and I don’t care.”

There has perhaps never been a better time in the Church to teach the truths of the faith. Pope Saint John Paul II gave us the great gift of the Catechism of the Catholic Church. There are incredible books written in an engaging way. There are many fantastic apostolates doing great work, including in the new media. I repeat: There has perhaps never been a better time to teach the faith.

However, if you are talking to someone who does not care, then it does not matter what you try to teach them. If I don’t care, then I don’t care what you are trying to tell me.

In my experience, most committed Catholics spend most of their time trying to address the “I don’t know” of the Catholic faith. We try to address the question of ignorance – but the “I don’t care”
trumps the “I don’t know.” Rather than addressing ignorance as the first step, we need to start first and foremost by addressing apathy.

Ignorance is addressed by catechesis, whereas apathy is addressed by evangelization. We need to start with evangelization. If we attempt to catechize before we engage in evangelization, the people whom we are trying to reach will tune out and no longer listen to us. How often do we hear from young people (or simply people) that they are bored by the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass? How frequently do we meet people who say they are bored or uninterested in the teachings of the Church? In truth, there are few things more exhilarating than contemplating the teachings of the Church – and yet, if we do not address the apathy pervading the faithful, then everything we teach will fall upon deaf ears.

With this in mind, how do we effectively address the challenge of apathy? We can start first with teachings from Pope Francis and Pope Saint John Paul II:

In catechesis too, we have rediscovered the fundamental role of the first announcement or kerygma, which needs to be the center of all evangelizing activity and all efforts at Church renewal. . . . On the lips of the catechist the first proclamation must ring out over and over: “Jesus Christ loves you; he gave his life to save you; and now he is living at your side every day to enlighten, strengthen and free you.”

In paragraph 25 of Catechesi tradendae, Pope Saint John Paul II defines the kerygma as “the initial ardent proclamation by which a person is one day overwhelmed and brought to the decision to entrust himself to Jesus Christ by faith.” As Catholics, we must take the fullness of the good news and figure out how best to apply it within a given circumstance and to a given person, so that the person has the best opportunity to hear the initial proclamation and entrust himself to Jesus Christ.

Many Catholics, however, would be hard pressed to share the good news in a succinct and compelling way. I propose that the
Encounter and Accompaniment

*Catechism* gives us at least one approach. We can get a sense of the basic outline of the kerygma by following the words of the *Catechism*, paragraphs 1 and 397: God, infinitely perfect and blessed in himself, in a plan of sheer goodness freely created man to make him share in his own blessed life. But man, tempted by the devil, let his trust in his Creator die in his heart and disobeyed God’s command; so God sent his Son as Redeemer and Savior. In his Son and through him, he invites men to become his adopted children and thus heirs of his blessed life. But it is not enough to simply know this truth; we must entrust ourselves completely to Jesus Christ, for God draws close to man and calls man to seek, to know, to love him with all of his strength.

In these four sentences alone, the seed of the gospel can be shared, simply and directly. These truths can have a powerful impact upon people in an initial encounter. A FOCUS missionary recently told a story about sharing the kerygma with a college freshman who was raised in a Catholic home and had received first Communion and the Sacrament of Reconciliation, but then stopped attending church shortly thereafter. This student is now a freshman at the University of Alabama and has been attending a FOCUS bible study. In a one-on-one meeting after one of the bible studies, the FOCUS missionary shared with this student something very similar to the passage I wrote above. Following the missionary’s brief presentation of the basic kerygma, this college freshman, in tears, entrusted her life to Jesus Christ. This student went to confession and began attending Mass for the first time in more than a decade. This student’s heart was prepared for the kerygma through her encounter with the Word of God in the scriptures, but it was still critical for her to hear the gospel and be given an opportunity to entrust herself to Jesus. This is but one example of many that demonstrate the willingness of people to respond if we are willing to make the invitation.

*Planting the Flag*. In addition to sharing the kerygma, the New Evangelization gives us the opportunity to help form a deeper commitment in those who were raised in Christian homes. One way to introduce and share this concept is by beginning with a quote from
Saint Augustine’s *City of God*: “Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self. The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter glorifies the Lord.”

I share this passage because it is a model and an understanding that most of our Catholic faithful do not understand. Most Catholics have heard the truths. They know that Jesus is God; they might not genuinely believe it, but they know that is what is taught. They know that Jesus came and died for our sins. They know that he rose from the dead. They even know what day Jesus died and rose: on a Friday and a Sunday, respectively. What they do not know is that their decision – their decision genuinely to accept and follow Christ – makes all the difference.

Let me share a little bit about my own experience in terms of “planting the flag” for my own faith. I was raised in a great Catholic home and am grateful for the formation and love my parents gave me. When I went to college, I tried for a few months to fight the good fight. I wanted to be a good kid; I would get up on Sunday mornings and quietly get ready for Mass, trying not to wake up others sleeping off their hangovers. I tried hard to remain committed to my faith, but eventually, after walking the road alone, I just threw in the towel. If you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em! So I joined them: I jumped into the world, and for more than six years, succumbed to the temptations of the world, the flesh, and the devil.

Eventually I made my way back to the Church from an intellectual perspective. I became convinced that the Church carried the deposit of truth, but I did not really have a relationship with Jesus. I had fallen in love with truth, but I didn’t know that truth was a Person.

It was during this time that I attended a Catholic Marian Conference. At this conference, a priest announced that we were going to have the opportunity to experience exposition of the Blessed Sacrament. I knew what those terms were, but at the time I didn’t know what they meant. The priest told the story of the woman
hemorrhaging for twelve years (cf. Luke 8:43-48), how she reaches out and touches the cloak of Christ, and when she touches the cloak of Christ she is healed. The priest said, “I am going to be walking around this auditorium, and just like that woman 2,000 years ago, you can today reach out and touch the cloak of Christ.” Soon the priest began walking around the auditorium with a thousand people in it; people were falling over, weeping and crying, and reaching out to touch Christ’s cloak in a beautiful pandemonium. That is the moment when it hit me: the Blessed Sacrament was not just a neat symbol but was Jesus himself, and I needed to get on my knees. No longer was truth something “out there”; truth was in front of me: it was Jesus.

That day, in the autumn of 1997, I surrendered my life to Jesus Christ. I didn’t say a specific “sinner’s prayer” or recite the words of the Catechism as articulated above, although either of those would have been beautiful. Rather, I simply fell onto my knees and I surrendered to him. I planted the flag of faith in Jesus Christ, and I have not looked back since.

I have had many other wonderful encounters with the Lord since that day nearly twenty years ago. I could mention many other times when I have encountered Jesus in a powerful way, but I will always remember the fall of 1997 – just like Saint Paul always remembered meeting Jesus on the road to Damascus, and just like Saint John, as he tells us in the first chapter of his gospel, remembers it was four o’clock in the afternoon when he met Jesus. John wrote his gospel decades after this initial encounter, and yet he remembers that it was four o’clock, the tenth hour, when he met Christ. This primary encounter must always come back to us, and we in turn must be willing to share this encounter and its significance with others.

**Accompaniment**

With a better understanding of encounter now firmly in mind, let us look together at what Pope Francis teaches us about accompaniment:
The Church will have to initiate everyone – priests, religious and laity – into this “art of accompaniment” which teaches us to remove our sandals before the sacred ground of the other (cf. Ex 3:5). The pace of this accompaniment must be steady and reassuring, reflecting our closeness and our compassionate gaze which also heals, liberates and encourages growth in the Christian life.

. . . Genuine spiritual accompaniment always begins and flourishes in the context of service to the mission of evangelization. Paul’s relationship with Timothy and Titus provides an example of this accompaniment and formation which takes place in the midst of apostolic activity. . . . Missionary disciples accompany missionary disciples.

Pope Francis is clear and direct in his teaching: “Missionary disciples accompany missionary disciples.” It is essential for disciples to walk closely with other disciples throughout the Christian journey. Two scripture passages directly related to accompaniment may help us to better understand what the “art of accompaniment” looks like in practical terms. These two passages are both from Paul’s letters, which is fitting given Pope Francis’s highlighting of Paul in his teaching about accompaniment. The first scripture passage is from Saint Paul’s first letter to the Thessalonians: “So, being affectionately desirous of you, we were willing to share with you not only the gospel of God, but our very lives, because you had become dear to us.”

Paul emphasizes the importance here of authentic friendship. It was in the context of friendship, of sharing life with others, that he shared the gospel with the citizens of Thessalonica. All of us have had experiences, both on the receiving end and on the giving end, to confirm that people hear far more by watching than they do by listening. I’ve had college students tell me, “John, your bible studies were great and all, but watching you with your family is how I learned to live the Christian life.” I have learned the same way. I have the privilege of spending time with great Christian men and women, and
it is by watching them and following their example, sharing life with them and putting flesh on the gospel, that I have learned how to live. We all resonate with the teaching of Pope Paul VI when he states: “Modern man listens more willingly to witnesses than to teachers, and if he does listen to teachers, it is because they are witnesses.”

A second passage that sheds further light on the essence of accompaniment is from Paul’s second letter to Timothy. Paul writes this to Timothy when Paul is in Rome, in chains, and will be martyred soon. Paul exhorts Timothy: “The things which you have heard from me, in the presence of many witnesses, teach these things to faithful men who will be able to teach others also.”

So Paul says to Timothy, teach these things to men who will teach others. We have four generations of Christian discipleship: Paul; Timothy; the ones whom Timothy teaches; and the ones whom Timothy teaches who in turn teach others. More simply, as we say in FOCUS: teach teachers how to teach. When we say teachers, we don’t mean knowledge/intellectual; we mean those who model how to live the Christian life, the art of discipleship. That is what the art of accompaniment is. Teach somebody more than just the faith: teach them how to live it and how to teach somebody else – and as the essential next step, teach somebody else how to teach somebody else how to teach somebody else, and on, and on. This approach to evangelization results in a multiplication of the hope of the gospel, as one person reaches two, two reach four, four reach eight, and so on, until one million reach two million, and one billion reach two billion. It is an approach which allows for a deep and powerful spread of the gospel.

One of the great privileges and wonderful experiences I expect we are going to have in heaven is the opportunity to look back at 2,000-plus years of disciples who, if not for them passing on the faith to somebody else, would not have eventually passed the faith to us. This art of accompaniment, equipping missionary disciples for the gospel, has to be at the heart of what we do. It is the approach Jesus took with his disciples, and the one that his disciples took with those who received the gospel from their own lips.
I will close with a story of an experience on a college campus, which I think helps to model this culture of encounter and the art of accompaniment.

At one of the campuses we serve, there was a missionary who had reached out to students at a fraternity. One of these fraternity students, among many, had surrendered his life to Christ and made a decision to begin leading his own small group bible study at the fraternity. One of the students in his fraternity was a Muslim (we will call him Ali), and although he was the president of the Muslim Student Association at the university, was interested in the bible study and thought it would be thought-provoking to have some interreligious dialogue with Catholic students. Ali faithfully attended the bible study, and it was not unusual for him to linger around after it was over to engage in more dialogue and conversation with the FOCUS student leader. This pattern continued for weeks.

It turns out that Ali was from Afghanistan, and upon learning that his father was in a car accident, he made the decision to visit his family over Thanksgiving break to be with his father. Before Ali left on his trip, the FOCUS student leader gave him a copy of the New Testament and encouraged him to consider reading it. Back in Afghanistan, Ali began to read the New Testament. As he read, he was struck by the person of Jesus Christ and that what he was learning in the gospels did not match up with what he had known from the Koran.

When Ali returned to the United States, the FOCUS student leader invited him to attend a five-day FOCUS conference. Ali went to the conference and was surrounded by thousands of Catholic college students, and he experienced the fullness and richness of the faith. At this conference, Ali approached one of our missionaries who was on the campus he was from and said to her in tears: “What do I do if the religion in which I have been raised is not the truth?” The missionary encouraged Ali to explore RCIA – and at Easter of the following year, Ali, the (former) president of the Muslim Student Association, joined the Catholic Church. The following year, he graduated and went into Catholic mission work. All of this was
possible because a friend had encountered Jesus Christ himself and was willing to share that encounter. Ali is now deeply following the Lord Jesus Christ and sharing the joy he found.

There is power in the encounter with Jesus Christ; there is power in the accompaniment of a fellow disciple of Christ. If we are to spread the gospel to all nations, it is essential for us to be willing not only to pursue a personal, intimate encounter with the Lord in our lives, but also to share it and accompany others in that same walk. Only then will we be able to bring the gospel to the ends of the earth.

_John Zimmer is vice president of apostolic development for FOCUS._

---

1 Pope Paul VI, Homily, Third World Congress on the Apostolate of the Laity, Vatican City, 1967.
2 Genesis 4:1.
3 _Evangelii gaudium_, 3.
4 Ibid., 164.
5 _Catechesi tradendae_, 25.
6 _Catechism of the Catholic Church_, 1.
7 Ibid., 397.
8 Ibid., 1.
9 Ibid.
12 John 1:39.
13 _Evangelii gaudium_, 169, 173
14 1 Thessalonians 2:8.
15 _Evangelii nuntiandi_, 41,
16 2 Timothy 2:2.
Heart Speaks to Heart:  
*Ex Corde Ecclesiae*  
Twenty-Five Years Later  

*Mark Newcomb*  
*Mount Saint Mary College*

**OR AD COR LOQUITOR**, this was the motto – heart speaks to heart – that John Henry Newman added to the coat of arms fashioned to be the emblem of his new ecclesiastical office in 1879, when Pope Leo XIII named him a cardinal. The idea of hearts in dialogue is a phrase that Newman borrowed from a letter of Saint Francis de Sales, and it accurately captured Newman’s own nature, since he was said to be a sensitive, impassioned, and empathetic interlocutor to those who knew him personally. Although he regularly focused on education, the mind, and the acquisition of knowledge in his writings, these works were also a constant effort to express the deep convictions of his heart, even as it passed through several phases of growth and development throughout the course of his life.\(^1\) Despite the erudition, academic cadences, and abstract and varied subject matter one encounters in his writings, it was chiefly Newman’s heart that drove him to pour out, in verbal form, what he felt as the beauty and attraction of truth, in an effort to help others discover the core of belief and the wonders of faith. Newman’s *affaire de coeur* with the splendor of truth connects all of his written endeavors, from his earliest tracts and sermons as an Anglican to the final works he published as a Catholic theologian, over the course of his long and prolific years. In what follows, we will consider the historical backdrop leading up to the publication of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, and some aspects of the reception of this key apostolic constitution in America on this twenty-fifth anniversary year of its publication. We will then trace some of Newman’s heartfelt convictions as he...
expressed them in *The Idea of a University*, and attempt to show how they spoke to John Paul II’s heart in the conceiving of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*.

This past August 15th, the Feast of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, the world marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the publication of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*. The circumstances that called this document into being have profoundly shaped our commemoration of John Paul II’s apostolic constitution; we are celebrating both more and less than we think in 2015. For, although the Holy Father intended that the general norms of the Constitution would go into effect at the start of the 1991-1992 academic year, it would be ten years before the USCCB and Catholic institutions of higher education in America would reluctantly implement it. In that sense – in America, at least – we are not marking a quarter century of *Ex Corde* as an active force in the landscape of Catholic higher education. On the other hand, the impulses and provisional steps that gave rise and final form to *Ex Corde* had been long germinating, even if they were rather slow in coming to full fruition.

*Ted’s Excellence Adventure*

The roots of *Ex Corde* go back at least to the late 1940s, with the founding and official recognition of the *Fœderatio Universitatum Catholicarum*. Although what would eventually become recognized as the International Federation of Catholic Universities was formed in 1948 and officially recognized in 1949 by Pope Pius XII, there had been efforts as early as the 1920s to establish an international network of Catholic institutions of higher learning. In the aftermath of World War II, it was finally possible for leading European and Asian Catholic universities gradually to build a network of dialogue and mutual support. Although it went through a number of permutations, the American universities were not very active in the early years of the *Federatio*, which took the name of the International Federation of Catholic Universities only in 1965. That same year, at a meeting in Tokyo, the IFCU began to deliberate on the criteria for
what constituted a Catholic university, as it contemplated future expansion of its membership. Those discussions culminated in a plan to hold four regional meetings around the globe to help establish criteria for admission into the IFCU.

This was the historical backdrop and impetus for the conference held at Land O’Lakes, Wisconsin, from July 20 to 23, in 1967. In addition to contributing to the discussion about criteria for IFCU membership, the statement was also ostensibly aimed to be a favorable response to several themes and concepts believed to be expressed in Gaudium et spes, promulgated by Paul VI on December 7, 1967. Although rather optimistic in tone about the general progress of man, Gaudium et spes also sounds several warning notes that man cannot liberate himself or find lasting happiness solely through the powers of his intellect, regardless of how much knowledge he obtains:

Thus while man extends his power in every direction, he does not always succeed in subjecting it to his own welfare. Striving to probe more profoundly into the deeper recesses of his own mind, he frequently appears more unsure of himself. Gradually and more precisely he lays bare the laws of society, only to be paralyzed by uncertainty about the direction to give it.

Nevertheless, the Land O’ Lakes statement suggests that the modern Catholic university is to be a place where academic freedom will lead ineluctably to excellence, permitting man to attain to truth, so long as no “external” authority intrudes on the process. The opening section, under the heading of “The Catholic University: A True University with Distinctive Characteristics,” is strident in this declaration:

The Catholic University today must be a university in the full modern sense of the word, with a strong commitment to and concern for academic excellence. To perform its teaching and research functions effectively the Catholic university must have a true autonomy and academic
freedom in the face of authority of whatever kind, lay or clerical, external to the academic community itself. To say this is simply to assert that institutional autonomy and academic freedom are essential conditions of life and growth and indeed of survival for Catholic universities as for all universities.5

On the face of it, such an assertion appears as a rather bald non serviam with respect to the aims of the Church for educating and forming Catholic laity for service in the world. Instead, the Catholic university, according to the late Fr. Theodore Hesburgh, CSC, and those who gathered with him at Land O’Lakes that summer, was to orient its life and labors around the pursuit of “academic excellence,” a term left wholly undefined in the statement. A document that aimed, in part, to help set criteria for membership in an organization called the International Federation of Catholic Universities might be expected to take stock of both the Catholic intellectual tradition and contemporary views in other regions of the world. Instead, the Land O’ Lakes statement is very much the product of a single age and social context, and does not include a single citation to any prevailing text, ecclesiastical, secular, literary, historical, or theological, in the history of the Catholic intellectual tradition – nor does it refer to any contemporary text produced outside of North America. In fact, despite repeated references to “academic excellence,” the statement contains no supporting or scholarly apparatus whatsoever, and reads as a freestanding manifesto framed to extol the themes of John Tracy Ellis’s 1955 essay “American Catholics and the Intellectual Life.”6

The authors of the Land O'Lakes statement were, however, concerned with ensuring that Catholicism was “perceptibly and effectively operative,”7 in the Catholic university. This “operative presence,” as it was described, was to be:

Effectively achieved first of all and distinctively by the presence of a group of scholars in all branches of theology. The disciplines represented by this theological group are recognized in the Catholic university, not only as
legitimate intellectual disciplines, but as ones essential to the integrity of a university. Since the pursuit of the theological sciences is therefore a high priority for a Catholic university, academic excellence in these disciplines becomes a double obligation in a Catholic university.  

It was probably much less clear in 1967 than it would be later, that small communities of academicians, even in theology, could not come to fundamental agreement on matters of belief and practice under a laissez-faire organizational structure and the banner of “academic excellence” that they alone were deemed competent to design and fashion. This was a rather jejune conception of the authority “internal” to the university, now that any “authority of whatever kind, lay or clerical, external to the academic community itself,” was deemed perilous for the “life and growth and indeed of survival [of] Catholic universities as for all universities.”

Unsurprisingly, the Land O’ Lakes document stood in stark contrast to the succeeding IFCU statement on the nature and role of the Catholic university. The Eighth Triennial Congress of the IFCU was convened in September 1968 at Lovanium University, Kinshasa, in the country then known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This gathering was a more representative international body of Catholic scholars and higher education leaders than those assembled at Land O’ Lakes the year before. North America fielded delegates from eight American and five Canadian institutions, but representatives from two African, six Asian, two Middle Eastern, eleven South American, and sixteen European Catholic universities rounded out the numbers and perspectives of the participants. The statement produced by the Eighth Triennial IFCU Congress described the Catholic university as having “an institutional commitment which includes a respect for and voluntary acceptance of the Church’s teaching authority.” In fact, the opening section of the IFCU Triennial Congress statement urges that the Catholic university is a place characterized by the “integration of all
knowledge in the light of the wisdom of Christian revelation.”

Though brief, the Congolese statement is consistently focused on the Catholic university’s duty to witness to and proclaim transcendent values and to be a place where “authentic Christian culture” is nurtured and promoted. The focus of this statement is not on the negative limitations of authority, but on the boundless and transforming nature of grace and Christian revelation. By these measures, it is a document that envisions the Catholic university constructively partnering with the Church in the building up and transmission of Catholic ideals and culture.

Heart and Soul

Perhaps alarmed by the tenor of the Land O’ Lakes statement and its turbulent aftermath, the Vatican thereafter became more active in facilitating and shaping the self-understanding of Catholic universities. In early 1969, the Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education sent a questionnaire to Catholic institutions of higher learning around the world. In May of that same year, the Vatican hosted an international congress of Catholic universities attended by thirty delegates. The Vatican congress issued a statement that became known as “The Catholic University and the Aggiornamento,” which enumerated four essential characteristics of a Catholic university. All four were later to be incorporated into Ex Corde Ecclesiae. As formulated in the Aggiornamento document, Catholic institutions of higher education should exhibit “a Christian inspiration not only of individuals but also of the university community”; engage in “a continuing reflection in the light of Christian faith on the growing treasury of human knowledge”; demonstrate “fidelity to the Christian message as it comes to us through the Church; and operate from “an institutional commitment to the service of Christian thought and education.” These four principles were reiterated in “The Catholic University in the Modern World,” an official statement issued by a follow-up congress on this subject held by the IFCU at the Vatican in 1972. This latter statement also emphasized the duty of theologians
to teach authentic Church doctrine in their classes, while acknowledging that they should enjoy scholarly freedom and free engagement in their academic research endeavors.\textsuperscript{\textdagger}

In America, the Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education promulgated an official letter to the presidents of American Catholic universities in 1973, asking them to address two propositions:

(1) on the necessity for each Catholic university to set out formally and without equivocation, either in its statutes or in some other internal document, its character and commitment as ‘Catholic’; (2) on the necessity for every Catholic university to create within itself appropriate and efficacious instruments so as to be able to put into effect proper self-regulation in the sectors of faith, morality and discipline.\textsuperscript{\textcopyright}

In his letter, Cardinal Garrone, prefect for the Sacred Congregation, amplified these points, urging “the Church asks these institutions, your institutions, to set out without equivocation your Catholic nature.”\textsuperscript{\textdaggerdbl} The request would seem to be an effort on the part of the Vatican to obtain greater clarity on, and to point out some of the shortcomings of, the more shrill notes of the Land O’ Lakes statement about institutional autonomy and precisely how a Catholic ethos would come to permeate an institution with no formal allegiance or stated fidelity to the Church and Church teaching. Having received no definitive response to his first letter, Cardinal Garrone wrote again in 1974 to the leaders of a number of American Catholic colleges and universities, repeating his request of the previous year.

The fifteen-year period between the Sacred Congregation’s second letter to the presidents of American Catholic universities and the promulgation of \textit{Ex Corde Ecclesiae} was characterized by a series of efforts on the part of Vatican officials to have U.S. institutions set forth clear statements about their Catholic identity and how it would be safeguarded within those institutions. These entreaties were met
with several attempts by the U.S. bishops’ conference and a confederation of American Catholic institutions of higher learning, known today as the Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities, to insist that legal and cultural issues in the United States would not permit these institutions to function and survive if they were explicit about their faith commitments and if they implemented an internal juridical system for maintaining fidelity to Church teaching for instruction in theology. Beginning in the early 1980s, the new Code of Canon Law in general, and the debate over Canon 812 in particular, gave sharp focus to the lack of agreement on the need to clarify and live out the Catholic identity of Catholic institutions of higher learning. The chief complaints against this enterprise were argued under three main headings. It was alleged that: (a) the constitutional arrangement of separation of church and state in America made it impossible to comply with such a request without imperiling access to federal financial aid funds in America, which were the life blood of many struggling institutions in this period; (b) academic freedom would be vitiated if U.S. Catholic institutions articulated juridical bonds with the Catholic Church; and (c) anti-Catholic sentiment in America would be rekindled with new vigor if American Catholic educational leaders declared direct allegiance to a magisterial authority led by Vatican officials and the pope. Many also feared that such a system would return U.S. higher education to an alleged “intellectual ghetto” that they claimed it inhabited prior to the Second Vatican Council. These were the same points, in differing form, articulated by many of the spokespersons for Catholic institutions opposed to instituting the general norms of Ex Corde Ecclesiae in the eleven-year period between its publication by John Paul II in 1990 and the ratification and enactment of the USCCB’s application document, which announced that the norms of Ex Corde Ecclesiae would have the force of law in America in May of 2001. The statement of the late Monika Hellwig, writing in 1999 as the president and executive director of the Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities, may be taken as representative of the arguments against the implementation of the norms contained in the apostolic
constitution. In her essay recounting the history of the efforts to implement *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* in America, she says that most Catholic academic leaders sought an exclusively nonjuridical relationship with the Church, citing the example of, among other “movements,” the Waldensians of the fifteenth century – even while noting that they were subsequently excommunicated by the Church. 19

Assessing the Past to Chart the Future

How will future generations of American Catholic historians explain the protracted process of defining the relationship between the Catholic Church and the Catholic university in the modern world? How will they account for the fact that this seemingly straightforward and reasonable task took four decades to come to full fruition? How will they view the fact that professedly Catholic institutions of higher education resisted any clear definition of their Catholicity so long and so stridently? Since the Church gave birth to the university – through the *scholas* that grew up around early medieval monasteries – why was it so difficult to articulate the connections between these two living institutions in the late twentieth century, particularly in an American context? Any one of these questions would be worthy of a monograph in its own right, but when one looks over the long and heated deliberations that culminated in the tailored implementation of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* in America, the subject both beggars belief and begs for an explanation that is neither easy to find nor simple to state.

It is not possible here to do justice to even one of the facets of the problem associated with effecting a *rapprochement* between modern Catholic universities in America and the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, the following observations may prove illuminating for the enterprising scholars who will tackle this topic with greater acumen and energy in the years to come. Here are some features of the landscape of American Catholic higher education that may help to account for Land O’ Lakes and its aftermath:
American Catholic colleges and universities, beginning in the latter 1940s, were not merely larger as a result of the influx of students under the G.I. Bill, but they also enrolled many students who were older and more worldly. The American intellectual historian Philip Gleason has pointed out that American Catholic universities expanded rapidly under the G.I. Bill after World War II.\textsuperscript{20} We must also bear in mind how these students shaped the institutions where they enrolled, following one or more tours of duty abroad. Many of those returning from combat in the European and Asian theaters were probably less satisfied with overly optimistic conceptions of humanity or pat theological answers on the nature of sin, suffering, and death. Many of them also probably returned home to America with less confidence in European ideas, and more assured of American cultural norms and ideals. In addition, their generational peers taking holy orders generally did not serve in active military settings, because many were enrolled in seminaries at that time. These seminarians took the helm of leading Catholic institutions in the years following the war and, having been somewhat removed from the hard exigencies of combat and the personal privations that came with it, may not have developed the courage of their conviction to the faith in the same way as those who served on the battlefields and seas of Europe and Asia.

To the extent that America has an intellectual tradition it can rightly call its own, the distinctive note has always been pragmatism. The coming of age of the American Catholic Church perhaps owes something, ironically, to that anti-intellectual tradition that wants always to be doing something and eschews abstract theories of organization and detailed intellectual pedigrees for concepts. In this sense, systematic theology is not a conceptual crop best cultivated in American intellectual soil.

To borrow an insight from the renowned early twentieth-century historian Marcus Lee Hansen, a great many Catholic religious, who were often also college and university presidents or other academic leaders in the 1960s, were children of immigrant parents. The great waves of Italian and Irish immigration to America
in the early twentieth century gave birth to a generation that was reaching maturity in the 1950s and 1960s. According to Hansen’s law, second-generation children, in an American context, wish to reject and overthrow the ethnic and – especially – the religious identity of their parents so that they can fully assimilate as Americans. The mid-to-late 1960s coincided with a period in which immigrant families were undergoing this kind of seismic shift, sociologically.

(4) The Church and Catholic higher education put a lot of intellectual eggs into the neoscholastic basket from the 1920s to the late 1940s. When this approach to systematic theology seemed to many as if it did not and could not speak directly to modern questions about man and society, nothing else constructive or systematic had been developed with sufficient scope to connect modern life, faith, and intellectual reflection on the gospel. In the American Catholic academy, the resulting options seem to have erupted in a stark polarization among different schools of theologians. One path was that of severe critique of neoscholasticism, based on what had been felt to be absent in it. Over time, the work of many of these theologians verged toward a type of “religious studies,” often focused on empirical sociological observations of humanity, rather than a disciplined reflection on revelation. Other theologians chose the route of hyper-specialization in their efforts to salvage neoscholasticism. In retrospect, considering these methodological divides in theological scholarship, it seems a time when all cried, “The center cannot hold.”

(5) Theology itself proved far more susceptible to faddism than was probably thought possible in 1967. Schools of theological thought, such as *La Nouvelle Théologie*, tried to fill the gap for many when neoscholasticism seemed to falter, but this new movement was very confused, and, in its early stages, included figures as disparate as Hans Kung and Hans Urs von Balthasar. It only gradually became apparent that a comprehensive theological vision could not emerge from, say, the “resignification” theory of the sacraments advanced by such figures as Edward Schillebeeckx. The result was that the study
of theology itself was not only more “silod” from other disciplines, but subsilos within the field were being erected during the era of the Second Vatican Council in higher education.

(6) The deterioration of all of the humanities, including theology, was both steep and swift, once they were awash in the corrosive acids of postmodernism. Since the mid-1970s, one can be considered an expert, especially in the American academy, without any actual content knowledge, by subscribing to the view that all texts and structures are expressions of power based exclusively on the constructed categories of race, gender, and class. By opting for deconstructionist ideologies, scholars in the humanities ushered in a global enfeeblement of intellectualism, as the study of literature, political science, and theology became differing forms of pseudosociology in the methodologically reductionistic approach of its practitioners.

It is precisely in view of these last three points that the pontificate of John Paul II in general, and his apostolic constitution Ex Corde Ecclesiae in particular, were vitally important for Catholic intellectual life, both in the Church and in the academy. In the dynamic fusion of Thomism and personalism, John Paul II rendered a signal service to the pursuit of Catholic intellectual and moral excellence. What the Church and Catholic higher education desperately needed at the end of the twentieth century was a constructive theological vision that could be comprehensive in the range of its reflections while allowing room for human experiential insights into the contemplation of God’s desire to be in relationship with man. In providing this theological vision, Pope Saint John Paul II pointed the way forward with a method that could take Catholic devotional life seriously while still being intellectually rigorous and nuanced. Other theological approaches may also lead to these same ends, but John Paul II’s was certainly a theological vision with room for a revivified appreciation of natural law and ecumenism, while not jettisoning the content of specifically Catholic contributions to theological reflections on the gospel.
A closer look at *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* reveals that the document not only calls for a deep integration of faith and reason in Catholic higher education, but that it also provides a general blueprint for accomplishing this goal. Only a comprehensive and constructive theology, focused on the transcendent action of grace in human culture, can satisfy our “ardent search for truth” and provide for “its unselfish transmission to youth and to all those learning to think rigorously,” so that we may “act rightly and . . . serve humanity better.”22 Because he was firmly convinced that the proper object of study in theology is God and God’s unrelenting striving to reach, know, and speak to humanity, John Paul II was bold to quote John Henry Newman in the opening sections of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, noting that “knowledge and reason are sure ministers of faith.”23

John Paul II’s theological wisdom is indebted both to Newman’s sense of the personal conviction of truth and to Thomistic categories related to the final cause of man, whose “Spirit of intelligence and love enables” us with our “own intelligence to find the ultimate reality of which he is the source and end and who alone is capable of giving fully that Wisdom without which the future of the world would be in danger.”24 This is a theological vision that calls for an academic culture that can form thinkers who are able to infuse the truth of the gospel into human culture: “Man’s life is given dignity by culture, and, while he finds his fullness in Christ, there can be no doubt that the Gospel which reaches and renews him in every dimension is also fruitful for the culture in which he lives.”25

In the final analysis, the light of John Paul II’s theological vision reveals both the shortcomings and narrowness – despite all of its calls for openness, freedom, and breadth – to be found in the Land O’Lakes conception of Catholic higher education. As it turns out, it is not simply having an ample bench of theologians in an institution that serves to safeguard a “perceptibly and effectively operative” Catholicism, but rather, what sort of theological vision those scholars possess and profess. This history of the Protestant Reformation
stands as a sufficient refutation of Land O’ Lakes. After all, we have university theologians and philosophers to thank for such concepts as nominalism, sola scriptura, and bare anamnesis in sacramental theology. Unfortunately, the trend from the late twentieth century has been for many American theologians to descend into sociological phenomena and to bring the results of their “findings” to bear on critiquing the Church—in effect, arrogating to themselves the role of a “super-magisterium” aiming to set the teaching office of the Church straight on a number of points of traditional doctrine. This form of pseudo-theology, which takes man – and only modern man – as its main object of study, has for too long masqueraded as serious scholarship, but has produced very little lasting fruit to sustain either the Church or Catholic intellectual excellence into the future.

Land O'Lakes was explicit in calling upon university theologians to hold the role of professional critic of the teaching office of the Church:

Every university, Catholic or not, serves as the critical reflective intelligence of its society. In keeping with this general function, the Catholic university has the added obligation of performing this same service for the Church. Hence, the university should carry on a continual examination of all aspects and all activities of the Church and should objectively evaluate them. The Church would thus have the benefit of continual counsel from Catholic universities. Catholic universities in the recent past have hardly played this role at all. It may well be one of the most important functions of the Catholic university of the future.26

However, there are several major flaws in the proposition that university theologians should serve as “the critical reflective intelligence” for the Church. In the first place, such a model places intelligence higher than fidelity or holiness in the hierarchy of virtues that are to shape Catholic culture and practice. This principle is also too narrow to give scope to gospel values that touch on human
action in the world. Furthermore, private theologians have no authority or appointment to conduct such “service” to the Church, and, even if they did, should certainly have to meet established, public, and ecclesiastically approved criteria to perform such a task. Most “critical reflective intelligence” is the product of a single age and sphere of human experience, and is therefore quite limited, while criticism is itself limited to commenting on felt shortcomings. It is therefore insufficient to provide a comprehensive or transcendent theological vision that could form the foundation of an enduring Christian culture or serve for the cure of souls, which are the primary charges of the magisterium.

The need of a comprehensive and transcendent model to ground and orient theological studies at the university level has long been a staple in Catholic reflections on the enterprise of higher education. Long before John Tracy Ellis and Land O’ Lakes, John Henry Cardinal Newman was attempting to limn the contours of a sustained engagement between faith and reason in The Idea of a University. There Newman is quite clear that the major service that theology can provide in the intellectual life of the Catholic university is to be an elevating and integrative metadiscipline for other areas of study.

Noting both that reality is an integrated whole, but that man must study it carefully one aspect at a time to comprehend it accurately, Newman states that each academic subject gains depth and veracity by drawing on insights from other areas of study. One of Newman’s famous illustrating examples of this interdisciplinary study is found in Dialogue III, where he states that one cannot be an expert in the study of projectiles without also studying gravity, velocity, and the principles of atmospheric resistance and drag. Otherwise, the “expert” will not know where his projectiles would land. This hypothetical figure is very much the model of the modern pseudotheologian in America, launching “critiques” in all directions, but with little awareness or care for what damage his or her self-professed supercompetence over the magisterium has done or will do over time. Answerable to no one, the occupants of such an office can do great moral harm to many. All of this is to say that it takes much
less energy and care to tear down than to build up, and that all of us are limited and often insufficiently susceptible to the counsel of our better angels. Anyone who would take it upon herself to be an unappointed teacher to the hierarchy of the Church, armed with only a research degree, had best ponder the high responsibility that such a task entails.

It is in this connection that Newman’s insights can also supply what a Land O’ Lakes vision lacks for the task of orienting the intellectual life of the Catholic university. The fact that our exclusive or near-exclusive study of a particular field or subfield may render us ignorant of other equally important counterobservations from other disciplines is always a serious possibility. As academicians, as fellow Catholic scholars, none of us is omnicompetent, so whatever critique we offer is naturally more limited and smaller than the insights of the teaching office of the Church, which has been gathering data and reflections from the leading intellectual figures and minds of the world over the centuries. Newman pressed this observation of our individual intellectual limits as early as 1835, stating of rationalism:

The Rationalist makes himself his own center, not his Maker; he does not go to God, but he implies that God must come to him... Instead of looking out of ourselves and trying to catch glimpses of God's workings, from any quarter... we sit at home bringing everything to ourselves, enthroning ourselves in our own views and refusing to believe anything that does not force itself upon us as true.28

Another vital concept that connects both the thought of Newman and John Paul II is the vivifying principle that faith and reason are mutually illuminating and reinforcing in the mind of man. Newman devoted a great deal of energy over the course of his life to the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge:

It would seem, then, that though Faith is the characteristic of the Gospel, and Faith is the simple lifting of the mind
to the Unseen God, without conscious reasoning or formal argument, still the mind may be allowably, nay, religiously engaged, in reflecting upon its own Faith; investigating the grounds and the Object of it, bringing it out into words, whether to defend, or recommend, or teach it to others. And St. Peter himself, in spite of his ardour and earnestness, gives us in his own case some indications of such an exercise of mind. When he said, “Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God,” he cast his faith, in a measure, into a dogmatic form: and when he said, “To whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life,” he gave “an account of the hope that was in him,” or grounded his faith upon Evidence.29

For Newman, the Church has an implicit knowledge of the truth that it makes explicit in different contexts and in response to particular concepts and cultures – this is the crux of his understanding of the development of doctrine. In a similar way, John Paul II hoped that theologians would continue to reflect upon and “open the treasury” of the Church’s teaching in response to a neopaganizing current in society, detrimental to family life, that seeks to identify “progress” with promoting a pre-Christian understanding of the human person and society. For both Newman and John Paul II, an authentic Christian culture cannot be founded on intellectualism or mere cerebral capacity, but on the earnest endeavor to bring the heart of the crucified Christ to the heart of a wounded and broken humanity.

Ex Corde Ecclesiae Today

Twenty-five years after the publication of Ex Corde Ecclesiae, and fifteen years after its modified implementation in America, we are seeing the fruits of this key apostolic constitution. There has been an ever-increasing amount of time and energy focused on mission and identity in institutions of Catholic higher education over the past twenty-five years, with Ex Corde Ecclesiae and its general norms serving as a staple text for any number of new faculty orientation
sessions or open fora in Catholic colleges and universities. Focusing on what constitutes Catholic distinctiveness in American higher education has been the subject of scholarly books and articles, and indeed, the present conference seeks to make key contributions to this effort. These trends are a cause for hope that the American Catholic academy will increasingly value and pursue a sustained engagement between faith and reason.

One of the most interesting fruits of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* has been the explosion in self-reflection and self-study about Catholic identity and mission on campuses that have a sponsoring religious order. In many American Catholic colleges and universities, leaders of the sponsoring religious congregations have drawn deeply from the wells of Benedictine, Jesuit, Dominican, Basilian, or Franciscan religious life to provide a specific frame for integrating Catholic principles into campus culture. Whether styled as “hallmarks” or “gifts” or “values,” these kinds of articulation of the accumulated wisdom of religious communities is entirely congruent with both Newman’s sense of the movement from implicit to explicit knowledge in the life of faith, and with John Paul II’s vision for explicating and inculcating the integration of faith and reason. Programs that aim to offer a distillation of the insights that religious communities have obtained over the centuries for building up an authentic Christian culture on campus have provided important signposts for living the gospel in an academic context. In many of these endeavors, John Paul II initiated the modern conversation through the clarion call of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, asking for Catholic institutions to be clear and forthright in articulating the value of the tradition for intellectual life on their respective campuses.

Parallel to these developments, there has, unfortunately, also been something of a countervtrend on some campuses, where even some members of the sponsoring religious order state flatly that the institution is not Catholic, but rather Benedictine, Franciscan, and so on. It is hard to know quite what to say to this conception of the issue when one is first confronted with it. It would not seem to be a mark of “academic excellence” to suggest that Saint Ignatius Loyola,
Saint Francis, and Saint Dominic imagined that they were establishing religious communities independent of and hostile to the teaching office of the Church and to her collective theological wisdom. The proposition that a college or university is Jesuit or Franciscan, but does not have a Catholic identity, is untenable, both conceptually and historically. Such suggestions seem often to flow from a mistaken idea that in order to be “relevant” or taken seriously intellectually, institutions must doff their collective hats to the media’s often negative portrayal of Catholicism. Such schools often are eager to downplay their origins and to jettison any commitment to their founding charisms in the hopes of better positioning themselves in the marketplace. Fiduciary concerns are, after all, no small part of the challenges that Catholic educational institutions face today. For many religious communities there is also a long tradition of appealing over the local ordinary to the vicar general of their order in cases of controversy about liturgical practices and other norms. In some circles, this also lends credence to the idea that a particular religious congregation can and will call all of its own shots. In the final analysis, however, many of these institutions wind up reducing their “charisms” to a kind of unidimensional focus on social justice, which is in turn reduced to an emphasis on social service or service learning programs as the sole indicator of a vibrant Catholic ethos on campus. This seems a very limited compass for the ideals of the universal Church to shape the intellectual life of colleges and universities.

How do we account for this perspective in American Catholic higher education, among professed religious? The roots of this issue lie in the massive fall off of religious vocations starting in the late 1960s. The reality is that, in the wake of so many abandoning their vows and leaving monasteries and convents in scores in the late 1960s and early 1970s, there were many fewer hands on deck to carry on the life and labors of the community in a way that conformed to the recent past and the great sweep of monastic life over the many centuries of its existence. In the midst of a social revolution, those religious who stayed, were left – in both senses of the term “left.” That is, many who remained within their religious communities were
more deeply formed by liberal secular and political forces than by the
call of and pursuit of personal holiness and spiritual growth. The
fracturing of religious communities in terms of personnel, which
resulted in an erosion of spiritual capital, led many communities to
divide further into clusters of brothers and sisters deeply engaged in
niche ministries, often without common worship, residency, or cause.
This pattern tends to break down the idea that there should be
universal gospel ideals that we all strive in common to incarnate in
society, reinforcing instead the idea that we are independent agents in
the work of bringing Christ to the world. The unfortunate reality is
that in many cases the outcome has not been the engagement with
the world called for by the Second Vatican Council, but full
emulation of it. Accompanying the emulation has been the loss of the
kind of distinctive identity and insight that could not be derived from
a wholly secular orientation to questions of financial and social
inequity. The whole issue recalls Christ’s admonition about the
uselessness of salt that has lost its savor. Clearly many of these
communities are downtrodden today.

However, the effort to connect Christian faith, even in an
atrophied way, to what we do in the world is right on target. It is
clear that the pursuit of “academic excellence” reduces too much of
the value of the Catholic intellectual tradition to a cerebral exercise.
No one comes to faith through reason alone, but by the actions of
both the mind and the heart reaching toward the “hope of things
unseen,” as the author of the Letter to the Hebrews gracefully st ates.
An exclusive focus on mission as the “pursuit of intellectual
excellence” makes the whole Catholic identity enterprise one of brain
first, foremost, and in toto. However essential intellectual acumen is
for establishing a level of quality for university life, it is not sufficient
in itself for the Catholic college or university – otherwise, all top-tier
research institutions could justly lay claim to the name, with perhaps
not a single Catholic or any Catholic community on the entire
campus. The heart of our students must also be engaged, in a call
from the heart of the Church to live out their faith in a fallen world.
Too often, a focus on “excellence” verges in the direction of a
rationalism that cannot witness to the risen Christ. Faith and reason, after all, while integrally connected, are not identical. All of this is to say that intellectual excellence, taken by itself, is not a moral virtue and not even a sure guide to fidelity. We must also stand firm in declaring that “intellectual excellence,” unaccompanied by at least a certain degree of virtue, ceases to be excellent, intellectually or otherwise. In the end, “excellence” is a value judgment that should be predicated upon how salutary or powerful ideas are to serve the greater good of humanity. When the sponsoring religious communities reduce the Catholic identity of their institution to social justice and social work, many are reacting to the kind of dry rationalism that is associated with setting brain power as the highest value of a Catholic college or university. Even conversations about how the identity of the sponsoring order supersedes concerns about Catholic identity, however, represent a part of the deepened dialogue about mission and charisms, which would be unthinkable in their centrality, without *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*.

In addition to focusing on questions of mission and identity in the abstract, many institutions have begun to consider how Catholic principles are or can be integrated into academic curricula. While this is a cause for hope in many respects, there is, however, still also a great cause for concern in the gap between aspiration and application. For example, a 2009 study on Catholic business schools in America revealed that, though most wished to have principles of Catholic social thought shape curriculum and instruction for their students, most of these programs rely on adjuncts – with little or no formation – to teach 70 percent or more of the business courses they offer. Many state that an on-boarding conversation with the president is sufficient for the purpose of orienting new faculty to Catholic ideals and principles, but concede that there is often little follow-up once someone is hired to teach business courses in their institution. The bright spot lies in the fact that these institutions wish to do a better job in this regard; it is up to us as Catholic scholars to lend support to Catholic higher education leaders who aim to have
Catholic principles better inform the curricula of our respective institutions.

If there is a single variable in the complicated equation that is American Catholic higher education that has changed dramatically since 1967, it is that presidents of such institutions seem to be very positive about how their institutions are integrating faith and reason on campus. One of the most helpful and thoroughgoing studies in this regard has been the doctoral research of Dr. James Ciardi, whose dissertation, completed in late 2011, is entitled "Ex Corde Ecclesiae and Catholic Higher Education in America." Dr. Ciardi’s research reveals that presidents of America’s Catholic institutions of higher education are very positive about Ex Corde and believe that their schools are making great strides, not only in implementing the general norms of the document, but also in meeting the ideals it sets forth in terms of facilitating a sustained dialogue between faith and reason. Dr. Ciardi conducted his research in two stages, providing a survey to a group of Catholic university and college presidents, and also to American theologians employed in such institutions, and then following up with personal interviews to gain greater depth of insight on the statistical data in the survey responses.

What is also clear from Dr. Ciardi’s research is that, while theologians are generally much less positive about either the general norms of Ex Corde Ecclesiae on the one hand, or how well its ideals are actually being realized on the other, on the whole, they do not report a loss of academic freedom associated with obtaining the mandatum or through engagement with the local ordinary. In fact, many describe a situation in which they would like to have a better working relationship with their local bishop. The aim to have greater interaction between university theologians and the local bishop has been substantially hampered in many areas, because the time and attention of local ordinaries have been thoroughly occupied with administrative issues. Many bishops have had to focus almost exclusively on the closing of several parishes in some dioceses, a situation often resulting from the fallout of the sexual abuse scandals across the country. It turns out that the wages of sin are often, in fact,
worse than death. Nevertheless, it does not appear that the implementation of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* brought the stifling effect to the American Catholic academy that was predicted by many who wanted to hold to the Land O’ Lakes principle that there should be no authority external to the institution, lay or clerical, involved with standards for teaching and the conduct of its affairs. Ensuring that what is taught as Catholic theology is, in fact, consistent with Church teaching seems to be not only reasonable, fair, and honest, but also not unduly burdensome on American Catholic theologians, according to their own account at this stage.

*Hearts, Minds, and Assessment*

For those of us who have been following the story of American Catholic higher education in a post Land O’ Lakes era, one of the greater ironies has been the unbridled sway that accreditation processes and bodies have come to hold over American Catholic colleges and universities. For all of the concern about not being hobbled by the shackles of any authority external to the university itself, these institutions have not made a joint statement resisting the establishment of continuous assessment processes, quality enhancement plans, regular self-study, and the assessment cycles characteristic of accreditation commission reviews. That these endeavors, salutary as they are in many respects, are often driven by a culture of fixation on the measurable and repeatable, which stands in some tension with the Catholic intellectual tradition’s focus on the good, the true, and the beautiful – whether they can be measured and repeated or not – seems a great puzzle unto itself.

Perhaps it is time that institutions of Catholic higher education set a new set of rubrics for themselves and attempt to fold candid and focused questions about their own Catholicity into their assessment processes. It would be fascinating to see what would be revealed from the collection of data on how many believing Christian students find their faith is stronger or weaker after four or six years of study on the average Catholic campus in America. Atheists,
Protestants, agnostics could all be surveyed and interviewed — the issue would not be Catholic proselytism, but measuring whether the engagement in theological and philosophical questions is substantial and serious enough that students feel they can, and are actually able to, better articulate the “grounds of their belief,” as Newman would say, at the end of the process than they were at the start of it. Perhaps focus group studies could help identify the forces and moments when students who lose their faith do so, in order that we could do a better job of letting the splendor of truth and the light of the gospel shine forth in campus curricula and culture.

These are among the many things that Catholic colleges and universities could undertake, in an American setting, to try to ensure that their hearts are beating in unison with the teaching office of the Church for the building up of an authentically Catholic culture in American higher education. It would be a great irony if all our pursuit of intellectual excellence resulted in our having, on the last day, to confess that we spent all of our time and energies on things that God has not “hidden from the wise” (Matt 11:25). Let us all hope — and work — for the building up of those values in the academy that may appear as mere foolishness to the world. Let us find our excellence in virtue, as we aim to shape students’ character, and call for all of our colleagues to be honest, respectful, gracious, and deeply concerned for the good and well-being of one another individually and corporately. This is the call from the heart of the Church that comes forth from the sacred heart of Christ himself, the Logos of God and the fount of true wisdom and excellence.

Mark Newcomb is headmaster at St. Theresa Catholic School in Sugar Land, Texas.

1 Newman himself discloses that many of his works flowed from his emotions. It is also apparent that he often felt hurt or surprised by things he read of himself in print, and the force of his feelings guided his pen as he replied to his detractors. See, for example, John Henry Newman,
2 IFCU web site, accessed June 8, 2015:


4 Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, 4.

5 See Gallin, American Catholic Higher Education, 7-12, for the full text of the Land O’Lakes statement.


7 Land O’ Lakes statement, #1, in Gallin, American Catholic Higher Education, 7.

8 Land O’ Lakes statement, #2, in Gallin, American Catholic Higher Education, 8.

9 Land O’ Lakes statement, #1, in Gallin, American Catholic Higher Education, 7.

10 Gallin, American Catholic Higher Education, 15-16.

11 For the full text of the Congress’s statement, see ibid., 13-15.

12 Ibid., 13.

13 Ibid., 14.

14 Ibid., 17-20, 34-35, 396.

15 Ibid., 37-55.

16 Ibid., 60.

17 Ibid., 131.


19 Ibid., 334.


21 See, for example, Marcus Lee Hansen, *The Problem of the Third Generation Immigrant* (Rock Island, Ill.: Augustana Historical Society, 1938).

22 *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, 1.

23 *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, 4.

24 *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, 4.


26 See Gallin, *American Catholic Higher Education*, 7-12, for the full text of the Land O’Lakes statement.


31 James Ciardi, “*Ex Corde Ecclesiae* and Catholic Higher Education in America” (doctoral diss., University of Nebraska, Lincoln, 2011).

32 Ibid., 42-47.

33 Ibid., 109-10.
Ex Corde Ecclesiae
and the Family

Rose Mary Hayden Lemmons
University of St. Thomas, Minnesota

This paper argues that application of the principles of Ex Corde Ecclesiae require the Catholic institution of higher education to develop not only pro-family policies but also a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary program of family studies. Let’s focus on pro-family policies before turning to family studies. Family studies will be discussed in three parts dealing with the necessity of offering a baccalaureate degree, the requirements for an effective major, and finally the construction of that major.

I

Ex Corde Ecclesiae and Pro-Family Policies. Ex Corde Ecclesiae requires institutions of higher learning to assist “each of [their] members to achieve wholeness as human persons.” This means that higher learning institutions need policies that enable their members to have a robust family life. Institutions should thus periodically review their policies regulating students, professors, administrators, and staff to see if their policies are sufficiently pro-family. Are family leave policies sufficiently generous so as to encourage university members to care for their families? Are women professors welcomed into the university’s community life and given opportunities to advance without having to sacrifice their motherhood on the altars of academia? In particular, do women professors have a way to take off the semester in which they give birth, without losing income? Are tenure requirements sufficiently flexible so as to avoid penalizing those utilizing maternity and family leaves? Are classes scheduled in ways that don’t unduly compromise family life? Are women
professors hired in sufficient numbers to advance the university’s search for truth? After all, as Saint John Paul II explains, women tend to be person-centered and interested in figuring out how to advance the welfare of others. Women can thereby help facilitate a humane working environment, while women professors can help to ensure that every discipline advances the cause of humanity. For knowledge is incomplete when not yet person-centered. Women professors can thus help to ensure that fields of study are sufficiently robust; for, as Saint John Paul II reminds us in Mulieris dignitatem, 6, “The Bible convinces us of the fact that one can have no adequate hermeneutic of man, or of what is ‘human,’ without appropriate reference to what is ‘feminine.’” Other important pro-family policies include providing tuition remission for all employees and being sure that students with families are receiving the support they need.

The development of such policies helps the Catholic university to pursue “its objectives through its formation of an authentic human community animated by the spirit of Christ.” Such communities can then be, as put by Ex Corde Ecclesiae, 49, “living institutional witness[es] to Christ and his message.”

II

Ex Corde Ecclesiae and the Need for the Baccalaureate Degree in Family Studies. Offering an interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary program of family studies is an important way the Catholic university can support its Christian witness. For the family needs to be better understood in order to propose effective remedies for the three crises currently confronting the family, especially in the United States. The first of these is that fewer families are being formed through publically exchanging vows committing to a life-long marriage. Not only are those who never attend college increasingly unlikely to marry, but those who do attend college are also less likely to prepare for careers able to sustain a family. Temporary, “ad hoc” families are on the rise. The second crisis is that divorce continues to disintegrate families. And the third crisis is that the baby boomers (America’s
second largest demographic) are on the verge of becoming frail and in need of care from their extended families.

These crises do not hit every family. Hence, more study of the strengths and the weaknesses of families will enable the Catholic university better to fulfill its duty to assist “each of its members to achieve wholeness as human persons,” as put by *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* in section 21.

Family studies can also help the Catholic university to achieve what *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, 4 identifies as its core mission, namely, freely to search “for the whole truth about nature, man and God.” I argue that this truth requires understanding nature, man, and God in relation to the family. Let us begin with the family in relation to God, and then discuss the family in relation to the person.

(A) *Family and the Truth about God.* According to Saint Paul, Saint John Paul II, and Pope Francis, the family helps one understand God. Saint Paul points out in Ephesians 5:21-33 that the relationship of husband and wife images the spousal love characteristic of Christ and his Church. Saint John Paul II adds that spousal love also illuminates the inner relationships of the Triune God. Pope Francis characterizes the Church as a mother exercising merciful love. The family is so important to understanding God that, as Mary Eberstadt argues, dysfunctional or fractured families make Christianity confusing.

The profundity of using love within the family as the image of God is so deep and wonderful that further discussion of the theology of the family is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, I cannot help but note that there is a great need for all Christians – including the clergy – to understand their own vocations, not only as exemplifying a way to participate in the universal family of God but also as a deeper participation – particularly through prayer and the Eucharist – in their own families of origin. The importance of understanding the family in theological terms shows that family studies has an important role in enabling the Catholic university to fulfill its mission to make the truth about God better known.
(B) *Family and the Truth about Persons.* The family contributes to understanding “the whole truth about nature [and] man.” This contribution can be understood in terms of spirituality, self-realization, caring social units, and builders of the humane cultures.

(1) *Spirituality.* The first contribution is the role played by the family in sharing the faith and developing the spirituality of its members. Indeed, Mary Eberstadt in her groundbreaking book *How the West Really Lost God* argues that the West lost God when it stopped having children. For there’s nothing like a child to inspire church attendance. In this respect, the family as an institution can be identified as the domestic church that brings children as well as adults into a deeper awareness of God’s love and enables them to model that love. Without this connection to God’s love, human beings cannot consistently love authentically. Saint John Paul II explains why:

> It is not easy to love with a deep love, which lies in the authentic gift of self. This love can only be learned by penetrating the mystery of God’s love. Looking at him, being one with his fatherly heart, we are able to look with new eyes at our brothers and sisters, with an attitude of unselfishness and solidarity, of generosity and forgiveness. All this is mercy. . . . Reestablishing the relationship of each person with God also creates new relations of fraternal solidarity among human beings.9

In other words, life is hard, and humans need to look to God in order to be able to achieve the serenity of self-giving love and the joy of solidarity.

Perhaps this is the greatest contribution that a Catholic university can make to individuals and to the emerging field of family studies, namely, showing how understanding God’s love is relevant for living to the fullest. For the denial of that relevance is the temptation of the new millennium.10 Yet, yielding to that temptation, according to Saint
John Paul II, leaves man living “in fear of the future, of emptiness, of suffering, of annihilation.”

(2) **Self-Realization.** The second contribution the family makes to understanding the whole truth about the person is through its indispensable role in the moral development and self-realization of its members. It is within the family that children first learn the importance of being helpful rather than hurtful. In the words of Saint John Paul II:

The family is the first and fundamental school of social living: as a community of love, it finds in self-giving the law that guides it and makes it grow. The self-giving that inspires the love of husband and wife for each other is the model and norm for the self-giving that is practiced in the relationships between brothers and sisters and the different generations living together in the family.

Family life, moreover, teaches that disagreements and other differences ought not to impair loving: love is kind, patient, and undaunted by difficulties. Self-giving love can thus heal the wounds of selfishness through the regenerative abilities of the sacraments of forgiveness and reconciliation, which, as put by Saint John Paul II, “always ensures the spiritual energy to begin anew.”

Exercising self-giving love within the reciprocity and joy of family relationships, whether within the nuclear or the extended family, is the antidote to loneliness. As Pope Francis has said, “Authentic love is capable of taking loneliness away.” He further cites the passage in Genesis 2:18, about God creating a helper for Adam, and explains that family life brings real joy:

These words [of Genesis 2:18] show that nothing makes man’s heart as happy as another heart like his own, a heart which loves him and takes away his sense of being alone. These words also show that God did not create us to live in sorrow or to be alone. He made men and women for happiness, to share their journey with someone who
complements them, to live the wondrous experience of love: to love and to be loved, and to see their love bear fruit in children. . . . This is God’s dream for his beloved creation: to see it fulfilled in the loving union between a man and a woman, rejoicing in their shared journey, fruitful in their mutual gift of self.\textsuperscript{15}

For those living apart from their nuclear or extended families, Saint John Paul II reminds us in \textit{Familiaris consortio}, 85, “No one is without a family in this world: the Church is a home and family for everyone, especially those who ‘labor and are heavy laden’.”\textsuperscript{16} Although researchers in family studies need to investigate how all can best encounter the Church as their ecclesial family, family life remains the typical vector of personal development and vocational fulfillment.\textsuperscript{17}

Families are able to be this vector for fulfilling one’s vocation; for, since human beings are created in the image of God, who is love poured out in the Incarnation, the vocation of each is to pour out one’s life in love – and thereby to reciprocate God’s love as does the Blessed Mother and the Church.\textsuperscript{18} As Mother Teresa of Calcutta put it, we are made to love and be loved.\textsuperscript{19}

As the vector of love, the family is also the vector for developing moral consciousness and becoming virtuous. That families make possible self-realization through unions of reciprocated self-giving love is an indispensable contribution that Catholicism can make, both to understanding the person and to family studies, inasmuch as it explains the importance of families for love and happiness. This contribution becomes only richer when students of family life figure out how to strengthen families, including the ecclesial family.

\textbf{(3) Family as a Caring Social Unit.} The third contribution that the family makes to understanding the whole truth about the person arises from its identity as the social unit best able to deliver personalized attention and care. This ability arises when families are built by other-centered spousal love and the mutual commitment to be caring and lovingly kind at all times and places.\textsuperscript{20} As Pope Francis explains:
[The marriage promise] involves a commitment [on the part of the couple] to welcome and educate their children; but it is fulfilled also in taking care of elderly parents, in protecting and caring for the weaker members of the family, in helping one another to achieve the full potential and accept the limits of each.21

By stressing that the marital vow extends beyond the couple to children and extended family, Pope Francis joins Saint John Paul II in stressing that families provide invaluable opportunities for loving and being loved.

Programs of family studies delving into the conditions of how love is shown and sustained within families could do much to stabilize families and advance the care of vulnerable members.22 In addition, family studies research into the areas of law and medical insurance could help determine better ways to support families in the care of both the elderly and vulnerable children who are over the age of 18, as such care faces many obstacles under current HIPAA regulations.

The vulnerable need their families, and the healthy family best cares for the vulnerable and the needy. Impersonal and bureaucratic aid to the needy are ineffective, violate the principle of subsidiarity, and are insufficiently humane.23 Justice needs friendship, otherwise the goodwill necessary for justice cannot endure.24 This means that as the United States faces up to the growing frailty of the baby boomers, as well as to the vulnerabilities of children, it needs to deliver social services in ways that foster family life – especially within extended families25 – and build community for those without a healthy and helpful family of origin. Saint John Paul II wrote:

Consequently, faced with a society that is running the risk of becoming more and more depersonalized and standardized and therefore inhuman and dehumanizing, with the negative results of many forms of escapism – such as alcoholism, drugs and even terrorism – the family
possesses and continues still to release formidable energies capable of taking man out of his anonymity, keeping him conscious of his personal dignity, enriching him with deep humanity and actively placing him, in his uniqueness and unrepeatability, within the fabric of society.\textsuperscript{26}

It is thus the personalized attention and care within families that is crucial for enabling individuals to know their dignity as persons and to treasure it. This crucial point needs to be emphasized within the Catholic university in order to meet \textit{Ex Corde Ecclesiae}'s requirement of making the truth about the person known.

\textit{(4) Family as a Social Unit Building the Civilization of Love.} The fourth contribution the family makes to the truth about persons is through its invaluable role in building the civilization of love. This social role has several interacting elements, including the procreative, the economic, and the cultural.

The procreative aspect of family life impacts both the economic and the cultural elements of civilization. Families fuel the consumer economy, from cribs to cell phones. And the changing needs of growing children challenge businesses of all kinds to adapt creatively to those needs. Knowledge of the human person thus cannot be complete apart from the context of family. Nor is any economic decision wise when made in ignorance of its impact on families.

Another way in which family interacts with the economy and culture is through family businesses. Family businesses are important not only economically but also culturally. This is especially the case when the family business is faith-based and used as a way for inculcating religious values among family members, while also witnessing to those values in a secular age – as recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in \textit{Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores} (the 2014 decision placing such family businesses under the protection of the First Amendment).\textsuperscript{27} The study of family businesses is thus necessary in order for a Catholic institution of higher education to promote the full truth about human beings.
History and political philosophy show that the values inculcated by families are influenced by political assumptions and values. Professor Scott Yenor, for instance, in his brilliant book *Family Politics*, argues that John Locke’s political philosophy was instrumental in recasting families as constructed by a social contract rather than by the betrothed love of spouses. Widespread acceptance of this view has led to a serious loss of insight into the family’s procreative character as well as its multigenerational character. It has also diminished the ability of the family to teach the self-giving that is necessary for successful unions of love.

There is now a great need for undergraduates to study the philosophies and theologies of love explicated by key Catholic philosophers and theologians, especially Saint Thomas Aquinas and Saint John Paul II. John Paul II, in particular, stresses that loving families affirm every member, and that affirmation helps build the civilization of love:

The very experience of communion and sharing that should characterize the family’s daily life represents its first and fundamental contribution to society. The relationships between the members of the family community are inspired and guided by the law of ‘free giving.’ By respecting and fostering personal dignity in each and every one as the only basis for value, this free giving takes the form of heartfelt acceptance, encounter and dialogue, disinterested availability, generous service and deep solidarity. Thus the fostering of authentic and mature communion between persons within the family is the first and irreplaceable school of social life, and example and stimulus for the broader community relationships marked by respect, justice, dialogue and love.

He continues:

The family is thus, . . . the place of origin and the most effective means for humanizing and personalizing society:
it makes an original contribution in depth to building up the world, by making possible a life that is properly speaking human, in particular by guarding and transmitting virtues and “values.” As the Second Vatican Council \[Gaudium et Spes 52\] states, in the family “the various generations come together and help one another to grow wiser and to harmonize personal rights with the other requirements of social living.”32

These invaluable social roles played by families in the building of civilizations require them to reach out in solidarity to other families so that they can render mutual assistance, especially in the education of their children.33 Studies in interfamily communications would thus not only help families flourish (and thereby help individuals flourish) but also contribute to the whole truth about persons.

Consequently, by making known the truth about the family’s social roles, family studies advances the mission of Catholic universities as specified by \textit{Ex Corde Ecclesiae}.

\section*{III}

\textit{Requirements for an Effective Major in Family Studies.} Accomplishing the goal of promoting the truth about the human person requires the Catholic university to research and then educate undergraduates about the various fields involved in the well-being of the family. \textit{Ex Corde Ecclesiae}, 15 sets out four requirements that family studies – or any field of study – must meet in order to be fruitful: namely, “an integration of knowledge, a dialogue between faith and reason, an ethical concern, and a theological perspective.”34 These elements enable knowledge to be related to “the very meaning of the human person.”35 It is the person who gives meaning to knowledge.36 It is the person who is fulfilled through self-giving love. This means that “Love . . . is not a utopia: it is given to mankind as a task to be carried out with the help of divine grace.”37 The importance of love underwrites the importance of families.38
Given the importance of family life to the exercise of self-giving love and the importance of self-giving love to living a meaningful life, Catholic universities need to educate students about the importance and nature of family life. Saint John Paul II identifies the key lesson to be taught in his *Letter to Families* in this way:

In God’s plan the family is in many ways the first school of how to be human. Be human! . . . The God who gave humanity the fourth commandment is ‘benevolent’ towards man. . . . The Creator of the universe is the God of love and of life: He wants man to have life and have it abundantly, as Christ proclaims (cf. Jn 10:10).

By emphasizing the family as the school of humanity, effective programs of family studies will discuss the indispensable roles that families play in making God better understood, in developing a person’s spirituality and self-realization, in functioning as the basic social unit most responsible for the delivery of social services and humanizing civilization. These discussions require studying not only families in crisis but also those that are healthy and flourishing, from a variety of fields, especially theology, philosophy, psychology, sociology, political science, history, business, social work, the health sciences, and communications.

IV

*Construction of a Major in Family Studies.* Family studies consists of many interacting disciplines, as shown by the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Studies: Analyzing the Family, Helpful Disciplines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengths and Weaknesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Roles and Societal Impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of the Family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship to God and Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essential Nature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This table illustrates that the family can be analyzed from a variety of disciplines. As such, it sketches how various fields can make invaluable contributions to fulfilling *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*’s prescription of pursuing the whole truth about the person by studying the family. The range of these contributing fields means that the major can be tailored to the interests and strengths of individual students and their professors.

The table also illustrates the need for family studies to be both an interdisciplinary and a multidisciplinary program. I envision the social sciences, with their emphasis on empirical research, to make interdisciplinary contributions, while theology, philosophy, and Catholic studies make multidisciplinary contributions. The interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary aspects of family studies mean that designing family studies as a baccalaureate liberal arts degree is compatible with designing it as a preprofessional degree.

As a liberal arts degree, the major helps graduates achieve the goal identified by *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* as “wholeness as human persons.”40 The degree also enriches a graduate’s contributions to any job connected with families, from teaching and public health to ministry. In addition, those who major in family studies are prepared to go on to graduate studies in many fields.

With this preprofessional degree, the family studies major is ready to earn professional certifications such as Child Life Specialist or Family Life Educator. Professional certification as a Child Life Specialist is earned through the Child Life Council, which posts certification requirements at its website.41 Professional certification as a Family Life Educator is earned through the National Council on Family Relations, which also posts certification requirements at its website.42 These websites are worth studying, as there are a variety of ways to be certified. This flexibility, moreover, makes it possible for Catholic universities to develop preprofessional programs of family studies in accord with *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*.

Family studies is an emerging field, especially for Christian colleges and universities. At present, not many Christian institutions
of higher learning offer this major. At the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota, where I teach, family studies was approved as a major in 2013, largely owing to student demand. The number of students who had been designing individualized majors in family studies had become so great that formalizing the major made sense. Student interest began growing around 1996, with the establishment of a vibrant minor in family studies through the efforts of seven professors from the Departments of Communications, Family Business, Health and Human Performance, Psychology, Social Work, Sociology, and Theology. As of the fall of 2015, there were about 54 majors and 27 minors in family studies at the University of St. Thomas. I expect these numbers will continue to increase as the crises of families continue to motivate students to figure out what is necessary to build healthy relationships and successful families.

While details about the family studies major at the University of St. Thomas can be garnered from its webpage, the overall design of the major is intended to maximize its interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary character. Majors must take no more than three courses from a single discipline, while minors are limited to two. As an interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary program, family studies is not a department and relies on the interests and talents of professors from across the university to develop and teach suitable courses of interest to students. Indeed, the major grew out of this interest and continues to rely on it. As a result, family studies is a field that stays close to the concerns of undergraduates as they consider their futures.

Because of its contributions to the whole truth about the person, family studies is a necessary field of study for Catholic institutions of higher learning to fulfill the requirements specified in *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*.

**Conclusion.** The principles of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* require the Catholic university to enact policies supportive of family life and to
take up the challenges of understanding the totality of the human person and God by offering an undergraduate major in family studies. Now is the right time to do so as families are in crisis. As Pope Francis said, “Catholic academic institutions cannot isolate themselves from the world, they must know how to enter bravely into the aeropagus of current culture and open dialogue, conscious of the gift that they can offer to everyone.”

This gift of the truth about the self-giving character of love can and will remake the world; for it is the loved modeled by Christ, the one who makes all things new (2 Cor 5:17; Rev 21:5).

Rose Mary Hayden Lemmons is associate professor of philosophy and also affiliated with the family studies program and Catholic Studies at the University of St. Thomas, Minnesota.

1 *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, 21.


3 *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, 21.


Rose Mary Hayden Lemmons


8 John Paul II argues that none is without a family because all belong to the family of God. Pope Francis argues that we ought not try to live without love. Pope Francis: “The family is the fundamental locus of the covenant between the Church and God’s creation, with that creation which God blessed on the last day with a family. Without the family, not even the Church would exist. Nor could she be what she is called to be, namely ‘a sign and instrument of communion with God and of the unity of the entire human race’ (Lumen Gentium, 1). . . . A pastor . . . will enable his brothers and sisters to hear and experience God’s promise, which can expand their experience of motherhood and fatherhood within the horizon of a new ‘familiarity’ with God (Mk 3:31-35). . . . By our own humble Christian apprenticeship in the familial virtues of God’s people, we will become more and more like fathers and mothers (as did Saint Paul: cf. 1 Th 2:7,11), and less like people who have simply learned to live without a family. Lack of contact with families makes us people who learn to live without a family, and this is not good. Our ideal is not to live without love! A good pastor renounces the love of a family precisely in order to focus all his energies, and the grace of his particular vocation, on the evangelical blessing of the love of men and women who carry forward God’s plan of creation, beginning with those who are lost, abandoned, wounded, broken, downtrodden and deprived of their dignity.” Address of the Holy Father while meeting with bishops taking part in the World Meeting of Families, St. Charles Borromeo Seminary, Philadelphia (September 27, 2015). Available at http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2015/september/documents/papa-francesco_20150927_usa-vescovi-festa-famiglie.html.
Ex Corde Ecclesiae and the Family


11 Ibid., 3.


13 Ibid., 14.


15 Ibid.

16 Familiaris consortio, 85.

17 There are three vocations: marriage, virginity, celibacy (Familiaris consortio, 11).

18 Familiaris consortio, 11: “God is love. . . . Creating the human race in His own image and continually keeping it in being, God inscribed in the humanity of man and woman the vocation, and the thus capacity and responsibility, of love and communion. Love is therefore the fundamental and innate vocation of every human being.”


20 John Paul II argues this case in Love and Responsibility.

Carol Bruess and Anna D. H. Kudak argue, for instance, that little rituals help families sustain love; see their *What Happy Couples Do* (Minneapolis: Fairview Press, 2008) and *What Happy Parents Do* (Minneapolis: Fairview Press, 2009).

*Centesimus annus*, 48: “Malfunctions and defects in the Social Assistance State are the result of an inadequate understanding of the tasks proper to the State. Here again the principle of subsidiarity must be respected: a community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving it of its functions, but should rather support it in case of need and help to coordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good. By intervening directly and depriving the society of its responsibility, the Social Assistance State leads to a loss of human energies and an inordinate increase of public agencies, which are dominated more by bureaucratic ways of thinking than by concern for serving their clients, and which are accompanied by an enormous increase in spending. In fact, it would appear that needs are best understood and satisfied by people who are closest to them and who act as neighbors to those in need. It should be added that certain kinds of demands often call for a response which is not simply material but which is capable of perceiving the deeper human need.” Available at: [http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus.html](http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus.html).


*Letter to Families*, 10: “the times in which we are living tend to restrict family units to two generations. . . . Families today have too little ‘human’ life. There is a shortage of people with whom to create and share the common good; and yet that good, by its nature, demands to be created and shared with others. . . . The more common the good, the more properly one’s own it will also be: mine – your – ours.”

*Familiaris consortio*, 43.

For an analysis of the religious free exercise issues before the decision was rendered, see my “The Affordable Care Act and Religious Liberty: Principles of Adjudication,” in *The Affordable Care Act Decision: Philosophical and Legal Implications*, ed. Fritz Allhoff and Mark Hall (London: Routledge, 2014), 179-92.

29 *Letter to Families*, 11, par. 3: “The newborn child gives itself to its parents by the very fact of its coming into existence. Its existence is already a gift, the first gift of the Creator to the creature.” Par. 4: “In the newborn child is realized the common good of the family. Just as the common good of spouses is fulfilled in conjugal love, ever ready to give and receive new life, so too the common good of the family is fulfilled through that same spousal love, as embodied in the newborn child.”

30 For evidence that Saint Thomas Aquinas based his ethics on the love precepts (love God above all and neighbors as oneself) see *Summa theologica* I-II, q. 100, a. 3, ad 1. For explication see my “Aquinas as Teacher of Humanity: Lessons of Truth and Love,” in *Thomas Aquinas: Teacher of Humanity*, ed. John P. Hittinger and Daniel C. Wagner (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publications, 2015), 360-79. For justifying arguments, see my “Are the Love Precepts Really Natural Law’s Primary Precepts?” *American Catholic Philosophical Association Proceedings* 66 (1992): 45-71. For a much fuller treatment of how love transforms natural law, see my *Ultimate Normative Foundations*. Saint John Paul II based ethics on the personalistic norm (“a person is an entity of a sort to which the only proper and adequate way to relate is love”; *Love and Responsibility*, 41). For arguments that Saint John Paul II made invaluable contributions to Aquinas’s natural law of love, see *Ultimate Normative Foundations*, 329.

31 *Familiaris consortio*, 43.

32 Ibid., 43.

33 *Letter to Families*, 16: “It is important that families attempt to build bonds of solidarity among themselves. This allows them to assist each other in the educational enterprise: parents are educated by other parents, and children by other children.”

34 See *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, 20, which argues that interdisciplinary studies ought to examine moral implications as “an integral part of the teaching of that discipline.”

35 *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, 7.

36 Saint John Paul II: “What is at stake is the very meaning of scientific and technological research, of social life and of culture . . . the very meaning of the human person” (“Allocution to the International Congress on Catholic Universities, 25 April 1989,” *AAS* 18, no. 3 [1989]: 1218 n. 10).
37 Letter to Families, 15, par. 11.

38 Letter to Families, 15, par. 12: “The family is an expression and source of this love.”

39 Letter to Families, 15, par. 9.

40 Ex Corde Ecclesiae, 21.

41 www.childlife.org.

42 www.ncfr.org/cfle-certification.

43 See http://www.stthomas.edu/familystudies/default.html. For a graduate program in family studies as part of their Family Life Ministry, see Concordia University, Nebraska: http://online.cuw.edu/online-degrees/masters-of-science-in-education-family-life.

The Complementarity of Woman and Man and the Mission of the Catholic University

Deborah Savage
University of St. Thomas, Minnesota

The proposal on offer in this paper — a particular account of the nature of woman and man, what constitutes both their equality and their difference, and the implications for the mission of the Catholic university — is accompanied by a very real, even profound, sense of urgency. Whatever your scholarly opinion of the theory that follows, above all I hope to persuade you that the concern at its heart is one that implicates us all. This paper is not just another wrinkle in feminist theory, nor is it merely a response to the “woman question.” I will argue that it must, in the end, propel us – at a minimum – toward a shift in viewpoint — or perhaps even some sort of action. I say this for two reasons.

First, *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* states unequivocally that the Catholic university as a whole is to engage in research devoted to the study of serious contemporary problems in order to become “an ever more effective instrument of cultural progress.”¹ Indeed, theology’s specific role in the intellectual life of the university is to find ways to “shed light on specific questions raised by contemporary culture.”² Perhaps we can all agree that it would be difficult to imagine a question more pressing than that of gender and its meaning. One would have to have been living on another planet over the last several decades to be unaware of the profound confusion that currently exists with regard to the nature of man and of woman. Even perennial questions such as those that will concern us in this paper have been swept aside by the relentless onslaught of the gay agenda and emerging convictions about what constitutes sexual identity. After all, what sort of coherent
discussion can one have about such a topic in the midst of surreal disputes concerning the proper pronoun to use when referring to oneself or to another person? Someone who, only yesterday it seems, could only be either he or she, the only two options available. Or so we thought – naïve realists that we are. Surely anyone who cares about the trajectory of contemporary culture will be concerned by these developments.

But if it is in fact “the honor and responsibility of a Catholic University to consecrate itself without reserve to the cause of truth” then, above all, its faculty and its administrators simply must have an abiding interest in the truth about the human person, in particular. Without this, the Catholic vision of the moral life, of culture, and of man’s final end have no meaning and no way to gain a foothold in the current situation. The Church’s hope in the new evangelization makes it even more imperative that we fully articulate and affirm such a reality.

And this brings me to a second reason I would argue that my topic has a certain urgency; though perhaps a little less obvious, it speaks directly to the responsibility that universities have in shaping civilizations and cultures. I spent the first half of my working life in the business sector. And when I finally entered the hallowed realms of academia and began a serious investigation of our intellectual heritage, it came as a bit of surprise to me to learn that, because of the particular place it occupies and has occupied in the life of man, especially since the thirteenth century, the university and those who teach in it, are – and have been – in fact – running the world, even if from behind the curtain. Ideas most certainly do have consequences, and responsibility for the state of affairs that characterizes contemporary culture must be laid in large part at the feet of the academy, philosophy in particular. As Alistair MacIntyre states in his recent publication God, Philosophy, Universities, philosophy is not just a matter of propositions affirmed or denied or of arguments advanced and critically evaluated, but of what takes hold in the social, cultural, and institutional milieu that counts as its dialogue partners – and, he
argues, it is above all the university that has shaped our common philosophical conversation.5

Thus I would like to submit that the university has been both the source and the cause of much of the confusion that characterizes our culture because – at least since 1650 – it has been complicit in the dissemination of ideas that are at best flawed, at worst, quite definitively toxic. Despite the valiant efforts of those involved in the neo-Thomist revival, sparked by Leo XIII’s encyclical *Aeterni patris* in 1879 and then neutralized around the time of the Second Vatican Council, generations have now absorbed the philosophical errors not only of the usual suspects – Bacon, Descartes, Hume, Kant – but also their more contemporary variants: Nietzsche, Hegel, Marx, Sartre, Derrida, Lyotard, and, skipping ahead to the present, the shockingly clear Peter Singer. Western culture has been under constant assault by philosophical movements that have led to this moment: a time when rational argument from self-evident first principles can actually be declared hate speech.4 And an intellectual climate in which the suggestion that it might be a legitimate research question to investigate the possibility that men and women are not only equal but also different reveals that one is at best an “essentialist,” someone who, unaccountably remains convinced that human beings (and other creatures) have natures. Such a scholar is nothing more than a closet misogynist intent on returning women to a state in which their biology determines their future, a mere Neanderthal who has somehow infiltrated the bastions of the truly educated.

It seems to me that the Catholic university is not only uniquely responsible for mounting an adequate response to these issues – operating as it does *ex corde ecclesiae* – but is also uniquely positioned to do so. For there is no other institution on earth – other than the Church herself – more prepared to access the accumulated wisdom of centuries that is so desperately needed in our time. But here is the catch: it is going to take a very intentional, self-conscious collaborative effort of both men and women to get it done. And that is not going to be easy. For these same philosophical currents have shaped the intellectual commitments of women (and men) in
Deborah Savage

and my observation is that many of those women, whatever their discipline – are angry. And perhaps, it should be admitted, not without reason.

Now I don’t really blame Aristotle for arguing so long ago that women were malformed males. After all, he didn’t have much to go on, and he is otherwise a giant on whose shoulders we have all stood for millennia. And we are all fond of saying how unfortunate it is that his metaphysics was thrown out when his theory of the heavens was quite legitimately replaced by the theories of Copernicus and Galileo. With this I quite agree. But unfortunately the notion that women are mistakes and that the male of the species is somehow normative for the species has persisted in the Western philosophical tradition. And even though, to his everlasting credit, the Angelic Doctor, Saint Thomas Aquinas, did not fall completely into the trap laid for him by Aristotle and argued that women were surely necessary in creation and equal heirs to the life of grace, it must be admitted that his account of gender leaves some things unanswered. Most certainly, he does not fully account for the question at stake here, something I am absolutely certain he would want to correct if he were among us now.

But what must be acknowledged is that by the time women found a voice in any public sense, the sources they had to turn to – the only ones available at the time – were not Aristotle or Aquinas, but the philosophers of the day mentioned above. It didn’t help things that it really wasn’t until John Stuart Mill’s famous essay “The Subjection of Women” in 1869, that anyone in the modern era (any man that is) spoke out so formally and publicly against the generally accepted idea that woman should be subject to the dictates of her husband and/or father since, according to the social norms of the time, it was understood that women were both physically and mentally less able than men, and therefore needed to be “taken care of.” In England, it wasn’t until 1870 that married women were allowed to own property; in the U.S., it wasn’t until the passage of the nineteenth amendment in 1920 that women had the right to vote. Prior to that and, for all intents and purposes, for some time
afterward, women themselves were considered the property of their husbands. And of course, in some places in the world, they still are.

The point is that it really wasn’t until the mid-twentieth century that women began to find a path into the professional academic disciplines in any real way. And when those searching for a way to ground their own reflections on the meaning of womanhood looked around, what did they find? Clearly Aristotle wasn’t going to be much help. Saint Thomas Aquinas was not even in the running. And though Mill’s essay makes some very good points, he is a utilitarian and a dangerous candidate. Though a more thorough historical analysis would be beyond the scope and purpose of this paper, surely we can agree that the philosophical underpinnings of the women’s movement simply must be considered to have been corrupt from the start and, further, that not much has helped to change its trajectory. That is, until now.

I submit to you that there has never been an adequate and comprehensive anthropological account of the nature of woman in relation to man on offer in our tradition. Some would point to the work of Pope Saint John Paul II and his analysis in the *Theology of the Body*, but he doesn’t actually provide a fully developed theory. In fact, he says he has no intention of doing so; he is quite clear that is interest in that text is in the language of the body.9 The need remains for a theory adequately grounded in a realist metaphysics and an anthropological framework that affirms the humanity of both man and woman, accounts for their differences philosophically, theologically, and scientifically, and permits us to make a coherent claim regarding what constitutes their specific and distinct charisms.

I believe I have such a theory, grounded in both scripture and the metaphysical anthropology of Aquinas, that both builds on the starting place found in the work of Saint John Paul II and constitutes a legitimate development of his project, while advancing the Church’s commitment to a realist anthropology of the person.10 Though I will only be able to provide a sketch of the theory here, I hasten to add that this cannot remain at the level of mere speculation.
My argument is that if the academy has any hope of playing its proper role in insuring the authentic progress of human civilization, it is our response to this very question – of what constitutes the equality and the difference between men and women – that must be repaired and set right. It is a key point of leverage in our efforts to insure the future of the self-consciously Catholic university, as well as to evangelize our community and recover our culture. The university is not isolated from the confusion that has begun to seep into every aspect of contemporary life; in many ways, we are responsible for it. And for decades, it has affected the ability of the academic community to think and act together.

The significance of this proposal is stated unequivocally in *The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*. There the writers declare, echoing the words of Pope Saint John Paul II, that the relational “uni-duality” that characterizes the relationship between man and woman constitutes our mission, for “to this unity of the two God has entrusted not only the work of procreation and family life, but the creation of history itself.”11 That is, the unity that arises from the relationship of a man and a woman and the complementarity that it expresses is found not only in the marital act and our natural capacity to create life. Men and women do not just make families together, we make history together.

We ignore this mission at our own peril. For there may be no more critical locus of its expression than the Catholic university.

**Part One: The Nature of Woman in Relation to Man**

My account begins with the opening passages of Pope Saint John Paul II’s *Theology of the Body*. It is by now fairly common knowledge that his starting place in that body of work is the two creation accounts in Genesis; his interpretation of these passages is well documented. What has gone mostly unnoticed by scholars of his thought in this area is the significance of John Paul’s claim that the two creation accounts each reveal a different aspect of the nature of
man, known and knowable in both its objective and subjective aspects.

In the opening pages of the text, the Holy Father points to the two distinct creation accounts found in Genesis 1 and 2 as the place in scripture where we can derive the meaning of man, first as an objective reality created in the image of God and, second, as a concretely existing subject. It is this claim that provides the scaffolding for my investigation.

In the second general audience, the late Holy Father states that the “powerful metaphysical content” hidden in Genesis 1 has provided “an incontrovertible point of reference and a solid basis” for metaphysics, anthropology, and ethics and been a source of reflection throughout the ages for those “who have sought to understand ‘being’ and ‘existing.’”12 Genesis 1, he claims, refers to man in the abstract, that is, to man _per se_. But in Genesis 2 we find that the depth to be uncovered in this second (though historically earlier) creation account has a different character; it “is above all subjective in nature and thus in some way psychological.” Here we find man in the concrete, as a subject of self-understanding and consciousness; here the account of the creation of man refers to him “especially in the aspect of his subjectivity.”13

As is well known to those familiar with his body of work, these two categories, being and existence and personal subjectivity, are foundational to the thought of Saint John Paul II. Throughout his writings, the philosopher from Krakow frequently contrasts the philosophy of being and the philosophy of consciousness and attempts to reconcile and synthesize their claims. His own anthropology is an attempt at a creative completion of the Aristotelian-Thomistic account of man, which, he argues, though it provides the necessary “metaphysical terrain” in the dimension of being and paves the way for the realization of personal human subjectivity, leaves out an adequate investigation of lived human experience and thus lacks an essential component of what it means to be an actual living person.14 The thrust of his effort is to capture the meaning of human personhood in light of both the objective nature
of the person and his lived experience as the subject of his own acts.\textsuperscript{15} I have written about this elsewhere.\textsuperscript{16}

Let us set aside for the moment the question of whether or not this is an accurate criticism of Aristotelian-Thomistic anthropology. Of greater interest here is John Paul’s claim concerning the metaphysical meaning hidden in Genesis 1 and 2, something he does not fully exploit in the *Theology of the Body*.\textsuperscript{17} In what follows, I will show that it does seem like an eminently plausible claim. But I will demonstrate that it is only in looking at these texts through the lens provided by a fuller exposition of the metaphysical anthropology of Saint Thomas Aquinas that we uncover their profound, hidden meaning. I intend to show that, when thus considered, the two creation accounts illuminate the full truth about man, not only in the sense of man qua man, but also in terms of his personal subjectivity and the differentiation and complementarity of the sexes, and to the particular genius that could be said to characterize them.\textsuperscript{18} Since I have written about this extensively elsewhere, I provide a sketch of the theory below; I have attempted to highlight only its most essential components. I begin with a few general comments about these two accounts as stand-alone texts before looking at them together.

*Genesis 1:27–28*

I will take the two parts of this passage in turn, beginning with “God created *adam* in his own image, in the image of God he created him.” First of all, it is important to note that, though we have always thought of the main characters as Adam and Eve, only Eve is ever actually named – and even then, not until after the fall. They are referred to in the first account by the word *adam* (which comes from *adama*, or earth). Now, in the original Hebrew in which it was written, this word is understood to refer to humanity in the collective sense. Ancient Semitic thought would likely not have had the concept of a universal human nature, a term introduced by the Greeks.\textsuperscript{19} Nonetheless, the word *adam* is used rather frequently in the collective sense, that is, as a term that stands for the whole human race.
Importantly, it retains its connotations of personhood and concreteness even while standing for the whole human race rather than merely an individual. Thus, though ‘adam can be used to designate the individual man so called, and also another individual man, what is meant in a particular passage would be clear either from the context or from the use of the definite article with it: namely, if the reference is to bâ‘adam, it would refer back to some man already indicated from the context. But in Genesis 1:27, the “man” already indicated from the context is precisely the individual man who also stands for the collective: the word ‘adam mentioned in verse 26 is without the definite article and therefore can be said to indicate man as such. Thus, we can say that ‘adam is a reference to man per se, not to an individual or particular human being. A different word – ‘îsh – would have been used (and is used in the second creation account) if the intention had been to refer to the individual man or that particular man the tradition has come to refer to as Adam, the husband of Eve.

Now, when the Sacred Author states “male and female he created them,” in the original Hebrew zakar and nikevah do not actually mean male and female; they are not nouns, they are adjectives. Thus, assuming the first account is concerned with the creation of man per se, it follows that these adjectival terms can be said to describe man qua man, and we can conclude that, in the first creation account, it is man as such that is created “masculine” and “feminine.” That is, masculinity and femininity – or, more properly, the active and receptive principles that characterize the male and female of the human species (indeed creation as a whole) – are attributable to man as such; they are a feature of the species of man.

Since that which is in the effect must first be in the cause, there is a further step that must be taken to account for the complementarity that is attributable to man as such. What would be the source? It would have to be a property of the substantial form since it is the soul that determines the nature of the substance, the powers and potencies it possesses. Here it is necessary to derive and propose a new metaphysical principle. It can be said that the nature of the soul
is both active (understood as the masculine principle) and receptive (understood as the feminine principle). How so? Aquinas follows Aristotle in arguing that the soul is the first principle of life in a body potentially alive. But he states further that “the soul communicates that being in which it subsists to the corporeal matter, out of which and the intellectual soul there is exists one being.”22 In another manner of speaking, then, the soul subsists in the being of God, receives its existence and life from God; it is this existence and life that is communicated to the body. In that sense the soul is therefore also active in that it animates the body as its form and first principle of life. Thus we can say that the soul itself reflects both receptive and active principles that, when taken together, lend a potency for relationship, for giving and for receiving, to human nature as such. It is a further specification of a principle that is an established premise of the received tradition: Man as such is a reflection of the nature of the Triune God, a God who is in his nature a relationship of persons; it is man qua man who contains the principle of relationality in his very essence.

Let me make the implications of this analysis clear: if Genesis 1 is concerned with man per se, referred to as masculine and feminine or active and receptive, then both man and woman simply must be understood to be both instantiations of the same substantial form, both equally endowed with intellect, will, and freedom – absolutely equal.

*Genesis 2:22–24*

While the first account has established that man and woman are equal, in the second account we begin to see what differentiates them. Here we find a very different description of the creation of man and woman. At Genesis 2:22, Eve is *made or built* (bannah) out of one of the man’s ribs (tsela), and both God and the man are finally content that a proper helper has been found. Here the sacred author refers to man and woman as *‘ish and ishšāh*; these are references to individual and concretely existing persons.
Thus in the second creation account, designated matter and the principle of individuation have been introduced into the equation. Man and woman (the ‘ish and the ishshâh) of the second creation account are the result of particular matter (earth; rib) being introduced; the substantial form or soul that makes man what he is absolutely (Adam) illuminated in the first account has now found individuation and differentiation via the designated matter that the form animates in the second. The complementarity that characterizes the nature as such has now been embodied in two concretely existing beings, differentiated by two distinct but related kinds of matter. Here we have man in his subjectivity.

However, lest we turn ourselves into materialists, though matter appears to be the principle of differentiation, individually existing persons cannot be reduced to the matter of which they are made, for our essence is a composite substance made of body and soul. Forms can be actualized in different matter, as in a male or female body, and thus produce different instantiations of the same form, without thereby changing the form itself. Gender in Aquinas is a special sort of accident, an inseparable accident, inseparable from the form of the human species once this species is individualized. That is, sexual difference is an inseparable accident since sexuality is derived not from the genus but from the common essence – the common human nature that informs determinate matter. It is accidental, and yet inseparable since every instantiation of human nature is either male or female.23

That Aquinas does not consider gender attributable to matter alone is demonstrated more precisely in the second book of the Summa contra Gentiles.24 After treating a series of objections to the claim that the individuation of the human soul continues after death, Aquinas argues that each soul is “commensurated” to a particular individual body; that is, it is adapted to this body and not to that body. 25 It is this commensuration that remains in the soul even in its state of separation. 26 Every human person is a union of a particular soul with a particular body; it is one and the same substantial form,
shaped by or “commensurated to” the composite substance of which it is a part.  

In sum, on Aquinas’s account, gender is an inseparable or proper accident, accruing to man on account of matter but residing not in the matter but in the composite. It is a proper accident, that is, something that is predicated properly of the substance, inherent in and inseparable from the res concretely considered. To be a woman or a man is not an accident like having blue eyes or white skin. The type of accident that is constituted by being a man or a woman is one that is “inseparable from the form of the human species once this species in individualized.” Thus, though matter is one of the things that differentiates a particular woman from a particular man, since woman is composed of both body and soul, and since, according to the principle of commensuration, her particular soul is meant for her, each woman is in some essential way, a woman. Her womanness does not reside in me merely in the matter of which she is made – it is who she is, as John Paul II states, both physically and ontologically.

Men and women are equal, composite creatures, differentiated by the matter of which they are made, and by the ontological differences that characterizes them in virtue of the hylomorphic union of the soul and body. This is true of both man and woman. And thus we have from scripture (and this is the essential point) proof that neither the male nor the female of the species can be considered normative for the species.

So what? It means that women do not have to act like a man to be considered human. And men don’t have to act like women to be considered human. We have two equally human but differentiated ways of being in the world! Thus is the error of history corrected. And in light of the claim John Paul makes in the opening audiences of the Theology of the Body, we now can say he is right – Genesis 1 does appear to refer to man in the abstract and a careful analysis reveals that we are able to conclude that woman and man are instantiations of the same substantial form. Second, Genesis 2 clearly refers to man in his subjective reality and accounts for the way in which the
complementarity revealed in the first account manifests in two concretely existing human persons.

*Genesis 1 and 2 Considered Together*

Now that we have established the necessary foundations, we are ready to look at what we can discover by considering the two accounts together from a somewhat broader perspective. And the first point of interest begins in Genesis 1, where the sacred author seems to lay out the particular hierarchical order in which God clearly creates.\(^{29}\) God begins with the heaven and the earth, then light, he then divides the waters, then creates dry land, then vegetation, day and night. He goes on to create swarms of living creatures: birds, monsters, cattle, and things that creep. This all culminates in the creation of *adam*, human nature created masculine and feminine – or better, active and receptive. This is clearly a hierarchy that is on its way up, from lower life forms to higher.

This cosmic hierarchy is mirrored on a more personal plane in the second account. We read at 2:7 that a man (*hâ‘adam*, here referring to the male of the species) is fashioned from the dust of the earth.\(^{30}\) When, at Genesis 2:18, God sees that man is alone, God forms every creature and brings them to the man to be named. Then God, realizing that none of the creatures correspond to man’s own being, and that it is not good for him to be alone, decides it is necessary to make a fitting helper (*ezer kenegdo*) for him – then puts him into a deep sleep and forms the woman from the man’s rib. Adam says, “This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh,” and as John Paul II says, in Eve he recognizes another *person*, a being equal to himself, a someone, not a something – a someone he can love, to whom he can make of himself a gift and who can reciprocate in kind. Further, this passage reveals the unmistakable fact that *’îsh* does not appear until the creation of *isshâh*. In other words, Scripture reveals that there is no *’îsh without ishshâh*, no individually existing man without his complement, an individually existing woman.\(^{31}\)
But there are several additional and important points to glean from considering these two chapters together. First of all, it is only when we come to the making of woman that we see the final significance of the order introduced in the first account and brought to completion in the second. Man is made from the earth (adamā), but woman is made from man. Though it has troubled feminists forever – and is arguably at beginning point of the historical misinterpretation of this passage – the fact that woman is created second is not to make her subservient. Woman is not created “second”; she is created last. And she is, in fact, made on the way up – the last creature to appear, a creature made, not from earth, but from something that arguably already contains a greater actualization than dust or clay. Man is made from the earth; but woman is made from man. It is certainly plausible to suggest that she is made of “finer stuff.” And science certainly can tell from just a few DNA cells whether or not what they are looking at is a man or a woman. And women are said to be more sensitive, no? But at least minimally we can say that because of the order suggested by reading the accounts together, woman can be seen (indeed has been spoken of throughout the history of the tradition) as the pinnacle of creation, not as a creature whose place in that order is subservient or somehow less in stature than that of man.

This proposition is reinforced when we consider that the Hebrew word usually translated as “helper” is ezer and actually does not mean servant or slave.32 When this word is used elsewhere in scripture, it has the connotation of divine aid.33 Used here to express helper or partner, it is a word that indicates someone who is most definitely not a slave or even remotely subservient – there is the sense of an equal, a partner, help sent by God.34 Thus, woman is not built to be his servant – a different word would have been used if that were the intention – but someone who can help him to live.

However, it is immediately essential to note the full text: it is ‘ezer kenegdo; kenegdo is a preposition that means “in front of,” “in the sight of,” “before” (in the spatial sense). And so we must recognize that while Eve is not “below” Adam in the order of creation, neither is
she above him. She stands in front of him, before him, meeting his gaze as it were and sharing in the responsibility for the preservation of all that precedes them. After all, at Genesis 1:27, both male and female are given the command to subdue the earth and fill it.

The nature of woman in relation to man is finally clear: woman and man are equal, equally possessed of intellect, will and freedom. But they are also, in a sense, equal in their difference, because while both are composites of body and soul, they are each distinguished by the matter of which they are made. Both are characterized by a capacity for action and receptivity while placed face to face in the order of creation, but as complements of each other. Both equally responsible for filling the earth and subduing it, but somehow tasked with somewhat different missions and, as we shall see, a particular genius that belongs uniquely to them. For there is more to be grasped from the texts than this. We will consider now what we can discover about the nature of the masculine and feminine genius. And I begin with man because he is first in the order of creation.

Part Two: The Genius of Man and of Woman

The Genius of Man

First, it is notable that man is (apparently) in the Garden alone with God for some period before the appearance of woman, something that has important implications for the place he occupies in the created order and the traditional understanding of man as the head of the household. But aside from this special relationship with the Creator, it can be said that man’s first contact with reality is of a horizon that otherwise contains only lower creatures, what we might call “things” (res); this is what leads God to conclude that the man is incomplete and alone, and ultimately leads to the building of woman. Now man’s orientation toward things is clearly a part of God’s design. Man is tasked with naming all the things God brings him (including woman); it is in naming them that he takes dominion over them. He knows them in ways that woman simply does not. It is
man who, at Genesis 2:15, is put in the garden to “till it,” well before the fall puts him at odds with creation. This is his work. The fact that man’s initial horizon includes only “things” could be said to provide a point of departure in scripture for the well-documented evidence that men seem more naturally oriented toward things than toward persons.\(^3\) In fact, it has significance for the question of what might constitute the genius or charism of men.

But this orientation toward things does not mean that man is somehow disordered. Man’s first contact with reality includes the Lord God. He is, in the first instance, aware of his dependence upon his Creator, and he is truly marked by that relationship forever after. It is within this context that he encounters the woman. Until the woman is brought to him, both to name and to love as he can love no other, he has no “other” like himself. Though this will change after the fall, he knows immediately that the woman is not a thing, not an object; she is a person. Without hesitation he declares that she is “flesh of his flesh, and bone of his bones.” And, while he can and does name her, he cannot have dominion over her in the same way he has over everything else. She represents for him his highest good, the greatest gift God has given him and, as a consequence, the value of all the rest of creation is abrogated. From and through his encounter with the woman, the Lord God reveals to him the nature of the reciprocal relationship of the gift of self. And he must realize as well that his own gift – that of caring for and using the goods of creation – is a gift to be exercised in service to her authentic good and in the service of their mission to have dominion over all the earth.

Now this gift cannot be reduced to an obsession with toy trucks, hammers, and bottom lines. It manifests itself in the astonishing capacity of man to state with accuracy what can be predicated of something and what cannot. It has led to the development of entire bodies of knowledge including not only in philosophical investigations, but in law, government – even, as Anthony Esolen points out, in the statistical rubrics relied on in assessing the relative merits of particular baseball players.\(^3\)
In addition, the contemporary dissatisfaction with the tendency of man to attend to things more than to people completely overlooks the fact that the “things” of creation also have ontological status. They may be lower creatures, but they are creatures and, as such, are held in existence by God in much the same way that human persons are. The masculine inclination toward things and their uses is an aspect of the charism of men and, in many ways, it accounts for the building up of human civilization, has led throughout history to human flourishing, and has made and still makes possible the preservation of families and of culture. If it weren’t for men, we would all still be living in grass huts and exchanging milk for apples. Thus the proper response to the manifestation of the genius of men is not ridicule or resentment – but gratitude.

The Genius of Woman

In contrast and of special significance is the quite legitimate claim that, since Eve comes into existence after Adam, her first contact with reality is of a horizon that, from the beginning, includes Adam, that is, it includes persons. One can imagine Eve, a person also endowed with intellect and free will who, upon seeing Adam, would also recognize another like her, an equal, while the other creatures and things around her appear only on the periphery of her gaze. This exegetical insight seems to provide a starting place in scripture for the equally well documented phenomenon that women seem more naturally oriented toward persons.

In Mulieris dignitatem, John Paul argues that the feminine genius is grounded in the fact that all women have the capacity to be mothers—and that this capacity, whether fulfilled in a physical or spiritual sense, orients her toward the other, toward persons. I agree with that, and I have plenty of evidence to demonstrate it. And in every sense, Eve is certainly the mother of all humankind. But, my point is that in addition to her capacity to conceive and nurture human life, indeed prior to it, her place in the order of creation reveals that—
beginning – the horizon of all womankind includes persons, includes the other. And, as revealed at the foot of the cross, God has entrusted all of humanity to Mary’s – and therefore to woman’s – care. This may explain why girls and women seem to know – from the beginning – that they are meant for relationship. It takes men a bit longer to look up and realize they are lonely for something they only just realized was missing and to look for the one who can complete them.

The genius of woman is found here. While man’s first experience of his own existence is of loneliness, woman’s horizon is different, right from the start. From the first moment of her own reality, woman sees herself in relation to the other. The fall will result in a disorder in this inclination; Eve’s desire will now be for relationship with man, even when she knows he is using her as an object. But the preceding analysis has shown that this capacity – to include the other – is not a lesser quality. It is not something that only unnecessarily complicates things, diverting us from an otherwise clear line of sight to achieving results. Nor does it compromise woman’s fundamental intelligence, her competence, her ability to get things done. Woman’s genius is to keep constantly before us the fact that the existence of living persons, whether in the womb or walking around outside of it, cannot be forgotten while we frantically engage in the tasks of human living. Woman is responsible for reminding us all that all human activity is to be ordered toward authentic human flourishing.  

The Fall

Of course, so far all of this is in reference to what John Paul II terms the state of original innocence. It is a description of what God meant things to be before the fall. And so it is necessary to make a few comments about the fall from innocence. Though a full treatment of the nature of original sin is beyond the scope of this present study, the analysis above does provide us with new insights into the way in which it manifests in the world. The account of the fall at Genesis 3 provides further evidence of the plausibility of this
theory and provides a critical point of leverage as we consider the larger aims of this paper.

Now Aquinas argues that the soul itself “is the subject of original sin chiefly in respect of its essence.”\textsuperscript{43} From this it follows that since both men and women are instantiations of the same substantial form, that is, the same soul, they would also both be equally burdened with its effects. But the account of the fall at Genesis 3 makes manifestly clear that they will suffer differently as a result of their sin. The woman will endure greater pain in childbirth; nonetheless her yearning will be for her husband who will, in spite of her desire, lord it over her (Genesis 3:16). The man will now struggle with creation; those things he named as his own in Genesis 2 will now only yield their fruits with suffering and toil (Genesis 3:16).

The place both had occupied in the state of original innocence has now been turned upside-down. In light of the previous analysis, this can only mean that, instead of somehow occupying a place of honor (while nonetheless his equal) woman will now be dominated by the man. As for man, instead of occupying the place of secure and confident steward of God’s creation, he will now have to fight with it. The effects of original sin will (and clearly do) manifest quite differently in men and in women. We will only consider the contours of this reality here.\textsuperscript{44}

It seems clear from the above analysis that original sin can be said to affect man in particular in his tendency toward a disordered relationship to things (or the misuse of persons as objects). His struggle is with creation itself. This manifests for some men in a compulsion for work and acquisition that leads them to forget themselves and their true meaning.

Eve’s punishment would lead to a distortion of her own natural gift – that of attending to the person and the capacity for relationship. She is told that her desire will be for her husband, even in light of the pain of childbirth. Here “husband” should not be taken too literally; it is necessary to interpret this in light of our contemporary context. Certainly it can be said that women now often manifest a disordered inclination in relationships. The confusion in
relationships between men and women that has manifest over the last fifty years is well documented. It is often the case for many women that their desire is for the other even when he treats her as an object, even when he dominates and uses her.

And last, the age old question of why the serpent approached Eve first with his temptation needs to be taken up anew. There have been only a few interpretations of this, mostly variations on the same theme – that Eve, being weaker and more vulnerable, was the easiest prey. But if I have shown that Eve is Adam’s equal in that she is fully human and therefore endowed with a rational soul and the powers of intellect, will, and freedom, we are no longer able to hold to that position. Eve is most certainly innocent, but she is not arational. However, she is at a disadvantage: she knows little about the world of things, whereas Adam’s relationship to the things of the Garden is much more sophisticated. He had named them; he knew God much more intimately than did Eve. And so, yes, Eve was easy prey.

But Eve was sent to Adam as a kind of divine aid; she is Adam’s equal while somehow occupying pride of place in the created order. In approaching Eve, the serpent is executing a very clever strategy: his intent is to corrupt the entire hierarchy of creation and so he begins, so to speak, at the “top.” He knows that if he can get to Eve, he will soon have Adam. As John Paul II tells us, Eve is first in the order of love; she was sent to safeguard Adam’s heart. Eve was the greatest point of leverage – because it was and still is her responsibility to turn toward the other, to keep man focused on the end toward which his work is ordered, the flourishing of human persons. And when woman loses her place, when she is corrupted, so is the family, the culture, the nation, indeed the world.

At the same time, Adam also had a job to do. He was first in the order of creation; his horizon included a greater grasp of the created order and the way it came to be. He was on intimate terms with the Creator. His task is to be the first line of defense against the serpent, to protect Eve from the threats to her person. And he failed her. Is that not so even today? Though many of us will deny it, women are
in very great need of protection now – they have lost their way in large measure – and so – men have as well.46

In this regard, it is fitting to consider here the effect that Christ’s redemptive act needs to have on these realities and to point, with the late Holy Father, to Mary as the prototype of the feminine genius – the model that women are to follow in pursuing their own vocation.47 I have argued elsewhere that Saint Joseph offers a model for men.48 The point is that, while the masculine and feminine genius can be spoken of on the level of nature, they are in fact both supernatural realities whose full expression cannot be realized without the action of grace. Both the feminine and masculine genius – if we can call it that – begins as a potency in nature, one that certainly can be actuated, observed, and spoken about on that level. But, in truth, if woman and man are to manifest this genius in its fullness, it will require them to enter into the life of grace and be sustained by it if they are to arrive at the level that represents a more perfected state.

For example, it is one thing to laugh about the fact that I can remember where my husband left his glasses or his keys, or to feel a sense of superiority when it is clear that I seem better equipped to multitask. Or for my husband to express his frustration at the ways in which I seem to complicate matters with my apparently incomprehensible need for dialogue. It is another thing entirely to exercise the virtue of charity in the home which, let us admit, often requires nothing less than an almost supernatural act – in order to be queen and king of our domestic Church – to share in the royal dominion we both are called to exercise over the life of the family – and the world.

The point is that this joint call to exercise royal dominion extends beyond the family, to every facet of contemporary life, including academia. Both men and women need to be encouraged to bring their particular gifts to the challenge of living out the mission of the university in its Catholic expression. If it is true that this complementarity is what gives us our actual mission, then we must face our very real challenges with full and explicit awareness of our status as equal partners, not adversaries. The difficulty is that the
effects of original sin are not left at the door; they accompany us wherever we go. Only a self-conscious awareness of this reality will insure that the necessary partnership is forged. Both men and women will each need to acknowledge their own blind spots and work together to arrive at a comprehensive vision of what constitutes the authentic progress of the community. Those who persist in promoting a nihilistic understanding of the human person – whether in the classroom or in policy decisions – must be challenged by a well-informed coalition of both men and women who understand their mission to be the same: to consecrate themselves without reserve to the cause of truth.

Part Three: Conclusion

My aims in this paper were fairly straightforward: First, to reinterpret the two creation accounts in the first two chapters of Genesis through the lens provided by Aquinas’s account of the soul in union with the body, in order to illuminate and extend the properly Thomistic framework of Saint John Paul II’s theory of complementarity. I have shown that it is reasonable to conclude that the nature of woman in relation to man is one of equality and one of difference, but a difference that in no way compromises that equality. I have endeavored to reveal the meaning thus found in Genesis 1 and 2 and describe its implications for a theology of complementarity and the genius of man and of woman. And second, to argue that it is this precise understanding of the nature of woman in relation to man that must inform our collaboration and our scholarship in the academic community.

Perhaps it goes without saying that there are signs all around us of the descent of man. The world is in desperate need of both women and men who understand and live out the complementarity that characterizes their fundamental relationship. Other than the family, there is no more important place for that understanding to take hold and find expression than in the Catholic university. For without question the future of humanity is in our hands – and not
just theoretically. This reality is reflected in every classroom, contained in every syllabus, expressed in every policy decision. To live out the mission that is ours in virtue of our complementarity will take humility and courage – the humility to remember that original sin affects us all – and the courage to refuse to be caught up in the logic of sin, to try to see the truth about the other, to recognize their gifts, to understand their need for recognition and healing. In short, to become saints – because clearly that is what we are called to be – and humanity, in particular our young people, deserve no less from us.

Deborah Savage is professor of philosophy and pastoral ministry at St. Paul Seminary School of Divinity at the University of St. Thomas, Minnesota.

1 *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, 29 and 32.
2 *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, 29.
4 For an analysis of this phenomenon, see Alistair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), esp. 6-22.
8 For a very interesting analysis of the events leading up to the passage of the nineteenth amendment, see [http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/19th-amendment-adopted](http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/19th-amendment-adopted).
9 Pope Saint John Paul II, *Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the*
Deborah Savage


17 As mentioned above, the late Holy Father states in the seventh audience that he has no intention of exploring the complexities of metaphysical anthropology at work but is, instead, interested in what constitutes the language of the body. See TOB, #7.1, p. 154.

18 It seems necessary to move beyond the notion of the “feminine genius,” which I believe Saint John Paul relies on primarily as a rhetorical device, to consider more fundamentally what distinguishes men and women at the level of the soul in its union with the body. Frankly, an overemphasis on this so-called genius risks its own kind of gender polarity (where one sex is considered superior to the other) and could result (indeed may have already resulted) in leaving out of the equation a more comprehensive account of
the genius of men and preventing a fuller grasp and appreciation of the way in which the particular charisms of men and women task them with the “mission” of working together to create not only families, but human history. I will take this question up later in the paper.

Though scripture scholars have maintained this for years, there are some who might be prepared to argue differently. For example, Benedict XVI states quite forcefully in the Regensberg Address that biblical thought encountered the best of Greek thought at a very deep level, arguing that this “inner rapprochement between Biblical faith and Greek philosophical inquiry was an event of decisive importance,” and that the Greek translation of the Old Testament, the Septuagint, is itself an independent textual witness and a step in revelation history. If this is the case, and depending on when that encounter occurred exactly in history, it is certainly possible that these categories could have been at least inchoate in Semitic thought.

It is important to state that the notion of man as such is not exactly the equivalent to the notion of all men collectively considered. However, as stated above, when the word *adam* is without the definite article, it is a reference to man in general, the notion of man. Thus it is possible to claim a certain degree of coextensivity between these two terms. It is really not going too far to say that if there were a reference to the notion of man qua man in Hebrew it would be *’adam*. To avoid any illegitimate leaps in interpretation, the best way to maximize care and precision would be to say that, of all the terms available in Hebrew, the one that would have to be adopted to designate what later philosophy would refer to as man in the abstract would have to be *’adam*. It is this word that stands for “man” as the English language has traditionally and collectively used the word; it corresponds to the Greek *anthrôpos*, the Latin *homo*, the German *Mensch*, or the Polish *człowiek*.

The word *’îsh*, on the other hand, designates specifically the male, the concrete individual man, ultimately referred to as Adam, because the word *zâchâr* is the one used in an adjectival sense for “male” (it is related to the word for “remember,” perhaps because of the computation of genealogy through the male line). Sometimes *’îsh* is also used in the sense of “each one, each man.” The word *’îsh* is not used at all until Gen 2:23, right after the woman is created; Adam names her *’ishshâh*, saying this is because she is taken from the *’îsh*. Thus, as we will see, *’îsh* does not appear until the creation of *’îshshâh* – the corresponding term that refers to the woman who would come to be known as Eve. In other words, Scripture reveals that
there is no ‘īsh without ishshâh. John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body, trans. Michael Waldstein (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 2007) 8:3, p. 155. However, here I need to highlight the fact that I have a somewhat different interpretation of this passage than that of other scholars, in particular that of John Paul II in the Theology of the Body. There he argues that the reference to man at 2:7 is a reference to man in the abstract or collective sense. But my reading of the text and its use of ba-adam to refer to “man” in that passage leads to the conclusion that it is a reference to a specific “human being,” in this case a man. In the Hebrew, adam without the definitive article ba, can refer to man in the collective sense (see Gen 1:26). But when the definitive article is used, it is a reference to a specific “human being,” and, in this case, according to the narrative that follows, one who is male. And indeed, the narrative goes on to reveal that it is from the man’s (ba-adam) rib that the woman (ishshah) is created. It seems clear from the passage that the reference is to the male at the level of the species. (That is, the concrete person of the ba-adam, while a specific individual, is at the same time representative and as it were “contains” the whole of humanity, an interpretation that is very much in accord with Semitic thinking. That is why ba-adam remains unnamed for the most part of the narrative. However, it is essential to affirm as well that John Paul is absolutely correct to point out that it is only with the creation of ishshah (the concretely existing woman we have come to refer to as Eve) that ‘īsh (the concretely existing man we have come to refer to as Adam) appears. There is no ‘īsh without ishshah. Some scripture scholars want to argue that Genesis 2 must be interpreted in light of Genesis 1’s reference to adam and that woman and man are created simultaneously from adam in both accounts. Along with Brevard Childs, I dispute this interpretation. The Hebrew text is clear and direct in this instance. Gen 2:22-23 states that the matter from which the woman (ishshah) is formed is from the ba-adam and that the woman (ishshah) was taken out of the ‘īsh. See Brevard S. Childs, Old Testament Theology in a Canonical Context (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 189-94. A careful reading of both the text and the narrative reveals the clear meaning of Genesis 2. I am in debt to my colleague, Dr. Mary Lemmons, for pushing me to clarify this point. I am especially grateful to both Msgr. Michael Magee at St. Charles Borromeo Seminary and Dr. Joseph Atkinson at the John Paul II Institute in Washington, D.C. for their expertise in helping me to confirm this interpretation. As I will argue, ba-adam, the male of the species, is in the Garden alone with God before the creation of woman; it is he who is asked to name the animals. We will see that this interpretation also anticipates Gen 3:16-18, where it is clear that man and woman receive different consequences for their fall
from grace, an indication that their particular charism, something unique to each of them, will now be a source of pain and confusion.

22 *Summa theologiae* I, q. 76, a. 1, ad 5. Italics mine.

23 I am indebted to Dr. Mark Spencer for pointing out to me the necessity of acknowledging that, in Aquinas’s metaphysical system, proper or inseparable accidents are said to be attributable to the species as a whole. And so while I would maintain that certainly “gender” and its derivative expression as male and female could be said to be such an attribute, perhaps sexual difference requires a further specification. In fact, as John Finley argues, sexual difference may indeed be in a category all its own. See John Finley, “The Metaphysics of Gender: A Thomistic Approach,” *The Thomist* 79 (2015): 585-614.

24 See *Summa contra Gentiles*, bk. 2, c. 81, n. 8. Though these questions do not deal directly with the distinction between genders but with the individuation of the human soul and its continuing individuation after it is separated from the body at death, it is clear from the text that gender is a property that is attributable to both the body and the soul, it remains with the form after death.

25 Commensuration is a term that means literally to have the same measure. Aquinas means here that each body is adapted or accommodated, even interpenetrated in an equal measure by the soul intended for it.


27 Thus Aquinas cannot be said to conclude that there are two different types of souls for men and for women. Further, this would seem to support Saint John Paul II’s frequent reference to the “personal inner structure” of the person. If each person is also individuated according to the soul with which it is destined to be united, this could be the origin of the personal subjectivity of concretely existing human persons. Indeed, John Paul II argues in *Mulieris dignitatem* that woman’s genius issues from “the personal structure of her feminine nature.” This category is used by Karol Wojtyla throughout his work and especially in *The Acting Person*, chap. 3.


30 Here this refers to the male of the species. It is still not the concretely existing man; the word 'îsh is used to designate the individual man. But that *ha-adam* can be understood here as the male of the species is clear from the narrative that follows.


32 I am using the word here as it is usually meant – as someone who occupies a lower rung on the ladder in any particular context. A different interpretation of the word servant is associated with being a follower of Christ, which, at this point in salvation history, cannot be invoked. But I do not mean to imply that woman is not to serve man. As Saint Paul says in Ephesians 5, both men and women are to submit to one another out of reverence for Christ. The question of the headship of the man in the family is not under scrutiny here and is a topic for further research.

33 Excellent examples can be found in the Psalms: for example, Psalm 30:11b, “The LORD will be a helper (*ezer*) to me,” or Psalm 121:1, “I will lift up my eyes to the mountains, whence comes my help (*ezrî*).” The name of the great scribe Ezra of the restoration of Israel under the Persians, namesake of the biblical book, seems to be the Aramaic masculine form of the same word.

34 In his very fine translation of these texts, Robert Alter translates *ezer kenegdo* as “sustainer” rather than helper, a word with a much closer meaning to that intended by the sacred author in my opinion. I refer here to “helper” since that is the more traditional term used in most translations and makes my dispute with the usual interpretation more precise. See Robert Alter, *Genesis: Translation and Commentary* (New York: Norton and Company, 1996), 9 n. 18.

35 For a fuller account of the genius of man, please see my essay “The Genius of Man.”

36 Indeed, Saint Thomas Aquinas argues that Adam received an additional preternatural gift, infused knowledge, in order to be able to name all the animals brought before him. *Summa theologicae* I, q. 94, a. 3. And though it is from an entirely different tradition, I find it so interesting to consider that one of Lao-Tze’s more famous aphorisms is: “The beginning of wisdom is to call things by their right names.”
37 See especially Mulieris dignitatem, 18. Scientific studies have documented that infants and young children display behavior that corresponds to these differences from the very beginning. See Steven E. Rhoads, Taking Sex Differences Seriously (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2004), 24-25.

38 Anthony Esolen, http://www.zenit.org/en/articles/finding-the-masculine-genius. Professor Esolen says in this interview that he doesn’t have an actual theory but points to these examples as evidence of a particular gift.


40 Rhoads, Taking Sex Differences Seriously, 24-25.

41 Angelo Cardinal Scola’s argues that the father introduces the child to the “law of exchange [work] as the law of growth in life,” while the mother introduces her to the “law of gratuity [love].” See Angelo Scola, The Nuptial Mystery (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005), 242.

42 A disordered relationship to things or the proclivity to use persons as objects is a manifestation of how original sin affects men in particular – and women have their own difficulties. The question of how original sin affects either gender is an interesting one and bears further study.

43 Summa theologiae I-II, q. 83, a. 2.

44 A subsequent paper will explore the significance of this analysis for how original sin, in its different manifestations, affects our struggle to comprehend and live out the complementarity of the sexes.


46 Not because they seek to fulfill their own creative potential through work outside the home, but because they insist on doing that within a social and economic context that reduces their natural capacity to bear life to an inconvenience and their natural orientation toward persons to an unnecessary complication.

47 Mulieris dignitatem, 5.

48 Deborah Savage, “The Genius of Man.”
Appendix

Fellowship of Catholic Scholars

MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION

For information about joining the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, visit our website at www.catholicscholars.org.

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

1. We Catholic scholars in various disciplines join in fellowship in order to serve Jesus Christ better by helping one another in our work and by putting our abilities more fully at the service of the Catholic faith.

2. We wish to form a fellowship of scholars who see their intellectual work as expressing the service they owe to God. To Him we give thanks for our Catholic faith and for every opportunity He gives us to serve that faith.

3. We wish to form a fellowship of Catholic scholars open to the work of the Holy Spirit within the Church. Thus we wholeheartedly accept and support the renewal of the Church of Christ undertaken by Pope John XXIII, shaped by Vatican II, and carried on by succeeding pontiffs.

4. We accept as the rule of our life and thought the entire faith of the Catholic Church. This we see not merely in solemn definitions but in the ordinary teaching of the Pope and those bishops in union with him, and also embodied in those modes of worship and ways of Christian life, of the present as of the past, which have been in harmony with the teaching of St. Peter’s successors in the See of Rome.
5. The questions raised by contemporary thought must be considered with courage and dealt with in honesty. We will seek to do this, faithful to the truth always guarded in the Church by the Holy Spirit and sensitive to the needs of the family of faith. We wish to accept a responsibility which a Catholic scholar may not evade: to assist everyone, so far as we are able, to personal assent to the mystery of Christ as made manifest through the lived faith of the Church, His Body, and through the active charity without which faith is dead.

6. To contribute to this sacred work, our fellowship will strive to:
   - come to know and welcome all who share our purpose;
   - make known to one another our various competencies and interests;
   - share our abilities with one another unstintingly in our efforts directed to our common purpose;
   - cooperate in clarifying the challenges which must be met;
   - help one another to evaluate critically the variety of responses which are proposed to these challenges;
   - communicate our suggestions and evaluations to members of the Church who might find them helpful;
   - respond to requests to help the Church in its task of guarding the faith as inviolable and defending it with fidelity;
   - help one another to work through, in scholarly and prayerful fashion and without public dissent, any problem which may arise from magisterial teaching.

7. With the grace of God for which we pray, we hope to assist the whole Church to understand its own identity more clearly, to proclaim the joyous Gospel of Jesus more confidently, and to carry out its redemptive mission of all humankind more effectively.
MEMBER BENEFITS

All members receive four issues annually of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars Quarterly, which includes scholarly articles, important documentation, book reviews, news, and occasional Fellowship symposia.

All members are invited to attend the annual FCS convention held in various cities where, by custom, the local ordinary greets and typically celebrates Mass for the members of the Fellowship. The typical convention program includes: daily Mass; keynote address; at least six scholarly sessions with speakers who are customarily invited to help develop and illustrate the theme of each convention chosen by the FCS Board of Directors; a banquet and reception with awards; and a membership business meeting and occasional substantive meetings devoted to subjects of current interest in the Church.

Current members receive a copy of the Proceedings of each convention, and every three or four years all members receive a Membership Directory with current information on Fellowship members (addresses, telephone numbers, emails, etc.).

NATIONAL AWARDS

The Fellowship grants the following awards, usually presented during the annual convention.

The Cardinal Wright Award – Presented annually to a Catholic judged to have done outstanding service for the Church in the tradition of the late Cardinal John J. Wright, former Bishop of Pittsburgh and later Prefect for the Congregation for the Clergy in Rome. The recipients of this award have been:

1979 – Rev. Msgr. George A. Kelly
1980 – Dr. William E. May
1981 – Dr. James F. Hitchcock
1982 – Dr. Germain Grisez
1985 – Herbert Ratner, M.D.
1986 – Dr. Joseph P. Scottino
1988 – Rev. John F. Harvey, O.S.F.S.
1989 – Dr. John Finnis
1991 – Rev. Francis Canavan, S.J.
1993 – Dr. Janet E. Smith
1994 – Dr. Jude P. Dougherty
1996 – Dr. Ralph McInerny
1997 – Rev. James V. Schall, S.J.
1999 – Dr. Robert P. George
2000 – Prof. Mary Ann Glendon
2001 – Thomas W. Hilgers, M.D.
2002 – Rev. J. Augustine DiNoia, O.P.
2003 – Prof. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese
2004 – Sr. Mary Prudence Allen, R.S.M.
2005 – Prof. Gerard V. Bradley
2006 – Dr. Patrick Lee
2008 – Dr. John M. Haas
2009 – Sr. Sara Butler, M.S.B.T.
2011 – Rev. Francis Martin
2012 – Raymond Cardinal Burke
2013 – Dr. John Haldane
2014 – Rev. Brian Daley, S.J.
2015 – Dr. Matthew Levering

The Cardinal O’Boyle Award – This award is given occasionally to individuals whose actions demonstrate courage and witness in favor of the Catholic faith, similar to that exhibited by the late Cardinal Patrick A. O’Boyle, Archbishop of Washington, in the face of the pressures of contemporary society which tend to undermine the faith. The recipients of this award have been:

1991 – Mother Angelica, P.C.P.A.
1996 – John & Sheila Kippley
2002 – Sen. Rick Santorum
2003 – Hon. Mel Martinez & Mrs. Kathryn Tyndal Martinez
2005 – Helen Hull Hitchcock
2006 – Sen. Samuel D. Brownback
2007 – Dr. Peggy Hartshorn
2008 – Richard M. Doerflinger
2009 – Mother Agnes V. Donovan, S.V. & the Sisters of Life
2010 – Archbishop Charles Chaput
2011 – Dr. Jennifer Roback Morse
2012 – Kevin Seamus Hasson
2013 – Maggie Gallagher
2015 – Most Rev. Thomas J. Olmsted
The Founder’s Award – Given occasionally to individuals with a record of outstanding service in defense of the Catholic faith and in support of the Catholic intellectual life. This award has been presented to the following individuals:

2007 – Dr. Ralph McInerny
2008 – Rev. James V. Schall, S.J.
2010 – Rev. John F. Harvey, O.S.F.S.
2011 – Dr. Kenneth D. Whitehead
2012 – Prof. Gerard V. Bradley
2013 – Dr. James Hitchcock
2014 – Francis Cardinal George, O.M.I.

PRESIDENTS OF THE FELLOWSHIP OF CATHOLIC SCHOLARS

2014 – Mr. William L. Saunders, Esq., Americans United for Life
2004 – 2008 Dean Bernard Dobranski, Ave Maria Law School
2003 – 2004 Prof. Gerard V. Bradley, Notre Dame Law School
2002 – 2003 Dean Bernard Dobranski, Ave Maria Law School
1995 – 2001 Prof. Gerard V. Bradley, Notre Dame Law School
1991 – 1995 Dr. Ralph McInerny, University of Notre Dame
1987 – 1989 Dr. William E. May, John Paul II Institute on Marriage & the Family
1979 – 1981 Dr. James F. Hitchcock, Saint Louis University