Bishops, Scholars, and the Church

About the time this issue of the Newsletter reaches Fellowship members, the long-awaited meeting between the Holy Father and representatives of the hierarchy of the United States will be underway. It thus seems to me an opportune moment to make a few observations about the respective roles of bishops and scholars within the Church.

A useful place to begin is with the distinction made by St. Thomas (In IV Sent., d. 19, q. 2, a. 2, qua. 2, ad 4) and other medieval theologians between the magisterium or teaching office of the cathedrae magistralis or chair of the "scholar," and the magisterium or teaching office of the cathedrae pastoralis or chair of the "pastor". The first office or function is proper to those who have, through their own free choice, committed themselves to a life of learning and scholarship. The second is proper to those who have been given by Christ Himself the authority to speak in His name on matters of Catholic faith and life.

The positions developed by scholars in various fields of human inquiry, including theology, demand our respectful attention. For the most part we take on faith or "believe" what scholars in fields other than our own have to say, leaving their peers to judge the adequacy of the evidence they bring forth.

(continued on page 2)
Bishops, Scholars, and the Church (continued)

and the arguments they marshal to support those positions and to test, frequently through experimentation, the hypotheses or "likely accounts" that they propose. In areas of our own scholarly competence we do not "believe" our fellow scholars; rather, we assess, as best we can, the cogency of their arguments. From this it follows that we have no obligation to "believe" what theologians say. What they say may well be true (or false); whether it is true depends on the cogency of their arguments.

But as Catholics we "believe" those whom Christ has appointed as "pastors" within His Church when they speak to us in their capacity as pastors in union with their fellow pastors and the chief pastor within the Church. We do so because our Catholic faith holds that our "pastors," i.e., our bishops, do for the Church today what the apostles did for the Apostolic Church and that our chief bishop, the Holy Father, does for the Church today what Peter, the "rock" upon whom Christ founded the Church and commissioned to strengthen the faith of his brothers, did for the Apostolic Church. Thus, as the Fathers of Vatican Council II remind us:

That divine mission, which was committed by Christ to the apostles, is destined to last until the end of the world (cf. Mt 28.20)....Moreover, just as the office which the Lord confided to Peter alone, as first of the apostles, and destined to be transmitted to his successors, is a permanent one, so also endures the office, which the apostles received, of shepherding the Church, a charge destined to be exercised without interruption by the sacred order of bishops. This sacred synod consequently teaches that the bishops have by divine institution taken the place of the apostles as pastors of the Church, in such wise that whoever listens to them is listening to Christ and whoever despises them despises Christ and him who sent Christ (cf. Lk 10.16) (Lumen Gentium, n. 20).

We hold, on divine faith, that our bishops, in union with the Pope, have Christ's own authority to teach us "everything that serves to make the People of God live their lives in holiness" (Dei Verbum, n. 8).

Everything that I've said so far is, of course, well known. There is no need here, nor do I have the desire, to distinguish between those truths proposed to us by the bishops that we must accept on divine faith and those which we must accept with a "religious assent of soul" (cf. Lumen Gentium, n. 25). My point is simply that we do accept on divine faith the God-given authority of bishops to speak in Christ's name, to strengthen our faith, and to pass judgment on the views of scholars, including theologians, insofar as these views affect the faith and life of God's people.

There is a grave obligation on the part of Catholic scholars to respect the rightful authority of bishops. Catholics with advanced degrees, even in theology, are duty bound to receive as from Christ Himself what the bishops teach on matters of Catholic faith and morals. In my opinion, they wrongly usurp the role of pastors in the Church when they instruct the faithful that what the bishops in union with the Holy Father teach is in fact erroneous and that the faithful can rightly set their teaching aside and put in its place the opinions of scholars.

Too often, I fear, the teaching of bishops is regarded as an "official" or "party" line that the bishops maintain chiefly to preserve order in the Church until the time comes when the "truth," known now to the more advanced, will be more palatable in backward regions of the globe. It is most important that our bishops dispel this notion. What they, together with the Holy Father, teach us about faith and morals is a liberating truth, for it is the truth about the meaning of our lives as beings made in God's image and summoned to be, in and through Christ, His faithful children.

My hope is that the leaders of the hierarchy will return from their meeting with Pope John Paul II strengthened in their own faith and in their resolve to proclaim, with him, the saving truths of the faith. Catholic scholars can and must support the bishops and the Holy Father by showing as persuasively and cogently as possible the reasons discernible by human intelligence for the beauty and truth of their teaching.

William E. May
Catholic University of America
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Dr. Russell Hittinger’s Critique of the New Natural Law Theory touches on the work and interests of many of our members. There is a true disagreement among them. Hence, we publish here two reviews of the book presenting differing evaluations.

Comments on
A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory
A Study by Russell Hittinger (University of Notre Dame Press, 1987)

The critical barrage against consequentialism fired over the past decade by the school of Germain Grisez and John Finnis has been a stalwart defense of the traditional positions of Catholic moral teaching. In a furious stream of books and articles they have exposed and attacked the proportionalist reasoning which some moralists have tried to use to justify perversions of Catholic teaching.

But is there a utilitarian lurking behind every bush? When even St. Augustine comes in for their criticism as a proportionalist when he argues that there is an ordi amorum and a hierarchy among goods that predetermine the ends the will should seek, we are given pause. While Professors Grisez and Finnis have won no friends in the consequentialist camp for their relentless challenges to the new dogmatism, there is still time and place for a friendly critique from the side of those who share their convictions about the rectitude of the traditional Catholic positions in morals.

Russell Hittinger’s new book does precisely this. His analysis takes Professors Grisez and Finnis as friend rather than foe but asks certain hard questions about the justification of their new method, for they have a new method. Although they call their work a “natural law theory” and would thereby be allied to the long-standing natural law tradition in Catholic ethics, they are also clear that it is a new natural law theory, one that operates without the presupposition of a systematic anthropology, philosophy of nature, and metaphysics, such as have characterized the preliminary work of past natural law theories in ethics.

Such theories of nature have been unacceptable to secular ethicians since the Enlightenment, and for just this reason ethical debate since that period has avoided natural law ethics and has instead oscillated between deontological (duty-respecting) and utilitarian (consequence-calculating) poles. The interminability of these ethical debates has left modern moralists longing for a way to return to the certainties of conventional morality. Yet every proposal seems to snag on the foundational question of how to generate an ought from an is, of how to make nature normative for anything in morals without reintroducing final causality and the predetermination of ends.

To begin with theoretical questions about what the predetermined end of a human being is, or what a person must become in order to be happy, seems to compromise the most cherished value of modernity, the freedom to choose one’s own end and destiny, so that all proposals for a return to an ethics that can decide moral questions prior to individual choice instead of generating ambiguity are torpedoed as question-begging, as if the theoretical work about human nature and the ends that really satisfy us were ad hoc devices by which later to generate norms in ethics. With fury certain moralists have raised the cry of the “naturalistic fallacy” against natural law ethicists.
If the Grisez-Finnis strategy really works, the answer would be that we should avoid nature-questions altogether and focus on the various goods that are self-evident to all as basic goods, each deserving our absolute respect, and then proceed from this insight of practical reason to work out the full implications for morality systematically.

Professor Hittinger's question to Professor Grisez and Finnis is whether they can in fact sustain the claim that their list, in any of its revisions, is self-evident independently of the background philosophy of nature and metaphysics which other natural law thinkers always tried to supply. Arguing from I-II, 94 of Aquinas' Summa Theologiae, Grisez and Finnis hold that the first principles of practical reason are self-evident, per se nota, and that we can forego the lengthy and laborious task of re-establishing a philosophy of nature and a metaphysics. We do not need, for example, to fight the battle about whether speculative reason in its metaphysical mode can affirm very much, or anything at all, about God as an end of human striving. This information is alleged to be unnecessary for their system of natural-law ethics.

In Professor Hittinger's abundant notes we can follow the paper-trail that proves how unfaithful this strategy is to Aquinas. For to separate the passage in which Aquinas articulates the first principle of practical reason from the preceding treatises in which he has demonstrated the teleological principles governing man's natural end makes non-sensical Aquinas' countless arguments that prior to any act of willing, evaluating, and choosing, the will is already ordered to a certain end. But Hittinger wisely confines this discussion to the Tsotes. His concern is to query Grisez and Finnis at the ethical and meta-ethical levels rather than to criticize them on the historical point. However, the evidence is there to show a decided discrepancy between the texts of Aquinas and the way Grisez cites texts of Aquinas to lend weight to his own theory.

Despite the reiterated assertions of Professors Grisez and Finnis that the first principles of morality do not presuppose any metaphysical proposition and that anthropological evidence is only confirmation rather than a prerequisite for knowledge of the basic goods, Professor Hittinger shows the continuing pertinence of the larger metaphysical and anthropological issues. Difficult as these claims may be to establish, answers are required to show why the "basic goods" are normative in ethics.

The Grisez-Finnis list of foundational but incommensurable goods includes the following: life, knowledge, skillful work and play, religion, justice, self-integration, and authenticity. Professor Hittinger points out specific problems in holding these goods to be incommensurable. While this decision may stave off the proportionalist approach of calculating utilities, for which commensurability would be required, it makes morality more deeply subjective than Professor Grisez would care to admit. The constraints of finitude in anyone's life means that these goods cannot all be equally pursued or perfected, so one's choice among them for a life-plan must be made on some ground other than morality, for morality, according to Grisez, gives no basis for ranking them. There is, besides, a faulty move from logic to psychology here. The fact of a predetermined ranking of goods does logically require that one ought to love the highest most, and the rest in due proportion, but the knowledge of such an order does not necessitate the will to choose in accordance with that order and so is not a perceived threat to human freedom.

Professor Hittinger also argues that the very firmness of Professor Grisez's stance on the incommensurability of basic goods is extremely problematic for the good of religion. Grisez's "self-referential method" of justification works well for a good such as knowledge, for anyone who states that knowledge is not a basic good is refuted in the very statement, for presumably someone would only make that statement while also believing the assertion to be worth making and a true statement. But such a self-referential argument does not work for a good like religion, nor is any other justification attempted, for these goods are taken as themselves basic and not the implication of any other foundation. The dilemma that results pushes Grisez to embrace some kind of theological positivism or fideism, whereby the content of revelation and the actual experience of faith become the grounds for making religion a basic good; but then Grisez is hard put to claim this good as self-evident and available to all. But the many claims that the good of religion is but one good among others seem to rule out in advance the possibility that our human relation to God is a superordinate
good that must be given pride of place, prior to one's own choice.

The central question which Professor Hittinger puts to the school of Professors Grisez and Finnis is a fair one: is this really a natural law method if it substitutes the moral intuitions of practical reason for a philosophy of nature? Perhaps it would be better to advertise the system as a "Christian Kantianism", although that would be to lose some of the credibility brought by the term "natural law" in Catholic circles. But for Hittinger it is not so much a matter of finding the right name (184) as of discerning whether the new method can sustain its admirable claims to defend the morality of the Catholic tradition.

Were Professors Grisez and Finnis to realign those portions of the system that are inconsistent (for example, the use of religion sometimes as a principle by which to order one's choices among the basic goods and sometimes as but one good among equals), the need to work out the precise metaphysics that supports this ethics would be clearer. Presumably it would be a metaphysics of participation which explains how finite goods do and ought to share in the Ultimate Goodness. At very least, questions about the structure of the human will and the nature of the human being need to be answered to justify one's proposal of a list of goods that will really perfect and satisfy the human person. Required here is an admission that a foundational principle in speculative thought is necessary for establishing how any of the basic goods is normative.

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Russell Hittinger's Straw Man

Russell Hittinger claims that the "new natural law theory" which he styles "the Grisez-Finnis system" is internally incoherent and flawed (above all in treating religion) by its failure to take due account of philosophical anthropology and metaphysics.

The system he describes is indeed self-contradictory and grossly flawed in many ways. It would deserve all the criticisms Dr. Hittinger can muster--and more. But it is not a system which Dr. Grisez or I have proposed, and to ascribe it to us is indefensible.


In it he quotes and examines sixty-nine passages from Dr. Hittinger's book. In each of these passages Hittinger is claiming that Dr. Grisez and/or I assert something. Simply by quoting from the passages on which Hittinger purported to be commenting, or closely related passages, Grisez shows that each of the sixty-nine passages is false in its claim to be representing and commenting on our work.

Most of the misrepresentations are quite gross, and concern central points. One short example: a theme of Dr. Grisez's master work, Christian Moral Principles (Franciscan Herald Press, Chicago, 1983) is that "faith is the fundamental option, the basic human act, of Christian life" (p. 599). In order to accuse Grisez of a major inconsistency, Dr. Hittinger quotes the eleven-word predicate of that twelve-word proposition, citing p. 599, but makes the subject of the sentence charity instead of faith (Hittinger p. 137).

Dr. Grisez's article demonstrates that Dr. Hittinger has by similar means simply manufactured the inconsistencies of which he accuses us. Anyone who wishes to entertain or express a view on this affair of the "new natural law theory" should read the whole article. (One will be somewhat hampered by misprints for which Grisez, a scholar meticulous in small matters as in great, was not responsible.)
Perhaps most mystifying to the reader will be the omission, six lines from the end of the text on p. 444, of the following short paragraph: "Hittinger says (H. 164): 'Finnis readily acknowledges that the speculative issues concerning nature place a question mark over the project.'"

Immediately after Dr. Grisez's article, in the same issue of The New Scholasticism one finds a 19-line "Response to Professor Grisez's Critique" by Russell Hittinger. The last six lines ask whether Grisez's critique is really a serious exercise, and note that Grisez has referred readers of The New Scholasticism to another source where one may find Grisez's constructive response to critics. Dr. Hittinger is right to draw attention to this response: Grisez, Boyle and Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends" American Journal of Jurisprudence 32 (1987) 99-151, fifty pages of philosophical reflection on, and development of, our theory, expressly in response to criticisms which touch our own assertions and arguments, not some straw man for which we are not responsible.

And the first dozen lines of Dr. Hittinger's response to Dr. Grisez? These:

Professor Grisez selectively quotes passages from his books, not unlike someone who cites proof-texts from scripture to suggest that there are no theological problems. It is difficult to ascertain in this piece what is philosophically important or trivial, except that he is displeased that I have tampered with the canon of his writings without the proper decretals. I stand by the material and interpretive accuracy of the quotations which I use in my book. Professor Grisez should give himself more credit, and entertain the possibility that what he has written and said over the years invites philosophical discussion of substantive issues. At least in this piece, he reduces the philosophical issues to an argument from authority, which in this case is his own.

A revealing response. Dr. Hittinger had written a book ascribing to Dr. Grisez many questionable and self-contradictory positions. Grisez took a fair sample of the significant passages and showed that the attribution of these positions to him was false and (though he did not draw this inference) defamatory: the texts to which Hittinger referred had been misquoted, mis-cited, mutilated in paraphrase, and misunderstood. To do this, Grisez had to take the passages cited by Hittinger, and quote them in their proper form and context. In responding, Hittinger has overlooked the difference between a scholarly debate and a political stand - between truth and what one wants to believe.


I have said nothing specifically about Dr. Hittinger's treatment of my own works. That treatment, quite rightly, is much less extensive. Suffice it to say that it is utterly inaccurate, materially, formally and interpretatively - so much so that it is hard to find any objection of Dr. Hittinger's which engages with my views.

Dr. Hittinger's standard form of misrepresentation consists of a quotation or paraphrase from my works, accompanied by the statement that the passage is about X, when in fact it was about Y. I have space to add to Dr. Grisez's only one relevant illustration of Hittinger's competence as a scholar and a philosopher. The illustration is representative, though not on a matter of first importance.

On p. 45, Dr. Hittinger tries to explain
one of the ways Dr. Grisez and I identify basic human goods. He begins by quoting a part of a sentence from Grisez: "noticing the assumptions implicit in people's practical reasoning". Hittinger explains: "This method is one of operational self-consistency". He is quite mistaken. The identification of implicit practical assumptions, as Grisez and I explain and illustrate, is quite distinct from dialectical arguments pointing to the operational inconsistencies (self-refutation) in certain sceptical objections.

Dr. Hittinger then remarks that Dr. Grisez has employed the latter form of argument in his writings against determinism, "but less so in his discussion of human goods". "Less so" should read "not at all", and "against determinism" should read "against determinism and against many other sceptical attacks on the classical positions of metaphysics".

Dr. Hittinger proceeds: "Finnis, however, who had taken it over from Grisez, has made it central to his exposition of the basic goods". Wrong. Grisez never applied it in relation to any basic good other than knowledge.

He proceeds: "In the chapter in Natural Law and Natural Rights devoted to the basic goods, Finnis begins by suggesting: (there follow six lines within quotation marks). As an example, Finnis takes the basic good of knowledge."

All wrong. The quotation is not from Natural Law and Natural Rights, but from Fundamentals of Ethics, where it does not deal with the identification of basic goods and introduces arguments which I expressly distinguish from the argument from operational self-consistency (self-refutation). And in NLNR, the argument from operational self-consistency is never used in "the chapter devoted to the basic goods" (Ch. IV). It is used only in Chapter III, concerning the good of knowledge, and is in no way used "as an example": on p. 73 of NLNR I expressly deny that it is applicable to any other basic good.

Anyone interested in Dr. Hittinger's principal substantive confusions should read Dr. Robert P. George's careful and patient analysis, "Recent Criticism of Natural Law Theory" in the University of Chicago Law Review, 55 (1988) 1371-1429. Had Hittinger read our work with minimal care, he might have been tempted to engage with our understanding of the very many passages of St. Thomas which we cite and defend against misinterpreters and murmurers, and thus also with our accounts of the interdependencies of ethics and metaphysical anthropology, and of the unity and complexity of humankind's last end. I still hope for the further illumination which would emerge from critical and exact discussion of these and many other fundamental matters.

But instead of engaging with us Dr. Hittinger has tilted against windmills, "gaps" filled in pages he simply overlooks, "inconsistencies" he has manufactured, and theses we have never proposed — theses which we reject with as much force as Dr. Hittinger does, but with reasons more ample and solid, and better conformed to the philosophia perennis, than his.

John Finnis
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Father John C. Ford, S.J.

Our dear friend, counsellor to Pope Paul VI and champion of moral truth and stability in the days of passionate dissent to Humanae Vitae, has gone to the Lord. He was ill when he came to us at the last Fellowship Convention to receive the first Cardinal O'Boyle Award for the Defense of the Faith.

We had no way to compensate him for the abuse and isolation he suffered for serving the truth. Nor did he require any. Now he is fully rewarded by the Lord.

Requiescat in Pace
Reflections on the Morale of Priests

Pointing the Finger at Rome

"Reflections on the Morale of Priests" is the title of a document published in late 1988 by the Committee on Priestly Life and Ministry of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (see Origins, Vol. 18, No. 31, January 12, 1989, pp. 497-505). The bishops claim that there is "a serious and substantial morale problem among priests in general." What do they mean by "morale"? They offer the following definition: "Morale is an internal state of mind with regard to hope and confidence." My Webster's Dictionary gives a more complete definition: "a state of individual psychological well-being based on such factors as a sense of purpose and confidence in the future."

Is it true that there is a substantial morale problem among priests in this country? Perhaps there is, but the evidence offered in this document to prove it is not convincing. Outside of some questionable research on the problem by Dean Hoge, a non-Catholic sociologist at Catholic University, we must take it on faith in the assertions of the authors of the document. There is no indication of who was consulted, what questions were asked, how many priests were interviewed, plus other data that sociologists usually present in support of their assertions. It seems to me that one can, with good logic, simply deny the assertions of this paper, based on the principle that what is gratuitously asserted can be just as gratuitously denied.

But my main difficulty with this document concerns the assumptions behind it. It is almost completely secular in tone, in the sense that it examines priests from the point of view of sociology and psychology rather than from the point of view of the Sacrament of Orders, Revelation, the Church as the Mystical Body of Christ, along with the doctrine and tradition of the Church about the spirituality of the priest.

As experts they cite sociologists and psychologists. There is absolutely no mention of any saint as a model for priests; in such a document one would expect at least a passing reference to the Cure of Ars or St. Francis de Sales or St. Charles Borromeo. If there is a "substantial morale problem" among priests, surely it has something to do with the spiritual life of priests. The center of the spiritual life of the priest is the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. The Eucharist is not mentioned here; likewise there is no mention of the Blessed Virgin Mary. There is no mention of chastity or poverty; obedience is mentioned once in reference to the bishop.

The current problems among priests, such as the lack of vocations, loneliness, divisions based on different ecclesiologies, and lack of community, need a spiritual solution, not a psycho-sociological solution. Men leave their families, the prospect of wife and children, to become apostles of Jesus Christ for the salvation of men. They are giving witness to the immortality and transcendence of the human soul, to faith in the resurrected Christ who will come again in glory.

Unfortunately, the bishops' document misses all of this. There are a few sops thrown in that direction, but it is mostly window-dressing. Any one of Pope John Paul II's Holy Thursday letters to priests offers more for the morale of priests than this document does. He looks at the priest from the point of view of Christian asceticism and the Sacrament of Orders; this paper looks primarily at human growth from a this-worldly standpoint. It sounds to me like the report of a sub-committee to the chairman of the board of some management firm. If this is the dominant view of the priesthood at the NCCB, then it is not surprising that there are so few seminarians. One does not give up wife and family and doing one's own will, for that.

What I find especially irritating and painful in this document is the finger pointing at the Vatican, and specifically at the Pope. He is not mentioned by name, but the inference is clear: if the Pope were not so intransigent, if he would allow priests to get married, women to be ordained and ex-priests to come back, "the substantial morale problem" would be solved for the most part. To sum it up in very blunt terms, what they are saying is: "There is a serious and substantial morale problem among priests in the USA because the Polish Pope will not let us get (continued on page 13)

Wilson Yates' article "The Church and Its Holistic Paradigm of Sexuality" Siecus (Sex Information and Education Council of the U.S.) Report, May/June 1988 (Vol. 16, Nos. 4-5) elaborated the following assumptions:

1) Sexuality should be viewed in light of an egalitarian perspective in which men and women are considered to be equal to one another.

2) The morality of homosexual expression should be judged much as we judge heterosexual expression: in light of whether it enables an individual to realize wholeness.

3) Sexuality, as part of creation, is good.

4) Sexuality should be understood to be related to both body and spirit.

5) Sexuality should be seen as a dimension of the self that is expressed in all forms of love - forms that together constitute holistic love.

6) Sexuality should be seen as a means through which persons can know the grace of God.

7) Rules governing sexual behavior are important to sexual health and wholeness.

Because Yates appeared to be speaking for "the Church" while in fact speaking as a Protestant, I wrote a response which Siecus did not consider appropriate for publication. Since the headings of the assumptions use language which has a different meaning for different audiences, publication of my response may be useful to readers of the Fellowship Newsletter who may find occasion for dialogue with persons of Yates' persuasion.

Yates cited only Roman Catholic writers, who are noted for their dissent from the wide body of Catholic teaching (Kosnik, Ruether). Before looking in detail at Yates' propositions, it is necessary to contextualize Catholic teaching about sexuality within the outcome of the sexual act - the family. "Familiaris Consortio", the fruit of the 1980 Synod of the Family emphasizes a central Catholic teaching: the family is the unit of society. It recreates and represents the communion of persons which is the basis of our faith - the Trinity. Familiaris Consortio teaches that marriage and the family constitute one of the most precious of human values.

Conjugal love involves a totality in which all the elements of the person enter - appeal of the body and instinct, power of feeling and affectivity, aspiration of the Spirit and of will. It aims at a deeply personal unity, the unity that, beyond union in one flesh, leads to forming one heart and one soul; it demands indissolubility and faithfulness in definitive mutual giving; and it is open to fertility." (ref. #13, citing Humanae Vitae, 9)

In our personalist world we begin with ourselves and often do not get beyond ourselves, yet we all began as the offspring of our parents. Those who were blessed to have been born and raised in an intact family do not need to be told about the many contributions that each family member has to make to keep the family going. Those who have lost a parent through death, separation or divorce appreciate the additional demands of single parent or "melded" families. The family is not merely a refueling and laundry base from which one goes to face the world and pursue a career. Instead, careers and jobs, rightly understood, ultimately support and maintain the family, the locus of primary relationship and the normal site of intimacy; but they also extend the family into the larger community. Martin Buber characterizes relationships as I-Thou, I-You, and I-It. Professional relationships are either I-It or I-You. Friendships and relationships of kinship; and marriage are, we hope, I-Thou. Yates' assumptions need to be viewed from the vertical dimension, from the generative communion of persons from which each individual has sprung. I believe this is important because a title like "The Church and its Holistic Paradigm" must necessarily include, even in the United States,
not only 78 million non-Catholic Christians, but also 53 million Roman Catholics, if it intends to be inclusive.

Assumption one of the book: "Sexuality should be viewed in light of an egalitarian perspective in which men and women are considered to be equal to one another." Roman Catholic theology, as well as Yates, view men and women as equal in dignity - complementary but not identical. Theologically speaking, God, who is above gender, has created men and women in the image and likeness of God, and has created them embodied, i.e., living in the body which is the 'sign' of their person. Pope John Paul II has taught and written extensively on the nuptial meaning of the body. Males and females are complementary - each is radically incomplete without the other. Only conjugal union can fully energize the life-giving power of the body. The second part of Yates' first assumption, that sociologically man and women should have equal opportunity to choose their roles based on their ability, energy, etc. omits the antecedent vocation to parenthood with its obligations to nurture children, while concentrating only on the pursuit of a career.

Priorities need to be respected. Fertility belongs mainly to youth. If couples wish to have families, they may need to postpone or even sacrifice careers. The vocation of parent is second to none in its demands, challenges and rewards, with its unique opportunity of begetting a child and helping it achieve full personhood. Humans are humans to the extent that they belong to a primary grouping, usually their biological family. No human child can develop its potential unless it is taught to speak and to interact socially. This requires a consistent nurturing figure, usually mother or a mother surrogate. Because bonding begins in utero, the father is distanced at birth and needs to be invited to join into the primary mother and child group. The mother, especially if she is breastfeeding, invests much of her affection and energy, including her sexual energy in the child and at times may appear to be a triangle competing for the child rather than parents working in harmony for the child's benefit. If that is the case, a man may well distance himself from the child in order to preserve his sexual union with his wife, and be somewhat remote as a father. Quite often then he will seek compensation in the career or job which brings financial support to the family and assigns him a role. The father represents external reality in the primary grouping and brings an essential facet to the child's growth. When that is absent, children often become insecure because without a father they experience boundaries differently. A father who is distanced by pleasurable or social forces may well seek emotional satisfaction outside the home, and the marital bond begins to weaken.

The role of the father has been denigrated in our culture almost to the point of symbolic castration in the loss of his self-esteem; as well as loss of consistent fathering for far too many children. On the other hand, if one can bring not only income but one's own life home, relationship and intimacy are nourished. The modern (false) assumption reverses the order of priority, and projects the impression that only the larger society is worth considering. This undermines the need for commitment and contributes to the destruction of the family unit. Youth need not only role models, but adults who will both love and challenge them to grow toward adulthood. Without a functioning family many of our youth lack the means of reaching emotional maturity.

Assumption 2, that homosexual expression should be judged in the same way as heterosexual expression when it leads to wholeness and must be answered from the point of view of the intrinsic nature of the body. If one believes that the sexual function is ordered to love and to life, one cannot perceive homosexual relationships as life-giving because it is an impossible situation. When Yates states that no question of morality is involved, he implies that it is possible to experience wholeness and grace rather than sexual alienation while engaging in an intrinsically alienating form of behavior. To me, this is classical double speak. We need to begin to take the body seriously and not see it only as an instrument of locomotion for the head, or the experience or expression of feeling. This is underlined in the discussion of Assumption 3 where Yates quotes the Song of Songs and interprets it as sexuality which is expressive of the goodness of creation by virtue of its procreative powers. However, he has just contradicted the necessity for looking at sexuality beyond partial perspectives in Assumption 2 which professes an inclusive stance toward sexual orientation. Assumption 3 refutes Assumption 2, correctly discerning the two purposes of the sexual act: intimacy and
procreation.

Mr. Yates' Assumption 4 holds that sexuality is related to both body and spirit. However, the notion is restricted to feelings as Yates apparently does not give much weight to the notion that the body possesses its own reality. It appears that the body is seen more as a vehicle for feelings, a perception which legitimates using the body at will without anticipating any consequences in the physical order. Unfortunately such an attitude leaves the door open to exploitation. In our culture extreme but common expressions of this exploitation are prostitution and rape.

Assumption 5 states that body and spirit should be understood in holistic terms. I fully agree and so does the Roman Catholic Church which condemned dualism in the 5th century. However, the assumptions which this article espouses refute the initial premise. It is never right to use another person because using a person not only diminishes the one used but also the user.

Assumption 6 states that sexuality is a dimension of self in all dimensions of love. Yates gives pleasure-for-its-own-sake (epithymia) place of its own even though he cautions against focusing oneself. I'm not sure that pleasure sought for itself is ever attainable more than fleetingly; seeking the real value of an act or of a relationship brings joy rather than pleasure. The secret appears to be to focus not on the pursuit of pleasure because one is seeking in the wrong way. There is an analogy in the human coital union. Those who enter it seeking their own pleasure usually do not find it, while those who enter it seeking to bring pleasure to the partner experience their own joy. The hedonists just discovered centuries ago that pleasure whether sexual, oral, or in any other sense, is only enjoyable in moderation. Excessive pleasure dulls one's appreciation.

The descriptions of eros and filia are acceptable but stop short of the ultimate in human creativity which is procreation. Only when we procreate do we make something equal to ourselves in dignity and worth. Anything we make with our heads or with our hands is less than ourselves. It is only when we procreate a child that we share in the creative power of God and bring forth another human. Yates reduces this, which is an awesome and crowning power, to only one aspect of Assumption 6: "we can know the grace of God through sexuality". Indeed we can, but precisely because we understand not only the power to share love but to share life, and it is, as he states, meant to be a communion of persons which includes not only love but healing and forgiveness.

The seventh and final assumption cites Kosnik "that norms governing sexual behavior should exist as guides to the realization of sexual health and wholeness". Kosnik's norm may call for sexual relations to be "self-liberating, other-enriching, honest, faithful, socially responsible, life-serving, and joyous". Yet Kosnik's book makes the unqualified assumption that contraceptive intercourse, which by definition fragments the person into sexual and procreative, is an adequate instead of a fragmentary expression of Catholic Church teaching on the meaning of sexual intercourse. (Kosnik no longer teaches moral theology in a Seminary, and may well have distanced himself from the 1977 position of his book.)

Because contraceptive intercourse necessarily excludes part of the person, namely their power to procreate, it denies the total self-giving implied in the gesture of intercourse, and is therefore dishonest. The procreative power is at the very heart of one's gender identity as has been shown very clearly in the sexual and contraceptive practices of adolescents. Conventional wisdom assumes that teens will be sexually active but that they are not yet ready for parenthood, hence they should have "protected intercourse". Yet anyone who looks at the statistics for continued teenage sexuality and contraceptive behavior with open eyes realizes that contraceptives are not acceptable to adolescents. Witness their continued high rates of abortion. It is time we began to ask why contraceptives are not acceptable to adolescents. It seems likely that the answer is in the value which contraceptives necessarily assign to the power to procreate, namely, that it is a non-important value.

At puberty the boy or girl becomes biologically capable of parenthood. The power to become a mother or a father is at the very root of one's gender identity and very much so of one's ego identity. When society comes along and suggests that this power is something which can easily be put to one side, the very heart of that individual's personhood is denigrated. If, on the other hand, one assigns great importance to
the power to procreate, one finds that the power is held as something very precious and used with a whole, different set of assumptions.

Because adolescents are bombarded with invitations to sexual-genital expression at every turn, providers of family planning have assumed that if they make contraceptives widely available and have an intensive educational campaign the devices and medications will be fully utilized by adolescents. By now, time has shown that this is not the case. Beneath the invitation to genital expression to which commercials, songs and many products entice, if not bombard, lies the assumption of the inevitability of genital expression which Yates has not examined, in other words the nature of the sexual drive. Is the human sexual drive personal or only instinctual; in other words, is it volitional or autonomic? Yates’ Assumptions 5 and 6 tend to support the latter.

The propaganda aimed at young people assumes that the sexual drive is so powerful that it is not under the control of one’s free will, and yet there is still an undeniable desire for exclusive love which at least most women cherish, which would not be tenable if sexual self possession (continence) prior to faithful marriage were impossible. Clearly sexual development of males and females progresses at a different rate. We know that the biological drive is highest among adolescent males age 15-19, while females generally peak at 18-24. It is also clear that women value tenderness and foreplay while men, perhaps as a result of their more rapid arousals, don’t mind getting down to business right away. Clearly the couples need to negotiate in order to reach orgasm together. However, the physical is only a reflection of what is happening inside the person which is totally sidelined if the only purpose of sex is to relieve tension and to have a fairly enjoyable evening. Clearly Yates would not support such mutual exploitation, and yet those who would take him seriously will find grounds and justification for their behavior. It seems very important therefore to emphasize that if Christian morality is involved as a norm for determining the rightness of behavior one has to speak about self-control in all areas where one desires something to which one is not entitled not only in respect to someone else’s body or someone else’s property, but also in accounting for one’s stewardship of one’s embodied self to one’s Creator. One of the Creator’s gifts is our free will which directs the decisions which are governed by considerations of morality. The market place has done a good job of pushing consideration of free will from center stage, replacing it with wants which quickly become needs. It is necessary to restate that the sexual drive is a personal drive and not an instinctual one, that its expression is a matter of choice not compulsion (with the exception of certain pathologies), and that the churches do not facilitate humanizing, let alone spiritualizing, human society when they imply that sexual self possession and control is not possible.

My response to Mr. Yates stems from our cross-cultural experience with youth in the framework of experiential learning of the body’s fertility patterns, discovering the values inherent in possessing the power to procreate and thence deriving the norms for using their power. While our program does not moralize, it monitors behavior and has demonstrated reduction in premarital sexual activity resulting from a concept of self which places a high value on not only sexuality but the power to procreate inherent in sexuality.

Hanna Klaus M.D.


Reflections...(continued from page 9)

married and he will not approve the ordination of women."

They go so far as to say that if the bishops want to solve the morale problem, they should take advice from the National Federation of Priests’ Council (NFPC). That is the dissident group that has been advocating married priests and women priestesses for years. By the way, the president of the NFPC speaks in glowing terms about this document in the January 13, 1989 issue of the National Catholic Reporter. An editorial in the same issue highly praises the document and commends the bishops for “those fingers pointed at Rome”. That should be further evidence that my evaluation of this sad document is on the mark.

Kenneth Baker, S.J.
A Report from our Irish Fellowship Chapter

Report on the First Annual General Meeting - October 29, 1988, University College Dublin

Present at the meeting were the following Fellowship members: Fr. J. Colin Garvey, Dr. Ivo O’Sullivan, Fr. Martin Drennan, Fr. Patrick Bastable, Dr. Mairtin O Droma, Fr. Tom Norris, Fr. Henry Leahy, Fr. Maurice Hogan, Fr. Maurice Curtin, Professor Cornelius O’Leary, Fr. Brendan Purcell, Dr. Noel FitzPatrick, Dr. Gerard Casey, Dr. Donncha O hAodha, Dr. Dom Colbert and Fr. Vincent Twomey. Our guests were: Dr. David Doyle, Fr. Tom O'Loughlin, Fr. Michael O'Carroll, Dr. Joseph MacCarroll, Mr. Paul Harmon, Mr. and Mrs. Kieron Wood.

The first paper "Just a Moment in History? Values in the Constitution of 1937" was delivered by Dr. David Doyle of the Department of Modern History in University College Dublin.

The acting Secretary, Dr. Gerard Casey, and the acting Treasurer, Fr. Brendan Purcell, were elected to the positions of Secretary and Treasurer respectively for the year 1988/1989. A decision was taken that the Annual General Meeting be held on the first Saturday in November of each year. Finally, it was agreed that the Irish Chapter of the Fellowship could, if it thought it appropriate, issue public statements from time to time on matters of public interest and concern in which its members might be deemed to have a special competence.

A second paper, given by Fr. J. Colin Garvey of the Department of Philosophy at UCG, was entitled "Secular City on Holy City: Irish Catholics in a Secular State". The final paper was "Religion, Church, and State in the Constitution: A Theological Analysis".

Contact: Secretary: Dr. Gerard Casey, University College Dublin, Belfield, Dublin 4. Telephone: (01) 693244, Ext. 8201 and 8228.

FCS Coetus on Canon Law Now Forming

As the dust begins to settle following the promulgation of the revised Code of Canon Law in 1983, greater attention is now being paid to the actual implementation of the law in the life of the Church. The Fellowship of Catholic Scholars believes that these canonical issues require reflection from the perspectives of both canonical scholarship and sound theology.

The Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, therefore, is pleased to announce the organization of a Coetus on Canon Law by which the canonical expertise of the Fellowship will be placed more effectively at the service of the magisterium of the Church. His Eminence, John Joseph Cardinal Carberry, (Archbishop Emeritus of St. Louis and a distinguished canonist) has graciously agreed to serve as Honorary President of the Coetus, and a Bishops’ Advisory Board is presently in formation. Regular membership in the Coetus on Canon Law is open to any interested members of the Fellowship. Other members with degrees or otherwise experienced in canonical matters may be asked to serve as consultors within the Coetus. The first organizational meeting of the Coetus will take place at the Fellowship’s 1989 annual convention this September in Atlanta, Georgia.

The Coetus hopes to serve as a canonical resource both for the members of the Fellowship generally and for the wider Church. It plans to offer this assistance in several ways, for example, through the publication of Consultationes (advisory opinions) on topical matters of canonical controversy, as well as through the development of Instrumenta (policy papers) on canonical issues of greater moment.

Fellowship members who wish to join the Coetus on Canon Law, to offer their services as Consultors, or to submit canonical questions for consideration by the Coetus are invited to contact the (Acting) Relator of the Coetus: Edward N. Peters, Esq., Post Office Box 921, Marshall, VA 22115-0921.

This is clearly a most serious book, written by three of the finest Catholic moralists alive today, written about the gravest, most frightening moral problem of our time. The penetrating grasp of the authors on moral theory and their faithfulness to Catholic moral principles are unquestionable; their mastery of a complicated world and relevant fact is astonishing; their patience in weaving a complex argument is impressive; and their moral courage is exemplary. Yet I find myself disagreeing with their basic conclusion.

A Frightening Thesis

The authors argue that we have a grave moral duty to get rid of our nuclear deterrent, unilaterally, now; and repent of having used it. They argue not as pacifists, who would hold all violent defense of justice wrong. Rather, they concede that Soviet world domination would be so terrible that we have a clear duty to fight violently against it. (ch. 3). But nuclear deterrence, they argue, involves so clearly a murderous intention, that we may not resort to it even to save the most necessary goods. We must abandon nuclear deterrence, the authors say, even though they concede that doing so is likely to have terrible results.

And this means really terrible results. The authors recognize that if we unilaterally dismantle our nuclear deterrent system, as we have a duty to do, we would have to accept whatever conditions our nuclear-empowered and immoral enemy demands (p. 333). We can easily foresee genocidal activity, mass deportations, a brutal enslavement of our whole population.

The authors insist that their conclusion follows from most basic moral considerations. Regularly they appeal to the "common morality", that is, "the Jewish and Christian morality, which, though often violated, provided standards of moral assessment formative of our civilization and still accepted by many" (p. 66). Even the public statements of officials defending deterrence, in their claims and evasions, this common morality is appealed to.

And it is a commonplace in Judaeo-Christian morality, as it is even more firmly a part of Catholic morality, that we ought not do evil or intend evil (as the deterrence requires) that good may come of it.

The Basic Argument

The argument for the claim that this deterrence is certainly and unmistakably wicked, so that there is an immediate moral duty to abandon it promptly whatever the consequences, is a charmingly simple one (though many complex, closely argued reasons and marshalling of facts brace the central argument). The argument is:

It is wrong to intend to murder the innocent. But nuclear deterrence (necessarily) involves a will to murder the innocent. Hence this deterrence is immoral.

The first premise I find unexceptionable, though many of the critics of this book really do not accept it.

The real difficulty lies with the second premise. One who reads the book will be impressed by the virtuosity with which the authors defend it. But many, like myself, will be far from convinced. The argument is a long, long chain: and every link needs to be secure for the argument to be decisive. They argue that nuclear deterrence, in its present form - and in any form that would maintain our battery of weapons but revise only the theory or rhetoric of deterrence, - involvespressing upon our leaders and our people a will to do murderous things. One who sustains nuclear deterrence the book argues, will essentially be required to have, reluctantly and conditionally perhaps, but really, a present will to kill millions of innocent non-combatants if certain conditions are fulfilled.

Here I can only sketch the path of their
tightly reasoned argument. Nuclear deterrence wishes to keep the enemy from doing violent things unacceptable to us by threatening them with unacceptable consequences. What we want them to fear (this is argued both from the statements made by American officials and from the inner logic of deterrence) is that not only their military, but their populations, will be devastatingly destroyed. We have weapons designed to destroy cities; we wish them to fear that we will do that if they do things we find utterly unacceptable to us. This threat of ours cannot be a mere bluff. Too many would have to be in on the bluff; besides all can see that a bluff would soon prove utterly ineffective.

But we want to deter effectively: so we do have a will, namely, that we will do what we have threatened under certain circumstances. Even if we were only “keeping our options open” (actually, the authors argue, this a form of bluffing that would not work), an immoral intention remains there. “If one intends now to be in a position to commit murder, should one later decide that the situation warrants it, then even now one is willing (however reluctantly) to murder” (p. III). The logic is inescapable: deterrence threatens doing things that common morality finds entirely wrong: intending to destroy indiscriminately combatants and the innocent. No deterrence works without at least a conditional intention to do actually what is threatened under some circumstances. But what is threatened here involves killing the innocent.

**Critical Comments**

It would be difficult to exaggerate the power of the authors' argument: its attention to detail, its patient answering of a thousand objections to the case presented. Yet I was not convinced. The authors saw clearly murderous intentions in situations in which I did not; sometimes, in my opinion, they elided what was necessary to be effective in deterrence with what a person must will in a desperate case in which he sees no other hope of preventing a perverse enemy from doing the most massive evils imaginable. Ties between threat and intention did not appear to me to be as indissoluble as they made them; ambiguities in “bluff” were not sufficiently probed. Ramsey's defense of deterrence seemed to me stronger than it did to them. The hope of mutual disarmament perhaps does not seem as unrealistic today as it did when this book was written. My margins are filled with problems I think need further exploring.

But my major problem does not lie there. It lies rather in this: I believe that the argument that nuclear deterrence involves murderous intent is an extremely complex one. I do not believe it is true that the "common morality" now actually includes this conclusion: "nuclear deterrence involves murderous intentions, and so is immoral." Perhaps (though I think not) the principles of common morality, as the authors insist, necessitate that conclusion. But even after studying the book I do not know that; and most people in the world do not. The authors seem to believe that their argument is not only right, but very clearly right. In fact, they find it plausible to distinguish just three sets of people who would disagree: (i) those who have immoral principles; (2) those who got confused in a complex argument (with no suggestions that the authors might have become confused in the same complex argument); and (3) those who realize the case is good, but won't accept it (p. 357). Their confidence in their argument puzzled me.

The history of ethical thought is filled with brilliant thinkers who made mistakes, but were convinced that their conclusions followed with certainty from the principles of the common morality. This book itself alludes to the case of capital punishment: one with many similarities to the problem of whether deterrence involves the intent to murder. Two of the authors of this book (Professors Grisez and Boyle) believe that capital punishment, carefully analyzed, necessarily involves an intent to kill in an immoral way. The third (Professor Finnis) does not. The certain detection of such intentionalities is extremely difficult: and it will take time for the moral community to determine whether it is these authors or their critics, or both, who are lost in the maze of complex arguments about whether deterrence necessarily involves the intention to murder.

The "common morality", like Catholic morality, has, in my judgment, an important social element that the authors here do not sufficiently acknowledge. Convinced of the power of their argument, they appeal to many kinds of people, admirals, politicians, and others, and point out to them what duties they have if they accept the argument. They speak as though men of affairs can satisfactorily come to their moral judgments by way of abstract arguments detached from
social factors some of which I shall note below. Hence they tell them to reflect on the arguments given, and point out what duties they will have if they are convinced. But I believe that it is very rare for non-philosophers (and, indeed, for philosophers, too) to come to their deep moral convictions through abstract arguments that are not commonly accepted by good men. Personal intelligence and individual graces may give secure insight into new difficult problems at times; but the persuasion of multitudes seems to have a different logic. The common morality has not yet spoken clearly on nuclear deterrence.

There is a kind of magisterium that must be convinced before most people will be able to judge that a finely honed moral argument is binding, and is to be incorporated into public life. This seems especially true to me in a case like this. People are being asked to make decisions that could be disastrous for them, and for those they love, and for all the members of western civilization. It would be very wrong for them to accept such an argument without certainty. They may well know how frequently even the best moralists have given persuasive arguments, that won over their followers, and gave the impression of being certain and even clear: yet proved wrong. Obviously even Aristotle and Augustine and Aquinas erred in some of their moral arguments. Many who thought they saw the truth of their arguments also erred. If we would sacrifice the security of the West because certain moralists convinced us it is immoral to employ nuclear deterrence, and they proved wrong: our tragedy would be a profound one indeed.

I do not mean that philosophical arguments never generate certainty: of course they do. But I suspect they, taken in isolation, provide firm conviction more rarely than the rhetoric of this book suggests. The conviction a statesman might draw from their arguments must be very deep indeed, I should think, to lead him to work to dismantle the West's defenses. (I must admit, with some dread, that if deterrence in fact does necessarily involve at least materially murderous desires, and often formerly murderous ones, we ought to hope that we will come to know this, and repent.)

When I say a "magisterium" must be convinced, I refer to two sorts of magisteria: one for the Catholic (the ecclesial magisterium), one for both him and other followers of the common morality.

The authors recall the words of John Paul II to the United Nations in 1982: that under certain conditions "deterrence...may still be judged morally acceptable". It is true that he did not suggest that the murderous intentions the authors find in deterrence are morally acceptable. But neither did he find the murderous intentions necessarily present in deterrence. I think that the arguments given in this book are not essentially new. I believe that they are better handled than they have been anywhere else, and more richly developed. But if they are new, and intellectually decisive, and if the Pope now declares deterrence immoral, then there will be a new situation.

There is another, less defined moral magisterium. It may happen that the overwhelming number of moralists who hold the principles of the common morality will come to see, in the light of this work, that deterrence is -- even if it is our last frail hope against a tragic historical fate -- immoral. Then good people, who have difficulties in getting certainty from abstract arguments, will begin to be convinced that a good man must accept this contention. "Common" acceptance of new moral conclusions from the principles of "common morality" comes only mediately from the lonely labors of creative minds. (This seems very helpful, in cases in which long moral arguments demand radical changes in the form of life of whole populations) Only when their colleagues, those who share their principles and plod more slowly behind them, pass judgment (slowly discerning the right insights of the more creative from the errors they make) do the conclusions of the wise affect public life deeply. I think that it will be a long time before a firm verdict is in on this book and its theses.

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Marvin R. O'Connell, John Ireland and the American Catholic Church. Minnesota Historical Society Press, 610 pp., $40.00

This book places Father Marvin O'Connell among the premier historians of matters American Catholic. First, his subject was and remains one of this country's great bishops, though born an Irishman. More important, perhaps, his research material is so well developed from original sources and in such an evenhanded way that the reader readily acquires a sense of what the U.S. Church in the 19th Century was all about. And gets from the reading a certain admiration, too, for the vision, energy, and Catholic accomplishments of one John Ireland.

During his lifetime the American hierarchy, of which he was a leading member, turned the motley millions of often warring and badly trained immigrant Catholic groups into a unified Church. They became such a body of practicing Catholics within a Protestant country that a succession of Popes applauded them with admiration. Father O'Connell is also modest. He admits that written history is not necessarily "the whole story", since "ordinary people performing their ordinary duties leave few traces in the archives" (p. 417). This surely includes the undocumented and uncontroversial deeds of the unsung American pastors and their lay leadership who carried out the Church's policies. The admission should help redirect Church history away from regular reports on the constant wars between Rome and far flung hierarchies, between bishops and clerics, and among breakaway scholars, disaffected immigrants, maladjusted priests, and the curmudgeons of every era. If one assimilates the customary diet of run-of-the-mill contemporary research, he is likely to find a book or two which never mention the words "parish priest" or "pastor", causing one to wonder how the American Church ever became the vibrant gargantua it was by the time John Ireland died.

Archbishop Ireland, in a real sense, ruled St. Paul from the day he was named Coadjutor Bishop (December 21, 1875) until his death (September 25, 1918) - forty-three years later. During his lifetime the city grew from a stripling town of 11,000 to a metropolis of 1,000,000 of whom a quarter were Catholic. His report to Rome at the end of the century showed two-hundred-fourteen parishes (all but ten in the hands of diocesan priests) and his personal foundations - the College of St. Thomas and St. Paul's Seminary, the latter housing one-hundred-forty candidates for the priesthood. The details of diocesan administration, some thought, seemed prosaic to him in comparison with his frequent and usually triumphal marches through the world's important capitals (p. 476), but Ireland never neglected his fundamental role as diocesan pastor. His pastoral approach from the earliest years is described in the following terms: "He learned about Catholicism not simply as a creed or as a collection of abstract precepts, but as a living system. The heart of Catholic life beat in the daily regimen of the parish. The round of priestly duties performed there - the celebration of Mass, the hearing of confessions, preaching, visiting and ministering to the sick, catechizing, charitable endeavors, counselling the troubled, christenings, weddings, funerals - gave substance to that life" (p. 91). Without these routine tasks "the Catholic ideal went aglimmering and the priest himself lost the central meaning of his life". John Ireland never forgot this homely truth.

The "consecrated blizzard", as he was sometimes called, had his share of problems, especially with difficult, sometimes unworthy priests; and he surely made mistakes, the result often of strong negative views about Germans and religious orders. But his job, as he saw it, was to govern the diocese of St. Paul (p. 291) to make sure parishes were conducted according to sound norms, that schools were staffed properly, that priests behaved themselves, and so forth. The process of God's salvation began with God's favor, to be sure, but in the Archbishop's view it was well served by large reminders of natural and supernatural virtue, whenever he thought it necessary (p. 101). He was a member of a generation of prelates who recognized that a critical element in a pastor's apostolate of evangelization was character-building, to be achieved as much by Church discipline as by preaching. His answer to schismatic or chaotic tendencies within the Catholic community was strong episcopal leadership, a principle of governance he would more than once remind Rome needed strengthening (p. 271). The only check on his authority, of course, was Rome itself, supervision from which he did not always take kindly. But by and large, Ireland was an obedient bishop, whose joustings with Curial officials were more tactical than strategic.
Archbishop Ireland never forgot that he was a man of God. His sense of the sacred was forever keen. He failed to turn the Twin Cities of Minnesota into the mega-metropolis which he would have called Paulopolis; but by 1915 he had erected two of the finest Cathedrals in the country - one in Minneapolis (now a Basilica), anticipating by many years its co-equal ecclesiastical status with the mother diocese of St. Paul. St. Paul's Cathedral today stands majestically on a hill, overlooking Minnesota's State Capitol, as if to indicate the supremacy of God over country. President Theodore Roosevelt expressed annoyance with Ireland, precisely because he thought the Archbishop placed his Church before his country.

All the rest of the Ireland story is here in Father O'Connell's magnum opus - the ecclesiastical brawling of the times (which had the virtue at least of defining clearly the issues on which bishops would legitimately differ), the struggle for miters, at times dispensed to "hangers-on and cronies", the tensions with Rome, the Faribault-Stillwater school plan, Ireland's political interventions in national and international intrigues, and his unseemly lust for the Cardinal's hat. Father O'Connell writes it all down with nice objectivity for a St. Paul priest who might have ample reason to be protective of his diocese's greatest bishop, one who upon death was called by James Cardinal Gibbons, no less, "the venerable Patriarch of the West". The author reports that New York's Michael Corrigan did a few good things, a prelate usually vilified, and has the good sense to use the word "ruthless" in connection with the rebel priest, Edward McGlynn - hardly the prophet he hoped to be. He deflates Denis O'Connell whom others have lionized because he was a leader in the so-called "Americanist Party" of bishops.

I, for one, would have liked to see more of a distinction between Ireland's constant "Americanist" views and his approach in later life to Modernism. The Archbishop was an avid admirer of American institutions and of the freedom they provided the Church in the United States. That Church, he thought, was in his lifetime and in his judgment far superior to established European countries still called Catholic, though controlled by atheists and/or Masons. Americanist Ireland repudiated the Americanism condemned by Leo XIII in Testem Benevolentiae (1899), the encyclical which condemned the alleged American tendency to choose private and practical judgment over doctrine and virtue, a situation more descriptive of the Church in the United States in 1989 than ninety years ago. At one point John Ireland, if my memory serves me correctly, indicated that Pius X might as well dispense with his tiara if he capitulated to the Modernists, a far cry from the heterodoxy Europeans, and some Americans, often attributed to him.

Two American prelates recently finished reading John Ireland and the American Church at about the same time. One concluded that the stormy story of his life demonstrated how necessary national conferences of bishops are. The other opined that under the present guidance of national conferences the like of John Ireland would never make it into the hierarchy.

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Wilton Wynn, Keepers of the Keys, Random House, 278 pp., $18.95).

Wilton Wynn, one-time Baptist Minister and a correspondent abroad for Time Magazine since 1953 (bureau Chief in Rome since 1979), has written a whale of a book, based on his observations of John XXIII, Paul VI, and John Paul II. His ten chapters cover papal styles, papal bureaucracy, diplomacy, decision-making, money and finance, and the winds of change. His vignettes are priceless, like the effort of staff to change John Paul's personally chosen and first itinerary because "this the way we do it here in the Vatican". To which the newly elected Pontiff rejoined: "Excuse me. You seem to misunderstand something. It is I who am the Pope."

Wynn is comfortable with John's objectives in calling the Council (as are most Catholics) and is sympathetic to Paul VI who played the role of "suffering pope" more than chief. John Paul II is described as a tough pope, but not so tough that he did not invite convert Wynn to his dinner table. At the end of one such dinner, where Charles Curran was discussed, John Paul II said: "It is a mistake to apply American democratic procedures to the Faith and to truth. You cannot take a vote on truth.
They must not confuse the 'sensus fidei' with 'consensus'. Truth is not determined by voting. It is something that must be accepted."

Mr. Wynn covers with reasonable objectivity events such as the Ambrosiano affair, but lets his feelings get in the way of Pius XII handling of the Jewish question. He also oversimplifies Paul VI's "liberation theology" and is apparently uncomfortable with Church discipline if it seems to interfere with a theologian's freedom of expression.

G.A.K.

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The appearance of these letters, which for Catholic readers of C.S. Lewis should have been like the discovery of the Oxyrhynchus Papyri, was ignored by diocesan newspapers and the tabloid press. They are Lewis's sporadic correspondence from 1947 to 1954 with Blessed Giovanni Calabria, who ran an orphanage in Verona and founded The Poor Servants of Divine Providence; and then from 1954 to 1961 with the priest's successor, Don Luigi Pedrollo. The editor, Martin Moynihan, Lewis's student before entering the British Diplomatic Corps, has completed the collection, part of which first appeared under the title The Latin Letters of C.S. Lewis.

Don Giovanni was beatified in 1988, not least of all for his ardent efforts on behalf of church unity evident in his approaches to many distinguished separated brethren. Unfortunately, and almost unforgivably, most of the holy man's half of the correspondence was burned in Oxford by Lewis who lamely excused himself: "Non, mi crede, quam nullo pretio illas aestimo; immo quia res saepe sacro dignas silentio posteris legendae nolo." (1) Dons are better stewards than censors.

The reader will not learn much about Blessed Giovanni, though his humility is something of a shining foil to Lewis's modesty. The exchanges are an edifying addition to the literature of spiritual friendship, and show Lewis at his kindest and most spiritually philanthropic, even when few pages are free of the preciseness and even preciousness which keep his brilliance from bursting into the magnanimity of the blessed. Most telling is the nervousness of his ecclesiology: a reticence touching evasiveness when he responds to questions which evidently moved beyond the ever-shortening shadows of Lambeth Palace. Lewis says lovely things to the saint in Verona, but rather as a cautious moth hoping the light is not a flame.

All of the letters are written in Latin, and evoke the humanism at once gentle and sturdy which was the cosmopolitan bond of a fraternity now smashed by ideological intellectualoids who speak no known language. Shorn of classical antecedents, vernacular diction becomes ephemeral. The Latinity of Lewis, though more adept than that of his friend in Italy, is hardly limpid and fluent as the editor claims; Moynihan is more candid when he calls it "rough and ready". As Lewis surely would have complained of today's self-conscious liturgical archeologism, he decried the pseudo-classicism of the Renaissance which destroyed journeyman's Latin. He would have been satisfied to think that the earthy audiences of Plautus could have understood him. If only Lewis had been able to help produce a Mass in English, for which the world still waits. Instead one tolerates the languid and unweighed importunity of the modern Missalettes.

The letters are followed by translations, for use in our Catholic institutions of higher learning.

Rev. George W. Rutler, S.T.D.
New York, New York
Several Fellowship members, including Helen Hitchcock and Joseph Varacalli, will be speaking at a conference entitled Winning the Battles of the Christian Family at Rutgers University, 7th to the 10th of June, 1989. It is sponsored by an interdenominational group called "Allies of the Faith and Renewal". For further information: 313-761-8505.

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Faith Seeking Understanding: Learning and the Catholic Tradition - April 20-23, 1989 - Saint Anselm College, Manchester, New Hampshire

In observance of its centennial year, Saint Anselm College is sponsoring a symposium entitled Faith Seeking Understanding: Learning and the Catholic Tradition to be held from Thursday, April 20th to Sunday, April 23, 1989. The conference will consider Catholic education in all its aspects, with special sections on Anselm of Canterbury. At an academic convocation during the symposium Jean Leclercq, O.S.B., will receive the first Saint Anselm medal. For further information on the program and housing please contact the Symposium Committee, Saint Anselm College, 87 Saint Anselm Drive #2278, Manchester, N.H. 03102-1310.

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Institute on Religious Life

The Papal document, "Essential Elements of Religious Life" is a wonderful synthesis of the teaching of the Church on religious life. The document was hailed with enthusiasm and joy by thousands of religious, but was severely criticized by the leaders of the officially recognized organizations of religious priests, brothers and sisters!

The Institute on Religious Life based on that document is committed to helping as many religious as possible to listen to the teaching of the Church for religious and to adopt it into their programs of renewal so that young people will once again see them as "visible signs of the Gospel" (Pope John Paul II) and follow Christ in the consecrated life.

The Institute is now serving 148 communities of men and women religious comprising a total membership of 27,000.

Interested parties may call 312-545-1946.

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The organization Aid to the Church in Need (ACN) was founded in 1947 by Father Werenfried van Straaten, a Dutch priest in the Belgian Norbertine abbey at Tongerlo. The organization is not very well known over here, but it should be. Next spring Ignatius Press will publish a book, Where God Weeds by Father van Straaten, which describes the tremendous work Aid to the Church in Need has done around the world.

ACN was founded when Father Werenfried found out about the millions of German displaced persons (after World War II) who were starving in West Germany as that country was striving to rebuild itself from the rubble.

Then, at the request of our Holy Father, ACN turned its attention to the Church in Africa where the growing and increasingly intolerant Moslem presence was as great a threat as Marxism.

Since it began by helping refugees, it was natural that ACN should respond to the thousands of boat people in Southeast Asia.

Since 1947, ACN has given almost two billion dollars to our persecuted and threatened Church! Contact: 516-242-8321

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The Board of Visitors of the Virginia Military Institute invites applications and nominations for the position of Superintendent
The Superintendent is the chief executive officer of the Institute, reporting directly to the Board of Visitors.

A letter of application or nomination, together with a resume describing the candidate's qualifications and the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of five references, should be forwarded to: Mr. Joseph M. Spivey, III, Chairman, Superintendent Search Committee, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA 24450.

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Neumann College, Aston, PA., (215-459-0905), is interviewing for the position of President.

The position will be available on July 1, 1989.

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Kentucky State University is seeking candidates for the position of Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences.

Kentucky State University is the designated small liberal studies institution among Kentucky's eight public universities.

Applications and nominations should be sent to: Director of Personnel, Kentucky State University, Frankfort, KY 40601.

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The University of Northern Iowa is seeking applications and nominations for the position of Academic Vice President and Provost.

If you have any questions, call 319-273-3245.

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San Jose State University invites nominations and applications for the position of Dean of the School of Social Sciences.

Contact: Vice President Arlene Okerlund, San Jose State University, San Jose, CA, 408-924-2400.

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San Francisco State University is looking for a Vice President for Academic Affairs. The individual should have the academic credentials that would justify an appointment as a tenured professor, and substantial and successful academic administrative experience.

Contact: President Robert A. Corrigan, San Francisco State University, 1600 Holloway Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94132.

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BOOKS IN BRIEF


To many modern Catholic elites Teilhard de Chardin is the latter day Christian prophet of things cosmological. In this scholarly work Louis Bouyer places the world where it belongs - in the hands of God - after he has informed the reader what everyone has to say on the subject from the mythologists of the Near East to poets like Shelley and Keats, to God's revelation. Father Bouyer even believes in angels.

Harpers Bible Commentary, James L. Mays, General Editor, Harper & Row, $34.95.

This mammoth 1,326 page book (with maps) drafted by eighty-two world-wide contributors from the Judaeo-Christian tradition will undoubtedly be a handy resource for many teachers of courses on the bible. The first seventy-two pages are introductory - historical material relating to the background of the Old and New Testaments, sections on Jewish and Christian interpretation categories (nothing specifically Catholic) - followed by articles on each of the biblical books and apocrypha (e.g. Maccabees). The General Editor is a professor at Union Theological Seminary in Richmond, Virginia, and eleven contributors are Catholic (mainly from Notre Dame or Jesuit faculties), these writing mostly on Old Testament books. The general approach is ecumenical and historico-critical.


Notre Dame's Father Gleason wrestles here, as a professional historian, with the problem of change in a Church committed to an eternal faith, especially as competing forces have engaged the Catholic Community of the United States. These ten essays, including an annotated bibliography, contrast the effort of the Church in the United States through instruments such as the Councils of Baltimore to institutionalize the "Faith of Our Fathers", (and thereby a synthesis of faith and practice) with the shattering impact on Church unity of the ecclesiastical events of the 1960's. Most of the book is devoted to exploring the rejection of traditional Catholic categories by changemakers.

If Father Gleason is preoccupied with "keeping the Faith", Christopher Kaufmann is interested in its transformation. Using the Sulpician community and its traditions as a base, the author in thirteen chapters depicts how the Sulpician influence grew from the days of Jean Jacques Olier in the 17th Century to 20th Century San Francisco, always with an eye on the superiority of "Liberal Catholicism". (He calls French Gallicanism "Liberal" and church efforts to control it "papal harassment"). For him modern is "open-endedness or constant change", the alleged *summum* of what Vatican II projected. Theological dissent is taken as a modern given to be dealt with through negotiation. The book is endorsed by Msgr. John Ellis, Father James Hennessy, S.J. and Archbishop John Quinn.

**FROM IGNATIUS PRESS:**


Andre Ravier, S.J., *Francis de Sales: Sage and Saint*, 265 pp., $11.95. St. Francis de Sales could well be called "an apostle to modern laity".


From Harper and Row:


