The Loss of the Sense of Sin

It is customary for the president of the Fellowship to write a short editorial in each issue of the Newsletter, so this is my first note to you since my election as your new president. I want to thank the Board for the confidence they have shown in me by electing me to this distinguished position. I wish to assure all of you that I will do my best to further the purposes of the Fellowship during the next two years of my tenure. I also wish to thank Dr. Bill May for the excellent job he did in leading us the past two years.

In this brief essay I want to call your attention to the drastic decline in the use of the sacrament of Penance on the part of most Catholics, including priests and nuns. The decline is related, I think, to a diminished sense of sin on the part of most of us. Everyone, it seems, goes to Communion at every Mass, but very, very few go to Confession. How can this be? Are most Catholics now immaculately conceived?

The problem was often mentioned in the 1983 Synod of Bishops on Penance. In his Apostolic Exhortation following the Synod “On Reconciliation and Penance”, Pope John Paul II said that “The Sacrament of Penance is in crisis” (#28). In saying that, he was reflecting the view of most of the Bishops at the Synod.

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The Pope went on to say that the Sacrament is being "undermined": "For the Sacrament of Penance is indeed being undermined, on the one hand by the obscuring of the moral and religious conscience, the lessening of a sense of sin, the distortion of the concept of repentance and the lack of effort to live an authentically Christian life. And on the other hand, it is being undermined by the sometimes widespread idea that one can obtain forgiveness directly from God, even in a habitual way, without approaching the sacrament of reconciliation" (#28).

Many Fathers at the 1983 Synod stressed what they called "a loss of the sense of sin" in the modern world. Our Holy Father mentions this also in his Apostolic Exhortation: "This sense (of sin) is rooted in man's moral conscience and is as it were its thermometer. It is linked to the sense of God, since it derives from man's conscious relationship with God as his creator, Lord and Father " (#18).

There is a loss of the sense of sin because there is a loss of the sense of God, that God is my Creator and that I am a mere creature; as such I am totally dependent on Him at every moment of my existence for being and life. The growing atheism and materialism of the Western world since the Enlightenment have tended either to obliterate this notion from men's minds or at least to obscure it. Here John Paul II quotes Pius XII who said that "the sin of the century is the loss of the sense of sin" (#18).

As reasons for the loss of the sense of sin, the Holy Father cites "secularism" which eliminates God from all dimensions of human life; then he refers to "the errors made in evaluating certain findings of the human sciences" (# 18). He refers to errors in psychology, sociology and cultural anthropology — a tendency to blame all failings on society but not on individuals. Another reason he gives for the decline is the relativism in modern ethics, such as you find in much of the work of Fathers Charles Curran, Joseph Fuchs, S.J., Richard McCormick, S.J., and many others. Distinguished members of the Fellowship have been opposing these theologians for years.

Two other factors in a loss of the sense of sin are the widespread acceptance of the unsubstantiated theory of evolution and the false theories derived from an atheistic psychology which deceive many people into thinking that they are an autonomous self, a petty deity totally self-sufficient and not accountable to anyone. Professor Paul Vitz of NYU has brilliantly described this phenomenon in his perceptive book, Psychology As Religion: The Cult of Self Worship (Eerdmans). Evolutionism leads to the same conclusion since it tries to eliminate the need for a Supreme Being or Creator of the universe.

The Pope goes on to conclude that the loss of the sense of sin is a consequence of the denial of God, not only in the form of atheism but also in the form of secularism. Two more factors are involved. One is the confusion caused in the consciences of many of the faithful when priests and theologians openly dissent from the moral and doctrinal teachings of the Church, as in the case of Humanae Vitae. In our world of instant communications, the confusion is furthered by the negative influence of the mass media. This situation has favored the gradual loss of the sense of sin on the part of many, perhaps most Americans, including Catholics who are not impervious to the secularizing influence of their culture.

Our task as members of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars is to proclaim, investigate further, and defend the truths of the faith as taught by the Magisterium. We are all committed to this, whether we are theologians or not. To this end I would suggest that we all take the Oath of Fidelity to the Magisterium. That was recently done publicly by the faculty at Christendom College in Front Royal, Virginia. I am going to suggest that we do this at our next annual meeting.

Finally, each of us should do what he or she can to foster not a morbid, but a healthy and realistic sense of sin in the hearts of the faithful. We can do this by personal conversation, but especially in our lectures, sermons, and writings. We should not give cause for anyone to think or say that the Fellowship is also guilty of "the loss of the sense of sin".

Kenneth Baker, S.J. Editor
Homiletic & Pastoral Review
Is a Female Priesthood Possible?

There have been few issues which have sparked more controversy during the last few years among Roman Catholics in the United States than the question of the ordination of women to the priesthood. There are those who assert that the Catholic Church, as a simple matter of justice, must no longer cling to the outmoded notion that only men can be priests. The exclusion of women from the priesthood, they assert, is just one more example of the sexism of a patriarchal Church which exists in a patriarchal culture. They argue that since women can be doctors, lawyers, and perhaps even President of the United States, there is no reason to exclude women from the priesthood in the Roman Catholic Church; especially now that the number of male priestly vocations appears to be in decline.

The most compelling arguments put forth for the ordination of women are these:

1. The fact that Christ did not call women as apostles, and therefore as priests, in the primitive Christian community was due to the prevailing culture which was labouring under an outmoded conception of the inequality of men and women. If Christ himself, and the apostles after him, called or ordained only men, it was due largely to the prejudices of the time which would not allow them to do otherwise.

2. There are some modern scholars who assert that Christ did not even intend to found a Church, much less a priesthood to serve it...They hold further that the words and deeds of the historical Jesus are, for the most part, unrecoverable, and what we are left with is the Christ of faith, not the Jesus of history. They tell us that we must realize that the early Church, through its tradition and new Testament writings, has presented us with its culture-bound interpretation of the message of Jesus. Therefore, since we do not really know what the historical Jesus intended, there is no compelling reason to maintain the exclusion of women from a priesthood fashioned by the Church in the first place.

3. Another argument set forth by those who call for the ordination of women is that a female is as able as a male to represent Christ as priest within the Eucharistic Celebration, since in the Incarnation God became human. The maleness of Christ is only a secondary attribute of his humanness. In fact, does not scripture (St. Paul, no less), tell us that in Christ there is no east or west, Greek or Jew, slave nor free, male nor female?

The first argument that Jesus, in calling only men to the priesthood, was acting only in accord with the dictates of his particular time and situation, does not follow from the information given to us by the early Church. There are numerous instances recorded throughout the New Testament in which Christ quite deliberately acted against the prevailing cultural norms. He ate with publicans (tax collectors) and sinners, he broke the sabbath (teaching us that the sabbath is made for man and not the other way around), and he kept company with women (a good rabbi was not even supposed to speak to a woman in public), he taught a radical new vision of the equality of women and men within marriage during a time when women were often viewed as little more than chattel, i.e., the property of their husbands...these are not the actions of a man bound by cultural prejudices. The Holy Father addresses this argument explicitly in his Apostolic Exhortation On the Dignity of Women: "In calling only men as his apostles, Christ acted in a completely free and sovereign manner. In doing so, he exercised the same freedom with which, in all his behavior, he emphasized the dignity and the vocation of women without conforming to the prevailing customs and to the traditions sanctioned by the legislation of the time. Consequently, the assumption that he called men to be apostles in order to conform with the widespread mentality of his times does not at all correspond to Christ's way of acting." It is also appropriate to note that Greco-Roman society, where the Jews and the first Christians found themselves, had women priests. Is it not then, of importance that when Christianity, at first a Jewish sect, moved into the Hellenistic world and began adapting to Greco-Roman culture it did not adopt female priestesses from the pagans?

The second argument that I want to examine is the assertion that the words and deeds of the historical Jesus are mostly unrecoverable and that all subsequent generations of Christians have only an interpolated Christ of faith to rely upon. Since there is no real contact with the man Jesus who walked the earth, what we are left with is an idea about the man; not really much of what Jesus
really said and did. This view of the relationship between Christ and his Church eviscerates Christianity. This subtle form of gnosticism reduces the Christian faith to a grand idea marching down through the centuries. An idea, whose central symbol, Christ, can be revalorized and manipulated as the need arises. If we find ourselves in a new cultural milieu where the practices and the proscriptions of the Church seem outmoded and backward, we are loath to stand under the authority of the Church who mediates Jesus Christ to the world; rather, we are tempted to invent a new Christ and a new Church to conform ourselves more easily to modern culture. The radical truth that Christianity presents to the world is that the Truth became a man; we cannot have a relationship with an idea, an idea does not need a mother, an idea cannot die for us. The fact is that the real Christ is as present to the Church today as he was at the Last Supper.

The Jesus of history and the Christ of Faith are the one Lord mediated to us by his Church. What this means is that we do not come to know the message of Jesus apart from his Church. Further, the message of Jesus is not something which the Church can change, it is something to which the Church must conform. There are those who say that, since we cannot really know what Jesus thought with regard to the priesthood, the male-only priesthood is merely a juridical matter of Church discipline, much the same as clerical celibacy, and could be changed at the stroke of the papal pen, as it were. This perhaps explains why certain groups continue to lobby the magisterium as if it were Congress and tell us that all that needs to be done is wait for a new pope, a more open pope. An "open" pope, of course, is one who agrees with their position. The question of the ordination of women to the priesthood, however, has ramifications which cut to the very heart of the Church's self-understanding and her relationship to Christ. And I will examine these questions in the context of my response to the third argument I presented above regarding the ordination of women.

Proponents of women's ordination assert that it is unjust to exclude women from the priesthood because women are just as capable of representing Christ as priest within the context of the Mass as are men. They appeal to Sacred Scripture; most often to St. Paul who wrote that "...in Christ there is no more man or woman, slave or free, Greek or Jew..." They seem not to realize that St. Paul was not talking about the suitability of anyone for ordination; this passage addresses the question "Who can be a member of the Church?", or, "For whom is the message of Christ intended?" One of the most divisive, complicated, and important controversies of the early Church concerned the universality of Christ's message. This was of special concern to Paul who was the Apostle to the Gentiles. St. Paul also wrote in his letter to the Ephesians (5: 25-32):

Husbands love your wives as Christ loved the Church and gave himself up for her, that he might sanctify her...Even so husbands should love their wives as their own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself. For no man hates his own flesh, but nourishes and cherishes it, as Christ does the Church, because we are members of his body. 'For this reason, a man shall leave his mother and father and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh.' This mystery is a profound one, and I am saying that it refers to Christ and the Church.

In this passage, St. Paul is not saying that the relationship between Christ and his Church is something like the relationship between a husband and a wife; he is teaching us that the spousal relationship between a man and a woman should strive to be something like the relationship between Christ the bridgroom and his bride the Church. This spousal analogy takes on its fullest meaning within the context out of which it emerges.

This spousal analogy was not invented by St. Paul or the early Church. It is rooted in the Old Testament. The uniqueness of the Jewish identity was bound up in their awareness of their relationship to the One God. The concept which they used to describe this relationship was Covenant. So when the Jews reflected on the relationship between God and His people Israel, they did so in terms of the Covenant. When they reflected about the nature of the Covenant - this relationship between God and His people - they often used the spousal analogy. There is explicit use of the analogy in the books of the prophets Hosea, Ezekial, Jeremiah, and Isaiah. So the Old Testament contains a precedent for the New. The difference is that in the New Testament, the relationship between God and His people, the New Covenant, is not a concept about love, or an idea about love; it is love enfleshed. Jesus
Christ is the enfleshment of God's love for the human race. At the Last Supper, the night before His death, He gave the Church a sacrament of his sacrifice. He charged the apostles to "Do this in remembrance of me...;" so that his sacrificial death would always be present within the Church. Christ's sacrifice is represented to us when the priest acts in persona Christi in the Mass. The priest is an icon of the Incarnate Christ, the bridegroom of the Church His bride. There is no such thing as a generic incarnation, we are male or female; our sexuality is not something apart from our bodiliness, our corporeality is not something apart from our humanness. The Eucharistic sacrifice is the place where the relationship between Christ and His Church is actuated and expressed. The priest is not a mere "presider" who orchestrates the collective "remembering" of the community...In his latest Apostolic Exhortation, Pope John Paul II restates that the Church is not free to ordain women for this reason:

It is the Eucharist which above all expresses the redemptive act of Christ, the bridegroom, toward the Church, the bride. This is clear and unambiguous when the sacramental ministry of the eucharist, in which the priest acts in persona Christi, is performed by a man. This explanation confirms the teaching of the declaration Inter Insigniores published at the behest of Paul VI in response to the question concerning the admission of women to the ministerial priesthood.

The fact, then, that during her 2,000 year history the Church has not felt free to call women to the ministerial priesthood does not of necessity indicate that the Church is sexist, as so many uncritically assert today. It is almost as if those who demand the ordination of women feel that the only way to participate fully in the life the Church is to be ordained a priest. I have not known many priests who are as clerical as that. Perhaps if we spent as much emotion and energy reflecting on the meaning of baptism, or the fact that we cannot participate more fully in the life of the Church than to receive the Body and the Blood of Christ in the Eucharist, the question of the priestly ordination of woman would cease to be a litmus test of power and full membership in the Church. For years now, extreme elements of the feminist movement have been demanding justice from the Catholic Church; it is now time for the Catholic Church to demand consistency from them.

Robert Casteel
St. Louis, Missouri

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Dr. Andree Emery - R.I.P.

On September 22, Dr. Andree Emery, a Charter Member of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, died quietly after a short illness. She was 88 years old. Though unwell for several years, she continued writing articles and translating the works of Hans Urs von Balthasar.

Dr. Emery came to Los Angeles in 1959 from San Francisco for two main purposes: to work as a psychotherapist and advisor to priests and religious and to promote the life of dedication to God for people living in the world. She was a member of the Society of Our Lady of the Way, a secular institute, founded in Vienna.

Bishop John J. Ward, Auxiliary Bishop of Los Angeles, recalled at her funeral how important she had been to the priests of Los Angeles. She taught at St. John's Seminary in Camarillo, where she introduced solid principles of psychology into the seminary curriculum, and was able to counsel many seminarians and priests.

One of her most significant contributions was helping launch the American edition of the international journal Communio.

May she rest in peace.
Other Thoughts on Nuclear Deterrence and Morality

We believe that it is one thing for professors Finnis, Grisez and Boyle to say that present U.S. nuclear deterrence policy is immoral. (1) It may be since senior Government officials have given conflicting statements on whether or not the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent relies on the intention directly to kill the innocent. It is quite another to say that nuclear deterrence is intrinsically immoral because its credibility always depends on willingness to kill the innocent directly and intentionally.

The authors' argument rests on their claim that no use of nuclear weapons, even if discriminate and proportionate, is intrinsically either credible or moral in and of itself, but derives its credibility extrinsically from the user's willingness to escalate, if necessary, to a non-discriminate, non-proportionate and, thus, immoral use. Such a claim is open to challenge. For example, a potential aggressor weighs costs and benefits in deciding to pursue his objectives, and the majority of the objectives are limited, both in terms of the benefits sought and the costs willing to be borne in pursuit of them. A potential aggressor's threat to escalate his use of force to a level out of all proportion to his intended objective simply does not have credibility. Thus, the credibility of a defender's threatened use of force to deny the aggressor his objective does not depend on his willingness to escalate to an immoral use of nuclear weapons. The defender's threatened limited response to deny the objective of a limited aggression has credibility in its own right. The defender, by possessing the capability and willing to deny the aggressor his objective through the limited use of nuclear weapons in a discriminate and proportionate manner, establishes both the credibility and morality of that use, standing on its own and not depending in any way upon the threat of escalation.

We believe, therefore that the authors' claim that nuclear deterrence is intrinsically immoral is wrong. Indeed, American adoption of the strategy of "flexible response" some twenty years ago comport with the requirements to make each use of nuclear weapons credible in its own right, to be discriminate and proportionate to the potential aggression to be deterred, and to have the probability of success. Just as it is not credible for an aggressor to threaten willingness to escalate to massive use of nuclear weapons to obtain limited objectives, so the defender cannot make similar threats in the face of limited aggression. He must match the deterrent to the threat.

The authors make a strong argument for thoroughgoing nuclear disarmament, but there are some questions that must be asked about this. Do the authors have a full grasp of the nature of deterrence? Their theory of deterrence seems to be primarily an "emotivist" one in which a deterrent threat strikes into the deterred "fear" of some future possible consequences. However, threats that instill fear are not as persuasive as are threats which rationally persuade and convince an agent that a given course of action cannot be expected to achieve its goal. The aim of deterrence is rationally to persuade a potential adversary that any given act of aggression will not attain its objectives because of the military capabilities and willingness to use them possessed by the deterring agent. This perspective on deterrence seems to be lost to the authors, and this inadequacy weakens their entire argument against the morality of nuclear deterrence.

Again, do the authors understand targeting doctrine? Targeting does not certainly, unequivocally and precisely indicate the intention of an action, but it can do so in a general way. The intention of an agent can be known fully and certainly only by the agent, although the actions of the agent can often partially disclose his intentions. Relative to nuclear deterrence, the targeting of missiles on a specific target might not absolutely, certainly and apodictically manifest the intentions of an agent, but it will probably give a rough indication of the direction of the intention.

The authors are practicing discernment of soul in making their claim that U.S. targeting policy does not reflect U.S. intentions, and neither we, nor they, are able to say that they are right. However, we are able to say that the statement "targeting does not prove intention" is not univocal. Targeting may, in fact, prove intention and the weight of known evidence argues against the authors' claim.

First, the intended uses of U.S. nuclear weapons do not involve "city-swapping" or "final retaliation", although such use is inherently possible. The military principle of economy of force, the mirror image of the jus in bello criterion of proportionality, makes this necessary. There are more legitimate targets than there are weapons to use against them. Were we not influenced by the moral imperative to use all weapons, nuclear and conventional, in a discriminate and proportionate way, we would change the characteristics of our weapons, the means for delivering them and the doctrine for employing them so that, in general, fewer weapons of larger yield would be available to destroy the maximum number of targets in a single strike. This is certainly an immoral use of nuclear weapons, and one eschewed by those responsible for U.S. targeting policy.

Moreover, although the authors argue that the credibility of nuclear deterrence ultimately rests on the threat of "city-swapping" and "final retaliation," they admit that this is never stated openly. They claim that since deterrence rests on a threat to inflict "unacceptable damage" on the Soviets and their values, then one is able to deduce that this implies a threat to directly destroy innocent civilians. Yet in declared U.S. policy, "city-swapping" does not play this role, for a more serious deterrent is a credible threat to destroy an adversary's military forces and war-supporting industries in a retaliatory attack. This is what restrains military aggression more than a direct threat to civilians because few believe that the latter threat would be carried out.

Also, at least since the Carter administration, the U.S. has made it clear to the world in general and the Soviet Union in particular that it distinguishes among different kinds of installations in the Soviet Union, and has developed the capability for limited retaliatory attacks against them. Such distinctions are meant to discourage the Soviet Union from thinking it could present a U.S. President with the options of either retaliating massively or surrendering in response to a Soviet attack directed solely against our military forces. As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown explained, the U.S. now has the ability to strike legitimate targets within and among four broad categories in the Soviet Union: nuclear forces, conventional forces, war-supporting industries, and leadership cadres. The U.S. believes that the ability to retaliate against remaining Soviet military forces while holding the Soviet leadership and war-supporting industries at risk will deter Soviet attack, and even if deterrence fails, it will provide a high probability that it will not fail catastrophically.

The points above address the fundamental moral issue concerning the morality of deterrence in general and U.S. deterrence policy in particular. Is it the intention of the U.S. to deter by its ability to retaliate and destroy legitimate targets which would deny the Soviets the fruits of their aggression, or is the intention to deter through collateral loss of life and destruction which such retaliation produces? We believe it is the former and that U.S. targeting policy is moral in its intent. We believe that this is especially true when one address the complex issue of who is and who is not a "combatant". We believe the authors have defined a combatant too narrowly and so their appeal to "noncombatant immunity to direct attack" to support their thesis is flawed. In the U.S., the distinction between military and civilian installations is generally sharply defined. This is not the case in the Soviet Union. How do you discriminate between the "combatant" and "noncombatant" working under the same factory roof, producing both civilian and military goods?

Again because so many Soviet industrial facilities which produce civilian products in peacetime have the potential to convert quickly to military production in wartime, they are considered to be legitimate targets. This is not the case in the U.S. where it would be difficult and time-consuming to convert civilian industrial facilities to military production. The purpose of retaliating against these installations, should it prove necessary, would be to prevent the Soviet Union from having the means to recover more rapidly than the U.S. and so be in a position to renew its aggression at some point in the future with a higher probability that such aggression would succeed.

Soviet industrial practices thus make it far from easy to discriminate between who is a combatant, i.e., "closely associated with the actual conduct of aggression" and who is a noncombatant. We reject, therefore, the authors' definition of a noncombatant, and any part of their argument based on this definition to support their claim that the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrent policy rests on the intention to kill the innocent.

One must also wonder if they give sufficient consideration to the requirements of prudence and the limitations of freedom in their
moral judgments of deterrence. They demand immediate unilateral nuclear disarmament despite the fact that this would put the lives of millions of innocent civilians in jeopardy of nuclear attack. Does this demand comport with the requirements of prudence? This creates a "near occasion of sin" for the Soviets, and yet the authors are silent about its morality. This seems irresponsible, for responsibility for the good of human life should involve not only prohibiting direct killing of the innocent but also preventing occasions where they could be unjustly killed.

The authors do not give adequate consideration to the role of prudence and this is seen best in their analysis of conditional intentions. They hold that an action done reluctantly, conditionally, and with limited freedom is no different from actions done unconditionally and in full freedom. One must ask if this is true, however. Is a spy who is being tortured and who misleads his tormenters to save innocent lives as guilty as one who lies to escape a jail sentence for drug dealing? One has the impression that the authors would consider both acts equally wrong while others would contend there are considerable differences between them.

The authors assert that they are proposing the views of the "common morality" but if that is true, then this morality is highly deontological. It is interesting that they devote much time to criticizing utilitarianism and consequentialism, but have very little to say against deontology, which leads one to believe that their sympathies lie with the deontologists rather than with those who uphold the "common morality".

The authors do not allow considerations of consequences or "circumstances" to enter into judgments of actions, and virtually all prudential consideration is categorized by the authors as "consequentialist". In doing this, they seem to separate themselves from classical Thomism which allowed circumstances (such as those which radically constricted freedom) to qualify actions or change their nature. Another prudential consideration which the authors do not seem to consider is how others would assess an immediate Western abandonment of nuclear deterrence. It is quite likely that such an action might be highly destabilizing and could precipitate the sort of indiscriminate war which the authors seek so desperately to avoid.

Finnis, Grisez and Boyle do not squarely face the dilemma posed for their arguments by the duty to defend one's society. It is morally admirable to turn a cheek when unjustly attacked, but it is not entirely clear that we have a right to turn one's cheek if that would mean that we would force others to turn their cheeks as well. It is not clear that we have a right to lay down our arms when other innocents are dependent on our maintaining those arms for their protection. This is a true dilemma, for it is wrong to use immoral means to defend one's self and others, but it is also immoral not to defend the innocent if the means to do this are available. In our pluralist society, there are many who are utterly repelled by deliberate killing of the innocent. But they believe they have a right to be defended against unjust aggression and they consider nuclear weapons a just means of defense, and it is not clear that it is moral to leave them without defense against unjust aggression. The authors' approach is unsatisfactory because they appear to ignore this dilemma and also jeopardize many innocent lives in order to protect the principle that the innocent must not be killed, even in circumstances where many would say that the killing is indirect.

This work also appears to suffer from ethnocentricity, for the authors demand only that the Western powers unilaterally disarm. It is not clear why they do not argue vigorously that immediate nuclear disarmament is a bilateral obligation. The authors are quite willing to impose harsher moral demands on the Western powers than they are on the Warsaw Pact nations, and they do not tell us why the Western powers appear to be under a much harsher obligation than the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact nations have nuclear, conventional and chemical weapons' arsenals that are larger than those of the Western powers, are more indiscriminate in their effects, and they have explicitly stated in the past that they would use such weapons against noncombatants. But the authors require only the Western powers to disarm even if it would mean tempting the Warsaw Pact into a nuclear first strike. It must be asked if the authors would require the Warsaw Pact powers to disarm unilaterally if the Western allies refused to do so, even if this disarmament presented an irresistible temptation to the Eastern powers to attack? If they should call for anything, it should be immediate bilateral nuclear disarmament rather than unilateral disarmament.
This book has advanced the debate on the morality of nuclear deterrence by its intelligent and comprehensive discussion, and it has changed the character of this debate. Because of this book it is now the case that the majority of not only liberal but also most moderate and conservative Catholics support unilateral nuclear disarmament. This book has made immediate unilateral nuclear disarmament by the West the new orthodoxy, and this could turn out to be a rather dangerous situation. It would be wise to consider the prudence of this present situation very closely.

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Doctor John Finnis Responds to the Observations of Mr. Murphy and Father Barry

I am grateful to the Editor for the opportunity to take up some of the critical observations made by Matthew Murphy and Robert Barry.

1. Mr. Murphy and Father Barry think that a potential aggressor whose objectives are limited, "in terms of the benefits sought and the costs willing to be borne in pursuit of them", cannot credibly threaten unlimited escalation, and can be resisted by threats of limited response.

Their argument is logically invalid, and overlooks strategic realities accepted by all nuclear-capable governments and virtually all professional strategists.

An aggressor willing to threaten nuclear strikes impacting seriously on our civilians has a high prospect of attaining his limited objectives without incurring any cost, unless we render his threats incredible by counter-threats going beyond merely blocking his military objectives. Where the aggressor's potential objectives and actual capabilities may include the elimination of our society, our counter-threats will themselves be incredible and futile unless they include the threat of reprisals directed -- if need be, after our own society's destruction -- against the aggressor's society as such.

Though this is carefully argued out in our book, Mr. Murphy and Father Barry make no attempt to identify a flaw in our premises or our reasoning (reasoning which is strategically standard and only confirms common-sense).

2. The US and NATO strategy of flexible response explicitly and for good strategic reasons makes its threats of limited response to limited aggression credible by also threatening a counter-society "general nuclear response" to excessive Soviet reprisals against our limited response(s). Only the umbrella constituted by this ultimate threat allows the US/NATO to contemplate meeting limited (e.g. conventional) attacks by a nuclear-capable aggressor with limited (conventional or nuclear) responses.

3. From our book's first sentence ("One acts to deter when one threatens to do something which another wants one not to do, so that the other will not do something one wants to prevent"), our treatment of deterrence has nothing to do with "emotivist, non-rational threats or non-rational modes of persuasion. This charge by our critics is not and I believe could not be substantiated.

4. Mr. Murphy and Father Barry are confused about targeting and intention. We never say what they "quote", viz., "targeting does not prove intention". Instead we say: "Targeting does not define intention".

This has nothing to do with weighing evidence or practicing discernment of soul. What defines the morally significant intention of a military operation is the military purpose of the operation in which targeting is a technical means.
The intentions we ascribe to the operations proposed in Western deterrent strategy are exclusively those intentions stated or plainly implied in official statements of the strategy. Only that official public policy is under scrutiny in our book.

It is important to notice that Mr. Murphy and Father Barry do not challenge our arguments showing that that public policy is not and cannot be a bluff.

5. We do not "admit that (the threat of 'final retaliation') is never stated openly". We say that it is stated openly, and quote the relevant official statements. The very term "final retaliation" comes from an official statement of the threat, by a Secretary of Defense who is a main architect of prevailing U.S. deterrent doctrine. (I am referring to Harold Brown, whom Mr. Murphy and Father Barry rightly rely on; they should attend to his constant reminders that capability to retaliate against military targets, as such, depends for its rationality on the underpinning threat of an ultimate retaliation against Soviet values as values -- a retaliation no longer to block military force by military force, but to impose on an otherwise victorious society losses "offsetting" what they have gained by our defeat.)

The threat of city swapping is also stated officially and openly (here we twice quote Harold Brown), though rather less frequently and explicitly; only the phrase "city swapping" is not used in official documents.

6. Mr. Murphy and Father Barry simply ignore one of our book's key conclusions (and the argument for it): that in a limited retaliation against an enemy city, for purposes of deterring further escalation and/or demonstrating resolve to escalate higher if necessary, all those killed in the city are killed as non-combatants, i.e., as innocents. They ignore our parallel conclusion (and the argument): that people, even war criminals and military personnel, killed in a final retaliation to impose what are officially called "unacceptable losses" would be killed as innocents.

7. Correspondingly, their criticism of our discussion of the combatant/non-combatant distinction, and their ruminations on Soviet industrial practices, and on the classes of industry included in U.S. targeting plans, are all beside the point. For the reason indicated in the preceding paragraph, nothing in our book's argument turns on what activities one counts as contributing to a society's war-effort. We are quite content to count as "combatant" even more people and industrial activities than Mr. Murphy and Father Barry seem to want to.

But I must observe that the definition of "combatant" which they themselves rightly adopt -- "closely associated with actual conduct of aggression" -- excludes treating as combatant those industries whose only relevance is that they would afford the Soviets a more rapid post-war recovery. The sometimes fashionable targeting category called "war-recovery capabilities" merely veils, diaphanously, the constantly reaffirmed and real content of the strategically necessary final deterrent threat: to impose on the aggressor society losses greater than anything they would gain by destroying us - losses of things the Soviets value, to be destroyed because they value them, not because they are elements of a force being or even about to be used unjustly.

8. Referring to "conditional intentions", Mr. Murphy and Father Barry claim that we "hold that an action done reluctantly, conditionally, and with limited freedom is no different from actions done unconditionally and in full freedom". This claim (which, incidentally, confuses intentions with actions) is quite wrong.

We state that the culpability of conditional intentions can be mitigated in several ways which are inapplicable to unconditional intentions and their execution in action. We state that the question whether act (or policy or intention) X and act (or policy or intention) Y are "equally wrong" is ambiguous: it may mean "both wrong" or it may mean "wrong in the same degree". The question for conscience, i.e., for prudence, is whether X and/or Y are wrong. Degrees of culpability are simply irrelevant in deciding whether an option open to one is morally permissible.

For the same reason, questions of "limited or full freedom" are irrelevant in a book which is trying, not to ascribe culpability to anyone, but to help guide the consciences of readers who can freely choose to support their country's deterrent policy or to reject it as immoral.

9. Our book by no means downplays the "dilemma" posed by the co-existence of the duty to defend our society with the duty not to intend to kill innocents. We explain the
"dilemma", prominently and, I think, very frankly. (Though we personally see little likelihood that unilateral nuclear disarmament, carried out on moral grounds and with awareness of the risks, would increase the risk of nuclear attack on the nuclear-disarmed nations, we do not exclude nuclear wars from our survey of the various quite possible bad consequences of unilateral disarmament; indeed, it is the first of these consequences we refer to.)

Nor is it true that we "do not allow considerations of consequences or circumstances to enter into judgments of actions" and categorize "virtually all prudential consideration as 'consequentialist'". Our book is full of suggestions about the very real moral relevance of consequences.

But, with the entire Catholic tradition, we refuse to accept that the "dilemma" is a true moral perplexity, or that a willingness to kill the innocent is compatible with prudence. Prudence is an integral virtue, not a worldly wisdom, nor even a well-intentioned willingness to do evil for the sake of good. Incorporating justice and the other virtues, prudence functions to exclude certain options from the deliberations of the prudent person. But what option should be chosen and carried out will depend upon a prudent consideration of foreseeable consequences.

Mr. Murphy and especially Father Barry owe their readers an explanation of how their remarks cohere with "classical Thomism's" conception of prudence, which absolutely excludes e.g., the option of a single act of adulterous intercourse to save an entire political community (de Malo qu. 15 a. 1 ad 5).

10. We in no way make harsher moral demands on the Western powers than on the Soviets. The Soviets' moral responsibility to renounce their immoral policies, including nuclear policies, must be at least as extensive and urgent as the responsibility of Western nations.

Each nation and alliance has an unconditional responsibility to renounce immediately every threat, proposal, and strategy involving the destruction of non-combatants by city swapping or final retaliation. This responsibility is indeed "bilateral", though unconditional. The Soviets have an additional responsibility which we also make very plain: to renounce definitively the immoral threats implicit in Marxism-Leninism and in a military apparatus geared for offensive war.

But everyone knows what to say about an examination of conscience which shifts from the question what should I have done, and what should I now do, away to the diverting and comfortable theme of my neighbor's guilt...

Dr. John Finnis
Oxford

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Rosenstock-Huessy visualized the Gospels serving the Church as the lips of Jesus. In order for these fundamental documents of Christian faith to function as they should in the Church, it was necessary for them to be properly disposed one to the other. Rosenstock-Huessy was well enough acquainted with the nineteenth century German academic history to know that something happened during the nineteenth century that had served to distort the twentieth century voice of Jesus. To be specific, Rosenstock-Huessy recognized that a certain “assured result” of nineteenth century German Protestant Gospel criticism - namely the primacy of the Gospel of Mark - had in fact never been established, and that this mistaken reversal of the traditional relationship between the Gospels had far-reaching consequences. This placed Rosenstock-Huessy fundamentally at odds with the established world of theological scholarship, since it was inconceivable to his theological colleagues that most German New Testament scholars could be mistaken on such a fundamental point, i.e., on their assumption of Marcan primacy.

The theory of Marcan primacy has led to the “scientific” practice of applying the text of the Gospel of Matthew, the foundational Gospel of the Christian Church, to the text of the presumed “primal” text of Mark. The consequent twist of Jesus’ lips that followed from this paradigm shift profoundly diminished the Jewish character of his message and helped pave the way for “German Christianity in the Third Reich”. Moreover, interest in the book of Isaiah (in which book Rosenstock-Huessy could see the whole of Christian faith prefigured), was discounted as a later obsession of the Apostles, rather than a beginning point for understanding Jesus’ own reading of the Law and the Prophets.

But in 1964, with the publication of The Synoptic Problem, A Critical Analysis by William Farmer, Rosenstock-Huessy’s insight concerning the misplaced confidence in Marcan primacy received support from an unexpected quarter – Dallas, Texas (where the year before John F. Kennedy had been assassinated). Rosenstock-Huessy contacted his former colleague at Dartmouth College, Klaus Penzel, who had recently moved to Southern Methodist University, where Farmer was teaching. This led to a meeting between Rosenstock-Huessy and Farmer in Heidelberg at the von Moltke residence in the Spring of 1965, where arrangements were made for Rosenstock-Huessy to travel to Gottingen for a small-scale high-level conference with some German and American professors. Out of this small beginning has come a series of international Gospel conferences: Pittsburgh 1970, Munster 1976, San Antonio 1977, Cambridge 1979, Tubingen 1982,AMPLEFORTH 1982 and 1983, Jerusalem 1984, Atlanta 1986, with further conferences scheduled for Cambridge in 1988, Dublin 1989, Dallas 1989, and Milan 1990 - all indebted to and giving expression to the insight and spirit of Rosenstock-Huessy.

In 1977 Rosenstock-Huessy’s recognition that Marcan primacy was never established in the nineteenth century received even more dramatic confirmation in a book published by the venerable house of Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht: Geschichte und Kritik der markus Hypothese by Hans-Herbert Stoldt (Eng. translation by Donald L. Niewyk, History and Criticism of the Marcan Hypothesis, Mercer University Press and T. & T. Clark Ltd., 1980).

In 1987 the late Professor Bo Reicke of Basel University published his study of “Synoptic Theories Advanced During the Consolidation of Germany, 1830-1870”, in which he traced the history of the idea of Marcan primacy from David F. Strauss to Heinrich J. Holtzmann, noting that the appointment of the young Holtzmann to the prestigious chair of New Testament at the reconstituted University of Strassbourg gave his scholarly career (and thus the Marcan hypothesis) an important boost.
From Straus to Holtzmann and Meijboom: Synoptic Theories Advanced During the Consolidation of Germany, 1830-1870, Novum Testamentum XXIX, 1 (1987) p. 18). Meanwhile, Hans-Herbert Stoldt in 1977 had analyzed Holtzmann’s influential book of 1863, and had demonstrated its scientific weakness. Since this had been done independently as early as 1866 by the Dutch scholar, Hugo Meijboom, well before Holtzmann’s appointment to the Chair at Strasbourg, it remains a mystery how and why this appointment was made. This leads us to focus on the decade in which this happened, 1870-1880, the era of the Kulturkampf, to see whether it is possible to discover how what was still only a popular “scientific” hypothesis in 1870 was soon transformed into a virtual Protestant dogma.

By Kulturkampf we mean that conflict which dominated relations between Germany and Rome during the decade of the eighteen seventies. This conflict pitted the Iron Chancellor of the German Empire Prince Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck-Schönhausen against Pius IX, the leader of the Catholic Church. The issue was an age-old question of Church and State.

Among the powerful ideological needs of nineteenth century Germany was not only that of a modus vivendi between the Protestant majority and a Catholic minority, but also between a Christian majority and a Jewish minority. Protestants, Catholics and Jews. following the Enlightenment, were, by 1869-70, all recognized as citizens of the Second Reich. These culturally diverse German citizens were expected to accommodate their inherited differences and work together if the German Empire was to thrive and to attain its ascending role in world politics.

Nineteenth century Biblical criticism served German society well in enabling it to meet these pressing ideological needs. The state-supported universities facilitated the inevitable process of intellectual accommodation, and/or assimilation. From our post-Holocaust vantage point it is shocking how far Judaism was willing to go in facilitating the possibilities for a German Jew to become a “better” German. Not only were the dietary laws given up, some synagogues were willing to move their main worship service to Sunday. Enlightenment Biblical criticism which became state-supported Biblical scholarship smoothed the way for this accommodation.

On the majority side, sacrifices made by Christians were less radical. However, all passages in Scripture which had fed Christian anti-Semitism through the middle ages needed to be discountable. This meant not only that the terrible words in Matthew “let his blood be upon our heads”, needed to be relativized; so also did the stinging condemnations of the Pharisees in Matthew 23. This was best achieved by denying the foundational role of Matthew in the constitution of the Church, and by giving this foundational role over to earlier hypothetical sources which were sanitized and purified as much as possible from anti-Jewish polemic. The two chief results of this process were Proto-Mark and the Logia source later called “Q”.

The breaking up of the text of Matthew into many parts with the earliest and most reliable coming from Mark and “Q”, and the later and less certain (which tended to include material that was troublesome) coming from the Church or from the time and hand of the Evangelist, made it possible for liberal theologians to pick and choose with a clear conscience as they composed “historical” reconstructions of Jesus serviceable for the time, i.e., serviceable for intellectually-liberal Germans — Jews and Christians, Catholics and Protestants alike. Ideally Jesus was a Jewish Rabbi of the liberal school of Hillel. But he could also be a Jewish Prophet. Both liberal Jews and liberal Christians could experience relief and joy over this deconstructive yet socially and nationally unifying achievement made possible by German Wissenschaft.

However, it was just this gentle liberal historical Jewish teacher or eschatological prophet — whichever the case might be — that proved inadequate as a basis for theology for disillusioned post-World War I liberal Christians in Germany when they tried to make sense out of the devastating defeat of their imperial forces. The defeated German people needed a theology with a strong doctrine of sin. In Germany, this led to Pauline dominated Dialectical theology with its rejection of the “historical” Jesus and, in this country, eventually to Pauline-dominated Neo-orthodoxy.

State-initiated pressure on German Catholics to accommodate and/or assimilate to the Protestant majority (and this is what the
Kulturkampf was all about) was at first successfully resisted by the Vatican. But eventually, through the state-supported universities of Germany, aided by British and American universities which followed the lead of German scholarship, German Wissenschaft triumphed over Church tradition, over "revelation", over "the Oracular". Sociologically speaking, within Germany, the critical tradition that developed in and was fostered by these State Universities was one that went a long way toward serving the ideological need for Catholics, Protestants and Jews to accommodate their differences, in the interest of a unified and purposeful Germany.

The societies of every country which faced essentially these same ideological needs readily embraced this liberal Protestant German criticism. These include those of England, Scotland, Holland, Scandinavia, the United States, Australia and New Zealand. The most talented and aspiring young Biblical scholars from these countries flocked to the German universities.

But societies in which these particular ideological needs did not exist, turned a deaf ear to this critical tradition. These included those of Ireland, Austria, Greece, France, Italy, Ethiopia, Spain, Portugal and all Latin American countries. The presence of students from these societies in the lecture halls of the theological faculties, whether Protestant or Catholic, of the universities of Berlin, Gottingen, Marburg, Tubingen, Munster and Strassbourg, was negligible...

And now we come to the point of our essay:

Marcan primacy became a German dogma. It is literally taught to children without question. How did this happen? In 1870, the Marcan Hypothesis was only a popular wissenschaftliche hypothese. But certainly by 1914, probably by 1890, and possibly as early as 1880 this popular Protestant hypothesis was converted into a dogma. Why? I suggest that belief in Marcan primacy and the existence of "Q" became dogmatic counterparts to the dogmas of Petrine Primacy and Papal supremacy. These dogmas (i.e., Marcan primacy and the existence of "Q") cut the theological (i.e., scriptural) ground from underneath the Vatican Council decrees. In sociological terms the wissenschaftliche achievements of Marcan primacy and the existence of "Q" correlate positively in results if not in intentions to the political passage of the May Laws. In both cases the results achieved were anti-ultramontane in effect, and both achievements were reached through State institutions under State control. In both cases, parameters were set, within which the Catholic minority was to find a viable place in the body politic of the Second Reich. (Not until they accepted Marcan primacy would Catholic exegetes be accepted by their Protestant colleagues.) The immediate reaction of the Catholic hierarchy was one of resistance to political aggression from the dominant Protestant majority. Bismarck, however, found a way around this resistance by going over the head of the German Catholics and negotiating a favorable end to the Kulturkampf with the new Pope who wanted to normalize relationships between Germany and the Vatican. This eventually freed German Catholic liberals — who, in the first instance, in the face of state persecution, had joined forces with conservative Catholics — to resume their program of cultural assimilation through university-sponsored German Wissenschaft. This in turn eventually paved the way for German Catholic university-based scholars to recommend Marcan primacy and the existence of "Q" even in the face of the Vatican-sponsored Biblical Commission's Responsum of 1912, which at that time was still negative to this theory.

During the Kulturkampf the German universities were more unified in support of Bismarck's goals than was the Prussian legislature. There had been open opposition in the legislature to the May Laws. No such concerted opposition to Protestant shibboleths developed in the universities. All German professors, both Protestants and Catholics, were appointed by the State. For a brief period, after 1875, any German scholar who questioned the Marcan Hypothesis in its essential form, i.e., entailing Marcan primacy would, in however small a measure, endanger "the foundation of the State". They would endanger the foundation of the State by denying the German majority a decisive defensive weapon against Vatican-inspired aggression manifest in the traditional use the Jesuits and the Pope were making of the Peter passage in Matthew, noticeably absent from Mark: "Thou art Peter and upon this rock I will build my church" - Protestants be damned! This being translated into ideological terms meant: dreams of German unity on Bismarck's (Protestant) terms be damned...

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It may be argued that no German scholar of the Second Reich, Catholic or Protestant, would have allowed himself to be influenced by the fear of being regarded as unwissenschaflich. But is such an argument sociologically tenable? And in any case would these German scholars also be free from all national sentiment? Would Catholic professors be immune from the societal pressure emanating from a majority prejudice that a Catholic “cannot love his Fatherland”? It is within this historical and sociological context that we are most likely to find the answer to our question: “How did Mark displace Matthew as the foundational Gospel for Christian faith and thus offer itself as the chief theological model for liberal Protestant, and eventually liberal Catholic theology?” Our hypothesis is: that this until now otherwise unexplained transformation happened in part in response to the ideological need of the German State for a theological defense against a life threatening move on the part of the Pope and his Jesuit army. The latter were bulldozing through the Vatican Council, over the opposition of liberals from northern Europe (especially Germany) and the United States. The decrees on Papal supremacy and Papal infallibility were intended to help rally a Catholic ultramontane coalition of France and Austria against Protestant Prussia. The decrees proceed from and depend upon the Peter passage found only in Matthew. Liberal Catholic losers at Vatican Council I, after the Kulturkampf was over, eventually regrouped, and in Vatican Council II they became the winners in this matter. Meanwhile, however, they had appropriated an important lesson. By Vatican Council II, they had come to recognize who was sovereign in Germany. It was Mark, not Matthew.

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Reflections on Second Chances: Men, Women and Children a Decade After Divorce -- Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why (1)

There is no doubt that some members of a progressive "new knowledge class" of intellectuals, bureaucrats, social activists, and those involved in the "helping" and "therapeutic" professions will consider Judith Wallerstein a "traitor to her class" given the publication of Second Chances (co-authored with a professional writer, Sandra Blakeslee). This is so because it would require an unrealistic display of mental gymnastics to read the book and then argue, as many Marxists, feminists, and other haters of the traditional family are wont to do, that divorce smoothly and universally translates into "liberation" for parents and, especially, for children. As outstanding as is Wallerstein's analysis of the effects of divorce on parents, children, and society in general, orthodox Catholics and Christians should not get too excited about the volume; the author cannot conceive of modern American society without either a great deal of, or easy access to, divorce. Indeed, while her diagnosis will irritate the authoritarians of the left, her scientistic and statist prescription, given widespread divorce, will smooth most of their ruffled feathers. Nor will her suggestions do anything to hurt either the material or status needs of the new knowledge class; instead of arguing against divorce, she argues that society can develop ways to better mitigate its hitherto devastating consequences. (Her suggestions bring to mind what the comedian Mel Brooks declared to a convention of psychiatrists in the movie, High Anxiety, about the significance of the life and work of Sigmund Freud: "He gave us a good living!") For Wallerstein:

At a minimum, the variety of supports and services for divorcing families needs to be expanded in scope and over time. These families need education at the time of the divorce about the special problems created by their decision. They need help in making decisions about living arrangements, visiting schedules, and sole or joint custody. And they need help in implementing these decisions over many years -- and in modifying them as the children grow and the family changes. Divorcing families need universally available mediation services. They also need specialized counseling over the long haul in those cases where the children are at clear risk, where the parents are still locked in bitter disputes, and where there has been family violence. Divorcing men and women must make realistic provision for the economic support of their children, backed up by the government when necessary. These provisions should include health care and college education, where it is appropriate (pp. 306-7).

Despite her essentially Comteian vision, there is much valuable and apparently objective research in Second Chances, "the first ever written on the long-term consequences of divorce on the American family" (p. x). Starting her study in 1971, Wallerstein and her research associates identified and interviewed a group of sixty families with a total of one hundred and thirty-one children who had recently experienced divorce. The author tracked these families over time, interviewing them again after one, five, ten, and fifteen year intervals. Her sample was consciously taken from a relatively homogeneous population: all the families were white and middle-class and none of the individuals suffered from any chronic emotional disturbance or severe learning disability. As the author plausibly argues, "our intention...was...to select families...that would enable us to see the effects of divorce in bold relief...These couples and their children seemed to be doing well or reasonably well and thus were representative of the way normal people from a white, middle-class background cope with divorce" (p. xiv).

Wallerstein's findings are all the more impressive when one understands that they were not expected at the initial stage of the study. (As a matter of fact, they give eloquent testimony to the proposition that social science need not be reduced to ideology.) The author:

When I set out to interview the families in our study at the ten-year mark, I expected that most adults would say that divorce was a closed book. For children, it would be ancient history. After all, most had spent the major part of their lives in divorced or remarried families. I expected to find a range of ways in which people had put their lives back together — with some doing well and others chronically unhappy — and I was braced for a few tears, nostalgia, reluctance to look back, lingering attachments, and maybe occasional regret a divorce had ever happened. But I did not expect the experience to endure so fully for so many, with high drama, passions, vivid memories, fantasy relationships, jagged breaks in development, intense anger, and profound discrepancies in quality of life. Nor did I anticipate the problems that so many young people would encounter upon entering young adulthood. Although I thought I was being realistic, nothing prepared me for what I found (p.20).

The last chapter summarizes nicely just what the author did find out.

Among her conclusions are the following:

- "Divorce is a wrenching experience for many adults and almost all children. It is almost always more devastating for children than for parents" (p. 297) —

- "The effects of divorce are often long-lasting. Children are especially affected because divorce occurs during their formative years" (pp. 297-8) —

- "Three in five (children) felt rejected by at least one of the parents, sensing that they were a piece of psychological or economic baggage left over from a regretted journey" (p. 298) —

- "Very few (children) were helped financially with college educations, even though they continued to visit their fathers regularly. But because their fathers were relatively well-off, they were ineligible for scholarships" (p. 298) —

- "Almost half of the children entered adulthood as worried, underachieving self-deprecating, and sometimes angry young men and women. Others felt deprived of the parenting and family protection that they always wanted and never got...Some children literally brought themselves up, while others were responsible for a troubled parent as well" (p. 299) —

- "Although boys had a harder time over the years than girls, suffering a wider range of difficulties in school achievements, peer relationships, and the handling of aggression, this disparity in overall adjustment eventually dissipated. As the young women stood at the developmental threshold of young adulthood, when it was time to seek commitment with a young man, many found themselves struggling with anxiety and guilt" (p. 299) —

- "The full legacy of the past twenty years begins to hit home...(as)...the new families that are formed appear vulnerable to the effects of divorce" (p.300) —

- "Some adults are at greater risk than others. Women with young children, especially if they are driven into poverty by divorce, face a Herculean struggle to survive emotionally and physically...Many older men and women coming out of long term marriages are alone and unhappy, facing older age with rising anxiety...Younger men are often adrift. Divorce seems to block them from expanding into their adult roles as husbands and fathers. Finally, for adults, the high failure rate of second marriages is serious and...often devastating because it reinforces the first failure many times" (p. 301) —

- "When a marriage breaks down, most men and women experience a diminished capacity to parent. They give less time, provide less discipline, and are less sensitive to their children, being caught up themselves in the personal maelstrom of divorce and its aftermath" (p. 301) —

- "It is difficult for fathers who have moved out of the house to sustain a close and loving relationship with their children, especially if one or both parents remarry...Many a father seems to
have lost the sense that his children are part of his own generational continuity, his defense against mortality. This blunting of the father's relationship to his children is a stunning surprise" (p. 302) –

"New, unfamiliar parent-child relationships have developed in some families in which the child is overburdened by responsibility for a parent's psychological welfare or by serving as an instrument of parental rage" (p. 302) –

"Good stepparent-child relationships are not assured. They need to be properly nurtured to take root in the minds and hearts of the children. Many children feel excluded from the remarried family" (p. 302) –

Not all of Wallerstein's findings regarding the effects of divorce are negative. For instance, the author argues that "many of the second marriages are in fact happier. These adults learn from their earlier experiences and avoid making the same mistakes" (p. 300). Also, she notes that "many of the children emerged in young adulthood as compassionate, courageous, and competent people...Some later experienced nurturing love affairs and good marriages of their own making" (pp. 298-9). Furthermore, this particular psychologist believes that "although our overall findings are troubling and serious, we should not point the finger of blame at divorce per se. Indeed divorce is often the only rational solution to a bad marriage. When people ask whether they should stay married for the sake of the children, I have to say, 'of course not'. A divorce undertaken thoughtfully and realistically can teach children how to confront serious life problems with compassion, wisdom, and appropriate action" (p. 305). Thus does Wallerstein give evidence of the modern bias that is simultaneously against constraints of any kind (e.g., one shouldn't divorce, one shouldn't engage in promiscuous sex) and for scientific "solutions" for "social problems" (e.g., therapy, an AIDS vaccine).

The author is well aware that her study will be attacked from the religious and political left regarding her diagnosis of divorce and from the religious and political right regarding her prescription given its reality. Wallerstein:

From the left we hear counter-arguments that relationships have become more honest and more equal between men and women and that the changes we face simply represent 'the new family form'. But to say that all family forms are equivalent is to semantically camouflage the truth: all families are not alike in the protection they extend to children... (On the other hand)... our findings do not support those who would turn back the clock. As family issues are flung to the center of our political arena, nostalgic voices from the right argue for a return to a time when divorce was difficult to obtain. But they do not offer solutions to the serious problems that have contributed to the rising divorce rate in the first place (p. 305).

Is Wallerstein correct that orthodox Catholics and Christians have no such solutions? On the contrary, the call to a return to God and to God's laws about both the sacredness and indissolubility of marriage are the answer. In order to make such a return possible, however, the orthodox must first shape up their own houses and then evangelize the faith in the never-ending attempt to "restore all things in Christ". Given her modern mentality, Wallerstein misses this religious opportunity when she observes that "the children of divorce have an old-fashioned view of marriage. They are disdainful of concepts like serial monogamy and open marriage, and compared with their parents, they are a morally conservative group. Their return to more traditional values, however, is not rooted in theology but stems from their own gut-wrenching unhappiness over the experience of divorce" (p. 25). Part of any authentic "Catholic moment" in American society would necessarily entail the conversion of these "moral conservatives" into orthodox Catholics.

It should also be critically noted in passing that nowhere in her study does Wallerstein analyze the influence of religious orientation on either the decision to divorce or on how one responds to its effects.

Given both its pluses and minuses from a Catholic perspective, the analysis contained within Second Chances should spur Catholics on to develop and/or resurrect an authentic Catholic psychology/social science. There is much truth in Wallerstein's work and it is incumbent upon the scholars within the Church to make even more perfect her analysis.

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Book Reviews


This introduction and fourteen essays deal with dissent in the Catholic Church, with special interest focused on the Curran case at Catholic University. The book was published before the case was decided.

The editor is not William E. May, the 1988-89 president of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, but William W. May, who teaches ethics at the University of Southern California. However, the former has contributed a chapter. And it is best to begin with his chapter because it makes a claim of central importance: that some specific moral norms proposed by the Church’s Magisterium have been proposed infallibly, and that Catholics do not have the right to dissent from these teachings. Dissenters often mistake certain infallible teachings for fallible teaching and also fail to accept authoritative non-infallible teachings with religious submission.

There is a great catalogue of dissent in this book; it offers a sad picture of division in the Church. Some of the dissenting authors are Charles Curran, Richard McCormick, and Ann Patrick (the President of the Catholic Theological Society of America). At the heart of their argument is a point dealt with by William E. May.

After making a case for dissent, several authors make a case for the Holy See doing little or nothing about dissenters. This makes sense of course because, if there is nothing wrong with dissent, there is no need for worry. But, if dissent is eating at the heart of the Church, and if certain actions can weaken dissent, the Holy See is obliged to take some action. The most common argument directed at trying to restrain the Holy See from acting is that, though there may be gains in the short run, in the long run one or more of the actions will prove to have been mistaken, and much harm will result. It seems to me that the answer to this is that taking such actions is a matter of prudence. The Holy See will have to measure the deplorable state of the Church caused by dissent, on the one hand, and the long term effectiveness of particular actions on the other.

Dissenters must take responsibility for their actions. If they decided that, before God, they must publicly contradict the Magisterium, so be it however un-Catholic that thinking. But they should not expect, as Father Curran does, permission from the Magisterium to do so.

It would be easier for the Holy See, of course, if local bishops or episcopal conferences, or university boards of trustees, were to do their share of the required correction, but most of them have decided to leave it to Rome. Archbishop Mahony makes a case in this book for some kind of episcopal intervention, even if his message is a rather mild one.

Leonard A. Kennedy, C.S.B.
St. Peter’s Seminary
London, Canada

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Father Thomas Weinandy, current Fellowship of Catholic Scholars’ Vice President, has produced a tool for parents, priests, and religious educators which shows both pastoral experience and theological wisdom. Recognizing the present state of confessional practice, Father Weinandy presents theological insights and practical help that will enable adults and children to participate in the Sacrament of Reconciliation in a more meaningful and fruitful manner.

In the first five chapters Father Weinandy presents cardinal scriptural and doctrinal truths that are indispensable for a proper understanding of the sacrament; they lead to a balanced and mature experience of the Christian life.

In addition the author offers a theological and pastoral basis for understanding the Sacrament of Reconciliation. Review questions at the end of each chapter bring into focus the key points of the chapter and call the reader to examine his or her personal response to these points.
In the second half of the book, Father Weinandy presents a guide to help families prepare for the sacrament. These chapters are addressed primarily to parents, but priests and religious educators will also find them valuable for the pastoral insights they provide. Three of these chapters provide guidance for a particular age group (children, young adults, and parents), to help each prepare for the sacrament.

The final chapter consists of seven "Questions Frequently Asked" about the practice and doctrine of the Sacrament of Reconciliation: from frequency of confession to the hope of emotional and spiritual healing through the grace of confession.

John J. Dillon, Ph.D.
Gaithersburg, Maryland

The Papacy and the Church in the United States, Bernard Cooke, Editor, Paulist Press, New York, 220 pp., $10.95.

One of the first books to follow Vatican II, written by two Fordham professors, was entitled "The De-Romanization of the American Catholic Church". This volume could be its sequel pieced together on another Jesuit campus (Holy Cross) and this time by an ex-Jesuit, Bernard Cooke. (His original research and conclusions on the Catholic priesthood/hierarchy was rejected by the U.S. bishops almost twenty years ago.) The usual papal demythologizers are here - James Hennessey, S.J., Gerald P. Fogarty, S.J., Agnes Cunningham, S.S.C.M., Msgr. Frederick McManus, Father James H. Provost, and so forth. There is no debate among opposing scholarly viewpoints, merely affirmations and re-affirmations that papal jurisdiction over the universal Church must be trimmed because ultramontanism, personified today in John Paul II, represents usurpation and misrepresents the historical reality of the Church. No one denies the practical difficulties popes have had, even some excessive reactions among popes trying to keep the Catholic faith alive and authentic in local Churches that often have gone their schismatic or heretical way.

Jesuit John Coleman, who glamorized the post-Vatican II Church of Holland, cites with approval Frederick McManus' animadversion that traditional defenders of papal jurisdiction know little of Christian tradition! Charles Curran thinks that the Church of the 1950's was the most authoritarian in history. No historian he. A small question: How did Father Marvin O'Connell and his straight story of Archbishop John Ireland get into this book? O'Connell's John Ireland was a home-ruling bishop and an Americanizer, but certainly no objector to papal primacy of jurisdiction. He supported Pius X's crackdown of modernists. The editors may have mistaken a loyalist Roman archbishop keen on local common sense and adjustment, for a Gallican. But nice to find Marvin O'Connell and John Ireland anywhere.

Everything You Always Wanted to Know About the Catholic Church by Paul L. Williams, Doubleday, New York, 1989, 310 pp., $17.95.

Paul Williams' book is intended to fill the gap left by Paulist Father Bertrand Conway's Question Box, a classic handbook of answers for inquiring and aspiring Catholics sixty years ago. Many priests in the 1940's and 1950's used Father Conway regularly - indeed handed these little books out to prospective converts like candy bars. Question Box was a short history course for them and it saved explaining to catechumens that there were Catholic scandals as well as glories even in New Testament times; and bad popes, later, who remain a faint business measured against the indeflectible riches of the Church's sacramental life and piety.

Paul Williams covers the same territory in eighteen chapters and in greater detail. Mr. Williams' specialty is patrology, so it is natural for him to spend a significant amount of space on patristic activity. His first chapter "A Primer to Church History and the Papacy" is replete with accounts of early Christianity, Constantine, the rise of the influence of the papacy, especially of "great" Popes like Leo I and Gregory I, even of Alexander VI and his failings; the story of the Great Schism, the condemnation of Galileo, and so forth. The text is also contemporary, covering the sorry state of Vatican finances in the 1970's and 1980's and the story of the Church's modern difficulties with the Italian banking system. The full story of that involvement has still to be told.

Paul Williams reflects the teaching of the Church accurately throughout the book. He confronts the issue of dissent honestly.
Although every parish priest, if he had the chance, would add or subtract from the questions eventually chosen by the author, the average pastor will find this book useful indeed. The index, always a valuable tool for the reader of any "question box", leaves something to be desired, e.g., Archbishop Paul Marcinkus appears on pages 263-267 for his role in recent Vatican finances, but he never appears in the Index.

George A. Kelly

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The Hebrew Christ by Claude Tresmontant, Franciscan Herald Press, 323 pp., $19.95.

I began reading this book the day I read a Catholic News Service report (October 5th) of Father Raymond Brown's declaration to seminarians in Washington, D.C. that Jesus never talked about a "church" except once, and that when he thought of priests at all, they were Jewish. Further, when the idea of bishops rose in the early Christian community it was St. Paul who was the initiator.

The Hebrew Christ, commissioned by a bishop and written by an experienced Hebraist at the Sorbonne, calls "into serious question many of today's received ideas on the conventional wisdom which is often regarded as certain, and is therefore simply taken for granted in most of the journals or studies on the gospels" (p. IX). The bishop, Jean Charles Thomas, presently in Versailles, then in Corsica, wanted short articles on the gospels (and got a book instead) because he thought the present reigning biblical hypotheses (that is all they are) represent "an intellectual world closed in upon itself."

Professor Tresmontant is a Hebrew linguist who insists that the gospels were written early and in Hebrew in spite of what modern critics suggest. He devotes one chapter to each gospel, one to the synoptic problem, demonstrating the validity of his view. He insists that Matthew's and John's original manuscripts were composed in the late 30's, Luke between 40 and 60 A.D., the first letters of Paul 50-52 A.D., and Mark last of all between 50-60 A.D., a heresy certain to bring interdict upon him from contemporary historico-critics.

To summarize Tresmontant: The claim that the Gospel according to Matthew was composed only toward the end of the First Century is a totally arbitrary claim...The only thing this claim has going for it is the fact that the majority opinion among exegetes today supports it...This is simply to say that the opinion rests upon nothing but itself...This view is plain begging of the question: the majority of exegetes today hold to this view, therefore, this is the view that must be held to...There is no more logic to the position than that." (pp. 9-10).

Bishop Thomas has done the Church a great favor in finding a Tresmontant, unafraid to challenge the control of knowledge in biblical circles.

Kenneth Whitehead, a member of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, translated the book from French into English.

And the Franciscan Herald Press should receive a medal for publishing it.

M.G. Cooney
Chicago

Books in Brief

FROM IGNATIUS PRESS

Fire Within by Thomas Dubay, S.M., 358 pp., $17.95.

Father Dubay, a Fellowship pioneer, has done it again. This book, the result of many years of giving retreats, is a book on holiness, intended for Christians generally, not simply religious. Capuchin spiritual writer Father

Benedict Groeschel calls it a "gold mine" for progress in prayer.

Joan of Arc by Mark Twain, 452 pp., $16.95.

Some will be surprised Mark Twain considered this his "best" work; called by his biographer "worth all of his other books together". A first-rate, accurate biography.
Three Philosophies of Life by Peter Kreeft, 140 pp., $7.95.

A commentary on Ecclesiastes, Job, and the Song of Songs, a study on the deeper meaning of love, sorrow, joy.


A useful study in homosexual power in the United States, endorsed by Congressman Henry Hyde and Evangelist Pat Robertson.


This lady, who spent two and a half years in a federal prison for her part in “Operation Rescue” tells the story of that movement and the suffering of those who are committed to save the unborn. Dr. Bernard Nathanson calls the book a “towering message of inspiration to all those who revere life”.

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