

# The Fifth Gospel

Ralph McInerny

**T**wenty years ago, Cardinal Giacomo Biffi published a little book called *Il quinto evangelo*. It is a bemused theological fantasy meant to point a Swiftian finger at the odd alterations of the Christian message that were turning up in the wake of Vatican II. It has recently been reprinted and it has lost none of its point in the interval. Far from it.

Cardinal Biffi's fantasy is that a fifth Gospel seems to be guiding us now, one that sets aside familiar injunctions from the hitherto dominant four.

To Matthew's "What does it profit a man if he gains the whole world and suffers the loss of his own soul?" the Fifth Gospel opposes, "What does it profit a man if he saves his soul and does not succeed in conquering the world?"

"If you would enter into life, observe the commandments" (Mt 19,17) No more. The Fifth Gospel reads, "If you would enter into eternal life, follow the dictates of your conscience."

In place of Mark 1, 35-36, the new gospel supplies this: "Simon said to him, 'Master, why do you never withdraw to a solitary place to pray?' Jesus answered, 'My prayer is to work for others, my solitude is to remain in the midst of the crowd.'"

You get the point. Biffi contrasts thirty passages from the hitherto regulative four gospels with the relevant passages from the Fifth Gospel.

Biffi, not a cardinal when his book first appeared, remarks that a member of the Curia was indignant. He observes that a sense of humor is not a prerequisite for a member of the Sacred College. It is pleasant to note that it is not an impediment either.

But the humor is melancholy. Biffi mentions that such luminaries as Maritain, Danielou, DeLubac and Von Balthasar had already drawn attention to the distortions of Christian doctrine that had invaded the Church under the guise of being in tune with the "spirit" of Vatican II.

It has been said, both as a boast and as a lament, that we are witnessing the delayed triumph of Modernism. Belatedly, as it seemed, with the Ratzinger Report and the Second Extraor-

(continued on page 2)

*O Timothee, depositum custodi, devitans profanas vocum novitates et oppositiones falsi nominis scientiae, quam quidam profitentes circa fidem aberraverunt. Gratia vobiscum. 1 ad Timotheum 6*

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### CONTENTS

#### EDITORIAL:

The Fifth Gospel ..... 1

#### ARTICLES:

Church vs. Anti-Church ..... 2

Catholic Education and  
Catholic Identity ..... 5

Staying Catholic ..... 12

Agenda for the Church ..... 19

Missale Romanum ..... 27

#### MAGISTERIUM:

Apostolic Letter on Reserving Priestly  
Ordination to Men Alone ..... 32

The Courage to Speak Bluntly ..... 34

CONSIDERATIONS ..... 36

DOCUMENTATION ..... 37

BOARD OF DIRECTORS ..... 42

BOOK REVIEWS ..... 43

dinary Synod, both in 1985, twenty years after the Council, there was official recognition of the enemies within the walls.

Yet things keep getting worse.

How sad to see *Ex corde ecclesiae* degenerate into the now withdrawn Ordinances, followed by the further declension into a plea for dialogue between our bishops and Catholic col-

leges and universities about the meaning of Catholic.

But the Fifth Gospel text operative on campus is the Land O'Lakes declaration. Monsignor Kelly lays out the whole sad sequence in his article in this issue. A vivid portrait of the way we are now is provided by an excerpt from the minutes of the Notre Dame senate. ❧

## Church Versus Anti-Church: The Revolt of the "Second Magisterium"

Msgr. George A. Kelly

### 1. Contemporary Questions

**W**hether Church laws will be enacted which will establish juridical standards for the conduct of colleges which claim the name Catholic, and which thereby attract support largely on that basis?

Whether Catholic colleges will accept such Ordinances or choose instead to opt for non-denominational public status, as practically all New York colleges have already done?

### 2. Early Background

**A**lmost immediately following the Land O' Lakes Declaration of Independence of Catholic higher education from Episcopal oversight on July 23, 1967\*, the Holy See

\*That Declaration was drafted by 26 representatives of 11 institutions, 10 of whom were Jesuit, 5 from Notre Dame. The chief episcopal participant was Archbishop Paul Hallinan of Atlanta.

initiated "dialogue" world-wide with university personnel on the following related subjects: the nature of a Catholic institution, its identity as Catholic, its relationship with hierarchy, the nature and limits of academic freedom and institutional autonomy, the rights and responsibilities of university officials and bishops, and the peculiar legal problems of such institutions in the United States.

The Congregation for Catholic Education then co-sponsored (with the International Federation of Catholic Universities) a series of "dialogues" with presidents over a five year period, first in Congo's Kinshasa (1968), then in Rome (1969), and in Italy's Grotto ferrata (1972). Cardinal Gabriel Garrone undertook a survey of university presidents in 1969 in preparation for the *International Congress of Catholic Universities* held in the Vatican on November 20-29, 1972. That Congress of University Delegates agreed to a document entitled "The Catholic University in the Modern World" which in one part, recognized that, when the truth of the Christian message is at stake, a bishop has the right to intervene by advising a particular person on a given campus of his concerns, or advise the college administration itself or, in an extreme case, by taking his concerns to the public.

Because American delegates returning home were declaring publicly that the Roman document reinforced their Land O' Lakes positions, Cardinal Garrone, angrily sent a letter on April 20, 1973 to all presidents demanding (1) that the Rome document be seen as a "totality," not

extrapolated to defend indefensible positions; (2) that a Catholic institution set out in documentary fashion ("without equivocation") its Catholic character and commitment; and (3) that it create machinery within its family to protect "faith, morality, and discipline." These requirements were invitations for them to proceed properly, not juridical demands at the time. These requests, however, were generally ignored in the United States and elsewhere.

### 3. Subsequent "Dialogue"

**B**etween 1972 and 1990 "dialogue" continued, usually mediated by the *National Conference of Catholic Bishops*. When the New Code of Canon Law was published in 1983, canons 807-814 and 833 did make demands on college personnel which also have been largely ignored. Finally, on August 15, 1990, John Paul II issued *Ex Corde Ecclesiae, An Apostolic Constitution on Catholic Universities*, which established laws for such institutions but permitting them "to be applied concretely at the local and regional levels by episcopal conferences." On May 4, 1993, the *Ex Corde Ecclesiae Implementation Committee of the NCCB* issued its "Ordinances," which in reality were mere invitations that Catholic colleges accept the papal norms, not demands that this be done. By the end of 1993, the presidents of leading Catholic colleges, led by the Jesuit hierarchy in education, rejected the bishops' proposals, in part, they said, because institutions are unable to make the faith commitments asked by Rome, in part, they said, because *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* cannot be implemented in the United States.

In the face of this rejection, the NCCB committee on July 8, 1994 reacted by proposing another round of "dialogues" on the ques-

tion first raised by Cardinal Garrone in 1968 and thereafter. The Project Director chosen to assist the NCCB in this ongoing dialogue was Terence Toland, S.J.

### 4. The Land O' Lakes Position

**T**he *Catholic University: A Modern Appraisal*, edited by former Jesuit Neil G. McCluskey (Notre Dame Press, 1970) is a compendium of the thinking and subsequent practice of Land O' Lakes colleges. In it one will find all the documents and the protagonists' responses to Vatican objections to the Land O'Lakes philosophy. For example, William Richardson, S.J., then at Fordham, made it clear that a college's commitment was to "polyvalent truth," to a search which must go on "without religious or any other bias," and "without fear of anything outside." He also averred that "the Church's magisterial task is to preserve in itself and communicate the revealing Word of God, not *something* (e.g. 'an interpretation of reality') but *Someone*." Ladislav M. Orsy, S.J., opined that a "new legal system" was necessary, one to be worked out above the level of local ordinaries, viz., with the episcopal conference.

From 1967 on the Church's university world became the chief source of opposition to magisterial teaching, whether it pertains to subjects like contraception (1968) or women's priestly ordination (1994) or to the definitive teaching contained in the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* or on the existence of moral absolutes (*Veritatis Splendor*).

The "double magisterium" theory, first espoused in the 1970's, has flourished ever since, and has contributed to diminishing the formative influence of popes and bishops in union with the popes on the consciences of Catholics.

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## 5. Historical Perspective

**P**hilip Hughes' history of the church described the centuries immediately prior to Martin Luther as a time of ecclesiastical decline, characterized during significant periods by the co-existence of popes and anti-popes. The "schism," as it was called, lasted the better part of four decades. It is variously attributed to the church's preoccupation with then, Renaissance worldliness, ineffectual and/or nationalistic prelates, immorality in high and low places, princes of the realm interfering in church affairs, and princes of academe from Paris to Prague opposed to church authority. A Council and a strong unopposed pope ended the schism, but the decline continued through the papacy of Alexander VI and the Protestant Revolution during which the church lost large segments of her patrimony.

There are no anti-popes in the 20th century, but many anti-church leaders in Catholic higher education and elsewhere. The church also suffers today from powerful interventions by secular governments in religious affairs, surprising immorality in Catholic places, and power structures within the church exercising anti-magisterial controls which undermine the authority of the successors of the Apostles to teach, rule, and sanctify, with the supreme authority of Jesus Christ, as the Councils of Trent, Vatican I and Vatican II determined.

The following questions may be more important than those set forth at the beginning of this paper:

1. How is the modern hierarchy to solve "schism" in the 20th century, one that has not been fully admitted by its perpetrators?
2. Will the solution be any more effective for the long range good of the church than the Council of Constance was in the 15th century?

## Rome: From Paul VI to John Paul II

**I**n summary, the essence of the church's requirements would seem to be the following:

1. No institution can claim the name Catholic without ecclesiastical approval.
2. The Catholic college must specify, in statutes and in contracts with personnel, its Catholicity and its adherence to norms of faith as determined by the magisterium.
3. The school must establish in its statutes a specific machinery for protecting the truths of the faith, and the faith of the college community.
4. The teachers of ecclesiastical subjects must profess their faith and receive a mandate (license) from competent ecclesiastical authority.
5. The institution's autonomy is "interior," not exterior. The president or the board manages the college, but since the school is not out of the Church but in, and "from the heart of" the church, the bishop or bishops may make observations or remonstrations, if need be, to a professor, to the president, or to the Catholic public, whenever the situation requires.

**I**n conclusion, a word must be said about the use by Government authorities, civil or religious, of the words "consultation" and "dialogue" before, during, or after any legislature process, ostensibly designed to promote the general good of a particular society.

The New Code of Canon law, under at least 25 headings, recommends that various Church authorities, prior to enacting laws or regulations in the name of some religious or ecclesiastical good, "consult" i.e. "take counsel", on matters of law or fact (pertaining to legislation or its implementation) with subordinate bodies. Accepting or rejecting such counsel generally remains with the authority in question, unless otherwise stipulated, whose role it is to exercise final judgment on what the Church's common requires.

"Dialogue", on the other hand, used frequently in open-ended philosophical discussions, by scientists engaged in therapy, or to create good

will between contesting parties, merely means “conversation” between contesting parties, it merely means “conversation” between equals. It has no direct relation to public purposes, such as the enactment of legislation. Its object is usually interpersonal. Political figures know the difference between congressional hearings (consultation) and informal extra-legal contacts outside the legislative process (dialogue). Not surprisingly, “dialogue” becomes an action taken to delay decision making which offends powerful special interests. In such

circumstances endless conversation leading to no public benefit is called “stone-walling.”

“Dialogue” is ill-used as a technique for settling irreconcilable differences, particularly when the interest of society—its well-being, even its security—requires appropriate action by authorities responsible for both. Civil governments, once they make up their minds about what is necessary to the public, may continue consultations for a time, but during crises “dialogue” is placed on the back burner. ✠

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## Catholic Education and Catholic Identity

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### Introduction

**L**et me begin with two short passages from writings by G. K. Chesterton. The effect of bringing them together is to suggest the need for a philosophy of education.

Philosophy is merely thought that has been thought out. It is often a great bore. But man has no alternative, except being influenced by thought that has been thought out and being influenced by thought that has not been thought out. The latter is what we commonly call culture and enlightenment today.<sup>1</sup>

Every education teaches a philosophy; if not by dogma then by suggestion, by implication, by atmosphere. Every part of that education has a connection with every other part. If it does not all combine to convey some general view of life it is not education at all.<sup>2</sup>

Whenever I read Chesterton I am left wondering why his non-fiction writings are not more widely discussed. Certainly there are circles of loyal devotees, but the Chestertonic is most

effective when not consumed so liberally as to induce intoxication and nostalgic melancholy. One gains most, I think, from taking small portions of his work, such as an individual essay or book-chapter, and letting them refresh one’s mind. Chesterton is not best read for reassurance but for stimulation; and the stimulation he provides enables one to start thinking again about matters which previously seemed closed or intractable.

A few years ago, inspired by a chapter of his 1908 book *What’s Wrong with the World*, I wrote an essay on Chesterton as a philosopher of education in which I linked aspects of his thought to elements in the writings of Thomas Aquinas.<sup>3</sup> It seemed to me then that there was need for a contemporary study of Catholic educational philosophy, and in the meantime I have become convinced that any such work ought to include an account of how concerns with education connect with more general issues in social and political philosophy and with the question of Catholic identity. Elsewhere I have explored the former issues, arguing that a Roman Catholic cannot accept certain liberal doctrines such as the moral neutrality of the state,<sup>4</sup> and on an earlier occasion I defended the traditional idea that general orthodoxy is non-optional for the Catholic.<sup>5</sup> Here I want to reflect briefly on such matters as they relate to the question: what is the proper function of Catholic schools? I shall be making five points as follows:

- 1) It is important to distinguish issues of experience from those of identity.
- 2) The question of Catholic identity is inescapable.
- 3) There is a distinctive Catholic identity.
- 4) Catholic identity is partly constituted by authority and dogma.
- 5) The primary function of Catholic schools is to transmit Catholic truths and values.

### Questions of Experience and of Identity

What does it mean to be a Roman Catholic? The question is ambiguous. Understood in one way it inquires about personal and social attitudes and is the sort of thing that an interviewer might ask expecting a personal biography or cultural description. When interpreted in this way let us call it *'the question of Catholic experience'*. This contrasts with a second interpretation according to which what is being sought for is some sort of objective essence, or at least a broad definition identifying central features of Roman Catholicism. When taken in this latter sense let us call it *'the question of Catholic identity'*.

My first point then is this: when thinking about Roman Catholicism many of those raised in that tradition now tend to confuse the two questions and assimilate the issue of identity to that of experience. At the meeting from which the essays in this volume derive, Thomas Groome addressed the issue: *what makes a school Catholic?* and asked those present to consider what they took to be distinctive of Catholicism. I found myself immediately thinking about such ideas as the duality of Holy Scripture and Holy Church, the special mediating functions of the priesthood, the Mass, transubstantiation, the extraordinary magisterium, the Papacy, the communion of saints, the Marian dogmas, prayers of intercession and so on. When the time came to report our thoughts, however, I was

struck by the fact that those who spoke all recalled personal memories of childhood and youth, memories of priests and nuns, of authority and discipline, of particular rituals and pieties, and the such like. Many, in fact most, spoke in terms that suggested that they thought the old ways had gone and that things in the Church were now better for this. At least two things are significant in these responses: first, the preference of the present over the past; and second, the fact that no-one else seemed to have taken the speaker to be posing the question of *identity* rather than that of *experience*.

The program included a couple of 'retrospectives' for one of which I had been detailed to reflect on some of the main issues discussed throughout the conference. These fell under several heads including the different legal and institutional circumstances of schools in the US and in the UK, questions of social justice, the role of Catholic schools and the issue of Catholic identity. Commenting on the latter, I began by noting that my own perspective was partly determined by the fact that I live and work in St. Andrews, a town and university strongly associated with the Scottish Reformation. The legacy of the sixteenth century in Scotland continues to give greater prominence to questions of religious identity than they generally have in England, and Roman Catholicism has only recently begun to enjoy 'non-alien status'. Additionally, something of the reformed heritage was in my own Scottish childhood, since although my mother was a cradle Catholic and I spent ten years at a Jesuit school, my father had a Presbyterian upbringing and only converted to Catholicism in middle-life.

Such circumstances, together with the fact that as a philosopher I am concerned with trying to understand the 'essences' of things, contribute to my interest in the question of identity. However, and this is my second point, this issue is anyhow inescapable if one begins to think seriously about the nature and purpose of Catholic schools. In recognition of this necessity and in the hope of getting clearer about differences in attitudes to the distinguishing features of Catholicism, I produced

the following diagram and considered various possible differentia:

Theist	Non-Theist
Christian	Non-Christian
Catholic	Non-Catholic
Roman	Non-Roman

My third point arises from this exercise. However difficult it may be to produce a definition of the essence of Roman Catholicism there are relevant and important differences between theists and non-theists, Christians and non-Christians, Catholics and non-Catholics, and Romans and non-Romans. This may seem too obvious for comment. However, I have been struck by the fact that as well as conflating questions of personal experience and of ecclesial identity, many people in Catholic circles are concerned to deny that there are differences of genuine significance between Catholics and other religious grouping—at least at any level that really matters. One illustration of this point would be to say that the issues between Anglicans and Romans over the matter of authority are not theologically deep but reduce to variety in the cultural realization of certain ideas. Or again it is sometimes said that the religious practices of non-Christians are equally significant and deserving of religious respect to those of Catholicism—as when, for example, members of a Catholic Commission suggested that Ratafarianism is a ‘valid religious experience’ and that its followers should be allowed the use of Catholic premises for worship. Similar claims are made by Anglicans and other Christians.

One way of bringing out disagreements over such matters of purported identity and difference, and I believe it is important for Catholics to recognize and explore these disagreements, is by considering the diagram and asking oneself the following questions: where am I located? why should I be there? and, do I want to bring others there also? For those in the Victorian and Edwardian periods confronted with challenges to

religion from science and politics,<sup>6</sup> as for those in the inter-war years struggling with the competing claims of Catholicism and Communism, or like George Orwell trying to find a humanist philosophy different from each,<sup>7</sup> the resolution of issues of theological and philosophical doctrine and the implementation of their practical corollaries were not viewed as unwelcome intrusions in the effort to live well, or to establish respectful relations with others, but as preconditions of the possibility of doing so. What has changed? One possible answer is “the Roman Catholic Church.”

### **Authoritative and Dogmatic: Vices or Virtues?**

**T**here is a widely held view that sometime during or after the Second Vatican Council the Church underwent a radical and irreversible change in its self-conception. To the extent that such distinctions are drawn, proponents of this view, whom I shall call the ‘revisionists’ would say that the transformation in question is not just, or even primarily, a sociological one but is theological and cognitive. In other words the Church has not merely undergone certain stylistic changes. Rather, the initiatives of the Council and the resulting post-conciliar reorientation mark a progression towards a truth previously unseen, lost sight of, or even deliberately obscured. For instead of regarding itself as an autocratic structure primarily concerned with preserving Tridentine orthodoxy through authoritative teaching and priest-administered sacraments, the Church now knows itself to be a community of equals moving uncertainly as a pilgrim body towards a more just social order.

Of course this way of speaking raises the question who or what is the Church? And one problem in maintaining the revisionist view is that it seems to be at odds with that presented by Pope John Paul II and by Cardinal Ratzinger, the Prefect of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, both of whom have been concerned

to combat what they regard as serious lapses from authentic Catholic teaching. Given some perspectives, to find oneself in disagreement with the occupants of these offices is to have reason to presume that one is in error. but of course from the revisionist perspective the authority of the Papal and Congregational offices is precisely a matter on which traditionalist occupants are likely to be mistaken. In other words assertions of and demands for orthodoxy are regarded as question-begging, reactionary measures against revisionist advances.

Clearly there is no quick or single way to resolve this dispute. But it is worth considering the plausibility of the competing interpretations of Catholic teaching during what both parties can agree has been a period of social change and religious questioning. Consider, for example, the important area of social issues as these have been addressed in Papal documents during the last century. According to the traditionalist the Church is committed to a core of unchanging norms and values which it has long propagated and which it continues to affirm with authority. On this account the passage from Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* (1891), via Pius XI's *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931) and John XXIII's *Pacem in Terris* (1963), to John Paul II's *Veritatis Splendor* (1993) is one of unbroken commitment to the same essential doctrines. In the revisionist view, however, Vatican II marked an important shift in the Church's understanding of morality and politics as it belatedly came to terms with liberalism and contextualism. Thus while it will be conceded that the present Pope's thinking is similar to that of pre-Conciliar Pontiff's, that very fact is taken to show that he is a reactionary, drawing back from enlightenment and retreating into the darkness of anti-modernism.

This latter impression is widely shared but it is doubtful whether it stands up to much scrutiny. Consider for example the claim that in his social teaching John XXIII inaugurated a new liberalism in Catholic thought. In *Pacem in Terris* he writes:

"Every human being has the right to respect for his person; to good reputation, the right to freedom in

searching for truth and in expressing and communicating his opinions within the limits laid down by the moral order and the common good. Every human being has the right to honor God according to the dictates of an upright conscience and therefore the right to worship God privately and publicly....Human beings have the right to choose freely the state of life which they prefer and therefore the right to establish a family with equal duties for man and woman and also the right to follow a vocation to the priesthood or religious life".<sup>8</sup>

Initially this may seem to be at odds with the anti-liberal claims of previous Popes and the purported 'illiberalism' of the present incumbent, but while it is certainly true that John XXIII sought to avoid the authoritarian tone of his predecessors and recognized the act that many societies had become pluralist democracies, the teaching retains its original and essential orientation towards an objective moral order and preserves its Papal authority. Notice, for example, the way in which the liberties are qualified by reference to permissible or required ends. The right to intellectual freedom is specified in terms of the pursuit of truth and is constrained by the demands of morality; religious liberty is described as the right to worship God; the right to choose one's state of life does not extend to pre- or extra-marital affairs or homosexual relationships. In other words the heralded freedoms are tied to prescribed ends.

In addition to the *matter* of Papal and Conciliar teaching there is the critical question of its *form*, more precisely that of its authority. Traditionally the Church claims to be the repository of Divine revelation and to possess an Apostolic magisterium in respect of the essentials of the Faith. Within this it defines an extraordinary magisterium the agents of which may be Councils or the Pontiff pronouncing *ex cathedra*. This 'magisterial' aspect of Catholicism has been the subject of much revisionist criticism. It is sometimes said to be a relatively late accretion at odds with the understanding of the early Church. At other times it is rejected as triumphalist and offensive to non-Catholic and non-Christian believers. Furthermore

it is held to be philosophically untenable in a post-Cartesian age.

Once again I can do little more than suggest considerations to the contrary. First, the idea that the Church is possessed of a special teaching authority is as old as systematic reflection upon the nature of Christ's mission and of that of the Apostles. Famously in Matthew we have the commissioning of Peter (*Matthew*. 16, 17-19), and prominent in John's Gospel are Christ's repeated promises of the coming of an Advocate, the Holy Spirit, who will be with the Church forever as a source of truth (*John*. CHs. 14-16 *passim*). Writing in the fourth quarter of the second century and building upon such scriptural foundations Irenaeus advises:

It is not necessary still to seek amongst others for the truth which it is easy to receive from the Church. Since the Apostles most fully committed unto the church as into a rich repository all things pertaining to the truth, that whosoever wills may draw out of it the drink of life.<sup>9</sup>

And elsewhere he writes:

This, beloved, is the preaching of the truth, and this is the manner of our salvation, and this is the way of life, announced by the prophets and ratified by Christ and handed over to the Apostles and handed down by the Church in the whole world (i.e., the ecumenical or "Catholic" church) to her children. This must be kept in all security, with good will and by being well-pleasing to God through good works and sound moral character.<sup>10</sup>

Of course such claims can be rejected but that is not the point. I have no ambition here to argue the truth of Catholic teaching, only to maintain that it has a distinctive content of the sort I have indicated and to urge that reference to this is central in answering any question about Catholic identity.

As regards the notion of doctrinal authority as such, and of its correlative, *viz.* *dogma*, it is a long standing claim of the Church of Rome that it shows its truth in part precisely through its making authoritative pronouncements. This idea needs to be properly understood. The assumption is not the obvious absurdity that claiming an inerrant teaching authority is *sufficient* for possessing it; but rather that a *necessary* condition of having such authority is that one presumes oneself to be possess it. As a matter of philosophy, but independent of Cartesian or any other theory of epistemological warrant, no person or institution that does not claim to teach with authority, either explicitly or by implication, can coherently be regarded as authoritative. While this fact does not guarantee the truth of doctrine it undermines the claim of revisionists to be advancing legitimate developments of Catholic teaching. My fourth point, therefore, is that whatever the nature of a Church that has only the most limited, if any, defined doctrines, that claims no special authority and regards itself as on a par with other faiths in respect of its grasp of truth, it is *not* that of Roman Catholicism.

The Catholic Church has a distinctive nature, part of which unites its members with other non-Christian theists and with the faithful of other Christian denominations, and part of which distinguishes them as separate. At the level of essences this is a matter of theology not of sociology or of psychology. While Catholic identity, therefore, is not a question of experience, nevertheless membership of the Catholic Church or extended encounters with its members should make a difference to one's experience. Sadly of course the difference is not always found to be beneficial, as was testified to by some of the reminiscences prompted by Thomas Groome. While that must be a matter for regret, the Catholic can only regard it as providing reason for improving the quality of lived

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Catholicism and not as grounds for shifting to some other religious foundation.

### Catholic Education and Catholic Schools

**A**t this point, then, let me return to the question of Catholic education and again quote from Chesterton.

The fashionable fallacy is that by education we can give people something that we have not got...These pages have, of course, no other general purpose than to point out that we cannot create anything good until we have conceived it...Education is only truth in a state of transmission; and how can we pass on truth if it has never come into our hand?<sup>11</sup>

In the context of schooling, education is a deliberate process whereby the cognitive, affective and practical potentialities of the pupil are realized and given determinate content.<sup>12</sup> The primary function of Catholic schools, therefore, is to provide forms of education through which the essential doctrines and devotions of Catholicism are transmitted. In the present day that is not an easy task either to plan or to implement; but nor was it unproblematic throughout most of Christian history, and I believe it follows from what has been said that the task is a non-negotiable one. It is a duty.

Against this, however, may be brought such objections as that the vocation of the Church is primarily to promote social justice, and that in multi-culture, multi-faith societies the religious function I describe is 'exclusivist' and as such both undesirable and impractical. In their recent book *Catholic Schools and the Common Good*, the publication of which was the occasion of the conference, Anthony Bryk, Valerie Lee and Peter Holland attribute part of the success of Catholic secondary schools in the USA to what they describe as "an inspirational ideology that directs institutional action toward social justice in an ecumenical and multicultural world".<sup>13</sup> However, since others who do not share Catholic, Christian or any religious

beliefs are also mobbed by considerations of social morality the question arises: what is this 'inspirational ideology' and how is it related to other aspects of Catholic faith?

In tracing the origins of this ideology the authors refer to the Neoscholastic revival initiated by Leo XIII's encouragement to Catholic scholars to study the work of Aquinas, and they go on to describe something of Maritain's Christian philosophy of education, one of the foundations of which is a social ethic involving the idea of the common good. In brief, this builds upon the natural law tradition giving special emphasis to the Thomistic-Aristotelian claim that human beings are social creatures constituted as persons through their relationships with others.<sup>14</sup> This is all to the good; however it hardly seems to point to an 'inspirational ideology' that is necessarily religious, never mind distinctively Catholic. Indeed, in what they say subsequently Bryk and his co-authors appear to widen the gap between the social philosophy of the common good and traditional Catholic theology.

Although selected Neoscholastic scholars such as Maritain...offered Catholics a way to engage with modernity, the more conventional and doctrinaire interpreters of Thomas wreaked much havoc. Their scholarship reinforced a hierarchical conception of the institutional Church, in which the magisterium would think and the flock would follow...Further, Neoscholasticism's very strengths were also its weaknesses. Its aggressive resort to intellectualising faith diminished the common appeal of the Christian message...Neoscholasticism distracted many Catholics from the more concrete imperatives of the gospel message to advance human goodness through hope in the vision of the "final Kingdom".<sup>15</sup>

What follows this is an account of the adaptation of Catholicism to the facts of "modernity" and "postmodernity", the upshot of which is said to have been the shattering of "the monolith of Neoscholastic thought as the authoritative synthesis of the 'Catholic position'", leading to the employment of "multiple rationales to ground social ac-

tion". However something of the earlier Neoscholastic tradition is said to remain and to constitute the Catholic contribution to social thought:

Postmodern thinkers increasingly speak of the need to rekindle a sense of social responsibility and public participation in a diverse and pluralistic American life. In the search for a grounding for this renewed social commitment, these two residuals of Neoscholasticism — the capacity of reason to arrive at truth and the need for moral norms and principles in social life — represent an active, vital, coherent Catholic voice in this extended dialogue.<sup>16</sup>

Admiring as I am of the authors' sociological study, I think that this assessment bears the marks of the revisionist tendency with which I was concerned earlier. It is undeniable that as a matter of historical fact moral theologians have drawn back from the claims of their predecessors. More to the point I am happy to admit that some of the assertions and arguments of the scholastic manuals do not bear close (or even middle-distance) scrutiny. The critical issue, however, is approached when one asks the question: is Catholic social teaching coincident with an objectivist ethic of the common good? There is scope for much philosophy here. Certainly it asserts the objectivity of values and claims that certain goods attach to society as a whole. But the interesting and troublesome issues arise when it is asked if such a view is tenable on other than theological grounds, and whether a theological foundation supports, and even necessitates, more extensive claims.

In place of lengthy argumentation permit me to conclude by merely sketching a line of thought. Just as in Catholic metaphysical theology Grace perfects nature, so in its moral and social teaching a theological ethic transforms what would otherwise be a mundane natural law structure. From this perspective no account of values can begin to be adequate unless it has at its heart the recognition that mankind has an eternal destiny. The primary purpose for which we were created is

certainly *not* that of loving ourselves, as the ethical egoist might have it; but nor is that of loving one another. Rather it is of loving *God*. Of course this last is not incompatible with an ethic of brotherly concern — we are not to love God *as opposed to* loving one another — but such brotherly concern is made sense of, as more than a romantic metaphor, by the claim that we are fellow creatures brought into existence by the one and only Divine creator.

A Catholic philosophy of education cannot limit itself to the claim that there are objective social goods. It must build an extensive structure around the simple yet unlimited claim that we exist for the sake of God's glory. It has to be acknowledged that this is nowadays an extraordinary and divisive claim. It is certainly 'exclusivist' in the sense of being incompatible with certain other secular and religious philosophies. But it is surely not open to the Catholic to believe that the design and implementation of an educational philosophy based on this assumption is 'undesirable' and 'impractical'. On the contrary, it is the thought that in pursuing it we are doing God's will that assures us that it can, and ought, to be achieved. My fifth and final point, then, is that the primary function of Catholic schools is to transmit Catholic truths and Catholic values. Everything else, no matter how important, is secondary to this.<sup>17</sup> ✠


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## Notes

1. "The Revival of Philosophy — Why?" in G. K. Chesterton, *The Common Man* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1950) p. 176.
2. "A New Case for Catholic Schools," *op. cit.*, p. 167.
3. J. Haldane, "Chesterton's Philosophy of Education," *Philosophy*, Vol. 65, 1990.
4. J. Haldane, "Can a Catholic be a Liberal? Catholic Social Teaching and Communitarianism," *Melita Theologica*, Vol. 43, 1992.
5. J. Haldane, "Critical Orthodoxy," *Louvain Studies*, Vol. 14, 1989.

6. For some account of these matters as they bore upon the Catholic Church in England, see E. Norman, *Roman Catholicism in England: From the Elizabethan Settlement to the Second Vatican Council* (Oxford: OUP, 1985), Chaps. 4 & 5.
7. See R. Johnstone, *The Will to Believe* (Oxford: OUP, 1982).
8. John XXIII, *Pacem in Terris*, 16 & 25.
9. St. Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses*, III, 4, 1, trs. Roberts & Rambant, *Ante-Nicene Christian Library* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1868) Vol. 1, p. 264.
10. St. Irenaeus, *Proof of the Apostolic Preaching*, para. 98, ed. & trs. J. P. Smith SJ (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1952), p. 108.
11. G. K. Chesterton, *What's Wrong with the World* (London: Cassell, 1910), pp. 198-200.
12. For a general discussion of the nature of education along these lines see J. Haldane, "Education: Conserving Tradition" in B. Almond, ed., *Introduction to Applied Ethics* (Oxford: Blackwell, forthcoming).
13. A. Bryk, V. Lee & P. Holland, *Catholic Schools and the Common Good* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 11.
14. See J. Maritain, *Education at the Crossroads* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943).
15. See Bryk et al. *Catholic Schools and the Common Good*, pp. 40-41.
16. *Op. cit.*, p. 40.
17. The present essay was written during the period of a Fellowship at the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities, University of Edinburgh. I am indebted to the Institute for hospitality and to the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland for support.



## Staying Catholic

by Jude P. Dougherty

**T**he first thing to recognize about Catholic higher education is that its demand begins in the nursery. It is in the pre-school years that the child first encounters the tangible fruits of baptism. Those fruits are encountered in the symbols found in the home, in the grace said at mealtime, in parental encouragement of night prayers, in bible story coloring books and in the Sunday morning trek to the parish church. Assuming committed parents, the child is brought through successive years to the practice and understanding of his faith. Practice and understanding are inseparable, and practice obviously depends on understanding, but in the early years, habituated behavior is the prelude to intellectual quest. Aristotle could have said, habits perform the same function in religious matters as they do in other aspects of life. Though in ancient Greece the father determined which gods were to be worshipped, mothers no doubt were then, as they are still, the major tutors in matters of the faith.

One may ask, why is the faith so prized that it is preserved and passed along sometimes with great sacrifice of time and of resource, and, in the past, often defended with the sword. Why do Catholic parents, even in a time of uncertainty within the Church seek a Catholic education for their offspring? From France to Indonesia the battle is the same, the preservation of Catholic education against the tendency of the state to usurp all tutelage.

What is it that the Catholic mind seeks to preserve? What is it that the faith brings to one's life? "Understanding," answered Augustine. But the faith is not merely a set of intellectual insights. It entails a morality, a way of acting, a way of behaving, a way of celebrating. One's faith both presupposes and identifies one with a community of believers. One is by faith a member of a religious

body. Those who profess the Catholic faith recognize that it comes to them not merely as the fulfillment of Hebrew prophecies, not simply as a result of the teaching of Christ and His apostles, but as a result of teaching by a magisterium instituted by Christ himself. Christ founded a Church out of love for the very race whose redemption he secured by his sacrificial death on the cross.

That Church brings to mankind not only essential teachings regarding the nature and purpose of human life, but the sacraments which bless and restore an ever frail human nature.

Christ did not invent religion; religion is found wherever man has acknowledged a transcendent order. Ancient peoples described in the bible worshipped their gods. So too did the Greeks and Romans, often in elaborate and noble ceremony. From antiquity, mankind has celebrated through religious ceremony the important passages of life, i.e., birth, puberty, marriage, death, and the seasons of the year. The Church has absorbed and reconsecrated, and in some instances redirected the fruit of natural religion, often standing alone in defense of truths and practices that even the pre-Christian acknowledged.

To say these things is to say why the Church is loved. She brings light, she provides joy and solace, she interrupts the humdrum with feast, in some countries more often than in others. She is positioned to show the way, she makes available the Eucharist in whose presence many a soul has found not only tranquillity but speculative and practical wisdom. The Church's mission necessarily leads to activity in the practical order. Apart from her sacramental function, her most important task is education.

To speak of Catholic education is to acknowledge, for one thing, a specific telos to education, and, for another a distinctive tradition. The recognition of that telos is, of course, shared by other believers. It consists in the awareness that

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the grave is not the end of man, that man is called to a life in union with the divine, a life, whatever else it might be, consists in knowledge and love of God. Acknowledgment of this transcendent end colors the whole of education. At no stage is ultimate fulfillment confused with terrestrial happiness.

The distinctive feature of Catholic education is the Catho-

lic tradition itself, a very complex tradition spanning two thousand years of history. One need only enter the Basilica of St. Ambrose in Milan to have the historical asserted. There, under the high altar, lie the remains of Ambrose who died in 397, accompanied by the remains of Saints Gervase and Protase, both first-century martyrs.

That physical continuity is a visible reminder of intellectual inheritance. Ambrose taught Augustine and Augustine taught the West. The Fathers, no less than the Greeks and Romans upon whom they drew, were educators. From Augustine's *De Magistro* to Newman's *Idea of a University*, one can find scores of books, some of them Christian and literary classics, which speak to the aims of education. In common they recognize that the end of life is contemplation and that the road to the Beatific Vision requires a kind of interiority even in the midst of the crassest of temporal pursuits.

**A** full Catholic life is a life of the intellect, but a life of the intellect under certain conditions: the intellect drawing upon its experience of the present, certainly, but experience understood and interpreted within the context of an appropriated past. Christ himself is the model. In teaching he appealed to his listeners' grasp of nature and built upon the inherited. Christ came to proclaim a new law but in doing so was respectful of the best of ancient codes. His disciples found him credible. When St. John

Chrysostom sought an empirical proof for the existence of God, he found it in the splendor of the Church herself. The evidence which he found compelling came from the fact that the Church in its teaching appealed to noble and low, rich and poor, learned and not, and had through its teaching in a brief span transformed for the good the lives of countless individuals and even of nations. An institution which produced such good effects, he reasoned, could only have a divine origin.

Three things I wish to underscore: the requirement of critical intelligence, the need for learning, and the need for the Church. Unaided intelligence will not suffice. Isolated from tradition and from community it will become as sterile as Hume's believer, sequestered in a private meditation for a moment in the confines of his study. Just as a knowledge of the practical arts is required for success in most of life's activities, so too in matters of religious activity learning is required. It would be foolish to proceed as if God and the way to God were unknown. Religion is a communal activity. The acknowledgment of God's existence, the acknowledgment of man's debt to Him, and an awareness of the propriety of paying that debt are communal affairs. Awareness of the need to worship is found wherever men are found. Piety is thus a natural virtue. "Spirituality" is but a term for the lifting of intellect and will to things divine. It is a habit of referral, grounded in contemplation, a habit of understanding things in the light of their finality.

The love of God requires some knowledge of God. No one can love an unknown God. God has to be present in some manner before his goodness can command the volitional act. Awareness is the result of some effort on our part, the result of our attentiveness to a witness, be it oral or written. The normal channel of awareness is parental teaching reinforced by formal education. Formal education can carry us to the heights of theological

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speculation, but the basic truths which ground appreciation are simple and are available to the whole of mankind. There are degrees of knowledge and there are degrees of appreciation. Natural knowledge is complemented by revelation, and he who hears and is privileged to possess the best of human knowledge can advance without limit. Development is open-ended. Like science, the augmentation of a knowledge of things divine profits from concerted effort. Rational disputation is social. Most of those we take as guides to the devout life were learned people. They made use of both native intelligence and learning to ferret out the secrets of the divine. St. John of the Cross and his modern disciples such as Edith Stein and Karol Wojtyla come immediately to mind.

To describe the beauty of the Church is not to claim that that beauty is universally acknowledged. A skepticism with respect to Christian convictions has been forming among the Occidental intelligentsia for the last century and a half. Nietzsche observed already in the last century that Western culture no longer possessed the spiritual resources which had justified its existence and without which he felt it could not survive.

What is more recent is that this loss of moral sense has now made itself felt on the level of the common man. In more ways than one, we are children of the Enlightenment. Views entertained in 18th and 19th century drawing rooms and in the academy of that day have in our own lifetime entered the market place. Voltaire urged the eradication of Christianity from the world of higher culture, but he was willing to have it remain in the stables and in the scullery less a servant class, deprived of a moral outlook, might steal. Mill repudiated Christianity, but not the religion of humanity which he thought to be, from the point of view of the state, a useful thing. Comte was more benevolent in his attitude toward Christian practice. In spite of his denial of all metaphysical

validity to religious belief, he was willing to accept as a civic good the moral and ritual traditions of Catholic Christianity. Durkheim was not so positive. For him, a major task of the state is to free individuals from partial societies such as the family, religious organizations, and labor and professional groups. Modern individualism, Durkheim thought, depends on preventing the absorption of individuals into secondary or mediating groups.

On this side of the Atlantic, many of these ideas were to find twentieth century expression in the philosophy of John Dewey. In his philosophy of education, Dewey had no use for religion or religious institutions, whatever roles they may have played in the past. Religion, he thought, is an unreliable source for knowledge and, in spite of contentions to the contrary, even motivation. Many of the values held dear by the religious are worthy of consideration and should not be abandoned, but a proper rationale ought to be sought for those deemed commendable. Through his critique of religion, Dewey sought not merely to eliminate the church from political influence, but to eliminate it as an effective agent in private life. Religion is deemed socially dangerous insofar as it gives practical credence to a divine law and attempts to mold personal or social conduct in conformity with norms which look beyond temporal society.

An awareness of American intellectual history is not irrelevant. At the turn of the century, at the very time many ideas characteristic of the Enlightenment were finding adherents in the academic mainstream, the schools themselves were changing hands. Toward the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th the land grant colleges were coming into being. Lacking religious sponsorship or identity, they tended to reflect the secular spirit. At the same time the older Protestant-founded colleges were losing their denominational identity. Whereas in the last quarter of the 19th century nearly every major chair of philosophy was held by an idealist whose philosophy was a support for Christianity, by 1910 the situation was reversed. Nearly every chair was held by a

naturalist. The causes for the shift are complex. Any explanation would have to take note of the widespread confidence placed in the methods of the sciences, social theories emanating from Europe, the discoveries of Darwin, and in the kind of biblical scholarship which tended to place doubt on the uniqueness of Christianity. Though these ideas did not have immediate social or cultural effects, the academy became cut off from its Christian parentage, coming to construe itself as a critic of established institutions, not as the bearer of a tradition or culture. Science was identified with "critical" intelligence. Its methods were to be turned on everything heretofore considered sacrosanct. It took another generation or two before such critique was to reach the primary and secondary schools.

Until the close of the Second World War, the common schools were largely Protestant. Since the beginning of the republic, their Protestant character was evident and taken for granted. It was because of Catholic dissatisfaction with Protestant public schools that the parochial school system came into being. That dissatisfaction plus the massive immigration of the second half of the 19th century made a dual educational system possible. But in the post World War II period, the Protestant character of the public school began to change. The secular philosophy of the academy began to make itself felt through a series of decisions of the Supreme Court. The Court had always appealed to the anti-establishment claims of the First Amendment, but it was now reading into the amendment outlooks which the Founding Fathers did not press and which would probably have been contradictory to the views of most. In the 1947 *Everson vs. Board of Education* decision, Justice Black decreed: "The establishment of religion clause of the First amendment means at least this...No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to

teach or practice religion.”<sup>1</sup>

Though *Everson* upheld bus rides for parochial school children, those hostile to religion were to quote it time and again. *McCullum* (1948) declared illegal religious education in public school buildings; *Engle vs. Vitale* (1962) struck down prayer; *Abington School District vs. Schempp* (1963) outlawed bible reading; and the *Committee for Public Education vs. Nyquist* (1976) ruled illegal tuition reimbursement arrangements.

In thirty years, these decisions of the Court were, in effect, to secularize public education. Whereas the schools previously fostered basic Christian values through their traditions of common prayer, bible reading, textbooks such as the McGuffey reader, and the celebration of religious feasts, those values ceased to be explicitly fostered. To be sure, the Court did not prohibit the teaching about religion or the reading of sacred scripture as a form of literature, but there is no doubt that Protestant Christianity was not only challenged but removed as a positive influence. Many observers have found that a non-denominational Protestantism has merely been replaced by a secular humanism which, while not a religion, is clearly an ideology with consequences for social policy and personal moral behavior.

Significant, too, is the Court's refusal, despite its decision in *Pierce vs. The Society of Sisters* (1925) acknowledging the prior parental right to educate the child, to allow options with respect to schools unless parents are willing and able to pay tuition in a non-state school.

Christopher Dawson, commenting on the American system, has said, “The secular state school is an instrument of the Enlightenment.”<sup>2</sup> Insofar as the state preempts education, the schools have become the seats of a new ideology, the ideology of secularism. Leo Pfeffer argues that a secular “state requires a secular state school.” He assures us that “the secularization of the state does not mean the secularization of society.”<sup>3</sup> But this opinion, as Walter Berns has pointed out, was not shared by Rousseau, for example, or by Washington; Jefferson too had his doubts. Experience can

be no guide here because we have no experience of living under wholly secular auspices. It is only in our day that we have approximated the secular state, a state that not only forbids aid to religion, but in the United States and elsewhere, is also under constant pressure to sever the connection between law and morality that finds its origins in religious doctrine. To quote Walter Berns, “If Pfeffer should prove wrong when he says that ‘society’ can remain religious though the state be indifferent to religion,” it will be left to our descendants to determine “whether de Tocqueville was right when he said that unlike despotism, liberty cannot govern without faith.”<sup>4</sup> Other decisions of the Court reflecting a secular outlook have permitted, in the name of freedom, the widespread introduction of pornography, the abortion decision, and the casting aside of those conventions of decency that used to govern public discourse. It is unfortunate that in recent years public opinion has inevitably begun to follow the court. America, unfortunately, is a conformist society where it is difficult for an individual or social group to maintain separate standards of value or independent ways of life. The state's near monopoly on education and the uniformity encouraged by the media have produced decisive changes in American society.

This scenario would suggest that if religious literacy is to be achieved, it will be achieved without help from and sometimes against the interference of the state. If it were once true, as de Tocqueville reported, that all Americans regard religion as indispensable to the maintenance of republican institutions, that claim cannot be made today.

Unfortunately, Catholic institutions themselves have not escaped the drift toward secularism. Some have modeled themselves after the secular state school; many have surrendered ties with ecclesiastical bodies in an attempt to qualify for state funding. Others have counseled what they believe to be a prudent course for Catholic colleges and universities vis-a-vis State and Federal regulations, advising administrators not to pursue a

distinctively Catholic course, but to seek objectives only insofar as they seem consonant with legal trends. A too Catholic student body, an effort to maintain Catholic identity through a predominantly Catholic faculty, are regarded as invitations to hostile rulings on the part of the courts when determining eligibility for Federal funds and tax exempt status.

While conflict should not be invited, Catholic educators must realize that certain issues inevitably have to be faced on the basis of principle. Catholic educators can elect to surrender, or they can maintain policies which wisdom would dictate and which still have the support of the people and legislative bodies, though perhaps not of the courts and the secular elite which the courts tend to follow.

**T**he Church's need for an educated class has never been greater. To produce that class, its own centers will have to be maintained and brought to high standards. While in many respects scholarship is a highly personal endeavor, individual effort requires institutional support. Scholars require like-minded colleagues and supporting disciplines. Moreover, the kind of inquiry most needed by the Church is not likely to be carried out in any programmatic way within a secular institution. True, individuals in many major state or private institutions contribute to the intellectual life of the Church, and their contributions are indispensable. But their individual work is not the same as a program or an institution, nor can they create single-handedly the intellectual milieu in which Catholic studies flourish.

To deal with the secular mind without succumbing, one needs not only the faith, but sound and careful training in philosophy and theology. The essence of secularity is the conviction that there is no evidence for the existence of God. The secular outlook deprives belief of a rational foundation and, consequently, of its credibility. Accommodated by the unwary it results in a fideist Christianity, which eschews the intellectual force

of tradition. The result is a radical evangelical fundamentalism with little intellectual credibility. Catholicism has not been handicapped in the same fashion. Its appreciation of classical learning has enabled it to deal with the findings of modern science and with the attacks brought by various forms of skepticism and positivism without slipping into fideism.

The Catholic world-view is woven out of threads that are cultural and philosophical as well as biblical and theological, strands provided by Greece and Rome as well as by Jerusalem. The appropriation of this tradition requires centers of learning where these components and their attendant disciplines, especially history and languages, are represented in a competent and significant way. There is no shortcut to wisdom and no substitute for it. Social science cannot replace history and philosophy. Learning theory or clinical psychology is no substitute for metaphysics. Courses offered under titles such as "Population Problems," "Human Ecology," and "Group Behavior" ought to supplement, not drive out, Greek and Roman History or the History of Medieval Civilization. In the last decades, the tendency to substitute the social and behavioral sciences for traditional disciplines has accelerated. This has had a detrimental effect for two reasons. One, the social sciences come laden with conclusions relying on assumptions that take a very sophisticated mind to evaluate, but the social science courses have most often been substituted for the philosophy which would render that necessary evaluation possible. A second reason is the value of their conclusions to the moral sciences. There is little knowledge gained from contemporary social science of the sort bearing on fundamental moral issues which was not available in antiquity. Basic moral truths and principles did not have to await the 19th century for discovery. But the student is left with the impression that everything is in flux, and that all that is important was discovered in his or her life time.

A further issue is the activist direction some training takes. The heavy emphasis on social

service and counseling at the expense of other disciplines represents an imbalance. True, the Church's mission includes both the pastoral and the prophetic, but in an age when the state has undertaken massively to care for the poor, the sick, and the aged through its almost omnipresent welfare programs, it is foolish to emphasize the social when the prophetic, or intellectual leadership of the Church is much in demand.

Another propensity which ought to be reexamined is the tendency to substitute techniques of counseling for first-order learning. Much of the personal malaise encountered in the pastoral order is the direct outcome of social ills that have to be addressed at the roots. As Dawson once remarked, the secular leviathan is vulnerable only at its brain. Only through its intellectuals will the Church be able to counteract the philosophical and ideological forces behind the secular movement. Clearly it is more important to influence the king than to shelter the beggar. There are fewer in need of "counseling" when properly directed social structures are in order. Judging from some Church-sponsored programs, contemporary Catholics seem more bent on picking up the pieces than in turning off the engine of destruction.

A university community is not unlike the human body in that self-maintenance is possible only within a narrow range of conditions. Body temperature may vary within a few degrees, but no more than that; atmospheric pressure does not leave much room for dalliance whether above or below the earth. We are assuming, of course, that the university really has specifiable goals and that it seeks to maintain itself in being.

At the heart of a university are both the people who compose it and the principles by which they choose to regulate their activity. In making appointments, it is foolish not to take into consideration the intellectual fabric and the moral character of a candidate for faculty membership. When a scholar becomes a member of a university faculty, he becomes part of a collegium, a collegium that he will in due course come to in-

fluence, whose tone he will help to establish. Both Plato and Aristotle taught the unity of the virtues. If a man is devoid of courage, there will be occasions when he will betray the ideals of the group. If he does not have his passions under control, his actions will in time affect his productivity and reliability.

Defects in perspective show up as the years go by. The young assistant professor who in the beginning of his career may make his contribution primarily through teaching will in due course be called to membership on committees and governing boards not only within a department, but in the university and perhaps in the community as well. If his own perceptions or fundamental outlook differs from those of the sponsoring body, he will inevitably contribute to the changing of the official outlook. Examples are not hard to find. If he personally is not convinced of the value of a liberal education, specifically of the need to study languages, the need to know history, philosophy and theology, these convictions will manifest themselves as he votes on institutional policy. Similarly, the relaxed attitude of some in sexual matters will influence their vote on policies governing student life.

One of the most valuable analyses of higher education to emerge in recent decades is that of A. McIntyre whose *Three Rivals Versions of Moral Inquiry* points to the almost irreconcilable difference between an educational institution based on the principles of Enlightenment philosophy and that grounded in the thought of St. Thomas.<sup>5</sup> Catholics for decades have acted as if the parts of a Catholic and a secular institution are interchangeable, not noticing that the compliment was not reciprocated. Higher education, McIntyre points out, has no shared set of principles on which judgment may be based. In the absence of a shared inheritance there is no common universe of discourse. The contemporary American University, unaware of its own Enlightenment bias, has excluded rival modes of enquiry, including the Catholic intellectual tradition. McIntyre does not despair that rival modes can enter into dialogue,

but the condition of fruitful exchange is the acknowledgment of fundamental difference and the need for integrity in discourse. There can be no ecumenism in the realm of ideas. One can not affirm and deny at the same time and in the same respect. Where the truths of the Catholic faith are denied there is no point in glossing over that fact. Acceptance of those truths leads the believer down one intellectual path; denial down another path. Only when this is recognized can there be an honest exchange. To be Catholic is to be different.

Writing in the 1960's, John Courtney Murray made a rather somber assessment of the American cultural trends. He had more confidence in the Church to provide the necessary leadership than he had in American institutions. Time has proven that his fears were not groundless. Writers as diverse as Walker Percy and Richard John Neuhaus have proclaimed the Catholic moment. But if the salvific teaching is to come, it will only come from trained Catholic minds. To prepare them, Catholic institutions for higher learning are indispensable. To reinforce them where they exist, to recover them where they are wavering we need, first of all, the kind of assessment attempted here. But, then we need men and women of courage who are willing to shoulder responsibility in the interest of long range goals. Etienne Gilson once remarked, the trouble with us Catholics is that we are not proud enough of the faith. I hope that cannot be said about many of us. ✠

<sup>1</sup> *Everson vs. Board of Education* 330 U.S. 1 (1947), pp. 15-16.

<sup>2</sup> *Crisis in Western Education* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961), p.22.

<sup>3</sup> *Church, State and Freedom* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 338.

<sup>4</sup> *The First Amendment and the Future of American Democracy* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1976), p. 70.

<sup>5</sup> Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990.

## Agenda for the Church

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James V. Schall, S. J.

With dioceses declaring bankruptcy, with Catholic-founded universities proclaiming complete autonomy from it, with increasingly awful ecclesial scandals appearing almost daily in the press, the Catholic Church in particular has lost much of its aura and potency. These things occur at a time in which the intellectual explication of the Church by itself, thanks largely to the systematic efforts of John Paul II, has never been more clear and even brilliant. A kind of spiritual torpor seems to exist among us, an unwillingness to face the nature or extent of the problem.

And it is not somehow as if we were engaged in a fair fight, confronting merely our own sins and disorders, though we all know of these self-inflicted wounds also. Something new, at least new for us, is in the air — enmity, intolerance, deliberate distortion, yes, lies. We have all quoted with amusement the remark that “anti-Catholicism is the anti-Semitism of the liberal.” But it has ceased to be an amusing witticism. The signs of virulent anti-Catholicism are all about us but hardly any official voice is willing to recognize the truth of its extent. We not only have an Administration with the least amount of Catholic influence and representation in high places in modern history, we also have policies formulated against Catholic teachings as they are explicitly enacted or explicated. Moreover, most of these policies contrary to Catholic teachings receive consistent popular approval, even, it sometimes seems, from the majority of Catholics. We Catholics appear to many to have little leadership. A sense of doom is not too far beneath the surface of public life. No one wants much to talk about it, since as far as we

know in public, the good guys have won, as in '92. Why are we not rejoicing?

Recently, I had a letter from a friend of mine in the Midwest. He suggested, on the contrary, that perhaps things were looking up in the Church. Actually he had heard, in his parish, an anti-abortion sermon for the first time in his memory and that the local bishop finally forbade general confession and insisted on auricular confession, as the Church has always insisted. This man is, however, in the "seamless garment" sphere of ecclesiastical polity so I had to warn him that this new attention to abortion just may be another way to get Catholics behind the new health plan. That is, if abortion is our only objection to this plan, then if abortion is dropped, Catholics will, so it is calculated, have no reason to oppose the other awful elements of the plan on other grounds. Abortion will simply be funded in some other way. Typical "seamless garment" logic; we end up with the worst of both worlds.

My Midwest friend even knew a couple of gutsy local pastors who were actually teaching *Veritatis Splendor* and the new *Catechism* to their parishioners. "I have come to the conclusion that things had turned a corner in the American church," he wrote.

The youth meeting in Denver has sent shock waves through the establishment, because the old baloney about their way being the new way has been refuted by this meeting. We can say to the New-Age priests what they said to us in 1978: "You are too old-fashioned and not in tune with the times. Changes are rocking the Church to its foundations, but you are stuck on out-moded beliefs, out-worn liturgies, and an overly dogmatic version of moral truth which of out-of-step and out-of-date. Please get with it." This is certainly amusing and well-said. I would even like to think it true.

"What would have to happen for it to become true?" This is what I asked myself, especially because many of the people I know denigrate the Pope's impact in Denver by saying that it had nothing to do with the way most people

think. I had just read William Bennett's essay "America's Revolt Against God." Bennett argued that by almost any standard of civilized morality, we are in an increasingly decadent society. This disorder of soul is becoming more and more obvious both to ourselves and to foreign visitors and observers.

"Who is to blame?" Bennett asks in a manner that sees the issue in properly broad terms. Here I would caution conservatives against the tendency to blame liberals for our social disorders. Contemporary liberalism does have a lot for which to answer.... Universities, intellectuals, think tanks, and government departments have put a lot of poison into the reservoirs of national discourse. But to simply to point the finger of blame at liberals and elites is wrong. The hard fact of the matter is that this was not something done to us; it is also something we have done to ourselves.

These are haunting words — our condition "is something we have done to ourselves." We have been busy putting blame everywhere but where it belongs. The search for victims has finally claimed ourselves. The Pope has been right from the beginning of his pontificate at Puebla in insisting that social reform must begin in personal reform, itself related to our accepting grace.

Rush Limbaugh insists that the main thing about public life is "character" or lack of it. While I was visiting my sister in Medford, Oregon, I read the following passage in an Editorial in the local newspaper. I take it as a kind of typical voice of small city America: "If marital fidelity were the primary qualification for national office, Ozzie Nelson might have been president. But the reality is that Bill Clinton was elected with the full knowledge of the voters that he wasn't — and didn't claim to be — a perfect husband." If I read this position correctly, it means that the American voters, even in small town America, do not think that character is a major factor in rule over them. What sort of a man one is, in this view, has little to do with what sort of a president we elect. We do not deny the actions, or even whether they are wrong. We just say they mean nothing.

I asked a friend who administers a law firm why he thought this unwillingness to see the correlation between action and character was so taken for granted, why character or fidelity did not matter to Americans? He replied, "because half of the population is itself compromised in the same way." We do not see the issue in terms of our recognizing and acknowledging our wrong deeds as such, but we declare that our wrong things do not matter, that, even more, we no longer recognize them as wrong in the first place.

The Holy Father remarked that there is at the basis of "social sin" nothing else but personal sins writ large.

The *Wall Street Journal* gave an account of the governor of one of the states of Brazil, a certain Ronaldo Cunha Lima, who went into a local restaurant and shot his predecessor in the governorship because the latter's son had accused Lima of corruption. "Why is Brazil, Latin America's giant, mired in crisis while the rest of the continent is taking off?" Thomas Kamm asked. Part of the answer, many say, may lie in Brazil's ethics. Just as many Brazilians failed to see anything gravely wrong with Gov. Lima's actions, they have long been complacent about runaway inflation, systematic corruption and frightening violence. Rather than confront problems head-on, Brazilians find ways to avoid them, justify them, or even benefit from them.

There is an unsettling relation between how we live and how our society prospers or declines. Statecraft depends on soulcraft. If it is true for the Brazilians, is it not also true for us? Why does not today's cultural relativism apply both to us and to the Brazilians, that both wrongs are really "right"? Or is morality only for export? Why imply that a Brazilian governor is "unethical" by some sort of universal standard and exempt an American official because we are not interested in such standards?

"Look at all the flap over

President Clinton's marital infidelity, pot smoking, draft dodging and other moral indiscretions. ... The fact that Mr. Clinton is the president of the United States says little about Mr. Clinton but a lot about widespread national moral degeneration," Walter Williams wrote.... We allow our children to bring home vulgar music.... Instead of parents setting limits, we call for Congress to regulate the entertainment industry. We explain away wicked behavior of murderers, rapists and social parasites by calling them "sick" or saying society made them do it.... Unless Americans summon the courage to confront the liberal-leftist government-backed assault on tradition, values and accountability, we are going to bequeath to future generations a demoralized, decayed nation. Again the themes of moral responsibility, of failed character, of degeneration of society are evident in William's thought.

Paul Johnson's essay on the failure of British and American governments to face the reality of crime because both operate with false liberal ideas about crime's causes is also worth citing.

**L**iberalism as the answer to rising crime has been applied in both the great democracies now for the best part of half a century.... It has failed everywhere, overwhelmingly and manifestly — except in one region: the minds of its advocates. For them liberalism is a religion, an article of faith, born of conviction and not susceptible to proof or disproof....

Ordinary people ... perceive that ... democracy does not work at all. They shrug their shoulders and set about protecting themselves.... It is not a healthy state of affairs. In fact the failure of authority to carry out the public's wishes on crime is even more corrosive of society than rising crime itself. Again, not merely in the area of personal morals, but in the obvious area of stopping crime, we are

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confused by our theories and unable to confront the issue because our own actions are themselves involved.

One final note about the moral climate of our society is worth citing. A friend of mine in California is active in various aspects of the pro-life movement. Many of us have walked in pro-life marches on *Roe v. Wade* Day (22 Jan.). My friend wrote of this year's march:

"Last Friday I took part in an annual Walk for Life in Palo Alto. I have been doing this for five years. Never have I felt such hostility as this year. The hatred that showed in people's eyes as we walked past the sidewalk cafés packed with lunch-time diners was daunting." We all commented on it afterward. These remarks are not, I think, chance observations, valid only for Palo Alto.

The moral, orthodox life, if it might be called that, is more and more seen to be an object of hatred, not just the sort of indifference seen in the Oregon Editorial. Crime is not dealt with; the personal causes of crime are not admitted. Many citizens do what their elected officials do. What they do sets the standard for what we are permitted to do. We choose to see no relation between character and office. We imitate those we elect. We choose them because they affirm what we want to do. As in the case of the abortion protesters, the government now has the power to jail us if we protest too much. Greater penalty attaches to protesting abortion than to performing it. The crisis of our society is no longer confined to a few. It is not in our institutions alone, but in our own votes, choices, and actions, in our hearts and homes. Degeneracy and decline seem to be proper words to describe ourselves. What is good in religious and classic terms, from now on, will be hated.

William Bennett, in his essay, suggested that we must return to religion, to the origins of the spiritual life, if we ever are going to confront these problems. We have, in one sense, tried all the other alternatives and none work. Reason seems insufficient to us, at least the kind of aca-

demical reason we employ. The only problem with Bennett's solution, however, is the condition of religion itself. We hardly dare speak of this above a whisper. John Paul II's *Veritatis Splendor*, in fact, is in its own straight-forward way an admission that there are serious deviations within the body of the Church itself. Much disorder stems from the academic and clerical dons.

**I**s there a remedy? At the risk of being blunt, I am going to propose, in the order of importance, the tentative agenda that the Church must follow. Too often the Church seems to have little to say on these topics other than what is found in the secular sphere, itself the cause of the problems. We are dealing at bottom with believers who have lost their sense of transcendence, of worship, of the truth of the doctrines of their faith about the meaning of this life, about life everlasting.

The first thing needed is that bishops be bishops. In one sense, the great structural weakness of the present Church is at this episcopal level. In my more pessimistic moments, I say that there is good news and bad news about bishops. The bad news is that there are only two bishops in the world who do anything. The good news is that one of these is the Pope and the other is Cardinal Ratzinger. The episcopal bureaucracies have been a serious and unattended problem for decades.

There are, no doubt, some quiet and forceful bishops, but the vast majority are silent, even when the Pope gives them an example of how to act and prods them as he regularly does at their *ad limina* meetings. It is worth reading carefully what the Holy Father tells the groups of bishops who come to visit him. This is, in part, as an example, what he told the bishops of Ontario, in Canada:

"Having spoken with previous groups of Canadian Bishops about holding firm to the sure word of truth and nourishing the people of God with the life of divine grace through the sacraments, our thoughts turn today to *our duty to teach* "the faithful the things which lead them to God, just as

the Lord did" (VS #114). ...The de-christianization of society involves not only an increasing indifference to religion, a loss of faith, but also an *obscuring of the moral sense*. As Pastors, we have a duty ... to *rekindle awareness of fundamental moral truths* as the necessary ethical foundation for a society worthy of man.... A grave risk for modern democracies is the raising of *ethical relativism* to the level of a governing principle."<sup>0</sup>

Reading between the lines, it does seem ironic that the Holy Father speaks so to bishops in modern developed countries, not just Canada. He tells them that their very society is being de-christianized, that their democracy is based on relativism, and that the fundamental moral truths are apparently not well known, in some part, no doubt, because they are not taught in the Church's own institutions over which the bishops have control.

But each bishop must seriously ask himself, in the light of his own, not his theologian's, careful reading of the *General Catechism* and *Veritatis Splendor*, whether his flock has actually been taught, including by him, any of these fundamental things during the past quarter of century, taught in any serious fashion? Bishops can no longer look at Catholic universities or high schools or seminaries and assume automatically that what is taught there is what is contained in these essential documents. It simply isn't. Hard questions must be asked and answers must be based on fact. How is it that the Holy Father in *Veritatis Splendor* could account for so many serious and deviant teachings in Catholic schools while we have not heard our bishops speak of most of these things in any meaningful or forceful sense, a silence implying that there is no problem?

Myself, I think that for the next five years, no more homilies should be preached in any Catholic church. The sermon needs reinventing. Each bishop, begin-

ning with himself, step by step, each Sunday, should go through a careful doctrinal exposition of the truths of the faith, an effort based clearly on the new *General Catechism*. The faithful, no less than the clergy, need desperately to know just what it is they are to believe. They have been inexcusably confused in every essential area from every side, including too often from the pulpit side. To find a fair or accurate account of the faith in the secular media or in the universities is almost impossible.

No priest should presume to give his own opinion in such sermons and instructions. He is there to say what the Church teaches, not to elaborate his own private views. The faithful are not dying to hear the subliminal musings of the clergy. Each member of the laity should have the actual *Catechism* and read it. The people need, have a right to know, as the *Catechism* says, just what the Church says in each of its basic teachings. They also need to understand that their own clergy believe and understand these things, that the faith is in its intelligibility. When what the *Catechism* and *Veritatis Splendor* are not mentioned or taught or taught correctly, this disorder should immediately be called to the priest's or bishop's attention, if not the Holy See's in a serious case. The faithful clearly have a right to hear their own faith presented and an obligation to object when it is not. Bishops cannot pretend that nothing is wrong.

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At this time, doctrinal instruction is more important than moral instruction, without denying the importance of the latter. Paul Johnson (in *The Intellectuals*) and Michael Jones (in *Degenerate Moderns*) are right to argue that most often deviant theories come from deviant ways of moral life. But what needs to be heard above all is a careful, clear exposition of the teachings of the faith on every basic issue of doctrine and sacrament, in every church and every

school. We have, too often, heard little but theories, experiments, and deviations for a quarter of a century. These things have rarely worked, except to the detriment of the faith itself.

Catholics need to know specifically both what they hold and why what they hold makes sense, as it does. The great and secret truth of our age is that it is the faith and the philosophy that it inspires that best explain what we actually know from science and history. And the people, clerics, professors, nuns, catechists, or authors, who explain and instruct us, should not be, without explicit conversion, the very same ones who have preached or taught the doctrines opposite to those found in the *Catechism* and *Veritatis Splendor*. We need to know first of their change of heart and we need to know if what they say is what the Church teaches. This is not censorship or authoritarianism, but a simple and elementary duty to the truth and an honesty in admitting what one actually is.

The second area that needs immediate and full attention is the liturgy. B. F. Smith was right. We need to get rid of the pamphlet missals and restore dignity to our liturgy. Each of us needs a complete missal, preferably with both Latin and English texts, certainly not ICEL translations, one clearly approved by Rome, one including all the parts of the Mass and the Sacraments, including the rubrics. We need to see when the priest is deviating from the Order or Wording of the Mass or sacrament. When we worship, we do not want constantly to wonder about the truth of the doctrine and thought being presented in the name of relevancy.

The bishop then should insist, beginning with himself, that the priest cease being a sort of actor. He should insist too that the atmosphere at Mass be not that of a sort of friendly party or picnic. The priest is to lead in the worship of the Lord. The solemn, transcendent, sacrificial aspects

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**We should not have to choose our congregations on the basis of the personality of the priest or the style of liturgy or the selection of doctrine being presented at Sunday Mass.**

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of the Mass need emphasis above all, both in experience and in explanation of what is happening. A Jesuit brother told me that in the old days, we used to expect that in Protestant Churches everything would vary with the minister. Today, he said, from the Masses he has regularly attended, "it is impossible to find any two Masses alike, either in teaching or in structure or in wording."

What has gradually happened in the Liturgy is that we have turned attention away from worship to personal communion and to community turned in on itself. The priest at times seems more and more unnecessary, someone who can be substituted for by a woman or by a committee or by the community itself. The community has replaced the Lord as the center of attention. Individuals get absorbed in the community — almost the very opposite of Catholic teaching in which each of us is to worship God and each of us is to live and die and hope for blessedness in our resurrection. We need silence, reverence, worship.

Priests should not deviate from the explicit rubrics of the Mass or other sacraments. Nothing is to be dropped. We need to hear the Creed, every Sunday. We need to know (even though it is optional) that the priest is washing his hands and specifically asking the Lord "to cleanse me from my sins." How can any priest today even think of dropping this petition before his congregation? The personality of the priest should not be the main focus of attention. We face the Lord, congregation and priest. We should not have to choose our congregations on the basis of the personality of the priest or the style of liturgy or the selection of doctrine being presented at Sunday Mass.

The third area that needs attention is private prayer. We need visits to the Blessed Sacrament, vigils, rosaries, Benediction, novenas, retreats. But these latter should not be humanistic

therapies. Psychology and sociology should not rule our novitiates, seminaries, and convents. We need above all grace and the sense of grace. The Holy Mass should not, as Cardinal Ratzinger remarked, have to bear the total focus of our worship and prayer.

Almost all the collects of the Missal need to be retranslated so that we again actually petition, actually beseech the Lord. We need to acknowledge transcendence in our very words. Recently, I have begun saying Mass in Latin more frequently. I confess I had not paid much attention to the English text over the years thinking that the translation was all right. After saying Mass in Latin, I began to understand that I was saying a rather different Mass, with a different mood, different teaching even. I became more curious about this difference when I would compare the Latin text with the English translations in the Missal. The latter were somehow vague, insipid sometimes. Something was left out. This seemed suddenly no small matter.

Take the Post-Communion prayer for the Twentieth Sunday of the Year, as a random example. It reads in Latin: "*Per haec Sacramenta, Domine, Christi participes effecti, clementiam tuam humiliter imploramus, ut, eius imaginis conformes in terris, per eius consortes in caelis fieri mereamur.*" The official English translation reads: "God of mercy, by this sacrament you make us one with Christ. By becoming more like him on earth, may we come to share his glory in heaven." A more literal and accurate translation would be: "Through these sacraments, O Lord, we, as participators in the effects of Christ, humbly implore, that, conformed to his image on earth, we may merit to become his companions in heaven."

What was bothersome in looking at these three items was that most of the sense of asking, of deserving, of transcendence were lessened or eliminated from the translation we are assigned in the official missal. After a more complete study of this problem, Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis wrote:

"All of this raises the serious issue of whether this translation does not constitute a sub-

stantial breach in the tradition of Catholic liturgy, in the literal sense of ceasing to hand down organically — through the living act of worship — the ever-ancient, ever-new deposit of faith." In other words, when an American Catholic attends Mass nowadays, can he be said to be praying the same liturgy as that prayed by Augustine, Monica, Ambrose, Leo, Benedict, Scholastica, Hildegard, Bernard, Aquinas, Teresa and Catholic Christians of all times? Surely the Mass is "valid"; but that is not the only important aspect of the question. What intellectual, moral, emotional and imaginative effect is the Mass having? My rough translations of the texts I have compared lends much truth to Leiva's analysis. And even stronger case for serious concern about the direction of liturgy is found in Msgr. Klaus Gamber's *The Reform of the Roman Liturgy*.<sup>1</sup>

Many aspects of our present liturgical translations are very inadequate if not downright deceptive about what the Church prayer really says. All of our bibles have now been quietly translated into an ideological language that presumably protects us from what the real words say in many crucial points.

At the present time there is no longer a single major translation of the Catholic Bible available in standard English. The New Revised Standard version and the New Jerusalem Bible were recently revised to conform with feminist aversion to the word "man." The New American Bible, whose copyright holder is the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine, a department of the NCCB/USCC, was a holdout. Until last year. Political questions, even in the case of the Bible, dictate how it is to be understood, even when we know the language.

**T**he fact is, in conclusion, that we may not have much time. We should not forget the hatred when we try to stand for what is true, that each human life is sacred. In many ways, the Church has been tamed. It has come too often to sound just like the world; it appears often

to express itself in exactly the same words and concepts that the secular world uses. This same secular world is the first to raise a cry when any sense of sin, grace, eternal life, penance, personal responsibility is mentioned as an essential element in confronting our decline and degradation. St. Paul said that our struggle is against principalities and powers. There seems to be nothing in our time that would suggest that he is wrong.

If we are going to maintain that religion is essential both in our willingness and in our ability to confront the disorders of our own lives and those in our society, we cannot avoid the first question about the condition of religion. We have become so ecumenical and so tolerant that we come pretty close to standing for nothing and implying that there is no reason either to convert to a true faith or to a virtuous life. These latter, however, necessarily involve our retaining enough respect for intellect to know and state the truth and enough drive in our wills to know that we cannot save ourselves by ourselves, even when we know how we must act, lest degradation and decline continue increasingly to characterize our civilization. ✠

### Rarely Conferred Papal Honor Conferred on Local Priest

On Wednesday, July 20, Bishop James C. Timlin conferred the medal **Pro Ecclesia et Pontifice** (For the Church and the Pontiff) upon Father H. Vernon Sattler of the Redemptorist order who is a retired Professor Emeritus of the University of Scranton, in residence at St. Patrick's, West Side, Scranton. The brief private ceremony happened at a quiet dinner provided by Bishop Timlin.

Father Sattler was honored for his loyalty to the teachings of the Popes John XXIII, Paul VI, and the present John Paul II.

For seven years, the honored priest was Assistant Director of the Family Life Bureau of the Bishops of the United States. He has taught at the Redemptorist moral theology Institute in Rome, has been a consultant to the Pontifical Institute on

### Endnotes:

- <sup>0</sup> William J. Bennett, "America's Revolt Against God," *Policy Review* 67 (Winter, 1994), 19-24.
- <sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21.
- <sup>2</sup> *The Mail Tribune*, January 5, 1994.
- <sup>3</sup> Theodore Kamm, "Why Does Brazil Face Such Woes? Some See a Basic Ethical Lapse," *The Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 1994.
- <sup>4</sup> Walter Williams, "Trendy Tradition Shredders," *The Washington Times*, January 16, 1994.
- <sup>5</sup> Paul Johnson, "Crime: The People Want Revenge," *The Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 1994.
- <sup>6</sup> John Paul II, "'Ad Limina Apostolorum'" Bishops of Canada, Ontario," November 19, 1993, *L'Osservatore Romano*, November 24, 1993, p. 3.
- <sup>7</sup> B. F. Smith, "A Modest Proposal," *Crisis*, 12 (January, 1994), 62-63.
- <sup>8</sup> See Klaus Gamber, *The Reform of the Roman Liturgy* (Harrison, N. Y.: Foundation for Catholic Reform, 1993).
- <sup>9</sup> Josef Cardinal Ratzinger, "Worship in the Parish Communities," *Feast of Faith* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), p. 152.
- <sup>10</sup> Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis, "The Catechetical Role of the Liturgy and the Quality of Liturgical Texts: The Current ICEL Translation," *Communio*, 20 (Spring, 1993), p. 77.
- <sup>11</sup> Gamber, *ibid.*
- <sup>12</sup> Joseph Fessio, "Blessed Is the Man...," *Catholic World Report*, 4 (February, 1994), 64.

the Family, and has taught at the University of Scranton for twenty-five years. His topic of instruction is the Theology of Love, Sex, and Marriage.

Father Sattler is one of the originators of the Cana Conferences for Married Couples and Pre-Cana for engaged couples. He is a founding member of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars.

He is the author of a number of books, the most famous of which was a pioneering work on sex education for parental use entitled **Parents, Children and the Facts of Life**, which was a best seller at 3/4 million copies, and has been reprinted recently. His most recent effort is **Challenging Children to Chastity**.

The Redemptorist priest is still busy at his word processor in producing pro-life letters to editors, commentaries on the cultural themes of the times, and scholarly articles for religious and private publication.

# Missale Romanum

Joseph Pope, D.Litt., F.I.C.B.

If ever a tome were incorrectly and inappropriately named, it must be that which these days is all too often referred to as the Tridentine Missal. It will be the object of this article to show that the Latin rite used for the celebration of the Mass by those members of the Catholic Church who come under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of the West, which rite had its use severely diminished in 1969 by Pope Paul VI, was not formed or brought into use by a decree of the Council of Trent. While the missal generally in use today is quite properly called the Roman Missal, that name, or perhaps *Missale Romanum* (M.R.), is actually the proper name for the missal which had been in general use for a great deal longer than the four hundred odd years that elapsed between Pope Saint Pius V's decree of July 14th, 1570 and Pope Paul VI's decree of 1969.

The decree of Pope Saint Pius V was not drafted to impose a new rite on Latin Christianity as did the decree of Paul VI. Its main purpose was to bring about conformity by insisting that a very old rite would henceforth be used in uniform fashion throughout the Western Church. Before the Council of Trent the M.R., while actually in use throughout the Western Church, had been adapted in various ways to suit the uses of different dioceses and different religious orders. With the advent of printing in the second half of the fifteenth century, these numerous adaptations found their way into print, so that by the first half of the sixteenth century printed missals could be found for the uses of the dioceses of Paris, Lyons, Le Mans, Salisbury, Milan, Venice, Wurzburg, and Tournai to name just a few. Then for the religious orders missals had been printed for the use of Benedictines, Carmelites, Carthusians, Cistercians, Dominicans, and Premonstratensians. There was even a missal for the use of the abbey of Monte

Cassino itself. Admittedly it differed only slightly from the one for general Benedictine use. According to the catalogue of Weale and Bohatta there were all of 208 differing missals, all R.M.'s of course, for the use of various dioceses and even towns, quite apart from at least 32 for the use of various religious orders and congregations. The Benedictines rather outdid things in having different uses for 13 of their abbeys. Of course the printers had a wonderful time of things, creating as they did any number of differing missals by the substituting of title pages onto books that did not always differ that much one from the other.

This lack of uniformity was not appropriate to the spirit of the Counter Reformation; it bordered rather on the chaotic. Accordingly Pope Saint Pius V by his decree of 1570 attempted to change chaos to order by declaring that the missal *secundum consuetudinem Romanae Curiae* was to be used throughout the Western Church. That it was not a new missal at all was made clear enough by the use of the word *restitutum* on the title page. He did allow exceptions for those places which could claim having had a particular use for at least two hundred years. Some did make such a claim. The Dominicans for instance kept their use until the advent of the Paul VI missal. Paris kept its until the French Revolution.

We see then that to call the missal of the use of Rome the Pius V or Tridentine Missal is to ignore for instance that on September 16th, 1549 Pope Paul III authorized the use of virtually the same missal *secundum usum sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae*. One has only to compare at random the prayers for any Sunday of the year to find that they are identical. It is also to ignore that since 1570 the R.M. has undergone numerous revisions, quite minor however in nature, none of which changed the propers of time. The first of these took place in 1604 during the reign of Clement VIII. One can say then to those who like to use the term Tridentine that quite unwittingly and ironically they are referring to a missal that enjoyed a rather short life of some thirty-four years, as it was in authorized use only from July 14, 1570 to July 7,

1604. Other revisions that followed were those of Urban VIII in 1634, Leo XIII in 1884, Pius XII in 1955, and even John XXIII who is remembered for having arranged that due honor be paid St Joseph during the canon.

It makes as much sense then to call M.R. the missal of John XXIII as it does to call it the missal of Pius V.

Now this missal of John XXIII (M.R.) goes back a very long time indeed. Recently this writer was accorded the very high and special privilege of being allowed to examine in depth over a period of many weeks a missal written on parchment c.1025 in the very scriptorium at Tours which was rounded by Alcuin himself c.795. Its shelf-mark is Bergendal MS 46.

Unfortunately, as well might be expected for a manuscript codex nearly one thousand years old, this Tours missal is not complete. Not a page nor a folio is to be found for the canon. As for the Proper of Time it does run from the First Sunday in Advent to the 25th Sunday after Pentecost, there is a gap from Low Sunday up to and including the Third Sunday after Pentecost. As for the Proper of Saints it starts with December 26th, the Feast of Saint Stephen, and runs with no gap to August 28th the Feast of Saint Augustine. Missing then are the feasts for all of September, October, November, and most of December. For those who imagine that the M.R. originated in 1570 with Saint Pius V it will be quite a surprise then for them to learn of the very great similarities that are to be found between missals used in the first part of the twentieth century and those that were used in the first part of the eleventh century. To choose for example practically at random the Wednesday of the Second Week in Lent we find that all the prayers from the Propers are the same in each case namely:

INTROIT: Ne derelinquas me Domine Deus ...

*Psalm 37*

COLLECT: Populum tuum, quaesumus  
Domine ...

EPISTLE: Book of Esther IV 17

GRADUAL: Salvum fac populum tuum ...

*Psalm 27*

GOSPEL: St Matthew XX 17-28

OFFERTORY: Ad te Domine levavi animam ...

*Psalm 24*

SECRET: Hostias Domine quas tibi ...

COMMUNION: Justus Dominus et justitiam ...

*Psalm 10*

POSTCOMMUNION: Sumptis Domine  
sacramentis ...

PRAYER OVER THE PEOPLE: Deus innocentiae  
restitutor ...

In the present Roman Missal of Paul VI only the introit for this Lenten Wednesday has not been changed, but these days it is rarely used given that the entrance hymn is now *ad libitum* of the pastor of the place if used at all. For the masses after Pentecost certain inconsistencies in the Epistles and Gospels are to be noted between Bergendal MS 46 and M.R. However bearing in mind that we are dealing here with a missal prepared in all likelihood for the use of the Abbey of Saint Julian in Tours (to judge for one thing by the litany for Holy Saturday) a reference to any early sixteenth century printed M.R. for the use of either Tours or Le Mans quite resolves the problem. Our eleventh century Propers for Sundays after Pentecost are identical with those used in Tours until that place conformed to the standardization ordered by Saint Pius V.

A point of interest is that in the eleventh century there were ferial masses for most of the Wednesdays in the weeks after Pentecost. This is a relic of the times in the Church's early history when fasts were practiced on Wednesdays, Fridays, and Saturdays to replace the Jewish fasts of Mondays and Thursdays. The ember days during one week in each of the four seasons, which were abrogated a generation ago, were the last vestige of this admirable practice.

Of course knowledgeable liturgists are aware that the M.R., as used in the Latin rite in the first half of the twentieth century, did not originate with St Pius V in 1570, but had been in

use for centuries previous to that date. There is general agreement that prior to the development of a book known as missal that there were three books used at Mass, that is for the celebrant himself there was the sacramentary containing collects, secrets, prefaces, the canon, and postcommunions, for the deacon there was the lectionary containing the epistles and gospels, and lastly the gradual or antiphony for the parts sung by the choir, being the introits, graduals, sequences, offertories, and communions.

There is no general agreement among students of the liturgy as to when the three books were combined. Some suggest that this did not happen until well into the thirteenth century. Those holding to this view point to the fact that the missal of the Roman Curia as reformed by Innocent III was adopted by the newly established Franciscan order and propagated by them throughout most of Europe. Later this Curia missal as used by Franciscans was imposed on the diocese of Rome in 1277 by Nicholas III. It is not easy to find agreement on this matter as manuscript witnesses of any missal for the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries are so very rare. It would appear that on the evidence of Bergendal MS 46 those who hold to a thirteenth century date for the merging of the three liturgical books into the missal may have to acknowledge that they are out in their reckoning of things by some two hundred years at least. What seems the safest opinion is that throughout the eleventh century both missals and sacramentaries were used for the celebration of mass but that from the beginning of the twelfth century missals more and more quite replaced sacramentaries.

That missal done for use in Tours can be dated on script and other internal evidence as having been written c.1025. As has been explained it contains complete propers with introits, collects,

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epistles, graduals, sequences, gospels, offertories, secrets, communions, and postcommunions. A point of considerable additional interest for students of music is that it contains as well the earliest form known of medieval music notation expressed in neumes without staff for those parts derived from the gradual. In the bibliography of things liturgical over the past three hundred years no mention is to be found, in any book written by a competent authority, of the existence of this

codex. It had lain unsold for several years on the shelves of a second hand book dealer until it was discovered in 1983 by the present curator of the little-known Bergendal Collection. One may opine that in time it will be recognized as being of considerable significance and interest to students of the development of the liturgy in general and the M.R. in particular. At the same time the codex is not without interest for students of both palaeography and musical notation. In this latter respect it is similar in many ways to the manuscript of a gradual done in Toulouse c.1050 and known now as MS Harleian 4951 in the British Library.

Bergendal MS 46 is a witness then to the fact that the sacramentary, lectionary, and antiphony had been merged into the M.R. by the very beginning of the eleventh century in at least some places. As for the prayers and mass formularies themselves there is general agreement that they go back possibly to the time of Saint Gregory the Great, who reigned towards the end of the sixth century.

These things are not easy to determine as so few early missals or sacramentaries remain in existence. They were subject to much wear and use. In the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana there exists a very early one known as *Sacramentarium Gelasianum* or in English the Gelasian Sacramentary. It is named after Pope St. Gelasius I

(492-496) who composed many of its propers. There is general agreement that it was written c.740 in northern France. It is also accepted that it was a copy of a sacramentary from the fifth or sixth century. It is famous and of great importance for being the most ancient and the most complete manuscript of the oldest sacramentary. It is known by its shelf mark of *Reginensis latinus 316*. If, when in Rome, one asks politely of the present Prefect of the Vatican Library, who is a most obliging, patient, and kind Dominican priest from Ireland, one stands just a chance of being allowed to examine it, even if one is lacking the usually necessary qualification of being acknowledged as a doctoral student engaged in research or else at the very least of being a curator from a recognized library.

Points of similarity between it and the M.R. are the Collect for Palm Sunday on folio 51r, the Collect for the Feast of Saint Thomas Apostle on folio 162v, and the Collect for the Feast Of the Holy Innocents on folio 1Or. The canon from the *Te igitur* through to the *Pater Noster* and *Libera nos quaesumus Domine* to the *Pax Domini sit semper vobiscum* are virtually identical to the same prayers in the M.R. Accordingly those celebrants who choose to recite a canon other than the Roman Canon, or first eucharistic prayer, are abandoning a tradition going back some fifteen hundred years at least. Then too one can find in it most of the Collects, Secrets, and Postcommunions running from the Fifth Sunday after Pentecost to the Twentieth Sunday after Pentecost as are found in M.R.

In the solemn prayers for Good Friday, in the Gelasian Sacramentary, one reads "*Oremus et pro Christianissimo imperatore nostro ut Deus omnipotens subditas illi faciat omnes barbaras nationes ad nostram perpetuam pacem.*" This prayer is found unchanged in sacramentary after sacramentary and missal after missal, including Bergendal MS 46, until well into

the nineteenth century. Apparently by the turn of the twentieth century it was felt no longer appropriate to pray that savage peoples for the sake of peace and good order become subject to a most Christian Emperor, and that possibly because a most Christian Emperor had become a pretty hard thing to find by then anyway.

Bergendal MS 46 is a true missal combining as it does the prayers from the sacramentary, the lectionary, and the gradual. It is an important documentary witness to two facts. The first is that the missal as such came into use quite a bit earlier than has been recognized by many writers on the subject. The second is that our M.R. of John XXIII goes back at least one thousand years, and not just to 1570, given the virtual complete similarity to be found between readings and prayers printed around 1965 and those of Bergendal MS 46 written around 1025. It remains to be determined how far back into time one can find examples of such extraordinary similarity. The lack of manuscript witnesses does not help one find an answer. This writer does not know of the existence of a complete missal done during the first millennium. Then there is the virtual impossibility of finding a sacramentary, a lectionary, and a gradual all written at about the same time during either the ninth or tenth centuries. Some are tempted to suggest that the prayers of the M.R. reached their definite form at the time of the re-

form of the liturgy during the reign of Gregory the Great (590-604). While quite possibly so, it could well prove rash to succumb to the temptation as the earliest copy known of a Gregorian Sacramentary dates from c.800. One would actually be on firmer ground in suggesting that the Sacramentary which resulted from the reforms instigated by Charlemagne and Alcuin in the years 801-804 is the first one to have prayers virtually identical to the ones used during the times

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of both Saint Pius V and John XXIII.

We know that Charlemagne (768-814) was anxious that uniformity prevail throughout his kingdom in the matter of liturgy. To this end he prevailed on Pope Adrian I (772-795) to send him a copy of the *Sacramentarium Gregorianum*, which owed its origin to the reforms of Gregory the Great (590-604). It seems that Alcuin (735-804) modified it and ensured its use throughout the Frankish Kingdom. Precision is difficult on this point as some authorities hold that the modifications were done actually by Saint Benedict of Aniane (750-821). Then by the tenth century this modified Gregorian Sacramentary had returned, as it were, to Rome and became the one used throughout the West.

As the existence of the Gelasian Sacramentary proves the mass for many centuries prior to 800 was very similar in form but tended to differ from M.R. in choice of prayers and readings. Even at that, as has been shown, many of the propers adopted by Alcuin had been in use two or three hundred years earlier. What can be said with relative certainty is that the M.R. as used during the reign of John XXIII had taken its form as a complete missal by the turn of the second millennium. There is general agreement that the very same prayers were in use from 800 AD to 1000 AD but were to be found in sacramentaries, lectionaries, and graduals rather than in missals. In other words over a period of one thousand two hundred years the ordinary and propers of the mass hardly suffered the slightest change. We can say too that the canon as we know it was used in the fifth century and that many propers of Time and propers of Saints used in the middle of the twentieth century were also used in the fifth century. What is intriguing is that the Roman Canon has come down to us unchanged from the very earliest times of Christianity of which we have the slightest liturgical record. One is allowed to wonder whether or not the composers of the Paul VI Roman Missal truly realized the extent of the tradition they were throwing overboard when they put together the prayers of the mass now in general use in the Latin

rite. It was an unbroken tradition of about twelve hundred years of use of virtually identical prayers and a tradition of more than 1,500 years of use of any number of prayers and readings that were unchanged during all that time.

Fortunately the M.R. of Saint Leo III, Saint Pius V, and John XXIII is still with us as its use was never entirely abrogated. During the reign of Paul VI it is true that its use was restricted to priests whose advanced age made it difficult for them to adapt to anything new. However during the reign of John Paul II its use has been increased considerably. In law, if not in practice, its use should be available to one and all. There is no reason why one cannot contemplate this renewed use increasing rather than not. A tradition of one and a half millennia is not one to be given up lightly.

A liturgical calendar has been prepared which shows all the saints' days as found in Bergendal MS 46. It bears a striking resemblance to the calendar that was used during the reign of Pope John XXIII. Naturally enough those who have been canonized in relatively recent times such as St Anthony of Padua (1232), St Thomas Aquinas (1323), and Saint Pius V (1712) are not to be found in it. However many old favorites such as Saints Sixtus, Lawrence, Stephen, Mathias, Barnabas, Agnes, and Agatha are there in full holy force. May those martyrs from the dawn of Christianity pray for us. ✠

#### Reinforcements

Members of the FCS will be interested to know of the formation of the Cardinal Newman Society for the Preservation of Catholic Higher Education, dedicated to promote discussion of the academic and spiritual benefits of Catholic higher education. The society intends to educate the general community about the nature of the Catholic university and to assist in a variety of ways in the efforts to halt the slide into secularization. Further information may be had from Patrick J. Reilly, Cardinal Newman Society, P.O. Box 75274, Washington, D.C. 20013.

## Apostolic Letter on Reserving Priestly Ordination to Men Alone: "Ordinatio Sacerdotalis"

Pope John Paul II

1. Priestly Ordination, which hands on the office entrusted by Christ to his Apostles of teaching, sanctifying, and governing the faithful, has in the Catholic Church from the beginning always been reserved to men alone. This tradition has also been faithfully maintained by the Oriental Churches.

When the question of the ordination of women arose in the Anglican Communion, Pope Paul VI, out of fidelity to his office of safeguarding the Apostolic Tradition, and also with a view to removing a new obstacle placed in the way of Christian unity, reminded Anglicans of the position of the Catholic Church: "She holds that it is not admissible to ordain women to the priesthood, for very fundamental reasons. These reasons include: the example recorded in the Sacred Scriptures of Christ choosing His Apostles only from among men; the constant practice of the Church, which has imitated Christ in choosing only men; and her living teaching authority which has consistently held that the exclusion of women from the priesthood is in accordance with God's plan for His Church." [1]

But since the question had also become the subject of debate among theologians and in certain Catholic circles, Paul VI directed the Congregation for the Doctrine

of the Faith to set forth and expound the teaching of the Church on this matter. This was done through the Declaration <Inter Insigniores>, which the Supreme Pontiff approved and ordered to be published. [2]

2. The Declaration recalls and explains the fundamental reasons for this teaching, reasons expounded by Paul VI, and concludes that the Church "does not consider herself authorized to admit women to priestly ordination." [3] To these fundamental reasons the document adds other theological reasons which illustrate the appropriateness of the divine provision, and it also shows clearly that Christ's way of acting did not proceed from sociological or cultural motives peculiar to his time. As Paul VI later explained: "The real reason is that, in giving the Church her fundamental constitution, her theological anthropology—thereafter always followed by the Church's Tradition—Christ established things in this way." [4]

In the Apostolic Letter <Mulieris Dignitatem>, I myself wrote in this regard: "In calling only men as His Apostles, Christ acted in a completely free and sovereign manner. In doing so, He exercised the same freedom with which, in all His behavior, He emphasized the dignity and the vocation of women, without conforming to the prevailing customs and to the traditions sanctioned by the legislation of the time." [5]

In fact, the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles attest that this call was made in accordance with God's eternal plan: Christ chose those whom He willed (cf. <Mk> 3:13-14; <Jn> 6:70), and He did

so in union with the Father, "through the Holy Spirit" (<Acts> 1:2), after having spent the night in prayer (cf. <Lk> 6:12). Therefore, in granting admission to the ministerial priesthood, [6] the Church has always acknowledged as a perennial norm her Lord's way of acting in choosing twelve men whom He made the foundation of His Church (cf. <Rev> 21:14). These men did not in fact receive only a function which could thereafter be exercised by any member of the Church; rather they were specifically and intimately associated in the mission of the Incarnate Word Himself (cf. <Mt> 10:1, 7-8; 28:16-20; <Mk> 3:13-16; 16:14-15). The Apostles did the same when they chose fellow workers [7] who would succeed them in their ministry. [8] Also included in this choice were those who, throughout the time of the Church, would carry on the Apostles' mission of representing Christ the Lord and Redeemer. [9]

3. Furthermore, the fact that the Blessed Virgin Mary, Mother of God and Mother of the Church, received neither the mission proper to the Apostles nor the ministerial priesthood clearly shows that the non-admission of women to priestly ordination cannot mean that women are of lesser dignity, nor can it be construed as discrimination against them. Rather, it is to be seen as the faithful observance of a plan to be ascribed to the wisdom of the Lord of the universe.

The presence and the role of women in the life and mission of the Church, although not linked to the ministerial priesthood, remain absolutely necessary and irreplaceable. As the Declaration <Inter

Insigniores> points out, “the Church desires that Christian women should become fully aware of the greatness of their mission; today their role is of capital importance both for the renewal and humanization of society and for the rediscovery by believers of the true face of the Church”. [10]

The New Testament and the whole history of the Church give ample evidence of the presence in the Church of women, true disciples, witnesses to Christ in the family and in society, as well as to total consecration to the service of God and of the Gospel. “By defending the dignity of women and their vocation, the Church has shown honor and gratitude for those women who—faithful to the Gospel—have shared in every age in the apostolic mission of the whole People of God. They are the holy martyrs, virgins, and the mothers of families, who bravely bore witness to their faith and passed on the Church’s faith and tradition by bringing up their children in the spirit of the Gospel”. [11]

Moreover, it is to the holiness of the faithful that the hierarchical structure of the Church is totally ordered. For this reason, the Declaration <Inter Insigniores> recalls: “the only better gift, which can and must be desired, is love (cf. <1 Cor> 12 and 13). The greatest in the Kingdom of Heaven are not the ministers but the saints.” [12]

4. Although the teaching that priestly ordination is to be reserved to men alone has been preserved by the constant and universal Tradition of the Church and firmly taught by the Magisterium in its more recent documents, at the

present time in some places it is nonetheless considered still open to debate, or the Church’s judgment that women are not to be admitted to ordination is considered to have a merely disciplinary force.

Wherefore, in order that all doubt may be removed regarding a matter of great importance, a matter which pertains to the Church’s divine constitution itself, in virtue of my ministry of confirming the brethren (cf. <Lk> 22:32) I declare that the Church has no authority whatsoever to confer priestly ordination on women and that this judgment is to be definitively held by all the Church’s faithful.

Invoking an abundance of divine assistance upon you, venerable Brothers, and upon all the faithful, I impart my Apostolic Blessing.

From the Vatican, on May 22, the Solemnity of Pentecost, in the year 1994, the sixteenth of my Pontificate.

Joannes Paulus PP. II

#### Notes

1. Paul VI, <Response to the Letter of His Grace the Most Reverend Dr. F. D. Coggan, Archbishop of Canterbury, concerning the Ordination of Women to the Priesthood> (30 November 1975): <AAS> 68 (1976), 599.
2. Cf. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration <Inter Insigniores> on the Question of the Admission of Women to the Ministerial Priesthood (15 October 1976): <AAS> 69 (1977), 98-116.
3. <Ibid.>, 100.
4. Paul VI, <Address on the Role of Women in the Plan of Salvation> (30 January 1977): <Insegnamenti>, XV (1977), 111. Cf. also John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation <Christifideles Laici> (30 December 1988), 31: <AAS> 81 (1989), 393-521; <Catechism of the Catholic Church>, No. 1577.

5. Apostolic Letter <Mulieris Dignitatem> (15 August 1988), 26; <AAS> 80 (1988), 1715.
6. Cf. Dogmatic Constitution <Lumen Gentium>, 28; Decree <Presbyterorum Ordinis>, 2b.
7. Cf. <1 Tim> 3:1-13; <2 Tim> 1:6; <Tit> 1:5-9.
8. Cf. <Catechism of the Catholic Church>, No. 1577.
9. Cf. Dogmatic Constitution on the Church <Lumen Gentium>, 20, 21.
10. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration <Inter Insigniores>, 6: <AAS> 69 (1977), 115-116.
11. Apostolic Letter <Mulieris Dignitatem>, 27; <AAS> 80 (1988), 1719.
12. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration <Inter Insigniores>, 6: <AAS> 69 (1977), 115.



#### Of The Earth Earthy

“It can’t be right to forbid the church to bless homosexual couples,” said Ivan Larsen, a gay parish priest in Copenhagen. “There is no earthly reason to separate homosexuals and heterosexuals and it can only mean that the Church doesn’t see homosexuality as being acceptable.”

Kierkegaard, thou shouldst be living at this hour.

## The Courage to Speak Bluntly

by J. Navarro-Valls

**T**he Holy Father has spoken a good deal about courage in recent years. He means the courage needed by the pope and his bishops to face ridicule and ostracism for their positions on the issues that lie at the foundations of human life and of the Christian revelation. An entire culture that held that the right to life was "self-evident" now wants to reject this fundamental principle in every sphere of life.

In the Vatican's view, next week's United Nations population conference in Cairo presents itself as a crucial challenge to Christianity's most fundamental doctrine on the sanctity of life as it is to come to be and exist in the family. The Holy Father is not merely defending a sort of Catholic view about life and family. He is in fact pointing to the key issue on which future humanity must make a choice. This issue of human life and population undergirds all others. A false step here leads to a general disorder of civilization itself. A small error in the beginning leads to a large error in the end, as Aristotle said. This error is precisely what is at issue.

According to the Vatican, the conference's theme includes coerced family planning, abortion, homosexuality and versions of women's rights that are harmful to women. Recent assertions by American and U.N. officials and by liberal Catholics in the U.S. and elsewhere attempt to challenge the church's view of what the confer-

ence proposals really mean. But while it is true that a studied ambiguity is often evident in the conference's proposals, allowing contradictory interpretations, the Vatican is especially attentive to the dubious use of words and language that imply only verbal agreement but leave the door open for judicial or legislative interpretations later.

### Rights of Women

**T**he Vatican's position is not in any sense in opposition to the rights of women around the world. The presumably popular "rights of women," unfortunately, have become an expression for pro-abortion and anti-family positions. This implies that there is no room for other statements about the "rights" of women if they contradict these Cairo and American proposals.

If we sort through the various controversial issues dealing with population, we see that they continually come back to human life, the conditions of its coming to be, its growth and its purpose. What are the principles that stand behind the conference's thinking about population control, the means to achieve it and the nature of human life subsequent to accepting these means?

First of all there is said to be, however much disputed on empirical grounds, a world population crisis. In this doubtful view, the need to control populations becomes the paramount ethical and political issue. World population is to be set at some such figure as seven and a half billion. Since that figure is said to represent the "carrying capacity" of the earth — something itself purely arbitrary —

this end justifies the means to achieve it.

Human beings then, on this hypothesis, cannot be expected to live by the ethical laws that the pope, following natural law and reason, proposes and insists on. However noble such proposals might sound, they cannot, it is said, deal with actual human beings. Actual human beings, it is implied, are not really ruled by moral criteria. We thus need to impose a widespread system of control of the reproductive act's consequences. All activity that results in children will be subject to political scrutiny and, if need be, to force.

All essentially sterile acts, on the other hand, are said to be relatively insignificant. Homosexual or lesbian activity, contraception or sterilization, all are viewed in a positive light because they have no visible consequences. Sex becomes literally insignificant. The social and political freedom of homosexual activity is thus rooted precisely in its lack of any real existential purpose or consequence. Only sexual activity that has potential consequences in the conception of a child had any political importance. And this activity must be limited and controlled as much as possible by the eugenic state.

This theoretical position has its own prior logic. Its premise is that there is no nature or principle of morality that is not subject to the state. The state cannot be itself limited by anything except necessity. The Holy Father has affirmed that "Thou shalt not kill" is as valid for the embryo as for the individuals already born. Since the proposals at the population conference envision the killing of such embryos as a means to achieve their

political ends, they must deny the validity of the Holy Father's premises, which are based not on the Holy Father's will but on the nature of things.

The advocates of population control by such means usually deny, contrary to all scientific fact, that a human embryo is human. Or if they admit that the embryo is human, they must claim that the power of the state extends even to human life so that the definition of who lives and who dies is not based on the prior existence or sacredness of a human life in any of its forms, but on the political will to control human population according to a questionable theory of world resources and human needs. Ironically, it is the church that primarily upholds the scientific reality of the human fetus in all its forms.

The Holy Father sees at work in this conference a series of principles that undermine revelation, human dignity and natural law as they have been understood in our tradition. For him to be silent would be unconscionable. This conference alerted him to the extreme dangers of bending man to the will of civil societies.

The constitutions and laws of many of these political societies affirm that life is sacred and that human enterprise and freedom can provide for human needs. The Holy Father represents a way that looks not to consequences but to causes. He understands, along with Plato and our whole tradition, that a reform of society must begin in the reform of the heart of the individual and an accurate understanding of the worth of each human life.

We live in a dishonest age. We call abortion everything but what it

is. The Holy Father cuts through this verbiage and calls it an evil as heinous as killing any other human being. This blunt talk sends a shock wave through the highest ranks of our civil societies because many of them have been busy, by their laws, killing our kind and calling it something else.

Alfonso Cardinal Lopez Trujillo suggested that if the principles of the Cairo conference are enacted and carried out, we shall see "the most disastrous massacres of history." This is not simply because of the numbers, though it is true that abortions already represent the greatest systematic slaughter of mankind ever known. It is also a disaster because human beings killed before their births have brains — brains that are, as the Holy Father recognized in *Centesimus Annus*, the ultimate source of the wealth needed to meet human problems. If we cut these human beings off before they are born, or if do not let them be conceived, born and raised in a proper family, we will deprive ourselves of the very means by which the goods of the earth become our goods.

### Stalin's Question


**W**hen the Holy Father devotes so much attention to the principles of such a conference, it is not because he enjoys the fray or is making a mountain out of a mole hill. It is because, as he says, "the future of humanity" is at stake. He has received widespread, if sometimes begrudging, praise for his role in the dismantling of Marxism. He has more than amply answered Stalin's question about how many

troops the pope had: more than enough to undermine Stalin's empire.

If the Holy Father is largely isolated and alone on this issue, as many would have it, it may well be because modern thought and politics have embraced principles that cannot enhance human worth and destiny. If he is free enough and courageous enough to stand firm when everyone else compromises with the essential dignity of man, it must mean that something more is going on here than a mere exercise of political will. Civilization is at stake. We would be foolish to see in the Cairo conference anything less.

*Dr. Navarro-Valls is director of the Holy See press office in Rome. This article reflects the position of the Holy See on the themes of the U.N. population conference in Cairo.*

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## A Story of Faithfulness, of Blood, and of New Beginnings

by Richard V. Warner, C.S.C.

**B**y now we have greeted everyone with the famous words, "How was your summer?" and have told everyone how ours was in response to the same question.

We are delighted, even exhilarated, to be back on campus and to be with our friends again. We are happy to be back on what has now become "our turf."

As we begin a new academic year under the Dome, each of us is filled with many thoughts, and with many hopes for what we want this year to be for us.

**O**ne of the grace-filled realities of our faith is that the blood of martyrs never dries. It flows. And from it, new strength always enables a rejuvenated and revitalized Church to become stronger and to grow.

Sometime during the night of May 8-9, 1994, while many Notre Dames students were still grappling with final exams, five young Rwandan Holy Cross Brothers, men in their twenties, were murdered. They were still in their preparatory years of training before they would become zealous Holy Cross religious serving their people in Africa.

Their blood flowed. The history of our faith tells us that from their blood, Christian roots in their country, which in recent years were not sufficient to overcome historical tribal animosity, will

strengthen the faith and hope they shared with us.

Holy Cross has given new martyrs.

May Brothers Eulade Gasasira, C.S.C., Leonard Karemangino, C.S.C., Venant Kayitana, C.S.C., Jean-Baptiste Mundeli, C.S.C. and Janvier Murenzi, C.S.C. rest in peace.

From their blood, their lives and their witness, may the Church become more deeply rooted in Africa and may the Gospel of Jesus Christ become a worthy way of life for many.

In the midst of these days of suffering and loss, there was cause for great happiness.

Eleven other Rwandan Holy Cross Brothers, who were missing since May, finally made their way safely to Uganda, arriving there three weeks ago. They are currently living with American, Kenyan and Ugandan Holy Cross priests and brothers in Fort Portal.

And just ten days ago, the first Tutsi Holy Cross seminarian pronounced final vows and was ordained a deacon. He was fairly certain none of his family members would be with him for this moment of commitment to be lived throughout a lifetime.

The Rwandan Holy Cross Brothers were not the first martyrs in Africa. A Notre Dame alumnus, Vince McCauley, C.S.C., was. He set foot on African soil for the first time when he was 52, when he was appointed bishop of Fort Portal, Uganda. Over the subsequent twenty years, he became a legendary figure in East Africa because of his accomplishments, and especially his holiness.

Twenty-five years earlier, doctors in Washington, D.C. and at

the Mayo Clinic had told him that he had less than six months to live. He was a young, recently ordained Holy Cross missionary, who had only been able to spend six months in Bangladesh, a land where he was prepared to live and work all the years of his life.

But instead of preparing for death, the young priest from Omaha traveled to Lourdes, France. At the Grotto of Our Lady there, he did not ask to be cured. He simply promised Mary that he would continue to work every day for the spread of the Gospel for as long as he might live. The Grotto, of course, meant a lot to him, for it was after the Grotto of Lourdes that our own is fashioned. And as a student at Notre Dame, he had visited the Grotto often.

He lived more than forty years beyond his six month expectancy, and in the course of those years, he became a modern saint for Africa. His diocese grew so rapidly that three additional dioceses were cut off from the one to which he was originally appointed bishop, so that his African auxiliary might become one of the first African bishops in post-colonial Africa.

But Bishop McCauley did not retire. Instead, he founded an institute for higher theological studies in Nairobi, Kenya. In order to prepare young African priests for an apostolic life that would include a rigorous theological and reflective component. He founded the Association of Member Episcopal Conferences of East Africa, to bring together the one hundred mostly African bishops of the region to work together for the good of all their peoples. And, above all, he loved and served the poor of Africa. He treated kindly and with

generosity thousands of refugees from the Idi Amin regime. And he never failed to see the face of Christ in every person he met and dealt with.

Bishop Vince McCauley, C.S.C. was one of the founders of the Holy Cross missions in Africa, and he became an inspiration for future generations of Holy Cross men and women. When he died in 1985, everyone who knew him, even a little bit, knew in their heart, that a true saint had joined in Lord in heaven, welcomed in a special way, surely, by Mary who knew he had more than kept up his end of the bargain he had made forty years earlier.

When Holy Cross priests entered his simple quarters in Nairobi, Kenya, after his death to gather his personal effects, they found only a few changes of clothing, two cassocks and several in-

consequential papers. He took the Lord Jesus at his word and kept only two tunics for his fifty year sojourn following Christ.

Oh, yes. The cancer that led to his original six month prognosis did not go away. He underwent more than forty operations to keep it under control until at last it killed him. Now he serves as model of loving Gospel service regardless of the cost, for generations of Holy Cross religious in East Africa and elsewhere, and for thousands of Africans.

**A**s a new academic year begins, you are happy to be here among and with your friends.

You are happy to be in place where you too can pursue and deepen your own desire for a more significant and life-giving relationship with Jesus and with our com-

munity of believers. There will be many opportunities for you to do so, whether in late night sessions with friends, at the Basilica or Grotto, at residence hall Masses, during N.D.E retreats, or in countless other ways.

However you want to allow this deepening of your spiritual side to happen, pursue it.

Pursue it relentlessly.

That is the way it has always been here. It was that way for Vince McCauley when he was a Notre Dame undergraduate. And please God it is the way it will be for you and for generations of Notre Dame men and women to come. ✠

*Father Warner is Counselor to the President and Director of Campus Ministry at Notre Dame. This article first appeared in the Notre Dame Observer on September 1, 1994.*

## DOCUMENTATION

### Testimony of Richard M. Doerflinger Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities National Conference of Catholic Bishops

**Public Comment Session  
Meeting of the Human  
Embryo Research Panel  
National Institutes of Health  
June 21, 1994**

**S**ince its first meeting in February, at which I also submitted testimony, the Human Embryo Research Panel has

discussed many complex and interesting issues. But the most interesting and most important issue of all, the moral status of the human embryo, was given a premature and dismissive answer by the end of that first meeting — or perhaps it was answered as soon as the membership of this panel was chosen. For it was at that first meeting that chairman Steven Muller said it was inappropriate to include on the panel any member who wishes to protect human embryos from experimentation outside the womb.<sup>1</sup>

Given such a view, it is not surprising that the panel decided to view the living human embryo as a special kind of “human material” or “human tissue,” as an object rather than a subject of research.<sup>2</sup> While the panel has spoken of

treating the embryo with “respect,” one panelist has rightly said that the word is a mere “slogan” in this context.<sup>3</sup> After all, the panel has decided that human embryos may be created and destroyed at will, dissected while still alive, and disposed of in a “biohazard disposal mechanism” when they have outlived their usefulness.<sup>4</sup> It is no exaggeration to say that the panel thinks researchers may do to a human embryo things that shouldn’t happen to a dog.

Be that as it may, I would like to raise the question: Aside from the aforementioned personal predictions of the panelists themselves, what basis can the panel show for its dismissive view of the embryo and its expansive approval of lethal experiments?

Can that basis be found in Congress? At least one panelist has written to critics, claiming that Congress has already decided to fund human embryo experiments — this panel is only setting guidelines as to how such experiments will be conducted.

But this is just not true. All that Congress has done, through enactment of the 1993 reauthorization act for the National Institutes of Health, is to drop a procedural barrier to the funding of human in vitro fertilization as a treatment for infertility. Congress said nothing at all about unrelated and destructive experiments on live human embryos already produced by in vitro fertilization. Still less did it have any intention of authorizing experiments in procedures like cloning or parthenogenesis, which produce embryonic life without using fertilization at all.

Is this basis found in NIH's own regulations? On the contrary: Since 1975 those regulations have treated the early human embryo as a human subject at least from the time of implantation (around 7 days after fertilization), and they have prohibited federal funding for any non-therapeutic experiments that may pose a significant risk to the embryo. Since 1985, Congress has insisted that these regulations incorporate a principle of equality: The unborn child who may be intended for abortion must be protected from research risks to the same degree as a child intended for live birth. The Human Embryo Research Panel has not even begun to explain why all these principles can be turned upside down when the embryo happens to be outside the womb. Why can such an embryo be subjected to lethal experi-

ments at 14 to 18 days after fertilization or even later? Why, in this context, do parents' lack of interest in that embryo for reproductive purposes automatically make him or her into appropriate "tissue" for a federally funded experiment, when this kind of reasoning is absolutely forbidden if the embryo already resides in the womb? The panel has given no answer to these questions. It has simply set aside the existing regulations and produced its own standard from whole cloth.<sup>5</sup>

Can one find precedent in other federal or state laws governing treatment of the human embryo, or in the laws of other nations? Quite the opposite. In current constitutional jurisprudence, a human embryo outside the womb is far more protectable than one inside the womb — because in the latter case efforts to protect the embryo's life may run up against the right of privacy of the mother. So in its Webster decision in 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed Missouri to assert a compelling interest in protecting life from the moment of conception — so long as that interest does not contravene a pregnant woman's right to an abortion. Similarly, Louisiana has been able to define the human embryo as a juridical person with a right to life — so long as it is outside the womb. An embryo created by in vitro fertilization in Louisiana is a person, then becomes a non-person after being transferred to the womb, and then re-emerges as a person at the moment of being born — what one might call being born again. In any case, according to the panel's own invited advisor on legal issues, at least 9 states have

laws banning experiments on human embryos (not just public funding for such experiments), and so do many other industrialized nations.<sup>6</sup>

Can a basis for this standard be found in science? No, because the human embryologist specially invited to advise the panel on this matter testified that human life is a continuum from fertilization onwards.<sup>7</sup> No basis was found for drawing strict dividing lines at 14 days, formation of the "primitive streak" or any other point. The panelists themselves, along with their invited expert on ethical issues, have referred to such dividing lines as mere "pragmatic" lines, as political "compromises" with no agreed-upon basis in fact.<sup>8</sup>

Is such a basis found in moral philosophy? One might think so at first, because the panel has spent considerable time constructing what it called a "multi-factorial" standard for personhood. Under the guidance of one of its members, Professor Ronald Green, the panel decided that a member of the human species must meet a number of criteria — developmental potential, sentience, cognitive ability, etc. — before demanding recognition as a full "person." Understandably, the early human embryo was found to fall short.

But this approach to personhood was advanced by philosopher Mary Anne Warren over a decade ago, and was brilliantly rebutted in the 1983 volume of the journal *Soundings*. The author of the rebuttal cogently observed that once one begins applying such a list of criteria, "it seems to be true that if the fetus is not a person, neither is the newborn or young infant."<sup>9</sup> That perceptive author was none other

than... Professor Ronald Green.

In his 1983 article, Professor Green went on to propose a "Copernican revolution" in our understanding of such moral issues.

There is nothing "out there" that objectively determines which human beings should be respected as persons, he argued. Rather, such determinations are essentially free decisions by "the community of mature, rational human beings." That community must engage in "complex 'balancing decisions' that involve us in weighing our broadest interests in protecting an entity against the restriction on our liberty which this protection necessarily involves."<sup>10</sup>

By Professor Green's own account, this panel's decision to set certain criteria for personhood, and to use those criteria to reject any significant protection for human embryos, is not an objective finding but a social construct, built from the personal values and prejudices of the panelists themselves.

Our final question, then, must be this: Is the panel's decision based on a social consensus on the values and interests involved? This is a particularly important question in Professor Green's account of moral decisionmaking, for he has written that a social decision to protect or destroy the unborn should involve all who are "reasonably mature individuals with roughly 'normal' intellectual and reasoning powers, the kinds of persons we allow to serve on juries or to make social decisions generally."<sup>11</sup>

Has the panel attended to the wishes of such a broad cross-section of Americans?

The answer, of course, is no. This panel's conclusions represent only the consensus of 19 individu-

als who were chosen with an eye toward their pre-existing *support* for embryo research. Public opposition to the panel's approach has been obvious during the public comment sessions at these meetings, and the more than 13,000 letters it has received from the general public are so overwhelmingly negative that the panel chairman's secretary refers to it as "the hate mail."

In short, this panel has no firm objective basis for its conclusions. And if the resolution of this issue requires a subjective social consensus, a community decision about values and priorities, the panel's unrepresentative makeup makes it a very poor instrument for making that decision. The real community debate — the fair debate — on whether taxpayers' dollars should support such experiments must take place in forums far broader than this. ❖

1. NIH Human Embryo Research Panel, Transcript, 2/3/94, pp. 97-8 (Steven Muller).

2. Transcript: 4/11/94, p. 10 ("valuable human material" — Ronald Green); Id., p. 22 (similar to the use of "fetal tissues" or other "tissue material," because "You're not dealing here with a research subject for whom mistreatment could be fatal" — Ronald Green); 2/3/94, p. 108 ("tissue" — Alta Charo).

3. Transcript, 4/11/94, p. 40 (Dr. Bernard Lo).

4. Transcript, 5/3/94, p. 22 ("biohazard" — Dr. Mary Martin); Id., p. 29 (discussing "the deliberate creation of embryos that will be used for research and then destroyed" — Ronald Green); Id., p. 48 (research in genetic diagnosis of embryos demands that the researchers "discard" embryos — Dr. Brigid Hogan).

5. The panel has explicitly recognized that harmful experiments will be allowed on these ex utero embryos that are forbidden in federal regulations for all other human embryos and fetuses. See Transcript, 5/3/94, p. 14 (authorization for harmful experiments will be "substantially broader" than for other embryos and fetuses — Patricia King); Id., p. 30 (this is "not going to be as tightly regulated as research on children or fetuses" — Dr. Bernard Lo).

6. See testimony of Lori B. Andrews, J.D. in Transcript, 2/3/94, pp. 11, and documentation

she submitted to the panel: "State Regulation of Embryo Research," by Lori B. Andrews, J.D., and "Cross-Cultural Analysis of Policies Regarding Embryo Research," by Lori B. Andrews and Nanette Elster.

7. Transcript, 2/2/94, p. 63 (Dr. Jonathan van Blerkom).

8. For example: Transcript, 2/3/94, p. 27 ("compromise" — Carol Tauer); Id., p. 60 ("pragmatic" decision — Bonnie Steinbock); 4/11/94, p. 23 ("reasonable compromise" — Carol Tauer).

9. Ronald M. Green, "Toward a Copernican Revolution In Our Thinking About Life's Beginning and Life's End," 66 *Soundings* 152 (1983) at 156, 10Id. at 159, 160.

11. Id. at 158. I do not share Professor Green's approach to moral decision making by social consensus, which would have provided little help to Jews in Germany in the 1930s or to African-American slaves in the U.S. in the 1850s. My view is that human society has no right to *deny* moral or legal respect to any living member of the human species. But since the panel has been guided by his approach, it should be aware of the ways in which it has failed to respect the internal demands of that approach.

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## S. P. Q. R.\*

### The Notre Dame Faculty at Play

Professor Philip Quinn turned the questioning to a recent news story in the *National Catholic Reporter* (NCR) which he had found very alarming. It alleged that twice in recent years outside interventions had violated Notre Dame's institutional autonomy, in particular the integrity of our academic appointments process for faculty and other staff. He knew the provost must also be concerned about this. The first instance cited was a letter of the local ordinary, John D'Arcy, to several powerful

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\* These initials, seen everywhere in Rome, once meant *senatus populusque romanus*. Now they are interpreted as *Sono pazzi questi Romani*.

Catholics in which he opposed an attempt by several faculty members at Notre Dame to bring Catholic theologian Fr. Charles Curran to the University as a tenured fellow of the Peace Institute. The second was a decision by University president Fr. Monk Malloy, C.S.C. to abolish the Program for Church Leaders rather than appoint as director the candidate unanimously recommended by the search committee, Beverly Brazauskas; she has a law suit pending against both the diocese and Sacred Heart Parish on campus. Was the decision to abolish the program driven in some part by fear of the bishop's possible displeasure? Quinn asked O'Meara if the allegations were true, what inferences we should draw if they are, and which parts of the story are not true.

O'Meara would not comment on the second allegation because of pending litigation involving individuals at the University. Quinn asked that, since he was not a defendant in the lawsuit, why should he not talk candidly about it with colleagues? In answer, O'Meara said he was not trying to evade an answer, but he was concerned that he might be called upon for testimony. He felt the nature of the litigation demanded that he give his own comments considerable forethought, so they would not be misinterpreted. When the litigation had been completed, he would then feel free to discuss it in greater detail.

For O'Meara, the larger issue raised by the story and Quinn's question was the independence and autonomy of the University from outside influences as described. This was one of the major issues facing Notre Dame and other

Catholic institutions. The University had recently presented, he believed, a very forthright statement on this for consideration by the bishops, which made it clear that there can be no outside intervention or interference with our appointments process. On the Curran matter, Fathers McBrien and McCormick had approached Fr. Malloy concerning the possibility of an academic appointment for Fr. Curran in the Peace Institute. He was unaware of their seeing Fr. Malloy after the fact. However, there was not an appointment for Curran in process at any time.

Professor Jean Porter referred to the provost's statement that he did not know of the possibility of a Curran appointment, and was disturbed by the implication that the chief academic officer was not involved in this process, including the discussions or conversations which led to the decision not to offer an appointment. Porter was disturbed that he seemed to have been put in a position where he did not know something of importance.

The provost said that no appointment was even in process and that he was unaware at the time of any conversations on the matter. He was informed only after Fathers McBrien and McCormick had gone to see Fr. Malloy.

Professor Richard McBrien sought to clarify the discussion on Curran, although he would not speak on the second allegation made in the NCR article, because of his own interest in the matter. He and a colleague in the theology department, Rev. Richard McCormick, S.J., spoke with the president about the possibility of bringing Fr. Curran onto the fac-

ulty in Malloy's first year as president. He spoke frankly to them of his concern in regard to Fr. Curran's departure from Catholic University, and he did not want to start his term of office amid the controversy that would ensue if Curran were to come to Notre Dame. The NCR article also reported on the role of Cardinal Bernadin of Chicago who wanted to try to do something of a positive nature to bring about a reconciliation between theologians and bishops in the United States, to try to heal the wounds caused by the Curran departure from Catholic University. Another party, whom McBrien could not mention, assured McBrien and McCormick that Bernadin would be supportive of the idea that Curran be appointed to the Peace Institute at Notre Dame, not to the theology department, and it was this idea that was floated to the president. The cardinal made it clear that he would see to it that the bishops and the Vatican would not oppose such an appointment, if there was no opposition from the local bishop.

Bernadin then proposed the idea to the local bishop who gave no direct response, except to say they should continue talking. Shortly after that discussion, the bishop wrote to the president of the USCC, to the Vatican, to Cardinal Bernadin, and to Fr. Malloy that such an appointment would be pastorally harmful. McBrien agreed with the vicar general of the diocese that a bishop has the right and duty to protect the pastoral integrity and health of his diocese. But, although the bishop may try to deny that he had interfered in the academic appointments process, the record was otherwise. McBrien

continued, saying that he and Fr. McCormick were simply exploring the possibilities of such an appointment with Fr. Malloy. No formal procedures had as yet been initiated. He and McCormick were trying to devise a delicate and sensitive compromise to make Curran available to the University, and to assist with the Bernadin effort at reconciliation and healing. All of this was aborted by the bishop's intervention.

O'Meara repeated that he knew only that McBrien and McCormick had spoken to Malloy, but he was not aware of the details in those conversations at that time. He knew the outcome was negative. In fact, he did not know until several years later of the discussions with Bernadin, which McBrien had felt duty-bound not to reveal.

McBrien concluded that the appearances in the NCR story were bad. To him the burden was

on others to clear up those appearances for the University. Professor Wilson Miscamble, C.S.C., said that NCR has not always been the most truthful source of information about Church matters, and that the course followed by McBrien and McCormick was quite irregular. Even it were a delicate political situation, why would they have considered involving an outside prelate in a University matter? This was as bad as what they were accusing the local bishop of doing. This discussion to him was sickening and would only serve to bring disrespect on the senate.

In their defense, McBrien said he and McCormick went to the president because McCormick and Malloy were colleagues as moral theologians in the same department, and McBrien was departmental chair. He agreed that Miscamble's view may be correct, and well-taken. But Curran was an

eminent moral theologian, at the time without any full-time academic appointment anywhere, and there seemed to be an opportunity for a solution of the problem not only to Curran's advantage and the Church's, but also to Notre Dame's. Malloy was obviously nervous about any possibility of Curran coming to Notre Dame. However, Bernadin, as part of his own larger purposes of reconciliation, was simply offering to be helpful. Nobody here went to him seeking his assistance; he offered his help through a third party. Miscamble pointed out that neither McBrien nor McCormick had any connection to the Peace Institute and that their behavior was inappropriate.

For O'Meara, end runs such as this one generally do more harm than good, and this was a case in point. ✠

*Touchstone: A Journal of Ecumenical Orthodoxy*, \$18/yr (quarterly), \$32/2 yrs, published by The Fellowship of St. James, 3300 W. Cullom Av., Chicago, IL 60618-1218.

*Touchstone* is of interest for its highly competent, very readable articles on the great theological and cultural questions stirring Christians today, e.g., biblical inerrancy and interpretation, the uniqueness of Jesus Christ, the nature of His Church, the infiltration of non-Christian cults into Christian churches. The writers are Evangelical Protes-

tant, Eastern Orthodox, and Catholic scholars, Helen Hitchcock, Donna Steichen, and Leon Podles are among the contributing editors. Particularly useful are the several pages of concise and accurate news-items that record important events from all over the Christian world; I have not seen a better compilation in this country. As a scholarly example of forthright yet respectful ecumenical discussion of neuralgic issues, I would recommend it to all FCS members interested in the problems currently faced by believing Christians of all kinds.

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*The Death of the Messiah — From Gethsemane to the Grave — A Commentary on the Passion Narratives*, Raymond E. Brown SS, 2 vols., hardback, 1608 pages, Geoffrey Chapman, London 1994.

For the past ten years, Professor Raymond Brown SS has been engaged on this monumental study, and the result is a masterly survey and evaluation of the literature published on the topic in modern times. It is impossible here even to summarize his treatment of the variety of questions that scholars have raised; but the student will find that he has gathered together in a convenient compass the research of a wide range of international scholarship. Thus the work will act as a treasury of academic information useful for pastors as well as scholars. It will be indispensable for the modern study of the background of the Passion; and we must be grateful to the author for the profound thought and immense industry that these two volumes signify.

Yet it is also necessary for a reviewer to take notice of the fact that the Roman Catholic world is strongly divided with regard to the acceptance or non-acceptance of the theological position which Brown has assumed. At the beginning of his Introduction he gives us "the primary aim of this book: to explain in detail what the evangelists intended and conveyed to their audience by their narratives of the passion and death of Jesus." The rest of the Introduction is concerned with endeavoring to justify the basic principles that have guided the whole of his Commentary; and he boldly sets them down (pp.4-5): a) "No one who

had been present [at the Passion] wrote an eye-witness account of it; b) The four different Gospel accounts were all written some thirty to seventy years later; c) All four were dependent on tradition that had come down from an intervening generation or generations; d) Intervening pre-Gospel tradition was not preserved even if at times we may be able to detect the broad lines of its content." Attempts to do so are speculation; but the Gospels themselves are tangible documents whose accounts need not be reconstructed.

These premises remind us of the strategy that H.S. Reimarus set down in his famous letter to G.E. Lessing in the 1760s, namely, "completely to separate what the apostles present in their writings from what Jesus himself actually said and taught during his lifetime." The avowed aim of the leaders of the Enlightenment had of course been to establish an unbridgeable gulf between Jesus and the Gospels precisely in order to discredit them. If Reimarus were alive today he would see in this Commentary the perfect fulfillment of his objective by a distinguished Catholic professor who is also a member of the Pontifical Biblical Commission! That is to say, Brown, in company with the majority of contemporary Catholic exegetes, has followed Reimarus in rejecting the Church's understanding of the apostolicity and historicity of the four Gospels despite its vigorous reaffirmation in *Vatican II's Dei Verbum*. For by giving these terms an alien meaning, he is able to assert that later unknown writers were responsible for Mt and Jn, and not the Apostles Matthew and John themselves — the corollary, of course, being that

we cannot then ever discover the honest truth about what Jesus himself said and did.

Brown has addressed his work to academics and laypeople of all religious and non-religious persuasions with an interest in the PN; but the rank-and-file in the Catholic Church do not as yet appear to realize the seriousness of this challenge to the traditional teaching about the Gospels as expressly affirmed in *Dei Verbum*. From the Catholic point of view this is a most disappointing work because he has disregarded both the wisdom represented by the Church Fathers, whose teachings he deliberately excludes, and also the guidelines propounded by the Living Magisterium. Thus for example it is very unfortunate that by beginning the PN only at Gethsemane and not at the Last Supper, Brown has chosen to omit the account of the institution of the Holy Eucharist, thereby losing the principal significance of the Passion of Jesus as the voluntary and heroic sacrifice of his life in order to bring about the Salvation of the world, and so reducing it instead to an aimless, wasteful and pitiable tragedy. Hence the usefulness of this Commentary for his co-religionists is limited to being a quarry and an encyclopedia of historical and technical information; and it is also doubtful whether it can genuinely advance the cause of ecumenism and the Jewish-Christian dialogue.

Brown originally set out as a young man to redress the recognized imbalance of Catholic biblical scholarship, because it was out of touch with non-Catholic exegesis, and he farsightedly devoted his life to persuading Catholic exegetes to adopt the Historical Critical

Method. Sadly, in his use of this valuable research tool in this Commentary, he has preferred to adopt the attitudes and practices of most non-Catholic scholars, and so has to prescind from the understanding of the Gospels as faith documents inspired by the Holy Spirit, whose secrets are to be unlocked not only by prayer and study, but also by faithful adherence to the Ordinary Magisterium of the Church.

Professor Brown's commentary on the PN is splendidly presented in a printed case depicting the *Crucifixion* by Tintoretto. The contents consist of 106 pages of general introduction followed by a Commentary in four Acts, each having two Scenes in which Brown first provides a literal English translation of the individual Gospel passages in consecutive arrangement and then proceeds to

deal verse by verse with the story as told in the four Gospels. There are five illustrative tables, nine appendices, a general bibliography, topical bibliographies to each section of the four acts, a bibliographical index of author and also separate indexes for subjects and Gospel passages. It has an American *Nihil obstat* and *Imprimatur*.

Dom Bernard Orchard OSB,  
Ealing Abbey, August, 1994

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### Fellowship of Catholic Scholars Newsletter

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