

# The Fellowship in Fieri

Ralph McInerny

**T**he Fellowship is currently engaged in an effort to expand its ranks, a task which consists largely in getting in touch with "natural" members. Some have found the procedures of joining somewhat Byzantine and have been put off by it. And the procedures were somewhat oblique.

In the past, names of prospective members were submitted by their sponsor, necessitating a delay until a meeting of the board could vote on the applications. This suggested a reluctance not characteristic of learned societies and candidates probably wondered if they were going to have learn a code or use a secret handshake once they got in. The point of all this was to insure that candidates were indeed faithful Catholics who enthusiastically embraced the Magisterium.

That requirement will not, of course, be altered. But now application forms contain the purpose and spirit of the Fellowship and the assumption will be that these are embraced by the applicant. Should this not be the case, procedures of excommunication can be employed.

We are not interested in recreating within the Fellowship the kind of "pluralism" that unfortunately exists among Catholics at large. The Fellowship does not regard wholehearted acceptance of the Magisterium as the mark of a *kind* of Catholic, perhaps of a "conservative" Catholic. In matters of faith and morals, there is only one kind of Catholic. Newman's poem on Liberalism, reprinted in this issues, conveys our thoughts on the alternative.

When Monsignor Kelly and our other founding fathers conceived the Fellowship, they thought of it as a counter tenor to the chorus of dissent that was then greeting Magisterial documents. The Fellowship would be an existential reminder of the many Catholic intellectuals who welcome the guidance of Christ's vicar on earth. Those voices of dissent have grown raspy and, if they leave a culture of dissent behind them, it is the thoughtless and *de rigueur* snickering about Rome that characterizes so many in the theology departments of Catholic institutions. I don't think their hearts are in it. Perhaps such kneejerk dissent is now only a prerequisite for promotion and will be outgrown when freedom and tenure come.

In any case, there is a groundswell of orthodoxy among younger scholars. Some are converts, bringing with them that

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keen appreciation of the Church that often rocks the cradle Catholic. By opening our doors wider, by the efforts of Jude Dougherty as secretary-treasurer, and thanks to the enthusiasm of our ostensible crown prince, Gerard Bradley, we are poised to become an even stronger force in the future. We are already feeling the benefits of Jude Dougherty's vigorous efficiency as secretary-treasurer.

Where, you might ask, is the tribute to those who have gone before, to Monsignors Kelly and Smith, to Fathers Weis, Lawlor, Baker, to Professors Scottino, May, Grisez and Hitchcock, et al? It is not here because it would be premature. They all have many miles left in them and will play major roles in our future as they have in our past. ✠

## ARTICLES

## Aquinas in America

William E. Carroll

**D**uring the various sessions of the Council of Trent in the sixteenth century two books lay open on the altar: the Bible and the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274). The thought of the angelic doctor, as Thomas is called, has not always been accorded such prominence in the life of the Church. Nevertheless, his theological and philosophical writings continue to inform Catholic thinking. Indeed, Thomas affirmed a complementarity between theology and the intellectual disciplines based on reason alone, which remains a characteristic of Catholic teaching.

In a famous 1879 encyclical, *Aeterni Patris*, Pope Leo XIII called for a renewal of the study of Thomas Aquinas as an especially effective way for the Church to meet the intellectual challenges of the modern world. Leo XIII thought that the perennial philosophy and theology of Aquinas would serve as a defense of the truths of Christianity and as a critique of modern materialism and atheism. In the twentieth century scholars such as Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, Yves Simon, and Charles DeKoninck labored mightily to reinvigorate the study of Aquinas in North America. The renewed interest in Thomism has had to face the complaint that it was just another sterile and barren "ism,"

a closed ideological system of cliches, memorized formulae, and dull textbooks, irrelevant to the contemporary world.

In Dominican houses of study near Chicago and in Washington, and at universities such as Laval, Toronto, and Notre Dame, a new generation of scholars such as Joseph Owens, Anton Pegis, James Weisheipl, William Wallace, Armand Maurer, Benedict Ashley, and Ralph McInerny wrote extensively on the life and thought of Aquinas and introduced their students to the fecundity of a living Thomistic tradition. In the work of these men and their students Thomism is not a closed system; rather it is a fruitful way to understand man, the world, God, and their interrelationships. Thomistic natural philosophy and metaphysics, developed in the broad tradition of Aristotle, are not artifacts from a distant past; they provide the principles for a sound understanding of nature and human nature.

This summer I participated in a two-week institute at the University of Notre Dame dedicated to an exploration of the current state of Thomistic studies. More than thirty scholars from North and South America and Europe examined a wide variety of topics in philosophy, theology, and the sciences of nature. The institute, the second of its kind, was sponsored by the Maritain Center of Notre Dame and the Saint Gerard Foundation. Ralph McInerny, director of the Maritain Center and professor of medieval philosophy at Notre Dame for nearly forty years, brought together

senior and junior scholars in order to share the kind of intellectual and spiritual friendship inspired by Jacques Maritain's *Cercle d'études thomistes*.

In addition to his own work on Aquinas, McInerney served as director of Notre Dame's Medieval Institute, helping to create a center for the advanced study of medieval philosophy and theology in their historical setting, which complemented Toronto's Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies. Recently he has undertaken the task of republishing in English translations of all Aquinas's commentaries on the works of Aristotle. By writing *A First Glance at St. Thomas Aquinas: A Handbook for Peeping Thomists and Ethica Thomistica*, McInerney has also sought to bring Aquinas before a wide audience. He is an accomplished novelist (the Father Dowling mysteries) and an indefatigable commentator on contemporary society. In this latter capacity, he is one of the founders of *Crisis*, an important American monthly of Catholic thought.

What was particularly evident at this summer's institute was the health of Thomistic studies, especially in the United States and Canada. With few exceptions, the participants were not educated in the old text-book and manual tradition which simply summarized Thomistic maxims. They have been nourished instead by the texts of Aquinas, but texts not viewed in isolation from their vibrant multicultural world in the thirteenth century. His renewed sense of understanding Aquinas in his historical setting has not led to a historicism which denies the existence of truths which transcend time and place.

The debates this summer were lively; there was no part-line to be espoused. The discussion

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embraced arguments about the relationship between the study of nature and metaphysics, whether Aquinas is an accurate interpreter of Aristotle, whether the distinction between essence and existence flows from a rational reflection in metaphysics or is first of all founded in God's revelation in Exodus as "I am Who am," and whether Aquinas thinks that the

principles of ethics are drawn from nature or are themselves self-evident to practical reason. The influence of modern philosophers from Kant to Heidegger and Wittgenstein can also be seen in proposed new versions of Thomistic thought, some of which may reflect a divergence from, rather than a development of, Thomism.

The participants in the institute saw such discussion as something other than an excursion into an arcane intellectual world. With Aquinas, they would agree that the purpose of the study of such questions is not so much to know what others have thought, but what is the truth about things. Ethical discourse is sadly deficient without the insights of Thomas Aquinas and the tradition of natural law. Aquinas's philosophy of nature is a necessary complement to modern scientific laws. His analysis of the human soul and its activities aids us in rejecting materialist accounts of human nature. The exploration of his doctrine of creation is of particular value in recognizing the limits of current cosmological reflections on the origin of the universe.

Those who spent two weeks together at Notre Dame this summer were able to see themselves as part of an intellectual endeavor which bridges centuries and cultures. It was refreshing to encounter again the probity and clarity of the thought of Aquinas, in the company of friends. ✠

# Oxford University Sermon on the Grace of Humility

(A Sermon Preached at the University Church of St. Mary the Virgin, Quinquagesima Sunday, February 13, 1994)

The Rev. Dr. Thomas Weinandy, O.F.M., Cap.  
The Warden  
Greyfriars, Oxford

**T**he title of this University Sermon is itself significant. Observe that I am to speak “On the Grace of Humility.” Humility is a grace. This suggests two points. Firstly, humility is not a natural human endowment like one’s intellectual ability or artistic aptitude. As human beings we do not innately possess humility. It is not a part of our genetic make-up. We are born in a humble state — naked and helpless — but we are not born humble. Secondly, the title of this sermon intimates that humility, being a grace, is a work of God in each of our lives. He alone bestows humility upon us as a free gift, as a *gratia*, as a grace. Precisely because humility is a grace, it must come from God.

But if humility comes from God as a free gift to us, it must be that God is himself humble. The medieval schoolmen were fond of the maxim: *Nemo dat quod non habet* — no one gives what he does not possess. God can give us humility, only if humility is his to give.

Normally we do not think of God being humble. As a matter of fact humility seems incongruous with how we normally conceive him. Within the Jewish/Christian tradition God is believed to be almighty, all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-perfect. He is the fullness of life and being. He exists in and of himself, and thus he is eternal.

Moreover, God is the all-powerful Creator,

who creates, as only he can do — *ex nihilo*, out of nothing. Only by his habitual will, then, does anything continue in existence. Nothing escapes his Lordship. He governs creation with his inscrutable wisdom and guides the course of history with his universal providence. The prophet Isaiah asks: “Who has measured the waters in the hollow of his hand and marked off the heavens with a span, enclosed the dust of the earth in a measure, and weighed the mountains in scales and the hills in a balance?” Isaiah answers that “It is [God] who sits above the circle of the earth and its inhabitants are like grasshoppers; [it is he] who stretches out the heavens like a curtain and spreads them like a tent to live in; [he] brings princes to naught, and makes the rulers of the earth as nothing” (Isaiah 40:12, 23-24).

These divine attributes, qualities, and titles seem hardly the endowments out of which humility is fashioned. How can someone of this stature be humble? One might even argue that God may be the only being who could actually be proud without sinning. Could not God, rightly and in truth, be proud of himself? However, what we discover is that God is not proud. Instead he defines what it means to be humble.

It is, in fact, within the very act of creating, an act which only he can perform, that the almighty and all-powerful God first manifested his humility. In the act of creating God revealed his desire to associate with someone other than himself, someone immensely beneath his own status as God, for anything that is not God is, by definition, immensely inferior to him. As the above passage from Isaiah implies, God’s act of creating us would be similar to our creating grasshoppers, doing so only because we wanted to live in fellowship with grasshoppers. But God did not make us grasshoppers. He created us in his own image and likeness, not for his benefit, but for ours. Being in the image and likeness of God, we are endowed with intelligence and will. Thus, we are empowered to associate with the all-powerful and almighty God in a rational and personal way. We can know God and know that he knows us. We can experience

his love and, in turn, we can love him. In humility God created us so that, as human persons, we could participate in his own divine life. So humble is God that he did not hoard his divine prerogatives, but desired to share his divine status with us, though we in ourselves are far beneath his divine stature.

**I**n light of creation a rather curious question now appears on the horizon. The question is not whether God is humble enough to be found in our presence. The act of creation itself reveals that he is. The question is: Are we as human beings humble enough to associate with God? The absurdity of answering 'No' to this question is readily apparent, and yet, that is exactly what we as the human race have become. 'No' resounds through out the whole of human history, and its echo today reverberates louder than ever before.

The story of the Fall of Adam and Eve is the story of us all. Adam and Eve were tempted not just to eat some forbidden fruit. The real temptation was the prospect of becoming gods themselves. The serpent assured them that, if they ate from the tree, their eyes would be opened and they would become like God, knowing good and evil (see Genesis 3:4-5). We as human beings, in the end, are not humble enough to walk with God. We, as a race, separated ourselves from God, and as individuals we continue to do so for the sole end that we ourselves might become gods. Pride — the desire to be God, to determine for ourselves what is right and wrong, to live separate from and independent of God — this is the primordial and ever-present sin, rooted in us all.

But notice the type of god we have become. In our rebellion we have not become like the humble God who created us. We have become prideful gods who seek our own power, well-being and self-indulgence. In our defiant attempt to become like God, we

have not become like God at all.

Now it is in this situation that the humility of God is most clearly manifested. So great is God's humble desire to live with us, and so great is his love in wanting us to live with him that, despite our prideful rebellion, he determined to do everything in his power to win us back to himself. And how was this divine power manifested? It was manifested in supreme humility.

God the Father sent his eternal and beloved Son into the world of creation, into the world infected by sin. The Son of God came to exist as a man. The Creator came to exist as a creature. As Paul states: "For you know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though he was rich, yet for your sake he became poor, so that by his poverty you might become rich" (2 Corinthians 8:9). The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ resided in his humility. Though rich in divinity, he became poor in our humanity that we might become rich in his divinity.

The Son of God, then, did not just assume some generic humanity or a humanity sanitized from evil. He came in the likeness of sinful flesh (see Romans 8:3) and so experienced all the evil effects that our sin has begotten. He was not immune from suffering. He was not immune from death.

The hymn in Paul's Letter to the Philippians is a hymn to the humility of God, an anthem to the humility of Jesus (Philippians 2:6-11).

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"Though he was in the form of God, he did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped." Jesus did not cry out in divine pride: "I am God! I will not demean my divine status! I will not become a mere man — a grasshopper." Rather, he "emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men." Jesus hid his eternal glory not just by becoming a man, but by becoming a servant, by becoming a slave to us who were

sinner. "And being found in human form he humbled himself and became obedient unto death." So humble was Jesus that as an obedient servant he died for us, offering his life for us in love, so that we might be cleansed of sin and reconciled to the Father who created us. But his death was not a death with dignity. So humble was he that he died, "even death on the cross." The cross is the supreme icon of the humility of God. To gaze upon the cross and to recognize in faith that it is the eternal Son of God in the flesh who hangs there is to perceive that no one is more humble than God himself. And it is in this supreme act of humility, a humility that first showed itself when he created us, that God destroys our pride and makes possible once more our life with him. As Paul states: "For the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men" (1 Corinthians 1:25). Ultimately, the humility of God triumphs over the pride of men.

Jesus' resurrected glory, his supreme Lordship, is founded upon his supreme humility. The Philippian hymn concludes: "Therefore", that is, because of the humility of Jesus, even to death on the cross, "God has highly exalted him and bestowed on him the name which is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in heaven and earth and under the earth, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father" (Philippians 2:8-11). There is no one greater than Jesus because there is no one more humble. He is exalted in glory above everyone else because no one has been more lowly. Every knee should bow before him because no one has been more abject. He alone should be proclaimed as supreme Lord of every race and nation and people because no one else is more a servant. Jesus' exaltation by the Father is in direct proportion to his humility.

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*Nemo dat quod non habet.* No one gives what he does not possess. Surely, in light of creation and especially in light of the cross, we recognize that only God can give us the grace of humility. But how do we receive this gift of humility, this humility that will once more transform us from being prideful gods, which is not to be like God at all, into being in the true likeness of God? We receive the grace of humility by associating ourselves with the humble acts of God. As Paul states just prior to beginning the Philippian hymn: "Have this mind among you as was in Christ Jesus" (Philippians 2:5). Our mind should be that of the humble bearing of Jesus.

If God was humble enough to create us so that he could associate with us, his creatures, then our first act of humility, the first grace of humility, is for us to acknowledge that we are indeed creatures whom God has created. In humility we acknowledge that God is God the Creator and we are his creatures. The grace of humility demands that we do not attempt to usurp the place of God, to make ourselves into gods. We associate with and relate to God not as his equals, but as the creatures we truly are. It is upon this foundational truth that we establish our life with God.

Ultimately, all that we possess as individual human beings comes from God the Creator. We are not the source of our intelligence, or our freedom, or our human dignity.

They were given to us when God created us in his own image. Therefore, as Paul states: "What have you that you did not receive? If then you received it, why do you boast as if it were not a gift?" (1 Corinthians 4:7). As human beings we are indeed unique in all of creation, but this boast of ours finds its source in the Creator God who humbly made us in his own likeness.

Moreover, if the Son of God was humble enough to be-

come man in the likeness of sinful flesh, then our second act of humility, the second grace of humility, is for us to acknowledge that we are indeed the sinful flesh in whose likeness Jesus came. If Jesus was humble enough to die for our sin, then we, in humility, must acknowledge that it was indeed for our sin, my sin, that he died. If Jesus humbly accepted our condemnation, then, in humility, it is only right that we acknowledge that it was our condemnation, my condemnation, that he assumed. The cross of Jesus not only makes visible the humble love of God, it also makes visible the sinful pride of man, and it is in humility that we acknowledge the truth that we are indeed the sinners for whom Jesus humbly accepted the cross.

Repentance, the acknowledgement of our sin in sorrow and the accepting of forgiveness in Christ, is truly a humble act, but it is an indispensable feature of the grace of humility. Without the humble act of repentance we are incapable of drawing near to the all-holy God. Yet this humble act of repentance brings with it a boast. Paul could cry out: "Let him who boasts, boast of the Lord" (2 Corinthians 10:17). Why could Paul boast in the Lord? He could boast because, in and through repentance, he gloried "in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by which the world has been crucified to me, and I to the world" (Galatians 6:14). Paul knew that, through the cross, Jesus had freed him from the world of sin. In Christ, Paul was now dead to the world of pride.

He could boast in the Lord also for it was in the risen Lord that he boasted. Jesus is risen, and through faith and baptism, Paul not only died to sin, but he had now also risen with Christ. In Christ, Paul had become a new creation. In Christ, Paul was a new man. No longer need Paul live in the flesh of sin, but he could now live by the power of the Spirit who dwelt within him. No longer was he an enemy of the Father, but in Christ, through the Spirit, he had been transformed into a son of God. In Christ, Paul's life was now hidden in God. And being a son of the Father, he could look forward to becoming an heir, with Christ, to the same glorious resurrec-

tion. This was Paul's boast — by humbly uniting himself to Jesus, he came to share in the glory of God.

The acknowledgement of our sin in repentance is a humble act. To place our faith in the risen Jesus as our Lord and Saviour is a humble act. But, as exemplified in the life and words of Paul, by humbly associating ourselves with Jesus we come to share in his glory. As it was for Jesus so it is for us. Our glory, our exaltation by the Father, is in direct proportion to our humility. To assume the likeness of God, to be transformed into the glory of Jesus, is to assume the humility of God, the humility of Jesus. The work of the grace of humility in our lives now becomes the source of our eternal grandeur.

**B**ut the original question once more looms upon the horizon, the question that first confronted our first parents, Adam and Eve. While God is humble enough to associate with us, are we humble enough to associate with him? Are we humble enough to associate with Jesus — in the folly of his cross — so as to be transformed into his likeness?

The question today though is not just whether you and I are humble enough to believe in God or place our faith in Jesus within the solitude of our own hearts. If left to ourselves, each of us may possess the humility needed to associate with God and Jesus through repentance and in faith. Today it is the public nature of faith that is the greatest test to humility. The question today is whether or not we possess the humility to associate with God, to have faith in Jesus, within a culture where such belief is often belittled and those who believe are often thought naive. In the past to believe in God or to be a Christian was what was expected. It required less humility. But today a person not only needs to be humble before God in order to believe, but a person also must be willing to be humble before men, for the believer today faces cultural opposition and even contempt.

Moreover, the Holy Spirit must double the grace of humility when it comes to us who live

and work within today's academic community, for it is within the academy that all the cultural and intellectual opposition to faith converges and is most intensely encountered. Within the academic community today the prospect of believing in God has become an embarrassing proposition. One might say that within the polite society of our technological, scientific, and sophisticated world of the academy, it can be rather humbling — 'humiliating' might be the better word — to be caught fraternizing with God — unless it be on formal and established occasions such as the present one. Even more so, to regard Jesus as any more than a good man, is thought by many to be a fanatic. So embarrassing have God and Jesus become that even some of those who say they do believe, especially churchmen and theologians, can be at times tempted to assure everyone, especially the intellectually sophisticated, that they really do not believe anything that is actually incredible to the unbeliever.

The heart of the problem for those of us who are academics today, faced with the question of faith and humility, is that to believe in God, in all that that entails, could be viewed as jeopardizing our academic credentials. Not only could we be considered devotees of archaic superstitions, but, even worse, such religious persuasion could be regarded as undermining our objectivity and credibility as scholars and as intellectuals. Faith is perceived to subvert our academic freedom and our intellectual autonomy. Belief in God so prejudices our minds, it is thought, that our whole integrity as serious scholars is called into question. Moreover, to be a Christian scholar, to take Jesus and his gospel seriously, to hold in faith the teachings of the Christian church, and at the same time be an academic looks to some to be a metaphysical impossibility. Such an animal can not exist.

This, then, may be called the third grace of

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humility, a grace not absent from the great Christian scholars of Oxford — past and present — that of humbly identifying with the visible body of Christ, the Church, and so to regard our lives within the visible Church as indeed our greatest temporal honour.

If there is any truth to what I have just said, to be a man or woman of faith within the academic community today one may need to speak, not of the grace of humility, but of the miracle of

humility, for only if one is humble will one be willing to profess one's faith in a milieu that is often hardly conducive to or appreciative of it.

I would like to conclude this sermon by asking a few questions of us all, all of us who are giving our lives to the noble adventure of education and to the pursuit of knowledge. While we may be experts in our own respective disciplines, yet does not the knowledge of our own ignorance — that which we are striving mightily yet to know — give voice to the humility within us whispering that there must be a God who does know it all because he is ultimately responsible for its creation? Is not he the one whom we ought humbly to reverence in awe? More so, while we may rightly boast of our academic achievements, yet do we not have to admit that these accomplishments have not stopped us from sinning? We may be professional scholars, yet we are also personal sinners whose minds are often ruled, not by wisdom, but by greed, lust, rivalry, resentment, and the fear and anxiety that spring from pride. Is not the recognition of our own sinfulness again the voice of humility whispering that we need the transforming grace of the Holy Spirit? Do not our own lives whisper the humble truth that we need Jesus to save us from ourselves and provide us, as our Lord, with the wisdom and power that comes from God? And lastly, does not the prospect of

our own death allow the grace of humility to whisper to our hearts that to know everything, without the knowledge of God, is to know nothing of lasting value; but that to know God, even if we are ignorant of a great deal, is to know everything of eternal worth?

The Letter of James proclaims: "Humble yourselves before the Lord and he will exalt you"

(James 4:10). We have seen that the omnipotent and eternal God possesses the grace of humility needed to exalt us. The question is: Do we possess the grace of humility needed to allow him to do so?

And now to that same God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit be ascribed as is most justly due, Majesty, Dominion and Power henceforth and forever more. Amen. ✠

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## Response to Cardinal Wright Award

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Dean Jude Dougherty

*(Dean Jude Dougherty was the recipient of our highest award, presented to him at the Corpus Christi meeting, September 24, 1994. Dougherty's remarks follow.)*

**N**aturally I am honored by this award. Given the citation, I cannot help but think that my colleagues deserve much of the honor. It is "fellowship" which I take as the theme for this address. In the *Paradiso*, Dante remarks, "Peter began his fellowship without gold or silver" (Canto xxii), but then Peter didn't have to gather his friends in first class hotels. The fellowship I have in mind is one grounded in classical learning and in the Faith; it transcends the ages. Among our fellows in this sense, we could number, in the fashion of Dante, a host ranging historically and alphabetically from Aristotle to Zubiri. There are those bonds grounded in natural learning and those bonds amplified by the Faith. It is the Faith that brings most of us together, but it is a Faith which employs the best of classical learning, and learning of every period, as it seeks to better understand the gifts provided through the Sacred Scriptures.

Aristotle taught that friendship can only exist between peers. The teachings of Christ created a

new peerage. Belloc could proclaim the virtues of Catholic men wherever they may be. Through baptism, we possess with many a common lineage, but as scholars, ours is a special vocation. With Faith comes a certain understanding to be sure, but what we make of the Faith is determined by what we bring to it. The riches of Sacred Scripture are there to be mined by the best intelligence available to the race. Those of us who believe that Christ came in "the fullness of time" recognized that the intellect of mankind had been prepared by centuries of learning to receive the teachings of Christ. Greek intelligence and Roman discipline provided the roots of a tradition which today binds us in its call, as it bound the Fathers of the Church, both Latin and Greek.

In a common effort of appropriation we become friends with the authors of those classical texts. In our choice of books, we choose the friends we make. They tutor us, we quote them, we begin to think like them. We correct them where they nod, and they correct us when our attention fails.

In friendship with Aristotle, with Augustine, with Aquinas, we find among our contemporaries friends the world over, from Taipei, to Buenos Aires, to Koln, to Praha. The Faith removes barriers to communication and opens one to profitable discourse. Aquinas has been translated into every major language of the world, so too has Augustine. In our own time, one can find from Sidney to Warsaw translations of Maritain. The lingua franca of the world is Catholicism.

Alike in common acknowledgement of basic

truths, Catholic men and women explore, but not always in unison, the implications of those truths for practical life. Although there is a science of things divine and even of things that pertain to the polis, speculative wisdom is not practical wisdom. The prudential admits of divergences; there are no rules respecting the application of rules. The Emperor, Charles V, once lamented that just as it is difficult

to make any two clocks tell the same time, it is impossible to make men's minds hold exactly the same opinion. Men may differ in the prudential order while adhering to the same body of norms, but those differences are resolvable in principle and are more likely to be resolved than they would be were the norms themselves not recognized.

**T**he bonds which unite also divide. There can be no ecumenism in the intellectual order. One cannot affirm and deny at the same time and in the same respect. More than one reader was recently chagrined to find a prominent Catholic periodical in its editorial columns eulogize a well known philosopher (in reality more a polemicist than a scholar) who was a life-long militant foe of religion. This apostle of Sovereign Reason, cut off from history, was anything but reasonable in confronting the informed religious mind. He consistently denigrated persons whom this Fellowship holds in high regard. It may be virtuous to forgive one's enemies, but not in the heat of battle. Good will cannot be allowed to blur differences when so many depend upon a clear affirmation of truth. Succumbing to the temptation to mediate is often the first step to capitulation. Mediation, as practiced in intellectual circles, is frequently the mediation between truth and falsity, between a rational position (often as mean) and its destructive extreme. The inclination to be liked is human, but approbation should not be sought from those who hold us in contempt.

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**The notion that the  
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ancients would have  
found strange.**

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repudiation of the ennobling and its sources. If indeed we are friends, we have enemies in common who rarely give us quarter. It is a point of wisdom to recognize this. Ours is the rebellion of serious thinkers against modernity's repudiation of the very foundations of Western culture. One cannot be a Catholic and live by the philosophy of the *New York Times*. Media morality is the antithesis of Catholic morality. The elite media, both of print and of screen, merely reflect the zeitgeist which prevails in the halls of the academy. The notion that the academy exists not to perpetuate but to challenge the inherited is one which the ancients would have found strange.

Cicero, reflecting on qualifications for leadership in the commonwealth, made a knowledge of and respect for tradition a prime requisite for office. Livy recommends much the same for his period when he wrote of a failing Rome: "I invite the reader's attention to the much more serious consideration of the kind of lives our ancestors lived, of who were the men and what the means, both is politics and war, by which Rome's power was first acquired and subsequently expanded. I would have him trace the processes of our moral decline, to watch first the sinking of the foundations of morality as the old teaching was allowed to lapse, then the final collapse of the whole edifice, and the dark dawning of our modern day when we can neither endure our vices nor face the remedies needed to cure them." (Preface to his *History*, Loeb Classical Library, 1924).

The dominant mode of secular thought did

If there is fellowship based on a common recognition of natural intellectual achievement and Biblical wisdom, there can be fellowship based on a rejection of those sources. The Enlightenment was after all a repudiation of the inherited. True fellowship, Aristotle would insist, can only be based on virtue, that is, in a common pursuit of the noble and the excellent. Much of modernity is a

not create itself in our lifetime. It has its roots in the Enlightenment, both Anglo-French and German. The reduction of Christianity to morality has in our day failed to preserve even the morality deemed commendable by its antagonists as the metaphysical and anthropological underpinnings of that morality have given way to a variety of empiricisms and materialisms. On another front, the essentially secular redaktionsgeschichte movement taught us how to give a purely humanistic interpretation to the Sacred Scriptures.

**T**o describe the course of an illness is not to provide a remedy, but it is a first step. We need to understand how we acquired the cultural sickness which seeks to destroy us. We need, too, to recognize that the Church herself has not been immune to infection. Decades of propaganda from the left have weakened its resistance to superficial "togetherness." We accommodate when we should resist, ignoring the long-range effect of practices that seem harmless at the time of adoption. If the Church is to be a beacon and not a weathervane, she must first recover her own heritage. This is the staging ground for the Fellowship. But to teach from within the tradition, is to first appropriate that tradition. That effort is not always an easy one for reasons extrinsic and intrinsic. Extrinsicly, we have lost many of our centers of learning to those who fail to appreciate the type of learning for which these institutions were called into being. Through rational persuasion and the persistent use of all available means, we must first recover our own institutions. Some, bearing saint's names for what have become essentially secular academies, may be lost forever, but wherever possible Catholic institutions of higher education must be maintained, because Catholic practice is rooted in an intellectuality that can only be grasped by learning. The integrity of the Catholic Faith is both speculative and practical. The Catholic mind is of one piece. Pluck a loose thread at any one point and you can unravel the whole cloth.

Intrinsicly, appropriation makes its own demands. Courage, the pursuit of the difficult

good, is as much the virtue of the scholar as it is of the warrior. To achieve the truth one must frequently take the next trying step, overcome inertia, or the tendency to be easily satisfied. But one must first regard the truth as a value. The virtues, as the Greeks well understood, hang together. One must first understand, one must intellectually grasp the nobility of the project before the will is summoned.

The value of the Church in the lives of the people must be acknowledged before we risk all in the heroic defense of her legacy. Appreciation is complex. It requires knowledge first. That knowledge comes mostly with effort, experience augmented with historical investigation. Newman was fond of saying that to be steeped in history is to cease to be a Protestant. To be steeped in history is to love the Church, its blemishes notwithstanding. St. John Chrysostom, in seeking an empirical proof for the existence of God, found it in the beauty of the Church itself. Only God, he reasoned, could have brought into being such a powerful instrument for the good in the lives of individuals and nations.

Etienne Gilson has an essay which has inspired more than one youth. Its theme is "intellect in the service of Christ the King." Obviously intellectual service can be rendered in a multiplicity of ways. Gilson is insistent that one of the most important is to become good at what one does while leading a moral life. All are called to such service. Members of this Fellowship are called in a more direct fashion to foster the teaching mission of the Church. The basic doctrines have to be clearly enunciated before they compel assent. Articulated they will command both intellect and will, and inspire the appropriate virtue. That articulation may be through a technical treatise that is read by only a few experts the world over, or by the no less scholarly work designed to reach the educated and not so educated among the faithful. It may be found in the novel or the film. Many have gained insight into faith through the novels of Francois Mauriac, Georges Bernanos, Graham Green and Evelyn Waugh, not to men-

tion through the work of one of our own, successful as a scholar, novelist and screen writer, the author who created that memorable character, Fifi LaRue.

Not all of us possess the same degree of talent, native or acquired; we consequently serve in different ways. At any level, service is not self-seeking. It obliges acknowledgment of debt, it compels us to honor that which is honorable and conversely withhold our endorsement appropriately.

In communion with each other, we reinforce our common vision. But we should always be wary of what C.S. Lewis calls, "the perilous charm of a shared hatred or grievance." "It is difficult," Lewis writes, "not to hail as a friend the only other man in College who really sees the faults of the sub-warden." (*The Four Loves*, p. 79).

I said that we must appropriate the legacy of Christ and the Apostles and that of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church. The bishops may be the official teachers of the Church, but a well-crafted essay by a syndicated Sobran, Novak or Buchanan reaches far more readers than the voice of any ecclesial authority. Novak is read by and has influenced many more than any document issued by the NCCB. Works by members of this Fellowship are not absent from the lists of major publishers. Dues-paying members, and those we may accommodate as members by a "baptism of desire," are perhaps better at front-line scholarship than at popular dissemination. The scholarship of Maritain, Gilson, Simon, Weisheipl lives on; so too will that of Owens, Mauer, Wallace and Wolter. and so too will the scholarship and the apologetics of the many whom they have tutored. So too, I am confident, will the already and the soon-to-be-recognized craft of many who are present today. If, as Leon Bloy remarked, God writes straight with crooked lines, may this Fellowship through its own scribes, become even more of a participant in the divine plan. ✠

## The Canonical Meaning of Recent Authentic Interpretation of Canon 230.2 Regarding Female Altar Servers

by John F. McCarthy

In an official letter, dated 15 March 1994 and addressed to the presidents of episcopal conferences, Cardinal Antonio M. Javierre Ortas, Prefect of the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Sacraments, announced an authentic interpretation of Canon 230.2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law and provided instructions for the implementation of this interpretation. The Holy See did not publish this letter immediately, but its text was received by the Catholic News Service of the United States Catholic Conference and published on 12 April 1994. The full text of the authentic interpretation of the Pontifical Council for the Interpretation of Legislative Texts and the text of the four directives sent out by the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Sacraments were subsequently published in the *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* under the date of 6 June 1994.

Canon 230.2 reads as follows: "Lay persons (*laici*) by temporary deputation may fulfill the function of lector during liturgical services; likewise all lay persons (*laici*) may carry out the functions of commentator and cantor or other functions in accordance with the norm of law."

On 30 June 1992, the members of the Pontifical Council for the Interpretation of Legislative Texts pronounced on the following question that

had been raised: "Whether, among the liturgical functions that lay persons, men or women, may exercise according to Canon 230.2 of the Code of Canon Law, may also be included service at the altar (*servitium ad altare*)." The answer given was:

**"Yes, and in accordance with instructions to be given by the Apostolic See."**

The answer of the Pontifical Council was confirmed on 11 July 1992 by Pope John Paul II, who also ordered its publication.

Cardinal Javierre Ortas, in conveying this information, presents also the following instructions:

1. Canon 230.2 has a permissive and not a perceptive character: "laici ... 'possunt'." ("lay persons...may'."). Hence the permission given in this regard by some bishops can in no way be considered as binding on other bishops. In fact, it is the competence of each bishop, in his diocese, after hearing the opinion of the episcopal conference, to make a prudential judgment on what to do, with a view to the ordered development of liturgical life in his own diocese.

2. The Holy See respects the decision adopted by certain bishops for specific local reasons on the basis of the provisions of Canon 230.2. At the same time, however, the Holy See wishes to recall that it will always be very appropriate to follow the noble tradition of having boys serve at the altar. As is well known, this has also led to a reassuring development of priestly vocations. Thus the obligation to support such groups of altar boys will always continue.

3. If in some diocese, on the basis of Canon 230.2, the bishop permits that, for particular reasons, women may also serve at the altar, this decision must be clearly explained to the faithful in the light of the above-mentioned norm. It shall also be made clear that the norm is already being widely applied, by the fact that women frequently serve as lectors in the liturgy and may also be called upon to distribute Holy Communion as extraordinary ministers of the Eucharist and to carry out other functions, according to the provisions of the same

Canon 230.2.

4. It must also be clearly understood that the liturgical services mentioned above are carried out by lay people "ex temporanea deputatione" ("by temporary deputation"), according to the judgment of the bishop, without lay people, be they men or women, having any right to exercise them.

In communicating the above, the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments has sought to carry out the mandate received from the Supreme Pontiff to provide directives to illustrate what is laid down in Canon 230.2 of the Code of Canon Law and its authentic interpretation, which will shortly be published.

In this way the bishops will be better able to carry out their mission to be moderators and promoters of liturgical life in their own diocese, within the framework of the norms in force in the universal Church.

In the question that was addressed on 30 June 1992 by the members of the Pontifical Council for the Interpretation of Legislative Texts, it was already understood that the expression *omnes laici* in paragraph 2 of Canon 230.2 means all lay persons, both men and women, as is clear from the wording of the question. The question answered was whether, in addition to the functions of lector, commentator, and singer at liturgical services, women may exercise, under the category of "other liturgical functions," the role of altar server. The answer of the Council is affirmative but qualified: "Yes, and in accordance with instructions to be given by the Holy See."

On a canonical level, what does this response mean? What bearing does the Phrase "in accordance with the norm of law" (*ad normam iuris*) in Canon 230.2 have upon the response of the Pontifical Council, what further bearing has the qualification "in accordance with instructions to be given by the Apostolic See"?

The expression *ad normam iuris* contained in Canon 230.2 means "according to the norm of law," namely the law which is in effect at any given time. Thus, lay men and women are prohib-

ited from carrying out liturgical roles that are excluded by some law. But, if the norm of law changes, it can open up liturgical roles that were heretofore excluded. The fact is that, in 1983 and until the publication of the present authentic interpretation and instruction, women were prohibited entirely by the norm of law from exercising the role of altar server.

Thus, Canon 813.2 of the 1917 Code of Canon Law declared: "The minister serving at Mass may not be a woman, unless, there being no male available, for a just reason and with the proviso that the woman answer from a distance and in no case come up to the altar (*ad altare accedat*)." This paragraph was not included in the 1983 revised Code of Canon Law. However, the need of an altar server was also dropped in the revised Code. Canon 813.1 of the 1917 Code stated: "A priest is not to celebrate Mass without a minister to serve and answer him." The new formulation is given in Canon 906 of the revised Code: "Except for a just and reasonable cause, a priest is not to celebrate the Eucharistic Sacrifice without the participation of at least one member of the faithful." With reference to Canon 813.2 of the 1917 Code, it was requested by a member at the 1981 planning session of the Commission for the Revision of the Code of Canon Law that in the new Code explicit mention be made of the exclusion of women from the altar. The Secretariat of the Commission replied that "it is not necessary to make reference to liturgical law, since it always retains its value. In the schema mention is no longer made of a minister to serve the Mass, but only of the participation of at least someone of the faithful."<sup>1</sup>

In fact, Canon 2 of the 1983 revised Code states that "the liturgical laws in effect up to now retain their force, unless any of them should be contrary to the canon of the Code." Again, as far as liturgical law is concerned, Article 70 of the General Instruction of the Roman Missal (1975 edition) states: "...Ministries which are performed outside of the *presbyterium* (sanctuary) may be entrusted also to women according to the prudent

judgment of the rector of the church. The conference of bishops may permit that a qualified woman proclaim the readings before the Gospel and announce the intentions of the general intercessions. The conference may also more precisely designate a suitable place from which a woman may proclaim the word of God in the liturgical assembly." Finally, the Instruction *Inaestimabile Donum* of the Sacred Congregation for the Sacraments and Divine Worship of 1980 confirmed the existing prohibition: "Nevertheless, it is not permitted to women to fulfill the function of acolyte, that is, of serving at the altar."<sup>2</sup>

Thus, at least prior to the recent authentic interpretation of Canon 230.2, the general law remained in effect that females were prohibited from serving at the altar during liturgical functions. To understand the canonical implications of the recent authentic interpretation, certain distinctions need to be considered.

An *authentic* interpretation is an interpretation which is imposed in an obligatory manner, or authoritatively, by a public person possessing this power."<sup>3</sup> Canon 16.1 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law declares who may give an authoritative interpretation: "An authentic interpretation put forth by way of law has the same force as the law itself and must be promulgated; if it only clarifies the words of a law that are certain in themselves, it has retroactive force; if it restricts or extends the law or explains a dubious law, it is not retroactive." Gommarr Michiels points out that an authentic interpretation is an act of the will commanding that the determined meaning of the law be accepted as obligatory, and not just an act of the intellect defining the meaning that was originally intended by the lawmaker.<sup>4</sup> The Pontifical Council for the Interpretation of Legislative Texts has been given the power to interpret authentically the universal laws of the Church<sup>5</sup> and thus has the power to establish new laws to the extent that its authentic interpretation restricts or extends a law or clarifies an objective doubt, it must be promulgated (Canon 7). Universal ecclesiastical laws are promulgated by their being published in the **Acta**

*Apostolicae Sedis*, and they take effect three months after the date of the edition if the **AAS** in which they appear (Canon 8).

From the data collected in the preceding paragraph it is clear that the interpretation of Canon 230.2 given on 30 June 1992 is an authentic interpretation as defined by Canon 16.2 of the revised Code of Canon Law. The interpretation was not only made authentically; it was confirmed by the Pope himself, and he is the same Pope (incidentally) who proclaimed the revised Code in 1983. Furthermore, it will be made clear that this interpretation does not simply clarify words in Canon 230.2 that were already certain in themselves; rather it has extended the law to women servers by an act of will of the Commission and of the Pope. Thus, the law has been modified by an act that went into effect three months after its publication in the *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, that is, on 6 September 1994, and this modification is not retroactive. Commentaries prior to the year 1994 arguing that female altar servers were canonically permitted were incorrect then and cannot be justified in retrospect.

Evidence that new legislation is contained in this authentic interpretation of Canon 230.2 is contained in the wording of the response: "Yes, and in accordance with instructions to be given by the Apostolic See." It is understood, of course, for all actions in the Church, and it is stated explicitly for the actions included in Canon 230.2, that they be carried out "*ad normam iuris*," that is, "in accordance with the norm of law." And the norm of law includes that of the liturgical laws, which, according to Canon 2, "retain their force, unless any of them should be contrary to the canons of the Code." There were in 1983 and thereafter liturgical laws prohibiting the service of women at the altar during liturgical functions (see above). These liturgical laws are modified by the present authentic interpretation, not categorically, but in accordance with the instructions given by the

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**The Congregation has clarified the authentic interpretation to mean that an *indult* is given to diocesan bishops to permit the use of female altar servers.**

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Congregation for Divine Worship and the Sacraments on 15 March 1994. It is to be noted that the divulging and the subsequent publication of the authentic interpretation of Canon 230.2 was delayed for almost two years pending the emission of instructions by this congregation of the Holy See. Thus, the Instructions of the Congregation must be considered an integral part of the new

legislation.

Paragraph 1 of the Instructions given by the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Sacraments points out that permission given by some bishops for the use of female altar servers "can in no way be considered as binding on other bishops." The Congregation bases this point upon the original wording of Canon 230.2, namely, that "all lay persons *may* carry out the functions of commentator, singer, or other functions." However, there is here special meaning regarding female altar servers. The implication is that the general liturgical norm prohibiting female altar servers remains in existence, so that in general women may not serve at the altar *unless* a local ordinary intervenes by a positive act and grants permission for his territorial jurisdiction. Thus, the Congregation has clarified the authentic interpretation to mean that an *indult* is given to diocesan bishops to permit the use of female altar servers.

Paragraph 2 of the Instructions clarifies the nature of the Indult, by stating that "the Holy See respects the decision adopted by certain bishops for specific local reasons," while at the same time maintaining that "it will always be very appropriate to follow the noble tradition of having boys serve at the altar." The NC News Service translated the Latin word *servat* in the Instructions as "respects." The basic denotation of the verb *servare* is either "to save," "to preserve" on the one hand, or "to pay attention to," "to observe" on the other (cf. Lewis and Short). In the context of these Instructions, perhaps the best translation is

"The Holy See notes....," rather than "The Holy See respects... ." What the expression "having boys serve at the altar" undoubtedly means is having boys *only* (exclusive of girls) serve at the altar. If, then, in the same paragraph of the Instructions it is stated that "the obligation to support such groups of altar boys will always continue," the reason seems to be, not merely because this noble tradition "has also led to a reassuring development of priestly vocations," but also and especially because the traditional liturgical norm prohibiting altar girls remains in general force. As such, it could be compared to the law prohibiting the eating of meat on Fridays (Canon 1251), which remains in general effect but can be modified by local episcopal conferences for their own territories. The present indult, however, from its wording, is intended to be used by individual bishops, not by episcopal conferences.

In fact, according to paragraph 3 of the Instructions, "If in some diocese, on the basis of Canon 230.2, the bishop permits that, for particular reasons, women may also serve at the altar, this decision must be clearly explained to the faithful in the light of the above-mentioned norm." The indult is not, therefore, intended as a general extension of the law of Canon 230.2 or as a permission that went into effect everywhere in the Latin Church, but only "in some diocese" or other "for particular reasons." Understood in this sense, as is stated in paragraph 2 of the Instructions, "The Holy See respects the decision adopted by certain bishops for specific local reasons on the basis of the provisions of Canon 230.2."

But such a decision by certain bishops "must be clearly explained to the faithful in the light of the above-mentioned norm." Several norms are mentioned above in the text of the Instructions: a) Either men or women may serve at the altar in accord with instructions to be given by the Apostolic See. b) The permission given in this regard by some bishops can in no way be considered as binding on other bishops. c) It is the competence of each bishop in his diocese to make a prudential judgment on what to do. d) It will always be very

appropriate to follow the noble tradition of having boys serve at the altar, and thus the obligation to support such groups of altar boys will always continue. Hence, it is not very clear what is meant exactly by "the above-mentioned norm," but it seems to the present writer that what is meant is the following: It is the competence of each bishop in his diocese to make a prudential judgment, taking care in every case not to undermine or overthrow the noble tradition of having boys (only) serve at the altar. And this implies that the bishop who permits women altar servers is making use of an indult contrary to the universal law for prudential reasons that are specific to his own diocese. It is also evident that, where the bishop does not intervene to use the indult, the general law prohibiting women altar servers remains in effect.

"It shall also be made clear," states paragraph 3, "that the norm is being widely applied, by the fact that women frequently serve as lectors in the liturgy and may also be called upon to distribute Holy Communion as extraordinary ministers." This instruction seems to mean that many bishops have already intervened to permit women to carry out the functions of lector at Mass and to act as extraordinary ministers of the Holy Eucharist, implying that this too is a derogation from the universal law granted for reasons that the bishops concerned have considered prudential. Thus, the permission to use women altar servers is not to be presented as a total innovation, although there is an aspect to this permission which is totally new as far as the sanctuary surrounding the strictly sacrificial part of the Mass is concerned.

The Congregation for Divine Worship and the Sacraments was competent to impose these instructions. In particular, the present Instruction have been issued by special mandate of the Pope, as is evident both from the letter of the Congregation in which the Instructions are contained and from the wording of the response of the Pontifical Council for the Interpretation of Legislative Texts.

This authentic interpretation does not affect liturgical discipline of the Eastern Rites of the Catholic Church, with its prohibition of women

altar servers. Canon 408.2 of the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches is parallel to Canon 230 of the Latin Code of Canon Law inasmuch as it states that lay persons "may be admitted for other functions also except for those which require a Holy Order or which by the particular legislation of an individual self-standing Church are expressly forbidden to lay persons." In fact, in all of the Eastern rites, service of females at the altar is excluded by liturgical law. The authentic interpretation of Canon 230.2 of the Latin-rite Code, since it is not a mere clarification of words but is actually a modification of the canon imposed by authority for particular pastoral reasons in the Latin Church, cannot be invoked by way of analogy as an interpretation of Eastern canon law. Furthermore, the authentic interpretation requires instructions to be given by the Apostolic See. If instructions in this regard were ever to be emitted by the Holy See for a change in the liturgical practice of the Eastern Churches as a whole, these instructions would normally be put out by the Congregation for the Oriental Churches, which has competence in this area, and not by the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Sacraments, which is not competent over the Eastern Rites of the Church.

From the juridical data gathered above, it seems clear that the general law prohibiting female altar servers remains in effect as a general law, notwithstanding the entry into effect of the authentic interpretation of Canon 230.2, except where it is suspended by the positive intervention of a diocesan bishop for his own territory. The permission by some bishops to use female altar servers during the sacrificial part of the Mass constitutes for their territory a suspension of the male presbyterium, or sanctuary, surrounding the altar of sacrifice. (Compare this with the cloister of the male and female contemplative orders.) The General Instruction of the Roman Missal of 1970 allowed women to perform ministries outside of the sanctuary according to the prudent judgment of the rector of the respective church. And it allowed episcopal conferences to designate a suitable place even inside of the sanctuary for women readers at Mass. These

permissions, however, regard the Liturgy of the Word, and they presuppose that a "suitable place" is at least not from the altar itself. Similarly, according to Canon 230.3 of the 1983 Code, women were permitted to distribute Holy Communion "where the need of the Church recommends," but this involved approaching the altar after the Eucharist Sacrifice had been completed for the sake of administering the Sacrament to the faithful in attendance. With the new permission, the male presbyterium disappears entirely by derogation from a law which, nevertheless, remains in effect for the universal Church.

Certain conclusions would seem to follow from this analysis. The first is that the use of altar girls does not necessarily imply a step forward in the liturgical practice of the Western Church. The Holy See "respects the decision" of certain bishops in the sense that it no longer regards such a decision to be an abuse of the law, but this does not mean that the Holy See recommends and advocates the use of women altar servers as an improvement in the liturgical practice of the Church. It is more a yielding to pressure, together with, perhaps, the theological, mystical, psychological, and social realities underlying the noble tradition of male servers only, which the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Sacraments certainly would have had to do before proceeding to overturn the constant discipline and practice of the past two thousands years.

A second conclusion regards the people affected by the indult: those priests, deacons, religious, and the bishop concerned to explain clearly his action "in light of the above-mentioned norm." There is no reason to impose altar girls upon people who do not want them and who have good spiritual reasons for not wanting them. To impose altar girls would be equivalent to turning an indult into an instrument of oppression.

A third conclusion follows from this. What kind of situation in a diocese could induce a bishop to make a prudential judgment to permit the use of female altar servers at the altar during the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass? Only the exist-

ence among some members of the clergy and of the laity of an emotional attachment to the idea of the introduction of females into the *presbyterium* during the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. We know that such an emotional attachment does exist and is widespread in some countries. This attachment can be limited to the simple desire to give girls and boys equal access to service at the altar, but it tends also to be understood by many of its followers as a step towards the ever greater introductions of women, not only into the *presbyterium* surrounding the altar, but even into the priestly office itself. From the Instructions it is clear that, as a recognition of the emotional situation with which some bishops are dealing, "the Holy See respects the decision adopted by certain bishops" to allow the use of altar girls, but this recognition does not imply a recommendation of female altar servers on the level of fundamental liturgical discipline and practice, nor does it suggest in any way that women are moving gradually towards the ordained diaconate and priesthood.

Any bishop who feels a need to permit female altar servers should employ great caution and understanding. In order not to impose the practice upon persons of sound emotion who adhere to the noble tradition of the Church, he should never

allow the use of altar girls at regularly scheduled parish or public Masses which people are obliged to attend or where they could be accosted with female altar servers by surprise. Nor should any priest be forced by circumstances to accept altar girls at Masses only for groups who have petitioned them and only in special places outside of regular Mass schedules. Also it would be in order to require persons making such a request to affirm their belief in the exclusively male priesthood and in the essential sacredness of the area surrounding the altar during the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. ✠

*Monsignor John F. McCarthy, J.U.D., S.T.D., founder of the Society of the Oblates of Wisdom, an ecclesiastical association of priests in the diocese of Ponce, Puerto Rico.*

<sup>1</sup> *Communicationes* 15 (1983), p. 193.

<sup>2</sup> *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 72 (1980), p. 338.

<sup>3</sup> G. Michiels, *Normae Generales Juris Canonici* (Tournai: Desclee, 1949), vol. 1, p. 482.

<sup>4</sup> Michiels, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 483.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. John Paul II, *Motu Proprio Recognito Iuris Canonici Codice* of 2 January 1984, establishing this commission, and the Apostolic Constitution *Pastor Bonus* of 28 June 1988, extending its competence of this commission was extended also over the universal laws of the Oriental Churches.

The Society of **Catholic Social Scientists** will hold its 2nd Annual National Meeting-Conference on **November 4-5, 1994** at Franciscan University of Steubenville, Ohio.

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# The Other Side

by Eugene T. Spain

## Who Are We? Ask Monika Hellwig

**J**ohn Paul II's Constitution *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* and the American Bishops' *Ordinances* for its implementation in Catholic colleges and universities forced Marywood to face the moment of truth about its Catholic identity.

The Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities had *rejected* the Bishops' directives (to put their action into common English). The rhetorical question in *The Other Side*: "Will Marywood side with the Pope or with the Jesuits?" has now been answered. Marywood has decided to follow the Jesuits.

If freedom from Rome and independence from the bishop on Catholic doctrine and morals were what was wanted, Marywood has it now. If freedom from lawsuits from future hypothetical theology professors fired for teaching outrageously heretical theses was sought, then Marywood has that freedom now.

The price for this questionable freedom is high: Marywood does not call itself a *Catholic College* any longer. The first installment of the price was paid at Dr. Monika Hellwig's lecture on Catholic Identity when its president referred to Marywood as an independent *College in the Catholic tradition*, instead of an independent *Catholic College*, as found in the Mission Statement.

The change in these key words is an implicit but honest and commendable acknowledgement by the administration of this basic fact: The Catholic Church, as founded by Jesus, is hierarchical. The Holy Father and the Bishops in communion with him were entrusted by Jesus with the custody of the Faith. They define and authenticate through the Magisterium the meaning of the word *Catholic*, not anybody else, including theologians, singly or by departments. Therefore, getting out from under the reach of the hierarchy means also

not being able to use the word "Catholic" in the masthead.

The real reason why the bishops' Ordinances were rejected was unwillingness to submit to "Rome" in matters of doctrine or morals, the legal reasons adduced being only a smoke screen.

This conclusion is corroborated by Marywood's choice of a mentor in interpreting its Catholic identity.

## Monika Hellwig

**H**ad the invitation to speak to the Marywood community been extended to Dr. Monika Hellwig in a spirit of open mindedness towards all views, no matter how extreme, or as an example of reefs to be avoided in doctrinal Catholic navigation, it would still have been like inviting Dr. Kavorkian to discuss medical ethics at a gathering of emergency room crews. The theology professor from Georgetown University was the one and only mentor, the bright beacon of orthodoxy, the high exponent of Catholic purity, the filial and humble daughter of the Holy Catholic Church who would define for us all the Catholic fine points, and lovingly instruct us in our Catholic character. St. Teresa of Avila, move over.

There was nobody invited to give us the other side.

In careful preparation for the event she had been sent the results of college surveys and questionnaires collected in the previous year. The lecture was well advertised. The attendance was excellent; everyone was there, from staffer to trustee.

Who is Monika Hellwig?

As James Likoudis observes in *Serviam* (Jan., March 1994), she is a widely known dissenting theologian, plying her trade in Catholic theological and educational fora and influencing the religious education curricula of Catholic schools.

Her work contains serious errors on Revelation, Original Sin, the perpetual Virginity of Mary, Transubstantiation, Holy Orders, Papal infallibility and sexual morality. She has been the defender of Charles Curran and Hans Kung, even

after they were fired by the Holy See as Catholic theologians. She herself cannot be fired by Rome because Georgetown is not a Catholic university, but a university in the Catholic tradition.

Paul H. Hallet examines her "radical revisionism of Catholic doctrine" in a 61 page booklet (available from Catholics United for the Faith, 50 Washington Ave., New Rochelle, NY 10801.)

She spoke to us at Marywood in a blithe and open manner. Either because she was not writing or because she felt she was on friendly or uncritical territory, she allowed herself some slack from her reported "studied ambiguity". Her greatest strength, apparent reasonableness, won the audience to her side, but this is her greatest shortcoming. Secular rationality wins at the expense of one aspect or another of the deposit of doctrine and morals transmitted to us through the Magisterium of the Catholic Church. With the catechetical foundation fading and secular culture predominating, Monika Hellwig can sound almost pious to practically any Catholic audience, even when uttering outrageously heretical statements.

Soundings made after the lecture, indicated that people felt comfortable, either because they were in agreement with her or at least did not see that her statements represent a radical departure from their own religious faith.

### Is This Redemption?

Consider her extraordinary position on the basic presupposition of Christianity. "The redemption is not a matter of saving individual souls, the redemption is a matter of welcoming the reign of God amongst us, and welcoming the reign of God amongst us means transforming patterns of relationships, patterns of community, structures of society."

There was no ambiguity here. She repeated the point in the question and answer period: "The whole project (of redemption) is a community project, not

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**Secular rationality wins at the expense of one aspect or another of the deposit of doctrine and morals transmitted to us through the Magisterium of the Catholic Church.**

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*the saving of individual souls, but the welcoming of the reign of God. We have to look at the world critically as to what in it is shaped as God would have it."*

And again: "Redemption is a community affair, welcoming the reign of God into the whole human race."

Hellwig did not make this point in passing, but very explicitly and with insistence.

The implications are devastating.

Redemption, according to Monika, is not about liberating individuals from original sin and from their personal sins; redemption is about societal structures.

Redemption is not about such spiritual categories as repentance, expiation for absolution of sin, nor love of and gratitude to God, and union with God, who redeemed us. Redemption is not about the practice of the traditional Christian virtues related to the inner spiritual life that perfects the individual: self-denial, sacrifice, humility, forgiveness, charity, works of mercy and above all prayer, all of this informed and driven by God's grace. Rather, redemption is about sociological, political categories which can be merely human and of this world.

Redemption is not about the Beatific Vision in a world to come nor about what the individual soul needs to do here to get there, but about the struggle for a better society here and now, about creating, through peace and justice, a decent acceptable heaven in the human world we live in.

Redemption is not about the city of God of St. Augustine, but about the secular city of Harvey Cox.

What Monika says about Redemption is of course an enormity in conflict with an overwhelming body of doctrine from the Scriptures and the Magisterium.

*"And she will bring forth a son, and you shall call His name Jesus, for He will save His people from their sins" (Mt. 1:21).*

The Lord "came into the world to save sinners"  
(1 Tm. 1:15).

*"It was necessary for the Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day: and that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in His name to all nations, beginning at Jerusalem"* (Lk. 24:46).

*"If you forgive the sins of any they are forgiven them; if you retain the sins of any they are retained"* (Jn. 20:23).

*"The blood of Jesus Christ His Son cleanses us from all sin"* (1 Jn. 1:7)

As for the Magisterium, the very same Vatican II allegedly so beloved by dissenters, is clear on this subject. The Decree on Bishops *Christus Dominus* opens with the statement: "Christ the Lord, Son of the Living God, came that He might save His people from their sins and that all men might be made holy".

The Apostles Creed that defines Catholicity explicitly says: "I believe in Jesus Christ ... the remission of sins", taking for granted that only through Christ is the remission of sins possible.

The Council of Toledo XI (a.675): "He endured His passion for our sins" (Denzinger, 286).

The Lateran Council IV (a. 1215): "He was made passable and mortal [...] for the salvation of the human race[...] He [will] judge the living and the dead and [...] render to each according to his works [...] that they may receive [...] everlasting punishment with the devil or everlasting glory with Christ." (Denz., 429).

The Council of Trent, Paul IV (a. 1555): "we [...] call such men away from so grave and destructive an error [...] that Jesus Christ did not submit to the most cruel death on the Cross to redeem us from sins and from eternal death, [...] with apostolic authority we demand and advise etc." (Denz. 993).

"Salvation" in the profession of faith of the Council of Trent: "The Lord Jesus Christ [...] for us men and for our salvation descended from heaven" means salvation of individuals one by one, not of wholesale societal groups. Furthermore

the salvation is accomplished through "the remission of our sins", i.e., the sins of individuals not of societies.

### **That Institutional Church!**

**A**lthough anything else may look minor compared to this theological enormity, Monika's speech was studded with assorted objectionable statements on doctrine and disrespectful references to the Church and its Hierarchy.

The event was billed as providing a reflection on Marywood's Catholic Identity with a perspectives on national higher education in general. What we were given was a social interpretation of the Gospel more or less in line with Liberation Theology, but markedly at odds with the old supernatural, spiritual, Sermon-on-the-Mount interpretation that outmoded hierarchies stubbornly cling to, following the Catholic Tradition.

"Rome" seems to be for Monika an authoritarian, inquisitorial, arbitrary dark power, an outdated, bureaucratic, hierarchal shell.

She never used the expressions "Our Holy Father", "The Holy Mother Church", or other terms of love or reverence. She referred to the Pope and the hierarchy with an adversary undertone: "the leadership", "the church", "the institutional church", "Rome". The pejorative, contemptuous nuance was hard to miss.

A student, perhaps bothered by her general style, asked in the question and answer period:

"Dr. Hellwig, what is your evaluation of the à la carte, pick-and-choose' Catholics?" Her equivocal response was one of the amusing high points of the afternoon, both in what Monika said and in what she did not say. "Americans", she evaded, "are more worried about what Rome thinks than most people from other countries, which attitude is curiously matched by Rome being more preoccupied with what Americans are doing than with people in other countries that take a lot more latitude. It is difficult here because Americans are so preoccupied with what Rome thinks."

This was the extent of her non-answer.

Americans should not feel unduly concerned with what Rome says.

### Those Dogmas!

**M**onika, as a theologian, does not like to be restricted by the authority of Rome or the Magisterium, but she doesn't like dogmas either. It is hard to follow her logic. While she berates Emperor Constantine for practically "inventing" excommunication in his penchant for unity, she criticizes the council of Trent for moving into precise definition of dogma at the expense of unity. Excommunication is bad, even if it is used for preserving unity; pursuit of dogma is bad because it destroys this same unity: any excuse is good for Hellwig to belittle excommunication or dogma.

She does not like dogmas because they carve truth in stone. She wants to have free fields of fluidity for her and fellow theologians to redefine and re-interpret truth to their hearts content, without any interference from the Congregation of the Faith, from Cardinal Ratzinger (Curial), or even from John Paul II or Paul VI who, when they are not speaking "ex cathedra" (they never did), are obviously inferior to the "expert theologians" from whom they should be deriving counsel and guidance.

In an address to fellow theologians she stated that the idea of a Universal Catechism, then in the planning stages, "was not very helpful" (ap-  
plause from the theologians), but that "the only cheerful thing about it was that no one had seen it yet", (laughter and more applause from the theologians.)

She dislikes a central authority on faith and morals, the limitation imposed by "dogmas" on free thinking, the codification and enumeration of beliefs found in the catechism. Very convenient.

"We had to *rediscover what it is to be christian*", to assert christian discipleship based on tradition, history, seeing how different groups—radical anabaptists, legalistic puritans, contemplative Franciscans—understood "Church." Tradition goes back 2000 years. That easy

*excommunication invented by tyrannical Constantine did away with radical communities. "The early Christian churches accepted plurality without mutually excommunicating one another." Conservative positions are sometimes shallow, "the institutional church tends to drag its feet, but the more reflective factors [would that be the progressive theologians?] can make a difference."*

Her arrogance is total. *Rediscovering the Church?* If Vatican II is the turning point for this rediscovery, where is the formulation for massive changes in direction in *Gaudium et Spes*, *Lumen Gentium* and the other documents of the Council? Aren't they a faithful restatement of Trent, Tradition and Magisterium?

The traditional, hierarchical Church *soft and mushy inside*, supported only by an outward shell? It is precisely the rigidity of the commandments and the hard Christian virtues of humility, obedience, detachment from the world, its pleasures and vanities, all for the love of a God who suffered and died for our sins; it is the rigidity of the institutional church in upholding commandments and Christian virtues, in sticking to the timelessness and permanence of the Gospel that the progressive theologians are trying to liberate themselves from.

### Secular Reason as Gate to the Kingdom

**W**hat could explain taking a stand so clearly at odds with age old Catholic doctrine, and for falling into the same errors that had been identified many centuries ago? Only one seems to fit: lack of faith through excessive reliance on unanchored speculation, perhaps with the purpose of making things easier for people in the modern age.

The problem is that the Kingdom of God, as it is proposed in the Gospel, is not based on a human-secular rationality that does not believe in the supernatural, that avoids suffering and promotes pleasure. The Kingdom of God uses peculiar, "irrational" Christian virtues suited for trial, for giving an account of oneself to God, for redeeming oneself before God, for atonement of misdeeds and for final union with Him through love. They are consistent with an interpretation of life as a

preparation for the *hereafter*, not as a terminal enjoyment of *this world*. The Christian outlook leads to redemption, the secular outlook leads to autonomy and rebellion.

Clever, contorted, sensible, historical, "rational" formulas, for Hellwig's new breed of theologians, determine whether the traditional interpretation of the Resurrection, the divinity of Christ, the Eucharist, the virginity of Mary, original sin, personal sin, hell, etc., pass muster.

The fact is that none of these Catholic dogmas make any human-secular sense. If that type of faithless reason is essential to these theologians, it would be simpler and more honest for them to jettison the faith, close shop and work only on subjects that have absolutely no supernatural component.

### Secular Reason as Guide for Scriptural Truth

**T**he thrust in establishing the gate keeper role for human reason is clear in Hellwig's outrageous statement that "There were things [Jesus] did not know, gradually becoming more fully aware of his own mission and destiny ... Jesus struggled to express (his mission) in Aramaic words." ("What are the Theologians Saying Now," p. 36-37).

First, this position is an old Nestorian heresy explicitly condemned — *Anathema sit!* — on May 15, 553 (Denzinger, 419), resurrected by the Modernists and again formally condemned on July 4, 1907 (Denzinger, 3432-3435).

Second, to conclude from Jesus' question "Why do you call me good, only God is good" that "Jesus distances himself from considering himself God, he seems to indicate that he doesn't know that he is God" implies a lack of faith in the divinity of Jesus, as if saying "let's apply to this guy the same rational criteria we would use with anybody else." How else can ignorance of His mis-

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## The Christian outlook leads to redemption, the secular outlook leads to autonomy and rebellion.

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sion be attributable to Jesus if it is clear from other passages that He knew about His divine nature and redemptive mission? Because by being an Aramaic Jew of 30 B.C. he was incapable of knowing or expressing knowledge about his nature or mission? But wasn't He the same Aramaic Jew who clearly expressed in many other passages

that He knew exactly Who He was and what His mission was?

Why doesn't Hellwig take the obvious approach of explaining the seemingly obscure scriptural texts by using the bright light shed by the clear texts? If Jesus unequivocally said in other occasions "I am the Son of God", if He straightforwardly accepted the statement "You are the Son of God", then He was not trying to distance Himself from the certain knowledge of His divine nature and mission when He asked "Why do you call me good? Only God is good". He was merely trying to elicit from the young man a more complete profession of faith in Him: "Call me good, not only because I seem like a good man to you, but because *I am really God.*"

The only way Hellwig's interpretation can work against so much evidence to the contrary is with this presupposition: "Of course Jesus was not God; it is obvious that he was only a man!" Then any hint, anywhere, no matter how small, that tends to back up this basic assumption becomes crucial and must be pursued. The apparently overwhelming evidence that seems to lead to the divine nature of Jesus is now what needs to be debunked.

Monika Hellwig talked about a tension between the understanding and the living of the church. There is a creative tension that vectors the fallen nature towards the redeeming God, and there is a destructive tension that seduces us intellectually and morally from the Gospel of salvation of Jesus into the lures of the Flesh, the World and the Devil. The antagonism between the Trinity of God and the trinity of Sin was instituted and pro-

claimed by Jesus and is central to redemption. It may not be eased or papered over.

If Hellwig's theology succumbs to the prevailing hedonism of the Flesh with her sexuality "myths", to the academic requirements of the World by making rationality the yardstick of the supernatural world of faith, and the primeval Non *Serviam!* of the Devil with her attitude of muffled rebellion against the apostolic hierarchy instituted by Jesus, then we are dealing here with more than an alteration in the balance of tensions, this is capitulation to the enemy. Such development does not enhance the Catholic Identity of anybody.

Marywood was not well served by choosing Hellwig as a mentor.

Monika Hellwig is only one of many dissenting theologians. Her case points to the folly, pointed out by Cardinal Newman, of entrusting the guardianship of the Faith to theologians. For how long would the deposit of Faith remain under their wild repackaging and reinterpretation? Against their intention, such theologians illustrate the divine wisdom in placing this essential custodial role in the care of a *hierarchical and permanent* Church headed by the Vicar of Christ. ✠

### DOCTOR WANTED

Comprehensive Health Care Services, a Roman Catholic health care organization, operated by the Religious Sisters of Mercy of Alma, Michigan, is searching for a physician to staff their offices in Jackson, Minnesota. An internist or general practitioner would be preferred. Please call Sr. Mary Judith O'Brien, RSM, JCD with inquiries. (517) 463-3451.

## Memorandum

To: Bishops and Presidents,  
Learned Societies/Experts

From: Bishop John J. Leibrecht

Re: Ex Corde Ecclesiae

Date: July 8, 1994

I write to ask that, in accord with the continuing work of the **Ex corde Ecclesiae** Implementation Committee, further dialogue take place between Catholic colleges, universities and bishops. Enclosed are themes which may be of assistance. Additional themes will probably be addressed during individual dialogues around the country. Learned societies and experts may participate in such dialogues or send their observations and recommendations directly to the Implementation Committee.

The plan is to have a dialogue on the enclosed themes in the Fall of 1994 and another, in the Spring of 1995, on the topic of the mandate and related matters. The Committee invites and welcomes comments from all dialogue participants as it continues its task of developing ordinances to implement **Ex corde Ecclesiae**. The U.S. bishops will devote time to ordinances, based upon Ex corde Ecclesiae, at their national meeting in November, 1995.

Please send your comments and recommendations from this Fall dialogue to the attention of **Ex corde Ecclesiae** Implementation Committee at the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in Washington, D.C. by December 10, 1994.

At the time of this writing, the process of retaining a Project Director to assist the Implementation Committee is well under way. As soon as the Director is selected, information will be sent to you. If you would like to invite the Project Director to be present for your dialogue, please send the invitation to the NCCB address.

*Theme:* **CATHOLIC IDENTITY**

*Reflection:* A Catholic college or university, by institutional commitment, brings to its task the inspiration and light of the Christian message. *Ex corde Ecclesiae* addresses the nature and objectives of Catholic identity in paragraphs 12-20. In paragraph 13 the document lists four essential characteristics of a Catholic college or university.

*Personal Reflection:*

*Questions:* How are the determinants or the Catholic character of the local college or university addressed by administrators? the board? the academic community? bishops? others?

Who is involved in determining the Catholic character of the college or university?

*Theme:* **COMMUNIO**

*Reflection:* *Communio* is a rich and complex concept having many analogous forms or realization. In the early church, *communio* was seen as the bond that united bishops and faithful, the bishops among themselves, and the faithful among themselves. In particular, the notion of *communio* involves the development of trust between the bishops and those who are responsible for administration and teaching in Catholic colleges and universities.

*Personal Reflection:*

*Question:* How is the concept *communio* between the local bishop and the Catholic college or university within the diocese expressed in the Apostolic Constitution *Ex corde Ecclesiae*?

How is *communio* realized in the relationship between bishops and Catholic universities/colleges and between bishops and theologians?

How does *Ex corde Ecclesiae* view the relationship between faith and scholarship?

How can Catholic colleges and universities be assisted in their efforts to recruit faculty who evidence "an attained integration between faith and life and between professional competence and Christian wisdom"?

What are the principal obstacles to *communio*

at present? What can be done to overcome them?

*Theme:* **RELATING FAITH AND CULTURE**

*Reflection:* One important recent phenomenon on Catholic college and university campuses in the United States is the effort of faculty, administrators and students to address the issue of evangelizing the culture as part of the mission of the institution.

*Personal Reflection:*

*Question?* What form is the effort to evangelize the culture taking today? Who on campus is involved?

How is this effort to evangelize the culture related to the local church?

How is this effort to evangelize the culture related to *Ex corde Ecclesiae*?

What are some structures that might be supportive of this effort to evangelize the culture? What are some obstacles?

*Theme:* **PASTORAL MINISTRY ON CAMPUS**

*Reflection:* *Ex corde Ecclesiae* underscores the importance of pastoral ministry on campus that "promotes the pastoral care of all members of the university community" by providing for "a sufficient number of qualified people—priests, religious, and lay persons" for the ministry of facilitating "the integration of human and professional education with religious values in light of the Catholic doctrine".

*Personal Reflection:* What are the various dimensions of pastoral ministry on campus?

Who is responsible for providing an adequately staffed pastoral ministry on campus?

What is the relationship between campus pastoral ministry and the local church?

What is the relationship between campus ministry and the academic community? Between campus ministry and administration? And the bishop?

**Theme: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DIOCESAN BISHOP AND THE CATHOLIC COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY WITHIN THE DIOCESE.**

*Reflections: Ex corde Ecclesiae* directs that "every Catholic university...is to be in close communion with the local church and in particular with the diocesan bishops of the region or nation in which it is located". The Apostolic Constitution suggests further that "each bishop has a responsibility to promote the welfare of the Catholic universities in his diocese and has the right and duty to watch over the preservation and strengthening of their Catholic character. Furthermore, *Ex corde Ecclesiae* suggests that "if problems should arise concerning this Catholic character, the local bishop is to take the initiatives necessary to resolve the matter, working with the competent university authorities in accordance with established procedures and, if necessary, with the help of the Holy See".

*Personal Reflection:* What mechanism exist for dialogue between the local bishops and Catholic colleges or universities in the diocese?

Identify some of the important issues in the dialogue between the local bishop and a college or university in his diocese.

How does the local bishop "promote the welfare" of Catholic colleges or universities in his diocese?

What mechanisms exist now for the resolution of disputes and how could they be better utilized? ☩

## Dialogue on *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* Continued

**O**n September 14 the *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* Implementation Committee of the United States Catholic Conference sent to all Bishops, College Presidents and Learned Experts a bibliography of what it deemed appropriate reading material for discussion. For the most part the list featured the writings of Michael J. Buckley, S.J., William J. Byron, S.J., Ladislav Orsy, S.J., James H. Provost, excerpts from a work edited by Theodore M. Hesburgh, and commentary by Cardinal Pio Laghi, Bishop John Leibrecht, Bishop James Malone, among others.

Since *The Fellowship of Catholic Scholars* came into existence in 1976 as a result of Cardinal Gabriel Garrone, then Prefect of the Congregation, asking whether there was no other voice in America on Catholic higher education than the NCEA, it may be of interest to review what the Fellowship Newsletter has had to say on this subject since then.

### Volume 17 - 1993-1994

Alfred J. Freddoso (University of Notre Dame), "On Being a Catholic University: Some Thoughts on our Present Predicament." December 1993, pp. 42-47.

Robert F. Sasseen (University of Dallas), "NCCB Proposed Ordinances for Catholic Colleges and Universities in the U.S." March 1994, pp. 10-17.

George A. Kelly, "Church Versus Anti-Church: The Revolt of the Second Magisterium." September 1994, pp. 2-5.

John Haldane (University of St. Andrew), "Catholic Education and Catholic Identity." September 1994, pp. 5-11.

Jude P. Dougherty, "Staying Catholic." September 1994, pp. 12-19.

(unsigned) "Notre Dame Faculty at Play." September 1994, pp. 39-41.

### **Volume 16 - 1992-1993**

Ronald Lawler, OFM, Cap., Francis Canavan, S.J., George P. Graham, William Bentley Ball, "Proposed Ordinances for Catholic Colleges and Universities in the United States." September 1993, pp. 2-14.

George A. Kelly, "Let's Stop Kidding Ourselves about Catholic Higher Education." September 1993, pp. 15-24.

C. John McCloakey III (Princeton University), "Parents' Guide to Catholic Colleges." September 1993, pp. 25-29.

Ralph McNerny, "On the Catholic University." June 1993, pp. 1-2.

Ernest L. Fortin (Boston College), "Do We Need Catholic Universities?" June 1993, pp. 2-6.

Jude P. Dougherty, "Intellectual or Moral Failure?" June 1993, pp. 6-8.

Lance Simmons, "The Core Curriculum and Free Inquiry at the University of Dallas." June 1993, pp. 8-10.

John F. Crosby (University of Steubenville), "Remarks on the Christian Humanism of a Catholic University." June 1993, pp. 11-15.

Timothy O'Donnell (Christendom College), "From the Heart of the Church." June 1993, pp. 18-24.

George A. Kelly, "Catholic University Presidents and the Ten Commandments." June 1993, pp. 25-36.

### **Volume 15 - 1991-1992**

Glen Olsen (University of Utah), "Destructing the University." December 1991, pp. 3-7.

Ronald Lawler, OFM, Cap., "Newman and Independent Catholic Universities." December 1992, pp. 23-24.

### **Volume 14 - 1990-1991**

John Paul II's "Apostolic Constitution on Catholic Universities." December 1990, pp. 5-6. (In the U.S. mostly teaching colleges.)

John Haas (Overbrook Seminary), "CTSA Report on Profession and Oath." December 1990, pp. 20-23.

William B. Smith (Dunwoodie Seminary), "When Dissent Gets Tenure." March 1991, pp. 4-9.

George A. Kelly, "What Makes for a Good Pastor in Today's Church." March 1991, pp. 19-24.

### **Volume 13 - 1988-1989**

William May, "Catholic Scholarship, God's Glory and Sanctity." December 1988, pp. 1-2.

William May, "Bishops, Scholars and the Church." March 1989, pp. 1-2.

William May, "Catholic Scholars and the Recovery of the Sacred." September 1989, pp. 1-2.

### **Volume 11 - 1987-1988**

(unsigned), "Bishops and Theologians - Again." June 1988, pp. 15-16.

### **Volume 10 - 1986-1987**

(unsigned), "Bishop Adam Maida on Institutional Property." December 1986, p. 7.

(unsigned), "Government Funding of Religiously-Affiliated Colleges and Universities." June 1987, pp. 1-2.

George A. Kelly, "The Catholic University - The Heart of the Matter." June 1987, p. 3.

George A. Kelly, "Academic Freedom for the Catholic College." September 1987, pp. 11-12.

William May, "Prior Principles in Scholarship: Catholic and Secular." September 1987, pp. 13-14.

(unsigned), "Recent Catholic Campus Notes." September 1987, pp. 16-17.

### **Volume 9 - 1985-1986**

(Fellowship Committee), "Concerning Catholic Higher Education." December 1985, pp. 5-8.

George A. Kelly, "Charles Curran and the Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities." June 1986, pp. 1-4.

### **Volume 8 - 1984-1985**

William May, "Meeting of the Learned Societies." November 1985, p.5.

Leo Elders, SVD, "The Influence of Philosophy on the Expressions of Faith." September 1985, pp. 19-22.

**Volume 7 - 1983-1984**

(unsigned), "Msgr. Frederick McManus, the Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities, and the New Code of Canon Law." December 1983, pp. 13-15.

William May, "Moral Theology and the Catholic Theological Society of America." September 1984, pp. 5-6.

**Volume 6 - 1982-1983**

(unsigned), "Cardinal Ratzinger and the Sources of Faith." June 1983, pp. 11-12. (Translated by Msgr. Michael Wrenn.)

**Volume 5 - 1981-1982**

(unsigned), "The Catholic University of America." September 1982, p. 5.

**Volume 4 - 1980-1981**

William May, "Scholars and the Church, The Church and Scholars." December 1980, pp. 6-7.

(unsigned), "The Joint Committee of Catholic Learned Societies and Scholars." December 1980, p. 11.

(unsigned), "Concerning Catholic Higher Education." March 1981, p. 11.

Joseph Scottino (Gannon University), "Fellowship Endorsed Inclusion of Catholic Universities Under Canon Law." June 1981, p. 5.

(unsigned), "Richard McBrien et al. On the State of Catholic Higher Education." June 1981, pp. 8-13.

**Volume 3 - 1979-1980**

(Fellowship Board), "Statement of the Fellowship on the Catholicity of Catholic Universities and Colleges." February 1980, pp. 9-12.

(Fellowship Committee), "The Significance of Sapientia Christiana." September 1980, pp. 8-15.

**Volume 2 - 1978-1979**

Donald Keefe, S.J. "The Present Situation of Dogmatic Theology." June 1979, p. 11.

**Volume 1 - 1977-1978**

(unsigned), "The Fellowship of Catholic Scholars in Scholarship." June 1978, p. 3.

**BOOKS**

Joseph M. Becker, S.J. *The Reformed Jesuits* (Ignatius 1990)

Christopher Derrick, *Church Authority and Intellectual Freedom* (Ignatius 1981)

George A. Kelley (Ed.) *Why Should The Catholic University Survive?* (St. John's University Press 1973)

Adam J. Maida and Nicholas P. Catardi, *Church Finances and Church Related Corporations* (Catholic Health Association, 1984)

William May (Ed), *Vatican Authority and American Dissent: The Curran Case and its Consequences* (Crossroads, 1987)

James V. Schall, S.J. *Does Catholicism Still Exist?* (Albatross, 1994)

Paul Williams, *Catholic Higher Education: Proceeding of Fellowship's 1988 Convention* (Northeast Books, 1989)

## A Faulty Quote in the Wall Street Journal

*[Like so many others, we were delighted by a letter on the Cairo conferences that appeared in the Wall Street Journal attributed to Dr. Navarro-Valls of the Vatican. Our admiration for the letter is undiminished, but we owe members of the Fellowship the following clarification of its provenance and authorship. How could we have failed to recognize the style of one of our own. Editor.]*

Dear Ralph,

As you reprinted the Navarro-Valls piece, let me enclose the dossier that gives some of its background. Originally, I had read an article in the *New York Times* about the Cairo Conference. At first I wrote a letter to the Editor, which they did not print. I then wrote an essay on the issue and sent it to *L'Osservatore Romano* English edition. Initially, I got back a fax from its Editor saying that superiors liked the essay but that the Pope did not respond to individual journalists. If I would rewrite it minus the reference to the NYT article they would do it at *L'Osservatore*.

About a week later, I get an illegible fax from *Wall Street Journal* in Brussels. I saw it had Navarro-Valls name on it, and I wondered why they sent it to me. I never

read it as I did not see what I had to do with it. I did not see the *Wall Street Journal* on September 1 when the article came out. About a week later, I receive the enclosed fax from the Vatican Press Office explaining what happened. As far as I know, the *Journal* has not made any note about authorship, which means that I cannot cite my own stuff! *L'Osservatore* never informed me of what was going on. Anyhow, my sister said that if the WSJ knew it was mine they would not have printed it, probably so. Anyhow, you might enjoy knowing this obscure information.

Rev. James V. Schall, S.J.

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Sala Stampa della Santa Sede  
Vaticano, September 9, 1994  
To: Rev. James V. Schall, S.J.  
Georgetown University  
Re: Wall Street Journal

Dear Father Schall,

Our Director, Dr. Navarro-Valls, as well as Msgr. Martin (who, I suppose, had direct contact with you when he was in New York) are both at the Cairo Conference. So, I feel I must apologize personally to you for the error made by the Wall Street Journal in publishing your article with the signature of Dr. Navarro-Valls. Of course, I have asked the paper for a correction, which should have been published by now.

The error was due to the fact that the Wall Street Journal asked for an article by Dr. Navarro-Valls when he was staying with Pope John Paul II in northern Italy, where the Pope was resting in the mountains. Phone contacts were not really easy as we could not call him when he was with the Pope, that is, nearly all day. I only knew Msgr. Martin had been asked to take care of the matter, and at that time Msgr. Martin was in the USA.

When we received the article, with your signature, I transmitted it to the Wall Street Journal, on behalf of Dr. Navarro-Valls, but with your name and address on the first page. Later the paper sent us back the article, by fax, to get our approval, as it had been cut for reasons of length. There was no signature at all on the fax. What a pity, as I could have seen there was an error if we had read the signature of our Director. In further phone conversations with the Wall Street Journal, I continued speaking about Dr. Navarro-Valls's article.

I am really sorry. I am fully responsible for the error. I never thought of specifying that, of course, the article was yours, as Dr. Navarro-Valls never would consider signing an article he did not write. Please excuse my carelessness. I hope that in the meantime the proper rectification has been made.

Yours sincerely,  
Elisabetta Cucchia  
Secretary

## An Open Letter to the Manly Seminary Staff

Dear fellow-teachers of theology,

I was saddened to discover from the September issue of AD 2000 the general tone and content of your book, *The New Catechism: Analysis and Commentary*, compiled and published in your role as faculty members of the Catholic Institute of Sydney. The citations in the review show that most of you are very far from accepting the *Catechism* as that "sure norm for teaching the faith" which Pope John Paul II declares it to be in the Apostolic Constitution *Fidei Depositum*.

This saddens me, as I say, because, like all Australian Catholics, I cannot but be conscious of the long and illustrious history of that splendid edifice overlooking the northern Sydney coastline. It has been the 'mother' of all institutions in our country dedicated to the advanced study of Catholic truth, and to the formation of our national clergy. That Manly has set her face against the authoritative teaching of the Successor of Peter can only bring sorrow to every loyal Australian Catholic heart.

Furthermore, I know most of you personally. Having studied with you and under you for three years at Manly, I know your gifts and your intelligence, and admire many of your personal qualities. All the more reason for sadness at your participation in what AD 2000 rightly describes as the continuing "rebellion."

Nevertheless, your attitude

toward the *Catechism* is hardly surprising. Indeed, those who know your well-established positions would have been most surprised if your attitude toward this new magisterial landmark had been one of grateful assent and acceptance. After all, a major part of its *raison d'être* is to help repair the damage done to the transmission of the faith by the tidal wave of theological dissent which has flooded—and emptied—seminaries round the world in recent decades. Seminaries like Manly.

Almost equally predictable, given the recent historical trajectory of the Catholic Church in Australia, was the decision of the present Cardinal Archbishop of Sydney to entrust scholars such as yourselves with running *Catechism* in-service sessions for teachers in Catholic schools.

Such an egregious case of setting the fox to guard the chickens would logically seem to imply one of three possible explanatory circumstances. First, it might be that the Archbishop, while being well aware of the conflict between your views and the clear teaching of the *Catechism*, considers those views quite legitimate for Catholic theologians. This would call in question the sincerity of his solemn professions of loyal submission to the See of Peter. Secondly, he might be unaware of the extent or gravity of your public dissent, in which case he would seem to be inexcusably incompetent or negligent (cf. c. 1325, *Code of Canon Law*). Finally, he might be neither unorthodox nor ignorant, but simply dismayed at the further implications of not entrusting you with the in-service sessions. After all, his own admission of your doctrinal unsoundness

would commit him, logically and morally, to far-reaching, highly unpopular, and deeply stressful reforms in the Catholic Institute of Sydney. If indeed His Eminence is simply daunted by such a prospect, he should remember that Apocalypse 21:8 includes the "fearful" among those destined for the eternal "lake of fire."

(My own bishop, Chancellor of the university in which I teach, closed down its entire theological faculty for a while in the 70s, and stood his ground as "a pillar of iron and a wall of brass" (Jer. 1:18) against the indignation with which the dismissed professors and their numerous supporters denounced his "pre-conciliar intransigence" in enforcing the letter—and therefore the authentic "spirit"—of Vatican Council II.)

I will say no more of that elderly shepherd whom God, soon enough, will call to account for his indulgence toward your own dissident teaching, for the grievous harm it is doing to the lambs entrusted to his care, and for the emptiness of his seminary. But theology teachers such as yourselves and myself will also be judged by the stern and awful criterion of the Gospel saying about millstones and scandal to the little ones (Mat. 18:6-7). What are we saying to justify before God and our consciences the contrasting kinds of teaching we provide for our respective students—warm acceptance of the new *Catechism* on the one hand, and cool disdain on the other?

For me there is no problem. Peter has spoken authoritatively yet again, repeating in substance what the Church has consistently affirmed, century after century, as

truths of faith and morals “to be held definitively” (*Lumen Gentium*: 25).

Your own objections, I suspect, are based on the whole hermeneutical matrix within which the *Catechism* has been composed. Like the encyclical *Veritatis Splendor*, it is rooted in what “progressive” Catholic thinkers like Bernard Lonergan and John Courtney Murray have described as the “classicist” world-view. The fact that their scornful dismissals of this “classicism” are long on rhetoric and short on reasoned argument only underscores the fact that the object of their attack appears to be nothing other than what the Church has traditionally called the “perennial philosophy.”

It is, after all, hard to find real arguments against this philosophy, because it is basically nothing other than a development and application of the fundamental principles of reason itself. It includes such elements as the law of non-contradiction, and the awareness that, after all allowance has been made for changing circumstances and historical conditioning, it is possible to formulate true propositions about religion, history, metaphysics and ethics whose meaning is not only immutable, but accessible and intelligible to people of all times and all cultures.

In my seminary days, those of us whose hearts warm to this language of unchanging, trans-cultural, propositional truth were frequently disparaged as “right-wingers” or “ultra-conservatives” in the common-rooms and classrooms of Manly; and I suspect little has changed since I lived among you. But the use of mere labels or rhetoric does nothing to refute our

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position. Let me try to summarize it.

The Roman Catholic Church claims to be an authority which is perennially reliable—century after century—regarding those propositions of faith and morals which she teaches with firmness and constancy to be true. If in fact she is not perennially reliable in such matters, she is nothing, or rather, worse than nothing: a colossal impostor speaking falsely in the name of God.

There are basically two ways in which the above claim could hypothetically be disproved: first, if one or more of those firmly and constantly taught propositions were demonstrated to be in conflict with scientific, historical, or moral *reality* by sources independent of the Church’s own magisterium; and secondly, if the magisterium itself ever fell into self-contradiction by firmly teaching the opposite of one or more of those propositions.

Now, the concern of us “right-wingers” is that you generals of the Church’s intellectual army have become all but blind to the second of these potential dangers, as a result of your one-sided and exaggerated

fears regarding our faith from the “findings” of the empirical and behavioral sciences, you are exposing our right flank to a withering attack from the more fundamental science of Logic. You are making Catholicism seem incoherent by neglecting that elementary truth which clearly undergirded the composition of the *Catechism*: *the Church’s credibility as a bearer of divine revelation depends on her never contradicting in one age what she has firmly and constantly taught in another.* In other words, the Church’s liberal academy since Vatican II has been trying to push and prod the Roman magisterium toward a door marked “Plausibility In The Modern World”, while failing to realize that the door opens onto nothing but an empty lift-well—about fifteen floors above street level! For the papacy to step inside that door (something which we know the Holy Spirit will never actually allow to happen) would be a leap of suicidal self-contradiction.


It is obvious, for instance, that the Church has traditionally taught with great firmness and constancy the personal existence of the Devil, the historical fall from grace of our first parents, the historical contraction of original sin by generation, the absolute immorality of contraception (and of other specific classes of sexual conduct which many of you want the Church to permit), the impossibility of women’s ordination, and the disciples’ true seeing, touching, and eating with the risen Christ. (Dr. Ormerod’s assertion that the *Catechism* “goes beyond the authoritative tradition” in its treatment of the resurrection is manifestly false.)

Since theologians like yourselves are openly questioning or

their efforts to “modernize” and liberalize doctrine in accordance with the perceived norms of contemporary culture. Meanwhile, the defiantly counter-cultural posture of conservative churches has been winning converts galore—including some very smart ones.

So, please think and pray, long and hard, at this time when weak episcopal leadership is allowing scholars such as yourselves to give an unusually large measure of direction to the Australian Church. If the Second Coming has not yet occurred a hundred years from now, we can be reasonably sure that whatever the theologians are saying then, it will be something very different from what you are saying today. But we can also be reasonably sure that in A.D. 2094 the *Catechism of the Church* will still be the official standard of doctrine. In short, you are very myopic to suppose that the *Catechism* has “been left behind by modern theology.” The truth is that your modernist theology has been left behind by the *Catechism*.

Sincerely yours in Christ,  
Brian W. Harrison, O.S.



## Position Paper on Health Care Reform

Catholic Physicians' Guild  
of Chicago  
P.O. Box 214, Oak Park, IL 60303

**T**he Catholic Physicians' Guild of Chicago is disappointed by the position of some Catholic leaders and organizations that the only serious flaw in President Clinton's "health care reform" is its coverage of abortion. While we agree wholeheartedly that taxes should never pay for abortion, we also believe that this feature of the President's plan is not an aberration, but rather typifies the essential moral bankruptcy of politicized medical care.

We believe that not only the Clinton plan but all of the plans currently proposed which rely on centralized funding and centralized control will lead inexorably to a deterioration both of the quality of medical care and, more importantly, of the moral and ethical standards of those who provide and those who receive medical care. We believe that such an outcome is consistent with the experience of Eastern Europe, which has recently emerged from long night of totalitarianism and which still struggles with a legacy of corruption and moral decay.

We believe that a free economy is necessary (although not sufficient) to a free society, and that a free society is necessary (although not sufficient) for the flourishing of ethical and moral standards among its people. Central planning is not only bad economics but is a violation of the principle of subsidiarity and deprives individuals, families,

communities and voluntary associations of rights and responsibilities which only they can exercise morally and ethically.

We believe that medical care is essentially a personal service, not a commercial transaction. We do not sell our services for a fee. We give our services; we ask a fee. This practice is neither heroic nor extraordinary. It is an integral component of the ethical practice of medicine. Because care is given to serve the patient's needs, care is not withheld if the patient is unable to pay. Ethical medicine, which has already been compromised by the intrusion of third parties into the doctor-patient relationship, would be destroyed by a national takeover of medical care.

Economics, as the Catholic Church clearly teaches is not value-neutral. Economic systems, to be just, must be structured according to just moral norms. We believe that government-controlled systems, whether they comprise a part or the whole of the economy, are inherently morally flawed. Central planning, whether total or partial, substitutes the value judgments of elite managers (e.g. Clinton's National Health Board) for those of the citizens. It assumes that the elite not only have superior moral understanding, but that their decisions can and should be imposed upon the entire nation.

Throughout this century those who favor the expansion of state power have claimed the high moral ground by exploiting flaws in free societies. One of their most successful tactics has been to cite problems of distribution caused by governmental interference as justifying yet more governmental control. Their record of achievement, from

Communism to National Socialism to the Western welfare state, has been uniformly miserable. The degree of their failure to produce a better life for their citizens is directly proportional to their "success" in achieving centralized control.

Now comes President Clinton's "health care reform," staking out a moral imperative for nationalizing medical care. The tactics are the same: point out the inequities in the current mixed system, claim that the private sector has failed, and enact a paralyzing monstrosity to "solve" problems caused by prior governmental intrusions and restrictions. Examples abound.

**1. Problem: Health Insurance Tied to Employment.**

*Governmental cause:* a tax policy which rewards employer purchased insurance and penalizes the individual purchase of insurance.

*False solution:* mandatory insurance dictated by the national government.

*True solution:* a level playing field; allow individuals to shop for their own insurance; *remove* the tax disincentive to personal choice and responsibility in the purchase of insurance.

**2. Problem: Unavailability of Insurance.**

*Governmental cause:* state mandated benefits.

*False solution:* national mandated benefits.

*True solution:* allow insurance companies to offer an array of benefits, deductibles, and premiums to consumers; i.e. *remove* the governmental distortion of the marketplace.

**3. Problem: Excessive Cost.**

*Governmental causes:*

- a. excessive first-dollar coverage, secondary to problem #1.
  - b. excessive demand fueled by massive infusion of Medicare and Medicaid dollars in the 1960's and 1970's.
  - c. cost shifting caused by reactive strictures on Medicare and Medicaid dollars in the 1980's and 1990's.
  - d. defensive medicine resulting from a judiciary run amok.
  - e. excessive administrative costs caused by regulatory agencies.
- False solution:* governmentally mandated cost controls.

*True solutions:*

- a. allow the market to work by restoring to the consumer the control of his own purchases. Most will choose high deductible, low-premium insurance, and will assume greater control over their medical expenses.
- b. and c. gradually privatize Medicare and Medicaid through medical savings accounts, etc.
- d. malpractice reform.
- e. deregulation.

Just as Joseph Stalin employed "the Big Lie" to consolidate his power, those who promote nationalized medicine employ an array of deceptions to confuse and divide the citizenry. Examples abound.

**1. Falsehood: "X million people lack access to care."**

*The truth:* "Access to care" and "access to insurance" are two different things. Each of us regularly cares for patients who lack insurance. Many who have freely chosen high-deductible, low-premium insurance are said to lack "adequate" insurance. This free-mar-

ket success is falsely claimed to be a free-market failure.

**2. False promise: "Universal Access."**

*The truth:* everyone will be forced to buy standard issue, one size fits all, government-dictated insurance. There will be no choice of premiums, deductibles, or benefits. "Access" thus will mean *no* access to choices appropriate to each individual's and each family's particular situation.

**3. False promise: "Comprehensive benefits."**

*The truth:* "Comprehensive" means unlimited, an economic impossibility. In a free system, consumers have control over the allocation of their own resources. Under nationalized medicine, benefits will be allocated by politically influenced central planners. Whatever "therapies" (e.g. abortion) have the most political clout will be included.

*The results:* skyrocketing costs, inevitable rationing of care or, most likely, both.

**4. False promise: "Equal benefits."**

*The truth:* If the wealthy are able to obtain better care by spending more (not a self-evident fact - harmful overtreatment is a hallmark of the care of the wealthy) then making that care available to all will drive total expenditures up. If, on the other hand, costs are contained, "equal benefits" will mean the lowest common denominator care for all. In either case, the patient is deprived of choice and control, while government or large insurance companies decide what benefits are available.

**5. False promise: "Fair burdens."**

*The truth:* Fairness will be determined not by each individual's assessment of his resources and his need, but by omniscient central planners. Experience shows, however, that central planners are never as omniscient as they think they are.

*Result:* nearly everyone's burdens go up while nearly everyone's benefits go down. Only those with political clout, like the Soviet "nomenclature," are allowed to go outside the system. (Special exceptions for government employees are already written into the Clinton plan.)

**6. False promise: "Generational solidarity."**

*The truth:* the politicization of medical care will accentuate resentments between groups. True "generational solidarity" exists only in a society in which families, churches, and voluntary organizations are strong. In today's America these institutions have already been weakened by the pervasive hand of government. The malignant effect of government intrusion, politicized class and group conflict, is the exact opposite of its intended benign effect.

**7. False promise: "Managed care."**

But who is the manager? Not the patient in consultation with his doctor, but a powerful insurance company or bureaucracy. Every family physician becomes a "gatekeeper," who is placed in a position of direct conflict of interest with every patient in every clinical encounter. We physicians know we are not saints. We try our best to serve our patients' best interests, but we also know that we

are susceptible to economic and social pressure. Why place physicians in an adversarial relationship with patients?

**P**erhaps for a few years, the basic altruism of most physicians will hold sway. Even in the worst conditions, a few heroic physicians may resist the blandishments of those who control their livelihoods. But inevitably the system will weaken those it holds in its grasp, as every compulsory system has done. Why unleash a system which will reward our worst tendencies and penalize our best?

It has been said that the road to hell is paved not with good intentions, but with evil deeds. The road to totalitarianism, however, is clearly paved with good intentions. Those who favor central planning and economic dirigisme generally intend to do good. By sacrificing freedom to material welfare, however, they destroy both.

We submit these reflections for the consideration of all thoughtful people. We submit them with a certain puzzled anguish. What have we done, we wonder, who have striven to do the best for our patients; who have tried to practice our art with charity; who have, we dare to claim, done some little good for others in our lives; what have we done to deserve a life sentence of involuntary servitude to the state? What have we done to deserve being conscripted en masse into life-long quasi-military services? What have we done that our own Church officials and elected representatives campaign for a sudden and undignified end to our freedom to practice our healing art according to the highest ethical

standards? Do the American people really want Soviet-style medical care? We hope not and we believe not.

Approved,  
Executive Committee,  
Catholic Physicians'  
Guild of Chicago  
June 28, 1994

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October 4, 1994

Most Reverend Harry J. Flynn,  
D.D.  
Chancery Office  
226 Summit Avenue  
St. Paul, MN 55102

Dear Archbishop Flynn,

Greetings. It is a pleasure for me to write this letter. First, because so many leading Fellowship members are personally attached to you. Secondly, because Bill May informs us that you look favorably on the 17th Fellowship Convention coming to St. Paul in 1995.

The dates in question are Friday, September 22nd (1 p.m. start) through Sunday Mass, September 24th. The theme will be the nature and function of Catholic Higher Education.

We build the program with a view to subject matter and the Local Ordinary, who in recent years has always been a friend. In particular the Local Ordinary confers the Cardinal Wright Award at the Banquet on Saturday night (September 23rd) and preaches at the Sunday Mass.

By preference we like to choose a hotel within walking distance of the Local Cathedral, depending on the wishes of the

Ordinary. Once we know your pleasure we will plan accordingly.

Professor Gerard Bradley of Notre Dame will handle the program, and Mr. Jack Rook of Steubenville is in charge of convention details.

If we confirm up the general plan now with your Excellency, Mr. Rook can begin to make the best deal with one of the hotels. He's an old hand at this.

When we come to a city, whose bishop is friendly, we not only serve our purposes of developing Catholic understanding but hopefully the apostolate of the Bishop himself. In Corpus Christi, Bishop Gracida arranged for many of his leading lights to attend our sessions on evangelization. There are no registration fees for local invitees.

It would also be helpful to know the name and phone number of your representative with whom details can be worked out, especially matters of weekday and Sunday liturgy. Everything proceeds from there.

We look forward to returning to Middle America under your guidance. We began in St. Louis in 1977, fathered in a real sense by Cardinal Carberry. Our Board was anxious to go to St. Paul this time, and we await expectantly to take our first steps in that direction with your blessing.

All best,

Ralph McNerny  
President, Fellowship of Catholic Scholars

cc: Gerard V. Bradley  
Jack Rook

## Notre Dame Professor Named to Receive Exemplar

The recipient of the 1994 Exemplar Award of Seton Academy is Professor Charles E. Rice of the University of Notre Dame Law School. The award was announced by William G. White, M.D., president of Seton Academy.

"With the Exemplar Award, Seton Academy honors those who exemplify in an extraordinary way the qualities we would like our children, and ourselves, to emulate. Professor Rice, teacher, author, constitutional scholar, and pro-life leader, is an outstanding recipient of this award," said Dr. White.

Previous recipients of the Exemplar Award include Rev. Charles Fanelli, Congressman Henry Hyde, Mrs. Eileen Dolehide, Dr. Herbert Ratner and Sister Assumpta Long, O.P.

Seton Academy is an independent Montessori school located in the western suburbs of Chicago. Founded in 1979 by parents seeking the highest standards of Catholic education, Seton Academy currently enrolls some 40 students, ages three to eleven.

"In this age of cynicism, when overpaid, morally stunted athletes and grotesque rock stars seem to be the only 'heroes' our children can find, we desperately need real role models, real heroes, not only for children but also for parents who are trying to raise their families in a world hostile to Christian principles," said Dr. White.

"Professor Rice is truly a hero because he defends right reason

even when it is unpopular. He has not hesitated to speak out uncompromisingly for the rights of the unborn, of Christians, and of families," Dr. White continued. "He has been a supporter of the rights of parents to educate their children according to their faith, either at home or at schools of their own choosing. He has been a valued member of the Advisory Council of Seton Academy since its founding.

"In allowing us to honor him with the Exemplar Award, Professor Rice gives us far more than we give him. It is we and our children who benefit, not only from his wise counsel, but also from his example of Catholic leadership as a layman in the world," said Dr. White.

Educated by the Jesuits at the College of the Holy Cross and at Boston College Law School, Professor Rice received advanced degrees at New York University. He served in the Marine Corps and is a Lieutenant Colonel in the USMC Reserve (Ret.). He has taught at NYU Law School, Fordham University Law School and, since 1969, at Notre Dame. "Throughout his professional life, Professor Rice has been active in political, legal and social issues," said Dr. White. "He has been a member of the Education Appeal Board of the U.S. Dept. of Education during the Reagan administration and served as a consultant to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and various Congressional committees on constitutional issues."

Professor Rice has been a pro-life leader for many years. His writings on the constitutional aspects of abortion law consistently place

principle before politics. he has steadfastly opposed any legislative compromises which would deprive unborn human beings of their fundamental rights. He maintains that sacrificing a few, even to save many, is unacceptable.

His defense of the unborn is not merely sentimental but is based on fundamental principles of law and justice. "In defending its tiniest citizens," said Dr. White, "Professor Rice is actually defending the structure society itself. If the weakest are not protected from the strong, then the law has lost its authority, and might—the might of the media, of the academics, of the politicians—supersedes right."

"It may seem ironic," said Dr. White, "that a small school for small children should honor someone so prominently involved in the great national and global issues of our time. How can the students of Seton Academy even understand, much less benefit from the words and example of an eminent constitutional scholar?"


"The key, I believe, is the family. Professor Rice recognizes the value not only of going out into the world to do battle, but also of returning from the battle to live the private family life made possible by keeping at bay those forces in society which are hostile to the family.

"Professor Rice and his wife Mary, as parents of 10 children, certainly recognize that the family is the bedrock of society, that it does not exist to serve the institutions of the larger society, but that they exist to serve it and its members. Although the family is the best way to prepare children to serve society, the obligation is not on the family to serve society's

needs, but on society to serve the family's."

"This is precisely why Seton Academy exists. It is an apostolate not merely to children but also to families. It cooperates with families and complements the education children receive in the home. Seton Academy recognizes that no school can ever replace the family or usurp its fundamental role in the upbringing of children. The school can only serve the child by working with parents to meet their children's needs. The greatest value of a good Catholic school is that it provides a safe moral environment for the child's first steps out of the family into the larger society. It supports the values of the good Catholic family while enriching them with contacts with other families of similar values.

"In this way I believe Seton Academy contributes in its own way to the greatest project of our time, the reconversion of Christendom," said Dr. White. "We are proud, then, to be marching, not stride for stride perhaps, but toddling along in our little steps, along the same path as a man of the stature of Charles Rice."



## Human Embryo Research Panel: Creating Life to Destroy It

by Richard M. Doerflinger

**A**t its fourth meeting on May 3-4, the NIH Human Embryo Research Panel reaffirmed its conviction that human embryos are not "human beings." It also tentatively endorsed federal funding for some extremely controversial experiments: harvesting and maturing eggs from the ovaries of aborted fetuses, specially creating human embryos for the sole purpose of experimenting on them and destroying them, and using techniques like "cloning" and parthenogenesis to create embryos for research and dissection. Although the panelists decided to oppose funding for some procedures—creating human/animal hybrids, or bringing "cloned" embryos to live birth—they also made it clear that any ban on these may be only temporary.

### Human Embryos: Getting No Respect

**T**he panel continued discussing the kind of "respect" human embryos should receive because of their "limited" moral status. The suggestion from an earlier meeting that research embryos be cremated after the experiment, to show "respect" for their remains, was rejected as too strict. As Dr. Mary Martin said, "the standard practice would be to use a biohazard mechanism."

As for the research itself, the

panel decided that human embryos in the laboratory can be subjected to destructive non-therapeutic experiments that would never be allowed on embryos residing in their mothers' wombs.

When applied to the human embryo, the kinds of experiments currently allowed on unborn and newborn children—"therapeutic" experiments to help a particular child, or observations that pose no risk of harm—were redefined by the panel. An experiment could be seen as "therapeutic" if it might benefit an entire group or "cohort" of embryos, even if it carried no benefit for a particular child. Dr. Kenneth Ryan said any other standard would be "a mirage." According to attorney Alta Charo, "risk" would mean the "risk of a child being born with some kind of deleterious condition." In other words, the whole concept of "harm" would be irrelevant as long as one makes sure a damaged embryo is not transferred to the womb and brought to term. As Charo candidly observed, "We're already ready to destroy them, so to talk about harm seems a little bit disingenuous."

The panelists acknowledged that a more meaningful protection against "harm" might forbid routine in vitro fertilization, and practices such as "preimplantation genetic diagnosis." In the former it is taken for granted that most of the embryos transferred to the womb will perish, as illustrated by this exchange between IVF practitioner Dr. Martin and philosopher Carol Tauer:

Martin: "When we transfer, say, three embryos, we expect or hope that there may be an implantation, but usually the likelihood of all

three of them is low. That's why we put three in."

Tauer; "You hope all three won't implant"

Martin: "Exactly."

Similarly, procedures like "pre-implantation genetic diagnosis" (testing embryonic cells for signs of abnormality) are designed to facilitate what Dr. Brigid Hogan called "the discard of genetically abnormal embryos." Convinced that such procedures should receive government funds, the panelists decided that even embryos initially intended for transfer to the womb must not be individually protected from harm or death. What matters is to ensure that damaged embryos are not born alive.

### Creating in Order to Destroy

The panel then turned to what Dr. Ronald Green called "the deliberate creation of embryos that will be used for research and then destroyed, with no intention ever of using them for implantation." These could be treated with even less respect than embryos originally intended for transfer to the womb, because none of them will be allowed to survive past the embryonic stage. Here the issue of "supply" again reared its head. Some panelists had ethical problems with using frozen sperm, eggs, and embryos previously donated for reproductive purposes—unless one could go back to the donors and obtain informed consent to use their "donations" for destructive experiments. Also rejected was the idea of offering payment to donors, because it would make their consent less than totally "voluntary." But then the panel began to worry

that the supply of "spare" embryos left over from fertility programs will not meet researchers' demand.

Chairman Steven Muller expressed doubts that once embryo research is funded, "there's going to be a terrible need for hundreds or maybe thousands of embryos." But the scientists on the panel quickly corrected him. According to Dr. Martin, "you probably need hundreds of embryos" for a single experiment to get a reliable result.

Some panelists nonetheless had reservations about filling this need by creating new embryos solely for experimentation and destruction. As Prof. Patricia King said, this involves "the act of creating for the purpose of not to allow to continue to exist." Since the panel's April meeting, she and chairman Muller had consulted friends on this topic. She said she encountered "absolute amazement" that the panel might approve such creation-for-destruction, and Muller also said he found it was more controversial than he had expected.

But Ms. Charo argued that research in "the development of new contraceptives" requires such special creation of embryos, because one must observe the process of fertilization itself and try different ways of disrupting it. And "if we're talking about things that have benefit to humankind, the development of new contraceptives is absolutely at the top of the list." Prof. King proposed allowing the creation of "research embryos" only for experiments that cannot be done with "spare" embryos. But Dr. Hogan objected that once such an experiment is completed, the new embryos should also be usable for other purposes. "Why not let's reap the most benefit we can out of

them," she asked, "and use them for as much as we possibly can before throwing them away?" Chainman Muller later added that such embryos might be used as large "control groups" for experiments on "spare" embryos.

Prof. King emphasized the need for "break points" to prevent a "slippery slope" toward mass-producing embryos as guinea pigs for lethal experiments. Muller agreed, but added that such production "probably will happen in any case, the way the world is going."

### **Fetal Ovaries: A Future**

**P**rof. King also urged some caution on the harvesting of eggs from aborted unborn children, noting that this issue "is as controversial as research embryos." She proposed that fetal eggs be used "only" when the experiment demands it—for example, when one is trying to learn more about the development of eggs in the fetal ovary. Dr. Bernard Lo agreed that the use of fetal ovaries will be "hotly opposed," and that the claims of lifesaving benefit made for some other fetal tissues do not apply here.

Some panelists nonetheless favored using fetal ovaries. Dr. Mark Hughes asked if there is "some magical reason" why these cannot be used when other fetal tissues can be transplanted using federal funds. But Dr. Martin said she had "done research with some fetal tissue," and found that "dissecting out fetal ovaries" is an "arduous" way to get eggs compared to harvesting eggs from the ovaries of women undergoing hysterectomies. Dr. John Eppig added that experiments to mature fetal eggs in

the laboratory can be funded without any action from this panel, because it does not involve research on embryos. Chairman Muller therefore proposed that the use of fetal ovaries to create embryos be classified as "requiring further review...but that experiments on harvesting and maturing the eggs themselves be funded now, to prepare for their possible use to create embryos later. The panel also decided that eggs can be harvested from dead adults to create "research embryos," following the same procedures used for other organs under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. A dead woman could have her eggs harvested, and used to create an embryo for experimentation and destruction, with nothing more than the usual consent from "next of kin." Dr. Guerra noted that dead children's ovaries can also be harvested with the consent of their parents. Prof. Tauer objected to the use of dead children, but was quickly corrected by Dr. Ryan, who said that excluding children would "condemn" them to being "unable" to participate in and "benefit" from embryo research.

### **Parthenogenesis and Cloning**

**S**ome researchers on the panel were excited about the prospects for experiments on "parthenotes." These are created by doubling the genetic makeup of an ovum, without fertilization by a sperm. (Also considered were their male counterpart, "androgens," created by removing the genes from an ovum and replacing them with the genes from two sperm.)

Since parthenotes are created without fertilization and cannot

survive beyond the embryonic stage, Dr. Hughes and other panelists claimed that "they're not embryos" at all. As Muller said, "parthenotes are not capable of evolving into human beings." According to Prof. Tauer, then, they can be used "to do things that you couldn't do with research embryos." Among other things, experimentation on these beings would have no limit as to developmental stage, but could go through the "primitive streak" stages that is supposedly a (somewhat flexible) barrier in experimentation on other embryos. So one could wait for the onset of differentiation into organs and tissues, then dissect out some tissues and grow them in cell culture for later research or transplantation.

The panelists noted that parthenogenesis will be controversial in some circles. Dr. Lo said it "involves some sort of tampering with the natural order," and Dr. Green noted that some "religious sensitivities" may be offended by the notion of a kind of "virgin birth" in the laboratory. But Dr. Hughes said this was simply "an educational problem" arising from the general public's ignorance, and chairman Muller announced a consensus on the panel that experiments in this area should be funded.

"Cloning" was another area where the panel was willing to proceed despite controversy. This term was seen as encompassing two procedures.

A kind of cloning known as "nuclear transplantation" could be used to replace an embryo's nucleus with a nucleus from the coil of another embryo, or even from the body cell of an adult, to produce an exact genetic replica of

the donor. Dr. Hogan outlined one possible application: "An adult human requiring something like a bone marrow transplantation with a very rare genotype...could perhaps donate something like a blood cell or a skin cell, the nucleus could be removed, and the nucleus could be put into an activated egg .... From that you could get cell lines, pluri-potential cell lines that could be differentiated into blood cells. Then they could be put back into a human. There would be no danger of any immunological rejection because essentially those cells would be identical to the person they came from."

The panel decided that such research would require further review but could be pursued "down the line"—so long as no one tried to bring such a clone to live birth. Dr. Hogan reported that use of the procedure in cows had produced calves with "abnormalities," and Dr. Hughes worried about public reaction to news of "virgin births" using the technique. Dr. Green expressed the panel's consensus that "implantation transfer is impermissible, absolutely impermissible at this point." The second kind of cloning, "blastomere splitting" or "embryo splitting," would involve separating the cells of a two- to four-celled embryo and growing each cell into a separate embryo. This was the technique used in the "cloning" experiment at George Washington University that prompted a public controversy last fall. Dr. Hogan reported that "the scientific justification for using this for infertility treatment is very small," because "the viability of these embryos drops off dramatically as cleavage proceeds." But it could be used to

produce several genetically identical "research embryos" at a time, so one could more easily compare the effects of "different culture conditions or treatments." She recommended funding the procedure for this purpose, but prohibiting its use to produce liveborn children.

Dr. Hughes intervened to make sure that this policy will allow funding for his specialty of "preimplantation genetic diagnosis," which involves removing a cell from an embryo for genetic testing to help decide whether to implant or discard the entire embryo. Other panelists said they would try to "protect" his research.

Dr. Eppig saw even more scientific benefit in "disassociating" embryos into their individual cells and then observing them as they "pull back together again." He agreed with Dr. Hughes that "there are some important reasons why you would want to take an embryo apart other than simply wanting to create more embryos." Dr. Hogan said that if it has a valid scientific purpose, "I don't see anything wrong with doing it."

Some panelists suggested that there should be limits on cloning, because it involves producing new embryos for the sole purpose of experimentation and destruction. But Dr. Green argued that this technique does not produce "new" embryos, because "they don't represent anything new that is not already present in the single surplus embryo that will not be implanted" from which they arose. In the end, "blastomere splitting" was recommended for immediate funding for experimental use, and attempts to transfer the products of such "cloning" to the womb were classified as "requiring further review." Prof.

Tauer said that "we're nowhere near ready to try implantation" of such clones, but "I would not like the prohibition of transfer with these embryos to be in the same category as human/animal chimeras, which I see as forever prohibited."

In fact, the door was left open a crack even for bizarre "chimera" experiments. When chairman Muller repeated that experiments mixing human and animal embryos "should be forever proscribed," Prof. Tauer took back her words: "I don't know if I'd use the word 'forever,'" she said.

### Public Comment

**A**s in past meetings, the panel heard brief public testimony; and as in the past, the testimony came largely from pro-life critics who object to the panel's entire enterprise. Dr. Marco Colombini of Maryland urged the panel to reject "deliberate killing" of human beings at every stage of development. Serrin Foster of Feminists for Life attacked the practice of "stripmining women's bodies for reproductive material," and objected to "genetic litmus tests used to weed out undesirables." They and other pro-life witnesses urged the panel to treat embryos as fellow humans deserving protection.

At one point a panelist expressed agreement with one of these witnesses: Dr. Ryan agreed with pro-life attorney R. Martin Palmer that it is "ridiculous" to use the word "pre-embryo" to describe early embryos. But when a witness from the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) stepped forward to promote embryo research, and used

the word "pre-embryo" throughout his testimony, he was treated with great deference. Interestingly, even ACOG admitted that it "could not come to a conclusion" on the ethics of creating embryos solely for research and destruction.

But a witness from the American Medical Association was more sympathetic to the idea, saying that "it would not be inconsistent with our policy."

Finally, some comic relief was offered by Paul Soberman of Brooklyn, New York, who insisted that "cloning should be federally funded to the maximum." He conceded that "some restrictions might be in order," because "no

one wants a Charles Manson clone." He also suggested "bringing back those who have passed on" through DNA experiments like the one featured in the movie *Jurassic Park*. While the panelists later joked about Mr. Soberman's testimony, it was not clear what right this panel had to see his ideas as funny.

### What's Ahead?

**T**he Human Embryo Research Panel continued on course toward an expansive recommendation for federal funding of lethal human embryo experiments. Almost the only experiments it seemed prepared to

prohibit were those which may lead to a live birth. It certainly saw no problem with using federal funds to create, manipulate, and throw away hundreds or thousands of human embryos a year. All that remains of the panel's work is a final meeting on June 21-22, to complete its report to the director of the National Institutes of Health.

*Mr. Doerflinger is associate director of Policy Development at the Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, National Conference of Catholic Bishops. This piece is taken from National Right to Life News, June 21, 1994.*

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## Catholicism and America

by Rev. Robert Batule

**I**n his now classic study entitled *Protestant-Catholic-Jew*, author Will Herberg described how Catholics were faring in America. Writing in 1955, Herberg said they were "successfully coping;" they were "weathering a storm." He went on to remark that despite the dissolution of ethnic solidarities, Catholicism in America was not "disintegrating." Indeed, it was "successfully negotiating" its transition. This led Herberg to the confident and happy conclusion that Catholicism was "now part of the American Way of Life."<sup>1</sup>

Herberg was of course referring to the position of Catholics in their new home. Their ancestors having left heavily Catholic Europe for the New World in many cases

not more than a generation or two before, there would surely be more than a little interest in how these popish Christians were faring in a predominantly Protestant nation. Herberg's choice of the terms "successfully coping;" "weathering a storm;" and "successfully negotiating," I think, gives some indication that not everyone was convinced that Catholics in America would be such a felicitous arrangement. Whatever the doubts though, Herberg pronounced them overcome by the middle of the twentieth century. According to Herberg, the different religion of a rapidly growing immigrant group was obviously not posing any obstacle to their social, political and cultural integration in America. Neither were Catholics losing their religious identity in Herberg's analysis.

Jay P. Dolan is a professor of history at the University of Notre Dame. In 1985, he published *The American Catholic Experience: A*

*History From Colonial Times to the Present*. Dolan is one of the leading spokesmen of the point of view that there is a "smooth fit" between Catholicism and America. He writes "by the end of the 1950s, Catholicism in the United States had clearly come of age. More accepted by the Protestant majority, Catholics entered the 1950s confident about their place in American society. Being Catholic was indeed compatible with being American."<sup>2</sup> Whereas Herberg before him had merely announced the doubts overcome concerning Catholics in America, Dolan positively gushes with enthusiasm about the prospect of Catholics being just like everybody else in American society. Dolan declares gleefully "no longer a fortress church, set off from the rest of society, Catholics were now part of the American mainstream."<sup>3</sup>

Before his conversion to Catholicism, Richard John Neuhaus

wrote *The Catholic Moment* (1987) in which he argued the case that American Catholics were uniquely positioned to lead a moral and spiritual renaissance in society. As American, they had inherited democratic and progressive ideals, freedom and liberty, they were well-positioned to lead their society away from slavery to corrupt influences. As Catholics, they were the proud beneficiaries of the natural law tradition, once maligned but now praised for speaking across confessional boundaries. And in religiously pluralistic America, where individualism is always a threat, Catholics were well-positioned to lead due to their deference for magisterial teaching. Readers of *The Catholic Moment* are aware that Neuhaus does not fall for the argument that there is a "smooth fit" between Catholicism and American culture. Neuhaus' argument is much too subtle and nuanced for it to be classified as a "smooth fit" as Dolan and others have characterized the relationship between Catholicism and American culture.

Whether it is a "smooth fit" or not however, we cannot avoid the question of who or what has won the "influence" tug of war. That is, have American Catholics been more influenced by their faith or their culture? In the 1950s, Monsignor John Tracy Ellis reported that differences exist between Catholics and a large segment of non-Catholic Americans on questions like divorce, birth control, euthanasia, abortion, and artificial insemination, and many of these differences may, indeed, remain. In other matter, too, such as censorship of the films and magazines, and demands for public financial aid to religious schools, the viewpoint of

Catholics is at variance with that of many of their fellow citizens. Moreover, at times some Catholics do give unnecessary offense by campaigning for things only remotely concerned with the moral code. But what is important to keep in mind is that for the most part Catholics hold their views from deep religious conviction based on their adherence to divine and natural law or to the moral code which they believe it is necessary to practice for the spiritual welfare of themselves and their children. For Catholics to do less would be, in a number of these questions, for them to cease to be Catholics.<sup>4</sup>

A mere four decades later, virtually every survey indicates that there is not any difference between Catholics and other Americans on the issues cited above. Catholics are just as likely to approve of divorce, artificial birth control, euthanasia, artificial insemination and even abortion as are other American. It is clear now that the differences Msgr. Ellis reported about Catholics in the 1950s have not survived into the 1990s. Regarding Catholics "hold[ing] their views from deep religious conviction based on their adherence to divine and natural law," we speculate whether they were ever "deep religious convictions" at all. If so, they collapsed mightily quickly. Or, did deep religious conviction shift because of a declining belief in divine and natural law? Ellis says that for Catholics not to have different views than other Americans on a number of the issues cited above would mean that they cease to be Catholics. Well, not exactly. Again, Catholics hold views on the issues already cited which are not any different than other Americans and

yet they continue to call themselves Catholic, some of them practicing the Faith by going to Mass on Sundays and some even holding very high positions in the Church bureaucracy.

Even as we speak, there are two patterns for integrating Catholicism and American culture. The first pattern accentuates the differences between Catholicism and American culture, including but not restricted to the differences Msgr. Ellis mentioned. The second pattern is what we described earlier as the "smooth fit" of Catholicism and American culture. The first pattern is in steep recession and the second pattern is now dominant. The new configuration is hailed by commentators like Jay P. Dolan. At the close of his book *The American Catholic Experience*, Dolan asserts "there are various ways of being Catholic, and people are choosing the style that best suits them... American Catholics are living in a period of transition. One mode the of church is passing away and another is coming to life."<sup>5</sup>

Central to the ascendancy of the "smooth fit" model over the Catholic first, American second model, is the de-institutionalization of ecclesial life in America according to Dolan. By de-institutionalization, it is usually thought to mean the cessation of institutions, their closing and going out of existence. De-institutionalization also refers to the deterioration of institutions which remain in existence. Certain institutions do not cease to be but they lose their way, their identity and sense of purpose are sharply weakened. In the first sense of de-institutionalization, we can point to the closure of Catholic institutions—be they elementary schools, high schools, colleges,

seminaries, novitiates, health care facilities and the like. Throughout all regions of our country, especially in the densely populated ones, hundreds of Catholic institutions have closed their doors in the last three decades. According to the Dolan thesis, there are many fewer institutions available today to pass along and transmit a Catholic way of being American. With fewer mediating institutions, Catholic must do without official guidance on how to integrate being Catholic with being American. In the second sense of de-institutionalization, we can point to the de-Catholicization of Catholic institutions. This is, the Catholic identity of institutions has been stripped away in a deliberate, conscious way. Among the institutions of higher learning, evidence of de-Catholicization is found in the approbation granted to campus pro choice groups and pro homosexual groups. Further evidence of de-Catholicization is found in Catholic health care facilities which have promoted sterilization and countenances the distribution of artificial contraceptives or, in some instances, even secretly engaged in these practices. Following the Dolan thesis, the rejection of Church teaching in Catholic institutions leaves up for grabs precisely how American Catholics integrate their American ethic with their Catholic ethic. With Catholic institutions sending mixed signals about Catholic identity, Catholics are left to conclude that Catholic life coheres very well with the entirety American culture.

Dolan cheers de-institutionalization because for him and many others it is the renewal of Catholicism. With fewer institutions, presumably with fewer opportunities for the institutional Church to

influence the way they think, American Catholics would be free at last to think for themselves on issues of personal and social morality. Free of institutional control, American Catholics could then lead the way to a more enlightened understanding of the exercise of one's conscience. In the Catholic institutions which remain, due to the influence of pluralism, a healthier respect for tolerance and greater compassion, American Catholics would not be expected to tow the party line as they had in the past against those things which most Americans now conceive of as untrammelled rights and uninhibited liberties. In Catholic institutions, renewal would mean passing from issues of personal morality to the pursuit of a social justice agenda.

In 1991, Fordham University undertook a study of Catholic identity in commemoration of its one hundred and fiftieth birthday. The study involved sending 720 lengthy questionnaires to every American bishop to several hundred leaders of Catholic institutions in the United States. A total of 390 responses were returned. The responses were then broken down by category of respondent. Thus, it is possible to compare and contrast the replies of the bishops on questions of Catholic institutional identity with others who lead, head up or otherwise are involved in Catholic institutions. These institutions, by the way, include colleges and universities, health care facilities and social services.

An analysis of the data reveals that the bishops were much more likely than the other respondents in the survey to find Catholic identity jeopardized, for example, by a Catholic hospital allowing tubal

ligations than the health care professionals who would perform this medical procedure. On this and a whole range of other issues affecting higher educations and social services, there was considerable discrepancy between the bishops, those who exercise magisterial authority in the Church, and the leaders of Catholic institutions, those who by virtue of office and title supervise the exercise of apostolates and ministries within Catholic institutions. Professor Gerard Bradley of the University of Notre Dame Law School analyzed carefully the findings of the Fordham study in a paper he presented at the annual convention of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars only a few weeks ago in Corpus Christi, Texas. He concluded that "there is an autonomous morality of Catholic institutions that is very tenuously related to the moral teaching of, say, *Veritatis Splendor*."<sup>6</sup>

The de-institutionalization of Catholic culture described by Dolan is not in dispute. What is in dispute, though, is Dolan's contention that the de-institutionalization of Catholic culture has meant the renewal of Catholicism in America. I for one do not believe that the de-institutionalization of Catholic culture has led to renewal. I am of the opinion that the de-institutionalization of Catholic culture has led to a re-institutionalization along very different lines. From my perspective, one set of principles, values, priorities, norms and convictions transmitted by Catholic institutions has been replaced with a decidedly different set of the same. In not all cases are the two sets of principles, values, priorities, norms and convictions mutually exclusive. However, the second set of principles, values, priorities,

norms and convictions is significantly or substantially different from the first set. In my estimate, the second set of principles, values, priorities, norms and convictions represents an ascendancy of cultural problematics over what Ellis called "deep religious conviction based on...adherence to divine and natural law or [a] moral code... necessary...for the spiritual welfare of [Catholics] and their children."

Were there not any institutions to promote a shift away from "conviction based on...divine and natural law...or a moral code...necessary for...spiritual welfare" to the cultural mainstream, the attitudinal changes which the survey research demonstrably shows would still have taken place. However, the Catholic institutions which have remained despite de-institutionalization have accelerated the pace of assimilation to the American cultural pattern by a new kind of re-institutionalization. Catholic institutions which used to be counter-cultural are now among the leaders of the reigning cultural consensus.

Charles Horton Cooley (1864-1929) was a sociologist who gave considerable attention to analyzing institutions and how they work. In his book entitled *Social Organization* (1909), Cooley defined an institution in the following way: "An institution is simply a definite and established phase of the public mind, not different in its ultimate nature from public opinion, though often seeming, on account of its permanence and the visible customs and symbols in which it is clothed, to have a somewhat distinct and independent existence."<sup>7</sup> For Cooley, institutions and public opinion were very much alike:

Institutions and public opinion pretty much reflected and reinforced each other in Cooley's analysis.

Catholic institutions, rather than reflecting and reinforcing the Church's mind on issues of personal and social morality, are more likely now to reflect and reinforce public opinion on these questions. Catholic institutions, which were once thought to be distinct and independent from their secular counterparts, are now just as likely to stand with their secular counterparts in important ways. From an institutional point of view then, Catholicism is securely part of the American Way of Life. From an institutional point of view then, being Catholic is indeed compatible with being American.

The renewal of Catholicism is being carried out, institutionally speaking, from an unambiguously American point of view. If the American point of view were that of Novak, Neuhaus and Weigel, I would be a lot more sanguine and favorable about the integration of Catholicism and American culture. I am afraid, however, that the renewal of Catholicism is being carried out, institutionally speaking, from an American point of view a lot closer to Jay P. Dolan. In this case, I do not think we have a renewal of Catholicism at all. We merely have a re-institutionalization of Catholicism according to a new set of principles, values, priorities, norms, and convictions. The new evangelization, however, does not rest upon a new set of principles, values, priorities, norms and convictions. It rests upon an old set of principle, values, priorities, norms and convictions given new life by bold proclamation once

again and courageous witness all over again. This ancient yet new set of principles, values, priorities, norms and convictions has produced saints in virtually every cultural context the world over, and has even transformed a few cultures along the way.

The renewal of Catholicism should be carried out, institutionally speaking, from a Catholic point of view. At the same time, Catholicism always exists in a specifically defined cultural context. In the dynamic interchange between faith and culture, we should insist that our institutions allow faith its proper role of criticizing culture and purifying it. Were this to occur, we might finally get it right. Successful integration of Catholicism and American culture results in Catholic coming before American. Our Faith defines us before our culture does. This is true not just personally but institutionally.

<sup>1</sup> Will Herberg, *Protestant—Catholic—Jew* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955), p. 174-75.

<sup>2</sup> Jay P. Dolan, *The American Catholic Experience: A History from Colonial Times to the Present* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1985), p. 417.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 452.

<sup>4</sup> John Tracy Ellis, *American Catholicism*, 2nd ed. revised. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 154.

<sup>5</sup> Dolan, p. 453.

<sup>6</sup> This quote is taken from a paper delivered by Gerard V. Bradley of the University of Notre Dame Law School at the annual convention of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars in 1994.

<sup>7</sup> Charles Horton Cooley, *Social Organization* (New York: Schocken Books, 1962), p. 313.

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*The Place Within*  
The Poetry of Pope  
John Paul II

Translated by Jerzy Peterkiewicz

Karol Wojtyla had been composing verse since 1939, but it was not until his election as Pope John Paul II in 1978 that his poetry came to the attention of a world-wide audience. *The Place Within* (Random House; November 1, 1994; \$10.00), originally published by Random House in 1982, is a complete collection of the poems written by Wojtyla between the years 1939 and 1978. Translated by Jerzy Peterkiewicz, this compilation is

the only English version approved by the Vatican. These poems were written throughout Wojtyla's adult life, while he was a worker, a student, a priest, and a bishop and his verse reflects the concerns of a man with a spiritual mission. Spanning nearly forty years, these poems offer the reader a rare glimpse into the thoughts and feelings of the leader of the world's 970 million Catholics. *The Place Within* takes a look inside the heart of the man.

**About the Author:** Karol Wojtyla was born in 1920 in Wadowice, Poland. After studying literature and drama in Cracow, he worked in a stone quarry and a chemical plant before he began studying for the priesthood in

1942. He was hidden from German occupation forces by the Archbishop of Cracow and was ordained in 1946. In 1958 he was named bishop of Cracow, and became archbishop in 1964 and a cardinal in 1967. On October 16, 1978, Wojtyla was elected pope, the first non-Italian bishop of Rome in nearly five hundred years. He took the name John Paul II, in honor of his short-lived and much-loved predecessor, John Paul I.

*The Place Within: The Poetry of Pope John Paul II*

By Karol Wojtyla, Translated by Jerzy Peterkiewicz  
Publication date: November 1, 1994  
Price: \$10.00/trade paperback

LIBERALISM

John Henry Cardinal Newman

*"Jehu destroyed Baal out of Israel. Howbeit from the sins of Jeoroboam Jehu departed not from after them, to wit, the golden calves that were in Bethel, and that were in Dan."*

*Ye cannot halve the Gospel of God's grace;  
Men of presumptuous heart! I know you well.  
Ye are of those who plan that we should dwell,  
Each in his tranquil home and holy place;  
Seeing the Word refines all natures rude,  
And tames the stirrings of the multitude.*

*And ye have caught some echoes of its lore,  
As heralded amid the joyous choirs;  
Ye mark'd it spoke of peace, chastised desires,  
Good-will and mercy, — and ye heard no more;  
But, as for zeal and quick-eyed sanctity,  
And the dread depths of grace, ye pass'd them by.*

*And so ye halve the Truth; for ye in heart  
At best, are doubters whether it be true,  
The theme discarding, as unmeet for you,  
Statesmen of Sages. O new-compass'd art  
Of the ancient Foe! — but what, if it extends  
O'er our own camp, and rules amid our friends.*

PALERMO, JUNE 5, 1833

## A Man of Hope

Catholics the world over in a multiplicity of languages call him "Papa," but he could also be called "magister," "teacher," or "professor." Only someone with the classroom experience of a Wojtyla could handle the aggressive, provocative questions of a sometimes impertinent journalist, Vittorio Messori, who is responsible for the shape of, if not the content of *Crossing the Threshold of Hope* by His Holiness, John Paul II (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994). Messori provided the questions for what was in the beginning to be a television broadcast.

If the *Acting Person* and other professional works of Professor Wojtyla were by virtue of their technical character unaccessible to the layman, this work is not. In *Crossing the Threshold of Hope* John Paul II is "popularizing" himself. And what a treat it is.

In the opening chapters we find a humble, personally revealing teacher discussing the nature of the papacy itself. The Vicar of Christ himself is talking about what it means to be pope. Paraphrasing Gregory the Great who described the office as that of "the servant of the servants of God," John Paul II describes the teaching and sacramental functions of the office. He goes on to talk about, among other topics, our knowledge of God, the nature of prayer, the nature of the Church, divisions within Christendom, the plurality of religious outlooks, the Church's indebtedness to the Hebrew Prophets, human rights, and the meaning of "eternal life."

No matter the topic, as readers we always find ourselves in the presence of an intelligent, informed and articulate master. Given the sources quoted, it is evident that upon assuming the papacy, John Paul II did not cease to read. Before he was elevated to the episcopacy, Karol Wojtyla was a professor of moral philosophy at The Catholic University of Dublin. This shows in his many citations of philosophers from Plato to Paul Ricouer. One can find references to at least twenty-five philosophers, some who are part of the Western canon, some who have achieved their reputations since John Paul II's election fifteen years ago. Few world leaders can quote Aristotle and Wittgenstein or Pascal and Aquinas in the same paragraph. The Holy Father shows an acquaintance with the work of contemporary figures such as Malraux, Eliade, Camus, and Buber, not to mention the leaders of the phenomenological movement of which he is a part, i.e., Husserl and his disciples such as Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler and Edith Stein. Hans-Georg Gadamer, whose name is identified with hermeneutics as well as phenomenology, relates that when John Paul II spotted him at a Vatican conference he came toward him, arms outstretched, to embrace him, saying, "All my life I have wanted to meet Professor Gadamer." Clearly the act of a man respectful of intellect, even when that intellect has not embraced the Faith.

As this book makes clear, for John Paul II the first line of defense of the faith and even of its explication is philosophical. Only one steeped in the Western philosophi-

cal tradition could have authored this book. Speaking of the sources of contemporary agnosticism, he writes, "The rationalism of the Enlightenment was able to accept a God outside of the world primarily because it was an unverifiable hypothesis. It was crucial, however, that such a God be expelled from the world." (p. 53). With insight, not always common in the academy, the Holy Father can with ease distinguish between the French, English and German Enlightenments.

Technically proficient, John Paul II can draw upon a wealth of knowledge to teach with precision and clarity. The present volume, while based on scholarship, is for those who call him "father;" it is addressed to all who wish to understand the nature of the Catholic Church and her mission as seen from its highest office.

Jude P. Dougherty  
*The Catholic University of America*



D. Dallin, Editor, *American Jews and the Separationist Faith*

Reviewed by Gerard V. Bradley  
*Professor of Law,*  
*Notre Dame Law School*

*Was I scared floating around in a little yellow raft off the coast of an enemy-held island, setting a world record for paddling? Of course I was. What sustains you in times like that? Well, you go back to fundamental values. I thought about Mother and Dad and the strength I got from them — and God and faith and the separation of Church and State.*

— George Bush, on the  
 1988 Campaign Trail

If there is a dogma in American public discourse it is that dogma is not permitted in American public discourse. That is why candidate Bush, realizing the “G” word had passed his lips, hastened to reassure his listeners (disingenously, one hopes) that his god, at least, was apolitical.

Sing your hosannas to the grand oracle of American secularism — Thomas Jefferson — for bequeathing us the separationist mantra. He coined (or gave renewed currency to) the phrase in a letter to a band of Connecticut Baptists, opining that the Constitution enacted “a wall of separation between church and state.” Our third President preached to the choir: Baptists have long adhered to the most extreme interpretation of the separationist faith on the American scene.

Except, almost certainly, for American Jews. Public authority may not encourage, foster, aid — materially or symbolically — reli-

gion, even if it would do so without discrimination among particular religious beliefs or institutions. This is the separationist faith. It was revealed by the Supreme Court in the 1947 *Everson* opinion. (“Revealed”, not reiterated: *pace* Jefferson, *Everson* is a false construal of the First Amendment.) American Jews were present at the creation (Felix Frankfurter was shadow craftsman of *Everson*), and heatedly embraced it, at least throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s. In fact, Jewish support may even have been essential to the judicial separationist project. At least Leo Pfeffer, veteran Supreme Court litigator on behalf of the American Jewish Congress, thought so. Pfeffer said in 1966, “Our absolutist policy has now become the supreme law of the land through a series of decisions to which our test cases, briefs and other writings contributed substantially.” [3]

Some Jewish separationists no doubt were genuine apostates, giving up Judaism for liberalism. Others assimilated, more or less consciously, for less worthy motives. Of these sorts of folks Irving Kristol writes, “[o]ne does get the impression that many American Jews would rather see Judaism vanish through intermarriage than hear the President say something nice about Jesus Christ.” [163] In any event, especially in 1947, it is easy to appreciate the appeal to Jews of a secular — practically speaking, de-Christianized — politics. There was a time when virtually all American Jews, regardless of denomination and degree of commitment to Judaism, spoke univocally on matters of church and state. They were, virtually to a person, separationists.

David Dallin, an ordained rabbi and professor of American Jewish history at the University of Hartford, writes in his introduction to this important book, “American Jewry [no longer] speaks with one ‘official’ voice on the issues or religion and public life.” [9] Dallin has been for several years at the center of an increasingly influential group of American Jews engaged in a “substantial reexamination” of the separationist faith. Other members of this group, all contributors to this volume, include Hadley Arkes, David Novak, Midge Decter, Marc Gellman, and Jerry Mueller. They have rejected what Richard Neuhaus calls the “naked public square.” This “growing minority” (by Dallin’s calculation) of American Jews has moved in a pro-religion or accommodationist direction.

To explore and give shape to this heterodox movement, Dallin asked 38 prominent Jews these questions: “What ought to be the role of religion in American public life? How has your thinking on this question changed (if indeed it has changed)?

Their responses, ranging from about two to six pages, along with Irving Kristol’s Afterword, make up *The Separationist Faith*. All of the contributors are *most* concerned about the deJudaization (exogenous marriage, lax ritual observance, moral decay) of American Jews. This, it seems to me, is the discussion’s center of gravity. But not its pivot: several contributors (Barry Cytron, Sam Rabinov, Cynthia Ozich, Marc Stern, to name a few) hold tight to the separationist faith of their fathers. If the problem is lack of Jewish observance in the home therein lies

the solution. As Stephen Bayme puts it, "efforts to enhance Jewish life ought to be aimed at enabling Jews to partake of the joys of Judaism in their private lives, rather than at marginal — and possibly hurtful — initiatives to weaken church-state separation." [21]

The separationist paleos (Rabinov, et al) deny that de-Judaization of Jews is meaningfully abetted by the naked public square, at least to an extent significant enough to risk...what? The answer uncovers one pivot: positions depend, on both sides, on an (implicit) estimate of American Christians: if the wall of separation were breached, what are *they* likely to do?

Without gainsaying their opinion of Christians, one may still question the paleos' dogmatism. Indeed, they seem to rely on a contradictory assumption: on the one hand, a pro-religion public square cannot be expected to help Jew be Jewish, yet the naked public square works to make Christians more tolerant of Jews. In my view, the naked public square *does* change religion. I borrow an expression from Bernard Lonergan (who deployed it in an entirely different context): the trick is to control the riverbed (the cognitive status of religious claims) over which any stream (the substance of the various religions) must flow. Donna Robinson Devine (no paleo) captures this notion in one of the volume's best essays, (I especially recommend also those by Alan Mittleman and Jerrold Auerbach):

American values have weakened rather than strengthened traditional Jewish identity. As much as America's principles have secured

life and livelihoods, they have imposed a single perspective on religion as if it were universal. The judicial system defines the religious sphere, but in countless ways the school as much as the church or synagogue imparts critical assumptions about what religion is and means. Similarities are emphasized as diverse religious cultures are placed within common categories. In that respect, Jews have ceded the power to conceptualize their own religious tradition to America's public arena. [41-42]

The paleo public/private divide evaporates in the face of the trigger of reconsideration for several of the new breed (notably Murray Friedman, Richard Rubenstein): the Jewish Day School movement. As David Novak puts it, "[S]chools are public institutions, even if they do not receive public funds...they do receive public accreditation and other types of official recognition" [94]. According to Novak, this sort of education is a better source of Jewish identity than that available after the state school has closed for the day. In light of possibly prohibitive costs, prevailing Establishment Clause strictures against aiding parochial school are bound for reconsideration.

A decided majority of the respondents are accommodationists. Given the premise of the volume, that makes for a lot of conversion stories. The occasional contributor (Sandy Levinson of Texas Law School) moved rightward, due to perceived incoherence in his separationism. Levinson, in other words, has not fundamentally reordered his thinking on religion in public life (which is, by the way, a

mild form of separationism). Most of the accommodationists have engaged in deeper reassessments of a thoroughly secular politics.

There is still another aspect of the de-Judaization question that divides the "paleos" form the emerging minority: the privatization of the good that is part and parcel of the naked public square. Dallin raises the question in his introduction. The naked public square is bereft both of religion *and* morality — it is "morally neutral". [9] Neutrality among *religions* is not, therefore, the key characteristic of Establishment Clause doctrine. It is rather neutrality between religion and "irreligion" or "nonreligion", itself an aspect of a broader neutrality on all questions of the good. This is the antiperfectionist liberalism of Rawls, Ackerman, Dworkin (more or less) and, alas, the Supreme Court.

Is *this* kind of nakedness good for Jews? Is it a cause of de-Judaization? David Novak thinks so, and I think he is right:

If the public realm is where the important moral issues are decided (important being defined as receiving more effort and attention), and if Judaism is something private, Judaism then seems to become something of secondary moral import at best. However, Judaism does not survive very well, let alone thrive, in an atmosphere where it is not the primary moral authority in the lives of Jews.

**N**ovak's is one part of a complete answer. The morally neutral public square undermines the moral life of Jews. The other part is supplied, in so many words, by several con-

tributors. There may be cause for concern among Jews (and other minority religions) in a "pro-religion" regime dominated by Christians. But if Christians give us pause, what of post-Christian nihilists? Are Jews really safer when the Golden Rule has been discarded in favor of "do your own thing", or "just do it".

From my reading of *Separationist Faith*, the paleos have no serious counterargument to Novak. Until they produce one, we should expect (and hope) for more Jewish conversions to the new accomodationism on religion and public life.

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George Marsden, *The Soul of the American University*, (Oxford University Press, 444 pages, \$35.00)

Reviewed by  
Monsignor George A. Kelly

"Words, words, I'm sick of words" complained Eliza Doolittle about 'Enry 'Iggins' preoccupation in *My Fair Lady* with her diction more than with her persona. The time for chatting was over, she said. "Show me!" she commanded.

This bit of persiflage came to mind when I closed the last page of George Marsden's very fine book, sub-titled "From Protestant Establishment to Established Unbelief? Why do Christian believers, I asked myself, continue to chatter over the nature of a university with non-believers rather than than show secularists how a university (or college) can be an advanced school of learning and Christian to the core? On terms set by the believers, naturally. After all, medi-

eval Christians created these houses of learning in the first place.

George Marsden, a believing Protestant, came to Notre Dame from Duke University because he wanted to teach in a place where religious questions were central to intellectual life. Through twenty-three chapters he traces the Protestants foundation of all the great American universities—from 17th century Harvard to the liberal de-Protestantized Universities of the present. The great names are here? William Jennings Bryan, James Bryant Conant, John Dewey, James B. Duke, Charles Eliot, Richard T. Ely, William Rainey Harper, Nathan Pusey. Chapters are packaged with data about the intra-mural fights over religion in colleges as varied as Yale, Princeton, Oberlin, North Carolina University, and so forth.

Secularization came to all these places, says Marsden, not as a result of cosmic decisions, but by a long series of small decisions designed to open up the institutions to the newer demands of an evolving society—mostly to its secularizing impulses.

Protestant universities eventually became victims of the Protestant principle. First by fudging religious truth. Later, the Protestant institution no longer found it possible to reflect its Church's world view, certainly not its doctrine. Freedom of conscience over Church authority, private interpretation of the Bible over the witness of Christ, were guaranteed to self-destruct institutions once their governors tried to absolutize what in principle they considered relative. When the scientific method became the only accepted instrument of learning, truth itself be-

came relative, especially any religious truth based solely on the witness of some authority, even if allegedly of one who claimed to be the Son of God.

The war currently going on within the Catholic Church on the catholic college campuses is of the same genre. The Catholic Church rejected the Protestant principle in its first centuries when it encountered Gnosticism. It is hard to believe, therefore, that modern Gnostics have set themselves up today within the same Church as rivals to bishops and pope (and Christ) as determinators of God's Word. The new *Catechism of the Catholic Church* indicates that the biblical skepticism, dogmatic pluralism, and moral relativism of the last quarter century are invalid guides to Catholic truth based on the Church's authentic witness to the Word of God as revealed by Christ.

Harvey Cox was not pleased with the idea of sectarian colleges. John Cogley left the Church, agreeing with George Bernard Shaw that the notion of a Catholic university is self-contradictory. These notables were wrong because their premise was wrong. A university is not a self-created or a self-defined institution, nor an autonomous abstraction with an absolute metaphysical meaning. As any dictionary will tell you, it is the highest level of "someone's" system of education. That "someone" sets and controls the agenda for his, her, or its college-level schooling. Sometimes, a State does this, or a Faculty or Professional Group, a Philanthropist, a Prophet, even a Church. The Catholic Church is neither Protestant nor secular nor Statist. But it has a world view all

its own, just as much entitled to exist in a free country on the Church's terms.

The American Church developed the largest system of religious higher education in the history of learning and teaching. Doing it quite well, evolving its system beautifully, improving in quality bit by bit, filling America's institutions with bright, young, and pious citizens, providing the church with the best religious practice in the democratic world. Until, that is, professors at Catholic University, Notre Dame, and Jesuit universities everywhere, sought union more with the secular ethos than with their Church birthright. The results have been catastrophic for the Church. And, in view of contemporary complaints about secular schooling everywhere, one wonders about the quality of the learning.

Every concerned Catholic, especially the clergy, should read *The Soul of the American University*. The soul still vivifies the body, according to the new Catechism. If the university soul is not totally Catholic, why should the Church have the body? Marsden believes that Notre Dame and other Catholic universities are today at the point where Protestant schools were in the 1930's. He may be optimistic. One Notre Dame professor says his school is already a "post-Christian university with some vestigial trappings of faith, relegated mostly to student living halls and ceremonial events."

Once upon a time a Catholic college campus was a beautiful place to be, even for a bad Catholic. He or she usually ended in the ranks of business, labor, government, or on the front lines of

Catholic family life. Are bishops prepared to reclaim the patrimony left them by their predecessors and by religious superiors of old? Reclaim those, at least, who think that being Catholic has more to do with salvation than gaining the Nobel Prize?

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Richard P. McBrien, *Catholicism*, San Francisco: Harper, 1994. Third edition, 1, 287 pp. (*This 3rd edition bears no imprimatur.*)

by James Likoudis

**R**ichard P. McBrien's Modernist 'Summa' features an Introduction by Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C., President Emeritus of Notre Dame who writes:

"I am always amazed at the number of young Catholic students who arrive at Notre Dame today, theologically illiterate even though many have attended Catholic high schools and have grown up in Catholic homes. Perhaps their Catholic parents never really understood the theological transformation of Vatican Council II. Even I, as a theologian who followed the Council clearly, needed the systematic and comparative insights of *Catholicism*. I wish that everyone of our students could take the course "Catholicism" taught by Father McBrien each year. Those who do are no longer theologically illiterate Catholics (page xxviii)."

One might well reply that Father McBrien's *Catholicism* will make them doctrinally illiterate, as well as dissenters from Catholic doctrine as affirmed by the Magisterium of the Catholic Church voicing the truth

of Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Word of God.

This third edition of Richard P. McBrien's *Catholicism* declares itself "completely revised and updated," and a "Classic that has sold over 150,000 copies." In 1985 the U.S. Bishops' Committee on Doctrine censured various aspects of this work, expressing the "hope that subsequent editions will incorporate the clarifications necessary to remove any remaining ambiguities in the expression of Catholic teaching."

The Committee took issue with the author's treatment of grace and other serious points of doctrine which:

"remain confusing and ambiguous: for example, the description of the virginal conception of Jesus as a "theologoumenon": the treatment of the perpetual virginity of Mary (cf. page 542), of the foundation of the Church and of the binding force of the Marian dogmas."

The Bishops also noted the:

"sections of the book...in which the presentation is not supportive of the Church's authoritative teaching as would be expected in a text entitled *Catholicism*. Such sections are those which discuss contraception and the ordination of women."

With respect to the manner in which McBrien had made use of the views of dissenting theologians, creating thereby the impression that the official teachings of the Magisterium have validity only when received or confirmed by the consensus of theologians (who also included Anglican, Protestant and Eastern Orthodox theologians — as

if Anglicans were not also Protestants,—the Committee insisted that:

“We would like to make the following points, with which Father McBrien agrees. In addition to those doctrines which have been taught by the Magisterium of the Church in the extraordinary way of infallible definition, the ordinary teaching of the Pope and bishops in union with him preserves many revealed truths which have never been solemnly defined and which, nevertheless, are infallibly true and definable. These are truths which cannot be rejected or neglected without injury to the integrity of the Catholic faith, because they are either explicitly contained in Holy Scripture or, although only implicit in Sacred Scripture, they have been taught universally and continuously, are professed in the liturgy and are believed and witnessed by the faithful as divinely revealed. While it is sometimes a difficult task for theologians to distinguish such definable truths from merely human elements in the life of the Church, it is the duty of bishops in union with the supreme teaching authority of the Pope to give clear witness to them. Bishops must take theological and historical scholarship seriously, but they rely ultimately on the sacred Tradition of the Church and the guidance of the Holy Spirit promised them as shepherds of the faithful.

In the area of moral doctrine some have called attention to theoretical possibility of error in some Church teaching. The Church does indeed enjoy infallibility in its ordinary and universal teaching (*Lumen Gentium*, 25; Canon 749). But even when a teaching may not be infallibly proposed, it enjoys moral certainty and consequently has a normative

role in the formation of Christian conscience. The moral instruction of the faithful should carefully and effectively explain the authoritative nature of Church teaching and the reasons for this teaching. This instruction should not leave the teaching defenseless before objections which otherwise may receive greater plausibility because of the conformity to secular attitudes.”

*(See the full text by the U.S. Bishops' Committee on Doctrine in Origins, August 1, 1985.)*

In assessing McBrien’s “understanding of contemporary theological insights,” the Committee on Doctrine further noted that many such are “admittedly of a hypothetical nature and some of which it seems difficult to reconcile with authoritative Catholic doctrine.”

If the Bishops’ Committee expected that McBrien would revise his third edition to meet their doctrinal demands, they (and McBrien’s readers) will suffer bitter disappointment.

The third edition, in fact, maintains McBrien’s Dissent from Catholic doctrine in precisely the areas noted by the Committee on Doctrine, such as the sinfulness of contraception and homosexual acts. For McBrien, such grave moral issues are to be left up to the supremacy of individual conscience, i.e., to the decision of the individual guided by a preference for the views of a paramagisterium of theologians and scholars rather than the Magisterium. Our author clearly continues his own Dissent from important doctrines taught by the Ordinary and Universal Magisterium of the Church, and sanctions others doing the same. For him, Papal judgments in mat-

ters of faith and morals (if not infallibly proclaimed) do not bind the consciences of the faithful.

McBrien’s book is heretical in denying the unity of the Catholic Church as the true Church of Jesus Christ, and in its denial that the historical Christ indeed founded the Catholic Church as a visible society with the mission to “teach all nations.” Doubt, uncertainty, and confusion are cast on certitudes of faith perennially taught by the Magisterium of Holy Church.

For McBrien the Gospels were not written by eyewitnesses, but are products of the later Christian communities who fabricated miraculous events as a method of conveying certain “theological meanings” and for communicating their faith in Christ as divine. But even his exposition of the divinity of Christ is grievously marred. What Fr. J.R. Sheets, S.J. (now an Auxiliary Bishop) wrote concerning McBrien’s original edition remains as true of the third edition’s “low Christology”: “It seems so ‘low’ that Christ looks as if he is retarded.” McBrien depicts Our Divine Lord as if He did not always know who He was. Taking his cue from certain unreliable biblical scholars, he attributes both ignorance and error to Christ, and makes the case that Christ could have sinned!

He further questions the facticity of some of Christ’s miracles, thereby giving the lie to the Gospel accounts. He not only undermines the divinity of Christ by casting doubt upon His infallible knowledge of all things, but insults Our Lady, bringing into question her perpetual virginity and including her among those relatives who regarded Christ the Prophet as “out

of his mind." The Church's dogmatic definitions of the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption he regards as not belonging to the essential core of the faith, and that one can still be a good member of the Church in sincerely rejecting them. He refuses to defend Catholic doctrine affirming that the sacrament of ordination brings about an ontological change in the priest's relationship to Christ and the Church. Any lay person, he suggests, can preside at the Eucharist.

The moral theory of proportionalism (as developed by Richard McCormick) he defends despite its condemnation by Pope John Paul II in *Veritatis Splendor*. McBrien even distorts the Pope's teaching on the relationship between individual conscience and the Magisterium set forth in the same encyclical. He continues to propose a theory of "fundamental option" that the Pope censured in 1984 in *Reconciliatio et Paenitentia*.

This third edition of *Catholicism* again reveals McBrien's seriously flawed "understanding" of the doctrine of Original Sin. For him, the existence of God cannot be proved or disproved by reason. He denies that the concept of infallibility (indispensable for the certainty of Catholics regarding faith and morals) is in the New Testament. The hierarchical infallibility of the Church, is, in fact, nullified by McBrien's favoring a two-fold magisterium operating in the Church, i.e., the official hierarchical one and that of the "magisterium of theologians." He further denies that Christ died to expiate our sins, and muddles the relationship between nature and grace.

In this latter regard, McBrien's

uncritical reliance on Karl Rahner's theological anthropology and his evolutionary understanding of human existence lies at the root of his many errors. Furthermore, McBrien's acceptance of an Hegelian absolutizing of History leads him to regard History as the absolute reality, the creative act of God through which God is manifested. This monistic approach results in an ignoring of the factor of human causality in history, which has so often proved to be perverse. Relying, therefore, on the ambiguities of human and Christian experience, McBrien's theology and defective ecclesiology rests on a quite sandy foundation. His minimalist reading of the Old and New Testaments in the light of form and redaction biblical criticism only results in his replacing Catholic doctrine with "theologies" and in reducing Magisterial doctrine to mere opinion which can be easily explained away or rejected when not found conforming to the "latest contemporary scholarship."

As Msgr. George A. Kelly observed in reviewing McBrien's original edition, even when McBrien admits the existence of some infallible dogmas, he places so many limitations on their number and interpretation that it becomes virtually impossible to know what they might be since they are all exposed to inevitable cultural conditioning and to the flux of a constantly changing "historical consciousness." Another critic of McBrien's first edition of *Catholicism* rightly concluded:

"McBrien's book illustrates how some of our dissenting theologians

can put the Faith of the Catholic Church through the shredder of their updating speculations and still claim that the bits and pieces represent Catholicism."

(Msgr. Nelson W. Logal in *Confraternity of Catholic Clergy Newsletter October - November 1980*)

Taking into account McBrien's previous dialogue with the U.S. Bishops' Committee on Doctrine and his promise to revise his work to conform to Catholic doctrine, it can only be concluded that the author of the third edition of *Catholicism* has proved to be a master dissembler and his book a shameful act of duplicity with contents unworthy of one who calls himself a "professional theologian."

McBrien's third edition of *Catholicism* which continues to make dupes of its readers, deserves an even more severe censure from the Bishops of the United States.

*James Likoudis is President of Catholics United for the Faith.*

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Joseph Sellings and Jan Jans, editors, *The Splendor of Accuracy? An Examination of the Assertions made by Veritatis Splendor*, (Dempfen, The Netherlands: Kok Pharos Publishing House; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994), 181 pp.

Reviewed by William E. May

Since a lengthy review essay of this volume will appear in the *Thomist*, here I will (1) provide a general overview of the essays found in it, (2) comment on the introduction by Sellings and Jans, and (3) examine in more

depth the essay contributed by Sellings.

1. After the introduction by Sellings and Jans (cf. below), the volume begins with a lengthy article by Sellings entitled "The Context and Arguments of *Veritatis Splendor*" (pp. 11-71), filled with inaccuracies, and designed to undermine the teaching of the Encyclical; his essay will be taken up in detail below. This is followed by Gareth Moore's "Some Remarks on the Use of Scripture in *Veritatis Splendor*" (pp. 71-98); Moore contends that John Paul II misses the central point of the dialogue found in Matthew's Gospel between the rich young man and Jesus—the centerpiece of the first chapter of the Encyclical, and gives far too legalistic an interpretation of this dialogue. He likewise avers that John Paul II, among other things, reads into (eisegesis) and not out from (exegesis) such Pauline passages as 1 Cor 6:9-10 a condemnation of "intrinsically evil acts." According to Moore in such passages Paul was concerned not with acts but with persons (I think it is legitimate to ask, what kind of acts does a person freely choose to do to give himself the identity of a  *pornos* or "sexual pervert"?) There follows an essay by Louis Janssens called "Teleology and Proportionality: Thoughts About the Encyclical *Veritatis Splendor*" (pp. 99-113). Janssens' thesis is that, *pace* John Paul II, it is not possible to judge an act morally bad merely on the basis of the object chosen but that to do so one must determine whether the means chosen (the object) is proportionate or disproportionate to the end intended by the agent. The following essay by

Brian Johnstone, "Erroneous Conscience in *Veritatis Splendor* and the Theological Tradition" (pp. 114-135), is markedly different in tone and content from the other essays. Johnstone in no way examines "assertions" of the Encyclical. Rather, he notes that the Holy Father, while following the teaching of St. Thomas on the nature of the erroneous conscience, did not repudiate other theological schools of thought on this matter, e.g., the thought of St. Alphonsus di Ligouri. Bernard Hoose's essay, "Circumstances, Intentions, and Intrinsically Evil Acts" (pp. 136-152) alleges, again *pace* John Paul II's "assertions," that one cannot judge an act intrinsically evil solely because of the object chosen, but must also consider the circumstances and end of the act. The final essay, Jan Jans' "Participation-Subordination: (The Image of) God in *Veritatis Splendor*," claims to find a "tension" in the Encyclical between two "models" of the God-man relationship? The one, the "participation" model, is the one dominant in the document and is, Jans avers, the one adopted by the revisionist theologians whose views are rejected in *Veritatis Splendor*? The other, the "subordination" model, which Jans claims is voluntaristic in character and results in the kind of "heteronomous" morality the Encyclical rejects, nonetheless makes its presence felt in key sections of *Veritatis Splendor*, namely, those in which the pope repudiates some modern tendencies in Catholic moral thought.

2. In their introduction Sellings and Jans write that the "central question that needs to be posed to the text of *Veritatis Splendor*" con-

cerns the audience and situation the author has in mind. They maintain that it appears to be addressed to "universal pastors (priests trained in seminaries) who (should) have one set of universal solutions to every conceivable pastoral problem one might face, anywhere, anytime. Assuming that this is indeed the case, they then say that the "best way to interpret what *Veritatis Splendor* says" is "from the point of view of the pastors and their educators" and that the Encyclical encounters serious problems here (p. 9). Notwithstanding the unmistakable implication of the book's title, subtitle, and, as we shall see, several of its main essays, the editors claim that neither they nor the contributors to the volume "wish or intend that this study be understood as a challenge or a rebuke to the teaching of the magisterium in the encyclical. Rather, they wish to "respond to the assertions made in the encyclical that give the impression of pointing to serious problem areas in contemporary Roman Catholic moral theology as it is being researched and taught in any number of seminaries, universities and institutions of higher learning" (p. 10).

I believe that Sellings and Jans seriously misconstrue the purpose of *Veritatis Splendor*. It is surely *not* intended to equip priests trained in seminaries with "one set of universal solutions to every conceivable pastoral problem one might face, anywhere, anytime. Rather its stated purpose is to clearly set forth "certain aspects of doctrine which are of a crucial importance in facing what is certainly a genuine crisis" (n. 4) and to address this crisis by presenting "the principles of a moral teaching based upon

Sacred Scripture and the living apostolic Tradition, and at the same time to shed light on the presuppositions and consequences of the dissent which that teaching has met" (n. 5). In particular, the "central theme" of the Encyclical, as identified by John Paul II himself, is to reaffirm the Church's teaching that there are "intrinsicly evil acts" prohibited "always and without exception" by universally valid and immutable moral prohibitions (n. 115).

John Paul II likewise emphasizes that the "morality of the human act depends primarily and fundamentally on the 'object' rationally chosen by the deliberate will" (n. 78) and that "reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature 'incapable of being ordered' to God because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image" (n. 80). Human acts specified by objects of this kind are the intrinsically evil acts prohibited by absolute moral norms, the teaching which constitutes, as has been noted, the "central theme" of the Encyclical. Thus the pope repudiates, as incompatible with Catholic teaching, those moral theories which deny that one can judge an act immoral because of the kind of "object" freely chosen and consequently deny that there are intrinsically evil acts of this sort and, corresponding to them, absolute moral norms (cf. nn. 74-77, 79). While repudiating these theories, John Paul II does not name any contemporary Catholic theologians who espouse them.

Some contemporary moral theologians, who advocate the proportionalist method of making moral judgments, which is rejected

by John Paul II in the Encyclical, are among the contributors to this volume, namely, Sellings himself, Louis Janssens, and Bernard Hoose, whose contributions are designed, as indicated in the overview of the volume, to show that the "assertions" of John Paul II on this central issue—and on other issues—are simply mistaken.

3. I want now to examine Sellings' essay, which begins with a somewhat long introduction to the background, context, and immediate origin of the Encyclical (pp. 11-20). He then scrutinizes many "assertions" of the document regarding freedom, conscience, fundamental option, the moral meaning of human acts, and the criteria for their proper evaluation. Here I will center attention on Sellings' long introduction and on the material devoted to the moral significance of human acts and the criteria for evaluating them. I do so because the discussion of this subject concerns the "central theme" of the Encyclical, namely, the universality and immutability of moral norms prohibiting always and without exception intrinsically evil acts, i.e., acts specified by freely chosen objects which cannot be directed to God because they violate the good of human persons by violating their "goods."

In sketching the background and context to the Encyclical, Sellings flatly states that those who accepted the challenge of Vatican II and "began the work of reconstructing moral theology on the basis of scripture and tradition rather than natural and canon laws ultimately came to be known as 'revisionist'" (p. 12). In other words, according to Sellings, the

only theologians who seriously sought to renew moral theology according to the mind of Vatican Council II are the "revisionist" theologians, unnamed in the encyclical but identified by him as including people like Louis Janssens, Joseph Fuchs, and Bernard Haering. According to Sellings, consequently, only "revisionist" theologians have sought to carry out the task assigned moral theologians by Vatican II. The efforts of such theologians as Servais Pinckaers, Dionigi Tettamanzi, Ramon Garcia de Haro, Benedict Ashley, and Germain Grisez to renew moral theology according to the principles set forth at Vatican II are simply ignored. Their work, in Sellings' view, does not merit consideration. It is also surprising that Vatican II, according to Sellings account, thinks that moral theology should disregard natural law as one of its sources; the actual documents of the Council frequently appeal to the "universally binding principles of natural law" (cf. *Gaudium et spes*, nn. 74, 79-80), refer to the "law" men discover in the depths of their conscience (ibid., n. 16), and speak eloquently of mankind's intelligent participation (=natural law) in the "highest norm of human life," namely God's "divine law—eternal, objective, and universal, whereby he governs the entire universe and the human community according to a plan conceived in wisdom and in love" (*Dignitatis humanae*, n. 3). Sellings' observations here indicate his way of approach.

So too does his claim, in the introductory material, that "nearly everything that" Pope Pius XII's Encyclical "*Humani Generis* stood for was reversed by the close of the

Second Vatican Council" (p. 19). Sellings here implies that the notion of theology and its work set forth in that Encyclical was repudiated by the Council Fathers. A Council document explicitly concerned with the teaching of theology, not least, of moral theology, makes the teaching of Pius XII's Encyclical its own. *Optatam totius* emphasizes that in order for the work of Catholic theology to be carried out rightly, it must be done "in the light of faith and under the guidance of the Church's Magisterium" (n. 16). Precisely at this point in the directives for the "renewal" of theology, we find a footnote referring to the teaching of Pius XII in *Humani Generis*. Moreover, the passage in this Encyclical to which *Optatum Totius* explicitly calls attention contains the following statements of Pope Pius XII: "Nor must it be thought that what is contained in encyclical letters does not of itself demand assent, on the pretext that the popes do not exercise in them the supreme power of their teaching authority. Rather, such teachings belong to the ordinary magisterium, of which it is true to say: 'he who hears you, hears me' (Lk 10:16); very often, too, what is expounded and inculcated in encyclical letters already pertains to Catholic doctrine for other reasons. But if the supreme pontiffs in their official documents purposely pass judgment on a matter of debate until then, it is obvious to all that the matter, according to the mind and will of the same pontiffs, cannot be considered any longer a question open to discussion among theologians."

Sellings' strategy is evident. In his view John Paul II's *Veritatis*

*Splendor* is a document analogous to Pius XII's *Humani Generis*. Just as the latter has now, so Sellings avers, been rejected, so too, the implication goes, will John Paul II's Encyclical be repudiated in the future.

Sellings also finds in Pope Paul VI's *Humanae vitae* the concept of theology set forth in *Humani Generis*, which Sellings judges incompatible with the renewed concept of theology advocated by Vatican Council II. His observations regarding *Humani Generis* also help to reveal the perspective from which he assesses the "assertions" of *Veritatis Splendor*. According to Sellings, Paul VI was compelled to take "a position that *somewhat mildly* rejected the use of contraception as a morally acceptable option for married couples" (p. 14; emphasis added). This is a surprising statement, but considering its source it is understandable? Sellings, after all, was awarded an S.T.D. from the University of Louvain for a study whose major claim was that "Pope Paul never really intended to condemn every form of artificial birth control for the mature, responsible, loving married couple."

This claim, I believe, illumines the presuppositions underlying Sellings' interpretation of the "background and context" of *Veritatis Splendor*.

I will now examine some of the principal features found in Sellings' exposition of the "assertions" of *Veritatis Splendor* regarding human acts and their moral assessment, in particular, the pope's thesis that the morality of human acts depends primarily on the "object" rationally chosen, and that the choice of some objects is always incompatible with love of God and

neighbor and hence acts specified by these objects are intrinsically evil.

Sellings finds "rather bizarre" the concepts of freedom and the will found in the following "assertion" of *Veritatis Splendor*: "Some authors do not take into sufficient consideration the fact that the will is dependent upon the concrete choices which it makes: these choices are a condition of its moral goodness and its being ordered to the ultimate end of the person" (n. 75, as given in the translation provided by Sellings, p. 47). Here I want to note that the Latin text (and the official English translation) is more precise than the translation Sellings provides. The Latin reads: "Nonnulli non satis aspiciunt voluntatem definitis *implicari* delectionibus, quas ipsa operatur" (translated, in the authorized translations, as "some authors do not take into consideration the fact that the will is *involved in* the concrete choices which it makes"). The point is that the person's moral character is dependent on his specific free choices. Sellings believes that the idea that the action of the will is dependent upon its choices for its goodness is a "relatively new idea that has developed in the literature in order to substantiate the theory of the 'basic goods'" (p. 47). I will return later to Sellings' remarks on the "theory of the 'basic goods,'" but here I want to comment on his truly astounding claim that the position found in *Veritatis Splendor*, no. 75, presents a "bizarre" and "relatively new idea."

Earlier in the Encyclical John Paul II had stressed that we determine *ourselves* through our freely chosen acts. He emphasized that "freely chosen deeds do not pro-

duce a change merely in the state of affairs outside of man but, to the extent that they are deliberate choices, they give moral definition to the very person who performs them, determining his *profound spiritual traits*" (n. 71). They are a "decision about oneself and a setting of one's own life for or against the Good, for or against the Truth, and ultimately for or against God" (n. 65). The pope notes that the precise point he is making has been "perceptively noted by Saint Gregory of Nyssa"; therefore it is hardly a "new" idea and unlikely to be "bizarre. The pope then cites a beautiful passage from Gregory's *De Vita Moysis* (II, 2-3, PG 44, 327-328): "All things subject to change and to becoming never remain constant, but continually pass from one state to another, for better or worse...Now, human life is always subject to change; it needs to be born anew...But here birth does not come about by a foreign intervention, as is the case with bodily beings...; it is the result of free choice. Thus we are in a certain way our own parents, creating ourselves as we will, by our decisions" (*Veritatis Splendor*, n. 71).

Moreover, St. Thomas's entire understanding of morality involves, centrally, the concept that Sellings now declares bizarre and novel: good acts build up the virtues, which are precisely what constitute the goodness of the person; vice consists precisely in bad actions, considered independently of any other effect (cf. *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3, 10).

In short, the understanding of free choice and its relation to the will found in John Paul II's "assertions" are neither "bizarre" nor "relatively new" as Sellings asserts.

As noted, Sellings believes that the "bizarre" and "novel" notion of the significance of free choices in determining man's moral character has been developed to substantiate the theory of the "basic goods. Sellings contends (p. 67) that the use of the term "good" as a substantive in the Encyclical, i.e., to designate "goods" of human persons that one ought not freely choose to damage, harm, or destroy, signifies that the Encyclical has been profoundly influenced by the "novel" doctrine of "basic goods" developed principally by Germain Grisez and John Finnis (cf. p. 67, note 52). Sellings says that he and other theologians are "comfortable" with using the word "good" as an adjective, but that its use as a substantive is unusual.

But the use of "good" as a substantive identifying real goods perfective of human persons is not novel; it is central to the thought of St. Thomas. In fact, St. Thomas held that "God is offended by us only because we act contrary to our own good," and in discussing the primary precepts of the natural law he had said that, since the very foundational practical proposition on which the whole natural law is founded is that "good is to be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided," "reason naturally apprehends as good, and thus to be pursued by action everything for which man has a natural inclination." He goes on to list one (substantive, not adjectival) good after another (human life itself, knowledge of the truth, especially truth about God, life in fellowship with others). In many places in the *Summa theologiae* he refers to "goods," i.e., *bona*, which have and *bona* which do not have a necessary

connection with beatitude (e.g., 1. 82. 2c), temporal *bona* (e.g., life) and spiritual *bona* (2-2, 11, 4c), etc., etc. Indeed, his whole treatment of law and of the goodness of the will is placed under the aegis of the Psalmist's question, often repeated by St. Thomas, "Quis ostendit nobis bona?" (Ps. 4:6; cited in *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, 19, 4c; 91, 2c; also 1, 84, 5c). In addition, St. Thomas is very clear that one loves one's friends by seeking what is good for them, the goods perfective of their personhood (cf. *ibid.*, 1-2, 28, 4).

Thus Sellings' claim that the Encyclical's use of the term "good" as a substantive, i.e., to identify real goods of human persons (e.g., innocent human life, the marital communion and so forth) is novel and unique to the recent "basic goods" theory is simply false. One must also note, with regret, an astonishingly inaccurate and offensive passage in Sellings' essay in which he lists the beliefs that it is natural to accumulate possessions beyond one's needs, to stratify society into leaders and followers, to destroy one's enemies, to accept that whites are superior to non-white persons, and so forth and then declares, "This is the 'basic goods theory'—when one looks below the surface" (p. 68). This is a grave abuse of Sellings' position as a scholar. His characterization of the "theory of 'basic goods'" is simply an atrocious falsification of the position he is considering.

In his further "examination" of the "assertions" of *Veritatis Splendor* Sellings claims that, "as the encyclical holds, it is possible to determine the morality of human acts purely on a consideration of the 'object' of those acts (the *physical activity* per-

formed)" (p. 49, note 38; emphasis added). Sellings is here claiming that according to the Encyclical the moral object putting an act into its moral species is *the physical activity performed*. However, if we read the Encyclical we find: "By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world" (n. 78, emphasis added).

In sum, in Sellings' essay neither the "splendor of accuracy" nor the "splendor of truth" shines forth. Not only does he attribute to John Paul II positions explicitly repudiated by him (e.g., that the moral "object" is a physical event), mistranslate key passages in the Encyclical, and distort its teaching on numerous issues, he also men-

daciously falsifies the "theory of the 'basic goods'" which he alleges to be the theory on which the Encyclical is based.

Although the articles by Moore, Janssens, Hoose, and Jans are not as patently fallacious, they nonetheless misrepresent the teaching of *Veritatis Splendor*, are carelessly inaccurate in presenting the positions of other theologians, and fail to show any "inaccuracies" in the Encyclical. Interested readers will find a detailed exposition of their essays in the *Thomist* article referred to at the beginning.

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<sup>1</sup> On this see Joseph Sellings, "Moral Teaching, Traditional Teaching, and *Humanae Vitae*" (a summary of his *The Reaction to Humanae Vitae: A Study in Special and Fundamental Theology* [S.T.D. diss., Catholic University of Louvain, 1977]), *Louvain Studies* 7 (1978) 43.

<sup>2</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, III, 122: "Non enim Deus a nobis offenditur nisi ex eo quod contra nostrum bonum agimus."

<sup>3</sup> Here it is also worth noting that in a "review" of Grisez's *Living a Christian Life*—a review highly disparaging in character—Sellings says: "I have not read this book" and shows clearly that he did not when he says it contains 10 chapters, which he proceeds to list. This list, like his enumeration of the chapters, omits the 11th chapter (the last 30 pages of the book). Sellings, reviewing only the table of contents, failed even to turn the page. His "review" is found in *Louvain Studies* (Winter, 1993) 379-380.

~ ~ PLUS ÇA CHANGE ~ ~

"If God, in showing me the good that would be done, had also discovered to me the pains and crosses which were to accompany, I would have lacked courage, and, far from assuming charge of it, I would not have dared to touch it with the tip of my fingers. Exposed to contradiction, I have been persecuted by several prelates, even by those from whom I expected help. The magisterates have joined our enemies and by their authority they have supported the efforts of these to overthrow us. As our functions are displeasing to the school masters, we find in every one of them an open and irreconcilable enemy, and by their united efforts they have armed the secular power to destroy us. However, in spite of their efforts, the edifice stands, though often on the brink of ruin; hence I hope it will continue to subsist; and, finally triumphing over persecution, it will render to the Church the services she has a right to expect."

*St. John-Baptist de la Salle (1651-1719)*

**Rev. Paul  
Michael Quay,  
A Professor at Loyola**

from Chicago Tribune, Thursday,  
October 13, 1994  
article by Kenan Heise

**R**ev. Paul Michael Quay, 70, a Jesuit priest and research professor philosophy at Loyola University of Chicago, for many years taught physics, spirituality, philosophy and theology. He was a lecturer and a writer on the moral, philosophical and ethical aspects of abortion.

He died Monday at the Jesuit residence at Loyola.

“Father Quay’s intellectual contributions to the pro-life movement made him an admirable figure to many people,” said Mary Hallan, director of the Respect Life Office of the Archdiocese of Chicago. “He generated a substantial amount of interest on the subject.”

He was the son of the late Effie Alley Quay, longtime science editor of Chicago’s American and Chicago Today newspapers. He graduated from Loyola Academy and studied at the University of Chicago and Loyola University of Chicago. After serving in the U.S. Army Signal Corps during World

War II, he joined the Jesuits and took his theological studies in West Baden, Ind. He earned a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

His career as an educator began as a visiting professor at Loyola. From 1967 to 1981, he was an associate professor of physics at St. Louis University. Since 1981, he has been a research professor at Loyola.

Father Quay has published articles on cadavers, spirituality, moral theology, physics and the philosophy of science.

There are no immediate survivors.



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