

Sober Thanksgiving

Gerard V. Bradley

It was a pretty depressing fortnight. The sober mood was set in mid-November by the American bishops, when they approved, by a vote of 225 to 6, an "Application of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* to the United States. The Fellowship Board had already communicated with the bishops, laying out the case *against* the document ultimately approved. Perhaps the overall tenor of the "Application" is most easily grasped by considering what its supporters said of it: "a useful first step." It is no more than that: the whole matter of Canon 812 — the theologians' mandate — is put off for "further study by the NCCB," and the Apostolic Constitution's requirement of a majority of Catholics on the faculty is replaced by a "serious effort" to recruit Catholics and others "respectful" of that "Faith tradition."

Not long after, word came from Hawaii that wedding bells played for Biff and Bill and others inclined to "same-sex marriage." There was no decent burial for the tradition that a single state court judge so eagerly set aside. Indeed, in a trial populated by "experts" talking about what marriage is — repeat: one after another experts talked of the nature, the defining features of marriage — not a word of the moral reality of the institution made its way into the judge's voluminous opinion. No moralist, no philosopher, no theologian testified. No clergy. The experts included a pediatrician and a bunch of social scientists. In one particularly arrogant passage, the Hawaiian judge refused to credit *at all* the testimony of one expert witness defending traditional marriage. Why? The witness held severe "opinions," such as (the only two examples cited by the judge) that most modern social science was "biased" (a fact amply evidenced by the evidence adduced during this very trial!) and that evolution was not a proved scientific fact.

At about the same time a single California judge set aside Proposition 209, the California Civil Rights Initiative which would have banned all forms of racial and gender discrimination by the state, including "benign" discrimination or affirmative action. Now, whatever you think of affirmative action, there is still a mighty presumption at work when a single unrelated official undoes what millions of voters did, after a campaign in which the matter was fully vetted on both sides. More so when the legal basis of the undoing is a cockamamie theory of . . . full political participation by all social and cultural groups! Entirely without irony, the California judge relied upon the same turgid doctrine that the

(continued on page 2)

O Timothee, depositum custodi, devitans profanas vocum novitates et oppositiones falsi nominis scientiae, quam quidam profitentes circa fidem aberraverunt. Gratia vobiscum. 1 ad Timotheum 6

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Supreme Court used last year to knock out Colorado voters' initiative to end affirmative action for gays and bisexuals. And the Supreme Court is gearing up as you read this for its grand pronouncement on still another issue in the culture war — physician assisted suicide.

There is a cultural crisis and the courts are in the thick of it. With a Providential sense of timing, then, Father Richard Neuhaus published, in his wonderful monthly *First Things*, a symposium titled, "The End of Democracy." The contributors included our (i.e. FCS) own Robert George and Russ Hittinger. And the contributions focused precisely on the question of judicial usurpation of power, and the bad uses courts have made of that power. Think of the Holy Father's encyclical *Evangelium Vitae* and you will get a good idea of the moral seriousness and general orientation of the symposium. It is worth careful reading and re-reading, because these are questions which will occupy us for the rest of

our days in this civil society.

The *First Things* essays have themselves become a happening, outstripping news of Madonna's baby in some quarters. Two things about the reaction are worth particular note. The essays raised the question of the "legitimacy of the regime"; that is, whether conscientious citizens could any longer regard their government as basically just. Several well known neo-conservatives jumped ship, paddling away from such talk as fast as the current and their word processors could take them. Some revealed a Hobbesianism that was there all along. And, interestingly, the places of neo-conservative defectors have been taken by some very prominent Protestant evangelicals, Charles Colson and Dr. James Dobson among them. Here, with regard to questions concerning the common good of our polity, we hope, to quote Claude Rains at the end of "Casablanca," this could be the beginning of a beautiful friendship. ✠

Schall on Belloc

by James Schall, S.J.

On Endurance and Fortitude

In his essay, "On Fortitude," in the Penguin edition of his *Selected Essays* (J.B. Morton, Editor, 1958, pp. 215-218), Belloc tells of the unusual cathedral of Perigueux, its massive, sheer stone. But it was not the Cathedral itself that he wrote of here. It was something, years later, that he recalled. He had once seen something in the Cathedral that struck him. He still remembers his being moved by what he saw, something that seems so incidental, so insignificant in itself, that he is surprised to remember it. He wondered a bit about how we could suddenly find ourselves meditating on some odd incident of our life, something that apparently made no visible difference, yet it kept coming back.

Indeed, Belloc took some time to reflect on how chance things can often change our lives. It is a beautiful passage:

It has been remarked by some men from the beginning of time that chance connections may determine thought: a chance tune heard in unexpected surroundings, a chance sentence not addressed perhaps to oneself and having no connection with the circumstances around, the chance sight of an unexpected building appearing around the corner of a road, the chance glance of an eye that will never meet our eyes again—any one of these things may establish a whole train of contemplation which takes root and inhabits the mind forever.

We have no doubt that each of these items — the tune, the sentence, the building, the glance — were incidents in Belloc's life, things he never quite forgot.

The chance event that remained to inhabit his mind "forever," of which he writes here, took place in the very massive and strangely cupola-ed, almost

Byzantine or Moorish Cathedral in this city in southwestern France, in the Department of Perigord. On the right side of the northern transept of this Cathedral — he does not explain how he happened to be there — there is a bare, gigantic arch with a mosaic of an elephant under which was found the word “Fortitude.” The elephant was immense too, like the stones of the Cathedral. The elephant, like the huge stones, seemed the perfect symbol of virtue.

Fortitude is found there enshrined in a Christian church because “it is one of the great virtues.” What does fortitude imply? It implies “endurance: that character that we need most in the dark business of life.” Belloc reminds us that sometimes, often perhaps, “the business of life” is “dark,” unpleasant, dire. Terrible things sometimes have to be faced, have to be borne with.

Several words cluster about this notion of fortitude — which itself means patient courage, not just courage, but patient courage. Courage itself indicates the habit by which we rule our fears and pains so that we can reach our end. This is Aristotle and Aquinas. Courage is necessarily at the basis of all the other virtues because it is directed to life itself, to existence and its preservation. But it has the connotation of life standing up for something. Courage is the opposite of cowardice. The courageous man endures; the coward gives up. If the courageous man dies, the principle for which he dies remains. The coward stands only for himself, for an existence that means nothing but itself.

Bravery adds to courage a certain daring, a boldness in the face of a threat to life or honor. Valor means the continuous presence of bravery, the lofty quality of being brave not just once but over time in the face of many hardships and dangers. But, as St. Thomas said, the primary act of courage is not to attack but to endure, even to suffer. This does not mean that courage is a kind of silly pacifism. It means that courage of the martyr, as Joseph Pieper pointed out, the one who endures what can no longer be avoided, endures in what he affirms.

Fortitude, Belloc remarked, must be not just endurance but “creative endurance.” It involves some memory of a better time and some hope of its return. Belloc, we know, was a military man in his youth. He

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loved to follow the lines of battle, to reflect on the course of the war in every place of combat. He understood that with no fortitude, there would be no civilization. “The thing, Fortitude, is the opposite of aggressive, flamboyant courage, yet it is the greater of the two, though often it lacks action. Fortitude wears armor and holds a sword, but it stands ready rather than thrusts itself forward.” The phrase “lacks action” said of fortitude needs reflection. Belloc’s passage is at first sight a version of “if you want peace, prepare for war.” It also contains a sense of

caution, a restraint on any untoward eagerness to “thrust forward.” It contains the experience of mankind. If it uses the sword, it does so reluctantly, knowing what is at stake.

Belloc then spent a page in recounting the effects of this enduring fortitude during the dark and middle ages, when it looked as if all was lost for Christendom. In the ninth and tenth centuries, with enemies on its south, east and north, Europe should not have survived. But it did largely because of the elephant of Perigueux, because of fortitude. “The West rose up again in glory, having been saved by Fortitude.”

At the very end of the 20th century, it seems almost eccentric to attribute anything to a virtue, to a virtue whose act is to rule our fears and our pains. Belloc did not write of arms or of strategy, he wrote of a virtue. “Fortitude does not envisage new things, rather does it tenaciously preserve things known and tried.” Thus fortitude implies that there are things worth preserving. Without this later sense, there can be no proper fortitude, no endurance, no resistance. Fortitude for its own sake is in fact a vice. Fortitude is for a reason, for a purpose, for the highest reason and purpose of all, the reason of why we exist and what is true, of what has been handed down to us that is worth our keeping. “A whole train of contemplation that takes root and inhabits the mind forever” of such is the elephant of the Perigueux Cathedral. ✠

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Can a University Be Fully Catholic and Fully American?

by K.D. Whitehead

I.

The short answer to the question in my title is: Yes, very definitely. We shall be examining how and why. But one of the singular things about today's academic and university climate generally is how widely it is believed and, indeed, largely taken for granted, that in our society today the answer to this question cannot be anything but: No.

It is almost universally recognized and understood today, for example, that many, perhaps most, of today's 230-odd Catholic colleges and universities currently operating in the United States are no longer "Catholic" in the sense in which that term was understood, say, in 1960. Following Vatican Council II, which was supposed to have changed everything, perhaps even the meaning of the word "Catholic" itself; and, especially, following the famous Land O'Lakes statement issued by 26 leaders of Catholic higher education in 1967, in effect declaring their independence from the Church—following these two watershed events, most Catholic institutions of higher education proceeded to secularize in a rather precipitous, if not actually heedless and reckless, fashion: crucifixes came down from classroom walls; compulsory, or even sometimes merely recommended, religion, theology and philosophy courses were dropped; Mass or other religious observances on campus were de-emphasized or sometimes no longer regularly offered.

Institutions hastened to secularize and laicize their boards or other governing bodies. Some representatives of religious orders suddenly seemed almost ashamed of being in the Catholic education business at all. Faculty members, it was proudly announced, were henceforth to be selected solely in accordance with what were described as academic qualifications, without regard to religious profession. Sometimes it almost seemed as if non-Catholics were *preferred* for faculty or board positions. Professional-

ization, as it was often styled, was the *novus ordo seclorum*.

Very little of this was necessary or even desirable. Some institutions seemed to eschew the very idea that they represented any particular tradition such as the Catholic tradition (or that, "representing" it really required them to *do* anything in particular!). Similarly, the venerable idea that as educators they stood *in loco parentis vis-à-vis* their students was actually deemed embarrassing for institutions now finally "come of age." Indeed, the idea that universities had anything at all to say about either personal behavior or personal advocacy, whether on the part of students or of faculty, tended to disappear from sight (until it re-appeared with a vengeance with the advent of political correctness and speech codes).

In short, what came about pretty generally on Catholic campuses in a very short time was that most of the leaders of Catholic higher education institutions began to operate these institutions in accordance with the modern American secular model of a university. Suddenly, many if not most Catholic academics and educators were reciting the mantra that the modern American secular model of a university was the *only* legitimate model of a university today.

The Catholic Church, of course, had originally created the institution of the university in the first place, just as John Henry Cardinal Newman in the 19th century had given classic expression to its salient characteristics in his *The Idea of a University*. Nevertheless, this traditional idea of the Catholic university became almost entirely effaced in the United States in the course of the 1960s. It happened almost without the benefit of any argument or discussion: one day institutions that had been Catholic seemed to be solidly there; the next day they were gone, virtually indistinguishable in most important respects from the secular colleges around them.

Moreover, little if any protest against this amazing and unprecedented transformation was heard from Catholic academics, students, alumni, trustees, parents, or bishops. If they understood what was happening, and the implications of it, few of them showed very many signs of any such understanding at the time. "This is how things have to be today," it was said—and mindlessly repeated.

Of course the whole thing was further complicated by the fact that few, or none, of the newly secularized Catholic colleges stopped calling themselves "Catholic"; few or none of them dropped their memberships

in the Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities (ACCU) or the Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities (AJCU)—although the very names of these associations too should have become problematical, considering the transformed character of the institutions belonging to them. Nor were these secularized institutions loath to continue recruiting students or raising money within the Catholic community, while perhaps still describing themselves as “within the tradition” of the Catholic Church or of a particular religious order. And, in fact, some pockets of genuine Catholic observance or practice did remain on most campuses. Some professors and, occasionally, whole departments, continued to adhere to an authentic Catholic profession in spite of the secularization all around them. Churches and chapels on campuses continued to remind observers of the institution’s Catholic origins, whatever its present status. Ironically, following the secularization of practically everything else, these pockets of Catholic observance or practice were often pointed to as “proof” that the institution was “still” Catholic.

This is more or less the situation that exists today. With the exception of the new, “orthodox” colleges which have been started in recent years, along with probably no more than a handful of the traditional institutions which have retained or restored an authentic Catholic character, the majority of the member institutions of the ACCU and AJCU today seem to be largely secularized institutions and proud of it.

Moreover, large numbers of their faculty, administrators and trustees—and perhaps also of their students and parents—evidently see nothing terribly wrong with this state of affairs, at least if we are to judge by the apparent acceptance still enjoyed by these institutions within the Catholic community. Average Catholics evidently believe that Catholic higher education institutions are *supposed* to be secularized today the way these institutions are. What other models do they have? But they are wrong. On the Feast of the Assumption, 1990, Pope John Paul II issued his Apostolic Constitution *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* on the subject of the Catholic university, and, once again, we have a full-blown authoritative affirmation not only of the possibility of such an entity as a modern Catholic university; we also have an ample description, impossible to misunder-

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stand, of precisely what is entailed in being a Catholic university today. Vatican II did *not* change the meaning of the word “Catholic” as far as universities are concerned; Land O’Lakes does *not* constitute the last word on the modern Catholic university.

It does not lie within the province of this paper to expound the excellent features of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*; this is quite capably being done by other speakers at this conference. The main point to be made here in the context of our present topic, namely, whether a college or university can be fully Catholic and fully American at one and the same time, is this: we do not have to debate what an authentically Catholic university *is*: for *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* now lays it all out for us.

The answer to the question of whether or not an institution is Catholic, therefore, or to what degree an institution may or may not be Catholic, can easily be found today by reference to this apostolic constitution of Pope John Paul II. No one can any longer pretend that we do not know what a Catholic university is supposed to be.

Similarly, there can no longer be any question or debate about what a college or university would have to do to *restore* its Catholic character, or, as some people have taken to saying today, to regain its “Catholic identity.” To restore its Catholic character such an institution would have to be brought into compliance with the provisions of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*.

II.

In the late 1960s and the early 1970s when most Catholic colleges and universities were principally engaged in transforming themselves into rather pale imitations of their secular counterparts, what were the reasons generally given as to *why* they no longer should be, or could be, Catholic?

Actually, the reasons why they were resorting to what was, after all, a rather drastic and far-reaching transformation of their own basic character and identity, were few, very general, and vague. They were transforming themselves mostly, it seemed, because that had become the thing to do; everybody was suddenly just doing it. The need for professionalization was often

cited. Catholic higher education institutions could no longer be like seminaries or parochial schools, it was said; they now had to be independent, full-fledged, up-to-date entities on a par with their secular counterparts. Allegedly, this is what Vatican II had called for, although nothing resembling a call for such secularization can be found either in the Council's Declaration on Christian Education *Gravissimum Educationis*, or in any of the other fifteen documents issued by the Council. The Land O'Lakes statement surely reflected what the new institutional consensus was becoming when it asserted that:

The Catholic university today must be a university in the modern sense of the word, with a strong commitment to and concern for academic excellence. To perform its teaching and research functions effectively, the Catholic university must have a true autonomy and academic freedom in the face of authority of whatever kind, lay or clerical, external to the academic community itself. To say this is simply to assert that *institutional autonomy* and *academic freedom* are essential conditions of life and growth and indeed of survival for Catholic universities as for all universities [emphasis added].¹

Thus, in the beginning, the issues of alleged government requirements or constraints, of the possible loss of accreditation or of federal or state aid, or of exposure to possible lawsuits, were *not* the primary reasons advanced for transforming and secularizing our formerly Catholic colleges and universities. Later, these reasons would be brought to the fore and cited, retrospectively, as the reasons why Catholic colleges and universities somehow *had* to secularize.

But this was not true then and it is not true now. Catholic colleges did *not* "have to" secularize. The leaders of Catholic higher education seem to have secularized essentially because they wanted to secularize; they remain secularized today essentially because they want to remain secularized. Catholic colleges were never under any serious or substantial constraints to secularize, nor do any such real constraints prevent them from adopting and implementing *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* now—as we shall see.

It is important for us to remember this capital fact as we go on to de-mythologize the issues of possible loss of accreditation or eligibility for

government aid or possible exposure to lawsuits: none of these prospects ever posed any major threat to Catholic institutions, and do not pose any major threat now. What we may call the Catholic higher education establishment nevertheless proved absolutely determined to render unto Caesar things Caesar was not even asking for.

While it is true that the issue of state aid to higher education did arise in a few instances such as New York state's "Bundy Money," which became available to institutions willing to secularize around the same time that most of them were secularizing anyway, this simply hastened and encouraged a trend that was already well underway nearly everywhere anyway. In any case, the amounts of state aid involved were almost laughable when considered as the price of repudiating one's Catholic identity: the biblical Esau got a far better deal on his mess of pottage when selling his birthright to Jacob!

Once the secularizing trend was firmly, and, it was thought, irreversibly, in motion, the secularizers on Catholic campuses then began to cast about for justifying reasons or pretexts for the actions they had been taking, actions which often signaled nothing less than a practical abandonment of their Catholic heritage. It was in this way that the myth arose that the accreditation and eligibility of Catholic institutions for government aid could have been at risk if they had attempted to go on being Catholic instead of rushing to secularize as they did. This myth rapidly became the conventional wisdom. By 1985, no less a personage than the then president of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) himself, Bishop James W. Malone of Youngstown, Ohio, commenting on an earlier Roman

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draft of what became *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*—a draft which envisaged, as does ECE itself, the full implementation of the canons pertaining to Catholic universities in the new 1983 Code of Canon Law—was giving full public credence to this myth.

Thus, Bishop Malone was quoted in *Newsweek* magazine as declaring at that time that the U.S. bishops were simply unable to enforce the Church's Canon Law pertaining to universities in this country. Such enforcement, Bishop Malone told *Newsweek*, would "constitute

outside interference with the autonomy of the university, its trustees, and its faculty...It would create enormous church-state problems in this country and jeopardize the half billion dollars that Catholic universities and their students now receive in the form of government grants and loans."²

In the same *Newsweek* article, Fr. James H. Provost, the executive coordinator of the Canon Law Society of America, was similarly quoted as saying: "If the bishops were to implement these rules [the Canons pertaining to universities], it could kill Catholic education in this country. States and agencies might yank the accreditation of any school which allowed any outsider to determine who is competent to teach."³

Thus, by 1985, both the head of the NCCB, and the principal spokesman on the subject of Canon Law in the United States, were already informing national audiences that the Church's universal law pertaining to universities could not be enforced in the United States. So far had the myth progressed that secular-style "institutional autonomy" and "academic freedom" were the only operative principles in U.S. higher education, and that Catholic institutions could lose their accreditation and eligibility for government aid if they attempted to conform to the Church's requirements of what a Catholic university is!

But these Church leaders and spokesmen were badly misinformed; they seemed unaware that American universities regularly accede to the requirements of entities "external" to the university: state, federal, and local governments, accrediting agencies, professional associations in all academic and professional fields, such as law, medicine, engineering, scientific societies, and the like. This is *normal* for American universities. Only when the Church is the "external" agency, it seems, does the question of outside "interference" suddenly arise and tongues begin to wag gravely about the harm the Church might do to the educational enterprise. Furthermore, such statements by Church leaders and spokesmen rarely or never betray any hint that perhaps institutions wanting to be Catholic, or calling themselves Catholic, might themselves have some responsibility on their own to comply with the universal law of the Church concerning universities. This is not just a matter of "outside interference" by the bishops; it is a matter of the school's own integrity as a would-be Catholic institution. (In any case, the last thing the Catholic bishops of America have ever seemed disposed to do, ever since the whole issue of universities

declaring their independence from the Church arose back in the 'sixties, would be to "interfere.")

A decade after he first informed the nation via *Newsweek* that the Catholic bishops could never enforce the Canon Law of the Church where American-style universities were concerned, the same Bishop James W. Malone, now retired, revealed to the NCCB annual meeting that, even prior to the promulgation of the 1983 Code of Canon Law, a delegation of U.S. bishops that included Cardinal Krol and the future Cardinal Bernardin had already gone to the pope himself seeking to exempt the United States from the then proposed norms of the new Code requiring that universities calling themselves Catholic actually *be* Catholic.⁴

Of course the 1983 Code of Canon Law did not, when issued, exempt the United States from the Church's universal law concerning universities, any more than *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* would exclude the United States from its Norms when it was issued in 1990. These Canons and these Norms still await implementation today.

Nevertheless, the myth that these Norms cannot be applied on these shores has persisted, and persists. In April, 1986, responding to an earlier draft of what became *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, the ACCU actually sent to the Congregation for Catholic Education in Rome a document drawn up with the collaboration of the presidents of 110 of its member schools in which Rome was informed that "Catholic institutions...must meet the standards for accreditation by regional accrediting agencies recognized by civil authorities...It is virtually *certain*," this ACCU document claimed (emphasis added), "that [government] aid would be withdrawn" if it could ever be shown that Catholic colleges and universities were "controlled by the Catholic Church."⁵

In June, 1986, the Catholic Theological Society of America (CTSA) drew up a statement in connection with the disciplining of Fr. Charles E. Curran, then a dissenting professor of theology at the Catholic University of America (CUA); this CTSA statement warned that the carrying through of the disciplining of Fr. Curran would be seen as a serious breach of church-state separation and risked suspension of government aid for Catholic schools.⁶

In November 1986, Fr. Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C., longtime president of the University of Notre Dame—and held by some to have been the most influential of the Land O'Lakes Catholic college presidents—told the *New York Times* that: "We would stand to lose

a lot of government assistance if we conformed to the dictates of the Church. Parochial schools cannot get government assistance because they are an arm of the Church. Notre Dame and other Catholic universities can get assistance because we are free and autonomous."⁷ Earlier Father Hesburgh had written in *America* magazine that "institutional autonomy is essential to federal support."⁸

The first time I read these two statements of Father Hesburgh's, I was a deputy assistant secretary in the U.S. Department of Education, responsible among other things (including a number of federal aid programs for higher education) for the Secretary of Education's national higher education accreditation standards. Before very long I would be promoted to be the assistant secretary for postsecondary education in charge of all federal aid to higher education in the United States. My immediate reaction to the assertions of Father Hesburgh was to write and publish in *America* magazine an article pointing out that Father Hesburgh's assertions were simply mistaken.⁹ Like the other Catholic leaders we have quoted here on the subject of federal aid and Catholic colleges, Father Hesburgh was evidently badly misinformed.

My article apparently brought down the wrath of the Catholic higher education establishment on the hapless editor of *America*; no doubt he had been thinking of the prestige of printing something by a high U.S. Government official, but he had apparently little reckoned about how Catholic academics and educators would react to an authoritative public refutation of their claims that they had to secularize in order not to lose government aid. A representative of the AJCU visited me in my office to remonstrate with me. A representative of the ACCU went straight to Secretary Bennett about me; the Secretary simply turned over to me for appropriate action the list of my alleged errors given to him by the ACCU. This list later became the basis of my book, *Catholic Colleges and Federal Funding*, in which, covering some of the same ground I am reviewing today, I in effect refuted point by point the ACCU case.¹⁰

One of the things I learned from this whole exercise, however, was that getting the truth out about something does not necessarily change the way people go on thinking about it; ingrained prejudices are hard to dislodge at the best of times, but in this case the Catholic higher education establishment desperately needed a justification for the secularization it had embarked on so rashly, and was not about to admit the falsity of its

claims that government aid was tied to secularization. When *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* came out in 1990, the immediate reaction from the Catholic higher education establishment was actually rather muted and not too markedly unfavorable. For one thing, the document was much more general and much less prescriptive than earlier drafts against which so many Catholic colleges and universities had protested vigorously; in this perspective, some of them initially thought that they might even be able to live with ECE.

Fr. William J. Byron, S.J., then president of the Catholic University of America, called it a "welcome call to renewal."¹¹ The Rev. Edward J. Malloy, president of the University of Notre Dame, described it as a "far superior formulation to earlier drafts."¹²

These relatively favorable initial statements concerning Pope John Paul II's new apostolic constitution apparently did not mean, however, that any of the major Catholic colleges or universities were seriously prepared to implement the document. And, in fact, this has not happened to this day. The AJCU, for its part, almost immediately upon receipt of the document commissioned a Washington law firm to prepare a legal opinion on the civil implications for Catholic higher education institutions of implementing the papal document. In this legal opinion, all the elements of the already established mythology about how Catholic colleges could no longer be Catholic were revived. For what must have been a sizeable legal fee, since Washington law firms do not come cheap, the AJCU was told that institutions honestly adopting and implementing *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* would find themselves at serious risk in three principal ways. I quote the summary of these three ways from an evaluation of this AJCU-commissioned legal opinion made by Dean Bernard Dobranski of the Catholic University of America Law School: *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*'s implementation "would jeopardize the universities' eligibility for federal and state funding on the theory that adherence to *Ex Corde* indicated that the university had crossed the 'non-sectarian line' and that federal and state funding of that institution was an unconstitutional establishment of religion."

"To the extent that *Ex Corde* can be said to limit academic freedom and institutional autonomy, its implementation threatens a loss of accreditation, and that loss of accreditation would, in turn, jeopardize the universities' eligibility for certain types of federal funding such as student financial assistance."

"*Ex Corde* inevitably would lead to litigation;

litigation brought about by professors, students and other university employees who are dismissed or otherwise disciplined for reasons which can be traced to *Ex Corde*.¹³

These three supposedly deleterious consequences that would ensue for a school implementing *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* represent perhaps a classic statement of the false mythology we have been discussing here. It is a pity the AJCU had to pay a law firm to say exactly what everybody was determined to believe anyway (maybe that is *why* a law firm had to be paid to say it!). However that may be, in the remainder of this paper, let us briefly examine the truth of all three of these statements. The true answers to the questions raised by these statements should serve to convince us that, contrary to what they assert, a university can be both fully Catholic and fully American without suffering any undue penalties.

III.

Jeopardizing Government Aid to Higher Education? Would the government aid currently received by Catholic colleges and universities really be placed in jeopardy by their adoption and implementation of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*? In replying to this question, we should recall that over 93 percent of all federal aid to higher education, as well as a considerable portion of state aid, comes in the form of student financial assistance—loans, grants and work-study stipends. Since the original G.I. Bill of Rights passed by Congress after World War II, this type of government aid—by far the greater portion of all government aid to higher education—has gone directly to students, regardless of the type of institution in which they were enrolled, whether religiously affiliated or not.

At any rate, the theory of student financial assistance holds that this aid goes directly to the student, even if it is administered by the school. *Since* it goes directly to the student, the question of the so-called “sectarian” status or lack of it of the institution the student is attending does not even arise. Thus, those Supreme Court decisions beginning in the 1940s severely limiting public aid to religiously affiliated schools

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at the level of primary or secondary education have never really applied to higher education. What we have had with student financial assistance in higher education since the 1940s is, in effect, a *voucher system* where the aid to the student can be used in a private, and, yes, a religiously affiliated institution.

Everybody knows, for example, that thousands upon thousands of veterans attended schools such as Fordham, Georgetown, Holy Cross, and Notre Dame on the G.I. Bill of Rights, with no questions ever having been raised with regard

to the “sectarian” status of these schools. Students attending these same schools today take advantage of federal student financial assistance. There has never been any serious suggestion that this type of aid was in jeopardy as a result of the religious affiliation of any of these schools.

Moreover, the Supreme Court has quite recently specifically upheld the constitutionality of this kind of aid. In January 1986, in *Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind*, all nine justices agreed unanimously that a Washington state program for the handicapped could not deny student aid to a handicapped student studying to be a Christian minister because, in the words of the decision of the court, “any aid provided under Washington’s program that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients.”¹⁴

More recently, in 1993, in *Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District*, the Supreme Court decided that “when the government offers a neutral service on the premise of a sectarian school as part of a general program that ‘is in no way skewed towards religion’ . . . provision of the service does not violate the Establishment Clause.”¹⁵

Thus, it is not true, as some Catholic educators and associations have continued to maintain, that the greater part of the government aid enjoyed by Catholic colleges and universities has ever been in jeopardy as a result of their Catholic character or affiliation. There are, it is true, some relatively small grant and fellowship programs, both federal and state, which specifically deny aid for “sectarian” purposes, as this term is cur-

rently understood by the courts. But even here Catholic colleges and universities, since their main purpose is higher education generally, have not been considered “pervasively sectarian,” and hence they too have qualified for most of this kind of aid most of the time, as things now stand. For example, a Catholic college could normally qualify for a federal construction grant for a new physics building (though not, obviously, for a new chapel!).

It does, of course, remain true that no government aid can be given in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment—again as the courts interpret what “establishing religion” means. This whole area is currently governed by a series of Supreme Court decisions dating from the 1970s into which we cannot enter in any detail here. Generally these cases concern questions of whether laws providing aid to education have 1) a primarily *secular purpose*; 2) whether they have the primary effect of *advancing religion*; and 3) whether they entail an *excessive entanglement* with religion—as one of the cases, the 1971 case *Lemon v. Kurtzman* has defined the church-state issues involved in government aid to higher education.¹⁶

However, as Dean Bernard Dobranski has pointed out in an excellent analysis of these Establishment Clause cases, it is up to Congress or the state legislatures to enact laws with primarily secular purposes; schools do not decide what a law’s purpose is. Similarly, “excessive entanglement,” if any, is again procedural, since the Supreme Court normally assumes that institutions will comply with the stated statutory purposes of laws. The whole issue accordingly boils down, according to Dean Dobranski, to the question of whether or not a school is “pervasively sectarian” with the primary purpose of “advancing religion.”

In his analysis, Dean Dobranski surveyed in the light of the Norms of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* a number of issues such as academic freedom, hiring a majority Catholic faculty, and Church or episcopal intervention in school governance; he concluded that schools fully implementing ECE would *not* thereby be judged as “pervasively sectarian,” as this term is currently understood by the courts. Thus, again, this kind of institutional government aid would not be jeopardized.¹⁷

We need to contrast this conclusion with what the ACCU told Rome in 1986 with regard to this same type of institutional government aid, namely, that it was *certain* that it would be withdrawn if Catholic colleges ever attempted to be Catholic in the United States.¹⁸

In any case, where government money going to higher education is concerned, whether or not such aid can be jeopardized by religious affiliation is not the only, or perhaps even the principal, question for an institution that is serious about its religious affiliation. For the larger question of whether an independent institution can take any government aid at all and still remain independent remains a very open question today. Over a decade ago, Grove City College in Pennsylvania learned that the federal government can dictate school policy under the rubric of enforcing civil rights legislation even if the institution accepts no direct government aid; all that was necessary was that some of its students were accepting government aid, and, *ergo*, the federal government was suddenly able to get into the act.

More recently, we have seen the Citadel and the Virginia Military Institute obliged by the courts to abandon distinctive traditions of single-sex, military-type education in order to comply with current ideas of civil rights; the fact that such decisions are made in the name of civil rights does not change the element of coercion that is only too evident in these cases. Who knows what new “civil right” institutions accepting aid will next be obliged to honor under the threat of coercion by means of the government’s powers of enforcement?

In other words, the real danger for Catholic or other religiously affiliated colleges is not that the government aid they are currently receiving might somehow be placed in jeopardy; the real danger is that they might increasingly lose their very independence—and hence any Catholic character they might have wished to maintain—to the coercive power of the government enforcing “civil rights.” The current Catholic higher education establishment appears to discern no danger in such government-enforced “civil rights,” even though they are often at variance with tenets of the Catholic faith: we have had more

...Government aid to education should in fact be voluntarily renounced if there is any danger of compromising religious principles.

than a whiff of coercion already, for example, where so-called "abortion rights" or "gay rights" are concerned. These questions are much more serious than the question of government aid to education; government aid to education should in fact be voluntarily renounced if there is any danger of compromising religious principles.

This, of course, is precisely what it *means* to be a Catholic school: religion may not be the be-all and end-all of education as such; but religious truth as expounded by the Magisterium of the Church does have to come first if there is any conflict. Educational leaders unwilling to accept this logic should not be allowed to go on calling themselves Catholic or pretending to be Catholic.

Sadly, though, the current Catholic education establishment sometimes seems to be more attuned to our decadent secular culture's judgments in such matters than to the teachings of the Church. However, the Catholic community in America cannot allow the current Catholic higher education establishment to jeopardize the First Amendment rights of all of us by its indifference to the encroachments of increasing government coercion in the name of so-called civil rights.

Loss of Accreditation (and Hence Eligibility for Federal Funding)? With regard to this second supposed threat to Catholic colleges attempting to implement *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, namely, possible loss of accreditation and hence of eligibility for federal funding, as identified for the AJCU by the Washington law firm it hired, we find even less reason for alarm on this specific issue than with regard to the general question of government aid. In order to be eligible for federal aid, a higher education institution must simply be accredited by an accrediting agency "recognized" by the Secretary of Education.¹⁹

However, as everyone knows, the American system of private accreditation of higher education institutions has long recognized, accepted, and accredited religiously affiliated colleges and universities. Even though accrediting agencies do require higher education institutions to have "institutional autonomy" and "academic freedom," these terms so dear to the Land O'Lakes mentality are not considered absolute; whatever appropriate modification of them that might be required for religiously affiliated schools has historically been readily accepted by the accrediting agencies. In any case, *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* itself recognizes and affirms

the need for institutional autonomy and academic freedom (although "within the confines of truth and the common good," as specified in ECE Part I, Para. 29). Even the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), in its Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, explicitly recognizes "limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution," provided only that these "be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment [of faculty members]."²⁰

Thus, the full implementation of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* would *not* jeopardize the accreditation of any Catholic college or university. Even if it did, as I pointed out long ago, both in my *America* article and in my book *Catholic Colleges and Federal Funding*, Catholic higher education institutions are free at any time to establish their own accrediting agency, within our basic American system of private, voluntary accreditation: Any groups or classes of schools—for example, the 230-odd group of Catholic colleges and universities in the United States—are entirely free to organize their own accrediting agency, just as barber colleges and cosmetology or chiropractic schools have their own accrediting agencies. If Catholic colleges and universities were thus simply to establish their own accrediting agency, it is hard to imagine on what grounds the Secretary of Education would fail to "recognize" its accreditation of schools for purposes of federal aid, provided it maintained the educational standards expected of accrediting agencies.²¹

The independent American Academy of Liberal Education (AALE), an organization devoted to high quality traditional liberal arts education in our present age of political correctness has recently done precisely this; it has established its own criteria for the accreditation of liberal arts curricula—and the Secretary of Education has not failed to "recognize" the AALE as a valid accrediting agency for liberal arts colleges.²²

But even with regard to accreditation, as we saw earlier with government aid generally, whether or not a school gets accredited so as to be able to be eligible to receive government aid is not the only, or even the principal, question. In our present era of political correctness, what is more to be feared is whether forces attuned to the secular culture will increasingly attempt to use accrediting agencies or the accreditation process to force religiously affiliated schools to comply with the demands of reigning current ideologies. Thus, a few years back, most of us will remember how the Middle

States Association of Colleges and Schools attempted to force a religiously affiliated institution to name women to its board of directors in the name of "diversity."

Similarly, in the name of diversity, the Western Association of Schools and Colleges (WASC) tried a few years back to impose some monolithic, non-academic standards which would have precisely threatened real diversity, most particularly curricula such as "Great Books" programs now thought by some to emphasize too heavily the works of "dead white males." In this particular case, the efforts of the accrediting agency were effectively countered primarily through the efforts of a small Catholic college—as it happens, an *authentic* Catholic college, Thomas Aquinas College in Santa Paula, California, an institution which was already operating in the spirit of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* before that document had even been issued.

TAC was instrumental in defeating the efforts of WASC primarily by pointing out to other schools how the accrediting agency's encroachments could compromise or destroy the independence of *any* college or university; in this particular battle, this small Catholic liberal arts college was able to enlist on its side even such Behemoth institutions as the University of California at Berkeley and Stanford University; these huge institutions saw *their* independence threatened by the accrediting agency's attempted encroachments. TAC similarly played a leadership role in countering a national effort mounted by the American Council on Education (ACE) to try to impose new, politically correct accrediting standards on American institutions.²³

We should take careful note here of the fact that, with all the expressed concern of the Land O'Lakes colleges about "institutional autonomy," it was not one of these colleges that led the fight against one of today's *real* threats against the autonomy of higher education institutions. Rather it was a small unabashedly Catholic "Great Books" college which led this particular fight, a college which, not incidentally, unreservedly accepts *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* as well.

Vulnerability to Litigation? This was the third and last of the three bad consequences which a Washington law firm advised the AJCU would follow upon the implementation of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* by a Catholic college or university. We must grant that the threat of litigation would constitute no small thing for a Catholic college or university struggling to make ends meet

as things stand. Even if few, or none, of these lawsuits was ever likely to be successful, given the existing laws and precedents which govern higher education, the harassment factor inherent in such litigation would nevertheless still have to count heavily in the calculations of university officials contemplating any possible action against rebels or dissenters on their campuses. To have to defend oneself even against a lawsuit which has no chance of success already constitutes a major project, given the present state of our laws and courts in our already far too litigious society.

But then one of the things that could always be done by a real ACCU, as opposed to the ersatz one we have now, would be to lend support to any Catholic college that ever did find itself hauled into court for upholding Catholic principles. Surely some 230-odd Catholic colleges, if they were really Catholic, could easily provide collective help to any individual member in their ranks that might get sued for being Catholic. However, the alleged threat that any college really might be sued for anything related to the implementation of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* has surely been greatly exaggerated. For one thing, institutions only have to state up front in such documents as their mission statements and faculty handbooks that they intend to abide by the Norms of the papal document and then to draw up their contracts with faculty members and employees accordingly.

For another thing, any institution determined to maintain a serious religious character still does enjoy, at least for the moment, special protection under the First Amendment. Currently, First Amendment rights trump even civil rights legislation under which institutions might otherwise be sued for "discrimination." Once again it is Dean Bernard Dobranski of the Catholic University of America law school who has collected a number of recent court decisions protecting the rights of religious institutions to operate in accordance with their religious commitments—for example, adherence to *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*.²⁴ The thrust of these recent court decisions is that it is quite unlikely that any institution would be penalized for adhering to the papal Norms in its operation and governance.

What is really rather surprising, though, is that the high-priced Washington law firm hired by the AJCU could have taken the threat of lawsuits so seriously *after* the judgment that was handed down in 1989 the case of *Curran v. the Catholic University of America*. Before dissenting theologian Fr. Charles E. Curran took CUA

to court as a result of his dismissal from his position as a tenured professor of theology, he and his friends had assumed as a matter of course that they would surely prevail in American courts on the academic freedom issue. After all, "freedom" of whatever kind is practically the only thing that is any longer very seriously worshipped in the Godless America of today. As a tenured professor, Father Curran told a press conference prior to filing his lawsuit: "I have a legally binding contract. The question is, can an external authority break that contract?... Obviously, it's a lawyer's dream," he concluded.²⁵

Father Curran certainly showed no hesitation in putting his trust in princes; he appealed to Caesar, and it was Caesar who let him down. For the result of his failed lawsuit against the Catholic University of America was far different from what many had anticipated, and should provide encouragement to those schools that would like to see an end to today's widespread tenured "dissent" on Catholic campuses. The judge in the Curran case based his decision primarily on what any contract with an entity such as CUA would reasonably entail. "No one," the judge wrote in his verdict, "least of all a Catholic priest and a professor of Catholic theology could have contracted with CUA without understanding the university's special relationship with the Roman Catholic Church, with all the implications and relationships flowing from that relationship... [Father Curran] could not reasonably have expected that the university would defy a definitive judgment of the Holy See... Thus, the judge added, "the university did not breach its contract with Professor Curran by requiring him... to agree to be bound by the declaration of the Holy See..."²⁶

We have here a perhaps not untypical (non-Catholic) modern American judge: *he* could not see how CUA could "defy a definitive judgment of the Holy See." Perhaps he and his like would no more be able to see how Catholic higher education institutions could possibly "defy" the "definitive judgment of the Holy See" as set forth in *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, either. So far from the secular courts penalizing Catholic institutions for being faithful to their profession of faith, then, the likelihood still seems to be that this fidelity would be honored by them.

So what does the decision in a case such as the Curran case really mean? It means, at least for the moment, that the Catholic higher education establishment has been plain wrong, embarrassingly wrong,

about the supposed inability of a university to be both fully American and fully Catholic at one and the same time.

In the midst of the current culture war in which we are engaged, there certainly are many dangers out there threatening religious people and religious institutions. No doubt we will be engaged in trying to ward off these dangers for some time to come, perhaps during our own lifetimes. However, the dangers that are out there manifestly do *not* include the things that Catholic academics and educators have typically been trying to tell both our bishops and Rome about over approximately the past quarter of a century. There are *no* substantial legal or cultural obstacles in the way of any higher education institution being fully Catholic in the United States today. We should not forget this the next time someone from the Catholic higher education establishment attempts to explain to us why *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* cannot be implemented in the United States. ✠

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NOTES

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15. 113 S.Ct. 2462 (1993).
16. *Lemon v. Kurtzman*, 430 US 602, 612-613 (1971).
17. Dobranski, loc. cit., Note #13 supra.
18. Note #5 supra.
19. See the U.S. Department of Education document published periodically and entitled *Nationally Recognized Accrediting Agencies and Associations*.
20. Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, adopted in 1940 (and never modified since) by the American Association of University Professors, 1012 Fourteenth Street, NW, Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20005.
21. Whitehead, loc. cit., Note #9 supra.
22. Bulletin for the American Academy for Liberal Education, Winter 1995.
23. See Thomas E. Dillon, "Coming After U: Why Colleges Should Fear the Accrediting Cartel." *Policy Review*, Spring 1995.
24. Dobranski, loc. cit., Note #13 supra, pp. 116-122.
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With Jealousy and Dismay: Protestant Reflections on the Catholic Intellectual Tradition

by Scott H. Moore

The first thing I should say is that I am a Protestant. More than that, I'm pleased to be one and frankly couldn't imagine being otherwise. (I thought I ought to get that out up front, because in what follows, some readers might have cause to pause.) The following reflections are the result of just two brief months of Protestant observation on the Notre Dame campus. I am at Notre Dame through the gracious invitation of the Center for Philosophy of Religion which has given me an appointment as a Visiting Fellow in philosophy. I teach in the philosophy department at Baylor University in Waco, Texas.

More than anything else, I have been struck by the depth and vitality of the intellectual tradition which Catholicism has, or is, for that matter. To be perfectly honest, I'm green with envy. You do realize what you've got here, don't you? Jacques Maritain, Josef Pieper, Yves Simon, Etienne Gilson, so many more. In their reflection on scripture, truth, and the common good, these luminaries provide a light in which to read and to make sense of things in our confused and chaotic world. We need intellectual role models, and we need an environment which encourages us to take the

intellectual dimensions of our faith seriously. The Catholic intellectual tradition performs precisely this function with remarkable clarity.

I will not here address the age-old question of whether our intellectual role models should help us identify WHAT to think (though surely that is sometimes the case—any authority worth her salt will do that some of the time), but it does seem to me that our intellectual role models should help us identify what we should think ABOUT and HOW we should go about the business of thinking. In short, we need role models who will help us think Christianly.

There's a contemporary Country-Western song in which the singer confesses, "Yes, I admit, I've got a thinkin' problem. . . ." His "thinkin' problem" is that he's love-sick, but the "thinkin' problem" of so many Christians in late modernity is that we've assumed that authenticity implies autonomy. As a result, we mislead ourselves about how to think about the things that are most important. We mislead ourselves because we assume that the leaders of generations past have no grasp of the scandal of our particularity. The Catholic intellectual tradition stands as a corrector to this modernist impulse. The Catholic intellectual tradition assists the faithful with the task of identifying what counts as success in "this common mortal life." I confront this Catholic tradition with jealousy.

Why jealousy? Because traditions make coherent thinking, valuing, and acting possible, and because my tradition has largely rejected tradition. Of course, just because an intellectual tradition is present doesn't ensure that coherent thinking and such will follow, but the absence of such a tradition is a recipe for incoherence and unreasonableness. Lots of silly folks still seem to think that one only becomes "reasonable" by

throwing off tradition and whatever ties that bind you to your past, but reasonableness has really very little to do with liberation. To be reasonable just means “to make sense” given some context or intellectual tradition. Neither rationality nor authenticity is the product of autonomy.

Here one encounters a powerful intellectual tradition of discourse which informs the life of faith and guides the pursuit of faithful flourishing. What are “traditions of discourse,” and what is “faithful flourishing”? Traditions of discourse are the ways of using language and of thinking and speaking which are special to a particular group, and almost always these ways of thinking have developed over time. When we say that something “makes sense” to us, it is usually because the language which expresses the idea employs certain concepts which we “understand.” Understanding means having the right sorts of “preconceptions” so that we can “make sense” out of whatever new thing we encounter.

“Faithful flourishing” is merely the intentional pursuit of the good which God intends for God’s people. Faithful flourishing includes learning how to make sense of the world around us. We only begin to get a handle on what that flourishing is through the living and thinking and loving and giving which we experience within the Christian community, that is, within the Church. We don’t pursue faithful flourishing by getting in touch with our inner child, by choosing joy, or by asserting our “right” to be happy. One can only begin to flourish faithfully by thinking (and acting) Christianly. This doesn’t come naturally, and no self-help book will do the trick. These are all the illusions of autonomy. To flourish faithfully, we need that sorry bunch of so-and-so’s, living and dead, who are the Church, and we need its very particular tradition of thinking and conversation.

On our own, we’re prone to make all kinds of mistakes about what counts as success. Even when we get it right, by ourselves, we’ve no reliable way for knowing that we’ve gotten it right. Flourishing ceases to be that process by which we become what we were designed to be and becomes instead a series of fitful starts of trial and error. Tradition helps us make sense out of what counts as flourishing and what is merely delusion.

We Protestants do not do a poor job of “making sense” out of our encounters because we lack an intellectual tradition. That’s not it at all. For about 1500

years, we can claim pretty much the same resources as Catholics. Even after that, there is no shortage of great Protestant thinkers to inspire, encourage, and correct the faithful. We have a wonderful tradition, and some Protestant denominations do better than others at utilizing that tradition. For so many of us, however, our problem is just that we don’t pay attention to that tradition. We have become so infatuated with autonomy and individualism that we have lost our connectedness, and we have assumed that just by being smart we will cultivate the capacity to make sense of all the goofiness that surrounds our lives. This is the delusion of modernity. just being smart is no guarantee for success.

I mention this inattention to the intellectual tradition because I see lots of smart Roman Catholics who, in the midst of their “protesting” this or that about the Catholic Church, have also unfortunately mistaken autonomy for authenticity. It is for this reason that I also confront this Catholic intellectual tradition with a sense of dismay. To be specific, I am dismayed by the many Catholics I encounter who are ashamed of their tradition or who want to abandon it. In their quest for enlightened authenticity, they have rejected the very bright lights which have illumined so much for so many of us, even those of us from afar.

I’m a baseball fan, and during the recent World Series, I read a lot of Chicago newspaper articles about how the Chicago Cubs traded away their star pitcher Greg Maddux to the Atlanta Braves. Most Cubbies just shake their heads in dismay over what they let get away. The lesson for all of us is that we should be careful about quick-fixes and expedient solutions designed to solve short-term problems. You have an extraordinary intellectual heritage, one which has served your tradition—and mine—quite well. Don’t abandon one of the secrets of your success. ✠



The Domino Theory Revisited

by Sr. Renee Mirkes, O.S.F.

Introduction

In this brief essay, I hope to realize two objectives: to be provocative and to be informative. First, to be provocative, i.e., I hope to provoke or suggest to you a fresh way of thinking about human life issues. Toward that end, I will discuss, in the first section of my presentation, the domino theory and how it can be applied to the moral revolution that has changed the way many in our society look at human sexuality, human life, and the family. Second, I hope to be informative, i.e., I hope to tell you something about the PPVI Institute and its pro-life work that perhaps you did not know before. Toward this end, I will explain, in the second segment of my presentation, how the work of the Institute—particularly its positive leadership in family planning and Catholic reproductive health services—helps to provide an antidote to the destructive fallout from the moral upheaval that is everywhere in evidence today.

1. The First Objective: To Be Provocative

On June 5, 1989, with a mixture of incredulous joy, quiet weeping, and a sense of renewed hope, people all around the globe, particularly in Western Europe, were riveted to television and radio reports describing the victory of the Solidarity movement of Poland and the eventual election of a president, Lech Welesa. At the time, I recall reading an editorial which predicted that this development in Poland would be the “first domino” that would trigger a series of similar political revolutions throughout the Eastern block. By appeal to the domino theory, the prediction was that one by one the remaining Eastern block countries—East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and even the Soviet Union—would eventually follow Poland’s lead in the democratization of what were former totalitarian states. The domino

theory proved to be an apt analogy in predicting the outcome of consequent political events.

[Now, for those who might need a quick review of the definition of this concept, the domino theory says that, if one act or event is allowed to take place, a series of similar acts or events will follow. The theory is based on the fact that if dominoes are stood on end one slightly behind the other, a small push on the first domino will topple the others.]

But I want to focus on the domino theory not in regard to the political/social revolutions of Eastern Europe—I only used that as an example to introduce the concept. I want to “revisit” the domino theory, to concentrate on it in reference to the moral revolution that has, since the 1960s, gripped our Western world. Similarly, I want to direct your attention not to the first domino of that political revolution, but, rather, to the first domino or the initial moral posture that triggered the moral upheaval of our times which has profoundly altered our views about sexuality, human life, and marriage and the family.

I will argue that contraception as a way of family planning—i.e., the separation of sex from procreation within marital intercourse—was the first behavior that triggered other morally destructive kinds of activity, all of which constitute what I think can appropriately be described as the moral revolution of our century. So, if you would ask: What got us into this mess? or What began the breakdown of our moral infrastructure?, I would respond that of the long line of behaviors that comprises the moral revolution—abortion, pornography, homosexual activity, prostitution, incest, single-parent families, higher divorce rate—the social acceptance of contraception is the first domino that has triggered the rest. And I am suggesting that, if we intend to stem the demoralization of our society, we need to analyze how we might right this first wrong, how we might reverse society’s ready acceptance and promotion of the contraceptive mentality. In short, if we are serious about making a difference in pro-life work, we need to take another long, hard look at the practice of contraception and sterilization as a method of family planning. We cannot afford to be like Nero, that is, to be caught fiddling while Rome burns. We cannot afford to take a laissez-faire attitude amidst the grim reality that engulfs us. Therefore, we need to analyze why, in and of themselves, these practices are contrary to the basic good of marital fulfillment and also how and why the social acceptance of contrac-

tion and sterilization sanction, and, therefore, lead to other morally deficient kinds of sexual behavior, behavior that in terms of moral sickness plunges us as a culture into a downward spiral that in many respects is irreversible.

I justify my thesis with the following supportive argument. Once we decided that it is OK to contracept as a means of regulating the size of our families, i.e., once we agreed that it is morally upright to separate the life dimension from the love dimension of marital sexual intercourse, or, if you will, once we no longer said that one of the purposes of marital sex ought to be procreation, we, in effect, said that we no longer recognized the inherent moral goodness of procreation within marriage. And having said this, we implied that the sex act is an exclusively biological function and that its physiological effect, human conception, should be able to be suppressed at will in order to produce a state of infertility for whatever length of time a couple would decide. But to agree that contraception, or its permanent form, sterilization, is morally acceptable or at least morally neutral behavior, we must see that we haven't got a leg to stand on when it comes to objecting to other kinds of sexual behaviors such as same sex marriages, lesbian parenting, incest, masturbation, child prostitution, oral and anal sex, or even bestiality. Each of these sexual behaviors is an example of sex separated from procreation. Each is a type of sexual activity that is, by its nature, incapable of begetting life and therefore constitutes sex that is permanently separated from procreation. But if we are going to be consistent, we must admit that if sex-closed-to-life in the case of contraceptive intercourse is acceptable, other forms of "lifeless sex" ought also to be sanctioned. And, be assured, this line of argument is never lost on advocates of these kinds of activities. Proponents of every kind of sexual license can and do logically point to the fact that the moral precedent for the social acceptance of their pet type of sexual behavior is society's prior approval of contraception. Listen to the perfect rationale behind this statement of Rev. Richard Kirker, General Secretary of the Gay Christian Movement in England: ". . . the roles of ordained minister and practicing homosexual are quite consistent since this logically

But if we are going to be consistent, we must admit that if sex-closed-to-life in the case of contraceptive intercourse is acceptable, other forms of "lifeless sex" ought also to be sanctioned.

flowed from the Anglican Church's radical alteration of its teaching as to the purpose of the sexual act through its changed teaching on contraception at the 1930 Lambeth Conference."¹

And contraception is not only limited to being the catalyst for other kinds of aberrant sexual behavior. It is also linked with the two "bookends" of life issues, namely, abortion and euthanasia. As evolutionary anthropologist Lionel Tiger put it in his commentary in the July 1st issue of *U.S. News and World Report*:

"I think the introduction of widespread contraception use in the 1960s caused a [this] revolutionary break between men and women. It put biological disputes at the center of our national life—women's rights, abortion, out-of-wedlock births, the turmoil among African-American men and the rise of angry white men. I do not think anyone is to blame here in the sense that they planned a raid on civil society and got away with it. As it happens frequently, technology (contraception, in this case) has generated an unexpected result: more abortions, more single parent families, more men abandoning their role of being good providers and a higher divorce rate."²

John Paul II argues that contraception and abortion, though acts involving different degrees of evil, are fruits of the same tree; contraception is the gateway to abortion.³ Supreme Justice William O. Douglas, one of the strongest advocates of abortion, was not ignorant of the connection between it and contraception. He viewed abortion as an extension of contraception. In fact, for Justice Douglas, *Roe v. Wade* was nothing more than an extension of his 1965 opinion in *Griswold v. Connecticut* which struck down a Connecticut law that limited the use of artificial contraception.⁴ And since abortion is an extension of contraception, and euthanasia is an extension of abortion, then, euthanasia is also, logically, an extension of contraception. I will return to this point momentarily.

In her 1993 novel, *The Children of Men*,⁵ authoress P. D. James is "chillingly convincing" in her thesis that if the temporary infertility we choose through contraception would ever evolve into a permanent, universal infertility, the world that would open up before us would look just like ours, only it would be even more

sexually crass, even more morally jaded, even more inhospitable to human life. With the story set in Britain in 2021 AD, Miss James systematically demonstrates the connection between temporary sterility-now-turned-permanent sterility to every other kind of social evil, including the denigration of human life, the suppression of the authentic meanings of human sexuality, and the disintegration of marriage and the family. Once life in its transmission is not respected or can no longer be honored, every other stage of life is threatened and every other purpose of human sexual expression is polluted.

In his diary accounts, the main fictional character of *The Children of Men*, Oxford historian, Dr. Theodore Faron, offers his opinion about the origin or the "first domino" of the disease of universal infertility. As Theodore Faron reflects back 25 years, P. D. James describes him entering the following into his diary:

Much of this I can trace to the early 1990s: the search for alternative medicine, the perfumed oils, the massage, the stroking and anointing, the crystal-holding, the non-penetrative sex. Pornography and sexual violence on film, on television, in books, in life, had increased and become more explicit but less and less in the West we made love and bred children. It seemed at the time a welcome development in a world grossly polluted by over-population. As a historian I see it as the beginning of the end.⁶

Several points cry out for our attention here. Through the thoughts of her main character, James is implying that our 20th century liberal view of contraception or birth control not only manages to suppress or deny the beauty of procreation but in the process of sex becoming lifeless, it also becomes loveless and even pleasureless. In another place, Theo Faron writes that in the face of the permanent separation of childbirth from sex, "Sex can still be a mutual comfort; it is seldom a mutual ecstasy. The government-sponsored porn shops, the increasingly explicit literature, all the devices to stimulate desire—none has worked. Men and women still marry, although less frequently, with less ceremony and often with the same sex.... Sex totally divorced from procreation has become almost meaninglessly acrobatic."⁷

Through all of this, the implications of James's underlying hypothesis shouts out at the reader: 'Do we, as a society want to continue to think that the choice to be infertile through birth control is a benign state, a neutral choice, even an enlightened choice, or are we

going to wake up and take a more critical look at what originally was hailed, among other things, as a panacea for our marital and overpopulation problems?'

Without losing a beat, P. D. James hastens to demonstrate that a society with zero population growth is a society that inevitably becomes top-heavy with the aged. From an utilitarian stance, the British elderly of 2021 A.D. represented a drain on resources, both societal and familial, as they proved to make little contribution by way of productive output. In Britain, in 2021 AD, James argues that the solution to this contraception-induced difficulty was termed "The Quietus," the systematic murder of the old, the sick, and the senile. Recall that a moment ago I described euthanasia as an extension of contraception. P. D. James capitalizes on that connection. Another character in her book describes the Quietus and the attempts by government officials to make this option of suicide appear to be a freely-willed, pleasant choice on the part of the elderly. Commenting to Theo, the character states,

You've heard of the Quietus, I suppose, the mass suicide of the old? ... I remembered one picture, I think the only one ever shown on the television: white-clad, elderly beings wheeled or helped into the low barge-like ship, the high, reedy singing voices, the boat slowly pulling away into twilight, a seductively peaceful scene, cunningly shot and lit.⁸

Remorselessly methodical, P. D. James holds a very powerful mirror up to every wrinkle and wart of our society in its downward moral trend and captures for us, in almost sickening detail, what we could very well look like in 25 years as a culture—or perhaps what we already look like. And the only hope for the world of 2021 A.D. is surely also one of the greatest hopes of the world of 1996 A.D.: the birth of a child, the fruit of a loving act of sex that is open to life. In a scene reminiscent of the nativity of Christ, the author of *The Children of Men* pictures government officials and common persons coming to look at and pay their homage to what turned out to be the savior of the universe of 2021 AD. Only the birth of a baby could reverse Theo Faron's prediction that birth control or elective infertility was, indeed, the beginning of the end. This one child, whose birth was the climax of James's novel, was the last glimmer of hope, indeed, a savior for that dying civilization.

James's underlying hypothesis ought to hold our imaginations captive. What if the infertility that we freely elect through contraception would become a

universal disease, an imposed curse, not something we choose, but a phenomenon we are condemned to learn to live with? Would we want the kind of world—lifeless, loveless, pleasureless—that follows from procreation permanently separated from sex on a universal scale? If not, why would we ever freely elect infertility or deliberately render our fertile acts of sex sterile, and deliberately bring the same effects into our world on the heels of that choice? As an ancient Chinese proverb counsels: “Unless we change direction, we’re likely to end up where we’re headed.” Should we not want, after all, to seriously consider taking another direction, choosing some other option to the regulation of birth, an option that is true, good, and beautiful, an option that enhances our humanity precisely because it reflects God’s plan for human procreation?

II. The Second Objective: To Be Informative

Now I am pleased to share with you how the services of the Pope Paul VI Institute provide a humane solution to family planning, a morally acceptable alternative to the destructive effects of the first domino of contraception and sterilization, and an antidote to its moral fallout that adversely affects human sexuality, family, and life issues.

The Natural Family Planning Center of the Pope Paul VI Institute is all about reconnecting love and life in the context of marital union. In an attempt to undo what contraception and sterilization promote, namely, separating love-making from baby-making and all the moral fallout therefrom, the Pope Paul VI Institute is committed to developing and teaching a moral model of family planning, the Creighton Model of NFP. It is dedicated to providing couples with an effective and morally acceptable method of family planning, a method that will assure that the integrity of their sexual union will never devalue procreation by deliberately suppressing it with the pill or some barrier method.

The National Reproductive Health Center of the Pope Paul VI Institute is dedicated to gynecological and reproductive health services which are truly Catholic in perspective. In welcome contrast to most gynecological services which treat fertility as a disease by prescribing harsh chemicals that suppress or even destroy fertility, the medical services of the Institute

treat fertility as a condition of normal physiology. Conversely, the problem of infertility is not treated by artificial technologies which separate baby-making or the life dimension from love-making or the love dimension of marital union. The Pope Paul VI Institute provides infertility services—medical, surgical and allied health energies—which cooperate with rather than suppress the woman’s natural procreative mechanisms and functions. Through a system of charting which identifies the woman’s menstrual and ovulation cycles, these services are not only effective in identifying the gynecological abnormality that might be causing the infertility, but also are effective in correcting the dysfunction.

The educational arm of the Pope Paul VI Institute has developed various training programs aimed at a team approach to family planning involving the couple, the physician, the NFP instructor, and the parish priest or minister. First, these programs train natural family planning teachers to be extremely knowledgeable in helping couples with every sort of regular and irregular fertility cycles and in every stage of a woman’s reproductive life, including pregnancy, breast-feeding, and menopause. Second, these programs train physicians to be medical consultants in NFP. Medical consultants are able to interpret certain patterns in a woman’s charting of her menstrual cycles which help them in the identification and treatment of gynecological abnormalities such as PMS, endometriosis, ovarian cysts, ovarian dysfunction, ectopic pregnancy, miscarriage, and hormone imbalance. Finally, the educational arm of the Institute trains clergy to become knowledgeable about the Creighton Model of NFP particularly in its psychological and spiritual dimensions so that they can provide the counseling and encouragement that husbands and wives need in order to persevere in conforming their procreative plans to God’s plan for marriage and the family.

The Center for NaProEthics, the ethics center of the Pope Paul VI Institute which I have the privilege of directing, first, dedicates its efforts to developing a position on the ethical aspects of family planning and human procreation that is consistent with the moral teaching of the church. Second, it promotes in its various publications the wisdom of the Roman Catholic moral tradition amongst educational leaders in the family, school, diocese and healthcare settings. And third, the ethics center offers consultation services for anyone who requests moral direction based on church teaching in the areas of family planning and reproductive medicine.

In short, the Pope Paul VI Institute is all about correcting the first wrong, the first domino, of the moral earthquake that has unseated the Judeo-Christian moral foundations of Western culture. In so doing, it is coming to terms in a very direct way with just about every other aberration associated with sexuality, with family, and with human life. ✠

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Right or Wrong?

by Charles E. Rice

*reprinted from The Observer
Sept. 26, 1996*

With respect to the University's denial of recognition to GLND/SMC and its creation of Notre Dame Lesbian and Gay Students, Vice-President O'Hara merits appreciation for her effort to make the most of a difficult situation. On its merits, however, the University's position is a non-starter.

In her open letter last April 2nd, Vice-President O'Hara emphasized that the University found GLND/SMC's position "regarding the range of ways in which gays and lesbians might live out their orientation to be inconsistent with official Church teaching. "Homosexual acts, however, are not wrong because "official Church teaching" forbids them. Rather, the Church forbids them because they are wrong. "Basing itself on Sacred Scripture, which presents homosexual acts as acts of grave depravity, tradition has always declared that 'homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered.' They are contrary to the natural law. They close the sexual act to the gift of life. They do not proceed from a genuine affection and sexual complementarity. Under no circumstances can they be approved." Catechism of the Catholic Church, No. 2357. Of course, the fact that a homosexual act is objectively contrary to the natural law does not warrant any opinion as to the subjective culpability of the person performing that act.

The University claims only that homosexual acts are contrary to "official Church teaching." It does not affirm, and inferentially denies or regards as irrelevant,

NOTES:

1. H. P. Dunn "Unexpected Sequelae of Contraception," *Linacre Quarterly*, February, 1996, p. 59.
2. Lionel Tiger, *US News & World Report*, 1 July 1996, p. 57.
3. John Paul II, *Evangelium Vitae*, #13.
4. Douglas W. Kmiec "The genesis of the 'right' to abortion," *Our Sunday Visitor*, June 30, 1996, pp. 6-7.
5. P. D. James, *The Children of Men* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1993).
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

the realities that the acts are intrinsically wrong in themselves and that the inclination toward those acts is itself a disorder. Since the acts are wrong in themselves as contrary to the natural law, how could the inclination to those acts be anything but a disorder? On the other hand, if the inclination to the acts is not a disorder, as the University implies, why may it not be acted upon?

The disordered character of the inclination was addressed by Cardinal George Basil Hume of Westminster, England, in his March 6, 1995, statement:

"The particular orientation or inclination of the homosexual person is not a moral failing. An inclination is not a sin. . . . Being a homosexual person is, then, neither morally good nor morally bad; it is homosexual genital acts that are morally wrong. . . . [W]hen the church speaks of the inclination to homosexuality as being 'an objective disorder,' the church can be thinking only of the inclination toward homosexual genital acts. The church does not consider the whole personality and character of the individual to be thereby disordered. . . . Nevertheless, it is a fundamental human right of every person, irrespective of sexual orientation, to be treated by individuals and by society with dignity, respect and fairness."

The University's refusal to recognize a student-run homosexual group is, of course, a form of discrimination. However, while the Catechism rejects "unjust discrimination" it does not change the reality that some discrimination against homosexuals is justified. For example, Pope John Paul denounced in 1994 the European Parliament's approval of homosexual marriage and the adoption of children by homosexual couples, as an "attempt. . . to tell the inhabitants of this continent that moral evil, deviation, a kind of slavery, is the way to liberation, thus distorting the true meaning of the family."

On June 25, 1992, John Paul approved the final

text of the Catechism. One month later, on July 23rd, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith made public a "background resource" paper which, while not "an official and public instruction," made the pertinent point that: "Sexual orientation" does not constitute a quality comparable to race, ethnic background, etc., in respect to non-discrimination. Unlike these, homosexual orientation is an objective disorder." As Cardinal Hume put it in 1995, "The church does have a duty to oppose discrimination in all circumstances where a person's sexual orientation or activity cannot reasonably be regarded as relevant. . . . These are matters of practical judgment and assessment of social consequences. . . . [I]t may well be . . . that Catholics will reach diverse conclusions about particular legislative proposals."

Subject to the imperative to respect the dignity of homosexuals as persons, and to treat them with "respect, compassion and sensitivity," a prudential judgment must be made as to what discrimination is fair in light of the common good.

It could be fair and desirable for the University to approve a student-run group of homosexual students premised on the realities of natural law and Church teaching in their entirety. Similarly, it could be legitimate to have student-run groups of alcoholics, bulimics, or compulsive shoplifters premised on the reality that their inclination toward those acts is disordered. However, the nature of the group as founded on such a shared disorder would justify increased supervision by the University. The purpose of authorizing a student group, say, of alcoholics, is not so that they can celebrate their condition but so that they can confront it and cure it or control it. So it is with homosexuals. Vice-President O'Hara's decision not to recognize an independent, and unpredictable, student homosexual group was appropriate and just.

The University's position, however, is incomplete and misleading. Of course, it would be Politically Incorrect for the University to affirm that homosexual acts are intrinsically wrong and to affirm that the inclination to those acts is itself a disorder. But the University's persistent omission of these affirmations invites interpretation as a denial of those realities.

The homosexual culture undermines the family and is harmful to the common good. But students might reasonably infer from the University's position that the homosexual culture is a legitimate alternative, differentiated mainly by the arbitrary imposition, by "official

Church teaching," of a ban on homosexual genital expression. This inference is strengthened by the fact that the University singles out homosexuals for intense and formal solicitude beyond that accorded the perhaps not insignificant number of students afflicted with other disordered inclinations. "[A]t Freshman Orientation," stated Vice-President O'Hara in her Open Letter, "I include. . . a . . . reference to harassment based on sexual orientation. Moreover, this year I prefaced my remarks on harassment based on sexual orientation with words of welcome and support to our gay and lesbian students. I will continue to do this in future years. " Perhaps Vice-President O'Hara could also include "words of welcome and support" to "our students with inclinations toward excessive drinking, fornication, drug dealing, arson, shoplifting," and other illicit acts. It might restore some balance—and it surely would impress the tuition-paying parents.

The University's intellectually and morally flawed position disserves all its students including homosexuals. The first step in formulating a coherent University policy on this issue is simple: Tell the students the truth. All of it. ✕

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Jean Ferrier or the Third Confessor

by Rev. Brian Van Hove, S.J.

After the appearance of Franciscus Annatus in the *Fellowship Newsletter* (April 1995), someone asked me who the Third Jesuit Confessor was. If Charles Paulin was the first when Louis XIV was a child, and if Jacques Dinet can hardly be counted as the second, and if Francois Annat served for 16 years, who followed him? Who was the Third Confessor or, as we might say today, the Office Manager for Religious Affairs stationed in Versailles—when the monarchy was not on the road visiting other towns?

Not enough people recognize the name of Jean Ferrier. He was actually a protégé of Annat's. Annat and Ferrier were from the Comtat de Rodez in the region of the Rouergue which bordered on the États de Languedoc, a little north, but was not technically part of it. However, it was still part of the Jesuit Province of Toulouse. Ferrier was from nearly the same native place as Annat, and was born in the village of Valady or Valadi in the modern Département of Aveyron. Annat was from neighboring Estaing. The coincidence of their both coming from the same region, if not the same village, is striking. They both had the same mother tongue which was Occitan. Perhaps they spoke to each other in the patois, even though the Rule generally required conversation to be in Latin.

Though they would not have known each other as contemporaries in school (they both attended the Jesuit Collège in Rodez), there is every reason to assume Annat was Ferrier's teacher in theology in Toulouse around the time of the 1645 affair of the *Scientia Media* with Antoine Réginald, O.P. Annat's book was censured by the University of Toulouse, with Réginald leading the charge. The older, established universities at this time had a severe rivalry with the newer Jesuit institutions. Ferrier would have known about the incident, since all of Toulouse did, and Annat would have had the assurance of the orthodoxy of Ferrier's theology since he taught him personally.

Kinship of the land may have strengthened his personal reasons, but there is no doubt Annat trusted

Ferrier and, insofar as Jesuits might have done such things, "promoted his career." The ways of patronage were well known at Court and in Rome, though perhaps our century would call it "personalism." You supported those you knew well and trusted. At least the outer appearance of it is that Annat made the personal recommendations that facilitated the advancement of Jean Ferrier. He was Annat's replacement more than once, both in the Society of Jesus and in the favor of Louis XIV. He followed in the footsteps of Annat in Toulouse inasmuch as he likewise became Rector of the Collège, professor of theology, and finally Royal Confessor when Annat retired.

Jean Ferrier was born January 20, 1614, and entered the Society of Jesus April 22, 1632. He was professed in 1648. That made him 24 years younger than Annat.

Both of these men were from the south of France. By comparison with the rest of France, this area had a large Protestant population and, among the Catholics, a number of bishops and clergy with a heavy Jansenist sympathy and spirituality. Everybody was a reformer—Protestants, Jansenists, and Jesuits—when issues of salvation were taken seriously to a degree unimaginable for us today.

Ferrier would have taught the Doctrine of the Society as directed by the *Ratio Studiorum*. The *cursum theologicum* was a fixed one. Not many traces are left of Ferrier's work, but we do know he publicly defended theses in theology, on the subject of probabilism, on June 8 and 11, 1659. The advance printed texts have been found in Rome, and perhaps a wider search would turn up more. Ferrier also had a polemical duel in 1662 with the same Antoine Réginald, O.P., over the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception [in those days there were "conceptionists" and "anti-conceptionists"] seventeen years after Annat had clashed with Réginald over Annat's book.

Jansenism was labeled the "new heresy" by the Jesuits and their allies. But a project of accommodation or reconciliation was initiated in 1663. That winter five conferences were held which had attracted world attention. Bishop Gilbert Choiseul of Comminges was the official moderator. Ferrier represented the Jesuits and, if you will, the Antijansenists. Dr. Noel de La Lane and Dr. Claude Girard of the Sorbonne represented the Disciples of St. Augustine, as they liked to be called. The discussions, both public and private, took place in the residence of the Marquis de Liancourt in Paris. This project ended in failure since both sides

accused each other of bad faith. But it is also possible that Annat who was the Royal Confessor, was not about to concede an inch to the Jansenists, and that he had instructed Ferrier how to direct the discussions. Later, Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694) and Godefroy Hermant (1617-1690) would review these conferences negatively, from the Jansenist perspective, as did Charles-Auguste Saint-Beuve in the 19th century.

Ferrier seems to have been Annat's hand-picked successor as Royal Confessor in 1669. Perhaps the Jesuits had other candidates in mind, but not everyone was equally acceptable to the monarchy. Ferrier was already firmly in place as Royal Confessor when Annat died on June 14, 1670, having served a type of apprenticeship. A letter in the Archivum Romanum Societatis Jesus Gal 71, f. 199r and f. 199v, records Ferrier's acceptance of being relieved of the administration of the Collège in Toulouse (dated April 22, 1669) in order to move to Paris to prepare for the transition.

One reason we don't have a more lasting memory of Ferrier is because he died after only a little more than four years in office, in 1674 at the age of 60. There is no evidence he changed any of Annat's policies, though he was perceived as more polished and urbane personally, and in the way he went about his Antijansenism. After all, the Jansenists were some of the most sophisticated people in the country, and included close blood relatives of the Royal Family. The Jansenists also enjoyed a certain reputation for holiness, and had their history not been written by their foes, that image might have come down to us.

Père Ferrier wrote to Father General Gian Paolo Oliva from Paris to announce the death of Annat, and in the letter he professes their friendship. The original letter is in the ARSI, Gal. 71, I, f. 200r and f. 200v and is dated June 24, 1670, the very day Annat died. In this same collection, Gal 71, there are 10 letters of Ferrier to Oliva, written between 1669 and 1673. Oliva received them in Rome, and the letters have been kept in good condition.

In the case of Jean Ferrier, we might speculate that his most important work was done in Toulouse before he became Royal Confessor. He was an early organizer of the "Aa" or young men's confraternity there. Perhaps we might call it the Sodality. This type of apostolate was very widespread and successful throughout France. His participation as the "expert" in the Conferences of 1663 has been more noted by the enemies of the Jesuits than has been their attention given to his role at Court. His premature death was not just unexpected, but it cut short his work, and made possible the appearance on the scene of the Fourth, and perhaps most glorious Confessor, Francois de la Chaize.

La Chaize is the only one who has a subway stop in Paris named after him today. It is called "Père Lachaise." ❖

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LETTER

Suggestions for the *Quarterly*

by Noel J. Fitzpatrick, Dublin

1. If the name, address, e-mail address, phone and fax numbers of authors were given in the *Quarterly*, readers could contact them and help to generate a deeper fellowship. At times I have agreed (and sometimes disagreed) strongly with authors and wanted to contact them.
2. Some of the articles are very long. Perhaps shorter articles

would be helpful. However, it would be most helpful if all articles were preceded by an abstract or summary.

3. If e-mail addresses and postal addresses of members were available, fellowship would be helped, especially for non-US members.
4. If the *Quarterly* were on the Internet, fellowship would be helped. I would be pleased to help in this regard. Then within our global village distances would not be a problem and again overseas members could participate more fully in the fellowship.

Catholic Social Scientists Urge Bishops to Implement *Ex corde Ecclesiae*

Official Statement from Society of Catholic Social Scientists
November 11, 1996

STEBENVILLE, OHIO—A recent statement issued by the Society of Catholic Social Scientists; (SCSS) to the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) urges the bishops to ensure that U.S. Catholic colleges and universities live up to an authentic Catholic character.

The SCSS statement responded to an invitation by the NCCB to groups interested in Catholic higher education to submit recommendations on how to apply the norms of *Ex corde Ecclesiae*, Pope John Paul II's Apostolic Constitution of 1990 on Catholic universities. The American bishops are meeting November 11-14, 1996, and will vote on an "Application to the United States" of *Ex corde Ecclesiae*.

Calling universities that foster dissent "a positive embarrassment," the SCSS statement noted the increasingly secularized atmosphere of many Catholic campuses, and exhorted the bishops to ensure that campuses provide "a vibrant spiritual life built on a foundation of orthodoxy, which fully complements and deepens their intellectual life and respects the liturgical norms of the Church."

The SCSS statement said further that bishops should "not hesitate to intervene to require of university authorities the immediate dismissal of any faculty members who publicly dissent from Church teaching."

Founded in 1992, the over 250-member SCSS is composed of American and Canadian scholars, professors, teachers and others whose academic or professional disciplines touch upon social or public concerns. For more

information, contact president, Stephen Krason, Professor of Political Science at Franciscan University of Steubenville at 1-614-283-6416. ✠

Statement of the Society of Catholic Social Scientists

The U.S. Bishops regarding the Proposed Document "*Ex corde Ecclesiae: An Application to the United States*"

The Society of Catholic Social Scientists is an organization of Catholic scholars, professors, teachers and practitioners in the social sciences and other disciplines concerned with social questions. Most of our members work in or have had a connection with institutions of higher education. We are very concerned about the state of Catholic higher education today, and it is in that spirit that we submit this brief statement to the U.S. Catholic hierarchy as it takes up "*Ex corde Ecclesiae: An Application to the United States.*"

There is no doubt that Catholic colleges and universities in the United States, with very few exceptions, are doing a poor job of carrying out their high mission for the Church. This situation has been developing for over 30 years now and can be seen in several problems readily apparent in these institutions: tolerating or even encouraging theological dissent; conducting of academic disciplines in a manner which does little to further the Faith and often is incompatible with it; fostering a student-life atmosphere which both undercuts good morality and the Catholic faith of the young people attending them; and, a general tendency to embrace—sometimes, in certain areas, with an almost perverse enthusiasm—the secular culture. These colleges and universities do a disservice to the Church; more, they are often a positive embarrassment to her and contribute to declining faith and in-

creased disobedience to Church teachings.

What should be the response of the U.S. bishops? In our judgment, they should exercise their full authority under canon and civil law and traditional Church practice to oversee Catholic colleges and universities. They should not hesitate to intervene to require of University authorities the immediate dismissal of any faculty members who publicly dissent from Church teaching. This intervention should be focused especially, but not exclusively, in the disciplines of theology and philosophy. We urge that bishops simply refuse to give their license to teach in the sacred sciences to any proposed new faculty members who are not both thoroughly orthodox and prepared to submit to the discipline of the Church. We urge that the bishops insist that college/university authorities implement procedures for hiring faculty members in all disciplines who uphold the teachings of the Church and will further Catholic intellectual traditions. The only pluralism that should be accepted in Catholic colleges and universities is a legitimate pluralism which accepts fully the principles of the Natural Law. The bishops should assure that non-Catholic faculty and major staff members will be the exception, not the rule, and that they will be respectful of the Catholic character of the institutions.

In line with the nature of our organization, we especially exhort the bishops to pay greater attention to the social sciences at Catholic universities and colleges. First, we urge them to work to ensure that programs in these disciplines (which are so influential in contemporary society) will accord with a Catholic world view and promote the social teaching of the Church. Second, we ask the bishops to strongly promote social science research which examines modern problems in light of Catholic social teaching.

The bishops should also insist that Catholic universities and colleges in their dioceses foster a campus life that

is consistent with Catholicism. Catholic colleges and universities must not adopt student life practices and policies which tolerate or encourage immorality or which permit the weaknesses of their students to be preyed upon so that they are easily led into immorality. Besides a good moral atmosphere, the bishops should also insist that Catholic universities and colleges foster an active and vibrant spiritual life built on a foundation of orthodoxy, which fully complements and deepens their intellectual life and respects the liturgical norms of the Church.

We further urge, in the spirit of *Ex corde Ecclesiae* that the Catholic presence at non-Catholic universities (state-controlled and private) be brought more closely in line with the authentic teaching and practice of the faith. Priests, religious and laymen who exercise the Church's teaching and pastoral office in all educational institutions should be exemplary in their fidelity to the faith because of their formative influence on future leaders.

There is a long and rich Catholic

intellectual tradition. We urge the bishops to instruct the authorities of Catholic colleges and universities about this tradition and its value, since the institutions themselves seem so much to have lost a sense of it. In line with this, we also urge the bishops to seek to persuade college/university authorities to review and institute curriculum and other program changes which will promote this tradition and be fruitful in building faith and understanding in their students and other members in their academic communities.

Many Catholic institutions of higher education claim that government and other restraints preclude their being "more Catholic" and moving in the direction outlined in this statement. Such claims are greatly exaggerated and often used to excuse a lack of will to make such changes. To the extent that government regulations, accreditation agency requirements, etc. do in fact stand as obstacles, the bishops should insist that the institutions make the changes which will

enable them to resist such pressures or break away from such ties, if necessary. Moreover, we urge the bishops, individually and collectively through their episcopal conferences, to assist them in doing this (e.g., by providing advice, heightening public concern, working for changed government regulations and legislation, and establishing Catholic accrediting agencies).

Finally, how should an individual bishop deal with a Catholic university or college which fosters dissent and loss of faith and good morals among its students and other members of its academic-community and refuses to change when he obliges it to do so? We urge that he use all possible sanctions available to him under both canon and civil law. If such recourse is limited, he should publicly rebuke the institution and firmly and repeatedly declare, that it can no longer call itself a "Catholic" institution.

Adopted by vote of the Board of Directors of the Society of Catholic Social Scientists, October 26, 1996.

REQUISANT IN PACE

Eugene Kevane

by George Kelly

Msr. Eugene Kevane, founding director of the Notre Dame Catechetical Institute in Alexandria, died Nov. 20. He was 83, and an early member of the Fellowship. He served as dean of Catholic University's School of Education during a turbulent period in the 1960s.

He was ordained to the priesthood at the North American College in Rome on Dec. 8, 1937, after having completed his theological studies at the Gregorian University. Msgr. Kevane served as chaplain in the U.S. Air Force from 1942 to 1946 in the Pacific theater.

A founding editor of the *Sioux City Globe*, he left Iowa in 1958 to

attend the Catholic University in Washington, where he was awarded both a licentiate and doctorate in philosophy. He served as dean of the School of Education from 1964 to 1968. During that time, he established a prominent faculty and updated curriculum. Msgr. Kevane was the only dean at C. U. to support the dismissal of Father Charles Curran in 1966. He did not support the faculty strike which forced the rehiring of the controversial theologian. "This position of conscience and courage eventually brought Msgr. Kevane's career at Catholic University to an end, but his stand was vindicated by the later action against Father Curran by the Holy See and the university."

In 1972, he was appointed visiting professor of catechetics at the Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas in Rome. Two years later, he was appointed professor of catechetics at

the Institute for Advanced Study of Catholic Doctrine at St. John's University in New York.

"Msgr. Kevane's contribution to the catechetical field is inestimable," said Arlington Bishop Keating in 1985 at the time of Msgr. Kevane's resignation from NDI.

Msgr. Kevane's book, *The Lord of History, Christocentrism and the Philosophy of History*, relates to the historical role of Jews and Christians. A prolific writer, his latest book, *Jesus, the Divine Teacher*, is scheduled for publication in 1996. Another book, *The Deposit of Faith*, is under consideration for publication.

He lectured widely here and in Europe, and made numerous contributions to such publications as the *Catholic Biblical Quarterly*, *Catholic Educational Review*, *Recherches Augustiniennes*, *Studia Patristica*, *L'Osservatore Romano*, *Social Justice Review*, and *Homiletic and Pastoral Review*. ☩

Justice Scalia Calls for Reform in Catholic Higher Education

Cardinal Newman Society News Release

Washington, DC—

Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia joined with several other prominent Catholic leaders and scholars at a national conference calling for the reform of Catholic higher education in the United States.

"The American landscape is strewn with colleges and universities, many of them the finest academically in the land, that were once denominational, but in principle or practice no longer are." Justice Scalia lamented before an audience of Catholic university students, faculty and alumni gathered near Washington, DC on October 19 and 20.

With foolish sectarian pride I thought that could never happen to Catholic institutions," Scalia continued. "Of course I was wrong. We started later, but we are on the same road."

Justice Scalia was the keynote speaker for the first national conference of the Cardinal Newman Society, a national organization founded in 1993 to seek the spiritual reform of Catholic colleges and universities throughout the United States. Catholic higher education has suffered numerous scandals and intellectual subversions by various factions promoting abortion, sexual promiscuity, radical feminism, liberation theology and other causes antithetical to Catholic beliefs.

Other conference speakers included Most Rev. John Dougherty, Auxiliary Bishop of Scranton; Rev. Peter Stravinskis, editor of *The Catholic Answer* magazine; Dr. James Hitchcock of St. Louis University;

Dr. Christopher Wolfe of Marquette University; Hon. Linda Chavez, director of the Center for Equal Opportunity; and Hon. Kenneth Whitehead, former Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of Education.

The conference, titled "Pope John Paul II and Catholic Higher Education," reflected on the causes of secularization at America's Catholic universities and explored ways that alumni, students and faculty can help to implement *Ex corde Ecclesiae*, the Holy Father's 1990 Apostolic Constitution on Catholic Universities.

"Prior to the conference, I predicted that Catholic historians would one day consider this conference to be the turning point for Catholic higher education in America," said Mo Fung, executive director of the Cardinal Newman Society. "I have no doubt of it now. The conference was a tremendous success for all who were involved.

Justice Scalia echoed the sentiments of each of the speakers in asserting that Catholic universities, if they are to retain their religious identity, must boldly challenge the relativism and secularism of modern society rather than drifting with the tide.

"In such a society there assuredly is such a thing as a university which is Catholic, because of the moral environment in which its work is conducted — an environment that sternly disapproves what the Church teaches, and in most cases what traditional Christianity has always taught, to be sinful." Scalia said.

"Part of the task of a Catholic university, at least at the undergraduate level, must be precisely moral formation." Scalia said. "Catholic universities cannot avoid that task, and indeed betray the expectations of tuition-paying, Catholic parents if they shirk it."

Bishop John Dougherty decried the efforts of Catholic colleges and universities to pander to the worldly concerns of students, such as anxieties about careers and material wealth, rather than students' greater spiritual needs.

"The tension in the Catholic university is not between faith and reason, but between body and soul," Bishop Dougherty said. "Truth belongs to the realm of the soul."

"Should we be surprised that when universities become skilled in teaching students to earn money, their religious heritage becomes less visible?"

Bishop Dougherty called upon his fellow bishops to turn their attention to the spiritual needs of Catholic colleges and universities and to forge "partnerships" with scholars in support of the most urgent needs of each diocese, including evangelization, religious instruction and research.

Linda Chavez, a regular columnist in *USA Today* and a noted television commentator, related the problems at Catholic colleges and universities to the greater social problems of American culture.

"Moral relativism is now taken for granted as the orthodoxy of American society, and infects virtually every institution and every group within our society." Chavez said. "The Church, I do not believe, is immune from that effect."

Chavez called upon Catholic universities to embrace their distinctive moral tradition rather than hide from it.

"Catholic universities have a special mission with respect to forming character, with respect to reaching morality, with respect to accepting an understanding of the Catholic Church's whole doctrine of truth." Chavez said. "I don't think that's incompatible with forming first-quality minds as well. In fact, I would say in order to have a first-rate mind, that the idea of forming good moral character is not only compatible with that but perhaps is an essential element of it."

Explaining the reasons for the secularization of the Catholic university, which began with the social turmoil of the 1960s, Dr. James Hitchcock rejected any notion that university administrators intended the current outcome. Had Catholic university presidents known the results of

their actions, "every single one of them would have turned away in horror. They would have said that is not what we want."

Dr. Hitchcock documented the efforts of Catholic educators, most notably through their "Land of Lakes Statement" in 1967, to proclaim their independence from Church authority in order to earn the respect of the secular academic community. The result was a gradual loss of Catholic identity and respect for the Magisterium and teachings of the Church.

"What the leaders of Catholic higher education did was to systematically remove all sorts of controls that had existed previously and then simply let things tumble on and be swept along as best they could with no plan, no foresight," Hitchcock said.

Kenneth Whitehead, however, argued that "the leaders of Catholic universities seem to have secularized essentially because they wanted to secularize. They remain secularized today because they want to remain secularized."

At the very least, Whitehead argued, the common reasons given for the secularization of the Catholic university — alleged government constraints, restrictions on federal or state aid, or the avoidance of possible lawsuits — are not true obstacles to the preservation of a strong Catholic identity. Whitehead, a former education official under the Reagan Administration, has written extensively on the ability of Catholic universities to be openly religious without any substantial restraint by the federal or state governments.

"Catholic colleges were never under any serious or substantial constraints to secularize, nor do any real constraints prevent them from adopting and implementing *Ex corde Ecclesiae*," Whitehead said. "What we may call the Catholic higher education establishment nevertheless proved absolutely determined to render unto Caesar things Caesar was not even asking for."

Fr. Peter Stravinskas, who recently completed his doctorate in Marian theology, called upon Catholic educators to return theology, "Queen of the sciences," to a central place in the university. Theology, he argued, is necessary to inform and enlighten all that is taught in every discipline.

"As worthwhile as the insights of philosophy, or sociology, or psychology might be, they must always be properly related to the Ultimate," Father Stravinskas said. "Theology, in the fullest and most professional sense, is essential to the whole Church's articulation of the faith."

But theologians, Father Stravinskas added, must be faithful to the Scriptures and Church teachings that are the proper objects of theological study. Theology must not become mere opinion, or what John Henry Cardinal Newman called "taste and sentiment, with everything reduced to subjectivity."

"Who can argue that without authority, no science can withstand the scrutiny of professional scholars?" asked Father Stravinskas. "Hasn't so much of theology, from the Protestant Reformation onward, become a kind of free-for-all?"

Dr. Christopher Wolfe noted that Catholic scholars are entangled in a false definition of academic freedom, leading to confusion and relativism on American campuses. Catholic scholars must recognize the validity of Divine Revelation and transcendent truths, which are understood through theological study and not traditional methods of natural science.

"Academic freedom cannot be an unlimited right to say that anything is true, however silly, or stupid, or profoundly evil," Wolfe said. "Some view of truth is inescapable, at least implicitly, in any legitimate judgment of academic competence."

"Transcendent truths form a framework of reality, a framework within which everything else needs to be viewed," Wolfe added. "It's the foundation for a Catholic university,

for a really comprehensive understanding or grasp of reality."

Panels of students and alumni also explored positive methods of promoting the Catholic faith on college campuses. Student leaders of pro-life groups from Benedictine College, Georgetown University, Loyola College of Maryland and St. John's University Law School discussed their efforts to defend human life on Catholic campuses and the unfortunate challenges that they often must face from both students and administrators.

A promising development on many Catholic campuses has been the increasing numbers of independent student-run newspapers that promote the Catholic faith, expose problems on campus and serve as alternatives to official student publications — often purveyors of anti-Catholic opinions and morally offensive articles. Student editors from *The Observer* at Boston College, *Right Reason* at the University of Notre Dame, and *The Academy* at Georgetown University described their extraordinary efforts to promote the Catholic faith in an often hostile environment.

Alumni from Boston College, College of the Holy Cross, Fordham University and Trinity College also discussed ways in which alumni can earmark donations for specific student activities, such as pro-life groups and Catholic newspapers, pressure university administrators through letter-writing campaigns and meetings, and form independent alumni associations.

For more information about the Cardinal Newman Society, call (703) 536-9585 or write: Cardinal Newman Society, 207 Park Avenue, Suite B-2, Falls Church, VA 22046. ✠

Ralph McNerny Citation: Cardinal Wright Award 1996

Jude P. Dougherty
The Catholic University of America

Those of us who are of Ralph McNerny's generation may understand if I invoke the names of some of the heroes of our common youth. Many of us, I am sure, not only profited from the writings of our intellectual heroes but followed their exploits as well, enjoying the robust feats of Chesterton and Belloc, the activity of the ethereal Maritain or the earthy Gilson, the gentlemanly T.S. Eliot, and the very proper Ronald Knox. They were men of letters, yet often of worldly accomplishment. Robert M. Hutchins was president of the University of Chicago, Mortimer Adler was eventually to edit the 15th edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Jacques Maritain was French Ambassador to the Vatican.

Then there were those far-off scholars (transatlantic travel was not as common then) Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange and Cornelio Fabro in Italy, Martin Grabmann in Germany, Louis Geiger in Alsace, Pierre Mandonnet in France, Leon Noel, Maurice De Wulf, Louis De Raemaeker, and Fernand van Steenberghen in Belgium.

The man we honor tonight, I submit, is equal to any of them. Not that he has matched the prime talent of every one, but in the aggregate, he has no superiors.

His contribution to scholarship is as multifaceted as that of St. Thomas himself. Like Fabro, Mandonnet or Geiger, he is a serious scholar at home in any medieval library; in the footsteps of Gilson he is both a competent historian and a metaphysician, and, like Maritain, a critic of modernity and a moral philosopher. He is also, like Chesterton, a journalist and novelist of

imagination. His Father Dowling has joined the immortal ranks of Father Brown. The world would be much poorer without Roger Dowling, Marie Murkin, and Phil Keegan. In the spirit of Chesterton he has founded and edited journals. But first and above all, he has been a professional philosopher, who, while remaining true to his craft, has placed his intellect in the service of the Church.

But McNerny did not beget himself. Leo XIII in his famous *Aeterni Patris* endorsed a fledgling Thomistic revival which was to grow in magnitude and carry generations to an appreciation of medieval learning and the classical texts upon which it was based. "La belle époque" one could call it. At McNerny's birth, a Catholic renaissance was in the making. The mood was euphoric, triumphal at times. Those steeped in the tradition easily detected the inadequacy of the then current positivisms and materialisms which made faith all but impossible. Of course, those trained in that period also studied Locke, Berkeley and Hume, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, Kant, Hegel and Schleiermacher, but the star of their wandering hung over Athens, which at once illuminated Jerusalem, Rome and medieval Paris.

McNerny was graced by the learning of his period and in perpetuating it has led others to see. One of the hallmarks of the tradition which he represents is the conviction that philosophy is a science with conclusions that can be passed from one generation to the next. The practitioner is but a laborer in the corporate enterprise. In McNerny you find no pride of office or authorship. Few have accomplished as much as he, but with the humility that characterized his mentor, Thomas, he has labored without calling attention to himself. Ever promoting others, especially those younger scholars in whom he has detected promise, he tirelessly works to provide them with opportunities. Faithful to his professional calling and faithful to the Gospels, he has led many to an intellectual

grasp of the prescientific truths which nature and human nature have manifested, and to the Biblical truths proposed and guarded by his beloved Catholic Church. One takes pleasure in noting that McNerny has not only succeeded in the classroom and has become a doctor-father to many graduate students who have studied with him, but has transmitted paternally his intellectual outlook to his own children.

His scholarly works are numerous. *Logic of Analogy* 1961, came first, followed by the two-volume *History of Western Philosophy*, 1963 and 1968. *Thomism in the Age of Renewal* appeared in 1966, *Studies in Analogy* in 1967, *New Themes in Christian Philosophy* 1967, *St. Thomas Aquinas* 1976, *Ethica Thomistica* 1982, *Being and Predication* 1986, *Miracles* 1986, *Art and Prudence* 1988, *A Handbook for Peeping Thomists* 1989, *Boethius and Aquinas* 1989, *Aquinas on Human Action* 1992, and *The Question of Christian Ethics* 1993. The list of titles does not disclose McNerny's breadth as a scholar. While devoted to the philosophy of St. Thomas, he, like Thomas, has appropriated the insight of other traditions. One can see this in his appreciation of disparate figures such as Augustine, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Marechal. McNerny's contribution to scholarship has not gone unnoticed by his professional colleagues. His own University of Notre Dame awarded him the Michael P. Grace Professorship of Medieval Philosophy. He is a past president of the Metaphysical Society of America, a past president of the American Catholic Philosophical Association (that Association conferred on him its highest honor, the Aquinas Medal, in 1993), and, as we all know, a past president of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars. I should mention that he is an elected member of the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas (affectionately known by the acronym PASTA). And recently he has become the founder of the fledgling International Catholic University, a media institution for

distance learning. A man of common sense—clear-headed, witty, amusing and profound all at once—he has touched the lives of many who without him may not have discovered the wisdom of St. Thomas. Those who know him regard his friendship as a gift. ✠

The Farrells of Oak Park

by Msgr. George A. Kelly

Only those who knew them a long way ago would think of John and Eileen Farrell separately as a couple, as an island unto themselves. Like a number of associate members of The Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, they celebrate to this day eight decades and more of their Catholic faith, and of God's presence in the Church, and activists they were, and have been. But also lay apostles in the secular world of Chicago, long before the myth died that the main function of the laity was to help the priests do priest's work.

The Farrells' "togetherness" was as other-directed, as it was interpersonal. John, trained at Loyola, Eileen a graduate of Rosary, were identifiably Catholic, but not because they were successful entrepreneurs of the business world, or because their extracurricular activities gained them public recognition outside their diocese. (John succeeded Sargent Shriver as the president of the Catholic Interracial Council of Chicago. Eileen's book *To Be or Not To Be* was well known in Family Life circles.) But because first of all they were pious parents of three growing children, and Godparents to many Catholics thereafter.

Married in 1942, the Farrells, at World War II's end, were impelled into the "Cana Movement" by another Chicago couple. "Cana," an extraordinary apostolic impulse during

the 1945-1965 period, was an outgrowth of the early sense of two Jesuits that Catholic family life needed Christian Renewal for the culture war that was still underground. This apostolate swept the parishes of the country like a great sea—for a time. Never quite making its way into the Church's institutional superstructures (as parochial schools did), the Family Renewal programs helped the Church become "adult" and "lay oriented" until, that is, under clerical leadership, Cana became a floundering ship, eventually to run aground on the shoals of "anti-clericalism" and "skepticism," especially about the Church's authority on moral matters.

During the Catholic contraception controversy, blossoming as early as January 1962, the Farrells directed public attention to the increasing lack of attention being given in Catholic circles to continence and mortification, to the tendency to make "family planning," in the secular sense, a foregone conclusion for Catholics, of the failure to realize that "sterilization is the family planning method of tomorrow," and of the correlation of contraception and sexual promiscuity among the young. Writing in *America* in 1963 about the development of a new Catholicity, the Farrells described an emerging reality within the Church:

"We mocked the poor old Catholic and his ghetto mentality. But all the while, by means of the circumscribed acquaintance of our reading list, we have constructed an even higher ghetto wall all of our own. We have talked about involving married people democratically in the work of the apostolate, but sometimes the loudest exponents of the will of the majority have been the most totalitarian of all. And it usually turns out that tight little hierarchies of laity, staff, or clergy, or all three of them, run most of our works.

After those "tight little hierarchies" proliferated throughout the

country, promoters of piety as well as Church-defined social justice often found themselves relegated to the fringes of a college, of a family life bureau, even of some publishers. When The Fellowship of Catholic Scholars came into existence in 1977, the Farrells took hope from its statement of purpose and from its early declarations. In a casual exchange of cards with Fr. Henry V. Sattler, C.S.S.R., that year (he a Fellowship Founder, and NCWC Associate Family Life Director before that), they learned that the Fellowship was open to their support as "associates." In that capacity, the Farrells attended the first convention in Kansas City, and all subsequent conventions until John's recent illness. When Cardinal John Wright died in 1979, he being one of their close friends, the Farrells proposed (and the Fellowship Board agreed) a Cardinal Wright Award each year for a scholar who contributed significantly to the intellectual life of the Church. As of this date 19 such honorees have been the recipients of this award. Few may remember that there might never have been a Fellowship of Catholic Scholars had it not been for the Jesuits at Loyola University in Chicago, notably Earl Weis, S.J., the late Joseph Mangan, S.J., the late Paul Quay, S.J., the late John Connery, S.J., John Powell, S.J., and later lay leaders there like Dr. Herbert Ratner and Dr. Eugene Diamond.

The Farrells of Oak Park are "benefactors" of the whole Church in the real sense of that word. They have "done well" with their lives and with their talents. In God's good time they will leave behind them a notable estate of good faith and good works, the kind that is celebrated by the Church on the Feast of All Saints, the liturgy that was created to thank God for "the little ones," whom everyone else has forgotten, but the Lord.

AD MULTOS ANNOS - SIMUL, i.e., together! ✠

In Memory of Joseph T. Mangan

by Earl Weis, S.J.



Fr. Joseph T. Mangan, S.J., one of the founding members of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, died October 8, 1996, at Colombière Center, Clarkston, Michigan. He was 85 years old.

After achieving the doctoral degree in theology at the Immaculée in Montreal, Father Mangan was professor of moral theology at St. Mary of the Lake Seminary, Mundelein, Illinois, from 1946 to 1969, and at Loyola University, Chicago from 1969 to 1981. At Loyola he was the first director of its graduate program in theology. After that he served as medical ethics education director at four Chicago area hospitals until 1994.

Monsignor George A. Kelly, president emeritus of the Fellowship, paid tribute to Father Mangan's crucial role in the foundational gatherings in Chicago at Loyola University and in St. Louis at Kenrick Seminary 20 years ago. A former member of its Board of Directors, Father Mangan was the recipient of a special citation of merit from the Fellowship.

"He is remembered for the exuberant warmth of his personality, as well as the commitment, energy, professionalism and perseverance of his teaching," Father Earl Weis, a Loyola colleague and friend, noted. ✠

REVIEW: The Father's Spirit of Sonship: Reconceiving the Trinity

by Thomas Weinandy, O.F.M. Cap.
T & T Clark, 148 pages, \$19.95
Reviewed by Timothy L. Smith

Thomas Weinandy, O.F.M., offers to both Eastern and Western Churches a reconception of the Trinity in which the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as the one in whom the Son is begotten. As opposed to the "sequential" views of the traditional doctrine, Weinandy proposes that the procession of the Holy Spirit and the begetting of the Son is contained in one act. He offers in support of this thesis brief New Testament exegesis, references to the Fathers as well as to contemporary theologians. This treatment is not a history of the doctrine but merely a recommendation for reconception toward the end of reconciling Eastern and Western views on this doctrine.

Weinandy rightly chooses the doctrine of the trinitarian processions as the focal point of his ecumenical efforts due to its centrality in the conflict. He is also quite sensitive to the position of both sides as he attempts to maintain their concerns while reformulating the doctrine in a mutually amenable and constructive fashion. According to the author, this thesis should be mutually acceptable because it is more thoroughly biblical, less tinged with philosophical presuppositions and resolves the filioque controversy by "transcending" it. It is in these terms that we will judge the success of the proposal.

Concerning the New Testament witness, Weinandy devotes two chapters to various illustrative moments in the life of Christ. The first part of the first chapter concerns Christ's baptism, death and resurrection. The second

part of the chapter concerns our adoption as children of God and is more important for the author's case. For him our adoption is a "more exact paradigm" of the immanent trinitarian life (p.33). The key trinitarian pattern here is that God by his Spirit makes us a new creation in Christ. The Spirit then provides access to the Wisdom of God. Moreover, this same Spirit is the "exclusive" foundation effecting and sustaining our new life with the Father in the Son. Hence, because our adoption is the work of the Holy Spirit, Weinandy contends that the Son's own personhood is effected within the procession of the Spirit as well. In fact, Weinandy turns around the phrase "Spirit of the Son" to mean the "Spirit by which the Son is Son" and which "conforms the Father to be Father." The Spirit conforms us as He conforms the Son and the Father to be Son and Father.

While this attention to spiritual experience is commendable and certainly important, its central position in this discussion seems to carry some danger for certain aspects of orthodox teaching. Those familiar with the early history of trinitarian doctrine will bristle at Weinandy's starting point of Jesus' baptism and his early emphasis on our adoption as paradigmatic. Such discussion all too easily leads to the errors of adoptionism in which Jesus either becomes or becomes more fully the Son of the Father at his baptism.

Weinandy's exegesis of the key New Testament passages is as he himself says, "creatively faithful" to the tradition. What this means in practice is that he is not arguing for the right reading of a passage per se, but for the plausibility of an additional reading. Hence, he does little to counter the traditional readings of certain phrases and often affirms them wholeheartedly. Nevertheless, Weinandy posits an alternative in which words are more specifically referential. A case in point: he cites the story about the woman at the well and proposes that the term "spirit" in each case refers specifically

to the Holy Spirit as opposed to the Godhead. Such statements as "God is spirit" and "God is love" become "God is Holy Spirit."

Indeed, he is right to say that the Holy Spirit can be called the Charity of God and the bond of the Father and the Son. Weinandy's interpretation of the Augustinian notion seems, however, to be too strict, for it leads to the very conclusions that Augustine himself castigated; namely, that the Son and Father have no love of their own but love only through the Holy Spirit. What is missing is the balance between essential and proper uses of the term. The Holy Spirit is not the sole significatum of the "love of God" in every case but is distinctively so called by reason of appropriation.

Equally problematic is Weinandy's assertion that the "Spirit of Truth" refers solely to the Holy Spirit. This claim empties the Son of his illuminative role and places all relational components of the God-human relation on the Person of the Holy Spirit. Weinandy is clearly not cognizant of the doctrine of appropriation. This very important doctrine formulated by Augustine and perfected by Thomas Aquinas explains how the Person of the Trinity shares, the essential attributes of power, wisdom, love and so forth. These attributes are also appropriated to the distinct Persons by reason of similitude; that is, particular attributes reveal the Persons as distinct yet are not merely proper. The Council of Florence's formulation of 1441 is absolutely clear on this matter: In God all things are one and the same unless there is opposition of relation, because the divine nature is numerically one with all its attributes.

Weinandy, on the other hand, claims not to be denying the traditional readings of these texts, but to be trying to find room for an additional reading. The problem is that a multiplication of readings regarding the very same doctrine is nothing if not unusual. A passage means this or that, not both and more. Weinandy's efforts to

graft yet another reading onto these texts as some sort of bandage on the wound of schism unfortunately makes the text meaningless as the reader is left wondering what really is at stake.

Regarding the use of philosophical presuppositions, Weinandy adamantly denies their validity and relevance for theological reflection. He castigates both East and West for using or being tinged with Neo-Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. For him these notions are non-biblical if not anti-biblical in positing sequentialism within the life of the Trinity. Weinandy attempts to avoid prioritizing the Persons by positing two coinciding processions of Spirit and Son.

Leaving aside the presence of platonic notions in the Johannine prologue, the outright rejection of such notions and principles for trinitarian discussion seems unwarranted. Weinandy is himself unable to speak about the divine processions without some language of priority. He manages to reverse the traditional ordering of Son and Holy Spirit, but the result is as much sequential as the positions against which Weinandy argues. It cannot be otherwise, for we cannot escape the temporality of our language in referring to some kind of originating.

Weinandy also uses the very same qualification that Augustine and Aquinas used to escape the charge of sequentialism; namely, that there is an order of origin and derivation only. The author's argument does not, therefore, change the essential debate, for almost no one posits the crude sequentialism that he opposes. The difference is that while the traditional reading must posit a logical "moment" when the Father was alone, Weinandy must posit such a "moment" before the Persons were subjectively identifiable. In other words, the Father is something else besides and prior to being Father, for it is only in loving the Son in the Spirit that He becomes or is Father. The act of loving overlays a sub-personal existence. Yet if the

Son and Father are constituted as Persons by their mutual love who is the Holy Spirit, then by what act is the Holy Spirit constituted? The Spirit must be the exception as He is constituted by his being, which is love.

At this point, then, we are in great need of the philosophical principles which determine a certain order in being, knowing and willing (loving), even if the order is one of logic only. A person cannot be loving or loved before being that person or Person. Philosophical principles are eminently helpful in this extremely complex area of doctrine, and it is only with them that we can intelligently support a theological grammar of the necessary subtlety.

Consequently, regarding the overcoming of the filioque controversy, Weinandy has surmounted it only by replacing it with another problem of origin and derivation. He affirms two seemingly opposite positions; namely, that the Father and Son are such by the work of the Spirit, and yet the Spirit proceeds from the Father. The question remains of how the two can originate in the one while the one's identity is established by the other two. The Father cannot be other than unoriginate and unbegotten.

In his last chapter, Weinandy charts the different ways in which we relate to each Divine Person. The Spirit is the one in whom we live and in whose power the Father speaks to us through the Son. The author's concern throughout is to provide an explanation for his personal religious experience and to make this experience the basis of his reflection upon the inner trinitarian life. The theology of the Trinity can perform its function, he says, only if it "nurtures the lives of Christians." Weinandy contends that the Divine Persons are subjects who derive their identity by their acts of love, paternal and filial, just as we become sons and daughters by entering into that love. The "Persons" act in love and in that love are or become the Trinity of Father, Son and Holy

Spirit. We enter into that immanent trinitarian life and relate to each Person according to the pattern revealed in the economy. Hence, we become as many sons within the Trinity loving the Father in the power of the Spirit. Weinandy thereby shatters the traditional "unum ad extra" teaching by asserting that each Person relates to us in a distinct manner.

Asserting that the acts of each Person within and without the Godhead are distinct, however, makes it extremely difficult to avoid the conclusion of "tritheism." In his efforts to provide a theological grounding for our experiences of the Divine Persons, Weinandy makes the mistake of reversing the order of being and acting within the Trinity and fails to provide an adequate grounding for Divine Unity.

Weinandy's book, while thought-provoking and challenging, does not accomplish its purpose because he exchanges the firm foundation of traditional reflection with its philosophical components in favor of a radical subjectivism in which there is no distinction between proper and essential acts of the Divine Persons precisely because all acts are proper. The result is a triad of Persons united by love but not, essentially or by nature, One.

Timothy L. Smith is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Notre Dame in The Medieval Institute.

REPLY:

A Response to Timothy L. Smith

by Thomas Weinandy

I want to thank Professor Ralph McInerny for allowing me to respond to Mr. Smith's review of my book, *The Father's Spirit of Sonship: Reconceiving the Trinity*. I will only attempt to respond to some of the major criticisms since to address all of his concerns would be impossible in so short

a space. I must say though, at the risk of sounding like the typical disgruntled author, that much of what Mr. Smith states is either a misrepresentation or a misinterpretation of what I have written.

Let me first address the issue of religious experience, since Mr. Smith seems to be highly allergic to such a notion; my book having caused him to sneeze uncontrollably. Yes, I did state that the insight for the thesis of the book came to me in prayer and helped me to confirm theologically my experience of Baptism in the Spirit within the charismatic renewal. The time between gaining the insight in my prayer and that of my experience of Baptism in the Spirit was approximately 12 years, so the thesis was not developed in a state of emotional religious frenzy. Moreover, having received the insight in prayer, it took me about another five years of reading, research, thinking, and yes, prayer before the book was actually written.

More to the point, Mr. Smith gives the impression that the use of religious experience in doing theology is to make it "radically" subjective. This would be the case if Christians did not found and test their experience on the Gospel and the teachings of the Church. But it is precisely this that I have ardently attempted to do, and thus, why it took me so long to write this small book. Moreover, is not the New Testament itself written from religious experience? Granted the apostles, experience is normative for the Church, yet what they wrote was, nonetheless, from their experience of Jesus as Lord and Saviour, and from the revelation of the Spirit in their lives. It would seem to me that the Christian life should not be devoid of experience, and that even some experience of the love of the Father, the salvation of Jesus, and the new life of the Holy Spirit should be expected and welcomed.

Moreover, the Western and the Eastern traditions profess that the true theologian is one who actually experi-

ences and knows the realities of which he writes — the truths of the Gospel. If our theology is not founded and nurtured on prayer, then, when we teach and write about the mysteries of our faith, we do so only as observers and not as participants within these mysteries. This, it seems to me, is a major problem within contemporary Christian and Catholic theology. Theologians attempt to write about the mysteries and truths of the faith without having had any experience of them. (As I tell my students, theology is probably the only discipline in which one can teach and write without actually having to know the subject matter — God.) It must be remembered that only Saints, who have a living knowledge of the faith, often initiated by religious experiences, are conferred with the title — Doctor of the Church. I am neither a Saint nor a Doctor of the Church, but I would like to think that I am attempting to do theology as they have done it.

Now to the more theological meat of Mr. Smith's concerns. Firstly, what I attempted to do in my examination of the New Testament was to establish a pattern. The Father conceived the eternal Son in the womb of Mary through the power of the Holy Spirit and so he became the Son of God incarnate. The Father declared Jesus to be his faithful Son through the descent of the Holy Spirit at his Baptism. The Father raised Jesus from the dead by the power of the Holy Spirit and so manifested that he is the Son of God in glory. The Father conforms Christians into the likeness of the Son through the Holy Spirit. Simply put, if the actions of the Persons of the Trinity within the economy reveal who they are and their relations to one another, and they must if we are not to be deceived, then, it seems to me, we have a window into the immanent Trinity. Thus my thesis is, based upon this biblical pattern, that the Father begets the Son in or by the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father as the one in whom the Son is begot-

ten. To say that my position is adoptionistic is simply to miss the point. Jesus was not adopted as Son at his baptism nor did he become more fully the Son. Rather, his baptism declares, illustrates and exemplifies what has eternally been the case, that the Son has been eternally begotten of Father in the Spirit.

Secondly, Mr. Smith is not happy that I disparage the use of philosophy, especially the way the tradition has used Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. I am not opposed to using philosophical terms and concepts. A previous reviewer of my book noted that my book is filled with philosophical concepts. What I am opposed to is the use of philosophy that is not baptized into the doctrines of the faith. As I stated in my book: "What makes these philosophical conceptions unacceptable is not their foreignness, but their incompatibility with Christian revelation. Some foreign philosophical concepts may be in accord with revelation, but normally they need to be thoroughly born anew in the water of Christian revelation" (P. 9, fn.18). Mr. Smith seems unaware that the entire history of the early trinitarian controversies is a history of attempting to get the philosophical concepts right. The heretics utterly failed and the Fathers only succeeded because they, to a greater or lesser degree, allowed the truth of revelation to fashion and govern their philosophical concepts. I believe, as I argue in my book, that the Eastern trinitarian tradition still contains the unbaptized remnants of Platonism and that the Western tradition, while less Platonic, also contains the unbaptized remnants of Aristotelianism. It is impossible to take Platonism and Aristotelianism wholesale and apply them to the Trinity. Plato and Aristotle never dealt with such truths and thus, while what they taught may be helpful, their teaching must be conformed to the doctrine of the Trinity and not the Trinity conformed to their teaching and presuppositions. This is what I have at-

tempted to do. I have tried to adjust philosophical concepts so as to articulate more clearly and precisely the truths of the New Testament and Catholic Doctrine.

Thirdly, Mr. Smith argues that, while I have accused the trinitarian tradition of sequentialism, I have added my own, only now reversing the order. I do not believe we need to use sequential language with regard to the processions within the Trinity, and I have argued, at some length, for such in my book. I stated at the onset that I believe "A proper understanding of the Trinity can only be obtained if all three Persons, logically and ontologically, spring forth in one simultaneous, nonsequential, eternal act in which each Person of the Trinity subsistently defines, and equally is subsistently defined by, the other Persons" (p. 14-15). I do not believe that we "must posit a logical 'moment' when the Father is alone," as Mr. Smith argues. Athanasius, and even Origen would, to use Mr. Smith's term, "bristle" at the thought. Athanasius' entire defense of Nicea was predicated upon the truth that the Father is eternally the Father and therefore the Son is eternally the Son. One is not allowed to conceive, even logically, the Father being alone, since for him to be even logically alone would demand that logically he would not be the Father. To say "Father" is to say, by necessary implication, "Son," and, for that matter, to say "Holy Spirit" as well. (This is the heart of my thesis: Why does "Father" imply "Holy Spirit"? What is it about the fatherhood of the Father that gives rise to the Holy Spirit?) Nor do I hold that I "must posit such a 'moment' before the Persons were subjectively identifiable." There is no 'moment' within God — logical or ontological. God just is the Trinity of Persons. What the one God is is the Father begetting the Son in or by the Spirit. What I argue for in my book is that, while there is by necessity an order of origin and derivation among the Persons of the

Trinity, there is not an order of priority, precedence and sequence.

Fourthly, Mr. Smith accuses me of not upholding the teaching of the Council of Florence that "In God all things are one and the same unless there is opposition of relation" and that because I argue that we, through grace, relate to each of the Persons of the Trinity in a particular manner, that I thus shatter "the traditional 'unum ad extra' teaching." I argue that there is one eternity, one goodness, one perfection, one consciousness, etc., within the Trinity for the Trinity is one God. However, I also argue, and I do not believe it to be contrary to the Council of Florence, that the Persons of the Trinity do not possess these attributes in a generic divine manner. Each Person possesses them in accordance with who they are as distinct, but not divided, Persons. Thus, while there is one consciousness in God, it is not shared generically by the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Rather, each Person defines and specifies this one consciousness in their own personal manner. The Father possesses the divine consciousness in a manner that is peculiar to being the Father, and likewise the Son and the Holy Spirit. To deny that each Person of the Trinity subsists with their own distinct consciousness would be to deny their distinct and irreducible personhood. The Son, for example, is aware, within the one conscious, that he is the Son and possesses all the attributes of the one God in a filial manner. What Mr. Smith fails to grasp is that the one nature of God is not distinct or different from the three Persons, but rather the one nature of God is the ontological inter-related oneness of the three Persons. The one God is a trinity of Persons.

Similarly, while the Persons of the Trinity act as the one God "ad extra", they do so according to who they are as Persons. The one God did act in the Incarnation, but the one God did not act generically as one God. The one God acted as a trinity of Persons, and

thus each Person acted in accordance with who they are. Only the Father sent the Son, only the Son was incarnate, and it was only by the Holy Spirit that this was accomplished. Moreover, to say that a Christian is related to the one generic God is not Christian at all. It is at best Jewish and at worst Islamic. By grace we are incorporated into the one God who is a trinity of Persons, and therefore we live within the one God as the one God is — a trinity of persons. I am not just a son of God, nor is God, simply as God, my Father. I am a son of the Father and the Father loves me as a Father. I am not a brother of God. I am a brother of the Son. I am not conformed into the likeness of the Son by God. I am conformed into the likeness of the Son by the Holy Spirit. It is through these distinct, but not separate, actions of the three Persons that I enter into the one life of the Trinity as the one Trinity is.

I am confident that Athanasius, Augustine and Aquinas, and maybe even Gregory of Nyssa, would have given a more positive reading to my book. Recently a conservative, orthodox, Roman Catholic theologian (need I say more, other than that he is probably a member of the Fellowship as well) wrote that my book “may be one of the landmark studies of the present century.” Whether he or Mr. Smith is correct, others will have to decide. Undoubtedly, both are exaggerating. Personally, I would have liked to have said more about what I positively present in my book concerning the Persons of the Trinity being “subsistent relations,” the role of the Holy Spirit within the Trinity, and the ecumenical significance of it all, but others will now have to read the book to discover these for themselves. I just hope that the price of the book does not put readers off. ✠

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Aquinas and Analogy

Ralph McInerny, Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996; cm 22.5 X 14.5, pp. X + 169. ISBN 0-8132-0848-3.

reviewed by Kevin Flannery, S.J.

[This review will appear in *Gregorianum* and is included in the Quarterly courtesy of that publication and Father Flannery.]

When Thomas De Vio-or Cajetan—was 29 years old he wrote a book entitled *De nominum analogia*. The basis of its argument is a response made by Thomas Aquinas to an objection in his commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences. The question posed in the pertinent article (Sent. lb. I d.19 q.5 a.2) is *Utrum omnia sint vera verita increata*; and the first objection argues that the truth that pertains to, for instance, propositions is the same truth that we find in God since what is at issue is analogy and, according to the doctrine explained in the previous article (Sent. lb. I d.19 q.5 a.1), that from which the things in an analogical relationship derive their unity is numerically one. For instance, medicine and urine might both be said to be healthy with respect to the health of an animal, which is numerically one. Thomas replies that something is said analogically in three ways. It might be said thus (1) *secundum intentionem tantum et non secundum esse*, as when health is said of the things just mentioned although primarily of animal; (2) *secundum esse et non secundum intentionem*, as when 'body' is said of corruptible and incorruptible bodies and the logician (who looks just to the intention) sees just a univocal use but the metaphysician and scientist see differences of being; (3) *secundum intentionem et secundum esse*, as when 'being' is said of substance and accident. In the latter case, “the common nature has some being in each of the things of which it is said, though differing according to greater and lesser perfection.” Thomas's point in setting out these three ways is to show that

the objector incorrectly assumes that what is the case in one instance of analogical naming is true in all. Analogy might, indeed, be used in a situation such as (1), but that does not mean that it might not also be used in a situation such as (3), where there is found diversity of the quality at issue not only in intention but also in being. For example, what we mean in attributing truth to God is different from what we mean in attributing truth to a proposition; but also, what it is for God to be true is different from what it is for a proposition to be true.

Cajetan, however, does not understand Thomas to be saying that analogy might be employed in different situations; rather, he believes that his point is that there are three types of analogy: (a) analogy of attribution, (b) analogy of inequality, (c) analogy of proportionality. Even this claim, however, Cajetan qualifies, saying that (b) is not really analogy at all, that (a) is “abusively” called analogy (also by Thomas), and that (c) is to be further subdivided into metaphorical uses and analogical usages, so that even within the category of the “properly” analogical some analogies are more analogical than others. This account of Thomas's understanding of analogy was to become the basis of almost all theorizing about analogy within the scholastic tradition after Cajetan, including much present-day theorizing. Ralph McInerny demonstrates in the book under review that it represents a serious misreading of the pertinent text. Thomas does not there distinguish types of analogy depending on how or whether the objects referred to differ from each other; analogy, as understood by Thomas, is a logical category and, as such, does not depend for its sense on the way that things stand in the universe. McInerny first made this argument in 1961, with a book entitled *The Logic of Analogy*. This new book is an attempt to present the same argument more clearly and more persuasively. It is time that McInerny be given more of a hearing than he has

been given heretofore, especially among continental philosophers, for what he says is not only enormously important both philosophically and theologically but it also seems to be the correct interpretation of St. Thomas.

Besides setting out the central argument just described, McInerny discusses analogy in Aristotle and also a number of other topics having to do with the use of analogous names (which is what Sent. lb. I d.19 q.5 a.2 is all about). With respect to Aristotle, McInerny argues that Thomas's use of the word 'analogy' does not correspond to Aristotle's use. Where Aristotle speaks of things *legetai pollakos* (as at Metaph.iv,2,1003a33) but never (in the same context) of *analogia*, Thomas's standard expression is *analogia* or *analogice dicitur*. But this is only a terminological difference. Aristotle and Thomas are in agreement with respect to the doctrine itself, both maintaining the strict division, obscured by Cajetan, between logic and the way things stand in the universe. In formulating this argument, McInerny makes good use of the Oxford philosopher G.E.L. Owen (who sharply distinguishes the *pros hen* relationship of Metaph.iv,2 from the "natural" analogy of Metaph.xii,4); he also criticizes the approach of Enrico Berti whose interpretation of Thomas, according to McInerny, is still under the influence of Cajetan.

With respect to the use of analogous names, McInerny's chapters three and four ("How Words Signify" and "Analogous Names") constitute, in effect, a very good introduction to Thomas's understanding of logic. He notes especially that Thomas includes within logic the way we order words, which is what we are doing when we use an analogy (in Thomas's sense). He also brings into relief for us a number of concepts essential for understanding how analogous names work. They include: *id a quo* (that from which the sense of a name such as an analogous name comes to be known—which might be its etymology or the form

signified by the name); *id ad quod* (that to which a name makes reference); *modus significandi* (the way of signifying); *res significata* (the thing signified by a name); *ratio propria* (among a group of analogates, that complex which signifies in a primary way the *res significata*). Employing this terminology, we can say that all the analogates in a particular instance of analogy signify the *res significata* (e.g. health), which is that *id a quo* the sense of the names comes, while *id ad quod* they refer is different for each (healthy medicine, healthy urine, a healthy animal). Among these various ways of signifying the *res significata*, only one of them represents the *ratio propria*—i.e., in the case under consideration, the health of the healthy animal. Cajetan understood Thomas's *ratio propria non invenitur nisi in uno* as meaning *res significata non invenitur nisi in uno*, thereby making analogy depend on the way things stand in the universe. According to Thomas, it depends rather on *rationes*, which are the proper subject matter of logic. Analogous names are analogous not on account of the way they signify things; they are analogous because they stand within a certain order, *per prius et posterius*, which is to be part of the artifact known as logic.

This is the basic argument of McInerny's book. The rest of it works out the implications of this approach for other considerations, especially for how we speak about God. He discusses, for instance in chapter six, the difference between metaphor and analogy, showing that it exists, according to Thomas, in analogy's—but not metaphor's—involvement of additional *rationes* besides the *ratio propria*. Thus, when scripture says metaphorically that God is a lion, the only *ratio* involved is that of the beast that roams the jungles.

In chapter seven, McInerny begins a sort of philosophical *jeu d'esprit* about analogy as analogous. He notes that, although Cajetan of all others was aware of the facts indicating that analogy is analogous (since he identifies various types of analogy, only one of

which is "properly" analogy), he could not have made this point since that would have been, according to his theory, to use the word 'analogous' abusively. But McInerny has no such theoretical difficulties and points out, most interestingly, that the analogy of names (the most prominent type of analogy in Thomas) is not the *ratio propria* of analogy. That title belongs rather to *analogia* as presented in the fifth book of Euclid's *Elements*.

Moreover, as McInerny argues in chapter eight, since the analogy of names is just one analogate within the analogy of analogy, it is quite distinct from the type of analogy used by both Thomas and Aristotle as a means of attaining knowledge—as when, for instance, Aristotle says at Physics i,7,191a7-8 that we know about prime matter by analogy. Such knowledge of things as they stand in the universe does not, however, immediately translate into analogous names (i.e., analogy as typically spoken of), as is apparent once we realize that things we know by analogy might be spoken of by means either of analogies or metaphors or even univocally. But this is just another way of saying that the analogy of names is a logical, not an ontological or metaphysical, doctrine.

Finally, in chapter nine, McInerny discusses the connection between analogy and participation. He argues, using Thomas's *In Boethii de trinitate*, q.5 a.4, that Thomas does not use the word 'analogy' of the analogy of being, although he does speak of the analogical use of the word 'being.' The analogy of being has, rather, to do with something quite accidental to analogy as he understands it centrally. And this is only right since the logical doctrine of analogy, which has to do with things as known, must assign the *ratio propria* to the human analogate (e.g. 'wise' as applied to man rather than as applied to God), even though God is prior ontologically. This is not to deny, however, that the *res significata* of a name such as 'wise' applied analogously to God exists first and

preeminently in Him. As things stand in the universe, the wisdom of the wise man participates in it, and not vice-versa.

What is the value of all this? I let McInerney speak for himself. "Thomas Aquinas took this difference between

the order of our knowledge and the order of being to be decisive between Plato and Aristotle. He accuses Plato of confusing these two orders and assuming that what is first in our knowing is first in being. Any confusion of the logical and real orders comes under the

same criticism. A correct understanding of Thomas on analogy saves him from the grievous mistake he attributed to Plato. The point of this book is far more than terminological precision." ✠

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