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OBITUARY

EX CATHEDRA
Ralph McInerny
A Blog Posting to Amy’s “What did you hear on Sunday?”
Blog by Marcus Daly (mdaly@pngusa.net), April 3, 2005

“In our vigil Mass Saturday evening, John Paul II was honorably remembered for his courageous witness to our resurrected Lord. A brief biography was included in our bulletin following a long printed homily. Father Roach, a former professor, puts a great deal of work into his weekly homilies and provides us with many pages to take home and prayerfully read.

He also pointed out that no human being is perfect and that our deceased Holy Father did not always distinguish between Tradition and tradition so as not to confuse the faithful, and that there were questions of tradition still unsettled, such as the essential nature of an all-male clergy.

At the end of our printed homily was a p.s. about Terri Schiavo.

‘Before Terri Schiavo died bodily, many raised issues about Catholic teaching concerning end of life decisions. It is important to take one’s guidance in these matters from established teaching of the Church, which one will find in the Declaration on Euthanasia from 1980 and in the encyclical John Paul II wrote entitled Evangelium Vitae (1995). In March of 2004 the ailing pope addressed a group of pro-life physicians at the Vatican. The text he read on that occasion seemed to revise (or directly contradict) what he had previously taught. I know of no informed person who thinks the Holy Father wrote the speech he read. In fact, many feel well enough informed to name the man who wrote it. I think it wise to treat with a grain of salt anything attributed to this pope from 2004 until his death.

Before our Holy Father went home to God, this speech caused many of us to fear what would happen when his time came. We feared that, prompted by this speech, persons caring for him would attach him to medical technology which would prolong his death agony. We feared even that some might have unworthy motives for doing so. But, John Paul II took charge of his own dying. Before he lost consciousness he refused a return to the Gemini hospital. This may well be one of the greatest and bravest thing John Paul II ever did. And, I thank God for his courage and faith! RRR sj’”
Editor:

We should try to be clear about the “debate on end-of-life care within the Catholic Community. Pope John Paul II did not say that food and drink could never be discontinued. He admitted of the possibility that assisted feedings could be discontinued when a patient is imminently dying of a fatal disease such as organ failure or metastatic cancer. In such cases the patient died of the underlying disease and food and drink will not preserve his life. In the cases where the patient is not dying such as persistent vegetative state, when gastrostomy feedings are withheld the patient dies, not of PVS but of starvation and dehydration. Withholding nourishment kills the patient.

The statement by John Paul II to the effect that food and drink constitute ordinary care and therefore obligatory was made at a Vatican-sponsored international convention in March 2004 in Rome. It was attended by 400 recognized experts of PVS. It was characterized by in depth presentations and dialogue. There was a large Dutch delegation. Holland is not known as the center of pro-life sentiment or for medical advocacy of the prolongation of life.

The statement by John Paul II was not a throw-away line. It was delivered solemnly at the end of the convention in the Papal Audience Chamber. As a delegate to the convention it was clear to me that the Pope was addressing one of the most important issues of the convention as the meeting closed. He has used such a venue to clarify other controversial bioethical issues such as brain death. Some Catholic theologians (notably O’Rourke, Paris and McBrien) have advocated for the legitimate removal of assisted feedings from patients who are not dying but lack “cognitive and effective” capacity. In a recent article in Neurology (64:514 2005) it was pointed out that MRI evaluation of patients in minimally unconscious states (e.g. Shiavo) do give evidence of cognitive ability. A poll taken at the aforementioned international convention of PVS experts in Rome revealed that 98% of those present disagreed with the theory that those lacking cognitive and affective function could legitimately be denied life saving assisted feeding. The Pope was not exploring new theories or overturning standards of care. He was, in effect, reiterating the Commandment “Thou Shalt Not Kill”.

Sincerely,
Eugene F. Diamond, M/D., Director, Linacre Institute, Catholic Medical Association, Chicago.

Letter

Religion and Politics

Thomas Cavanaugh, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of San Francisco

If polite company avoids discussion of religion and politics, then the recent presidential election has rendered the nation impolite. Bars, boardrooms, and barracks echo with talk of religion and politics. How should a politician’s religion relate to his politics? How ought a voter’s religious beliefs influence his vote? Of course, religion’s relation to politics has been a salient topic in our republic from the beginning, as the Constitution’s monitory first amendment indicates, “congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”

This constraint limits the law’s bearing on religion. What governs religious influence upon law? Some would prohibit all religious influence upon laws and public policy. Historically, the ability to persuade one’s fellow citizens determines the degree to which religious convictions influence laws. Consider the prohibition of alcohol and civil rights. In each case, religious believers played a robust role limited by the cogency of their arguments. In the case of prohibition, the public ultimately found the arguments that alcohol was entirely evil unconvincing. Prohibition proved to have too little of a basis in publicly accessible reasons and, correspondingly, too large of a dependence upon specifically religious commitments that too few shared.

In the case of the civil rights movement, religion played a very effective role. In his leadership, the Reverend Martin Luther King brought religious beliefs to bear on politics with greater success than the Christian temperance league. Why was he successful where others failed? Reverend King employed arguments inspired by religious convictions, yet persuasive beyond the boundaries of his Baptist religion. It would be wrong, however, to think that King’s arguments were not religious in nature. He himself referred to the ethical convictions of Christianity and Judaism as the, “great wells of democracy,” from...
which he drew inspiration. The question then becomes, what enables some religiously grounded arguments to transcend the boundaries of religion and appeal to voters of many faiths or no faith at all? To put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas, whom King often cites, preambles to religion allow such arguments.

What is a preamble to faith? Alumni of Catholic institutions will recall Aquinas’s famous five ways or arguments for the existence of God. Aquinas proposes that these reasons for assenting to God’s existence do not properly belong to religious faith. That is, they are not uniquely religious. (That Thomas borrows arguments for God’s existence from a pagan philosopher such as Aristotle indicates their rational, non-sectarian basis.) Of course, to assent to God’s existence is a religious commitment; Aquinas acknowledges this. He proposes that this assent, however, can be grounded either in faith or in reason. St. Thomas calls truths accessible both to faith and reason preambles. One might think of them as religious convictions overlapping with conclusions able to be arrived at by reasoned argument. Here one finds ground common to faith and reason, by which the faithful may speak to the reasonable.

In the practical realm of politics, one finds such shared convictions. For example, Christian and Hebrew scripture consistently indicate our religious obligation to care for the orphan and widow, as God’s wards. In the public arena, one argues on their behalf in terms of their vulnerability and profound need. In such terms, religious believers frame arguments capable of influencing reasonable people of good will. Consider the more controverted example of embryonic stem cell research, opposed by the Catholic Church. Theologically, the Church opposes this research insofar as God personally and intimately creates each embryo in His image. Thereby, each and every human embryo enjoys the sanctity and corresponding inviolability of human life. Philosophically, one argues against the use of embryos as human beings in our most inchoate state, and, therefore, accorded the protection due the innocent. Those who remain unconvinced by the philosophical grounds for banning this research have, nevertheless, been offered arguments and not sermons by their fellow citizens.

Discussion of politics and religion may never be welcomed in polite company, but a vibrant republic will find itself full of such conversations, as ours now does. In those conversations, let us agree that Congress shall make no religiously biased laws and religions shall, as preambles to faith allow, make reasoned arguments.

John Paul II’s First Visit as the Successor of Peter: A Retrospect

Prepared for delivery to The Friends of John Paul II Foundation, Inc., May 7, 2005

Jude P. Dougherty, The Catholic University of America, Washington, DC

He taught us how to live, and he showed us how to die. I am sure that most of us who have lost our parents like to remember them in their prime, not in the declining years. That is the way I like to remember John Paul II, not in his decline but by the way he captured the heart of the nation on his first visit to the United States as pope. Catching his stride soon after his arrival in Boston, he went on with charm and vigor to teach an attentive nation in the name of Christ. If it was a personal triumph, it was one that was shared by all of the faithful. The Catholic Church, an immigrant Church, a Church that has never been fully accepted in the United States, was, through its leader, suddenly the center of respectful attention.

Decades before, the vision of the Bishop of Rome celebrating Mass within sight of the Lincoln and
Jefferson Memorials and spending hours in the White House, would have been unthinkable. Two prominent Catholic politicians from different eras, New York Governor Al Smith and President John Kennedy, would not have believed it possible. The effect John Paul had in Washington, D.C., was extraordinary. Hundreds of high level government officials clamored for invitations to a reception in his honor. Some legislators are said to have traded votes for the privilege of attending. By the time the guest list had been revised for the final time, over 10,000 people had been invited.

To say the least, John Paul was photogenic. The backdrops chosen for his speeches were for the most part spectacular. Framed against the Statue of Liberty as he spoke in Battery Park or against the U.S. Capitol in Washington, his speeches were staging triumphs. The Pope appeared to millions of television viewers as exceptional, intelligent but warm, scholarly but humane. His speech was direct and simple. Throughout his visit his speeches reiterated time-honored truths and were uncompromisingly frank. Here before the public was an attractive human being, clearly enunciating the moral teachings of the Church before audiences used to equivocation and timidity; here was obviously a man of courage as well as a man of considerable physical endurance. Despite a grueling schedule, his good spirits never flagged.

The Papal visit was in many respects similar to those of other world figures or returning national heroes. It was reminiscent of Queen Elizabeth’s first visit to the United States. Time magazine featured the pope on its cover under the banner headline, “John Paul II, Superstar.” But this superstar was not simply a media personality. That he attracted and held attention was in major part due to his message as Vicar of Christ. Further, he seemed in his person to illustrate the very virtues that he prescribed for others—humility, sacrifice, compassion, love of life, and love of Christ.

On his second day in North America, the atmosphere at United Nations headquarters was such that the delegates of member states were prepared, even eager, to listen to the Pope. This receptivity, as well as the apparent acceptance of the Pope as a universal teacher, if not as a father, by the cheering millions he experienced in Italy, Mexico, Poland, Ireland, and now in the United States, contrasts with the decline in prestige of international institutions—foremost the United Nations itself—and with the absence of commanding leaders on the world scene.

The political substance of the Pope’s message at the United Nations was simple. More by way of prolegomena than anything else, he dealt with topics such as Auschwitz, the Middle East, and the arms race. But the heart of his message dealt with a more fundamental issue, namely, the need to recognize the relationship between the spiritual and the material. All other issues including peace and prosperity, he maintained, hinge on the proper relationship between these two. On balance, it is the spiritual goods that deserve first consideration. He said, “It is easy to see that material goods do not have unlimited capacity for satisfying the needs of man…They are not in themselves easily distributed...they give rise to tension, dissension, and division that will often even turn into open conflict. Spiritual goods, on the other hand, are open to unlimited enjoyment by many at the same time without diminution of the goods themselves.” Although the Pope went on to indict modern civilization for subordinating the whole man to his material needs, economic needs he did not deny. Later in Iowa he said, “The earth and its fruits are to be shared fairly by all mankind under the guidance of justice tempered by charity.” Generosity, he reminded his audience, is a collective as well as an individual responsibility. Calling for cooperation between countries to overcome the serious disparity between geographic areas of overabundance and areas of dire need, he urged that this disparity be systematically reduced through international cooperation.

Twenty-six years have passed since that Iowa address. It would require the sophistication of a globally minded or macro-economist to determine if first-world aid and capital investment have made a difference to the poor nations of John Paul II’s concern. Yet throughout his pontificate his teaching remained the same. In a message promulgated on World Immigration Day in December 1999, he said, “On the one hand, globalization accelerates the movement of capital and the exchange of goods and services among men, inevitably influencing human movements.” But globalization, he reminded his audience, causes new cleavages. In the context of unbridled
freedom without adequate brakes, the difference between rich nations and poor nations becomes more profound. “The former have capital and technology that enables them to enjoy the planet’s resources, a faculty they do not always employ with a spirit of solidarity by learning to share.”

Another papal theme on that first visit was the threat to human rights, what he called “injustice in the field of spirit.” The pope was concerned with the whole gamut of civil rights, but he was particularly concerned with religious freedom. Human beings are obligated by their nature to seek truth, to direct their lives on the basis of truth, and to give expression of their understanding of truth in the community of like-minded individuals. Only in an atmosphere of religious freedom can the confrontation between the religious view of the world and the agnostic or atheistic view take on honest and human dimensions.

Speaking at Battery Park with the Statue of Liberty in the background, he warned that liberty must be conjoined with truth about the human condition. Past achievements in the name of freedom, however significant, can never be an adequate substitute for present social responsibilities. Christians must strengthen natural human virtue by infusing it with the Gospel message so that they may discover its deeper meaning and assume more fully their duties and obligations toward their fellow man. American values are strengthened when freedom is accepted not as an absolute or as an end in itself but as a gift that enables self-giving and service. Freedom must be guided by divine law, which is given to us in the Gospel. It is that Truth which sets men free. In Philadelphia, the Pope preached traditional Catholic clerical discipline. He said “no” to women priests; he said no to married clergy.

Speaking to all Americans without distinction, John Paul II did not shy from entering the emotionally charged abortion debate in the United States. He summoned Catholics and like-minded people to redouble their campaign against abortion, declaring that, “When the sacredness of life before birth is attacked, we will stand up and proclaim that no one ever has the authority to destroy unborn life.” He went on to utter the memorable line, “When a soul is created, it is forever.” In Boston and Chicago and in his homily at the Shrine of the Immaculate Conception he reaffirmed traditional Church teaching on marriage, sex, and the family.

Respect for the institution of marriage begins with respect for human life. Those who truly respect human life will bring life into this world only within the context of a stable marriage. “The great danger for family life, in the midst of any society whose idols are pleasure, comfort, and independence, lies in the fact that people close their hearts and become selfish.” He contrasted this danger to the security of mutual love that is abetted by Christian marriage. The need for a stable relationship between parents also rules out the legitimacy of extramarital and premarital sex.

While the Pope took unequivocal and unpopular stands, he did so in a manner that did not, at least on the surface, promote bitter divisiveness. He displayed no discouragement about the prospect that his words would have little or no immediate impact. On the contrary, he depicted the enormity of the challenges facing the modern world as a reason for the renewal of Christian evangelization. A settled will summoning the unsettled. “A challenge for our age,” he said, “and indeed for every age in the Church is to bring the message of the Gospel to the very core of our people’s lives...Christ is calling you one way or another to the service of life: to the love of God and your neighbor.”

A professional philosopher could not help but notice the subtle influence of Professor Karol Wojtyla on his papal discourse. It often takes considerable learning to make simple distinctions or to defend a basic principle. I have in mind the ease with which John Paul II made distinctions, defined his terms and displayed causal connections. Anyone familiar with the philosophical work of Professor Wojtyla will recognize that, in addition to his theological learning, most of his teaching in the United States on that first visit was a popularized version of his Lublin philosophical work. His teaching was clear because his mind was clear. His classical and scholastic training were evident, but so was his indebtedness to Edmund Husserl, Roman Ingarden and Max Scheler. Previous sojourns to the United States undoubtedly gave him a sense of the vernacular and aided his rhetoric. But then his whole career as a scholar and teacher had habituated him to seek contemporary modes of
exposition. It is evident that though he had his feet planted firmly in tradition, he could speak the language of his contemporaries.

As the world media covered his death and the subsequent papal conclave, we have been flooded with assessments taking the measure of his pontificate. It will be the work of future historians to adequately judge his reign, but this much can be said. Clearly he has not rolled back the secular juggernaut. If anything, the West is more materialistic than it was when he assumed office. Within the European Union, Christianity is in full retreat. Betrayed by its intellectuals, Europe is ill equipped to appreciate its past, let alone to defend itself from a resurgent Islam. Through the years and against all odds the Holy Father proclaimed, almost daily, proclaimed the Gospel to those willing to listen. His magisterial teaching, exemplified by Veritatis Splendor, Fides et Ratio, and Centesimus Annus will remain to enlighten future generations, becoming the textbooks of a renewed evangelization. When he assumed office, his intent was to teach over the heads of dissident and maverick theologians. Proclaiming the faithful were entitled to hear the Gospel in its purity, he called on the Church to be a beacon, not a weathervane.

The extraordinary coverage of his last days and the election of Benedict XVI are testimony to his success. His appeal to youth in life and in death is uncontested. Visibly he has touched the minds and hearts of many who will assume positions of leadership in the years to come. No doubt he has inspired others by the example of his teaching and courage to consider the priesthood. On this side of the Atlantic, in the midst of a superficial religiosity inspired by the evangelicals, we can find in the young a genuine desire for that learning essential to the perpetuation of the faith as students turn not only to the encyclicals but in increasing numbers to the pre-papal writings of Professor Karol Wojtyla.

This center as well as others is devoted to the perpetuation of John Paul II’s basic insights, insights grounded in a Catholic intellectual tradition enriched by acute observation. May it succeed in its effort to amplify and expand that teaching in the years to come both in its study of John Paul II and in the sources that have enriched his teaching.

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A Tale of Failed Feminism

Sister Renée Mirkes, OSF, PhD,
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The book version of The Vagina Monologues (VMs) has received fair to good reviews. Toasting Eve Ensler as the cheri du jour, the elite print media describe both the book and its authoress as witty, frank, funny, never offensive, and—of course—always honest.

Recently, Fr. John Neuhaus cryptically dismissed the dramatized version of the book as “women getting their kicks by talking as dirty as possible about their sexual fantasies” (First Things, May 2005, p. 64). While his assessment is not inaccurate, the impressionable collegians that pack playhouses to participate in V-Day (as in Vagina-Day) deserve a more comprehensive critique.

PC Pornography

In my view, the VMs belong in the genre of politically correct pornography—porn that is ideological sexual propaganda. Ensler’s book (and its dramatization) replace the traditional adult rules of sexual behavior with those of adolescents. Stripping away every last remnant of human goods such as postponed gratification and altruistic love, the VMs enshrine a sexual agenda that celebrates the basest of human instincts. As such, they are a part of the much larger contemporary cultural movement to define deviancy down.

And Ensler’s tome accomplishes this in a duplicitous way. It attempts (under the smoke and mirrors of literature, art and prevention of male violence) to put a respectable face on what is nothing more than pornographic text and drama. It throws
sexual explicitness—nearly always vulgar, trashy and voyeuristic—in the faces of everyone. To what end?

Well, instead of expanding the reader’s or participant’s knowledge and understanding of human sexuality, the VMs reduce sex from an experience that should be private, holistic, and rich in self-giving into one that is exhibitionist, solipsistic and a matter of mutual sexual gymnastics.

Overcoming Sexism

Ensler would probably agree with me that overcoming sexism, one of the principal ills of marriage and male-female relations in general, is what would truly empower women. Eve and I are probably not in accord, however, about the definition of sexism, and most assuredly don’t agree about how best to overcome this problem.

Here is my take on misogyny and how to end it. Sexism has been the root problem of married life throughout the ages. Please do not misunderstand me. I am not arguing that sexism has been the major difficulty of every marriage since the dawn of time. I am only asserting that sexism in marriage happened with enough frequency throughout recorded history that one can say it is a root problem. The male’s greater physical strength and his freedom from child care, especially in a fallen world, has led to two misconceptions: that of manhood as characterized by violence and lust and that of women as sex objects and slaves. As a consequence, the flotsam and jetsam of rape, polygamy, premarital promiscuity, adultery, wife battering, and child abuse litter our cultural shores.

Until women dedicate themselves to correcting the false notion of manhood, there will exist “the war of the sexes.” And the Ensler/radical feminist solution—distorting women’s identity by over-independence and seductiveness or by hidden or not so hidden hostility toward, competition with, and segregation from men—will not and cannot correct the problem.

We will end male violence when vices such as aggression and abuse are replaced by true masculine values: protection, partnership and fatherhood. But—and here’s the crux of the matter—true male virtues will flourish only when the natural female values of motherhood and companionship are honored.

Thus, to the extent that women are confused as to their nature and destiny, and I think Ensler is very confused on these matters, to that extent men are confused. That’s just the way it is (and the way it will always be) with male and female human beings, each only one-half of humanity, each trying to find his or her true self so each can discover what it means to complete—and be completed by—persons of the opposite sex.

As more and more women become who and what they are meant to be, more and more men will get the message—or catch the message. Some men, perhaps even most, will see the meaning of their masculinity in the “mirror” that women provide in their authentic female personas.

The Male-Female Relationship

I just declared that Ensler’s portrayal of women and the relationship of the sexes are fundamentally confused. Let me put some meat on the bones of that declaration.

First, while I would not want to underreport or suppress the evil of male violence against women, and while I think abusive men must be brought to justice, I also think the VMs describe the problem in a way that demonizes all men and canonizes all women. Ensler implies that women are incapable or innocent of all violence and abuse (whether toward self or others).

To set the record straight, the VMs need to address the following issues: 1) wives or female partners that verbally abuse and dominate husbands and 2) partner abuse amongst lesbians. Ensler also needs to galvanize women to work equally hard to resist what I would call hidden aggressors against them: contraception, sterilization, abortion, breast implants, starvation diets, etc. Eve needs to tell women that these activities and practices can kill them, injure them physically and spiritually, and destroy their unique feminine good of motherhood.

Second, the VMs hawk a lesbian genital sex which, just like failed heterosexual sex or lust, is a lose/lose or take/take kind of sex. Eve Ensler’s brand of sexual activity is a version of genitality that I cynically describe as “filling-station-sex,” an “all-about-me-sex” or a “fill-me-up-because-my-needs-must-be-met-sex.” Twisted sex, whether between two
heterosexuals or two homosexuals, is twisted sex. It simply cannot make men and women happy in the sense of helping them become complete persons.

Referring directly to the VMs text for examples: How will Eve Ensler’s espoused ideal of “women as sex workers serving women only” make women genuinely fulfilled? How will her description of a 24 year-old woman teaching a 16 year-old girl how-to-achieve-an-orgasm-sans-male further her goal of overcoming sexual abuse of women? And, in categorizing the latter experience as “good rape,” the 24 year-old woman as a “savior,” and the experience for the 16 year-old as “salvational,” does Ensler mean to say that only male pedophilia is wrong?

Third, blindsided by her agenda of male phobia and hatred, Ensler fails to discuss that there is another alternative beyond hedonistic sex, viz., sexual relations that represent mutual self-gift between two heterosexual, loving, caring persons who are capable of entering into a lifelong, two-in-one flesh union.

As any good parent will confirm, the step from being a spouse to being a parent is gargantuan. Parenthood matures the person almost on the spot, and only this maturity helps to realize the natural feminine and masculine potential of both spouses. A wife who is mother calls from her husband the fullness of his manhood: the gravity, dignity, sense of responsibility and sobriety which characterize a father. The husband who is father calls from his wife her unique richness: the warmth and fierce tenderness characteristic of a mother. The fact of the matter is, no matter how many orgasmic groans the VMs at-tribute to lesbian genitality, non-procreative sex can never speak the language of totality, the language of mutual, embodied self-gifting.

Fourth, Ensler implies that one’s sexuality is unimportant and that one’s gender is nothing more than a social construct. This view, in my mind, muddies the waters of building genuine male-female relationships and of finding a way out of sexism.

Certainly nothing could be more controversial today than the problem of discriminating between those sexual differences that are innate (and, therefore, unchangeable) and those that are due to cultural custom and liable to change. Eve Ensler, I would suggest, is among the many today who believe that only the mere anatomical differences between the sexes are innate (and, for EE, even these are fungible). All other divergences are cultural and can be altered with impunity.

However, when we carefully examine cultural variations regarding gender practices, we discover they are limited by fundamental biological factors: males are, on the average, physically larger and stronger than females; females alone bear and nurse the child and are needed by the small child for a number of years. Human experience teaches that, although these biological characteristics (to which men and women have also been psychologically adapted) are very general in character, they cannot be ignored without creating severe tensions in human development and sexual relationships.

Women and the Priesthood

In the introduction to the VMs, I read with great interest Gloria Steinem’s reveries (and, by extension, those of Ensler) about overcoming a sexist Church that bars women from ministerial priesthood. I am compelled to share the following insights from Fr. Benedict Ashley (“Gender and the Priesthood of Christ: A Theological Reflection,” Thomist [57, 3, 1997]).

Christ’s priesthood consisted in his central act of humiliated, sacrificial love and hence also in his entire life as Suffering Servant: renouncing his rightful claim to kingship and dominion in favor of servanthood. This seems the reason why, in choosing to be incarnate, the Second Person of the Trinity chose to become a male rather than a female human being—a fact which is the ultimate stumbling block for feminists in the mold of Gloria Steinem and Eve Ensler. They suppose that this implies that God prefers men to women! But this is to miss the notion that for God to become a woman in order to be a slave who died on the Cross would have been pointless since, in fact, in first century AD society, it was expected that women be slaves.

No, in order to overcome all human pride and masculine claim to tyrannical dominion, a claim which is part of the sinful, sexist glorification of power and violence, God had to become a male human being who could deliberately submit himself to servitude for the sake of the poor and powerless, such as women. Consequently, an essential qualification for priesthood is that the priest symbolize Christ in His masculine
The most recent globalization debate caught the Christian denominations of Europe by surprise, exposing both certain crisis-ridden phenomena but also a great readiness to participate in dialogue. While Islam displays a strong, self-assured claim to coherence and missionizing that easily surmounts the boundaries of religion, politics and science, Christianity is in a state of gradual retreat from society due to an ongoing process of secularization over the past decades. History is not a theological, philosophical science, nor is it one related to the study or discovery of general scientific laws, and thus it will not face the challenge at the abstract level of the concept. But it can, perhaps more often now than before in an age of increasing specialization, point out the fundamentals of the development of Western religion. When we address, for example, the relationship between Christian religion and politics, we discover a structure based on dialogue between secular attitudes and attitudes of belief, and beyond that a great historical variety, in which the relationship between faith and the world found its expression.

### Freedom and Justice: German Catholics and Their Concept of Democracy

**Presented at the VIII German/American Colloquium**

Winfried Becker, Professor of Modern and Contemporary History at the University of Passau, Germany.

By the late Middle Ages, Christian unity had developed into religious variety under the roof of a common Christianity. Various and sometimes rival theological schools of thought developed. Liturgies, festive traditions and even the honoring of saints varied between cities, territories, nations and nationalities. In contrast to this, in Germany the early modern age in the 16th and 17th centuries shows tendencies towards further establishing the faiths and institutions of the three largest denominations: Catholicism, Lutheranism (Confession Augustan) and Calvinism.

Germany is one of the few countries in Europe that allowed equal coexistence between denominations as early as 1555. The Religious Peace of Augsburg separated the areas of religious dogma and political-social coexistence. Rulers of both Protestant and Catholic territories were forbidden to use violence to settle religious differences. This critical interposition did not arise from a modern, secular view of the state or modern views of tolerance, but rather because the compromise reached to preserve the peace in religious matters is based, according to the Religious Peace of Augsburg of 1555, on the Christians’ duty to live peacefully and respectfully with their neighbors.
The tendency to liberate the state from its Christian foundations first began to spread in the 18th century. Yet despite the Enlightenment and the differences between the various faiths, the Holy Roman Empire still retained the character of a Christian State. The churches had their own vested properties and rights. *Germania sacra* was dominated by a coexistence and cooperation between the clerical and secular powers. Even the less powerful social structures, such as small states, estates of noblemen, monasteries, were protected by the guarantees of the imperial Constitution that maintained a centuries-old right of tradition.

The “Revolution of Ideas of the 18th Century” (Heribert Raab) reached its climax in France with the Great Revolution, in Germany with the Great Secularization of 1803-1806. Instead of a social upheaval as in France, Germany saw its secular princes expand their possessions and powers and ascend to the position of keepers of state sovereignty. The clerical princes disappeared, monasteries were disbanded. Many bishoprics had only temporary appointments. Following the secularization of 1803, many Catholics found themselves in Protestant states without any guarantee of their religious rights following the change.

**Secularization and striving for freedom**

The Great Secularization had a special meaning for the start of the Catholic consolidation movement. The individual states achieved an increase in power. They ruled, conscious of their own sovereignty, the *cura animarum*, or subjected without further concern the *iura circa sacra*, i.e., the special legal and pastoral matters of their Catholic subjects, to their bureaucratic access. Catholics striving for religious freedom arose to counter this. This began in the state councils in the Vormarz period (from 1815—the Viennese Congress and the end of Napoleon) prior to the March revolution of 1848 and the early public association movement, and came out in the revolution of 1848 and in the debates over the constitution of the North German league and the Empire (1866–1871) as well as in the cultural struggle. It found its fulfillment in the Church Articles of the Weimar constitution. If one applies the criteria of a truly liberal, not secularly constricted national-liberal viewpoint, one notices in these efforts a tug-of-war over a central basic right, whose success, i.e., its inclusion in the constitution, was to a great extent decisive for the modernization of the state.

But this movement was complex and is to be understood not only according to the predominant thought patterns of an anti-state emancipation. According to Adam Müller and Novalis, and starting with Joseph Gorres in the direct investigation of the effects of the revolution in Germany, we see a criticism of the one-sided view of mankind in the Enlightenment. The traditions of the Christian religion should no longer be seen from the viewpoint of a flat rationalism as a hindrance to progress, a relict of the past and impediment to freedom. It belonged much more to the concept of life; and the interdependence of the various areas of life should find some consideration when the state commenced its rearrangement of the relationships in politics and business, in science and in society.

When the bishops of Cologne and Mainz, Johannes Geissel and Wilhelm Emanuel von Ketteler, demanded freedom for the Church and its teachings as part of the constitutional movement of 1848, they were not demanding delineation or total autonomy in the sense of opposing the existing system. To this extent one cannot draw any parallels to claims currently propagated by certain radical representatives of non-Christian religions.

Geissel and von Ketteler wanted rather to present an up-to-date definition of the role that Christians had come to play in shaping public life over the course of a long historical development. They sought to create the conditions for conveying the Christian image of humanity in civil society. This required freedom of association, freedom to form associations and organizations, freedom of the press and the ability to retain or found religious schools. Some of these demands were addressed in the constitution of 1849. This was the start of a line that led to the anchoring of the constitutional position of religious communities within the democratic state. They were guaranteed their specific sphere of influence in 1849, in...
1919 in the Weimar constitution and in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. They have the guaranteed right to convey the values and principles of coexistence that every free community relies upon, but which such a free community must not dictate out of respect for the citizens’ right to religious and philosophical self-determination.

With their Pius Associations, petitions and the formation of a General Congress of the Catholic Associations in 1848, and with the parliamentary union of Catholic representatives attained in the Paulskirche in Frankfurt, the Catholics and their leaders took an active part in the constitutional movement. The exclusion of Austria made the Catholics a minority in the so-called “lesser Germany” of Bismarck and the Kaiser. Despite their repeatedly announced regret that the previous “major Catholic power” of Austria was not participating, Catholics did not adopt any maximalist or extraterritorial religious positions. Rather, Bishop von Ketteler expressed understanding for the political development and loyalty towards the new Hohenzollern empire. In return he expected the Catholics to be granted full recognition and the right to exist in the new state. Here he put his faith in the Prussian constitution to regulate matters.

Das Zentrum—paving the way for a democratic state

On Ketteler’s calls for peace were lost in the turmoil of the cultural struggle. Catholics were once again made the object of politics. After the introduction of universal voting rights, Bismarck saw himself and his works in danger if the Catholic element of the population, which resided primarily in those areas that most supported the “greater German” solution (the south of Germany), could unite and act against him as opposition. So he pieced together a domestic policy alliance with the national Liberals and those parts of the Prussian Conservatives that had followed him along the way to German unification. German Catholicism as organized in the Deutsche Zentrumspartei in 1870/71 could, in his eyes, have become the breeding ground for demands of a right in co-determination for a broad range of political forces that he did not want and could hardly have controlled. The anti-church laws of the cultural struggle provided, among other things, for the extensive curtailing of state contributions for parsonages in Prussia, suspending training of new priests, restricting the right of the pulpit and that of church offices in their interaction with Rome, the deportation of the Jesuits and other orders.

However, the spectrum of political disputes also extended well beyond purely Catholic concerns. The Zentrumspartei did indeed have a political program and immediately assumed clear legal views. The party called itself the “Constitution Party” and based its program on their election slogan of *Justitia fundamentum regnorum*. They supported a “federal character” for Germany, “civil and religious freedoms” for all citizens.

The representatives of the Zentrumspartei recognized and also used the podium of the parliament and the potential of the press to counter the cultural struggle. Party leader Ludwig Windthorst proved to be a brilliant parliamentary strategist, in that he pointed out the connection between the Catholics’ demands and the general postulates of freedom, equality and parity. He demanded freedom for the Catholic Church, the Lutheran Church and the religion of the Israelites. At the same time he criticized the lawmaking practices in the Prussian state: Zentrumspartei delegates contributed greatly to making politics more public, more exposed to open discourse and subject to exchange of arguments.

To its neoliberal admirers, the Hohenzollern state was the summit of the avidly sought after transition to a unified national culture. After its victory over France, the Hohenzollern state was said to symbolize a Germanism that had demonstrated its superiority over Romanism. It also was said to represent at once the long-renounced power of the German state and a Protestant culture of individuality which had overcome the slavery of the clerically dominated Middle Ages. The Zentrumspartei developed a countering theory of state which, sober and exact, removed of false and pretentious historical constructions, strove to organize community life according to the general principles of extratemporal rights and assigned the state the task of balancing social interests.
The Christian view of humanity: basis for social and political Catholicism and the Catholic world view

Political Catholicism was formed over and above any delineations and clarifications on the part of any who attempted to bring about a national or social substitute religion. It came to stand out in the Reichstag in that it always adopted an independently defined social standpoint in disputes with Bismarck’s social policies. The Zentrumspartei endorsed neither Bismarck’s dream of the state-dependent worker nor the determinism of Marxist theory, that the paradisiacal final state of just distribution of wealth is to be achieved when the working classes, via revolution, finally come to own the means of production. Constructive proposals on the part of the Zentrumspartei for accident insurance, pension and health insurance were equally directed at restricting too great a state intervention, at overcoming the patronage of the factory owners and at ending the class struggle. They resulted from a view of humanity that remained aware of religious and Christian ties and further developed inherited concepts of justice and fairness. They viewed the person as a whole. Speakers of the Zentrumspartei, especially the philosopher Georg von Hertling, referred to the basic rights of each individual. The natural rights of the individual are exercised and restricted based on the moral equality of mankind as created by God. Subsequently, the Zentrumspartei did not see any class or race of people as preferred. From that point on, this clear view of humanity characterized to a great extent political Catholicism’s thinking on the state. It developed immunizing powers against all ideologies’ artificially created or maintained inequality to the point of rejecting teachings of a master race under National Socialism, whereby mankind is divided by blood and descent into useful and useless elements.

The political religions, which began in the 19th century and completed the phenomenon of totalitarianism in the 20th century, were at first determined by specific philosophical developments. The currents of agnostic and materialistic thought had been spreading since the middle of the 19th century. Their representatives disputed the contents of the Bible, including the story of creation, and finally the transcendental sense of the universe and our human, earthly life. Chance and matter were now seen as the elements that guided cosmic and physical processes. Catholic academics disagreed with this new “mechanical explanation of nature” especially where it shoved aside the belief in an all-powerful God as scientifically untenable. They concluded that such premises and conditions could lead only to the conclusion that science and faith were to be completely separated from each other, that culture had a purely secular basis—clearing the way for the new belief in the saving powers of the nation and national culture—and that the previous, differentiated relationship between faith and science was a hindrance to development of a secular culture of knowledge based on its own premises.

Because the representatives of political Catholicism took a clear position regarding these challenges because they maintained their position as a clearly disputed minority in the political, social and philosophical arena, the Zentrumspartei developed into the generally recognized representative for German Catholics in the 1870’s. This was expressed poignantly in the image or the caricature of the besieged Zentrum tower. The German Zentrumspartei even served as a model for the delayed formation of the Catholic party in Italy.

Threats prove of value in the Weimar Republic

The way of the Zentrumspartei until its dissolution was marked by maintaining its own independence while striving to achieve integration. The tendency towards integration reached a climax in the patriotic fervor of the First World War, in which German Catholics joined in solidarity with their people and Kaiser against their French fellow Catholics. But they found it easier than the German Protestants to part with the abdicating Kaiser during the upheaval of 1918/19. Together with the non-revolutionary elements of the Social Democrats and the left-liberal German Democratic Party, the German Center Party (Deutsche Zentrumspartei) stood on the basis of the Weimar Republic, creating and maintaining it. They campaigned for a moderate foreign policy, a con-
tinuation of social policies and for a Christian approach to society and education. The Zentrumspartei was closely involved in coalitions with all parties. It was present in various coalition cabinets and, with Joseph Wirth, Wilhelm Marx and Heinrich Bruning, even provided significant, albeit not outstanding Chancellors. Above all, Wilhelm Marx personified politics of moderation, reason and selfless reconciliation out of a spirit of moderation.

However, Catholicism during the Weimar Republic also showed some ambivalent traits. On one hand, the Zentrumspartei and its Bavarian sister party could not escape the widespread tendency of the time that worked towards some sort of emergency dictatorship or an authoritarian regime not dependent on a series of changing parliamentary majorities. On the other hand, certain developments within Catholicism resulted in a “longing for community” (Alois Baumgartner). The aftereffects of a romantic universalism became concretized in the “holistic theory” of Othmar Spann. In individual cases it can be seen that the Catholics, organized in a political party, were less susceptible to National Socialism than those who explicitly spoke out against the tried and tested “Catholic parties”, accusing them of misusing their religion for political goals and disrupting the national community. This showed the success of decades of political education.

Although the external political situation for this state improved by the end of the 1920’s, the undemocratic, radical parties had already won too much support. Criticism of the Weimar parliamentary “system” was heard from violent politicians ready for civil war all the way to the highest circles of politics and business. Ongoing inner differences, religious and philosophical tensions were also added. And then came the world economic crisis.

Faith and National Socialism—two irreconcilable views

The Zentrumspartei, like other political parties, fell victim to Hitler’s aggressive policy of bringing parties into line. Article 32 of the Imperial Concordat (after all, already the third international treaty under Adolf Hitler) required that priests, who were traditionally strongly represented in the leadership of the party, refrain from taking part in politics. In spite of that, it is not completely correct to say that Hitler and the Curia came together to dig the grave for political Catholicism in Germany out of affinity for their authoritarian convictions. There was a difference between the quality of authority in the church and that of the authority as exercised by the state. Another great difference, initially covered up by Hitler, separated National Socialism and the Catholic Church in the area of philosophy. Primarily, the Curia saw itself confronted with increasing, threatening incursions into the life of the Catholic Church in Germany. In this emergency and strained situation, the Curia saw it necessary to take on a duty that it could not delegate to anyone, namely to take up responsibility for the undiminished maintenance of religious life and to try and achieve corresponding legal guarantees. In the emergency situation that arose, the head of the Church assumed care for German Catholics. Religion was separated from politics, but according to the Concordat, it was to be granted a protected place within society, albeit in an apolitical form.

Further developments brought to light an irreconcilable contrast and conflict of goals between the Catholic Church and National Socialism. The very activities of Catholic organizations, schools, newspapers and journals were diametrically opposed to the National Socialists’ totalitarian claims.

There were attempts to redefine National Socialism as a philosophically neutral or opportunistic form of rule. These overlooked the principal intolerance with which this political religion fought against the Christian faith and the Church. National Socialism consistently attacked Christian teachings because of their Judaic origins, as witnessed by the origin of its founder and the Old Testament. In addition, there figured the old, nationally motivated charges against the German Catholics, who were internationally organized and thus predestined to betray the Fatherland. The National Socialist regime was more than a philosophically neutral ruling structure, but saw religious faith as an opponent to its own views on the meaning of life. Helmuth James Graf von Moltke noted in his death cell that his crime consisted, according to Roland Freisler, not of any verifiable activities against the regime, but rather in his faith in God’s highest determination for mankind,
which makes man incapable of making the final sacrifice for a Greater German Reich that relied only on itself. At the center of National Socialism stood not only the extermination of the Jewish people but also combating Christianity, whose suppression in politics and society meant curtailing their democratic freedoms. The connection between religious faith and political freedom was established by the regime itself in a negative manner. What was more important to the men and women of the Christian-motivated resistance than to own up to this connection, to turn it to the positive and finally to make it useful to the future constitution of a democratic Germany?

The new relationship between Catholics and Protestants after 1945

Unlike any other German state, The Federal Republic of Germany is based on political lessons, experiences and upheavals of the recent past. Their joint persecution under National Socialism led Catholics and Protestants to resolve themselves to the fundamental similarities of their faiths. After the crimes and aberrations of the politics of violence and racism, they felt compelled to introduce Christian standards of value into political life, and in doing so also to distance themselves from previous value-neutral political concepts.

This ideological reorientation was complemented by strategic considerations directed towards occupying leadership positions and participation in government. Competition between the newly formed and re-formed political parties began with the assumption of responsibility in 1949, at first with the cities and states. The Social Democrats’ claim to leadership was based on their persecution under National Socialism. The Christian Democrats, with a core of former Zentrumspartei followers, also philosophical opponents to Hitler’s regime, sought to form a broad civil center to overcome the previous political and religious divides and to ward off any renewed totalitarianism from whichever side it may come.

The Catholics’ share of the history of the Federal Republic of Germany is not extensive but effective. Although often set back due to their particularistic origins under the Kaiser or in the Weimar Republic, they moved more to the center of the West German state, even though it comprised only a part of the previous nation. Their higher share of the population afforded them a better position, without construing any causal connection between Catholic denominationalism and the founding of West Germany. In 1950, Catholics made up 45.2% of the population, with Lutherans comprising 51.2%. Catholics went from being citizens to being citizens of democracy (Rudolf Morsey), and played a key role in determining the domestic and foreign policy course this state would take. The Rhineland Catholic Konrad Adenauer had enough distance from the Germans’ traditionally nationalistic fixation on their own sovereignty to undertake a new approach that fitted in with the existing global political situation and dispensed with a separatist approach. Adenauer immediately embraced cooperation with other European nations and with NATO. This decision, not taken alone, but without a referendum, regained for Germany the very respect and recognition that Adenauer’s predecessors as Chancellor had failed to gain using entirely different means.

The long era after the Second World War, which is again subdivided by several markings such as 1990 and 2001, differs essentially from all previous periods when we view the history of the faith. Strongly pronounced denominational antagonisms were fortunately a thing of the past. Instead, Christianity entered into a state of tension with the rapidly secularizing societies of many European countries, especially since the end of the 1960’s. In many cases, practicing Christians have become a weak minority.

Especially for Germany it can be established that Catholicism has lost its traditional forms of existence in society and politics, developed in the 19th century and reaching even further back. A reanimation of a social and intellectual, argumentative presence would be a major task. It would also consist of anchoring an awareness of subsidiarity, solidarity, personality, self-organization and self-responsibility of social forces in the various areas of life.

In conclusion, it can be stated that trying to simply whisk away Christian faiths from the overall picture of modern Europe would be akin to devising
a guide to losing track of historical reality. There are in fact various lines of connection between politics and religion. Mutual toleration of faiths, a coexistence of Church and state that serves the separation of powers, the teaching of human equality that is based in each individual, all derive to a great extent from the influences of Christianity, even if it cannot be denied that violence and intolerance have been practiced in the name of Christ. With the disappearance of the Christian state and the increasing separation of church and state, representatives of the Christian faiths found it indispensable to seek to achieve constitutional guarantees of freedom for church activities. In taking this approach, German Catholics contributed to the development of the democratic plurality of the modernizing state. Without intermingling politics and theology, one can reach some understanding of this development by considering whether Christianity in comparison to the other gentile religions is not itself a religion of freedom and liberation, namely a religion of a true successor of Christ (“Let the dead bury their dead”).

National Socialism showed most clearly that the struggle against the churches was also to the same extent a campaign against democratic freedoms. In the Federal Republic it was possible to bring religious freedom and democracy together in a positive context, prompted by an enhanced awareness based on experiences under dictatorship that democracy requires basic rights of freedom and actively takes part in realizing them. Wherever people and groups professed to the transcendent religion of the Christian faith, they were probably most able to resist the temptations of political religions and modern idolatries. A traditional understanding of religiosity may contribute greatly to the continued existence of a free society, because it ventures the social acceptance of each individual personality and makes this part of the foundation of their faith.

It is not the profession of a transcendental faith that makes people unable to take advantage of freedom or of the free thought of science, but rather when faith is delivered onto an immanent national, racial or class goal as defined by certain ideologies. Here we must not make any rash analogy to the Christian claim to the whole or the inner self or to place it on the same level as the totalitarian claims of inner world healing theories, as it was defined by National Socialism, Fascism or Communism. Such so-called historical thinking erases the boundaries between Christian religiosity and the totalitarian claims of political systems.

Disagreements over the interpretation of the past often have significance for the orientation in the present. Equating political with transcendental religiosity is very much an invitation to indifference and could reinforce the present impetus towards secularization that set in all over Europe by the end of the 1960’s (or earlier). In certain circles it is considered good form to profess apathy or great reserve in questions of religion or philosophy. Naturally, skepticism is not out of place whenever someone in the sciences, for example, prematurely announces the latest truths. But a general indifference that one takes to be the norm is of no use to society and does not promote any striving for truth and secured realization, which accompanies a goal-oriented and results-driven activity, whether wanted or not.

**Outlook**

Has the question of the relationship between faith and society not become obsolete in the face of entirely new developments and problem areas? Overnight, globalization placed Germany under a previously unknown pressure to compete. Unemployment among young people, especially university graduates, is currently widespread. The relation between wages for the working populace and transfer income is dramatically worsening. The generational contract exists now only on the social experts’ paper.

With the birth rate in decline for several years and ancillary wage costs ever increasing, the social state requires basic reforms. We must reanalyze our own requirements in light of what workers are satisfied with in previously industrially underdeveloped countries. Work must become affordable again in Germany, where a process of de-industrialization has already begun.

It is in the light of these new challenges that we see that there is still a need for transcendent-Christian motivated standards in our society that go beyond the private sphere. Society’s moral foundations and references require a theoretical basis of argumentation, for which Christian teaching and
natural rights have always provided arguments worthy of discussion. The feeling of responsibility for one another must not be lost. The balance between performance and claims should be re-established, room should be made for care. Especially in “Old Europe”, the state should invest more in youth.

Only a resolved return to the precepts of economic and social reason in an era of unavoidable globalization will secure the survival of our tried-and-tested values. This includes retaining our own personal center and identity, responsibility for the whole, not least life in and with the family, which had already provided a natural support for earlier generations.

How will we manage to solve these challenges of the future without employing the current forms of interaction from religion and politics? In assuming Christian responsibility, one can hardly do without proven forms of interaction and intermediaries, to consider only the differences between differing bodies of law. After reunification the process of founding the Federal Republic could not be repeated to the same extent in the New States as far as the quick, spontaneous and permanent establishment of Christian-Democratic parties in the area of the former East Germany is concerned. Christian forces turned to the Christian-Democratic Union, but also to the Social Democrats and the Greens. At first, the Christian Democrats had considerable support from voters who did not belong to either major faith. This then contributed to their decline, as they did not have core constituency that had been loyal to them for decades as had the Catholics in West Germany. In state elections in Thuringia the CDU went from 51% in 1999 to 43% in 2004, the ex-communist PDS took second place (1999 21.3%, 2004 26.1%) ahead of the Social Democrat SPD (1999 18.5%, 2004 14.5%). In the state of Brandenburg the CDU share declined from 36.31% in the federal elections of 1990 (SPD 32.9%, PDS 11.03%) to 22.26% in the federal elections of 2002 (SPD 46.37%, PDS 17.24%). The Union fared best in Brandenburg with local and European elections, two not unimportant fields of politics. An uncalled-for wave of nostalgia for the old East Germany, the return to the familiar socialization forms such as the “youth ordination” and disappointment over the slow adoption of living standards to the already no longer rosy conditions in the west seem to have muddied the view of the large transfer payments that have been made by the “Old Federal Republic” since 1990.

The often-bemoaned religious deficit in the New States cannot have been wholly responsible for these declines. A study conducted in December 2002 by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation found, among citizens of eastern and western Germany, an approval of the influence of Christian values on politics (77%) and for retaining the reference to God in the preamble to the Constitution (56%). 57% of West Germans and 30% of East Germans agreed with the statement that man was created by God. The results of the survey indicate on one hand that parts of Germany have become a missionary land where the gospel must be spread anew, on the other hand, that the ground that the churches have to work is still fertile. It seems necessary to spread or establish the practice and knowledge of the Christian religions. But a party political option that is trustworthy in its presentation and historically proven, which despite its fallibility still measures itself against the Christian view of humanity, releases powers of impression of a specific type. ✠
ARTICLES

The Demolition of Man

Terry Graves is a novelist and essayist living near Pittsburgh. His novel, Rain in Hell, is about original sin without, he hopes, being yet another fruit of it.

In his excellent C.S. Lewis and the Catholic Church, Joseph Pearce devoted 18 pages to Lewis’ space trilogy, yet nowhere did Pearce mention the lectures, later published as The Abolition of Man, that embodied what Lewis elsewhere called “the serious point” behind his trilogy. In Lewis’ own words, in a letter to an Anglican nun, the “serious point” is: “… that thousands of people in one way or another depend on some hope of perpetuating and improving the human race for the whole meaning of the universe—that a ‘scientific’ hope for defeating death is a real threat to Christianity…”

Sixty years later, it is now tens or hundreds of millions who depend on that hope. Some go further, believing, as Jacques Barzun put it, “the fallacy… that the method of science must be used on all forms of experience and, given time, will settle every issue.” Of course, science cannot explain even its own bases: why matter and energy exist and why they are not chaotic. (Those of us who reply, “God,” might be told our answer begs those questions. Yet, even if He does, those questions persist.) Still, this dependence on science is to be expected, if only because so few comprehend an alternative: George Sayer wrote in Jack, his biography of Lewis, that few members of the audience at the Abolition lectures understood them – and this was at a university, in 1943. And in that same letter Lewis noted that of about sixty reviews of the space trilogy’s first novel, “… only 2 showed any knowledge that my idea of the fall of the Bent One was anything but an invention of my own.”

That same sixty years later, in this far less literate era, even fewer would trouble to pry Lewis’ “serious point” out of a long essay like The Abolition of Man. Still fewer would find it hidden in the fantastic elements of the space trilogy’s entertaining novels, set on, successively, Mars and Venus and in a literally demonic institution in Britain, the National Institute for Co-ordinated Experiments, or N.I.C.E.

This reluctance, or inability, to grapple with “the serious point” is calamitous. What Lewis feared and foresaw is no longer science fiction: underway are numerous scientific and pseudo-scientific efforts whose purported goals are to perpetuate and improve the human race and to achieve personal immortality. This essay will not debate the morality of any one of these efforts, because, taken together, their scope is so broad and their ambitions so grandiose that it will be the rare Christian who will find all of them morally acceptable.

Instead, my own serious points are – another thing science cannot do is judge morality, especially of its own actions; these scientific efforts have significant moral implications; and that each Christian must act, openly and loudly, on them. Those of us who meet on the common ground of what Lewis called “mere Christianity” and certainly of his “Tao” may disagree on specifics about these efforts. But whatever each decides must be done, must be done soon, because there are more, and stronger, challenges than most realize.

Unnatural Family Planning

In one of Bob Thaves’ recent “Frank and Ernest” cartoons the two stood in front of a “Biogenetic Research Lab.” Frank complained to Ernest, “When I ask about cloning all I get is doubletalk.” Of the efforts to remodel mankind, those employing some form of genetic manipulation are the best known to us in the comic strip reading public, thanks to the controversy over cloning and stem cell research. But the very unfamiliarity of these terms and their careless, even deceptive, use are among the reasons large-scale embryonic cloning has come upon us so quickly.

To clarify the doubletalk: the word embryo denotes, in humans, the first eight weeks after conception. As the National Institutes of Health summarized: stem cells are unspecialized cells, found in both human embryos and adults, that can develop into specialized cells and can also reproduce themselves for an extended period. Because of their potential for curing diseases, the Federal government
supports research on stem cells from both adults and embryos. Harvard magazine, in its July-August 2004 issue, explained that embryonic stem cells derive from, “a ball of four to 50 undifferentiated cells that forms in the first few days after a sperm fertilizes an egg.” Writers such as Susan Estrich and Mortimer Zuckerman make much of the allegation – with no attribution – that fertility clinics in the U.S. have 400,000 frozen embryos that are likely to be “discarded” – that is, killed. (As we shall see, these 400,000 embryos would not begin to fulfill the demand.)

There are two kinds of human cloning—research, or therapeutic, limited to a few cells for use in research or a medical therapy, and reproductive, where cells would be allowed to mature and be born. However, as David A. Prentice, a professor of biology at Indiana State University, told a committee of the Colorado legislature, the methods and the clones produced are precisely the same, differing only in how far the process is allowed to proceed. The intent of the cloning of and research with embryonic stem cells is not to treat the embryo, whose cells are instead used to treat others—after the embryo is killed. In stark contrast, adult stem cells are harmlessly extracted from various parts of the body, such as blood, marrow, and even fat. Research with embryos has gone on around the world, despite 1998 and 2001 Presidential orders that restrict its Federal funding (and hence its frequency) in the U.S.

Despite the continuation of embryonic research, all the existing medical treatments instead use adult stem cells. There is no reason to presume this will change: in October 2004, 57 biomedical researchers from major laboratories all over the United States wrote a letter (copy supplied me indirectly by one of the signers) to then presidential candidate John Kerry. The letter warned that cloned embryonic stem cells are unstable, spontaneously accumulate genetic abnormalities, are prone to uncontrollable growth and tumor formation, as well as “serious and potentially lethal side-effects,” and may be rejected by even the host that produced them. As these researchers were not, so to speak, Heinz 57, their letter received no media attention.

*Our Bodies/Our Selves*’ Judy Norigian, who is pro-abortion, opposed research with embryos at www.sfbg.com/38/53/cover_stem_cell.html, citing the health risks for women who provide the eggs to create the embryos. In his “The Science of Human Cloning” (www.stemcellresearch.org/testimony/prentice_03-02-05.pdf) David Prentice spelled it out, estimating that treating just the 17 million diabetics in the United States would need, at the very least, 85 million (not 400,000!) women to provide eggs. (Not that many American women vote.) Providing the eggs, Prentice continued, would carry with it significant health risks for the women and likely lead to their commercial exploitation, both here and abroad.

The only certainty, then, about embryonic cell research is that millions of women must risk their health to donate eggs and a like number of fetuses will be killed. These are among the moral issues to which Christians should react, openly and loudly. But “cloning” and “stem cell” research are but two of many biomedical research efforts with moral implications. The Center for Genetics and Society (CGS) surveys them at www.genetics-and-society.org/analysis/index.html. Along with the many sites that quote David Prentice, the huge CGS site is invaluable, because despite the Center’s preferences—it favors research cloning of embryonic stem cells—its presentations are thorough, skeptical, and evenhanded. Its analysis begins with this warning: “The motivations and visions driving the development of genetic technologies are varied. Some are quite troubling. Utopian beliefs, economic potentials, and exaggerated medical promise are playing as much of a role as the desire to alleviate human suffering.” To this I add an open and loud, Amen.

There is another, more subtle motivation. More than four years ago, the pro-abortion writer Anna Quindlen hoped in her Newsweek column that “thinking—really thinking—about the use of the earliest embryo for life-saving research might bring a certain long-overdue relativism to discussions of abortion across the board.” The cant that abortion should be safe, legal, and rare never made any sense: if safe and legal, why should it be rare? The “exaggerated medical promise” of embryonic stem cells will update the cant, and abortion will be touted as safe, legal, and useful.

The Center for Genetics and Society lists dozens of “troubling” technologies and dystopian urges, such as transhumanism and post-humanism; gender selection; gene transfer experiments; and inherit-
able genetic modification (IGM). About the last, four American bio-ethicists asserted that people should not be prohibited from creating genetically enhanced children (with, for example, higher IQ’s) and went on to argue that since this practice will likely create dramatic inequities, public policies should be adopted that make IGM freely available to all. University of Texas law school professor John Robertson introduced “procreative liberty” as a legal and ethical principle that argues against prohibitions on reproductive cloning and IGM. Princeton biologist Lee Silver champions both and couples these with a libertarian social and political philosophy, arguing that a future in which humanity segregates into genetically engineered sub-species, the “GenRich” and the “Naturals,” is “inevitable… whether we like it or not.”

Ethic Intimidation

An aside about ethics: nowadays no one qualifies as (or wants to be) a moralist, while just about anybody can hang out his shingle as an ethicist – and expect to attract well-heeled clients. When Nobel laureate James Watson was trying to reassure Fr. Richard John Neuhaus about the Human Genome Project, he told Neuhaus that the project had set aside several million dollars “to get the best ethicists money can buy.” That a profession or academic specialty happens to include members who bill themselves as ethicists does not mean there is a consensus about what its ethics are. Even if there is, they need not bind its members. For example, when Harvard’s provost recently created a committee to review embryonic stem cell research because of the ethical issues it raised, its chair said, “Our starting point is academic freedom”—thereby effectively ending any reason for his committee’s existence. (Indeed, when a group decides it needs a code of ethics, it is likely too late to rein in its members, and the code and its ethicists will be less conscience than camouflage.)

And while a body of ethics can be a more stringent application of ordinary morality, it can also be a gentrified, upscale body of exceptions to morality, or even a low-carb substitute for it. A profession’s code of ethics does not trump morality, is not binding on the greater society. As Kierkegaard wrote in a similar context: “What Plato says on immortality really is profound, reached after deep study, but then poor Plato had no authority whatsoever.” These issues are far too important for us to leave to low-carb ethicists, bio- or otherwise, who have no authority whatsoever.

Mini-Me

Another technology (and issue) is human reproductive cloning – allowing the clone to mature and be born. The CGS names several groups that support it, such as the Raelian cult, which advertises, none too convincingly, that it has successfully cloned 13 human babies. But far more oppose reproductive cloning, including the CGS itself and others who strongly support research cloning: Pitt’s Gerald Schatten, who led the team that in December 2004 first cloned (through the blastocyst stage) a non-human primate, told Science News that he and most other researchers are “unhesitatingly” against human reproductive cloning. Schatten and “most other researchers” may believe that a cloned human baby will go from being one kind of chimera straight to the other, from Raelian myth to real monster.

Despite what these trained professionals say, those readers who still wish to try this at home can go to eBay or, say, Stratagene of La Jolla, California (www.stratagene.com). There they will find a helpful instruction manual, “Human Clone Collection,” along with warranty information and instructions on how to order Stratagene’s “Products.” (The word embryo never appears in the manual.) Though the site warns its “Products” are for research only, they are, as Prentice said, precisely the same as clones intended for reproduction. If businesses and the GenRich are to treat children as “Products,” will we then have IQ wars as we do automobile horsepower wars? Will Consumer Reports, which recently referred to unborn children as “uterine content,” rate each year’s new models? And what will happen to the inevitable “Product” recalls?

About the qualms of people like Schatten, David L. Bump wrote Science News, “The researchers charging into this field think that we should pass laws to keep others from abusing their research. Ha! Do they really think they can keep this genie in a bot-
credible scientists trying to make Mini-Me. Stanford lab technician tells the hapless Ernest, "Sorry. We've examined your DNA and it's labeled 'Do not refill.'" A pro-eugenics group, Future Generations (www.eugenics.net) noted that Theognis of Megara wrote a poem in its praise about 520 B.C., and notions of inherited nobility always relied on its supposed efficacy. And not just nobility: in his Millennium Felipe Fernandez-Armesto noted that in the Communist China of the mid-1960’s, “class enmity was held to be genetically transmitted…” In the West, eugenics was popular and respectable from the mid-1800’s through the 1930’s, thanks to people themselves as respectable as Charles Darwin’s cousin, Francis Galton, later knighted for his studies.

Most might believe eugenics died in the bunker with Hitler, but it did not. In 2004 Rolf Winau, a professor at a medical school in Berlin, wanted his colleagues to “exorcize their demons” about eugenics. Winau then let his own demons out for some exercise, as he urged researchers to overcome their moral revulsion against eugenics (http://www.lifesite.net/ldn/2004/jun/04062806.html). But Germany has some of the strongest laws against eugenics and genetic manipulation, far stronger than the United States. The Center for Genetics and Society listed (as a cautionary) the many organizations and academics espousing eugenics in one form or another; most are here, in Britain especially, or in Europe. Some of its proponents, such as psychologist Richard Lynn, focus on the desire of parents to have children who are intelligent and free of genetic disease. Another quoted, with seeming approval, a 1939 reference to some unspecified humans as “noxious animals” (this from Harvard professor E.A. Hooten, by the way, not Hitler). Other sources the Center surveyed seem at least tinged with racism and anti-Semitism, and all exude a dull arrogance.

It is the disabled, the canaries in any eugenics coal mine, who most fear its current resurgence. On http://www.h-net.org/~disabil/ a posting noted that, for example, Britain’s People Against Eugenics, or PAE, fear that cloning or other genetic manipulation will lead to Nazi-like eugenics and the abortion of disabled children. For good reason: in the fall of 2004 the Royal Society, no less, sponsored a confer-

**Human Husbandry**

The second approach to improving the species is eugenics, the control over who gets to mate with whom and how many children, if any, they may have—as in another Bob Thaves cartoon when a lab technician tells the hapless Ernest, “Sorry. We’ve
ence whose topics included—“Why we are morally obliged to genetically enhance our children,” “Gay science: choosing our children’s sexual orientation,” and “Preventing the existence of people with disabilities.”

Nevertheless, the PAE hastened to add that it “… supports women’s right to choose abortion…” In effect, therefore, PAE supports the abortion of only healthy babies. So we have been practicing eugenics on a large scale for decades: abortion is a kind of post-coital eugenics. In his Birth Control in America: The Career of Margaret Sanger, David M. Kennedy quoted Sanger as saying, “Birth control is nothing more or less than the facilitation of the process of weeding out of the unfit, or preventing the birth of defectives or of those who will become defectives.”

Necessarily, eugenicists will adjudge some genetic traits as defects, others as benefits, and what was once the one may become the other. Just a few years ago, some behavior was to be excused because there supposedly was a “fat” gene or a “gay” gene. Will these be subject to manipulation? Deletion? Enhancement? These judgments about “defectives” are not just scientific or political; they will, or at least should, begin as moral questions, about which Christians should be open and loud.

Ipsilon

Yet another question science cannot answer is why humans are conscious of self and surroundings; that is, what is the evolutionary benefit of mind, of consciousness? (Science alone cannot even prove to me that anyone else possesses consciousness. And how do you know that I am conscious?) Without consciousness, free will has no meaning—indeed, many scientists insist consciousness is a meaningless illusion. As Nobel Prize winner David Hubel put it, “The word Mind is obsolete… like the word sky for astronomers.” A Frank and Ernest cartoon put it better: “I respond to external stimuli, therefore I am.” (I cite cartoons to stress that the practical and moral aspects of these efforts to make us over are not rocket, or any other kind of, science.)

Here the Greek letter epsilon—also the ancient Y-shaped Christian symbol for free will—will represent the third and last approach to the reshaping of us and of human society. Call it will power or, paradoxically, its evil twin, conditioning. Now that brainwashing is no longer the buzzword it was in the 1950’s, this approach is obscure even, thankfully, to those who might wish to misuse it. But brainwashing is more than just the plot device in The Manchurian Candidate.

A fine source of information is The Mind and the Brain by Jeffrey Schwartz, M.D. and science writer Sharon Begley. In it Schwartz, a neuropsychiatrist, related his far-ranging search for an effective therapy for his patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder, or OCD. He reviewed the various theories of dualism, materialism, and determinism and showed that those layman—and scientists like Hubel—who profess to hold to them are 70 years or more behind in the pertinent science. Schwartz and Begley cited numerous peer-reviewed studies by Michael Merzenich and Edward Taub, among many others, that show a person can, within limits, rewire his brain, alter both its physical form and functions—and therefore his outward behavior—by an effort of conscious will. The limits of change are broad: the authors said what happens is a “wholesale remapping of neural real estate.” Therefore, the crude diagrams purporting to show which part of which side of the human brain does what, are naïve and quite misleading. Instead, the brain’s map varies from one person to the next—and for the same person, from one moment to the next.

This ability to will changes does not end in childhood and continues through old age. Examples: a Japanese learning English must first rewire his brain so as to hear the L sound before he can learn to say it, and Schwartz learned that his “… OCD patients can, by changing the way they think about their thoughts, also change their brain.” That is, they can willfully reduce their repetitive behaviors. He mentioned similar therapies that had helped patients suffering from Tourette’s, depression, stroke, and dyslexia.

The brain adapts to outside influences; it also adapts to the mind’s thoughts. Here are two of the experiments that dramatically illustrated this. In the late 1980’s Greg Recanzone and William Jenkins learned that if their lab “… monkeys’ attention [emphasis added] was focused elsewhere while they received the same tactile stimulation that had otherwise produced massive cortical remapping, no such reorganization occurred.” In 1995, Alvaro Pascual-Leone had one group of human volunteers practice a five-
finger piano exercise, while a control group merely thought about it. As expected, the physical exercise caused changes in the motor cortex of each member of the first group; but the same changes in the brains showed up, and to the same degree, in the control group that merely imagined they were practicing.

Both these experiments showed that the mind’s attentiveness is both necessary and sufficient to effect a physical change in the brain. Schwartz and Begley relied on quantum theory to show how our mind causes the brain to carry out the mind’s will, to effect this rewiring, but the reader interested in their shade tree quantum mechanics must read their book. Suffice for now to say that they began their discussion by quoting the great physicist, Niels Bohr: “Anyone who is not shocked by quantum theory has not understood it.”

No matter: how we exercise free will is far less important than that we do. Schwartz, whose discernible leanings are toward Buddhism, believes strongly in free will and, indeed, blames “the cultural morass of the late twentieth century” on the philosophy of materialism. Most Christians, too, will readily affirm a belief in a conscious free will and may be impatient with, say, the expedient determinism of defense attorneys whose clients are, in the lyrics from West Side Story, depraved on account of being deprived. Oddly, such pop materialism is never used to explain away good or beneficial behavior, such as Hubel’s research that earned him the Nobel Prize. And since Hubel believes he has no Mind that guided his research, did he refuse his Nobel? (Answer: No.) Like anyone else, materialists and other determinists do not just sit around waiting for their molecules to motivate them. They reserve their notions of inevitability, of helplessness for other people.

Despite such inconsistencies, for generations we have absorbed some form of determinism with the very air we breathe. It must afford us comfort: even so staunch an advocate of free will as the Roman Catholic Church has inhaled: while section 1734 of its Catechism says: “Freedom makes man responsible for his acts to the extent that they are voluntary….” its 1735 qualifies this into, literally, a nullity: “… responsibility for an action can be diminished or even nullified by ignorance, inadvertence, duress, fear, habit, inordinate attachments, and other psychological or social factors.” This leaves a loophole the greenest public defender could drive a truckload of felons through.

An epsilon has two branches, as a sword has two edges: if one is empowered by his own will, so are the wills of others. An outside will can bend one’s own will to bring about major, long-lasting changes in the brain’s wiring and, hence, in behavior. This happens, of course, to all of us, every day—it is how a child learns language and the violin and why “practice makes perfect.” But if one’s will power can effect these changes so haphazardly, it can also happen, indirectly, as a result of someone else’s will. The process can be as innocent and beneficial as a tennis coach’s helping with your forehand—or as insidious as advertising or as sinister as brainwashing. Schwartz and Begley put it this way: “… several hundred ‘trials’ consisting of hearing spoken language spoken imperfectly… [might] result in a new brain—and possibly a new impairment—in people. The brain changes causing these impairments could become so severe that Merzenich coined a term to capture their magnitude: learning-based representational catastrophe.”

Because it has three arms, the epsilon has also been used as a symbol of the Trinity. But its three arms can also represent three kinds of behavior—moral; immoral; and conditioned, which is say, amoral: a representative catastrophe. We must choose among them, while we still can. As the prison chaplain put it in Anthony Burgess’ A Clockwork Orange, “When a man cannot choose he ceases to be a man.”

The Camel’s Other End

Archimedes is supposed to have said, about the lever, “Give me a firm spot to stand, and I will move the Earth.” The Center for Genetics and Society disapproves of many of the technologies its Web site discusses, such as inheritable genetic modification and reproductive cloning. But it gives no ultimate, bedrock reason why it does and presumably relies on some flavor of ethics, bio- or otherwise. Professional ethics are no substitute for morals, so in this respect, the CGS is like Archimedes, without a firm spot to stand. It hopes to be a Pandora who can selectively swat down the evils she has released, while allowing others to fly away.

Furthermore, the CGS disagrees that these technological changes are inevitable, “whether we like it or
not,” writing: “In a democratic society, people have the power to agree on the rules under which they wish to live.” Ironically, this naïve statement remains on the CGS Web site even after the 2004 election, when the voters in California voted overwhelmingly to amend its constitution to establish and extravagantly fund the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine, or CIRM. Its purpose is to promote and perform research cloning of human embryos—though as coy as Stratagene’s cloning manual, CIRM’s official statement of over 10,000 words includes no form of the word embryo and substitutes pluripotent or, like Stratagene, products.

The Center strongly opposed the amendment, as did pro-life churches and groups and some pro-abortion groups, warning of, not only the evils of embryonic stem cell research, but also of the waste, cronyism, and corruption built into CIRM. (California’s Council of Churches, representing 1.5 million Protestants and Orthodox, supported it, however.) Yet CIRM is now firmly embedded in California’s constitution, thanks to the obfuscation in its official statement and mostly to a campaign led and financed by those who will directly benefit from it—researchers like Irving Weissman, universities like Stanford, and private biotech companies such as StemCells, Inc. Weissman, prominently featured in the pro-CIRM advertising, could serve as the poster child for the latent conflicts of interest CIRM encourages: he both directs a major Stanford laboratory and is a founder and director of StemCells, Inc. (The advertising did not trouble to mention the latter role.) Professor/Director Weissman is hardly unique—a molecular biologist recently told me he estimated that 80% of established biomedical researchers have patent or other financial interests in their research, and the federal National Institutes of Health has been embroiled for months in trying to come up with rules to obviate the conflicts of interest among researchers who request grants from it and its own scientists who pass judgment on those requests.

And just how much benefit will Weissman and the others stand to gain? Three billion—with-a-b dollars. Crime may not pay, but CIRM does.

The demonic N.I.C.E. of Lewis’ space trilogy wanted, as Pearce put it, to implement “all the ‘progressive’ wonders of the eugenically correct state.” So, while demons are neither necessary nor sufficient for evil, it would be, well, nice if N.I.C.E. could be seen as an ancestor of CIRM. But so far CIRM has not shown any sign of intelligent control, demonic or otherwise. It is not the camel’s nose inside the tent flap; it is behaving more like the camel’s other end: in the few months since the election, CIRM has managed to confirm the warnings of its detractors and to disappoint its supporters, some of whom now seek, too late, ways to rein it in—even while praising it with faint damnation. CIRM is not N.I.C.E.; it is a slippery slope into a money pit, or worse, and will become just another strand in the web of amoral, ineffectual, and countervailing organizations that enmesh us.

If something as blatant and clumsy as CIRM elbowed its way into California’s constitution, then the Center for Genetics and Society (and we) would be unrealistic to believe that mere democratic effusions can derail other such efforts—that will themselves, in the long run, grossly warp the electoral process. In the short run, already Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York seek to follow California into embryonic research; their announcements indicated they regard it as just good business, a way of keeping up with the Gomezes. It snaks more of the mindless, bigger-is-better boosterism one usually associates with small town mayors or university presidents. And while groups like the Raelians may be crackpots, they are the worst kind: crackpots with money and influence.

And lawyers: nowadays, a “right” claimed is very nearly a right earned. The Raelians shrewdly sponsor a web site, www.HumanCloneRights.org, to promote what its name suggests, and attorney Mark Eibert (http://reason.com/opeds/eibert.shtml) said in 2001 he was preparing court challenges to establish human reproductive cloning as a legal right. Once established legally and politically as a “right,” cloning, for example, will become a moot issue, a mere matter of personal preference, of choice—like abortion and same-sex marriage. Too, the financial interests naturally attracted to such an activity will make it difficult to reverse politically. Again, abortion, because of the income it generates for many of its proponents, is an excellent parallel.

This process is hardly new: Pearce considered that Lewis was, sixty years ago, representative of those who opposed “a drab egalitarian culture run by bureaucrats in which the sense of duty and responsibility would have no place amid the selfish demands for ‘rights.’”
Unmoved Movers

It may seem like comparing apples to clockwork oranges, but these efforts to nudge evolution along and defeat death share three characteristics: they complement, not compete with, each other and, while they claim to have only the best intentions, are threats to any form of free society. And all have or will attract defenders: “the best ethicists money can buy” will duly be bought, and each effort will duly become what U.S News and World Report columnist John Leo called the killing of Terri Schiavo: “a scandal successfully redefined as unexceptional and therefore moral.”

Lewis intuited that the “culture run by bureaucrats” might not be egalitarian, only drab; he put these words into the mouth of one of the leaders of N.I.C.E: “Man has got to take charge of Man. That means, remember, that some men have got to take charge of the rest.” And in The Abolition of Man he had already linked this taking charge directly with science: “…what we call Man’s power over Nature turns out to be a power exercised by some men over other men with Nature as its instrument.”

There need be no grand conspiracy to dumb us down and take over our lives. Our Abolition, or Demolition, may just be our path of least resistance. After all, we have dreamed these dreams before Hitler Youth and the Lebensborn, the New Soviet Man (who turned out to be an old Georgian thug), Mao’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and the good doctors Frankenstein, Jekyll, and Mengele. Unlike Dr. Jekyll, who drank his own concoction, the controllers, the conditioners, the manipulators will try to exclude themselves from their own techniques, to be unmoved movers.

It is possible that all these efforts will messily fail; the greater danger is that they will gloriously succeed. And the would-be unmoved movers likely will be caught up in their own systems, leaving no one free: all of us, the movers and the moved, are already bombarded with external stimuli of all kinds, every day. You reading this may not be at risk, but our children, and certainly their children, will be. It is already too late to stop at least some of these procedures from being attempted. For example, a culture that supports partial-birth abortion will do as it pleases with a clump of embryonic cells smaller than the period at the end of this sentence.

Armed with the latest genetic and neuropsychiatric research, better techniques and chemicals, and decades of experience, successive generations of manipulators will grow more effective. Next time around, Raymond Shaw, the sniper in Richard Condon’s The Manchurian Candidate, will carry out his mission, and the Ludovico conditioning technique Burgess invented for A Clockwork Orange will not need to be reversed so as to “cure” Alex, its protagonist, of his docility. The time after that, Raymond and Alex may each be designed for his role from the moment of conception in some Petri dish. Of course, just so many ducks in someone else’s row, novelists in this bleak future will never think to write of such matters, and you would never read this essay because I would never think to write it.

Nor will these efforts be the last. For example, surgical and chemical interventions to control behavior are outside the scope of this essay because their use is limited to criminals and the mentally ill. For now. All depends on definition: for example, Freud was not the last to consider religion a form of mental illness, and the Soviet Union will not be the last to act on Freud’s belief.

Milton wrote in Paradise Lost, “The mind is its own place, and in itself/Can make a heaven of hell.” In the centuries since we have gone from striving for Heaven to striving for Heaven on Earth. Now, to the extent we remain inward, quiet, and passive, we are ready to settle for a drab culture run by bureaucrats, an Earth on Earth, so long as it promises to be eternal. Instead, once we cannot choose, we shall remove man and woman, as well as God, from the equation, and our minds will make a Hell on Earth. ✠
ARTICLES

Cardinal Jean Daniélou, s.j.

Co-authored and co-edited by Prof. Marie-Joseph Rondeau and Rev. Brian Van Hove, SJ

Theologian, patristics scholar, Jesuit, spiritual writer, bishop, and cardinal; b. May 14, 1905, Neuilly-sur-Seine near Paris; d. of a heart attack May 20, 1974, in Paris. His father, Charles Daniélou, was a deputy and minister during the Third Republic; his mother, Madeleine Clamorgan, was in her own right a woman of great spiritual and intellectual caliber. Jean Daniélou obtained his degree in classical letters from the Sorbonne and he passed the competitive teaching examination in the section of classical philology (agrégation de grammaire) in 1927. He was then introduced to political life by his father, and at the same time briefly engaged in the brilliant Parisian life of that era, translating into Latin Jean Cocteau’s Oedipus Rex. On November 20, 1929, answering a call he had felt since childhood, he entered the novitiate of the Society of Jesus at Laval. He made his profession of first vows on November 21, 1931, and after that took his course in philosophy at Jersey (1931-34). He served as professor of rhetoric at the Collège St. Joseph in Poitiers (1934-36), and then took his theological studies at the theologate of Lyon-Fourvière (1936-39). At Fourvière, where the Fathers of the Church were held in great esteem and where plans were maturing for the collection Sources Chrétiennes, his elders, Fathers Victor Fontoymont (1880–1958) and Henri de Lubac (1896–1991), introduced Daniélou, along with his fellow-scholastic Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905–1988), to patristic studies. He was ordained to the priesthood on August 24, 1938. He was mobilised into military service in 1939–1940 and performed his “Third Year” (the Jesuit tertianship) in 1940–1941. He pronounced his solemn vows in Paris, February 2, 1946. The personal notes he took during this long formative period, published posthumously as Carnets Spirituels (1993), witness the seriousness of his spiritual training.

In 1941 Father Daniélou was assigned to Paris and there he spent the rest of his life in intense activity as teacher, scholar of international repute, student chaplain, and apostle to intellectuals who accepted him as one of their own. Daniélou was not only effective with them, however, but also with every other level of society. In 1942 he published Le Signe du Temple ou de la Présence de Dieu. This small book contained, he used to say, the whole of his thought in embryonic form. Characteristic of the personality of its author, it shows a contemplative attitude, a taste for symbolic theology, a use of the exegetical methods of the Fathers, and a care to impart in a simple way to a vast public the riches of his spiritual life, scholarly work, and highly cultivated mind. Both a Hellenist and a devotional man, his doctoral dissertation dealt with the spiritual doctrine of St. Gregory of Nyssa. This dissertation was defended successfully at the Institut Catholique in Paris in 1943, where he was made docteur en théologie, and at the Sorbonne in 1944, where he was made docteur ès-lettres. For the then-required secondary thesis at the Sorbonne he translated Gregory of Nyssa’s Life of Moses (December 1942; second edition revised and augmented from the Greek, 1955; third edition revised with a new translation, 1968; fourth edition revised and corrected, 1987) which formed the first volume of Sources Chrétiennes. The rapid development as well as the high scholarly quality of this collection owes much to the personal initiative of Jean Daniélou who was its codirector along with Henri de Lubac. In 1943 he was given the status of writer (scriptor) for the Jesuit review Études and he succeeded Father Jules Lebreton (1873–1956), as professor of the history of Christian origins in the faculty of theology of the Institut Catholique in Paris. He was elected dean of this faculty in 1961 and he would occupy this post until 1969. From this chair he formed generations of young priests. He exercised, simultaneously with his friend Henri-Irénée Marrou (1904–1977), professor of ancient Christian history at the Sorbonne, an undisputed leadership in the field of patristics.

His substantial professional achievement clearly opened several new areas. (1) Parallel to Wãlther Volker and Hans Urs von Balthasar, he is the chief instrument of a return to Gregory of Nyssa. In addition to his
1944 thesis, *Platonisme et théologie mystique/Essai sur la doctrine spirituelle de Grégoire de Nyssse,* he dedicated numerous articles to the subject. The most important ones are collected in *L'Être et le temps chez Grégoire de Nyssse* (1970). A contemplative himself, he especially studied mysticism and spiritual exegesis in Gregory. He prepared an anthology of Gregory’s mystical texts which Herbert Musurillo translated from the Greek into English (*From Glory to Glory,* 1961) and Mariette Canévet from the Greek into French (*La colombe et la ténèbre,* 1967). As an intellectual sensitive to the problems raised by secular culture for the Christian, he applied himself to the study of how Gregory reworked and Christianized the philosophical ideas of his day. (2) With Henri de Lubac, he is the principal artisan of a rediscovery of patristic exegesis, which, like the liturgy to which it is closely bound, explores the symbolic dimension of Scripture in order to draw therefrom an understanding of the Christian revelation. In particular he illuminates the notion of typology which ties history and symbolism together in a specifically Christian way. Salvation history is marked by such interventions of God that the events of the Old Testament announce those of the New. They, in turn, are spread out across the ages of the Church in the sacramental and mystical life of the Christian people in anticipation of full eschatological realization. Here his pertinent works are: *Sacramentum futuri/Étude sur les origines de la typologie biblique* (1950); *Bible et liturgie; La théologie biblique des sacrements et des fêtes d’après les Pères de l’Église* (1951) this work resulted from courses given at Notre Dame University in Indiana in 1950; *Les symboles chrétiens primitifs* (1961) and *Études d’exégèse judéo-chrétienne. Les Testamentia* (1966). (3) In his *Histoire des doctrines chrétiennes avant Nicée* [3 vols., *Théologie du judéo-christianisme* (1958; second edition revised and augmented 1991); *Message évangélique et culture hellénistique aux IIe et IIIe siècles* (1961; reprinted 1991); and (1978; reprinted 1991)], which is more than a history of dogma in the traditional sense, he sketches a history of Christian culture. He describes it in the light of the resources provided by the cultures surrounding it, then shows how Christian culture tests, purifies, or adopts these cultures, at times suffering the failures known as heresies. By gathering together disparate texts of the most archaic Christianity, apparently confusing in themselves, he provides the key by showing that an authentic faith expressed itself in the modality of Semitic thought. He became one of the most outstanding specialists of this rediscovered “Judaico-Christianity.” With the same care for cultural roots, yet always bearing in mind the uniqueness of the faith in order to appreciate it in its various embodiments, he dedicated a monograph to each of the two Alexandrians, *Origène* (1948) and *Philon d’Alexandrie* (1958), as well as the first part of the first volume of the *Nouvelle histoire de l’Église, Des origines à Grégoire le grand* [1963; republished in paperback as *L’Église des premiers temps. Des origines à la fin du IIIe siècle* (1985)] the second part of this first volume is by Henri-Irénée Marrou. Again, Daniélou exerted a notable influence in the scientific life of his time by producing yearly from 1946 his “Bulletin d’histoire des origines chrétiennes” in the Jesuit review *Recherches de Science Religieuse.* Distinguished by the powers of assimilation, perceptiveness, and insight of its author, this critical bulletin reviewed, for a quarter of a century, nearly the whole of the works published in the field of patristics.

Professionally, Daniélou was a historian of the early Church. However, both by family heritage, the Jesuit tradition, and his own temperament, he was a man transformed by the zeal of the apostle, intellectually alive to every contemporary current of thought, and open to every kind of dialogue. Thus he was, along with Marcel Moré (1887–1969) and the Islamic scholar Louis Massignon (1883–1962), the soul of the review *Dieu Vivant/ Perspectives religieuses et philosophiques* (1945–55). This publication, Catholic in its inspiration, welcomed thinkers of other Christian confessions and from various philosophical persuasion in a forum which was friendly, culturally open-minded, and spiritually demanding. *Dieu Vivant* had as its fundamental concern to recall to a secularizing world the transcendence of God and the ultimate eschatological effect which that transcendence imposes on human destiny. To that end *Dieu Vivant* was the polar opposite of Esprit, another journal with which Daniélou had personal ties. He had witnessed its birth, and its editor was his friend Emmanuel Mounier (1905–1950). *Dieu Vivant* was concerned with political and social problems requiring the involvement of the Christian. During its brief existence *Dieu Vivant* was of a high quality and represented a significant part of
the activity of Daniélou as a Christian intellectual.

He was also much involved in the ecumenical encounter and formed lasting friendships with Orthodox Christians (such as the theologians of the Institut St-Serge in Paris), Protestants [such as the Lutheran exegete and theologian Oscar Cullmann (1902-1999) who was an observer at Vatican II], Anglicans [such as Dr. Frank Leslie Cross (1900-1968) who was a patristics scholar, dean of Christ Church, Oxford, and the organizer of the International Patristics Conference at which Daniélou was a dedicated and influential participant], and with Jews [such as the biblical scholar Natân André Chouraqui (1917- )]. From this last association there emerged Les Juifs, Dialogue entre Jean Daniélou et André Chouraqui (1966). Daniélou’s outlook was quite all-encompassing. The Cercle Saint-Jean-Baptiste was a group of young people cofounded by Daniélou with a view to the missionary vocation. He was their chaplain and he proposed to them, somewhat in the same attempt as Jules Monchanin (1895-1957) and Louis Massignon’s to meet non-Christian cultures in a positive way. The aim was to form a Christianity not of individuals torn from their own culture and uprooted from their natural environment, but of Christians who were part and parcel of their actual culture, as was historically the case with the Semitic culture of the Judaeo-Christians and also that of the Graeco-Latinis. He set to work to develop a theological vision flexible enough to embrace these principles, but especially to draw out all the implications related to Christian spirituality as he viewed it. The essential teaching which he gave to the Cercle Saint-Jean-Baptiste is contained in: Le mystère du salut des nations (1945); Le mystère de l’Avent (1948); L’essai sur le mystère de l’histoire (1953); Les saints patrons de l’Ancien Testament (1956); Jean-Baptiste témoin de l’Agneau (1964); and L’Église des apôtres (1970). The members of the Cercle received a thorough theological and spiritual education from him. In an effort to free them from unsound exegetical vulgarizations, the following works appeared: Au commencement (1963); Les Évangiles de l’enfance (1967); and La résurrection (1969). Two retreats given to the Cercle have also been published: La Trinité et le mystère de l’existence (1968), and Contemplation, croissance de l’Église (1977). They show us the true stature of Daniélou as a spiritual theologian. Father Daniélou exerted a great and lasting influence as chaplain upon the Catholic students at the Sorbonne, and especially beginning in 1941 upon the young women of the École Normale Supérieure (Sèvres). Out of this apostolate came Dieu et nous (1956) and Approches du Christ (1960). Up to the end of his life he kept himself in contact with the world of young people and, with penetrating judgment, responded to their needs, which he often anticipated. He was a man of public note, a speaker both warm and clear in his thought, sought after for lectures by parishes, varied Catholic groups, professional clubs and the like, as well as for articles in the national press, and for radio and television broadcasts. Farsightedly and very soon he saw the signs of the crisis of faith which arose in the Church and he sounded a cry of alarm in Scandaleuse vérité (1961). From that time on he set himself to show, without losing any of his supernatural optimism, the intellectual roots of the ambiguities of the moment and their inevitable developments: the rejection of realism, the separation of religion and faith, the loss of the sense of the sacred, and others. In 1962 he was nominated as a peritus to Vatican Council II by Pope John XXIII. At the service of the Theological Commission Daniélou, under Cardinal Gabriel Garrone, contributed considerable work. In particular the preparation of the first part of the Constitution Gaudium et Spes owes much to him.

Jean Daniélou was consecrated bishop in Paris on April 21, 1969, and created cardinal deacon by Pope PaulVI during the consistory of April 28. Though he resigned from his work as professor and dean, this did not change his manner otherwise in the least. While keeping up his scholarly work and most of his apostolic commitments, he increasingly spoke out on issues of the day. Addressing both the French clergy and the public at large, he used the authority of his office to make the voice of fidelity to the Gospel heard. This fidelity had been weakened by the “reductionism” of the secularists and by those who, at least in practice, had often betrayed the Council while pretending to be inspired by it. This struggle alienated him from the most influential part of the Catholic intelligentsia and clergy. His burning zeal expressed itself through his talent as a polemicist. He who in the past was an “avant-gardist” was now rebuked for having gone over to the “integralist” or reactionary side. [One can
only recall his article in Études in 1946, “Les orientations présentes de la pensée religieuse,” which had provoked suspicion in Rome and unleashed the attacks of the ultra-conservatives against the “new theology,” all of which amounted at that time to a portent of the ensuing repression against some of the most eminent Jesuits such as Henri de Lubac and Henri Bouillard (1908-1981). Though he rejected this charge, he could not allay the force of this hostility. He merely affirmed that, just as always, he was a free man and faithful to the Gospel, notwithstanding the pressure of factions and other schools of thought. Thus he courageously met unpopularity in the conviction that service to the Church and zeal for souls demanded it. Concerning this struggle see: L’oraison, problème politique (1965); L’avenir de la religion (1968); Christianisme de masse ou d’élite? (1968); Tests (1968); La foi de toujours et l’homme d’aujourd’hui (1969); Nouveaux tests (1970); La culture trahie par les siens (1972); and Pourquoi l’Église (1972). ✠

Sports and Philosophy

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An Address Presented before Delta Phi Epsilon, the Foreign Service Professional Fraternity at Georgetown University, Washington, D. C.

I.

On February 15, 1983, Vital Speeches published an address of mine entitled, “On the Seriousness of Sports.” This essay was later included in my book, Another Sort of Learning (Ignatius, 1988). Originally, it was given at a Conference on Sports’ Journalism, held at Harrah’s Club in Reno, Nevada—itself, as you know, a well-known arena for a certain kind of sports, namely, “gaming sports,” as they are called. Last year, moreover, I published a book entitled, On the Unseriousness of Human Affairs: Teaching, Writing, Playing, Believing, Lecturing, Philosophizing, Singing, Dancing (ISI Books). Note the words “playing” and “philosophizing” in the sub-title. They are not accidental or wholly unrelated to each other. And how they are not unrelated is the subject matter of what I wish to speak with you this evening.

At first sight, of course, to the attentive reader, it will seem that, in the intervening two decades, Schall has passed from calling sports “serious” to calling them “unserious,” an obvious contradiction, something this same Schall, as a matter of principle, warns us to avoid at all costs. Yet, if we all be Thomists, as I hope we are, we are intellectually prodded by apparent contradictions, such as that between serious and unserious, to examine things more carefully. We need to take a more careful look at something of obvious common interest like sports to see what we can learn from what appears, at first sight, to be oddly contradictory.

But first let me ask a prior question: are sports at all worthy of attention, serious or unserious? If the answer is “no,” then we need proceed no farther. Over Christmas one year, to put this issue in another way, I spent a couple of days with a cousin of mine and her husband. It happened to be the day of the Fiesta Bowl, the national championship game in college football, which game I definitely wanted to watch. In fact, I delayed my return to Washington from San Diego, home of the Chargers and the Padres, for a couple of days just so I could watch that game. Most of the bowl games I had, with the benefit of pop corn, seen up to that time at my brother’s were lemons. But the Fiesta Bowl between Ohio State and Miami that year turned out to be a wonderful game. My cousin, for whom the Fiesta Bowl was not the epitome of existence during New Year’s, several times suggested that watching football, even at New Year’s, was a sheer “waste of time.” She could not
understand why aging gentlemen, like myself and her husband, found it worthwhile to sit around for four hours to watch a one hour game between monstrous men violently smashing each other by trying to get an oblong leather ball across something called a goal line. Her scepticism about sports reminds me of Chesterton’s quip, speaking of golf, that he could not understand why grown men, dressed in knickers, with sticks in their hands, walked around a green meadow avidly chasing a little white ball.

Now, I am the first to admit that pro football games, as are Bowl games, are too long, too contrived to make extra ad time for TV advertizing. It does take some of the luster off watching a good game, the essence of which is what I want to explain here. In this sense, soccer with its continuous time flow for everything but serious injuries is a far better game, granting that the rhythm and flow of the two games are different. Time-outs are part of football as is walking out of the batter’s box in baseball, though not necessarily the extended TV pauses we presently have to suffer through. But like the two-minute drill at the end of a football game, you do have to admire the genius of advertizing types who know that they have but thirty seconds to catch our attention to sell us a bottle of beer, a Ford truck, or a vacuum cleaner, before we block them out of our minds, screens, or attention.

How does one explain both that my cousin is right, watching football or other sporting events is indeed a “waste of time,” and, at the same time, that the games are still well worth watching, worth spending the time contemplating them, preferably in person at the game itself, but also on television? I usually approach this matter by recalling the famous passage in Exupery’s The Little Prince that reminds us that “it is only the time that you ‘waste’ with our friends that really counts.” You cannot be a friend with someone who is forever watching the clock to do something else. “Wasting time” means the capacity to enjoy the present, really to look at what is going on, on who or what is before us in this time and this place.

In a paradoxical sense, all the important things in time stand outside of time. When we are absorbed in a game, in a very real sense, we are “outside of ordinary time,” the time we measure on our watches. The “time” measured by the referees’ watches, though within cosmic time, is a different kind of time. This is game time, the frame within which the action takes place. Referees measure the time within which the game goes on. When we are on referees’ time, we are already within the game action. Even “time-outs,” measured by the referee’s watch, are part of the game. We leave our own time for the time of the game while we are beholding before us its unfolding, its action.

Indeed, Aristotle asks us to notice that when we are wholly interested in something, be it writing, playing, or loving, we do not notice the passage of time. He notes this phenomenon of not noticing cosmic time passing especially in the case of the theatrical drama, and it also happens at concerts. The initial point I wish to make here, then, is that watching a good sporting event of whatever variety, from the Rose Bowl, to the Preakness, to the World Cup, to the NCAA basketball finals, or to a good high school lacrosse game, has an effect on us. It causes us to stand outside of real time. And time itself is indeed real, as Aristotle and Augustine remind us, a category of the real.

II.

But this observation about time leads us to another question, as it should, namely, what is the relation between time and nothingness, or even more profoundly between time and eternity? Aristotle already hints, I think, that game time is closer to eternity, nunc stans, as Aquinas called it, than to the time that keeps going on and on, as measured by our watches. The phrase, “time stood still,” is well worth pondering and hints at something Aquinas was getting at, that eternity is the “standing now,” not the complete evaporation of time or its complete denial.

Where does this leave us? Schall has now established that “wasting our time” is quite all right. After the publication of the Vital Speeches talk, some journal, I believe it was Sports Illustrated, picked its theme up with the amusing comment that now Schall has finally and philosophically justified the dream of the common man, in his eternal struggle with his womenfolk, namely, with a clear conscience, to sit
around with a beer and chips on Saturday or Sunday afternoon to watch a ball game, whether it be baseball, golf, tennis, football, basketball, sailing, diving, soccer, cricket, boxing, or auto racing, to mention no more. Actually, over the years, as I usually have my large classes read this essay, I have been struck by the number of young women who tell me that they have always wondered why they too like sports. Most women, I suspect, agree with my cousin, bless them. When they are reluctantly forced by the culture to watch the Superbowl, they spend their time knitting, talking of the children, or admiring the half-time shows or the way the cheerleaders fix their hair.

The phrase “wasting time” generally has a pejorative meaning. It implies that we are not doing what we ought to do, that we have our priorities wrong. Surely, we think, no one wants his priorities wrong! This question of priority naturally brings up the question of what we ought to be doing and whether sports have any place in the scheme of things. And this is the question that brings us to Aristotle, whom Thomas Aquinas rightly called simply “the philosopher.” It also brings us to Aristotle’s mentor, the great Plato himself, who was quite certain that the rules of games should not change but that we should all play them in our youth according to the rules our ancestors set down for how the game is to be played. Change the rules of games, Plato thought, and you change the polity. He said much the same about changing our music. Indeed, Plato even says that a young man should not marry until his top sprinting speed begins to decline. You might ask yourselves why he put it in that way.

In a way, this consideration even brings us to St. Paul who told us that we run the race to win the laurel, the prize. That is, we run the race, we play the game, to win. And if we do not understand this about a game, that it is about winning, about winning indeed according to the rules, then we have no idea what games are about, and probably not what life is about. Grantland Rice, the famous sportscaster of my youth, in a famous phrase, said that “it matters not whether you win or lose, but how you play the game.” He was quite wrong. The only thing that matters, as Vince Lombardi said, is “winning,” but, again, winning according to the rules of the game. Without winning, there is no game. The real reason we play the game is to find out who wins and the style with which they play to win. This is why games are fascinating, why we play them, because that is the only way to find out who plays better, who plays best of all.

In Aristotle, particularly in the last book of his Politics, we find passages that make several relevant distinctions about what we do in living and playing—distinctions nowhere more clearly elaborated than in Josef Pieper’s famous little essay Leisure: the Basis of Culture. Again, we have to examine what we mean by the words we give to the things we do and know about. “Wasting our time” seems to be the other side of the Aristotelian phrase about things existing “for their own sakes” or knowing them “for its own sake.” There are things we do want because they are useful for something else or simply pleasurable to us. There is nothing wrong with this, provided we do not think that there is no other reason for our fascination with things.

I have already hinted that the phrase “wasting our time” may not be all that bad. I do not in fact deny that what we do when we watch a game is precisely “waste our time.” What I do deny is that this wasting is a bad thing, granted that other important things have to be taken care of. We have to choose how we use or waste our time, the time given to us, the only time there is. I do not, however, want my logic to be carried to the absurd conclusion that Schall justifies spending all his time watching games or to the equally absurd conclusion that he spends all his time in “significant” things of usefulness or duty.

To take the next step in understanding the fascination of sports—and that word “fascination” is worth looking up in a good dictionary as it has some reference to the holy—I usually like to cite a passage from Allan Bloom’s Shakespeare’s Politics, a passage to which I also call my students’ attention when we read it. The passage concerns, not the game, but the “play”—interesting word here—that is, the theater. It reads as follows:

What is essentially human is revealed in the extreme, and we understand ourselves better through what we might be. In a way, the spectators live more truly when they are watching a Shakespearean play than in their daily lives, which are so much determined by the accidents of time and place. There could be a
theater dealing totally with private life, the cares for providing for a living and raising a family. But men who never get beyond that life would be cut off from their fullest human development…

Notice, that Bloom here is not speaking of actors, but spectators, just as in this discussion, with Aristotle, I am speaking primarily of the spectators, not the players, in a game.

Without the spectators, I think, there is no game, even though a game can go on with no spectators, with no cheering. For an understanding of what Bloom is getting at, we must return to Aristotle’s Poetics. Aristotle understood that when we behold the plot of a drama unfolding before us, we are moved from within our very selves by fear and pity for the characters. We form our souls after the models of the virtues and vices we see before us. Games, likewise, simply draw us and have their own catharses in our souls as we behold them within their own time.

III.

What, you might object, does an exalted Sophoclean or Shakespearean drama have to do with the Superbowl, the Masters, March Madness or the Penn Relays? Indeed, we might ask, what does it have to do with Aristotle’s Metaphysics or Aquinas’ Summae? The answer is that in a good game we see displayed before us not only the unfolding of a game to its unknown conclusion, but we see the excellence of our kind stretched to its best in a certain order. The very notion of the Olympic Games was designed to find out what human beings could achieve in the excellence of their physical being. Who could run or skate or ski or swim the fastest, who could jump the highest or the most distance, who could throw the shotput or the javelin the farthest? Who wrestled or boxed best? What team played best volley-ball or soccer or hockey? These are the testings of our human limits.

Let me also say a word about cheating and refereeing. In a Breeders’ Cup in Chicago, a couple of years ago, one of the betting combinations known as the Pic-Six was rigged. By a slick change in certain tickets after the race was won, certain few tickets, partly because of an unexpected long-shot, apparently won an enormous amount of money, some three million dollars. On investigation, it turned out that the winners were college fraternity brothers from Philadelphia, one of whom just happened to work for Auto-Tote, the company that ran the betting mechanism. Thus, it is possible for games or races to be “fixed” or “thrown,” as they say.

The question of gambling and games I will not go into here except to say that betting has long been considered to be part of games, particularly horse races. One of the purposes of referees or stewards is to make sure that the games are played according to the rules of the game. The rules of games are made-up, they are arbitrary, but once they are set, they form the structure of the game and make it what it is. The referee is not a player in the game, but without him, generally, there is no game. He is responsible, not to the outcome of the game, but to the rules so that the outcome, when achieved by the winners, is “according to the rules.”

Thus, there is a clear right and wrong in games. Rules have penalties. If you read the sports pages of any newspaper in the world on any given day, you will notice that they are full of moral judgments about right and wrong, about fairness and unfairness, about honor and worthiness and about cheating and dishonesty. In this sense, sports are almost the last bastion of clarity in morals, though the slowness of baseball facing the steroid problem reminds us that sports’ figures are not always on the side of the gods. This awareness of the firmness of rules in sports is also why, as in the case of German soccer, there is something more corrupting about a referee who cheats than a player who cheats. As in the playoff between, say, the Patriots and the Steelers, a player may get by with an unnoticed penalty. His team may win as a result. No justice can be requited in such a case. We may not like this failure to notice, but the rules of the game, as such, are not being broken here. But if the penalty is not called because the referee is promised a huge financial reward, we clearly have a higher form of corruption.

As Thomas Boswell said in the Washington Post (January 10, 2003), there is a danger in trying to make the game so perfect, with so many rules and checks, that it is no longer playable. In this case, the referees, the replays, and the fine-points of the rules
become more important than the game. “A sport can reach a point where it has so many rules—-which are amended so often and then enforced by officials who are repeatedly overturned by replay—that the game strangles on technicalities, loses its flow and exasperates out patience.” As in life itself, place must be left for human error, even human corruption. Otherwise, our games are for angels, not men and women.

IV.

But let me come to the essence of what I want to say about watching and playing games, about sports. Not too long ago, I had an e-mail from a student who had read the essay on “The Seriousness of Sports.” In it, he told me that it explained something to him about himself that he had never quite understood before, namely, what was it about good games that so absorbed his interest? He had heard a million times, even from his own mother, that he was, yes, “wasting his time” by watching various games. He almost believed there was something wrong with him. But the fact is that someone who finds no fascination in watching games is probably much farther away from what is highest in our human experience than someone who does experience this sense of interest, this “wasting of time,” but does not understand what it is about.

Aristotle makes several perhaps enigmatic remarks on this score. The purpose of “recreation” is work, he tells us, while the purpose of “work” is leisure. We work so that we may have leisure. We have leisure so that we may have all that is. Actually, Aristotle says that we are “un-leisurely” so that we may have leisure. Work, or labor, or technology, or business is not what we are doing at games, even when we are playing them with great exertion. Indeed, the Greek and Latin words for what we call “business” mean precisely that we are “un-leisurely,” that we are busy, devoted to producing or running useful things.

Aristotle suggests that there are things beyond use, indeed the highest things. The Greek word for these things is theorein, theory, while the Latin word is contemplatio, contemplation. Such words imply that we have things to do “for their own sakes.” That is, we do not need some “useful” reason to do them. We do them simply because they are worthy, fascinating, delightful. They have no reason beyond themselves. Somehow they draw us into themselves.

What does this consideration have to do with sports? Aristotle, in his uncanny way, compares contemplation and sports, or more particularly, the watching of sports. Games themselves need not exist. They are technically artifacts, things made up. Yet, when they exist, when they are being played, they are “for their own sakes,” they are, if you will, a “wasting of time.” Aristotle does say that theory, contemplation are more “serious”—that word again—than games. His point is not to imply that games can replace the gods, but to suggest to us that what most of us experience about games, their absorption, their absorbing our time and interest, is analogous to our absorption in the highest things. A similar thing happens to us when we hear a good symphony or see a play. We are taken out of our time to behold something for its own sake. Things like dancing and liturgy fall into the same category. They do something to our time because they give us something in itself worthy to behold, something, like ourselves, that need not be, but is. This is why on reading, say, Josef Cardinal Ratzinger’s (Benedict XVI) book The Spirit of the Liturgy, we sense that what it says is analogously closer to watching games than it is to almost anything else we normally encounter.

In conclusion, I do not know if your generation still remembers Charles Schulz and “Peanuts,” how Charlie Brown could never win a ball game, nor would Lucy ever let him kick off the football without pulling it out just before he kicked it, so that he fell flat on his derrier, much to her amusement. “Peanuts” was one of the great on-going reflections on the relation, among other things, between philosophy and sports in our time.

In a collection called, If Beagles Could Fly (Topper, 1990), we see Charlie Brown returning home, still with his baseball hat on, glove in hand. He is obviously dejected. Sally, his sister, is stretched out on the bean bag chair watching TV. From behind her, Charlie says to her, “It was the last game of the season, and we lost it.” In the next scene, Sally is off of the beanbag and walks away from a glum Charlie. She says to him, shades of “wasting time,” “so what does that mean?” Next, Charlie is standing alone next
BOOK REVIEWS


Reviewed by Francis Canavan, S.J., Fordham University

This two-volume work is a must-read for anyone really interested in what the U.S. Supreme Court has made of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion; or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Or, if reading all the information packed into these pages seems too great a demand on your time, it is a must-have work, to be consulted as needed. Just about everything you need to know on this topic is here (an exaggeration, of course, but not a great one) and it will serve you well in arguing with liberals who regard the Supreme Court as a secular Holy See, with law school professors as its theologians.

James Hitchcock is a professor of history at St. Louis University, and writes as an historian rather than a constitutional lawyer. He tells us in his introduction to volume 1, “This volume provides the most comprehensive survey of the religion cases that has yet been published and can be used, independent of volume 2, as an overall survey of the historical development of the jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses.”

You will have noticed that the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses do not include the words “a wall of separation between church and state.” Those words were taken from a letter written by President Thomas Jefferson to a Baptist church in Connecticut. Now, Jefferson had been neither a delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 nor a member of the Congress in which the First Amendment had been framed (his friend and colleague, James Madison, had been both, but he was not the author of the “wall of separation” metaphor).

You will also have noticed that the First Amendment says, “Congress shall make no law . . .” The Amendment purposely leaves out any mention of the States being bound by it when it says, “no law respecting an establishment of religion.” Some States at that time had established religions which the Amendment forbade Congress to disestablish.

Justice Black, who began the contemporary interpretation of the
Establishment Clause in 1947, knew that, of course. But he had convinced himself that the purpose of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment (framed and ratified after the Civil War) was to make the federal Bill of Rights (the first eight amendments) binding on the States. Had he taken the trouble to read the debates in Congress on the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, he would have known that the purpose section 1 of the Amendment, which its sponsors in both houses of Congress repeatedly explained, was to confer on Congress the power to enact civil-rights laws binding on the States. It would have been unimaginable for them to transfer the power to protect the civil rights of the recently emancipated slaves to the Supreme Court, which less than ten years earlier had handed down its well-known and infamous decision in the Dred Scott case.

What Black did know, however, was that he wanted to transfer the control of civil-rights legislation from State and local legislatures to the federal courts, ultimately to the Supreme Court. Hence his flat assertion in the opinion of the Court in the 1947 case of Everson v. Board of Education: “The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impenetrable.” But that statement does not suffice to grant the U.S. Supreme Court the power to decide a case arising, not from an Act of Congress, but from an action by a subdivision of a State. The First Amendment, on its face, limits the power of Congress, not of New Jersey.

The Court, however, relies on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which says that no State “shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” That is to say that all of the penalties or losses that a State may impose on persons may be imposed only in accordance with those legal procedures summed up in the phrase “due process of law.”

Justice Byron White, in the opinion of the Court that he wrote in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), remarked, “It is true that despite the language of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which appears to focus only on the processes by which life, liberty, or property is taken, the cases are legion in which those Clauses are interpreted to have substantive content, substantive rights that to a great extent are immune from federal or state regulation or proscription. Among such cases are those recognizing rights that have little or not textual support in the constitutional language.”

The cases are indeed legion: although Justice White had made it perfectly clear that he disagreed with the substantive right to abortion found in Roe v. Wade and its sequels, in this case, when writing an opinion of the Court, he had to accept the power of the Court to create substantive rights.

The Court has never asserted that all the rights listed in the Bill of Rights are binding on the States. But it has “incorporated” a number of them into the Fourteenth Amendment as the substantive meaning of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. In this way it has made the words “Congress shall make no law” mean “No State shall.” Having done that, the Court has assigned itself the task of determining the meaning of “establishment,” “religion” and “the free exercise thereof” in cases involving State as well as federal actions.

One might think that in interpreting clauses that contain these terms in the course of deciding cases arising under them, the first duty of the Court would be to ask what the terms meant to those who wrote and ratified them. Or, to put it in other words, to determine what was the evil to be remedied, and what was the remedy provided by the law. If the Constitution is the supreme law of the land it must have a discernible meaning and a purpose that the Court can recognize and apply to the decision of the case before it.

But if the Court, or a majority of its members, regard the Constitution as an accordion to be pulled out or squeezed in to meet the needs of society as the Justices see them, the result is to make constitutional litigation a device for resolving political controversies, or even a tool for advancing political agendas, and to turn the appointment of Justices into the fierce political struggles that we now see.

In his treatment of the Court’s interpretation of “establishment,” Hitchcock divides the members of the Court into separationists who believe in Justice Black’s high and impregnable wall, and accommodationists who think that accommodations to the religious beliefs and interests of citizens are sometimes and to some extent permissible. (The “incorporation” of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth through “substantive due process” is now generally taken for granted.)

Among the strictest separationists Hitchcock numbers Hugo L. Black, of course, and William O. Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, Wiley Rutledge, and William Brennan. In Volume 2, Hitchcock reports at length on the religious beliefs and church membership of the Justices. Anti-religious bias seems to have been more evident than partiality toward the creeds in which they were raised. According to Hitchcock, “The roots of the [ir]assumption about the irrationality of religion can perhaps be found in the personal histories of the majority of the justices who during the 1940s fashioned the modern jurisprudence of the religion clauses. In 1947, probably for the first time in history, the Court was composed of a majority
who were alienated from the religions of their youth.”

Justice Antonin Scalia has been the most conservative member of the Court in the religion cases. Hitchcock calls his judicial philosophy “a modified ‘original intent’—not the personal opinions of the Framers of the Constitution or later lawmakers but the ‘evident meaning’ of the texts themselves as they would have been understood at the time they were drafted.”

Justice Brennan, says Hitchcock, “was fairly certain that . . . the Founders were so preoccupied with opposing a formal establishment of religion” that they had not given “specific thought” to modern questions like prayers in public schools. But the Constitution, said Brennan, should not be treated “as a static document when in fact its interpretation had to change in each age in order to be faithful to its original purpose.” (The Court, of course, would decide what the purpose should mean today.)

There have therefore been several “patterns of establishment” in the Court’s interpretation of the Religion Clauses. The premodern Court seldom found “either a violation of free exercise or an act of establishment.” Hitchcock’s thesis is that the primary purpose of the Religion Clauses was to ensure the free exercise of religion and, as means to that end, it forbade the establishment of religion, i.e., a Church of the United States by Law Established. The modern Court is quick to protect minority sects in its practices, but tends to regard any public expenditure of money or other governmental action that favors a religious institution as an establishment of religion. This became, in rough outline, the modern ‘separation of church and state.”

He says, in addition:

The legal climate also changed because of the newly aggressive posture of three organizations—the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Jewish Congress, and Protestants and Other Americans United for the Separation of Church and State—which often for somewhat different motives, each espoused a separationist view and mounted systematic challenges to existing forms of accommodation.

This change has appeared, not only in the opinions of Justices of the Court, but in a large literature of commentators, most of them liberals. According to Hitchcock, “The term ‘liberalism,’ in modern American politics refers both to an agreement to abide by constitutional principles that provide access to all citizens (‘political liberalism’) and to an ideological act of faith in a particular concept of a free and open society (‘comprehensive’ or ‘transformative’ liberalism.).”

“The premodern Court,” says Hitchcock, “was hardly a bastion of religious orthodoxy . . . But the justices’ personal doubts seldom influenced their willingness to support religion, . . .” From the modern liberal point of view, which has strongly influenced the Court since the 1940s, religion is subjective and irrational, and therefore should be confined to the private realm and kept out of influence on public law and policy. Carried to its logical extent, it would seem, belief that God created man in his own image should bar one from having a vote on public questions of human rights such as abortion, stem-cell research, and same-sex marriage (which last item is constitutionally protected because “male and female He created them” is the only objection to it). The liberal mind acknowledges no revealed law of God or moral law derived from our nature as human beings.

In his conclusion to volume 2, Hitchcock states:

Liberalism emphasizes rights so strongly that it overlooks the question of the goods that individuals should pursue in their lives, political rights being taken as prior to the good itself. Liberal thought cannot conceive of persons belonging to communities bound by ties that are antecedent to choice, an attitude that inevitably sees strong religious groups as dangerous. Contemporary liberalism seems bifurcated, in that it is obsessed with ‘rights talk’ even as it treats certain rights, especially those having to do with religion, as though they were conferred by the state. The ultimate issue is whether citizens possess natural rights, which the Constitution merely promises to respect, or whether rights are conditionally bestowed by the state.

James Hitchcock deserves loud and prolonged congratulations for striking a blow for liberty in this well written and thoroughly documented work. We can only hope that he will be listened to.


Review by David Paul Deavel, adjunct lecturer in theology at the University of St. Thomas and a doctoral candidate in historical theology at Fordham University

In his memoir, Milestones, then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger recalled that while he and the renowned Jesuit Karl Rahner had come to many similar conclusions at the Second Vatican Council, they resided in different mental universes. Ratzinger’s universe was the Bible, the Fathers, and the entire history of the Church. Rahner’s world, especially after the Council, evidenced if one has ever read his essay in fundamental theology, Foundations, at least appears to be a combination of philosophical perspectives from St. Thomas, Kant, and Heidegger among others. Scripture and the Fathers rarely appear, while the appearance of the Church at the end of the book feels...
almost an afterthought. I am aware that there have been attempts at re-
habilitating Rahner as a man of the Tradition, notably by R. R. Reno and
Patrick Burke, but I think my general-
ization still stands.

Not so Karl’s brother Hugo, also a Jesuit, and also influential before and
during the Council. Hugo, who sup-
possedly joked that he was waiting to
read his brother’s works when they
were translated into German, lived in
the mental universe of those conciliar
figures, like the young peritus Ratz-
ingger, who thought any aggiornamento
was only possible with a rigorous and
constant ressourcement. The Church
could only truly serve the world if
she knew in what her service consist-
ed and with what her own treasury
was stocked. It is noteworthy, then,
that this reprint of Hugo Rahner’s
pioneering study of the Fathers’ vi-
sion of Mary and the Church as
two sides of one reality bears on its
cover the recommendation of Joseph
Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict XVI,
as “one of the most important theo-
logical rediscoveries of the twentieth
century.”

Three cheers seem too stingy for tiny Zaccheus Press, which also
brought out last year one of the
greatest theological works by an Eng-
lishman in this century, Dom Anscar
Vonier’s A Key to the Doctrine of the
Eucharist. Our Lady and the Church
is physically a gorgeous book. The
cover’s cobalt blue border and white
background surround a print of Bot-
ticelli’s Madonna of the Book, while the
title, in gold lettering, and the author,
in red lettering, are above and below
the print respectively. For those who
judge books at least in part by their
covers, it should be said that designer
Robin Terra gets a special prize.

But like the stable in Bethlehem,
what is inside is immeasurably greater
than the outside. Written originally
before the declaration of the Assump-
tion, Rahner set himself the task of
resolving a growing apparent “con-
tradiction” felt between the historic
western devotion to Mary and to the
newly revived devotion to the Church.
This book, said Rahner, “has one
single object: to show from the warm-
hearted theology of the great Fathers
and Doctors that the whole mystery
of the Church is inseparably bound up
with the mystery of Mary” (5).

After an introductory chapter
detailing the notion of typology in
Scripture since St. Paul, Rahner takes
four chapters to treat various aspects
of this great, two-sided mystery under
four traditional Marian titles: “Im-
maculata,” “Ever Virgin,” “Mother of
God,” and “Mother of the Faithful.”
Each chapter is filled with quotations
from both Latin and Greek Fathers,
as well as numerous medieval com-
mentators, designed to show that the
Catholic understanding of Mary and
the Church was indeed universal.
Rahner specially highlights many of
the statements of St. Augustine on
this topic, showing that the Doctor
of Grace’s concept of salvation was
as intricately wrapped around Mary
and the Church as any of the other
Fathers. It is thus useful in proving the
19th century Calvinist B. B. Warfield
a grand simplicateur in his facile claim
that the Protestant Reformation was
the triumph of Augustine’s soteriology
over his ecclesiology.

The next chapters proceed to take
insights from the Marian aspects thus
surveyed and apply them to individual
spiritual lives. “Mary at the Font”
beautifully details the Christmas im-
agery of baptism when Christ is born
anew in one of the children of Adam.
Rahner quotes wonderful passages like
the following from the old Spanish
liturgy of baptism:

The children of light go forth from
baptism: tonight they are born, by the
grace of the Spirit, of their mother the
Church to greet a new day: without
stain she conceived them, she brought
them forth without pain: for she
stands as a figure of the Virgin Moth-
er of God, who without the work of
man received the blessed fruit of her
womb. (71)

The child of baptism must continue
to give birth to Christ in his own
soul throughout life, so Rahner fol-
ows Mary through her life leading
to her place at the cross where the
sword which threatened to pierce her
own heart did.

The eighth chapter, “Valiant
Woman,” is perhaps the most pow-
erful of the chapters, attempting to
open up “the mystery of her inner
strength amid the ordinariness of her
life on earth. For only he who can
prove his unwavering faithfulness to
Christ by his powerful patience in
everyday life, is able to go with Christ
to Calvary and share in the Resurrec-
tion” (88). This thread has an impor-
tant effect on our understanding of
the sacraments, and consequently on
our lives: “Incarnation and death are
made one in the Church’s sacraments,
for in the sacrificial death, Christ’s
body is every day reborn” (90). Even
the old claims about Catholics focus
more on the Incarnation and the
Orthodox (or Protestants, depending
on who bears this legend) more on
the Death and Resurrection must
find their end. The Incarnation and
the Paschal Mystery are as inter-
twined as are Mary and the Church.
Every sacrament and every day in the
life of the Church bear the weight of
the glory of Christmas, Good Friday,
and Easter.

If the eighth is the most power-
ful, the ninth chapter, “The Pledge of
the Spirit in our Hearts,” is the most
personal. Mary’s pondering of the
mysteries revealed to her is revealed
as the essence of Pentecost, that is,
being filled with the Spirit. “For into
her heart,” writes Rahner, “came the
Spirit with a fullness that filled it to
human capacity” (103). Mary’s fill-
ing was a precursor to the wind of
Uncommon Dissent: Intellectuals Who Find Darwinism Unconvincing
Reviewed by Prof. Jude P. Dougherty, Emeritus, The Catholic University of America

Dembski has brought together a valuable collection of essays in an attempt to clear the air in the “creationist-evolutionist” debate where terms are rarely defined and ideological motivation is often hidden. Dembski makes clear in his “introduction” that a few basic distinctions are in order. One must distinguish among theories of evolution, Darwin’s work itself, Darwinism as an ideology, and the use made of evolutionary theory in the cause of militant atheism. Theories of evolution ante-dated Darwin, notably those of St. Augustine and Immanuel Kant. Darwin’s own grandfather, Erasmus Darwin (1731–1802), had proposed a theory of evolution shortly before Darwin’s book, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection (1859) was published. Wallace’s paper and an abstract of Darwin’s book were presented together at a meeting of the Linnean Society of London in 1858. Neither said anything about the origin of nature itself or about a creator or purposive designer. Why then the alarm? Darwin’s account did challenge the biblical account of creation as found in the book of Genesis, but Christians had long understood that the Bible was not to be taken literally. St. Augustine, himself, distinguished among three levels of interpretation: literal, figurative, and moral. The theory of evolution arrived on the European scene when the philosophical empiricism of the 18th century was prepared to use an interpretation of it in support of its own agnosticism. Reason to doubt the existence of God as the author of nature as we experience it fitted nicely with the enlightened secular philosophies of the day. No doubt there have always been village atheists. Plato thought atheism so serious that in his ideal republic he mandated the death penalty for the second offense of atheism. The youthful first offender was to be excused. Today the situation is reversed given the willingness of the ACLU to commit its resources to anyone willing to challenge the public expression of the existence of God, including those who attribute order in the universe to an intelligent designer. How did we come to this?

Who, we may ask, has a stake in the denial of the existence of a creating God? In their respective contributions to the volume, both Phillip E. Johnson and Nancy R. Pearcey make it clear that the debate about creation is not a debate among paleontologists but a debate among philosophers who represent conflicting worldviews. Dembski is astonished that someone like Daniel Dennett can get away with invoking Darwin in defense of his atheism, and not only that, but that Dennett, with the aid of willing editors, is given a forum in his attempt to make atheism attractive in the wider culture. On July 16, 2003, the New York Times op ed page published an article by Daniel Dennett proclaiming his atheism and encouraging others to do so as well. That a philosophy professor at Tufts University would feel compelled to evangelize on behalf of a question-able opinion and brag about liberating high-school students from their religious upbringing is interesting in itself. The antecedents of his view are indeed more interesting. One would have to look hard to find a philosopher who claims to have evidence that God does not exist. Yet belief in the non-existence of God is fairly
widespread, particularly in a class that Dennett calls ‘bright.’ As Dembski points out, the term “bright” is used as a synonym for “atheist” or alternatively for “Darwinist.” It is also used deliberately to suggest an affinity with an 18th century movement that has come to be known as the Enlightenment.

From the vantage point of classical antiquity, the Enlightenment was anything but that. The brights that Dennett urges to come out of the closet may well be advised in the interest of self-esteem to remain in the closet where their dim light may seem bright. Why promulgate a view for which there is no evidence? Claiming that most scientists support the view provides no evidence for the view itself. The existence or non-existence of God is not a question that arises in any of the natural sciences. The Enlightenment fathers were more cautious in advancing their views. David Hume, who awakened the somnambulant Kant by challenging the principle of causality, in much the same way as Locke had challenged the principle of substance, drove reason into a doubting and skeptical mode, but even Hume left the need for private meditation of a religious sort. Unlike the British empiricists, the ancients from Plato to Plotinus and beyond had no trouble reasoning to a self-thinking intellect, a sumnum bonum, a first efficient cause, an ultimate final cause, and an immaterial intellect. Design in nature hardly had to be postulated; it was taken to be self-evident. Without an acknowledgment of the intellect’s ability to move from effect to cause, from the observed to the unobserved, from the seen to the unseen, there is no way to demonstrate the existence of God or, for that matter, much of what we take for granted in theoretical physics.

The efficacy of causal reasoning is dramatically seen in those sciences where the postulated entities of one generation became the encountered ones of another. The encountered is routinely explained by that which is not encountered. In the lifetime of our fathers, if not in our own lifetime, the molecular structure of a solid was a mere postulate, a crude analogue to represent what was thought should be the case according to the evidence at hand. Today an electron microscope can take directly interpretable pictures of atoms within solids. Now we can understand why some solids behave as insulators, others as semiconductors, and still others as metals. To use another example, with nuclear magnetic resonance imaging we are able to determine sodium and phosphorus concentrations in compounds such as fats and carbohydrates in the living tissues of the human body. Causal inference, which produced various 19th-century models of the cell and its components, turns out to be in the 20th century a close approximation of the inferred structure.

An amusing episode in the annals of science may illustrate this point. Wolfgang Pauli in 1930 postulated the existence of an undetected particle to account for phenomena he could not otherwise explain. Perhaps tongue in cheek, he apologized in the atmosphere of the same academic Zeitgeist that Dennett seeks to promote. In correspondence with a colleague, he wrote, “I have done a terrible thing. I have postulated a particle that cannot be detected.” In supporting Pauli, the Italian physicist Enrico Fermi baptized the hypothetical particle “neutrino,” or “little neutral one,” but his paper was rejected by the prestigious journal Nature as “too speculative and remote from reality.” The first experiment to hunt for the neutrino was called “Project Poltergeist.” In 1956 Clyde Cowan and Fred Reines found a definite trace of the elusive neutrino as a result of experiments performed with a newly commissioned reactor at Los Alamos. Pauli, in a realistic manner, was seeking an explanation, reasoning from effect to unseen cause, but clearly he was out of line as judged by reigning positivistic canons.

Dennett, knowingly or not, has revived an ancient debate, playing the role once assumed by Epicurus (341-270 B.C.), who aimed to free the human being from fear of the gods and the threat of punishment in an afterlife. He deployed atomic physics to eliminate divine causation from the world as well as the possibility that the soul could survive the death of the body. Yet he did not deny the existence of the gods altogether, given the widespread belief in their existence; rather he reinterpreted their nature, identifying them as idealizations or eternal models of behavior for which human beings might strive. Thus, brights in Dennett’s words “even teach Sunday school and Hebrew classes,” no doubt in the spirit of Epicurus.

The shallowness of the Epicurean position was, of course, recognized in antiquity. Cicero (106–43 B.C.), in page after page of works such as On the Good Life and On the Laws, castigates Epicurus for his unwarranted atheism and the destruction of an accepted moral order, calling him “an effeminate pleasure lover.” Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150–215 A.D.), who obliged his students, in their attempt to understand the implications of Sacred Scripture, to read all of the pagan philosophers, nevertheless declared that “the only completely useless sect is that of Epicurus.” It seems to be a law of history that periods of high rational achievement are followed by periods of doubt, only to give way to a resurgence of confidence in the intellect’s ability to navigate once again in difficult metaphysical terrain. Perhaps the present is the trough of a Pyrronism that has been in the making since the Enlightenment.
Modern paganism differs from its ancient forms. The ancients may have been ignorant of the teachings of Christ which were to come later, but their disciples were open to Christianity. The paganism of contemporary philosophers is directed not merely against the intellectual confidence of the high periods of classical antiquity but against Christianity itself. The use of criticism within the confines of the university is one thing; the quest for power through channels of popular opinion is another. Indeed, the quest for power may be the root of the skeptical impulse. If there are no natural standards against which behavior and policy are to be held accountable, then the will of those in power becomes paramount. The current resentment of politicians and bureaucrats to reminders that they are accountable to a moral order is a case in point.

Current efforts to prevent any mention of the Christian sources of European culture in the yet-to-be adopted European Constitution are by no means innocent in intent. One is reminded of an oft-repeated adage, “Those who control the present control the past; those who control the past control the future.” The rewriting of the past has become an industry on both sides of the Atlantic as university presses bring out one volume after another ignoring the classical and Christian sources of Western culture. The “upward filtration of a new spirit that of an emancipated, atheistic, international democracy” that the American philosopher, George Santayana foresaw three quarters of a century ago is upon us. Materialist though he was, he found the prospect appalling. Recognizing the importance of religion to society, he wrote, “Modern materialists, I confess, have usually had vulgar and jejune minds; but not so the ancients who were materialists by nature and not foolishly hostile to popular religion or without religion in their hearts.”

In another passage, Santayana proffers this assessment, “Not only does the decay of religious faith let loose all sorts of moral license, but the inevitable rebellion of the passions, noble as well as base, against any external control, because people wish to be free to do as they like with good conscience.” The resulting moral decline and eventual political chaos, Santayana feared, may beg for resolution by the fiat of a dictator. “The modern mind,” he continues, “is liberal and romantic; but a state of society and a discipline of the will inspired by pure reason would be neither romantic nor liberal. It would be sternly organic, strictly and traditionally moral, military and scientific. The literary enemies of Christianity might soon find reason to pine for the broad margin of liberty and folly by which Christianity, in merry Christian times, was always surrounded.” Santayana’s magisterial volume, Dominions and Powers, from which these passages are taken, could profitably be read by Dennett’s Albrights as well as by members of those parliaments about to vote on the European Constitution. The omission of any reference to Christianity may be a fait accompli, but Santayana could remind anyone willing to listen of the historic role of Christianity, its beauty and moral import when judged even from a forthright naturalistic standpoint.

Space does not permit the examination of each of the fourteen essays that constitute this volume. Together they make clear that the use of Darwin in defense of a naturalistic worldview has no place in a biology classroom. The use of Darwin to challenge personal accountability to a natural moral order is unconscionable. There is evidence that the Darwinians, who heretofore have been highly successful in quashing dissent in academic and intellectual circles are, if not in retreat, at least on the defensive. Impressive chapters by Michael John Denton and J. Budzisewski not only offer devastating critiques of Darwinism but show clearly that evolutionary change requires direction. In the classroom, theories of evolution must be taught for what they are, hypothetical explanations for empirically encountered natural phenomena, but Darwinism has to be exposed as spurious philosophy masquerading as science.


Reviewed by John Adam Moreau, Ph.D., Mobile, AL

In Caring for a Dying Loved One Robert Fischer, a nurse and a former Naval Nurse Corps officer, lays out invaluable counsel about dealing with a dying person who—let’s say it in plain English—would try to bully and control the person caring for him.

It is an unsettling idea but of course one knows it to be true. The dying person was human and flawed before he took to his death bed and he is just as much or more so as he nears death.

Enter the compelling idea that the dying person also has responsibilities to those caring for him, and it is the duty of the person caring for the dying person to set limits regarding lines the dying person may not cross.

Otherwise, writes Fischer: “The ‘emotional vampire’ can convert the caregiver into an ‘emotional cripple.’” He goes on:

“The emotional vampires can be emotionally dysfunctional, mentally unstable, or demented loved ones. They are difficult to deal with in the best...”
of times, but can be little less than a nightmare when they are sick. They are generally self-centered, co-dependent, demanding, materialistic, paranoid, angry, controlling, hateful....

“In their self-centeredness, for whatever the pathology, they believe the world exists for and through them alone. When they cannot live on their own terms they become very frustrated and act out their frustration.”

The person providing the care, says Fischer, has his own packet of emotions and he needs to do an ongoing gut-check by reminding himself he does not have to justify his actions.

Setting limits is of course done with both inflexible firmness and love and respect.

This book is free of psycho babble and is carefully attentive to the subjects one expects and needs covered such as prayer, the stages of grief, forgiveness, and, new to me, an emphasis that it often is crucial to tell the dying person his family will get along without him. An obvious example: A dying woman torn by how her children will fare.

I don’t recall ever coming across quite the following experience about which Fischer writes this way:

“There are instances when your loved one appears to be communicating with family members already departed, with celestial creatures such as angels, or with Jesus or the Blessed Virgin.

“They may be experiencing two realities simultaneously, the reality of this world and that of the next. These people often describe the beauty of the next world in terms of colors, peace, or the wonderfully warm and bright light that draws them closer to it.

“Our first inclination is to think that they are confused or delusional or that they have become distant and detached. Often they cannot explain the things they are experiencing which only compounds the doubt of those who do not share what they are experiencing.”

A fascinating passage, the above, since it makes one wonder about the experience of a dying person not in the state of grace.

As for Father Curley’s commendable book, it was written, he says, to avoid what he says is the mumbo jumbo jumbo and jargon found in such literature. He succeeds. Among his several impressive professional endeavors has been as president of the Board of Trustees of the National Catholic Ministry to the Bereaved.

Page after page has rewarding information on the rules and guidelines of the church.

“We express our rituals by word and action,” Fr Curley writes. “Religious rituals are a body of ceremonies or actions which help us express our connectedness with God and one another. Through these rituals we communicate our beliefs, our hopes and our concerns in a formal way.”

This book is the resource for those readers who continue to be scandalized and disconsolate about liturgical abuses. The book is a lode of information on the rules and guidelines about funerals and the events leading to them and following them. For those of us who say we think we’ll go postal if we attend one more slovenly hideous sham-like funeral and who want the right things done after death the right way this book is where to turn.

Subjects such as vigil, funeral liturgy, rite of committal, and up to what point do secular symbols play an acceptable role are concisely dealt with. Often I found myself glad to know where I could get a useful explanation if ever I need one. Example:

“The pall,” writes the author, “reflects the clothing of the person at baptism when a white garment is used to designate the new life of the Christian. We remember in this ritual the words of baptism: ‘See in this white garment the outward sign of your Christian dignity. Bring that dignity unstained into the everlasting life of heaven.’”

To the layman; volunteers and professionals who help the dying; religious orders, and doctors and nurses I suggest that you put these two works with two others you have just about a perfect library.

One of the two is Arise from Darkness: What to do when Life Doesn’t Make Sense by Benedict J. Groeschel, C.F.R., wherein he makes the sharp comment, “...grief is the price of love.”

The other is Dom Hubert van Zeller’s Suffering: the Catholic Answer. The Cross and Its Meaning for You wherein he starkly turns the “why me?” question on its head and thus embraces “why not me?”

I am grateful to authors Fischer and Curley for not trying to explain the unanswerable—why creatures grieve and mourn. Dogs and elephants and some other critters, apparently do so, and we know that man does. I can only hazard that we grieve and mourn because of our fallen and scarred nature.

God didn’t have to make it that way. Just as he could have made grass orange or there to be no oceans, he could have made us immune. But we are not immune and can only guess why. Possibly, Calvary could not make sense if men did not grieve and mourn.
**Book Reviews**

**Queen Mother: A Biblical Theology of Mary’s Queenship**, Edward Sri, (Steubenville: Emmaus Road, 2005)

Reviewed by Thomas P. Scheck, PhD, Research Associate, The Jacques Maritain Center, University of Notre Dame

This exegetical monograph is the first title in “The Letter & Spirit Project,” a new series, launched by Scott Hahn and the St. Paul Center for Biblical Theology, that aims to advance the work of biblical theology by publishing studies on key themes in Scripture from literary, historical, and theological perspectives. Hahn is the general editor of the series and has written the Foreword to the present work. Sri’s thesis is that there is rich scriptural support for viewing Mary, the mother of the Messiah, as a queen-mother (Hebrew: Gebyiah) figure in accordance with the OT Davidic kingdom traditions (Gn 3.15, Isa 7.14, 1 & 2 Kgs) that are evoked or alluded to in such texts as Mt 1–2, Lk 1.26–45 and Rv 12. Consequently, Sri asserts, the Catholic doctrine of Mary’s queenship in heaven and her share in Christ’s rule over the Church is solidly grounded in Scripture and salvation history. Sri argues his case calmly and convincingly in this concise book, which distills to 116 pages (plus 74 pages of endnotes) his doctoral dissertation from the Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas, Rome. The author, an Assistant Professor at Benedictine College in Atchison, Kansas, is conversant in all relevant literature in English, Italian, French and Spanish, though I found no references to German works.

Chapter one sets the context for the exegesis that follows in chapters two and three by summarizing common antecedent approaches to the doctrine of Mary’s queenship in the Catholic tradition (liturgy, popular piety, magisterial teaching, and the Fathers). This chapter is based primarily on secondary works and examines four approaches, which Sri articulates as follows: 1) proof-texting based on pre-conceived notions of Mary’s royal office; 2) establishing the doctrine by means of logical inferences; 3) “extra-biblical” typologies of feminine royal figures (such as Esther and Wisdom); 4) the salvation-historical approach which sees Mary within the context of relevant OT passages that are subsequently discussed. Without completely dismissing the validity of the first three approaches, Sri favors the fourth, and feels that there are no good grounds for allowing the biblical roots that animate our theology of Mary’s royal office to remain in obscurity. The weakness of this chapter is that there is little evidence of first-hand engagement of patristic texts, as is found, for example, in Hugo Rahner’s, *Maria und die Kirche*, 1961.

Chapter two is, in my judgment, the most important and intriguing chapter in the book. Here Sri examines the OT concept of the Queen Mother, a personage clearly of great importance in the Ancient Near East in general and in the Davidic dynasty in particular. The basic idea is that, owing in part to the polygamous nature of ancient Near Eastern kingdoms, the mother of a king played an important role in the political, military, economic and cultic affairs as well as a key part in the process of dynastic succession. In fact, the king’s mother was often more important than his wife, and generally it was the king’s mother who ruled as queen, not his wife. One can see the prominence of the Persian queen mother in Dn 5.10–12, where she is the one who takes charge of the critical situation and gives the counsel that is immediately carried out. My suspicion is that the consultation of other ancient texts, such as Aeschylus’ *Persians*, would further corroborate the importance of the queen-mother in antiquity.

Sri argues that, like her ancient near eastern neighbors, Israel too bestowed great honor upon the mother of the ruling king. This is visible above all in the narrative of 1 & 2 Kings. In the case of Bathsheba, mother of Solomon, we encounter a queen mother whom the king (Solomon) honors by rising in her presence, bowing to her, and seating her at his right hand. Clearly she shares in the king’s royal authority and holds the most important position in the kingdom, second only to the king. She serves as an advocate for the people and a counselor for her son.

Sri argues that the theme of the royal mother-figuré is intentionally developed or alluded to in Isa 7.14 and Gn 3.15. In the former passage, the prophet offers the House of David a sign of a Davidic son who would manifest God’s faithfulness to the people of Judah in a time of dynastic crisis. The prophecy explicitly links the royal son with his queen mother. Similarly, Sri relies on the best insights of modern exegesis of Gn 1–3 to demonstrate that these chapters, when informed by Ps 8 and other OT texts describing the Davidic dynasty, are suffused with royal imagery. Accordingly, the author of Genesis, according to Sri, is portraying Adam and Eve as royal figures who have been given a mission to rule over all creatures. In such a context, Gn 3.15 can be read as a promise of a future kingly figure who will crush the head of the serpent in the same way that Davidic kings would subdue their enemies. In the midst of these royal images, the mother figure in Gn 3.15 is intimately linked with the royal seed, who will bring about a future eschatological victory over the serpent.

What Sri’s explanation essentially implies is that typological exegesis of Scripture is embedded in the OT texts themselves, a point that Hahn also makes in the Foreword. Symbolic imagery is employed throughout Gn 1–3 in a way that makes a strict literalist interpretation of these texts
unlikely from an exegetical point of view. This is not to say that Sri denies the literal and historical truth of the texts in question, but he stresses their rich symbolic significance and opposes a crassly literalistic interpretation. Using Scripture to interpret Scripture, Sri effectively shows the double entendre and symbolic nature of the language.

The upshot of Sri’s examination is that the queen-mother figure plays an important role in the OT. In David’s kingdom, she held an official position in the royal court, shared in her son’s reign, and served as advocate and counselor. She appears proto-typically in Gn 3.15 and is linked with the promise of future salvation found in Isa 7.14. All of this sheds a great deal of light on the NT. I found Sri’s exegesis of these OT passages both stimulating and persuasive. He draws on a plethora of modern OT exegetes from various theological persuasions, including both liberal and conservative Protestants. The latter, it seems to me, have very seldom been engaged by modern Catholic exegetes and it is good to see Sri doing it.

Chapter three of Sri’s analysis completes the canonical investigation by explicating the queen mother figure in the NT portrayal of Mary. Here the best insights of modern exegesis are cited to demonstrate that Mt 1–2, Lk 1, and Rv 12 link the Davidic Messiah with his queen-mother in the context of rulership. Mt 1–2 clearly places Jesus in the context of the Davidic kingdom and highlights Mary’s role as the mother of this new Davidic king. Likewise Lk 1.26–45 show the evangelist to be depicting Mary as the mother of the Messiah—King who is closely associated with the fulfillment of the Davidic promise given above all in Isa 7.14. Here Sri dissents, thank God, from his principal exegetical guides, R. Brown and J. Fitzmyer, both of whom question whether Isa 7.14 stands in the background of Luke’s infancy narrative.

For Sri, in contrast, “there is no reason to exclude the importance of Isa 7.14 for Lk 1.31.” This strikes me as an insight that is so obvious it scarcely requires proof.

Finally Sri tackles the highly symbolic text in Rv 12 which describes the woman clothed with the sun who gives birth to a male child who rules the nations. Sri finds echoes of Gn 3.15 in this passage and concludes that Rv 12 portrays this drama as a climactic fulfillment of Gn 3’s description of the serpent’s war with the woman and her royal messianic offspring. After discussing various interpretations of the difficult text, Sri finds that while the woman in Rv 12 primarily refers to God’s people, she also can be understood as the mother of Jesus, when the text is read in the light of other canonical texts. And since she is the mother of the Davidic Messiah (cf. Rv 12.5), “the queen-mother tradition of the Old Testament can shed light on the woman’s queenly position.”

In brief, I find the present monograph an outstanding example of canonical exegesis of the Bible. It capitalizes on the best insights of modern exegesis without capitulating to dubious conjectures that emanate from the modern school. The author stresses the unity and coherence of the Christian canon; he reads Scripture within the living tradition of the whole Church; and he is attentive to the coherence of the truths of the faith among themselves and within the whole of revelation. In other words, the author operates with Catholic principles of exegesis. Moreover, his book reads well, and the author appears to possess both humility and confidence. The topic of the investigation was well-conceived, and his thesis is, for the most part, convincing. For all these reasons, I commend the book and hope to use it as a text in my Foundations of Theology course.
ary Brown, this one a product of the fertile mind of G.K. Chesterton, the seemingly lost young Bryce will be found, pulled back into the bosom of the Church with but a twitch upon the thread.

II) Before moving on to a brief synopsis of the novel in the next section, it is perhaps fitting to pause and reflect upon the genre of the Catholic novel. For while we seem to invoke this term more and more nowadays, it is rarely with the assurance that accompanies constant use. Does the Catholic novel actually exist, and if so, what is its essence? As Hamlet might note, that is the question. Moreover, it is a question that has stimulated a good deal of debate in Catholic literary circles in recent years. From a philosophical perspective one would have to at least inquire whether a novel which qualifies as Catholic must fulfill any necessary and sufficient conditions. The first use of the term, just like the inaugural use of the term Big Bang in modern cosmology, was not descriptive in intent. It made its debut as a term of derision for the novels of Francois Mauriac. While he certainly knows the difficulty of meeting the strict definition he imposes upon the wildly popular Catholic Novel seminars which he has conducted in the Diocese of Brooklyn over the last dozen or so years, Father Robert Lauder of St. John’s University not only looks for novels that deal with sacramental, liturgical, or moral principle(s) of the Church, etc., but moreover do so in an affirmative way. For example, Graham Greene’s Big Four overly Catholic novels – The Power and the Glory, The End of the Affair, The Heart of the Matter, and Brighton Rock, satisfy his definition, whereas Joyce’s Portrait of an Artist as a Young Man does not measure up. According to Flannery O’Connor, novels which present the faith as mere props or furniture would not qualify, which seems acceptable; yet she, and we presumably, would classify her own two novels and many short stories as Catholic even though her Catholic characters are few and far between. Which brings up the further question of whether a Catholic novel must be written by a Catholic. Alan Paton, of Cry the Beloved, Country fame, also wrote a novel entitled Too Late the Phalarope, which pits the social and political commitments of Dutch Reformed Afrikaners of the post-war period in South Africa against the more liberal and progressive social vision of the South African Anglican community. Should such a Christian novel, or even a secular novel, be considered non-Catholic, while still not being uncatholic in the topics it broaches?

War was certainly an important focal point for the development of the so-called Catholic Novel in the last century. Evelyn Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited paints a ravishingly beautiful word portrait which depicts a waning British aristocracy with the brushstrokes of a fervent Catholic sensibility, while his later Catholic trilogy brings us to the brink of the post-war era. Vatican II provided a subsequent prism through which Catholic artists could imaginatively conceive a relationship between the faith and the modern world. Some of the novels of David Lodge, for example, immerse themselves in post-conciliar concerns while the lone novel of Michael Novak entitled The Tiber Was Silver captures the moment, in the life of a young seminarian in Rome, when the pastoral foundation for what we now call the new evangelical springtime was just about to begin. One prevalent hypothesis from years ago credits the decline of the Catholic novel to the Church’s embrace of modernity as marked by the Council. According to this view the vitality of the Catholic novel prior to the Council was directly proportional to its capacity to speak with a counter-cultural voice.

Ralph McInerny is not the only important contemporary Catholic novelist at Notre Dame. My friend Valerie Sayers, a distinguished novelist who heads the Creative Writing program there, takes a more flexible approach to the problem of the Catholic novel than does Father Lauder. If Father Lauder endorses what we might dub the Strong Definition of the Catholic Novel then Valerie Sayers espouses the Weak Definition, which stipulates that a novel should be recognizably propelled by the message of the gospels even if it doesn’t explicitly deal with easily identifiable Catholic themes. Also, for her, novels in which Catholicism is itself the problem should not necessarily be dismissed as non-Catholic, since what is valuable, or hurtful, about a book is the result of the thinking it stimulates in the faithful. To twist the arm of the post-modernists a bit, the Catholic novel is a sacred space that extends beyond the written word and the author’s intentions, to include the community of readers who confer meaning upon it.

III) All this being said, it is my view that The Heretic should qualify as a Catholic novel from the perspective of every Catholic. It is also refreshing to have a book whose emphasis is upon the Church as mysterious rather than militant, although this is not to denigrate the social dimension of the Catholic novel which goes back well over sixty years to works like Christ in Concrete and many others. In 2005 we celebrate the 400th anniversary of the publication of Part I of Cervantes’ Don Quixote, often referred to as the first modern novel. The recently deceased Catholic philosopher and mystic Fernando Rieüo also characterized it as a Catholic novel whose main purpose was to reinvigorate the mystical soul of Spain which dates all the way back to the origins of the pilgrimage to the shrine of St. James. While the Catholic novel boasts a marvelous past, books
like *The Heretic* bode well for its future. Baer’s book is but one of a legion of post-conciliar Catholic novels that puts the lie to Ortega y Gasset’s claim that the novel form has reached a point of exhaustion.

**Structure:**

*The Heretic* consists of 211 pages and is divided into three parts, each of these being further subdivided into four chapters apiece. It is literally possible then, even for the reader of average speed, to finish the book in a single sitting. I confess that it took me three. According to the implication from his blurb on the back cover of the book it took Ralph McInerny just one. But to borrow a line from former Senator Benson to an unsuspecting Dan Quayle, I am no Ralph McInerny. The first section of the book is entitled *Confession*, the second *Penance*, and the third *Aftermath*. Thus the novel is framed by a simple structure that facilitates the communication of its content in part by promoting the proper mood of expectation as the book progresses from the admission of guilt in part I, to the requirement of suffering as compensation in part II, to the tying up of loose ends in conformity with the Dantesque significance of commedia as an ultimate alignment of life with the will of God in part III. To me this is reminiscent of the sequence of poems which chronicles the unfolding events in the life of Bryce is periodically interrupted by the first person confessions of a heretic whose exact identity remains unknown until later in the book. As with the serialized novels of a previous era, each new revelation from the heretic is continuous with its precursor, thus priming the reader’s expectation for what is to come.

**Synopsis:**

The action begins in Rome on Thursday, August 3rd. The specific year is not specified. Bryce Sinclair, a handsome young American journalist living and working in Rome, is courting Angelina Parento, an Italian beauty who spent a good deal of her youth living in the United States. They are both lapsed Catholics. A marriage proposal is pending when Bryce is suddenly and unexpectedly summoned to the Vatican by Cardinal Visconte. While meeting with his Eminence they are joined by the pope who tells Bryce of the impending death of his namesake and uncle, Father Bryce Sinclair, in Fatima.

Young Bryce arranges for some time off and flies to the city of the famous Marian apparitions on Friday, August 4th.

He is whisked to the bedside of his uncle, a leading Catholic theologian as well as a personal friend and confidante of Sister Lucia, the lone surviving Fatima visionary. Father Sinclair is also reputed to possess the gift of prophecy. The dormition scene which then unfolds is frightening. Father Sinclair seemingly confesses to being the heretic who has been publishing extremely popular, seductive and heretical anti-Catholic tracts under a pseudonym for years. There are two other priests at the vigil, one a Cardinal, another the long time Jesuit assistant of the dying Father Sinclair. With his last breath the latter issues a prophecy: one will become a saint, one the pope, one will be condemned to hell, while one will serve the prophet.

To find out what transpires after this I leave you with the very pleasant task of reading the book. Needless to say it ends happily: despite a murder, a miraculous conversion, a treasure hunt, a spiritual betrothal in Fatima so pure that one can even begin to appreciate why Gabriel Marcel believed the marriage bond could be used to prove the existence of God, heresies so sordid that even a devotee of the Black Mass might blush, a spine tingling visit to the giardini vaticani, plus the very real possibility that the heretic could be the vicar of Christ himself. Not to mention that our Lord might have survived the crucifixion by arranging for Simon of Cyrene to die in his stead. Please accept my apology. Knowing the pleasure of which you would be deprived should I continue with more details of the plot leaves me with no other alternative but to desist. Oscar Wilde once said that he could resist everything except temptation. I only hope that what I have said is sufficient to tempt you to try a Catholic literary experience that you will long remember and never regret.

**All the Pope’s Men: The Inside Story of How the Vatican Really Thinks**


**Reviewed by Rev. Brian Van Hove, S.J., White House Retreat, St. Louis, Missouri**

We have heard the expression “fair and balanced.” John L. Allen, Jr., in this book about the Roman Curia has accomplished just that, despite working for the National Catholic Reporter. He claims to be a mediator between two cultures, that of the Holy See, which he tries to interpret in a professional way, and that of the English-speaking world.

How much Mr. Allen should be believed is, of course, up to you the reader, but genuine notes of sympathy for the Vatican’s way of life punctuate
this story.

This book is not an exploration of structures, but an exposition of thinking, a more subtle task, if not nearly impossible. If anything, the author seems indifferent about ecclesiastical issues which for others of us in the church are vital and passionate. But his hope is that the Vatican will evolve in the direction of more transparency, to avoid misunderstanding and needless friction. He is no pope-basher. His goal is harmony. The chapter on “Vatican Psychology” is particularly rewarding and helpful.

All the Pope’s Men is timely. When in 2004-2005 we saw the pope weakening physically, his assistants naturally were delegated more and more of the burden of the governance of the universal church. Allen writes about them from the experience of many conversations and interviews in Rome where he is stationed, unlike some other “fly in” journalists who come for an occasion.

Throughout church history, and especially since the Reformation, curialists have been reviled for real or imagined practices. Allen is generally positive about the men and women who serve the church in Rome. He hopes he has gotten to get “inside their minds” and has interpreted their minds to promote genuine understanding of a unique culture that is very different from Anglo-Saxon efficiency and the corporate approach. Just because something is different does not make it suspect. Perhaps he wishes to say with Sir Winston Churchill’s remark about democracy, that “our system may be bad, but all the others are worse.”

The author lists five top myths which must be dealt with. These are The Vatican, Who’s in Charge, Vatican Secrecy, Vatican Wealth, and Climbing the Career Ladder. In short, we learn that the voices in the curia are less than unified, that there is more decentralization than many suspected, that there is a genuine openness that can be contrasted with traditional allegations of secrecy, that Vatican finances are actually quite modest in scope, and that many who work in the curia are quite humble and obscure.

The last half of the book is an application of what we have learned to two American situations: the clergy abuse scandals and the war in Iraq. Here he shows that neither the Vatican nor the Americans are wrong, nor are they both always right. There is genuine goodwill on both sides, and genuine misunderstandings occur on both sides. The Vatican often sees “the big picture” while the United States sees rather its own particular needs. The Vatican is sympathetic toward America, but at the same time rejects the “secularized Protestantism” which America represents. The Vatican mistrusts the unilateralism which the American superpower exercises in the world. Allen ends by saying “the relationship between Rome and Washington seems destined to be complex and sometimes strained.” But we take away from this statement a fresh understanding of how this can be, an appreciation for those complexities, and for this much alone the book is to be recommended.


Reviewed by (Rev.) Michael P. Orsi, Ed.D., Research Fellow in Law and Religion, Ave Maria School of Law

The electronic age has given rise to a rapid-fire style of discourse that reduces human communication to something that is often less than reflective. In particular, the speech of politicians has been reshaped by the demands of the mass media for “sound bites” that fit easily into brief on-air reports and provide punch, drama and simplicity.

This pressure for brevity has dovetailed with another demand on public figures: the expectation that leaders be able to comment knowledgeably and succinctly on an increasingly broad range of issues. Indeed, the sheer number of subjects politicians are expected to have at their command certainly limits the ability for a thoughtful response on any one topic, and has increased the dependence of political figures on speechwriters. That, in turn, has tended to remove speakers even further from the content of their remarks—and from their hearers as well.

The real issue, of course, is whether the spoken word truly reveals the speaker and the vision behind what is being said.

In The Eloquent President: A Portrait of Lincoln through His Words, Ronald C. White, Jr., Professor of American Intellectual and Religious History at San Francisco Theological Seminary, makes the case that Lincoln’s respect for the spoken word enabled the message and the messenger to become one, thereby enhancing his power of communication and persuasion. White examines Lincoln’s key speeches, his letters, and his posthumously published “Meditation on the Divine Will” in light of Aristotle’s “Treatise on Rhetoric.” White’s analysis presents a developing portrait of our nation’s 16th President as a politician and statesman, and even as something of a theologian.

White shows how Lincoln’s technique in building a case was developed from his courtroom presentations and the experience he had gained in debates. The logic of Lincoln’s arguments was heightened by his use of simple and sometimes folksy language, which he knew would resonate with the assembled group. Lincoln was careful to know his audience, and crafted his remarks to resemble a dialogical encounter with them. Lincoln was acutely aware of the power of words, and was espe-
cially sensitive to how they impacted the ear. In their diaries, his aides frequently recount how the President read his speeches to them out loud to determine how they would sound to the listener. White examines the speeches for content, structural balance, points of emphasis, and the types of words used, as well as their cadence.

Aristotle taught that it was words, integrity and the ability to know one’s audience that gave a speaker power. These elements are particularly obvious in Lincoln’s “Letter to the Rally at Springfield,” in which he took the opportunity to speak about objections to the recent “Emancipation Proclamation.” He set forth his case in a very “upfront” manner, presenting his arguments in the form of a conversation, discussing the contested issues, and giving a defense for his actions—all in a way designed to convince. He then tried to move his listeners to see the bigger picture for the future of one nation comprised of interdependent states.

Lincoln’s “Little Speech” to Albert G. Hodges speaks to Lincoln’s awareness that his policies were a product of his growing understanding of the role of the chief magistrate, which he refined over the four years of war. He says, “I claim not to have controlled events,” in other words, admitting that (to an extent) events had molded him, especially so in regard to his position on slavery. He, in effect, says that God had shown him the why of the war and revealed His will through historical circumstances.

In what is widely acclaimed to be the pearl of Lincoln’s speeches, “The Second Inaugural Address,” Lincoln not only used the common connection between North and South—biblical faith—but took the focus off of himself as the speaker, so that the “We” of a united nation might emerge as the speech’s central vision. This is an example of truly inclusive language. Addressing a nation built on biblical principles, Lincoln now used commonly held beliefs to make sense of God’s ways, and invoked God’s wisdom to bind the wounds of the nation as the war was drawing to a close.

White shows an evolution from the legal Lincoln of the “First Inaugural Address” to the theological Lincoln of “The Second Inaugural Address.” And he shows how Lincoln tended to draw on the highest source—jumping over the Constitution in the “Gettysburg Address” to the values of equality found in the “Declaration of Independence,” and in the “Second Inaugural Address,” appealing directly to the God revealed in the Bible, in order to make sense of the past divisions and move to the hope of a united future. He was now speaking as “pastor” to the nation, citing the prophets, the psalms and the words of Jesus.

Lincoln was eloquent because of his ability to use language well, the connections he made with his audience, and his gift for painting with words—but most especially because of his own moral character. In articulating America’s ideals to the nation, he was persuasive because he himself embodied those ideals. Lincoln’s speeches reveal his soul and the soul of the nation that he believed was formed by God and reformed in the course of the Civil War.

By applying Lincoln’s lessons, contemporary politicians could significantly heighten the quality of their discourse and bring greater insight to current discussions of the critical issues confronting our nation. Let’s hope some of them read this book and take the hint.
If you would like to receive a complimentary copy of one of the books below in order to review it for a future issue, please email your request to Alice Osberger at osberger.1@nd.edu


Seeing Judaism Anew: Christianity’s Sacred Obligation, ed Mary C. Boys, Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham, MD (2005)


Father John Arthur Orr had article(s) published in the Winter 2004 and Spring 2005 (Volumes 131, No. 4 & 132, No.1) of the journal “Sacred Music” which he co-authored with another Catholic, Dr. Barbra A. Murphy.

He was also recently accepted into the doctoral program in Philosophy at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville where he hopes to write on “ratio” in “Fides et Ratio” of John Paul II (14 September, 1998).

About Aquinas College
Aquinas College, a small Catholic institution located on a beautiful 92-acre campus in west Nashville, was founded in 1961 by the Dominican Sisters of St. Cecilia (“Nashville Dominicans”). The Dominican Sisters have more than 140 years of experience providing education in a value-centered, Christian learning environment permeated with faith.

At Aquinas College, liberal arts are at the heart of all our programs of study. In addition to studies in Liberal Arts, we have concentrated our professional degree programs on three areas in which we believe our students can make a tremendous impact on today’s culture: business administration, education, and nursing. Encouraged by the Church’s message to colleges and universities, Ex Corde Ecclesiae, Aquinas desires “to determine the relative place and meaning of each of the various disciplines within the context of a vision of the human person and the world that is enlightened by the Gospel, and therefore by a faith in Christ, the Logos, as the centre of creation and human history” (ECE #16). Thus, we consider it important that candidates be committed to the Catholic moral tradition. Catholic applicants are preferred, but all applicants are expected to uphold this moral tradition and the Mission of Aquinas College.

Business Administration Position
Aquinas College is currently accepting applications for a full-time faculty position for the Bachelor of Business Administration Degree, a young program that seeks to fulfill the challenge of Ex Corde Ecclesiae by ‘providing an education in a faith context that forms men and women capable of rational and critical judgment and conscious of the transcendent dignity of the human person with professional training that incorporates ethical values and a sense of service to individuals and to society’ (ECE #49).

Requirements: Applicants must be at least masters prepared (doctoral preferred) in business administration or a related field. Those who are currently in pursuit of doctoral studies may be considered. Teaching experience is preferred.

Interested candidates should submit the following: 1) resume, 2) minimum of one-page essay addressing (a) your qualifications for the position, (b) teaching philosophy, and (c) how you would promote, through teaching, the Mission of Aquinas College as a member of its community, 3) unofficial transcripts of graduate coursework, and 4) name and contact information for three references.

Reply to Search Committee, c/o Sister Mary Justin, Aquinas College, 4210 Harding Road, Nashville, TN 37205. haltom@aquinas-tn.edu 615-297-7545 ext 425 fax: 615-279-3892

David E. Sparks, South Bend, IN, died May 25, 2005. He was 83. David was the former Director of Libraries at the University of Notre Dame, associate librarian at Yale University and deputy chief of the Science and Technology department for the Library of Congress. He is survived by his wife Mary, three sons and a daughter.
Fellowship of Catholic Scholars 28th Annual Convention
Renaissance Hotel Suite, Charlotte, North Carolina
September 23-25, 2005

Breaks and meals are not indicated in this schedule.

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2005
10:00 a.m. Registration begins
12:30 p.m. Convention opens with Holy Mass (at the hotel)
2:00 p.m. Welcome by Dean Bernard Dobranski, J.D.,
Dean, Ave Maria School of Law, and President of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars
Introduction by William E. May, Ph.D.,
John Paul II Institute, Program Chairman
2:30 p.m. Session I: Gaudium et Spes: Its Moral Vision and Anthropology—Mark S. Latkovic, S.T.D.,
Detroit Sacred Heart Major Seminary
Response: Reverend Paul F. DeLadurantaye, S.T.D.,
Notre Dame Graduate School of Christendom College
4:00 p.m. Session II: The Christian Anthropology of Vatican II and Virtual Reality—Sister M. Timothy Prokes, F.S.E., Ph.D.,
Notre Dame Graduate School of Christendom College
Response: Peter Casarella, Ph.D.,
Catholic University of America
7:30 p.m. Keynote Address: Vatican II Today: Forty Years Later
Reverend Thomas G. Weinandy, O.F.M. Cap., Ph.D.,
Executive Director, Secretariat for Doctrine and Pastoral Practices, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2005
7:00 a.m. Holy Mass (in the hotel)
Reverend Monsignor William B. Smith, S.T.D.
9:00 a.m. Session III: Panel on Christian Anthropology and Contemporary Psychological Studies—Dean Gladys A. Sweeney, Ph.D., Institute for Psychological Science, Paul C. Vitz, Ph.D., New York University, and E. Christian Brugger, Ph.D., Institute for Psychological Science

Response: Reverend Matthew L. Lamb, Th.D.,
Ave Maria University
1:30 p.m. Session V: Dei Verbum: Sacred Scripture since Vatican II
—Rev. William S. Kurz, S.J., Ph.D., Marquette University
Response: Stephen F. Miletic, Ph.D., Franciscan University of Steubenville; Joseph Atkinson, Ph.D., John Paul II Institute
3:00 p.m. Session VI: Dignitatis Humanae: Religious Liberty and American Foreign Policy: A Practitioner’s Perspective—Thomas F. Farr, Ph.D., U.S. Department of State (retired)
Response: Kevin Hasson, the Beckett Fund
4:30 p.m. Membership Meeting
6:30 p.m. Cardinal Wright Banquet
Awards to be presented:
Cardinal Wright Award: Gerard V. Bradley, J.D., University of Notre Dame Law School
Cardinal O’Boyle Award: Helen Hull Hitchcock, President, Women for Faith and Family, and, Editor, Adoremus Bulletin

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2005
8:30 a.m. Holy Mass (in the hotel)—Celebrated by the Most Reverend Peter J. Jugis, D.D., Bishop of Charlotte
9:45 a.m. Session VII: Unitatis Redintegratio: Providential Turn or Historic Mistake?—Kenneth D. Whitehead, Assistant Secretary of Education for Postsecondary Education, U.S. Department of Education (retired)
11:00 a.m. Convention officially ends
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FCS Quarterly • Summer 2005
WORD AND DEED

For Plato and Aristotle it was a truism that the good ruler must be a good man. Nowadays, such a reminder would likely be regarded as a partisan remark. But everyone seems convinced that the lives people lead casts some light on what they publicly do. Why else do we gossip? Or read biographies?

Perhaps the two most influential philosophers of the 20th century were Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein, not least perhaps because they both wrote in ways difficult of access. Their works cry out for interpretation. As for the lives they led, well, the photographs of Heidegger in his Nazi uniform and of Wittgenstein strolling with his boyfriend will affect those with a classical view. Primum vivere, deinde philosophari.

There is no doubt that in this leveling age, the biographer sees his task as cutting his subject off at the knees before lopping off his head. How much information on the quotidian affairs of a writer is helpful in understanding what he wrote? Joakim Garff’s life of Kierkegaard is huge but one puts it down wishing it were even larger; but then Kierkegaard is a special case, the life he led thematically part of what he had to say.

The new biography of P.G. Wodehouse is a delight, despite that fact that it must be the sixth or seventh biography of this exquisitely ephemeral writer, whose style drew praise from Belloc and Waugh. It is the rare writer who, like Wodehouse, survives biography after biography, retaining his almost saintly simplicity. Do we need to see that the gold of an author’s writings was extracted from the muddy creek of his daily life, with the emphasis on the mud?

Art does not require moral virtue. This claim can be solidly established. But one can be convinced by the argument and go on thinking that there is an unavoidable connection between the bio and the graphy, the writer and the life. Even if the life seems an impediment and is incommensurate with the achievement, its relevance haunts us.

Ralph McInerny

Fellowship of Catholic Scholars Quarterly
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