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THE PRESIDENT’S LETTER

Munus Petri

by Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.
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If we are mindful of the vastly different styles with which popes, especially our recent pontiffs, have exercised their duties, the distinctiveness shown thus far by Pope Francis might even be expected. The men elected to such an office will tend to be highly creative individuals. Of greater significance for the Church than their personal creativity, however, is that they are specially guided and protected by the Holy Spirit in carrying the burdens of their ministry.

In recent months we have been able to watch how our new pope does things. It has become clear to all that he is highly gifted in symbolic communication. He showed a marvelous capacity to warm the hearts of young and old to the Church at the recent World Youth Day. His goodness of character is evident in even some of his simplest gestures. Who could forget the photos of him releasing from their cage the doves unexpectedly thrown into his open-air car during a motorcade in Rome? His modus operandi includes doing whatever it takes to give the Church and the truths she perennially professes a fresh hearing.

But to those eager to find in this charismatic leader someone daring enough to change long-entrenched Catholic doctrines, we can be confident that he will ever prove a disappointment. He is guided and protected by the Holy Spirit, who inspires popes to new initiatives and who prevents them from falling into error on matters of faith and morals when speaking to the universal church from the Chair of Peter.

Unprecedented as it is to have a reigning pope and his predecessor both living in the Vatican, we are blessed in the way they do so: the transition has not only been without schism but also with Benedict’s profession of complete loyalty. We have from their joint workmanship the treasure of a new encyclical, Lumen Fidei. To most commentators, there is every sign that Francis signed, with only minor additions, the virtually finished draft provided by Benedict. They speak as one. If it is increasingly evident that the oral statements of the new papacy, and especially those that come unscripted, will have a new tone, it is equally clear that those statements too will be steadfast in maintaining the Church’s...
unchanging doctrines on even the most controversial topics. A change in tone is not a change in doctrine. It is new way in which to get one’s message heard.

At the basis of such profound continuity of substance amid genuine changes of style is, it seems to me, the munus Petri. It may be helpful to turn, for a moment, to the letter of abdication that then Pope Benedict read to a meeting of cardinals on 10 February 2013, in its Latin text. There he explains that he had convened a consistory not only for the sake of some canonization ceremonies taking place that day, but to announce a decision of great moment for the life of the Church:

Conscientia mea iterum atque iterum coram Deo explorata ad cognitionem certam perveni vires meas ingravescence actae non iam aptas esse ad munus Petrinum aeque administrandum. Bene conscius sum hoc munus secundum suam essentiam spiritualen non solum agendo et loquendo exsequit debere, sed non minus patiendo et orando.

The Latin word munus has a range of meanings that includes office, duty, burden, and gift. If I am not mistaken, Benedict may well have intended all four. The burden of the office, he explains, had grown increasingly heavy, not only because of his waning strength but also because of the increasingly complex demands of the Petrine ministry in our day. Those who confuse the authority of an office with the powers entrusted to the occupant of that office might well cherish the notion that some new holder of this office could change things at will with the sovereign power available to its new occupant. But this will not be true for anyone who understands that the munus Petri is a gift—not so much a gift given to the individual as a gift given to the Church. It is a gift that the recipient must be sure to use well, not to abuse. Hence the author of these lines—and his successor—understand that the one to whom the munus Petri has been given—indeed entrusted—needs to exercise that office according to its genuinely spiritual nature, not only by action and speech but also by the endurance of suffering and by prayer.

Admittedly Benedict was speaking of himself when he mentions the need for suffering and prayer in the same breadth as action and speech. But just as surely he intended that his successor would equally need to embrace all four of these in order to respect and carry out the gift entrusted to him for the good of the Church when the munus Petri was placed upon his shoulders: the burden of an office with various duties is all part of the same gift.

Perhaps we might speculate even further. Let me suggest that we add a new item to the list of suggestions that have been made about the possible reasons for the new papal style. Some see it as a rejection of tradition and formalism in favor of novelty and simplicity. We do have it confirmed from the lips of Francis that he desires the Church to be a Church for the poor in the spirit of St. Francis of Assisi.

But might it not also be that the symbolic communication in which Francis is engaged in carrying out the munus might actually be a display of his sense of the need for the unity of the Church? A survey of recent papal history makes me that his gestures might be especially directed to the long-sought goal of reunification with the Orthodox.

If there is such a thing as a papal playbook that is passed from one pontiff to another, I can only imagine that one of the most important items in it is a note about the need for initiatives that will assist in making the Church one again. It does not require special revelation to see that we would not be in the current mess that engulfs us on so many sides were the Church more united. Sadly, there is division between Catholic and Orthodox, division between Catholic and Protestant, division within Catholicism itself. When the Church is divided, her enemies will not be slow to exploit the weakness.

The papal playbook, as I imagine it, records the initiatives of Pope Paul VI and Patriarch Athenagoras in 1967, when they mutually removed the excommunications mutually imposed centuries ago. It also records the ways in which John Paul II prayed the Symbolum Apostolorum, the Creed, in Greek (and thus without the filioque) with representatives of Orthodox Churches. They could do this together even while continuing to work and hope for a resolution to the filioque and whatever else divides them.

Not all the plays that I imagine to be outlined in this playbook were able to be executed. One thinks, for instance, of how dearly John Paul II hoped to be able to travel to Moscow. Although this goal was thwarted, he did return to Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow the icon of the Mother of God that now rests in Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, where it first miraculously appeared.

With Benedict there has been further clarification of the possibility of new ways of understanding the primacy of Rome. Already in 1976 then Father Joseph Ratzinger (ordained an archbishop in 1977) gave a lecture in Graz, Austria, in which he stated that “Rome must not require more from the East with respect to
the doctrine of primacy than had been formulated and was lived in the first millennium.” Ignatius Press later republished this essay in Principles of Catholic Theology (1988). Admittedly, a statement made by the future cardinal and pope cannot claim any more authority than that of a priest-professor. As Cardinal Ratzinger he later qualified this statement so as to make clear that his earlier statement should not be taken in any way that denies the existence of the Universal Church in the second millennium, as if the living, truth-giving authority of the Church were somehow frozen at the end of the first (see “Problems and Prospects of the Anglican-Catholic Dialogue,” Church, Ecumenism and Politics, pp. 83–84, 84–85). As our pontiff, he worked tirelessly to advance this extremely important goal.

Might the simplicity of Francis be yet a further instance of the irenic stance of his predecessors, a part of the munus Petri designed to suggest yet further openness to the pathways of forgiveness and reconciliation that will be necessary to restoration of unity with long divided brethren? Foregoing some of the papal attire, and often calling himself the Bishop of Rome, fit as easily or better with this goal as with other suggested goals. His humility may go a long way in this regard. Warning people so often about the crafty machinations of the devil and stressing the need for the Church to be vigorously at work in the world are signs of his sense of urgency in his mission. Holding fast to the truths enunciated over time by the living Tradition of the Church is central to the Petrine ministry and crucial to the goal of reunion.

Something worth thinking about, and much worth praying for. ✩

### Articles

**Aristotle on Slavery**

*by D. Q. McInerny
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Reading what Aristotle has to say in the *Politics* on the subject of slavery can be a disconcerting experience. How was it possible, one might wonder, that so profound and perspicacious a thinker could end up defending something like slavery, and, moreover—this could be cause of even greater wonder—defend it with arguments which, besides displaying an embarrassing (and entirely uncharacteristic) feebleness, undermine some of the seminal principles which ground his own metaphysics? One might attempt to explain the matter by saying that Aristotle, in his views on slavery, was only reflecting the fact that he was a product of his place and time, and let it go at that. But such a resolution seems too facile, not that we should be unwilling to take into account the historical and cultural contexts within which Aristotle did his philosophizing. As far as we know, slavery would seem to have been a more or less constant fact of social life throughout the course of human history, and it has been only in relatively recent times that the basic wrongness of the “peculiar institution” has come to be universally recognized. Slavery was an integral part of the Greece of the fourth century B.C., without the sustaining presence of which the city-state, as it eventually developed, would very probably have been impossible. It was regarded, at least by the citizens who benefited from it, as an entirely normal aspect of the social structure. And on the face of it there seems to be no reason to believe that the attitude taken toward slavery by the average Athenian citizen was not one shared by Aristotle.

The political community, or city-state, was considered by Aristotle to be a natural society, in the sense that it could be said to have come into being almost spontaneously, for man, its creator, is, by nature, a social animal. Aristotle, we may assume, very likely saw slavery as simply a natural component of the natural society which was the state. Not surprisingly, none of the arguments that Aristotle advances in defense of slavery is compelling; it is an impossible task to mount good arguments on behalf of something which is itself not a good. The principal purpose of this article is to show, by looking at these arguments closely, the pronounced inadequacy of each of them. It is the very inadequacy of those arguments, given their source, which should give us pause. There is reason, I believe,
to be cautious about taking them at face value, that is, as representing the settled position of a man who is fully committed to what they are ostensibly intended to defend. The thesis that I will propose in the conclusion of this article is that Aristotle’s attitude toward slavery is deeply ambivalent.

The pivotal idea, around which Aristotle builds his case in defense of slavery, is that a slave is such by nature. “It is clear, then,” he writes, “that some men are by nature free, and others slaves, and for the latter slavery is both expedient and right.” In order to come up with the proper framework within which better to grasp what Aristotle might have in mind in saying that a given individual is a slave “by nature,” we need to have some understanding of what he means in general by the concept of nature, a concept which figures prominently in all of his thought. In book 2 of the Physics, in discussing animate and inanimate substances, he explains that each substance, be it animate or inanimate, has a nature, which is to say that it possesses an internal dynamic principle which accounts for all the actions that are proper to it, given the kind of substance it is. At the most fundamental level, what accounts for substance, and the nature that is peculiar to it, is substantial form. It is substantial form which determines any substance to be precisely what it is as a substance; substantial form establishes a substance’s essential identity. Now, a human being is a substance, and as such he has a nature which is peculiar to himself. The substantial form of a human being, to identify it precisely, is the rational soul.

With these elementary metaphysical principles in mind—all of which are derived from Aristotle’s thought—we return to the import of Aristotle’s contention that an individual can be a slave by nature. It needs to be emphasized that everything that Aristotle has to say about the slave in the Politics strongly indicates that the identity of a slave is not finally determinable by accidental forms of one sort or another, but rather by substantial form. What this comes down to, in practical terms, is that slave nature is to be thought of as something which has to do with the very essence of the individual. It is not something peripheral; it is central to what he is. To identify someone as a slave, then, is to call attention to his substantial reality, a substantial reality that is founded upon substantial form. It would seem, therefore, that to be a slave, to have a slave nature, an individual would have a substantial form peculiar to his identity as a slave, and the substantial form would serve as the foundation of that identity.

If the above analysis is correct, and it seems to be consonant with Aristotle’s description of slave nature, we immediately run into a very large difficulty, a difficulty which is created by the clear admission on Aristotle’s part that a slave is a human being. He writes: “For anyone who, despite being human, is by nature not his own but someone else’s is a natural slave” (emphasis mine). If a slave is a human being, then of course he has a human nature, and that human nature is necessarily founded on the substantial form which is the rational soul. The question then becomes, what is the relation of the slave’s human nature to his slave nature? Could he be said to have two essentially different natures, human and slave, each of which is founded on different and separate substantial forms? This would be impossible, for it would create insuperable ontological problems with regard to individual identity. It is substantial form that establishes an individual as a single, separate entity, a coherent “one.” If we suppose there to be two different and separate substantial forms, then there would have to be two individuals, not one. But clearly Aristotle regards the slave, whom he acknowledges to be a human being, as a single individual.

We are left, then, with a major conundrum regarding the essential identity of a slave, as he is described for us by Aristotle. While it is Aristotle himself who, by admitting the slave to be a human being, creates this difficulty, interestingly, that same admission provides us with a way out of the difficulty, but at the cost of Aristotle’s position that there is such a thing as natural slavery. As a human being, the slave can have but one essential nature, a human nature, and that precludes the possibility of his having any other nature. Any claim that he has a slave nature as well as a human nature must therefore be dismissed as lacking any philosophical foundation.

A human being is, by definition—Aristotle’s definition—a rational animal. By conceding that the slave is a human being, Aristotle would unavoidably have to acknowledge that the slave is possessed of reason, but it is precisely with regard to this critical point he balks. In drawing the distinction between the natural master, or freeman, and the natural slave, he describes the former as someone who “is capable of rational foresights,” and strongly implies that the latter is totally lacking in the same. But then, as mindful of the fact that a slave could not be a human being and yet be completely alienated form reason, he makes the peculiar observation that the slave “shares in reason to the extent of understanding it, but does not have it himself.” In response to this assertion, the first thing that has to be said is that if the slave in fact does not himself have reason,
then he simply does not qualify as a human being, and Aristotle’s acknowledging him to be such is a contradiction. With respect to the other part of the statement, how might it be, if the slave is lacking in reason, that he would be capable of understanding it? What would count as “understanding” in this case? According to traditional scholastic usage, to understand X is to have an intellectual grasp of the intrinsic intelligibility of X. So, we say that a man understands the principle of contradiction because he grasps its import. There seems to be warrant for supposing that Aristotle is here likening a slave’s “understanding” to the kind that we attribute to animals. Animals, though bereft of reason, can be said to understand human beings insofar as they can correctly “read” sense images that have their origin in the human intellect. When his master commands Rover to “sit,” and Rover obediently sits, the dog, in an oblique, analogous way, grasps his master’s intention. But he is responding to sense images only; he literally has no idea of what is going on between himself and his master. In this respect, a slave, if indeed he is lacking reason, would be on the same epistemological level as Rover.4

After specifying that “a piece of property is a tool for maintaining life,” Aristotle goes on to explain that “a slave is a piece of animate property of sort.” He gives us a better sense of the meaning of “animate property” when he places the slave on the same level as a beast of burden, such as an ass or an ox. Needless to say, if we are to take a comparison like this seriously, the meaningfulness of acknowledging the slave to be human is called into question. In the late pages of the Politics Aristotle writes that “it is evident that human beings have the same end, both individually and collectively.” If indeed both master and slave are human beings, then as such they have the same ends, individually and collectively. But if that is so, how can the slave, who is the property of another human being, and seemingly on the same level of beasts of burden, expect to achieve those ends which are proper to him specifically as an individual human being? Would not the ends of his master trump his own at every turn? Indeed, the slave’s ends would not only be subordinate to those of his master but they would be effectively negated; his very humanity would thereby be severely diminished.

In the Ethics we learn that the dominating end that is common to all human beings is happiness, the precise nature of which is a life lived according to virtue. The acquisition of the good habit which we call virtue requires assiduous and continuous effort on the part of the person who seeks to acquire it, but any such effort would be meaningless if it did not proceed from the free exercise of the will. While not denying the possibility that a slave could attain a life of virtue, perhaps even to a high degree, that attainment, given the confining moral conditions in which he is forced to live, would have to be of a heroic kind. If the slave owner should happen to be a vicious man—a real possibility but one which, oddly enough, Aristotle does not take into account—then he would be one who systematically pursues evil ends, which ends would contradict, and be constantly warring against, the ends of any slave who would have aspirations for the virtuous life.

It is in the apparent attempt to bring home with special emphasis the naturally subservient condition of the slave that Aristotle compares him to: a tool; a beast of burden; a part, as it relates to the whole; the body, as it relates to soul. In a very broad application of the term, Aristotle uses “tool” to refer to any piece of property whose purpose, as he tells us, is to maintain life. But he also employs the term according to a narrower and more common meaning, to refer to an instrument, such as a hammer or a saw. And he seems to consider a slave as comparable to a tool understood in both senses. All of these comparisons, if given close scrutiny, show that they are fraught with logical difficulties; we will put aside the moral difficulties they entail.

An instrument, such as a saw, acts causally to bring about a very precise kind of effect, sawing wood, but it can do so only when it is put into action by the carpenter. The saw, as instrumental cause, is completely dependent upon the principal cause, the carpenter, for its causative activity. These elementary considerations are reviewed only by way of accentuating the inapplicability of comparing a slave to an instrument. Looking at it from a purely practical point of view, a slave who was only an instrument would be incapable of acting with the kind of independence which would make him an effective worker, and thus he would not be of much use as a slave. However, the language Aristotle uses in discussing this matter is not easy to interpret, which is especially evident in his use of the terms “property” and “tool.” He tends to link the two terms together so as to suggest that they are more or less synonyms, and then describes the slave as animate property. But if the slave is also the peculiar kind of property which is a tool, then it would seem that he could be rightly regarded as an animate tool, which, if we take tool to be referring to instrument, does not make a great deal of sense.

Aristotle’s comparison of slaves to domestic animals is probably prompted by his notion that nature tends
“to make the bodies of slaves and free people different,” in the sense that the bodies of slaves are apparently stronger than those of free people, therefore enabling the slave to “provide the necessities.” We may understand by this that the slaves are able to do the arduous manual labor, allowing for the smooth running of the polis, of the kind which the citizens would apparently not be capable. But comparing a slave to a domestic animal is no more coherent than comparing him to an instrument, for the obvious reason that the slave, acknowledged to be human, is possessed of reason and therefore has just that mark which sets him radically apart from the brute beasts. In any event, there would seem to be little basis, from what we know of the Athenians of the time when Aristotle was a resident there, for his claim that the bodies of slaves were appreciably different from those of the average adult male citizen. Historians tell us that most of the slaves in the Athens of that day were not drudges, but employed as domestics, which employment presumably did not require unusual bodily size or strength. Slaves were employed in a variety of tasks, some of which required not only a high level of manual skill but also considerable intelligence, which does not comport well with Aristotle’s contention that slaves, by nature, are hampered by deficient rational powers. Furthermore, the implication that the bodies of free people are not as robust as those of slaves cannot be easily reconciled with the great emphasis the Greeks put on physical training for its citizens, not to mention the fact that the adult Athenian freeman had the obligation to do service in the army as a hoplite, or in the navy as rower in a trireme, both of which required men who were very much able bodied.

Aristotle proposes that a slave can rightly be likened to a part as it relates to the whole, the “whole” in this case being the slave’s master. He tells us that a slave is “a sort of part of his master—a sort of living but separate part of his body.” He explains further: “A part is not just a part of another thing, but is entirely the thing’s” (emphasis in text). And this means that “a slave is not just his master’s slave, he is entirely his” (emphasis in text). The implications contained in this extraordinary comparison are incompatible with a line of thought which Aristotle develops with some care in the Metaphysics, where he discusses the parts of animate substances. He uses the example of a severed hand to show that something cannot be meaningfully taken to be a part if it is separated from the body of which it is a part. A part separated from the whole thereby loses its very identity as a part. Thus a hand which is severed from the body ceases to be a hand in any meaningful sense, for a hand is a hand, he argues, “only when it is alive; if it is not alive it is not a part.” According to these criteria, then, there is no rationale for Aristotle’s describing a slave as a living and yet separate part of his master’s body, for, as separate, he is not really a part; and, a fortiori, not a living part. But in point of fact the slave is separate, and he is very much alive, so in no wise can he be considered to be a part.

Slaves are people, Aristotle writes, “who are as different from others as body from soul, or beast from human.” Hearkening a slave to a beast is a pointed way of suggesting that there is a radical difference between the slave and—we are invited to assume—the emphatically human master. We are also told that a slave may be considered to be comparable to the body, in its relation to the soul; however, in this comparison it is not separateness which is being suggested but rather a very tight form of unity. If we take seriously the comparison of the slave to the body, as it relates to the soul, then, as was the case with the comparison of a slave to a part, we are once again confronted with some testy logical difficulties. We need to remind ourselves, first, that body and soul compose a single substance, the human person, and, second, that they do not occupy the same existential plane. The soul relates to the body as the ruler to the ruled; clearly, this is just the feature of the relation that Aristotle had in mind in making his comparison. Thus, we are to understand that, just as the soul rules the body, so the master rules the slave. But the soul rules the body as a principle which is integrally one with the body. If we were to assume a Cartesian position regarding this matter, that is, if, like Descartes, we were to take body and soul to be separate substances, then one could perhaps allow Aristotle’s comparison to be at least somewhat intelligible. There is no need to advert to that expedient, however, for we have Aristotle’s own hylemorphic theory at our disposal. That theory has taught us to look upon a human being as a single substance, the soul being the substantial form that renders prime matter signate as a human body. With this in mind, if we were to suppose that a slave is comparable to the body as it relates to the soul, we would be asked to imagine a kind of unity between slave and master which is completely incongruous to the kind of separateness Aristotle has been insisting is a salient mark of their relation. Furthermore, if slave is like body and master is like soul, we would have to imagine that the real individuality of the slave is effectively dissolved. But the slave is, in fact, an independent, living entity, whose status as such does
not depend on the master because the master, unlike the soul as it relates to the body, does not confer vitality upon the slave. In other words, the master does not relate to the slave as substantial form relates to the body. In sum, Aristotle’s comparing the slave to a beast and to a tool, on the one hand, and his comparing him to a part and to a body, on the other, are at war with one another, for the first set of comparisons ask us to see slave and master as separate, and the second set invites us to regard them as in effect a single entity.

Aristotle maintains that the relation between master and slave is mutually beneficial. One can readily see how the relation could be beneficial to the master, but it strains the imagination to be able to see how it could be so for the slave. Perhaps if we were to accept the comparison of the slave to a domesticated animal we might then find it plausible that a slave would find his bondage beneficial, in much the same way as would an ox that is owned by a farmer who makes a point of taking good care of the animal, if for no other reason than to ensure that he continues to do his work efficiently. But the comparison of the slave to a domesticated animal is based upon the premise that the slave, by nature, is lacking in reason, and it is just that premise which cries out for demonstration.

One of the more surprising claims Aristotle makes in his attempt to justify slavery is that there can be real friendship between master and slave. He writes in the Politics that “there is a certain mutual benefit and mutual friendship for such masters and slaves as deserve by nature to be so related.” And in the Nicomachean Ethics, where we find his fully developed theory of friendship, he contends that “there can be friendship with [the slave] in so far as he is a man.” And in that same work we are informed that the master can be a friend to the slave “qua man,” but not “qua slave,” and that is because “the slave is a living tool.” In remarking that master and slave can be related as friends if they “deserve by nature to be so related,” he seems to be saying that master and slave are deserving of friendship only if each is what he is by nature, that is, either a natural master or a natural slave. There are a number of problems related to the claim that there can be friendship between master and slave. We are told that the master cannot be a friend with a slave if he is regarded qua slave, that is, specifically in his identity as a slave, and that would be because, as a slave, he is but a tool, and one cannot reasonably befriend a tool. In order to befriend a slave, the master must somehow switch his focus and regard him only qua man, seeing him in his specific identity as a human being. Does that mean, as the result of that alteration of perspective on the part of the master, that the slave loses his identity as a slave and ceases to be a tool?

If friendship is possible between master and slave, we need to ask what is the nature of that friendship. According to the Aristotelian analysis of the relationship, there are three types of friendship: that based on pleasure; that based on utility; and that the foundation of which is a mutual regard for the good of the other. This last is taken by Aristotle to be genuine or true friendship, and because it can exist only between “good men qua good,” that is, between those who are good in themselves, it seems unlikely that this is the kind of friendship that Aristotle would allow to exist between master and slave, for given everything that he has to say about the nature of a slave, he would surely be reluctant to place him in the elevated category of men who are good in themselves.

Of the two inferior kinds of friendship, friendship based on pleasure can be easily dismissed as a possibility for the kind that might exist between master and slave, for whatever pleasure is derived from the relation would go almost entirely to the master. That leaves friendship based on utility. But here too there are difficulties, for while it is easy to see how the master would find the slave useful, it would not seem to work the other way around, and therefore the reciprocal element which is a mark of any kind of friendship would be lacking. In what way, we might ask, could the slave be made to use of his master which would be consistently beneficial to him? A much larger difficulty is created by Aristotle’s assertion that “even bad men may be friends of each other” if the friendship in question is based on utility. In proposing the possibility of friendship between master and slave, Aristotle would unquestionably not be prepared to acknowledge either of them to be bad men.

It appears that the only thing we can conclude, based on what the texts tell us, is that it was true or genuine friendship Aristotle had in mind in claiming that master and slave could be friends. C. C. W. Taylor would seem to have reached the same conclusion, and that led him to ask how it might be possible that a slave, “a being supposedly lacking in deliberative capacity” could show the type of sensitivity and practical intelligence that such a demanding relationship would require. There is a further consideration. Earlier I quoted Aristotle as saying that “a slave is not just his master’s slave, he is entirely his.” This type of comprehensive, we might say suffocating, possessiveness would completely
rule out anything deserving of the name friendship. But yet more needs to be said on this matter.

In the *Ethics* Aristotle argues that where there is nothing common to ruler and ruled there can be no friendship, and then he gives as examples of such a circumstance the relations “between craftsman and tool, soul and body, master and slave.” This passage takes us aback a bit, for here he is citing the relation between master and slave as one which *precludes* the possibility of friendship. Qualifications of the statement are quickly to follow, but rather than clarifying the issue they serve only to make it more obscure. Later in the same passage he tells us, using a phrase he uses elsewhere, that while the master cannot be a friend to the slave *qua* slave, he can befriended him *qua* man. But the implications of this distinction are such that make it incompatible with a real reciprocal relation between master and slave, and it is therefore antithetical to friendship. It would always be the perspective of the master that governs; he is the one who chooses to regard the slave either as a slave or as a man; the slave has no say in the matter. And what strange mental gymnastics would this involve for the master’s way of thinking? In order to regard his slave as a man, and therefore as a possible friend, he would have to negate his identity as a slave, but this identity, we have been led to believe, goes to the very core of the slave’s being. But assuming that the master is nonetheless somehow able to think along these lines, and convince himself that the slave is his friend, how long would he be able to sustain that conviction, again, if he really understands a slave to be such by nature? But there is more. If the only way a master can regard a slave as a friend is by ignoring the fact that he is a slave, then it cannot be logically maintained that there can be anything like friendship in the master–slave relation, for the individual the master is befriending is, precisely as a friend, not a slave.

Aristotle contends that nature operates in such a way so as to make the bodies of slaves and freemen different, as we have seen; however, he qualifies that observation by telling us that nature does not always operate consistently in this respect. “But the opposite often happens as well: some have the bodies of free men, others the souls.” It is not perfectly clear to whom the “some” refers in this statement. Aristotle may be referring to men in general, and is claiming that it sometimes happens that there is a discrepancy, within a given individual, between soul and body, in that a man may have the soul of a slave and the body of a freeman, or vice versa. But if that is true we would have in either instance a serious problem to confront, for the soul, or substantial form, would not be properly manifested in the body it is informing. We would have a freeman imprisoned within the body of a slave, and a slave who would not be recognizable for what he really is, a slave, because he has the wrong kind of body. But would we not then have to conclude, because it is soul or substantial form that determines essential identity, that an individual who has the soul of a freeman *is* such, despite his slavish body, and that an individual who has the soul of a slave remains a slave, even though he sports the body of a freeman? It would seem so, and thus body must be said to lose its character as a reliable index for distinguishing between freeman and slave.

What appears to be more likely, however, is that the “some” in the statement quoted above refers specifically to slaves. If that is the case, then the whole notion of natural slavery collapses. While one might allow for the possibility that a slave could have the body of a freeman—this could perhaps be dismissed as simply an aberration, one of nature’s mistakes—but he would be a slave nonetheless. However, if, on the other hand, one allows for the possibility of a slave having the soul of a freeman, then for that very fact he could not be a slave, for it is soul that determine essential nature, whatever be the quality of the body.

Among the more arresting assertions regarding the subject of slavery that Aristotle makes in the *Politics* is that all non-Greeks are slaves. With seeming approval, he cites the Greek poets, who hold that “it is proper for Greeks to rule non-Greeks,” the presumed rationale for which is that “non-Greeks and slaves are in nature the same.” Clearly Aristotle regarded the city-state as the optimal form of government, for it was government which was conceived and put into place by free men. If non-Greeks were by nature slaves, it would follow that they would lack the ability to establish the right form of government, the specific reason for which is that “there is no natural ruler among them.” But how is this to be reconciled with the large facts of non-Greek history, and, for that matter, with Aristotle’s own principles? He laid it down that, “[f]rom the hour of their birth, some are marked for subjection, others for rule.” Neither the populations of Egypt or Persia, to take but two examples, were perfectly homogeneous in composition; there was a clear distinction between rulers and subjects, and those who ruled showed themselves to be quite adept at doing so. They were what reasonably could be described as “natural rulers,” hence not slaves. By Aristotle’s own criteria, then, one could be both
non-Greek and non-slave.

While devoting most of his efforts to defending natural slavery, Aristotle does acknowledge the existence of what he would perhaps be willing to call non-natural slavery, or purely legal slavery. This type of slavery comes about most commonly through the misfortunes of war, where freemen are captured and then enslaved by their captors; they would thus be in a state which is not in accord with their proper nature. Aristotle accepts the opinion of those who regard this type of slavery as unjust. He seems to suggest that besides the situation where there are people who, though not slaves by nature, are nonetheless in bondage, there are as well others who are slaves by nature and yet are going about as if they were freemen. If freemen are enslaved, the natural order of things could be said to be violated, but that would presumably also be the case if natural slaves have their freedom. Those whose unnatural enslaved state is explained by their having been captured in war would, it seems, necessarily have to be Greeks, for there would apparently be nothing wrong in a situation where non-Greeks are captured and enslaved. Because non-Greeks are natural slaves, it is only natural that they should be in the state proper to them. Changing the venue of non-Greeks' slavery from their homeland to a Greek city-state would entail no injustice.

Aristotle argues that it is not inappropriate for young free men to perform many tasks that are normally undertaken only by slaves; in fact, it is positively noble that they should do so. The reason he gives for this claim is that “the difference between noble and shameful actions does not lie so much in the acts themselves as in their ends, or that for the sake of which they are performed.” But if this is true, could not the principle Aristotle is expressing here be just as well applied to a slave, with telling consequences for the notion of natural slavery? Might it not reasonably be surmised that a slave could transform what would otherwise be considered a slavish act into a noble one because of a noble end for which it is performed, and thus thereby be acting nobly? If a slave is capable of acting nobly, that is, in a way typical of a free man, would not that, at the very least, render dubious the notion of natural slavery?

The only proper summarizing response to Aristotle’s various arguments in defense of slavery was given succinct expression by C. C. W. Taylor, and, with full endorsement, I can only repeat it here: “Aristotle fails to provide a justification of slavery as actually practiced either in the Greek world or in any other known society.” Aristotle’s arguments do not even come close to convincing. That in itself may not be particularly surprising, given what he was attempting to defend. But it is the sheer ineptitude of the arguments, and not simply the fact that they do not convince, that makes one wonder. The proposition around which all of his arguments revolve, that there is such a thing as natural slavery, is, as I have tried to show, completely incompatible with his admission that the slave is a human being. If it be granted that the slave is a human being, then he can be such only by reason of his essential nature, determined by substantial form which is the rational soul. Aristotle would want us to believe that a slave is such by reason of his essential nature, but no single individual can have at once two essential natures. If there are two different essential natures there are two substantial forms, and if there are two substantial forms there are two individuals differing in nature. To admit that an individual is a human being, as Aristotle does, is to preclude the very possibility of his being a natural slave.

Aristotle fails, and emphatically, to make a coherent case for slavery. But why did he attempt to do so in the first place? Does this not present us with a philosophical scandal of rather large proportions? Here we have one of the most formidable philosophers the world has known arguing that it is right and just for one human being to own another, and in the process suggests that we might fittingly compare slaves to beasts of burden, or, more degradingly, to tools. One way of responding to the problem presented by this disconcerting circumstance, already noted, is to say that in attempting to justify slavery Aristotle was simply being a child of his time, and that he was therefore unable to rise above certain firmly established social conventions and view them in a disinterested, critical way. There is something to be said for this point of view, but in the end it is not entirely satisfactory. In terms of what we have come to know of Aristotle from all of his works, he does not impress us as the type of person who is inclined to put in abeyance his critical faculties as he docilely subjects himself to the dictates of convention.

Perhaps we would have a more productive approach to the problem if we were to consider the Politics, the principal source of the arguments we have reviewed in this article, from the point of view of its condition as a text. Scholars are pretty much in agreement that what we have in most of Aristotle’s works as they have come down to us are not so much polished pieces of writing that have been carefully redacted for publication, but rather something more in the line of
lecture notes. The *Politics* is a work that would seem to fit that description, and for that reason perhaps we should be hesitant about attaching anything like a definitive quality to Aristotle’s arguments on behalf of slavery to be found in that work. May we not regard the *Politics* as, say, a work in progress, a work that Aristotle may have seen as subject to future rethinking and rewriting? C. D. C. Reeve, a translator of the *Politics*, would appear to regard the work somewhat in this light. He writes: “In some ways, indeed, the *Politics* is best thought of not simply as argument, but rather as an opportunity to think about some of the most important human questions in unparalleled intellectual company.” This merits consideration. There is a definite exploratory tone to the *Politics*. In reading it one has the sense of observing someone who is in the process of attempting to get the firmest possible grip on “the most important human questions,” among which slavery would certainly have to be included. Perhaps the most productive way to respond to what Aristotle has to say about slavery in the *Politics* is to imagine that we are, with him, simply thinking through this question, and not to suppose that we are being presented with what is for him a settled position. This point of view might be corroborated by much of what we read about slavery in the *Politics*, where it is not entirely clear whether Aristotle is giving us his own opinion on the subject or, as is a common practice of his, acting principally as an historian and simply reporting the opinions of others. This point of view, too, has something to recommend it, but it could be carried too far if it should lead us to where we persuade ourselves that what Aristotle has to say on behalf of slavery is put forward “only for the sake of argument,” and that he really has no serious intellectual convictions regarding the institution. That would be seriously to misread Aristotle.

Are we to conclude, then, that, on the one hand, Aristotle was seriously committed to the notion that slavery was a just social institution, and yet, on the other hand, he was able, formidable philosopher though he was, to come up with only the feeblest of arguments in defense of that institution, arguments that are freighted with many of glaring inconsistencies? There may be something refreshingly clear-cut about such a conclusion, but, knowing Aristotle to be Aristotle, the troubling incongruity it involves makes it hard to accept. The nagging question is this: How are we to explain those embarrassing inept arguments? Would I like to suggest that the arguments Aristotle advances to justify slavery, precisely because of their ineptness, serve to reveal, on Aristotle’s part, a deep-set ambivalence toward the whole matter of slavery. If he does not succeed in convincing us of the rightness of slavery, it is because he did not succeed, antecedently, to convince himself of its rightness.

By way of supporting this suggestion, I would first call attention to Aristotle’s attitude toward individual slaves, his own slaves, that is reflected in his will. In that document, the authenticity of which is generally accepted, he instructs one Nicanor “to take care of the slave Myrmex, so that he is conveyed in a fashion worthy of us to his own people, together with those of his belongings which we received. They are to be free Ambracia and to give her, on the marriage of my daughter, five hundred drachmae and the maid which she has.” This does not convey the impression of a man who has a habit of looking upon slaves as mere parts, as soulless bodies, as domesticated animals, as tools; rather, the strong suggestion is that we are reading the words of a man who regards them as in every way fully human.

However one might be inclined to interpret what Aristotle has to say about slaves in his will, there is a much stronger support for the suggestion I am making here in what I will call his attitude toward manumission. In the passage above taken from Aristotle’s will, we have seen that he leaves instructions that his slave Ambracia is to be set free. Later in the will we read: “Tycho is to be freed on the marriage of my daughter, as are Philo and Olympus and his child. Do not sell any of the slaves who served me, set them free as they deserve.” Here Aristotle seems to be following something like a policy regarding the freeing of slaves, a policy, we can imagine, that he had been thinking about for some time. In any event, there are two significant passages regarding the freeing of slaves that need our attention, one in the *Economics*, the other in the *Politics*. In the first work we read that “it is just and beneficial to offer slaves their freedom as a prize, for they are willing to work when a prize is set before them and a limit is defined.” In Book VIII of the *Politics* we read the following: “Later we shall discuss how slaves should be treated and why it is better to hold out freedom as a reward to all slaves.” This statement must remain permanently tantalizing for us because the discussion which Aristotle announces therein is not to be found in the text of the *Politics* as we have it today. And that leaves hanging in the air a provocative question: Just what did Aristotle have in mind when he writes that “it is better to hold out freedom as a reward to all slaves”? It seems
a reasonable surmise that he had worked out something like a comprehensive policy regarding manumission, and that he was perhaps even willing to propose it as something which was worthy of general implementation. Assuming this to be a possibility, then every argument he has presented in defense of the notion of natural slavery takes on a different complexion. They have sincerity behind them, but not firm conviction.

Whatever Aristotle has to tell us in support of the notion of natural slavery carries with it the clear implication that, because the state of slavery is natural, it is permanent. The most salient feature of the slave, as described by Aristotle, is his mental condition; he is either seriously impaired with respect to reason, or lacks it totally. The slave therefore does not have the intellectual wherewithal to enable him to guide his own life in productive, self-beneficial ways. He is thus dependent on his master for his safety and security, indeed for his overall well-being. His slave status, then, is the only means through which he would ever be able to attain whatever version of the good life might be available to him.

If all this is true, and if Aristotle earnestly believed it to be true, then on what possible basis could he justify the freeing of slaves, and all slaves at that, not as an occasional gesture of goodwill on the part of a beneficent slave owner, but presumably as a general policy? In fact, there would be no justification at all for it. To set a slave free, given his supposedly natural debilities, would be to do him no favor, far from it. Freeing a slave would be sentencing him to a life of precarious uncertainty. At every turn he would have to meet with problems and dangers before which, because of his intellectual incapacity, he would be helpless. Hence, to free a slave, as suggested by Taylor, would be like turning loose in the wilds a domesticated draft animal, where his sojourn would be short-lived because of the hungry predators that would be waiting for him there.

The fact that Aristotle even brings up the matter of freeing slaves, and asserts that it is the just thing to do, provides good grounds for our believing that his attitude toward slavery bore the deep impress of ambivalence. And it was this ambivalence which provides the best explanation for the quality of the arguments in defense of slavery which are to be found in the Politics. Did he, in his heart of hearts, in fact think that in those arguments he was attempting to defend the indefensible? ★

ENDNOTES
1. Politics 1255a1–2.
2. Ibid. 1254a14–15.
3. Ibid. 1252a30.
4. Ibid. 1254b22–23. The translations I am principally relying on in this article are those of C. D. C. Reeve. Benjamin Jowett’s translation of the cited passage reads: “He who participates in rational principle enough to apprehend it, but not to have such a principle, is a slave by nature” (in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon [New York: Random House, 1941], 1133).
6. Politics 1253b30–32.
7. Ibid. 1334a11–12.
8. Ibid. 1254b24–27.
9. H. D. F. Kitto writes that “agricultural slavery in Greece hardly existed: the tradition was still vigorous that the citizen owned his land and slavery offered little advantage in small-scale farming like this, as the slave would have to eat as much as he produced.” The Greeks (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1953), 131. Kitto tells us that it is estimated that around the time of the Peloponnesian War (431–404 B.C.) there were some 125,000 slaves in Attica, “of whom something like 65,000 were in domestic employment” (ibid., 132). One may presume that the situation had not much changed at the time Aristotle was writing.
11. Ibid. 1254a10–12.
12. Metaphysics 1036b31–32.
13. Politics 1254b16–17. Apropos of the various comparisons Aristotle makes with regard to the slave, a comment made by C. C. W. Taylor is germane: “Aristotle’s other analogies, those of a tool and a part of the body, tend if anything to confuse the issue” (The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, 255).
14. If anything, Taylor understates the case.
15. Nicomachean Ethics 1161b7–9.
16. Ibid. 1161b2–3.
17. Ibid. 1157a12.
18. Ibid. 1157a16–17.
20. Ethics 1161a34–35.
22. Ibid. 1252b7–8.
23. Ibid. 1252b6. Aristotle writes: “For no city-state that is naturally slavish can possibly deserve to be called a city-state at all; for a city is self-sufficient, whereas something that is slavish is not self-sufficient” (ibid. 1291a8–10). Granted that the governments of great civilizations that were antecedent to the maturation of Greek civilization (the Sumerian, Babylonian, Assyrian, Egyptian, Persian) did not display the city-state model, and granted that they did not fully measure up to Aristotle’s standards as “self-sufficient” social entities (nor, in his opinion, did Plato’s republic), nonetheless one must concede that those societies were self-sufficient to a rather high degree, and for that reason cannot be labeled as slavish.
24. Ibid. 1254a22–23.
25. “But it is not difficult to see that those who make the opposite claim [that slavery is unjust] are also right, up to a point. For slaves and slavery are spoken of in two ways: for those are also slaves—that is to say, people who are in a state of slavery—by law” (ibid. 1255a2–5).
26. “It is clear, then, that the objection with which we began has something
The Unborn Baby: A Precious Opportunity for Communion

by Kerry Pound, M.D.

When I was a third-year medical student beginning my rotation on obstetrics and gynecology, one of the physicians began her lecture with the following statement: “We are the only specialty that deals with two patients at once.”

“Two patients.” A simple yet profound statement recognizing that the baby, like the mother, is truly a patient to be respected and cared for throughout a pregnancy. For a brief moment, with a small glimmer of hope, I wondered whether the training I would receive in obstetrics at McGill University in Montreal would be, like me, pro-life.

Rather quickly I realized that, as at most teaching hospitals, abortions or “terminations” went on routinely. During the next couple of days of my OB rotation, I would learn that “products of conception” is the euphemism used for the fetus and placenta when discussing the completion of a miscarriage or abortion. For medical purposes, women are often referenced by their age and name followed by three figures known as their “GPA”—a kind of shorthand for their obstetric history referring to the number of gestations, births beyond twenty weeks’ gestations, and abortions. The final qualifier essentially treats a miscarriage and a “termination” the same.

And yet, for all these euphemisms, there was the clear recognition by all caring for expectant mothers that there are, in fact, two patients, that is to say, two persons.

The baby’s heart rate is assessed at each prenatal visit. The woman’s “fundal height” (how big her uterus is getting) is checked to assess the baby’s growth. Vital signs of both baby and mother are essential as both patients are carefully and lovingly cared for by obstetricians. Typically the goal of obstetric care is simply to have a healthy baby and a healthy mother after the nine-month gestation period is completed. To accomplish this certainly necessitates the consideration of two patients.

When I became pregnant for the first time during my pediatric residency at Massachusetts General in Boston, I was fascinated with the reactions elicited by my condition from colleagues and hospital staff, both familiar and unfamiliar. Everyone, from members of the cleaning crew to the most pompous surgeons, would glance at my “baby bump,” and a twinkle would appear in their eyes. There often would follow the obvious three questions: “When are you due?” “Boy or girl?” “Is this your first?” And then, with just the slightest encouragement from my response, the sharing would begin to flow freely: “When my wife was pregnant with our first…” “I carried so low, I was always in pain…” “My sister loved every minute of being pregnant…” “I was sick for nine months, but it was worth it…” This would happen every single day of my pregnancy. I would encounter random people: renowned Dr. Steadyhands, Michael from the cleaning staff, a patient’s

27. Ibid. 1333a8-10.
31. As to the slave Myrmex, who is also named in this passage, it is not clear whether he, along with Ambracis, is also to be given his freedom. The context strongly suggests, however, that he too will be manumitted.
32. Economics 1344b15-17. In a “Note to the Reader” in the first volume of The Complete Works of Aristotle (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), xiii, the editor, Jonathan Barnes, identifies the Economics as a work whose “authenticity has been seriously doubted.” The question has apparently not being definitively settled, one way or the other; we have reason to give due regard to the work because of the significant fact that Barnes, a formidable Aristotelian scholar, chose to include it in the Complete Works.
33. Politics 1350a10. This is C. D. C. Reeve’s translation. Benjamin Jowett translated the passage as follows: “I will hereafter explain what is the proper treatment of slaves, and why it is expedient that liberty be always held out to them as the reward for their services” (The Basic Works of Aristotle, 1292).
34. In his translation of the Politics, C. D. C. Reeve attaches this note to the passage: “The promised further discussion is missing from the Politics as we have it” (Politics, Reeve translation, 208). He then makes reference to the passage from the Economics which I quote in the article.
family member, and me, randomly sharing a ride on the elevator at Mass General, and on a short trip up to Ellison 17 we would let go of our various hospital titles and roles and instead speak about something intimate and profound because of that baby in my belly. We would connect in a personal, private, perhaps even vulnerable way regarding the most beautiful event of life: the beginning of a new human life.

Of course, that wouldn’t happen just at work. As any pregnant woman can tell you, everyone loves to talk to a pregnant woman about pregnancy, labor and delivery, breastfeeding, and raising babies. The hairdresser, the librarian, the gentleman behind me in the grocery store check-out line—they all want to connect, to share, to be in communion with that experience. That bump, which, without hesitation, they all recognize as a baby, is just the excuse to spend a moment in common wonder and joy contemplating life’s new beginnings. It is a precious means toward communion with one another.

Being in communion changes us. It sustains us. These short interactions provide an immediate knowledge of one another because we had come together briefly to wonder about the miracle of new life. We shared in a transcendent moment, and it had made us better. The next time I would see Dr. Steadyhands, I would be comfortable chatting about our mutual patients rather than intimidated as I might have previously experienced. The next time I would see Michael the cleaning guy, not only would we smile and greet each other as we always had on the floor, but now we might also ask each other about our families. We had, in essence, begun to love each other and build a closer community. It truly matters that the context in which this happened was so essential to happiness—wonderment, joy, and appreciation of the miracle of new life.

The reality is that everyone, even Dr. Kermit Gosnell, the abortionist recently convicted in the murder of three infants who had survived his abortions, in some way recognizes that there are two patients in every pregnancy. Gosnell had simply accepted that it was OK to kill, mutilate, and disregard the younger one while barely treating the older one with common decency. How did he come to be this way? How did he transform into this “monster” who saw his young patient as a nasty nuisance that could be so brutally disposed of? He was certainly not experiencing that sustaining communion with either his patients or his staff.

When did our society begin to equate the disregard of these youngest patients with the greatest freedom for women? Doctors in much cleaner clinics than Gosnell’s, with more advanced tools, make similar choices in the way they “treat” the younger patient. How can we as a society declare that the “fertilized content” of a woman’s uterus is somehow her enemy? Why instead don’t we stand up and declare, “Babies are beautiful; babies are good. Babies remind us of our humanness, our connectedness, our ability to share with one another”?

Babies are not the problem. We are called as individuals and as a culture to protect human life, to value human life from the earliest stage to natural death. When we allow family disintegration without a fight, when we seem not simply to tolerate but also to expect men to desert women and the babies they helped bring into being, when we let poor and disadvantaged women believe death is better than birth for their children, when we insist to women and girls that the feminist battle is to be fought in their own bodies, we lose hold of a culture of life. We no longer see life as inherently precious. It’s a culture where Kermit Gosnell can flourish. It’s a culture that’s lost sight of our innate human need for communion.

Gosnell must have lost an authentic sense of community, of sharing and experiencing the joy of being human with others. Over time, he had to become blind to the beauty of life and, therefore, to the beauty of his two patients, the baby and the mother. Although he tacitly recognized that the babies were patients—products of conception don’t “walk to the bus stop,” as he reportedly joked about the size of one thirty-week-old fetus whose spinal cord he snipped after the child had been born alive—he chose death, as has our culture.

If we don’t begin to recognize as a society that these most vulnerable humans are precious, as any stranger in an elevator is able to do on a personal meeting, then we are losing sight of that which constitutes our human beauty: Our ability to live together in community. ✨

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Drone Wars: The Morality of Robotic Weapons

by Msgr. Stuart Swetland
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One dramatic example of the use of military drones (unmanned aerial vehicles) recently grabbed headlines throughout the world. Soon after the tragic and unjust killing of four Americans in Benghazi, Libya (including Chris Stevens, the U.S. ambassador to Libya), on the anniversary of 9/11, reports circulated that the deaths were a preplanned and coordinated attack in retaliation for the killing earlier this year of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a top al-Qaeda leader from Libya.

Yahya al-Libi was killed in North Waziristan on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, most likely by a U.S. drone attack with “hellfire missiles.”

With drone technology rapidly becoming ubiquitous, many people ask: Is the use of drones for surveillance, identification and aerial attack in accordance with the Catholic moral tradition?

New technology does not change moral truth. The basic ethical norms are unchanged and unchangeable because they reflect how humans are to flourish individually and as a community of persons on our pilgrim path toward God and his Kingdom.

However, new technology does provide new challenges in applying these moral norms.

The use of drones in war falls under the same category as the use of manned aircraft. The moral presumption is that one should not employ deadly force.

But there are exceptions to this presumption if one is justly defending others. This is true domestically (police actions for example) or internationally (fighting in a just war). For a war to be just it must meet very stringent conditions: be fought for a just cause, as a last resort, with the right intention, declared by the competent authority, with a probability of success and be proportionate (in the sense that the goods to be protected and promoted are proportionate to the assumed damage the war will most likely cause).

These criteria are the _jus ad bellum_ (justice of war) requirements.

But a just war must be fought justly, so there are also _jus in bello_ (justice in war) criteria that must be followed. These include that each action be militarily necessary to achieve the just cause, be done for the right intention, be part of a lawfully ordered action, have a probability of success, inflict minimum loss of life or injury while demonstrating proportionality in the good achieved versus the damage inflicted on the enemy, and properly discriminate between legitimate military targets and innocent nonmilitary civilians.

If the “war on terror” is not a just war, then no action in it can be just. The only moral course would be to cease fighting. However, assuming the “war on terror” is a legitimate application of the _jus ad bellum_ criteria (an assumption not without many difficulties given that, among other things, it is an unconventional, asymmetric war), does the use of drones meet the _jus in bello_ requirements?

Before answering this question, the decision-making procedure for a drone strike should be examined.

Due to the excellent work of investigative journalists like Esquire’s Tom Junod, the Council on Foreign Relations’ Jonathan Masters, and Jo Becker and Scott Shane of The New York Times, a fairly clear picture has emerged. “Targeted killings,” as they are sometimes called, are authorized on al-Qaeda operatives (and their supporters or allies like the Taliban) only after they have been placed on the unfortunately named “kill list.”

This list is drawn up at the highest level of the American political and military chain of command. Names are added only with the direct approval of the commander-in-chief, the president of the United States.

President Barack Obama is frequently briefed on terrorist activity and reserves his right to have the final say in authorizing strikes. According to the _Times_, he personally authorizes all strikes in Yemen and Somalia and many in Pakistan.

All strikes must meet strict “rules of engagement” when it comes to identifying some high-value person of interest or group on the approved attack list. A strike may be a deployment of special forces in a “capture or kill” mission, a cruise missile launch, or an aerial bombardment from manned or unmanned aircraft.
More often than not, the weapon of choice is a missile strike from a drone.

Drones have several military advantages. They offer little or no risk to the U.S. forces. They are less expensive and dangerous than maintaining manned aircraft on station. They can remain in the air for an incredibly long time, and they have proved both deadly and accurate.

The New America Foundation, a widely accepted nonpartisan analyst, estimates there have been approximately 337 drone strikes in Pakistan alone from 2004 until October 24, 2012 (about 285 of these occurred during Obama’s presidency) causing casualties of between 1,908 to 3,225 people. These strikes have killed 1,018-2,769 combatants, about 153-192 civilians, and another 130-268 persons whose identities were unknown.

This means the collateral-damage estimates range from 7-15 percent. Over time, this figure has decreased, as targeting methods, technology, and technical skills of the remote pilots have all improved.

Compared to other methods of attack and other wars, these collateral-damage figures, though still tragic, are fewer.

These statistics make clear that U.S. military authorities are seriously attempting to minimize civilian casualties and make these attacks as “surgical” as possible. And we know from captured documents and other intelligence that these strikes have seriously hampered al-Qaida’s efforts to carry out terrorist activities and recruit and train new leadership.

Therefore, these strikes seem to be serving a real military purpose (just cause) in the ongoing battle to disrupt terror activity.

One might ask if these strikes are not tantamount to murder, since they intend to kill.

In fact, the intent is to sever the command, control, and communication (CCC) ability of these terror groups by striking at their key leaders and command posts. Each terror leader is a walking CCC nerve center vital to the enemy’s ability to continue their threat to innocent human life. The intent of any attack in these cases is morally similar to a police attack on kidnappers in a hostage situation who refuse to surrender and continue to threaten others. There seems to be a right intention here.

This leaves four more problematic questions.

First, although we are not there yet, this increased reliance on remote technology does give one reason to pause and ask whether such mechanization threatens to make war (and everything else) even more inhumane.

Does this increased reliance on technology create a new “arms race,” where the chase is for ever-increasing electronic sophistication, with more and more automation? Is there a point where we humans might lose control of our own machines? Already, the use of automatic drones which would be programmed to search, identify, and fire on targets without direct human intervention is being considered. This “brave new world” would be fraught with real ethical dilemmas.

Second, shouldn’t we pay more attention to the requirements of minimum force and make an attempt to capture these terror operatives rather than “shoot first and asking questions later”? After all, morality requires the use of deadly force as a last resort. And from an “intel” perspective, a captured operative can be extremely helpful, while a dead one cannot.

While this is true, and every reasonable effort should be made to capture rather than kill, the terrain, political situation, operative style, and patterns of these terror leaders make capture a near impossibility. This being said, it would be in better keeping with the just-war tradition if more were done to try to capture these “high-value targets.”

Third, what are the legal implications of such attacks, given that many take place in countries like Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, where the U.S. and her allies technically are not engaged in an ongoing war?

Here, to meet the criteria of lawful action, there must be at least the tacit approval of these governments. The only exception would be where the government is actively aiding and abetting the terror organization. Then the offending nation would be subject to attack, as Congress authorized in its resolution on the use of force against al-Qaida and other terror groups (passed first in September of 2001 and renewed as recently as this year).

This tacit approval is becoming a real issue, especially as the U.S. relationship with some of these nations is highly problematic.

Last, but certainly not least, there is the question of last resort. Doesn’t the use of drone technology lessen the natural barrier to authorizing the use of deadly force? Isn’t it much easier to give a “go” order to attack when none of your military personnel is being placed in harm’s way?

When a nation asks a soldier to risk life and limb, any decent commander will think long and hard before sending in the troops, knowing what is being risked. But if all that is at stake is some hardware that can be programmed to self-destruct, what is there to give a
leader pause, except his or her well-formed conscience and empathy for one’s enemies?

If we look at history, neither of these characteristics has been in high supply among the emperors, kings, princes, prime ministers, and presidents who have ruled their respective nations. Perhaps, in the end, this new technology will call for new types of leaders, not ruthless and cunning, ambitious and grasping, but ones who truly are empathetic and sacrificing, who are filled with compassion and “love of enemy” (see Matthew 5:44).

But where will these saints be found? As technology advances, mankind’s moral progress and even survival may depend on our answer to this question.

Msgr. Stuart Swetland, a 1981 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, holds the Archbishop Harry Flynn Chair of Christian Ethics at Mount St. Mary’s University in Emmitsburg, Md., and is the host of EWTN’s Catholicism on Campus. He served six years as a line officer in the U.S. Navy.

Edmund Pellegrino—Gone to His Reward

by William Saunders

Edmund Pellegrino died peacefully in his sleep on June 13. A peaceful death—a gentle end to a life of unwavering generosity and service to the common good and his fellow man—seems an appropriate passing for one of the finest doctors and bioethicists, Catholic or otherwise, of the past half century.

There is much that can be said of his full and eventful life, which ended just a few days shy of his ninety-third birthday. Though it is impossible to recount all of his accomplishments, the reader should know a few. He served as the president of the Catholic University of America and wrote over twenty books and more than 600 scholarly articles (a good introduction to his thought is The Philosophy of Medicine Reborn: An Edmund Pellegrino Reader). He was a dedicated physician, deeply committed to his patients, serving them for over fifty years. As you can see just from this short account, he obviously influenced hundreds—indeed, thousands—of people.

I was one of them.

I first met him on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land with the John Carroll Society. As an adult convert to Catholicism, I was looking for role models for what it meant to be a professional, a Catholic, and a good citizen. And I found such a role model in Ed—a man for whom there was no conflict between science and faith, a man whose faith framed his life and deepened the knowledge he gained from science and experience.

I was with him on a subsequent pilgrimage—this time to Sicily—when President George Bush announced his decision on federal funding for embryonic stem cell research (limiting such funding to stem cell lines created prior to August 10, 2001). At the time, I was doing a good deal of work on that issue. And I joined Ed on a hastily convened panel to discuss Bush’s decision, a panel we subsequently repeated at Visitation School in Washington D.C. I was honored to be on it, but did not deserve to be. It would have been more than sufficient to listen to Ed alone. After all, for many in this country and elsewhere, he was known as the “father of bioethics.”

You can gain some idea of the important role he played in the field of bioethics by considering just the following facts: he served for many years as director of Georgetown’s Kennedy School of Ethics; he succeeded Leon Kass as Chair of the President’s Council for Bioethics; and in 2004, he was appointed to UNESCO’s Bioethics Committee.

But there was another role that best illustrates Pellegrino’s special approach to bioethics—he founded the Center for Clinical Bioethics at Georgetown Medical School. Clinical bioethics, a bioethics of the bedside, was Ed’s particular focus. He was, after all, first and foremost (as he always pointed out) a doctor. And doctors have patients. The care of patients is their primary responsibility. Decisions have to be made in the difficult, complex, confusing context of the suffering patient. Ed felt that though many no longer understood the importance of making patient-sensitive decisions, doctors in particular were losing this skill, this sensitivity. The Center for Clinical Bioethics was intended to bring that back into focus.
A couple of times, Ed asked me to join him, since I was a lawyer, when he worked through ethical, fact-based hypotheticals with medical residents training at the hospital. I can assure you that it was an education for me as well as for them. He was a man finely tuned to the ethical nuances of any particular healthcare situation, though in whatever post he held, at Georgetown or elsewhere, his work always remained within a fully Catholic understanding of life issues.

Often death brings regret for the living. We wish we had taken the opportunity to let the deceased know how much his or her life meant to us. In Ed’s case, however, I am happy to note that two events happened in the past few months that let him know how much his life meant to others.

First, in March, Georgetown held a “Pellegrino Symposium,” during which his life and work were celebrated and a special portrait was unveiled, and for which many of those thousands he influenced were in attendance.

Then just a few weeks ago, the Kennedy School of Ethics held its renowned Intensive Course in Bioethics. Ed returned to teach his master class in Virtue, at the very end of the course. By all accounts, it was a bravura performance. A few days later, he died.

A great man, a scholar, a physician, a Catholic, a gentleman, Ed Pellegrino was all of these, and more. Everyone who knew him will miss him deeply.

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Lonergan’s Moral and Systematic Theology of Marriage: Cause for Dissent or Reason to Affirm?

by Kent Lasnoski
Quincy University

Bernard Lonergan’s scholarly work on marriage is limited to one 1943 article in Theological Studies titled “Finality, Love, Marriage.” His classroom work on marriage took place in the early forties when he wrote the article. His pastoral work on marriage took the form of a September 1968 correspondence to a Canadian priest preparing for a meeting of bishops in Winnipeg. While the sources are few, the content is rich. Moral and systematic theologians have oft mined this vein of thought in what has been a wide-ranging, often polemical debate over the last sixty years.

In this article, I attempt to lay out the geography of the secondary literature on Lonergan’s theology of marriage and sexuality. A touchstone for organizing scholarly interpretation of Lonergan is the perennial question of contraception. Two kinds of questions exist with respect to Lonergan and this touchstone: (1) historical; (2) dialectic. At the historical level, one might ask—what was going forward in Lonergan’s thought? In other words, did Lonergan hold or express the opinion publicly or privately that artificial means of birth regulation ought to be allowed in some cases? At the level of dialectic, one might ask, which position authentically follows from Lonergan’s moral and systematic theology of marriage?

I am going to address two groups of scholars: those who find Lonergan’s thought a reason to dissent from Catholic teaching on contraception and those who find Lonergan’s thought a reason to affirm Catholic teaching on the topic. In the revisionist group, I will take up Richard P. McCormick, Margaret Monahan Hogan, and Jon Nilson. In the group reading Lonergan in favor of Church teaching I will treat the work of Jason King, Mark Frisby, and David Fleischacker.
Lonergan as Cause for Dissent

I begin with the revisionists and particularly with the most well-known of them, Richard McCormick. In an article written for the twenty-fifth anniversary of Humanae vitae, McCormick argues two points: (1) Humanae vitae created a crisis of authority in the Church; and (2) to end the crisis of authority the hierarchy must accept dissenting theologians as a source of theological insight.

So, why does McCormick go fishing in Lonergan’s work to support his claims? In the process of trotting through a list of theologians in favor of dissent, McCormick quotes Lonergan from the Catholic New Times (October 14, 1984), but the rest of his argument relies on a subtle, even cryptic, letter Lonergan wrote to a Canadian priest in September of 1968. McCormick, though, reads the letter confidently, as if the “historical question” I mentioned above can be taken for granted. McCormick’s reliance on Lonergan follows through two syllogisms: (1) Lonergan noted that the natural law argument tying a procreative meaning to each act of intercourse had been based on erroneous Aristotelian biology; modern biology notes a statistical rather than classical relationship between insemination and conception; therefore the question of contraception is a question of whether one may modify the statistical relationship between insemination and conception. (2) The Church has affirmed natural family planning; natural family planning modifies the statistical relationship between insemination and conception; therefore other means of modifying this statistical relationship may be allowed under certain circumstances.

McCormick rightly points out the key point of the letter and a key in Lonergan’s approach to theology: the shift from a classical to a statistical, historically conscious worldview. In the realm of sexuality this means a shift from Aristotelian to modern biology. According to Aristotelian biology, each act of conjugal intercourse was per se procreative. As Lonergan puts it, “the seed of the male was an instrumental cause that changed the matter supplied by the female into a sentient being.” It follows that “any positive interference was an act of obstructing the seed in its exercise of its efficient causality.” According to modern biology, though, conception is related to insemination per accidens. Lonergan puts the question thus: So there arises the question whether this statistical relationship of insemination to conception is sacrosanct and inviolable. Is it such that no matter what the circumstances, the motives, the needs, any deliberate modification of the statistical relationship must always be prohibited? If one answers affirmatively, he is condemning the rhythm method. If negatively, he permits contraceptives in some cases. Like the diaphragm and the pill, the menstrual chart and the thermometer directly intend to modify the statistical relationship nature places between insemination and conception.

McCormick correctly states that the Church has said this statistical relationship is not inviolable. Couples may change the relationship by limiting their conjugal intercourse to days where the statistical probability of conception approaches zero.

McCormick runs afoot, and certainly goes beyond Lonergan’s own thought, when he confidently concludes that “artificial contraception can be permissible under certain conditions.” The conclusion does not follow from his premises. True, the Church has affirmed that the statistical relationship between insemination and conception is not inviolable, but what follows from this fact is merely that some method of changing that statistical relationship must be and has been traditionally approved by the Church. McCormick mistakenly passes over the question Lonergan’s letter forces us to ask, namely, which means of modifying this relationship befit the Christian, develop virtue, express conjugal love, and honor the dignity of human life? In the process McCormick assumes that all methods are in theory allowable since all merely change a statistical relationship. McCormick mistakenly assumes that a shift from Aristotelian to modern biology radically changes the content of the Church’s teaching; instead it offers a better explanation of the teaching. The Magisterium, in her competence on faith and morals, has faithfully determined that methods manipulating or impeding the natural processes and functions of the body do not befit the dignity of human life or faithfully express conjugal love.

From McCormick it is a small step to our next author, Margaret Monahan Hogan. McCormick wrote the preface to her monograph Marriage as Relationship: Real and Rational, wherein he praises her reading of Lonergan and even compares her to Lonergan in her fidelity to the quest for truth. Hogan approaches “marriage” at the level of dialectic. Her goal is to revisit the twentieth century’s doctrinal development in the area of sexuality and marriage to find therein a movement from a “traditional position” toward an “emerging position.” The result of her study is the following definition of marriage: “a special kind of human relationship. It is an intimate personal union which is to supply the
matrix of conditions for the perfection of the marriage, for procreation, and for the perfection of the parten-
ers.” For Hogan this definition amounts to a Lonergan-ian “higher viewpoint,” an Aufhebung, under which opposing viewpoints may be seen as partial viewpoints and within which meaningful conversation may begin among the well intentioned and scholarly people on all sides of the issue.” Hogan explicitly describes her position “not as a disagreement with the tradition but rather a development of the tradition,” but it is clear that she disapproves of what she sees as insufficiency in the Catholic Magisterium: namely, that they allow relational language to define marriage but not to determine the proper use of intercourse in marriage.

Hogan adapts Lonergan’s theology of finality in marriage. She distinguishes three kinds of ends within the marital union: unitive, procreative, and personalist. These she places parallel to Lonergan’s horizontal, vertical, and absolute finalities. The union itself is essential to marriage, and thus is the horizontal finality of the marriage. Hogan claims that procreation is intrinsic to the marital union as a vertical finality, in other words as that for which the union has a potency to reach above and beyond itself. Finally, because of God’s action in grace, marriage is the kind of union that has a further, supernatural potency for union with God. This notion of marriage allows Hogan to make the procreative end a sort of extracurricular to the task of marriage itself. For Hogan, the marriage need not, and indeed must not, seek the procreative end unless it is assured that the procreative end will be completely successful. If there is doubt as to whether the couple will achieve the tripartite horizontal, vertical, and absolute finality of procreation—a living, educated, and holy child—then they are compelled to prevent conception. Furthermore, if the procreative end would endanger either the unitive or the personalist ends of marriage then it must be foregone on those accounts as well. Artificial means are allowed, in her thinking, for reasons similar to McCormick’s. Conception is distant in time and place from insemination. The relationship between the two is statistical by nature, and human reason ought to modify that statistical relationship for the good of the marital union when it can.

Perhaps this all sounds reasonable, but what Hogan has done here is to nearly reverse Lonergan’s own position as expressed in “Finality, Love, Marriage.” As Lonergan states, “vertical and horizontal finalities are not alternatives, but the vertical emerges all the more strongly as the horizontal is realized more fully.” The finalities of marriage are not so distinct from one another that spouses can embrace one and put off the other. For Lonergan, the procreative end is not something that should be sought after everything else in the marriage is going swimmingly. In fact, the opposite is true. Rationally, responsibly, and virtuously procreating and raising children is the kind of activity that allows marriage to rise from an organic union of animals to a virtuous and unrestricted union of friends, to a holy union of Christians. Marriage is the kind of relationship that is strengthened and made holy in and through its primary end, which is procreation. Hogan seems to forget that in “Finality, Love, Marriage,” Lonergan was setting out to defend Casti Connubii’s distinction between the primary and secondary end of marriage using the notion of horizontal and vertical finalities. As Lonergan concludes of his own work, “If this analysis satisfies the exigencies of modern data and insights, it is no less true that it leads immediately to the traditional position on the ends of marriage.” Marriage is the kind of relationship that rationally orders procreation. Fulfilling the horizontal and vertical finalities of procreation is part of the task of marriage. The marriage isn’t merely strengthened for the task, but strengthened and developed in the task.

While McCormick and Hogan directly take up Lonergan’s own theology of marriage, the next author takes up Lonerganian ideas as tools to impugn the authority and method of the Magisterium itself on the issue of marital sexuality. In “The Church and Homosexuality: A Lonerganian Approach,” Jon Nilson accuses the Magisterium of developing what Lonergan calls “general bias” (or, love of darkness). As Lonergan puts it in Insight, “the general bias of common sense involves the disregard of timely and fruitful ideas; and this disregard not only excludes their implementation but also deprives subsequent stages both of the further ideas, to which they would give rise, and of the correction that they and their retinue would bring to the ideas that are implemented.” For Nilson, the scotosis in the Magisterium is that it has become blind to any data or questions that potentially lead to a reunderstanding of human sexuality—especially if that reunderstanding would see contraception as licit and homosexual desires as natural. As Nilson puts it, “contemporary experiences and perspectives on sexuality are taken as prima facie erroneous.” In Nilson’s version of Lonergan’s thought, this Oedipal self-blinding has resulted in a process of decline with in the Roman Catholic Church. Once the Magisterium successfully blinds
itself and the Church to the data and questions that will allow for and follow from insights, we lose the ability to identify a valid insight even if we were to arrive at one. Truth doesn’t look like truth anymore because it does not accord with the anomalies we’ve come to associate with common sense. The hierarchy, says Nilson, has created a “social surd calling itself a social achievement: the systematic ignoring of data and perspectives relevant to homosexuality.”26 Finally, he concludes that the Church hierarchy wants to serve God, but until it pays attention to all data and perspectives, “their service is likely to be construed simply as fear masked by arrogance.”27

Nilson’s critique is worthwhile, necessary, and humbling. Certainly all individual theologians and groups themselves suffer from blindspots and biases. In Lonerganian terms, each person and social group requires continued psychic, intellectual, moral, and religious conversion in order that they might appropriate themselves as experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding subjects and societies. Nilson’s approach, though, is not without problem. First, it is well neigh impossible to make the kind of accusation Nilson has leveled against the Magisterium without the very “fear masked by arrogance” that he has accused the Church of herself. To make such an accusation is to implicate oneself in the fault. To make the claim, Nilson needs the same kind of epistemological certitude he accuses the Church’s Magisterium of uncritically wielding. Second, Nilson is not sufficiently critical of “experience” as a source for discovering moral truth. After all, Lonergan’s own method is not merely bottom up through experience to understanding, judgment, and decision. As a transcendental method it is at once bottom up and top down. Religious conversion and the resultant being in love with God transforms our scale of values, our criteria of judgment, and even our way of experiencing the world. Without the transformative grace of the sacraments and liturgy, and without the examples of the unassailable experience of Christ Jesus and Mary his most chaste mother, our own human experience can easily prove a stumbling block to the very insights we so ardently seek.

To sum up this group of scholars, I can say that they find Lonergan supporting contraception in marriage based on two distinct premises: (1) Lonergan seems to suggest a kind of separability between the procreative and unitive meaning of conjugal intercourse; and (2) Lonergan’s notion of “general bias” could be applied to the Magisterium’s intransigence on the topic of sexuality in marriage.

Lonergan as a Reason to Affirm

The attractiveness of Lonergan’s thought at an intuitive level has secured for it a wide readership and many adherents, but the nuance and complexity of Lonergan’s writing also guarantees many a debate about its meaning and its implications. We have seen how one group of scholars finds in Lonergan a cause to dissent from Church teaching on contraception; now we must look at another group of Lonerganians who find the opposite conclusion in Lonergan’s thought.

First, I will take up Jason King’s article, “Bernard Lonergan’s Theology of Marriage.” King’s work recovers from the dust-bin of history Lonergan’s 1943 article “Finality, Love, Marriage.” According to King, Lonergan’s work on marriage is continually neglected for two reasons: his dense prose and his metaphysical realism, which modern antifoundationalist students may not be prone to seek out. The power of Lonergan’s theology of marriage, says King, is that it situates marriage “in the general field of human process, the context of nature, history, and grace.”28 Further, not only does it span the older tradition on sexuality but it integrates John Paul II and the newer thought on sexuality, even modern critiques of consumerism. King is not here seeking to import a Lonerganian idea on the side of any given argument, but to accurately explicate and note the continued relevance of Lonergan’s theology of marriage. In the course of his explication, King touches on the issue of contraception.

Although Lonergan’s article was written twenty-five years before Humanae vitae, King believes that Lonergan’s emphasis on the interpersonal nature of marriage conditioned by the biology of sex seems to reflect Paul VI’s claim in Humanae vitae that the unitive dimension of sex cannot be divided from the procreative dimension.29 Herein begins the controversy. King has just claimed for Lonergan a position sounding exactly opposite from the one McCormick attributed to the theologian. McCormick—unitive and procreative are separable. King—unitive and procreative are inseparable. Who is correct?

In his article “Finality, Love, Marriage,” Lonergan calls marriage the rational form of sex and sees its finality in a child.30 In other words, that conjugal intercourse affectively joins two persons is coincidental (accidental). The organismic union of conjugal intercourse is per se unitive at a biological level, but only per accidens unitive at an affective level. Essentially, conjugal

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intercourse physically and temporally joins two persons, where both participate in one act that may or may not result in the eternal union of two persons in a human offspring. It would seem that in Lonergan’s thinking, to entirely disconnect the procreative aspect of conjugal union from the affective aspect of that organismic union is to mistake the accident for the essence. It is to think that marriage is the rational integration of sex and its finality in an orgasm rather than a child. Empirically speaking, at the level of personal, affective union, conjugal intercourse and a life lived together are ambivalent. It is the task of the spouses to integrate the act of conjugal intercourse and the rest of their daily round into their own growth in personal virtue and the historical realization of the common good.  

King’s explication of Lonergan sets the stage for Mark Frisby’s approach to the question of contraception. King ends where Frisby begins, that is, from the standpoint of Lonerganian ethics. He investigates the spouses’ quest for virtue and the historical realization of the common good. In his article, “Lonergan’s Method in Ethics and the Meaning of Human Sexuality,” Frisby asks what kind of ethical error contracepting couples might be making, if any.  

Lonerganian ethics are isomorphic to the Lonerganian construction of human cognition: just as in human cognition there is experience, understanding, judgment, which are transpositions of the terms potency, form, and act, in ethics there is a potential good (object of desire); a formal good (good of order); and actual good (value). Just as human cognition depends on authentically appropriating oneself as a knower, so ethics depends on authentically appropriating oneself as a decision-maker and doer.  

Frisby defines marriage in Lonergian terms as “[t]he unrestricted (and therefore lifelong and exclusive) communion of two persons distinctively embodied (or consummated) in hetero-sexual intercourse.” As potential good, conjugal intercourse is the physical embodiment of the spouses’ potency for the unrestricted development of a new human life. Conjugal intercourse, as potential good, must take place within and embody a formal good, a particular order consistent with the act, namely, an unconditioned communion of love and life (with all the political implications that accompany it). Conjugal intercourse is in itself not an actual good or value in the Lonergian sense, but rather the child is the actual good or unrestricted value of conjugal intercourse. On these grounds, argues Frisby, “unauthenticity would characterize any sexual act between spouses from which has been contracepted that which makes sex sex (its orientation to new unity of life), from which has been contracepted precisely that which lets sex embody their marital community.”  

What Frisby has done, is to identify Lonergan’s term “authenticity” as the manner of properly appropriating oneself as knower, a transcendental tendency to move beyond oneself toward unrestricted knowledge and development. Then he notes an isomorphism between knowing and morally deciding. Ethics, or determining and deciding to act on the good, demands the same authenticity, the same self-transcendence, demanded by human knowing. Just as “experience” is not “experience” if it is blocked from being the potency for the realization of the unrestricted development in the truth; conjugal intercourse is not conjugal intercourse if it is blocked from being the potency for the unrestricted development of value (in this case the value of a new human life). Therefore, Frisby, according to Lonergan’s thought, must conclude that contracepted sexual acts are inauthentic, that is, they reject the demand to self-transcendent openness to unrestricted development of the good.  

In a similar study, David Fleischacker, the director of the Lonergan Institute in Washington, D.C., investigated the intelligibility and finality of the schemes of recurrence involved in human procreation according to modern biology. Fleischacker’s commitment to authentically following a Lonerganian method is impressive. His method is to proceed from “the lowest levels of the procreative order to the highest.” In the course of the study he finds that, for both men and women, “the lower levels are intrinsically oriented toward higher levels of intelligibility. Another, [sic] way of saying this is that the lower levels of organic life possess intrinsic orientations toward higher levels of intellectual, rational, volitional life, and an obdiential potency to a life of sanctified grace in faith, hope, and love.” He carefully analyzes the finality of the male and female reproductive systems (including meiosis, spermatозoa, the oocyte, hormones, and so on) and the schemes of recurrence in male and female sexuality (including organic and psychic levels, pheromones, neurological responses, and so on). At every stage of the study Fleischaker finds that “the entire meaning of these schemes is oriented toward the creation of new life.” Everything in the schemes of recurrence of human sexuality “contributes to increasing the probability of conception. Thus, these
schemes simply do not make sense except in relationship to conception.”

They have a finality in conception that is prior to and requisite ground for the development of any other finality, for example, friendship or love.

On these grounds, Fleischacker concludes that an authentically Lonerganian understanding of human schemes of recurrence in human procreation make contraception unintelligible. Fleischacker has said it well himself: “Contraception adds something that has an intent that is contrary to the functional intelligibility of all these schemes.” When men engage in the conjugal act, their person, their body and mind together “participate in the activation of various schemes which do not pertain to fighting wars, capturing prey, tackling viruses and bacteria, gaining oxygen for the blood, digesting food, nor for any other functional relationship to the body and the planet. They are for conception. One can hopefully see how, in the language of the body, to use John Paul II’s phrase, biochemically and organically, thus [sic] using a condom or some other contraceptive is contrary to the very intelligible conjugates constitutive of these schemes.”

Conclusion

In this presentation I have looked at two groups of scholars, each claiming Lonergan for their own. The first group, rejecting the intrinsic connection between unitive and procreative meanings of conjugal intercourse, sought in Lonergan evidence to support the position. For McCormick this evidence came in the form of a letter and a statement in which Lonergan challenges the older, natural law argumentation to defend the Church’s position on contraception. The mistake McCormick makes is to assume that because Lonergan rejects a method of argument he also rejects the conclusion. For Hogan, this evidence came as a version of Lonergan’s three finalities as applied to marriage. Hogan’s mistake is to distinguish absolute finality as an orientation that takes place above and beyond horizontal and vertical finality rather than behind and within the two. For Nilson, this evidence came in the form of Lonergan’s notion of general bias, which he applies to the Magisterium’s method of carrying out the debate on the theology of sexuality in general. Nilson’s mistake is to assume the veracity and authenticity of his own method, which is open to the same ad hominem attack he levels against the Church herself. As is clear from what is above, I conclude that this group of scholars does not authentically develop Lonergan’s thought. They offer a counterposition to the position that follows from Lonergan’s own general method of systematic and moral theology and from his own particular theology of marriage.

On the other hand, Jason King, Mark Frisby, and David Fleischacker, in their own way contribute to authentic explication and systematic development of Lonergan’s thought and method on the question of contraception. King correctly draws theological attention back to Lonergan’s own perennially important work on marriage and finds it prophetically parallel to the work of Paul VI, John Paul II, and modern social approaches to marriage. Frisby delves into Lonergan’s ethical method and finds there a robust connection between epistemological and moral process in the human. He applies this isomorphism to the question of contraception and finds that contraception inauthentically appropriates the self. Contracepting couples mistake the potential good of conjugal intercourse for the concrete, actual, and unrestricted good, which is in fact the child. Finally, David Fleischacker, in an attempt to follow Lonergan’s example in *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, explores the meanings and finalities of the biochemical, organic, and psychic schemes of recurrence in human procreation. He finds there a fundamental finality in conception, a finality that makes contraception unintelligible.

I began by noting that there were two questions to ask of Lonergan and contraception: historical and dialectic. At the historical level, I believe we have evidence to suggest Lonergan may have had private sympathies with those dissenting from the magisterial teaching on contraception, yet he remained convinced that the language of marriage’s primary and secondary ends must be maintained. While there is no definitive historical evidence of a published statement by Lonergan for or against the Church’s definition of contraception as “intrinsically evil,” Lonergan’s position of sympathy is suggested on three major occasions: (1) an audio file of a Q & A session from 1969, as well as reported private, friendly conversations with dissenting theologians (for example, Sebastian Moore in 1967), and a private letter to a Canadian priest (1969).

On the other hand, I believe we have found an answer to the dialectical question. Lonergan stated that all he knew on the science of sexuality was that Aristotle’s biology was wrong and a statistical understanding should replace it. He prescinded from expertise in the
area. Much has been learned since Lonergan studied marriage and sexuality in 1943. The authors who have attempted systematic development of Lonergan’s thought in light of a modern understanding of reproductive biology itself have found that the Church’s position follows from Lonergan’s own method. They have found that Lonergan’s method helps to put the magisterial conclusion into new terms. At the organismic, psychic, and ethical levels, human sexuality is intelligible as possessing an essential finality in conception. Contraception introduces a radical unintelligibility into human sexuality; it is a flight from true insight into human sexuality.

Ultimately, Lonergan’s thought is not the possession of any theologian or group of theologians. It should serve as a font for ever-greater insights and ever-more questions for intelligence and reflection. We can only hope, work, and pray that we authentically pursue the truth in love in Lonergan’s spirit of self-transcendence. Certainly this is presuming much, but perhaps we could even ask that Lonergan pray on our behalf.

ENDNOTES

1 While both the letter and the article in Theological Studies have been pored over, Lonergan’s class notes remain unstudied. I hope to study them in more detail in the near future.

2 See Method in Theology (128) FULL BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFO?, where Lonergan introduces the functional specialty of theology “history.”

3 In Method (129), Lonergan describes the functional specialty of dialectics. Among its tasks is to seek a higher viewpoint by treating “[c]onflicting viewpoints found in confessions of faith and works of apologists, but most often in unnoticed assumptions and oversights and aversions, in the quiet but determined decisions of scholars, writers, preachers, and the men and women in the pews.” I will be looking for just these sorts of unnoticed assumptions and oversights, preclusions and aversions in the work of scholars.

4 At this point, the question of why I should speak on the secondary literature surrounding Lonergan rather than on Lonergan’s own work immediately presents itself. Why a metaanalysis, when an analysis of the primary text is what we are ultimately after? Lonergan’s work is complex enough on its own, why bother approaching it through the many scholars who have tried with more or less success to explain him or to employ him in their own proposals? An analysis of the work by scholars relying on Lonergan’s theology of marriage will show us where the potential pitfalls, oversights, and perhaps even scotoma (blind spots) might be when one attempts a study of Lonergan’s work in itself and in the authentic appropriation of and development of Lonerganian theology.

5 See Richard McCormick, “Humanae Vitae’ 25 Years Later,” America (July 17, 1993), 6–12. In September of the same year McCormick published a response to an article in favor of Church teaching on contraception. In that article he states that the earlier article involved a paraphrase of Lonergan’s letter. McCormick reproduces the majority of that letter in his response article. See America (September 25, 1993), 11–14. The Church’s authority, McCormick believed, was devastated when Paul VI wrote that each act of contraception was “intrinsice inhonestum,” or intrinsically immoral. See PaulVI, Humanae vitae, 14. The Church’s authority was lost by Paul’s attempt to save it. If the Church changed its teaching on contraception, it might appear that all the previous teachings against contraception had been incorrect, and the Church’s competence in faith and morals would be shaken. Ironically, the opposite happened. The typical Catholic so expected a change that Paul VI’s decision to maintain the status quo snacked of rigid intransigence, fear, or just plain incompetence on issues of faith and morals. For McCormick, the “Inability—or refusal—of the magisterium to deal with this problem except by repetition has resulted in a debilitating molex that has undermined the credibility of the magisterium in other areas” (McCormick, “Humanae Vitae, 25 Years Later”).

6 The letter was published as “Dear Father,” in the Lonergan Newsletter 11, no.1 (1990): 7–9. See also Lonergan’s comments in Catholic NewTimes (October 14, 1984).

7 “The Aristotelian position is erroneous. Insemination and conception are known now to be quite distinct. The act of inseminating is not an act of procreating in the sense that of itself, per se, it leads to conception. The relation of insemination to conception is just statistical and, far more frequently than not insemination does not lead to conception.” “The issue is that, when there is no reason whatever for a precept, that precept is not of natural law” (Lonergan, “Dear Father,” 7, 9).

8 Other authors have seized upon Lonergan’s rejection of the older natural law argument against contraception as well. See Mark MacGuigan, Abortion, Conscience, & Democracy (Toronto: Housonw, 1994), 24–25, who quotes a private conversation between Bernard Lonergan and Sebastian Moore in Rome in 1967. Moore reported this conversation in “Crisis over Contraception,” The Tablet (7 October 1989), 1146–48, at 1146. Lonergan is to have said, “They’ll never prove it’s against the natural law for the simple reason that the relationship between cotton and conception is statistical.” Moore calls up Lonergan’s 1944 article “Finality, Love, Marriage” to affirm a personalist finality of sex wherein he assumes that Lonergan would agree that the personalist finality of sex can be achieved even with the excursion of the procreative finality. It is my contention that this assumption is false.

9 McCormick (“Humanae vitae’ 25 Years Later,”) writes, “Lonergan would argue, however, if the relation of intercourse to procreation is only statistical, then one must ask if this statistical relationship is inviolable. If it is, then even natural family planning is excluded. If it is not, then artificial contraception can be permissible under certain conditions.”


11 Ibid.

12 Ibid. “It is a statistical relationship relating a sufficiently long and random series of inseminations with some conceptions.”

13 Hogan, Marriage as Relationship FULL BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFO?, 9, 15, 16. In particular, she looks at (1) “the essential nature of marriage, (2) the several finalities to be accomplished within marriage, (3) the role of conjugal intercourse, and (4) the governance of the reproductive finality within marriage.”

14 Ibid., 9–10. She goes on here to say that “marriage has three ends: (1) personal union—intrinsic necessary end; (2) procreation—intrinsic contingent end; and (3) personale—intrinsic contingent end. These ends press for actualization on three distinct interrelated levels: horizontal, vertical, and transcendent. Governance of the reproductive finality is directed from within the marital matrix” (ibid., 10).

15 Ibid., 10. Throughout, Hogan shows her dependence on the philosophy of Bernard Lonergan, S.J. In particular instance, her use of the term “higher viewpoint” refers to the term as Lonergan would use it in Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, 37–38 FULL BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFO?. A series of insights leads to the emergence of a higher viewpoint, from which series of data seeming to be only accidentally connected are systematically intelligible. Reaching a higher viewpoint is a manifestation of the term “vertical finality,” which will become important later in the analysis of Hogan’s use of Lonergan.

16 Ibid., 19.

17 Hogan repeats this critique multiple times. See, for example, ibid., 99 (against Evangelium vitae), and 123 (against modern Catholic scholars...
defending the magisterial position. For her description of the proper regulation of the fertility finality, see ibid., 139.

18 Unfortunately, Hogan’s interpretation of “finality” in Lonergan’s thought is flawed. She does not look beyond the 1943 article (“Finality, Love, Marriage,” Theological Studies 4 [1943]) to understand or explain the term. Lonergan developed the notion of finality over the course of his life. In Insight the term has been developed, and again in “Mission and Spirit,” in A Third Collection: Papers, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (New York: Paulist, 1985), 23–34.

19 Hogan is trying to integrate the thought of St. Alphonsus Liguori on the nature, ends, and intentions involved in marriage with Lonergan’s notion of finality in marriage. Her categories “intrinsic necessary” and “intrinsic contingent” come from Liguori on this subject. See Hogan, Marriage as a Relationship, 123. See Kent Lasnoki, “Alphonsus Liguori’s Moral Theology of Marriage: Refreshing Realism, Continued Relevance,” Nova et Veta 9.4 (2011): 1003–1028; and See Alphonsus Liguori, Theologia moralis 4.61–62.


21 Ibid., 506–07.

22 Ibid., 508. “The strength of this up-thrust [from organicist union to union of friendship] is not to be exaggerated. An integral part of Catholic thought on marriage is the doctrine that virginity is preferable to marriage, widowhood to second marriage, temporary abstinence to use with in marriage.”


24 So that it may always require the presence of both the biologically procreative and the unitive meaning and function of any morally pure genital expression of love.

25 Nilson sees the following consequences of the decline he identifies: “(1) there has been increasing anomalies and conflict, spreading stagnation, and a ‘credibility gap’ between Rome and the ordinary faithful; (2) ‘genuine understanding becomes increasingly irrelevant to a social body shot through with anomalies;’ and (3) the surrender of the normative significance of the detached and disinterested intelligence leaves the understanding no method to distinguish between social achievement and social surd” (Nilson, “The Church and Homosexuality,” PAGE, FULL BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFO?).

26 Nilson, “The Church and Homosexuality,” 71. He continues, claiming that the Church’s “diagnosis of the problem and its reiteration of the solution both need empirical confirmation, and there is insufficient evidence that empirical data have materially affected the official teaching” (ibid., 70).

27 Ibid., 72.


29 Ibid., 83–84.


31 Ultimately, this kind of integration will require spouses to look beyond the borders of their own home and resources. They will need to rely on the grace of their chief social body, the body of Christ.


34 Ibid., 246.

35 Ibid., 244.

36 While this study has appeared as a series of online publications over the course of a year, I hope the work will appear soon in a peer-reviewed journal. The source for the entire series is as follows: David Fleischacker, “40 Years After Humanae Vitae,” Lonergan Institute, available at http://lonergan.org/?s=humanae+vitae (accessed on May 24, 2010).


38 Ibid.

39 Fleischacker, “40 Years After Humanae Vitae: Male Procreative Schemes,” no page.

40 Ibid.

41 Apart from his “Finality, Love, Marriage” article, Lonergan was critical of the American birth control industry and also negatively reviewed Dietrich von Hildebrand’s On Marriage, which made the personalist concerns central to marriage. See Lonergan, Shorter Papers, Collected Works of Lonergan, vol. 20, ed. R.C. Croken, R.M. Doran, and H.D. Monsour (Toronto: Toronto University Press, YEAR), 154.

42 Available at the Marquette Lonergan archive (www.bernardlonergan.com).
Love and Sex: the Redemption of Sexuality

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Introduction

My purpose here is, first, to consider briefly the reasons why human sexuality is in need of redemption. I will then reflect on the great normative truths in whose light we are able to make true moral judgments and good moral choices whenever the goods of human sexuality are at stake. Attention will then focus on the significance of marriage as a reality that enables men and women truly to love one another as sexual persons and to honor the great goods of human sexuality. In particular, I will reflect on the meaning of the marital or spousal act in order to illustrate concretely the beautiful relationship meant to exist between love and sexuality. I will then seek to show the precise reasons why the free choice to engage in nonmarital genital acts simply cannot express authentic human love or honor the great goods of human sexuality. In conclusion I will briefly consider contraception.

The Redemption of Human Sexuality

In Love and Responsibility, the book he authored while he was still simply Karol Wojtyła, Blessed John Paul II made the following very thought-provoking observation:

Man, alas, is not such a perfect being that the sight of the body of another person, especially a person of the other sex, can arouse in him merely a disinterested liking which develops into an innocent affection. In practice, it also arouses concupiscence, or a wish to enjoy concentrated on sexual values with no regard for the value of the person.

Concupiscence and sin! Here we find the reason why human persons, male and female, are in need of redemption, and with them their sexuality, from which “the human person receives the characteristics which, on the biological, psychological, and spiritual levels, make that person a man or a woman. (see Persona Humana: Declaration on Certain Questions on Sexual Ethics, section I).

The first two chapters of Genesis—those accounts of the “beatifying beginning of human existence”—instruct us that, in the beginning, when God made man, “male and female he created them” (Gn 1:27). Thus, in creating man, male and female, God created bodily, sexual persons. As Blessed John Paul II put it, “Man, whom God created ‘male and female,’ bears the divine image imprinted on his body ‘from the beginning’: man and woman constitute, as it were, two different ways of the human ‘being a body’ in the unity of that image.” He made them, moreover, precisely so that they could be “gifts” for each other, and their bodies, which perfectly revealed their identity as male and female persons, were the means and sign of the gift of the man-person to the woman-person and vice versa. Thus, “in the beginning,” when it issued from the creative word of God, the naked human body, male and female, fully disclosed the person, “a good toward which the only proper and adequate attitude is love.” This truth is dramatically and beautifully expressed in the text of Genesis 2:23, where we find the words which the first man, on awakening from the sleep into which the Lord God had cast him, speaks on seeing the woman who had been “taken out of him.” “This one,” he joyfully exclaimed, “is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh.” “Exclaiming in this way,” John Paul II writes, “he seems to say: here is a body that expresses the ‘person,’ that is, a being to be loved!”

But the first two chapters of Genesis are followed by the third, which tells us of the sin of the first man and its dreadful consequences for human existence. As a result of this sin, man, male and female, is alienated from God; the man and the woman, moreover, are alienated from each other. “The ‘man of lust’ took the place of the ‘man of original innocence,’” and there takes place what can be called “a constitutive break within the human person, almost a rupture of man’s original spiritual and somatic unity... The body, which is now not subordinated to the spirit as in the state of original innocence, bears within it a constant center of resistance to the spirit, and threatens, in a way, the unity of the
Making Good Genital Sexual Choices

Christians believe, and rightly so, because they have this on the authority of Jesus himself, that the first and greatest commandment is to love God above all things and our neighbor as ourselves (cf. Mt 22.37–39). Indeed, as St. Thomas explicitly says in his discussion of the relationship between the precepts of the Decalogue and the principles of the natural law, this twofold command of love is the basic normative principle on which the truth of these precepts depends. And Blessed John Paul II, in his magnificent encyclical on fundamental questions of the moral life, *Veritatis splendor*, reminds us that the commandment to love our neighbor as ourselves expresses “the singular dignity of the human person, ‘the only creature that God has wanted for its own sake.’” We can love our neighbor, the Holy Father goes on to say, only by respecting and honoring the good of the human person, and we can honor his good only by respecting and honoring the real goods perfective of him at different levels of his being: “the different commandments of the Decalogue,” he writes, are really only so many reflections on the one commandment about the good of the human person, at the level of the many different goods which characterize his identity as a spiritual and bodily being in relationship with God, with his neighbor, and with the material world. . . . The commandments of which Jesus reminds the young man [in Mt 19:16–21 and parallels] are meant to safeguard the good of the person, the image of God, by protecting his goods, goods such as life itself, the communion of persons in marriage, and so forth.

Thus, if we are to make morally good choices we must, in doing so, respect the real goods of human persons and steadfastly forbear intentionally damaging, destroying, or impeding what is really good, either in ourselves or in others. We are never intentionally to do evil so that good may come about (cf. Rom 3:8), a requirement rooted in the Catholic tradition and clearly affirmed by the Magisterium.

Thus the choice freely to exercise one’s genital sexual powers can be a morally good choice only if one is willing to respect the relevant human goods that come into focus when such a choice is made. But what are these goods?

The goods that come into focus when one considers the possibility of exercising one’s genital sexual powers are, above all, the good of human life itself in its
transmission and the good of steadfast conjugal love—a unique kind of human friendship. Vatican Council II clearly affirmed this when it referred to the “objective criteria drawn from the nature of the human person and of human action” that are to guide married couples in their choice to unite coitally, for it said that they should do so in such a way that they “respect the total meaning of mutual self-giving and human procreation in the context of true love” (Gaudium et spes, 51). That the good of human life in its transmission is “in focus” when one considers exercising one’s genital sexual powers is clearly indicated by the fact that the powers in question are named “genital.” The practice of contraception confirms this point, for one is tempted to contracept only when one is thinking of engaging in the sort of act one reasonably regards as capable of generating new human life. If one does not want this life to begin, one then does something, either prior to, during, or subsequent to the life-giving sort of act precisely to impede procreation. Contraception would make no sense otherwise.

That the good of human friendship is also “in focus” in the choice to exercise one’s genital sexual powers is clear from the fact that genital coition is possible only between two persons. One can, of course, engage in solitary genital acts such as masturbation, but even in making a choice of this kind one realizes that one is exercising a personal sexual power that is dynamically ordered to the union of two persons.

Thus the goods at stake in genital sexual choices are those (1) of human life in its transmission—a good the Catholic tradition (and everyday language, for that matter) recognizes as the good of procreation or the procreative good of human sexuality—and (2) the good of union between two persons—the good this tradition calls the unitive good of human sexuality. But there is still another good that comes “into focus” when one considers exercising one’s genital sexual powers, namely, the good of “personal integrity.” John Finnis has ably described what this good requires. It requires fundamentally, that one be reaching out with one’s will, i.e., freely choosing real goods, and that one’s efforts to realize those goods involves, where appropriate, one’s bodily activity, so that the activity is as much the constitutive subject of what one does as one’s act of choice is.

The goods, then, of human life in its transmission, of deep interpersonal friendship, and of personal integrity, are the goods that come into focus in considering the exercise of one’s genital sexuality. These goods of human persons must be fully honored and respected if such choices are to be morally good. We shall now see how beautifully these goods are respected in the marital or conjugal act and how they are not honored in non-marital sexual choices.

Marital Sexuality: The Meaning of the Conjugal Act

Marriage, which has God for its author because it is integral to his wise and loving plan for human existence, comes into existence when a man and a woman, forswearing all others, give themselves to each other through “an act of irrevocable personal consent.” By doing so, a man and a woman establish “marriage, the covenant of conjugal love freely and consciously chosen, whereby man and woman accept the intimate community of life and love willed by God himself.” Precisely because they have given themselves irrevocably to each other as irrepealceable and nonsubstitutable spouses in marriage, husband and wife have capacitated themselves to do things that nonmarried persons simply cannot do. They can now give to each other an absolutely unique kind of love, conjugal or marital love, a love that is human, total, faithful and exclusive, and fruitful or ordained to the having and raising of children. This love, moreover, “is uniquely expressed and perfected by the raising of children.”

When husband and wife engage in the marital or conjugal act, this act truly unites two irreplaceable and nonsubstitutable spouses. It does so because they have already, through the act of marital consent, “given” themselves irrevocably to one another as bodily, sexual beings and made one another to be irreplaceable and nonsubstitutable in their lives. This bodily act, then, signifies and actualizes their marital union. Precisely as marital, it is not merely a genital act between two persons who happen to be married. Husbands and wives, like nonmarried people, are capable of engaging in genital acts because they are endowed with genitalia. But husbands and wives, unlike nonmarried people, are capable of engaging in the conjugal act because they are married!! Their marriage capacitates them, as I noted earlier, to do what married couples are supposed to do, and one of the things married persons are supposed to do is to express their marriage and their marital love through the act proper and exclusive to them, the conjugal or marital act.
Through this bodily act they literally become “one flesh,” and they come to “know” each other in an unforgettable way, and to know each other precisely as male and female, as husband and wife. In it they “give” themselves to one another and “receive” one another. Yet they do so in strikingly different and complementary ways, for it is an act made possible precisely by reason of their sexual differences. The wife does not have a penis; therefore, in this act of marital union she cannot enter the body, the person, of her husband, whereas he can and does personally enter into her body-person. He gives himself to her, and by so doing he receives her. She, on the other hand, is uniquely capable of receiving her husband personally into her body, her self, and in so doing she gives herself to him. The wife’s receiving of her husband in a giving sort of way is just as essential to the unique meaning of this act as is her husband’s giving of himself to her in a receiving sort of way. The husband cannot, in this act, give himself to his wife unless she gives herself to him by receiving him, nor can she receive him in this self-giving way unless he gives himself to her in this receiving way. As the philosopher Robert Joyce says, “the man does not force himself upon the woman, but gives himself in a receiving manner.”

In giving himself to his wife in the marital act, moreover, the husband releases into her body-person millions of his sperm, which go in search of an ovum. Should his wife indeed be fertile and an ovum present within her, one of the sperm may succeed in uniting with it, in becoming “one flesh” with it, and in so doing be instrumental in bringing into existence a new human person. These facts dramatically illustrate another dimension or aspect of male-female sexual complementarity. The man, as it were, symbolized the superabundance and otherness of being, for his sperm are differentiated into those that will generate a male child and those that will generate a female child. The woman, as it were, symbolizes the oneness or unity of being insofar as she ordinarily produces only one ovum, and what might be called the withinness or abidingness of being.

The marital act, by respecting and honoring the sexual complementarity of husband and wife, fully respects the personal integrity of each, for each is indeed reaching out with his and her will toward real goods and their efforts to realize those goods involves their bodily activity. The marital act, indeed, speaks the “language of the body,” as Blessed John Paul says: it is a language expressing “the total reciprocal self-giving of husband and wife.”

As the reflections in the previous paragraphs also indicate, the marital act, precisely because it is marital, is the sort or kind of act open to the “goods” or “blessings” of marriage, the goods, namely, of marital love and of new human life. As an act in which the husband can, in a unique way, “give himself to his wife in a receiving way” and in which she is uniquely capable of “receiving him in a giving way,” it is an act “apt” to foster and enrich conjugal love. It is moreover the kind or sort of act open to the gift of human life, a gift which husbands and wives, unlike unmarried persons, are able “to receive lovingly, nourish humanely, and educate religiously,” that is, in love and service of God and neighbor, precisely because they have, by getting married, capacitated themselves to receive this precious gift in this way.

The marital act thus honors fully the good of human life in its transmission, for it is an act open to this gift. It is likewise an act that fully respects the good of deep conjugal friendship, that fully respects the irreplaceable and nonsubstitutable character of the human person, male and female. It truly “consummates” the marriage, for it is done “in a human way,” that is, in a way fully responding to the good of the human person.

So true is this that a genital sexual act forced on one spouse by the other without regard for the other’s condition or legitimate desires, can hardly be said to be a truly “conjugal” act. It likewise follows that a contrac- cepted genital act between husband and wife cannot be regarded as a true “conjugal act.” Indeed, as Blessed John Paul II has rightly pointed out,

When couples, by means of recourse to contraception, separate these two meanings [procreative and unitive] that God the Creator has inscribed in the being of man and woman and in the dynamism of their sexual communion, they act as “arbiters” of the divine plan and they ‘manipulate’ and degrade human sexuality—and with it themselves and their married partner—by altering its value as a “total” self-giving. Thus the innate language that expresses the total reciprocal self-giving of husband and wife is overlaid, through contraception, by an objectively contradictory language, namely, that of not giving oneself totally to the other. This leads not only to a positive refusal to be open to life but also to a falsification of the inner truth of conjugal love, which is called upon to give itself in personal totality.

The marital or conjugal act, then, is one that fully responds to the priceless value of human persons, male and female, honoring the “goods” perfective of them as bodily sexual beings.
Nonmarital Sexuality

When nonmarried individuals choose to exercise their genital sexuality, either with other nonmarried individuals (fornication, or, as it is sometimes euphemistically called today, “premarital sex”), or with persons married to others (adultery), or in noncoital ways (masturbation), or with persons of the same sex (homosexual acts), they cannot be making good moral choices insofar as they cannot, in making genital sexual choices of these kinds, properly respect the real human goods that “come into focus” when such choices are made, the goods, namely, of true personal friendship, of human life in its transmission, and of personal integrity. I will now try to show this by reflecting first on nonmarital heterosexual coital union (fornication and adultery), masturbation, and homosexual acts.

1. Nonmarital Heterosexual Coition (Fornication and Adultery)

When a man and a woman who are not married to one another choose to have sexual coition, their free choice violates the goods of true interpersonal friendship, of human life in its transmission, and of personal integrity.

It violates the good of friendship because those who choose to have intercourse have not, through their own free and self-determining choice, established one another as irreplaceable and nonsubstitutable persons. They have by no means “given” themselves to one another in an act of self-giving love. Their act of sexual coition, consequently, does not and cannot unite two irreplaceable and nonsubstitutable persons, male and female. Rather, it simply joins two individuals who in principle remain replaceable and substitutable, disposable. It is, in short, a “lie,” because it speaks the language of love while the “love” it signifies is not the committed love of husband and wife, but at best the “romantic” love of a man and a woman who may “feel” that their act symbolizes a love committed to a sharing of life, but who refuse to make the commitment to marriage necessary for this kind of shared life to be possible. The two individuals may have some deep feelings of tenderness and affection for one another, but such feelings are far different from authentic human love, which takes such feelings, which Karol Wojtyla calls the “raw material of love,” and integrates them into an intelligent commitment to the personhood of the other. The “partners” in nonmarital sexual union do not and cannot regard one another as irreplaceable and nonsubstitutable because they have refused to make one another irreplaceable and nonsubstitutable persons by an act of marital consent. Thus, the act of bodily coupling they choose cannot be the sign and expression of a full personal self-giving. If they think it does, they are simply deceiving themselves.

Moreover, if one of the individuals is married to another then their free choice to copulate has the added malice of adultery, which violates the great good of marital love and fidelity. In choosing to commit adultery, a married person chooses to substitute, for the spouse he or she has made nonsubstitutable by his or her own free and self-determining choice, another human person. One violates one’s marital commitment and is gravely unjust to the spouse to whom one has given oneself “irrevocably.” Nor does it make any difference if the adultery is done with the consent of one’s spouse. Those who think that a spouse’s consent to the other spouse’s adultery justifies the deed are using a line of reasoning based on a subtle form of dualism, for this specious reasoning seems to hold that a man and a woman can continue to give themselves, that is, their conscious minds, to each other uniquely and exclusively even if they give their bodies, now regarded as distinct from their “selves,” to another. This fallacious assumption ignores the unity of the human person and promotes self-deception.

Fornicators and adulterers likewise choose to act contrary to the good of human procreation. They choose to engage in acts which they reasonably believe can bring a new human life into existence. But it is not good for human life to be given through acts of fornication and of adultery, because fornicators and adulterers have not capacitated themselves to “welcome human life lovingly, to nourish it humanely, and to educate it in the love and service of God.” Thus in choosing to engage in coition the nonmarried violate the good of human life in its transmission. Indeed, it was precisely because fornication fails to respect the irreplaceable dignity of any child who might be conceived as a result of it, inasmuch as this child would not then be given the home where it can grow and develop as it ought, that St. Thomas judged simple fornication an intrinsically evil act. Today, of course, most fornicators and adulterers seek to avoid the generation of human life through their nonmarital acts of sexual coition by contracepting. For them, this is merely acting “responsibly,” and preventing the birth of an “unwanted” child. But, even prescinding from
the morality of contraception (which I will consider in my conclusion), everyone realizes (or ought to realize) that pregnancies can and do frequently result even if contraceptives are employed. When this occurs, the child conceived comes to be as an “unwanted” child, surely a position no one would wish to be put in.

It should thus be clear that the choice to engage in heterosexual genital coition outside of marriage is morally irresponsible because it violates the goods of exclusive spousal friendship and of human life in its transmission. This choice, moreover, fails to honor the good of personal integrity, for those making it are not reaching out with their wills and bodies to participate in authentic goods of human existence. Rather, they are using their bodies to participate in the sensibly experienced pleasure of genital orgasm separated, precisely because of the kind of free choices they are making, from the real goods of human existence into which this pleasure is to be integrated.

2. Masturbation

Masturbation is the deliberate stimulation of the genital organs to the point of orgasm which is not part of sexual intercourse. Thus understood, masturbation can be done either by a person acting on himself or herself or by one person acting on another.

Masturbatory activity simply ignores and undercutsthe great human and sexual goods of conjugal friendship and of human life in its transmission. It is not, like fornication and adultery, directly opposed to the good of conjugal friendship, nor is it, like them, harmful to the good of human life in its transmission by failing to see that such life, if given, is “welcomed” into a home where it can take root and grow. It is simply irrelevant to these great goods, these “ends” of human sexuality, these goods that make human sexuality itself meaningful and integrally personal and human. In short, such activity trivializes human sexuality.

Masturbatory activity, moreover, clearly violates terribly the good of personal integrity. It is, in fact, self-disintegrating, as the following reflections, I hope, will help make clear. I also think that such sexual behavior damages what Blessed John Paul II called the “nuptial meaning” of the body, that is, the body as a “gift” that husbands and wives can give to one another.

Today very many people accept the principle that sexually maturing and mature individuals are entitled to regular sexual satisfaction and may get it in any way that pleases them, provided that “no one gets hurt.” Such people see nothing wrong with masturbation, and many such people deem masturbation a normal, natural kind of behavior, useful if not indeed necessary in order for one to “get in touch with one’s own body.”

This superficial view overlooks what sexual acts in this kind, including masturbation, do—do in and of themselves—to the acting person. The desire-satisfying person becomes the sensory-emotional subject who experiences the sexual urge and its satisfaction. The reasoning and freely-choosing subject is engaged only to the extent that he is put to work in the service of the sensory-emotional subject, and the body becomes an extrinsic object, an instrument for avoiding frustration and replacing urge with satisfaction. The person is thus dis-integrated; instead of a unity of soul and body the person now becomes the “consciously experiencing subject” of desires and their satisfaction, and the body becomes the tool or instrument of this consciously experiencing subject. By disintegrating themselves, desire-satisfying persons act inconsistently with what they really are: unities of body, sense, emotion, reason, freedom. Such self-disintegration is an essential element of what is morally wrong with masturbation and other sexual activity undertaken principally in order to satisfy the urge for sexual release.

Engaging in sexual acts in response to a sexual urge cuts sexual activity off from the real goods that make such activity humanly good and meaningful: the goods of human life in its transmission, the good of interpersonal friendship, the good of personal integrity. Such activity has no bearing on the good of human life in its transmission, and any relationship with the good of interpersonal friendship is trivialized. In acts of mutual masturbation there may be present a wish for interpersonal friendship, and one might even claim that one is doing one’s friend a kindness by helping him or her masturbate and thus relieve sexual tension and experience orgasmic pleasure. People who satisfy their sexual desires with one another are often deeply affected emotionally, yet their shared activity does not make them one. Each enjoys a private experience and satisfies an urge, but there is no commitment to any common good transcendent to their individual selves that can serve as a basis for real friendship. And sexual activity of this masturbatory kind surely fails to honor the good of personal integrity, for in and through it one is not reaching out with one’s will toward real goods of the human person and endeavoring to realize those goods through one’s own bodily activity. Rather, such
sexual activity reaches out to the satisfaction of sexual desire and one’s body is involved in such activity merely as an instrument of the experiencing subject and not as “much the constitutive subject of what one does as one’s act of choice is.”

From what has been said thus far, one can see the truth of the judgment given about masturbation by the Magisterium:

...both the Magisterium of the Church...and the moral sense of the faithful have declared without hesitation that masturbation is an intrinsically and seriously disordered act. The main reason is that, whatever the motive for acting in this way, the deliberate use of the sexual faculty outside normal conjugal relations essentially contradicts the finality of the faculty. For it lacks the sexual relationship called for by the moral order, namely, the relationship which realizes the “full sense of mutual self-giving and human procreation in the context of true love.” All deliberate exercise of sexuality must be reserved to this regular relationship (Persona humana, section X).

3. Homosexual acts

The same judgment which the Magisterium makes regarding masturbatory acts can also be made about homosexual acts, that is, genital acts performed between persons of the same sex. Acts referred to as homosexual are usually acts of sodomy (anal or oral intercourse) although homosexuals may also engage in mutual masturbation.

Homosexual acts cannot serve, as do conjugal acts, to unite two persons, two lives, in an act of conjugal love, the sort or kind of act, moreover, inwardly open to the gift of new human life which husband and wife have capitivated themselves to welcome lovingly and give it the home it needs to take root and grow. Thus homosexual acts do not and cannot embody and honor the goods of faithful spousal love and of human life in its transmission.

Homosexual acts, moreover, can in no way express the complementary sexuality of male and female. The “partners” to homosexual acts can not possibly act in such wise that one “gives himself in a receiving kind of way” (as a husband does in giving himself to his wife in the conjugal act) while the other “receives in a giving sort of way” (as a wife does in receiving her husband into her body-person). In the conjugal act the good of personal integrity is fully respected, for in this act the spouses are reaching out with their wills toward real human goods, those namely of faithful spousal love and of human life in its transmission, and their bodily activity is as much a constitutive subject of the conjugal act as is their choice to engage in it. They are indeed speaking “the language of the body.” But the chosen behavior of homosexual genital partners simply cannot reach out toward these real human goods, and their bodily activity serves only as an instrument necessary for the attainment of orgasmic pleasure. Claims that some kinds of homosexual unions are analogous to the marital heterosexual union simply ignore the reality of conjugal love and the conjugal act and serve only to foster self-deception.

Contraception

I want to conclude this presentation with some brief reflections on contraception. Earlier, in considering the marital or conjugal act I had noted, with Pope John Paul II, that when married persons contracept they falsify the inner truth of conjugal love and fail to “give” themselves to one another unreservedly. One major reason why it is wrong for husbands and wives to contracept, therefore, is that by doing so they falsify the meaning of the conjugal act—indeed, they make the kind of act they choose to engage in nonmarital. It is no longer an act of self-giving love. This is the principal argument that Blessed John Paul II used during his pontificate to show why contraception is terribly immoral for married persons. But is this the only reason why contraception is morally bad?

Fornicators and adulterers can also choose to contracept. Their genital acts, precisely because they are nonmarital, cannot be true acts of love, of “self-giving.” If they contracept, are they choosing to do something additionally evil? They surely are, because contraception is the kind of act, specified by its object of choice, that the Catholic tradition has recognized and still recognizes as intrinsically evil and never to be done under any circumstances or for any good ends.

But precisely what is contraception? A very good definition of it is given by Pope Paul VI in his encyclical Humanae vitae, where he described it as “every act, which either in anticipation of the conjugal act [genital act], during it, or in the development of its natural consequences, proposes [the Latin term used is intendat], either as end or as means, to impede procreation [Latin: ut procreatio impediatur].” As this definition makes clear, contraception itself is not a genital sexual act although
it is, obviously, essentially related to a genital sexual act. Thus, for instance, a widowed father, who is himself now celibate, chooses to contracept if, judging that his married daughter, who with her husband lives in his home for economic reasons, ought not to get pregnant, he mixes contraceptive pills with her cereal every morning. The daughter may abhor contraception and may indeed ardently desire to conceive a child as the fruit and gift of her and her husband’s conjugal act. And she in no way engages in contraception. But her father does, because the precise object of the act he freely chooses to do is to impede procreation in the freely chosen conjugal acts of his daughter. What this also makes clear is that contraception, whether chosen by married couples, by fornicators, by adulterers, or by parents seeking to prevent their children from getting pregnant, is an anti-life kind of deed, embodying a will set against the great good of human life itself. Moreover, should this life come to be despite one’s deliberate attempts to impede it, it will then come to be as an “unwanted child,” and will then give rise to the temptation to abort this unwanted baby.

Here I have, of necessity, treated the issue of contraception very briefly. My major purpose was to show that of itself it is not a sexual act, although clearly and obviously related to sexual acts and usually chosen because individuals want to engage in genital sex, realize that new life can come to be through such activity, and do not want that life to come to be. Contraception is thus an act that is both anti-life and anti-love. It is an act directed against the good of human life in its transmission and also against the good of spousal love.

The theology of the body has come to mean different things to different people. Even the experts on the theology of the body are not always in agreement about its central meaning. For some it would seem almost to have become a theology of sex, a theology of nakedness, or a theology of shamelessness. What then is the theology of the body really about? Is it primarily about nudity, sex, or the body, as some would have us think, or is it essentially about a spiritual journey in the interior life of the whole person? If the question is simply, “What does the pope talk about most in the theology of the body?”, the answer clearly is the body. He uses the word “body” more than 1,300 times in the text of the Theology of the Body. If we ask instead, “What is the pope’s main goal or purpose in the work?, i.e., what is he really trying to teach us?”, the focus shifts, and we see that his concern for the body has to do primarily with its relation to the interior life. If we read the text carefully, we will see that his goal in mentioning the body is to direct our attention to the interior dimensions of the person.

A few passages from the Theology of the Body will show that the pope’s main goal in this work is to lead us to an interior purity and holiness and to call our attention to the deep, spiritual values revealed through the body but recognized, promoted, embraced, and reverenced in the inner dimensions of the human heart. The project of John Paul II in the theology of the body, therefore, is to present in a new way the traditional message of Christ and the Church. He is calling us to holiness; he is calling us to develop, to live, and to share (that is, to communicate via the body) the interior life with each other and with God, as it was meant to be in the beginning.

A common misconception about John Paul II’s theology of the body is that we can somehow regain original innocence and, like our first parents, be once again “naked without shame.” While it is true that John Paul II begins his theology of the body with an analysis of Adam and Eve in the state of original innocence, when they were “naked without shame,” he explicitly states that nakedness, in our fallen state, is always connected to shame.

It is significant that the statement contained in Genesis 2:25—about reciprocal nakedness free from shame—is a statement unique in its kind in the whole Bible, so much so that it was never to be repeated. On the contrary, we can quote many texts in which nakedness is linked with shame or even, in a stronger sense, with “defilement.”

Theology of the Body and the Interior Life

by Kevin Rickert, St. Mary’s University of MN

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In a parallel text, John Paul II makes it clear that we, in our fallen nature, are no longer capable of being naked without shame:

This new moment or new situation [after the fall] also brings with it a new content and a new reality of the experience of the body so that one can no longer say, “they were naked, but did not feel shame.” Thus, shame is not only one of man’s original experiences, but is also a “boundary” experience.¹

When the pope says that the experience of shame is a “boundary” one, he is indicating a condition which limits our human experience—a line beyond which, in our fallen nature, we are no longer able to pass. “In the Sermon on the Mount,” according to John Paul II, “Christ does not invite man to return to the state of original innocence, because humanity has left it irrevocably behind.”⁶ If we fail to understand this, we miss the tension that provides the occasion for the pope’s reflections in the theology of the body. At the starting point of John Paul II’s analysis, is the reference that Jesus makes to the beginning (Mt 19:3 ff.). John Paul II sees that Jesus is pointing to something exemplary in the state of innocence that provides the key to understanding marriage and ultimately human nature. Yet a tension arises between this state of innocence, which reveals the true meaning of marital love, and our current situation in the fallen state, a state that necessarily includes shame.

The central project of the theology of the body does not entail, in any way, a sense of license for the body or a dispensation from modesty or shame. The main goal is not an intensified focus on the sex act or even the body itself. John Paul II himself warns that “there is a more or less pronounced tendency to interpret the ‘gift of self’ in a purely sexual, or sexual and psychological, sense.”⁷ At one point, he does say that the theology of the body “becomes in some way also a theology of sex,” but he immediately clarifies his statement; what he means by “sex” is not the sex act, but “masculinity and femininity.”⁸ In the same paragraph, he explains that the meaning of the body, in its masculinity and femininity (that is, because of the complementarity of the sexes), calls for a communion of persons on a level “that is deeper than the somatic structure as male and female.” John Paul II is a personalist, and his lifelong project is to explore what he calls the “integral vision of man” with a focus on the interior life of human persons. Ultimately, he is interested in exploring what is required for our fulfillment, our happiness, and our beatitude, given that we are these interior beings he calls “persons.”

At the same time, John Paul II is no Platonist. He does not discount the importance of the body. On the contrary, he warns against the kind of thinking that might lead us to focus on one aspect of the human person in isolation:

We are, in fact, the children of an age in which, due to the development of various disciplines, this integral vision of man can easily be rejected and replaced by many partial conceptions that dwell on one or another aspect of the componens humanum, but do not reach man’s integrum or leave it outside their field of vision.⁹ For John Paul II, as for St. Thomas Aquinas, the human person is both body and soul. ¹⁰ We are ensouled bodies, and since our bodies are sexual, male and female, an important part of our nature is, no doubt, tied to our sexuality.

One of the central points of the pope’s meditation in the theology of the body is the relationship between ethos and eros.¹¹ His analysis begins with the words of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount when he identifies lust with “adultery committed in the heart” (Mt 5:27–28). Using this text, John Paul II turns our attention from the external, bodily, animal experience of the sexual urge to the spiritual/personal values that define the spousal meaning of the body as it is understood in the interior depths of the person.

Christ’s words are demanding. They demand that in the sphere in which relationships with persons of the other sex are formed, man has full and deep consciousness of his own acts, and above all of his interior acts, and that he is conscious of the inner impulses of his own “heart” so that he can identify and evaluate them in a mature way. Christ’s words demand that in this sphere, which seems to belong only to the body and the senses (that is, to exterior man), he should succeed in being really an interior man.¹²

The main focus here is the need for development of the interior life of the person. In this text, the pope is calling us to a thorough examination of conscience, a complete interior house cleaning. He wants us to evaluate not only our actions, but the thoughts, urges, motives, and values that drive our actions. In this way, we actually have a chance to redirect the whole realm of sexuality and bring it in line with the values and goals that are only recognized and appreciated in the interior reflections of the person.

Although a person’s body is driven by instincts and other physical impulses, a person’s intellect and will provide a basis for freedom—the freedom to recognize, embrace, and respond to things of value, not only on a
physical level, but on a spiritual and personal level. It is only in this interior region of the intellect and will, that the person is able to recognize and embrace what John Paul II calls “the ethos of the body,” that is to say, the moral significance of the body. According to John Paul II, “The inner man is the specific subject of the ethos of the body, and it is with this [ethos] that the Christ wants to impregnate the consciousness and will of his audience and his disciples.” The body by itself (that is, exterior man) cannot be the “subject of the ethos of the body” because it is incapable of grasping an ethos. Only the interior regions of a person, that is, “the consciousness and will,” are capable of grounding the ethos of the body. If a person is able to develop and strengthen the impact of this ethos, the body will be redirected both to serve and to reflect the inner values of the person.

For John Paul II, the one thing that surpasses all others in value is a person. When Adam was alone in the garden, he was surrounded by animals with bodies, but in his solitude, he came to realize that what he was missing was another person. He longed for a communion of persons. When he finally sees Eve, he recognizes her as another person like himself; he sees her as a person with whom he can enter into communion. She is a person, like himself, made in the image of God. She is a being with an inner, spiritual dimension, which allows for a deep sharing of the interior life and a communion that surpasses the mere union of bodies.

Man appears in the visible world as the highest expression of the divine gift, because he bears within himself the inner dimension of the gift. And with it he carries into the world his particular likeness to God, with which he transcends and also rules his “visibility” in the world, his bodiliness, his masculinity or femininity, his nakedness. When we see another human being as a spiritual gift, as another “I” made in the image of God, as a person seeking communion; we transcend the experience of the body, of corporality, of “visibility.” Attention to the body is surpassed and changed by an attention to the inner depths of the person. Instead of seeing a body to enjoy on the purely physical level, the lover sees a whole person to embrace on a physical level and more importantly on a spiritual level.

In light of this spiritual aspect of the gift, which, for John Paul II, transcends the bodily aspect of human beings, the body nevertheless has an essential role to play. Since humans are bodily beings, the only way to communicate and share the gift of self is to communicate in and through the body. The main reason John Paul II is concerned with the body is that “the body reveals man.” Commenting on the bride and groom in the Song of Songs, the pope explains that the language of the body takes its meaning from the interior life of the spouses. “The words, movements, and gestures of the spouses, their whole behavior, correspond to the inner movement of their hearts. It is only through the prism of this movement that one can understand the ‘language of the body.’” John Paul II recognizes that, in the fallen state, people have the tendency to focus on the body in isolation. We have a tendency to value corporality or “visibility,” so our attention is drawn to the body and sex in a way that divorces it from its deeper significance. In the theology of the body, he reminds us that this deeper significance of the body is to be found in the interior movements of the heart.

According to John Paul II, the human body has a special significance and meaning that transcends the physical and the biological. The body certainly has a meaning from the viewpoint of physics and biology, but it has a higher, more important meaning, because of the role it plays in forming and cultivating a communion of persons. The pope describes what he calls an “inscription” by which the whole structure of the person is directed to a mutual gift of self. “This deep inscription—or rather incision—is decisive for the spousal meaning of the human body, that is, for the fundamental call it receives, that of forming the ‘communion of persons’ and of participating in it.” The thing that is unique about human bodies is that they participate in immaterial, spiritual, personal relationships. The human body takes on a higher meaning (“the spousal meaning of the body”) precisely because it is involved with self-gift and a communion of persons.

Although the relationships of animals are confined to the physical—to “bodiliness” and “visibility,” the relationships of humans are able to penetrate to a deeper level of unity. On the human level, a person is able to transcend the physical union of bodies, and establish a communion of persons that reaches, and respects, the interior aspirations of the heart.

Sex, however, is something more than the mysterious power of human bodiliness, which acts, as it were, by virtue of instinct. On the level of man and in the reciprocal relationship of persons, sex expresses an ever new surpassing of the limit of man’s solitude, which lies within the makeup of his body and determines its original meaning.

After the experience of original solitude, in which we experience, in a profound way, our individuality and
our isolation in the inner regions of the heart, we long for communion with another. Through the movements of the body, in harmony with the goals of the interior person (that is, in harmony with the ethos of the body), we are able to cross the threshold of solitude, and confront, not only our own solitude, but the solitude of the other.

To understand the message at the core of the theology of the body, one must appreciate the significance of a communion of persons which offers a remedy for original solitude and at the same time mirrors the communion of persons that takes place between Christ and his Church. In light of this interior goal of the human person, a catechesis of the body must emphasize the meaning of the body with regard to the communion of persons, and therefore, it must ultimately direct our attention to the interior, moral realm of the person. According to John Paul II, “interior innocence (that is, rightness of intention) in the exchange of the gift consists in reciprocal ‘acceptance’ of the other in such a way that it corresponds to the very essence of the gift; in this way, mutual gift creates the communion of persons.” For John Paul II, the proper intention of the gift is the key to forming a communion of persons, but this involves an interior reflection upon, and appreciation of, the various dimensions of the person making (and receiving) a gift of self.

To gain this appreciation, one must recognize the mutual gift of self as more than an exchange of bodies. A complete catechesis of the body must teach people to direct their attention beyond (and in a sense, through) the body to the interior life of the other, in order to recognize their thoughts, feelings, and intentions, so that they can receive the gift and reciprocate.

The exchange of the gift, in which their whole humanity, soul and body, femininity and masculinity, participates, is realized by preserving the inner characteristic (that is, precisely, innocence) of self-donation and of the acceptance of the other as a gift. These two functions of the mutual exchange are deeply connected in the whole process of the “gift of self”: giving and accepting the gift interpenetrate in such a way that the very act of giving becomes acceptance, and the acceptance transforms itself into giving. In this passage, John Paul II explains how the gift of self comes to be “realized.” The whole person, body and soul, participates; but the interior attitude, with regard to the donation and acceptance, is key. For John Paul II, the interior “innocence” amounts to an understanding and appreciation of the mutual gift of self and a full acceptance of the other as a complete human person including their interiority. Lacking this innocence, one might see the other in a superficial way, as a body simply to be enjoyed.

It is significant that the pope also mentions that “giving becomes acceptance, and the acceptance transforms itself into giving.” In the case of extramarital sex, there is a sharing or a lending of bodies, but there is not a full mutual gift of self. In the mutual gift of self that occurs in a marriage with the “interior characteristic” to which the pope is calling married couples, both spouses give and receive each other on the spiritual, as well as the bodily, level. In a full gift of self, according to John Paul II, a man’s masculinity, and a woman’s femininity, “through the reality of the body and of its sex, reaches the innermost depth of self-possession.” That is to say, when the gift flows mutually from persons in “possession of themselves” on an interior level, the commitment is complete; it is understood in their intellects, embraced in their wills, expressed in their vows, and lived intentionally in their everyday actions together. When the lover’s gift of self is accepted and embraced in the heart of the beloved, that acceptance itself becomes a gift to the lover. Each person receives the gift of the other, but each one also receives the gift of being accepted and recognized as a gift.

John Paul II understands human nature. He realizes the tendency, in our fallen state, to focus on the body and sex, so he addresses that interest, and directs it to a deeper understanding of the body in the larger context of the whole person. The theology of the body starts with a consideration of the body, but it certainly does not remain exclusively on that level. In the last audience of the Theology of the Body, John Paul II admits that theology of the body was, “in some sense, a ‘working’ term.” Instead he mentions two titles that point more clearly to the spiritual goal of the catechesis.

THE WHOLE OF THE CATECHESIS that I began more than four years ago and that I conclude today can be grasped under the title: “Human Love in the Divine Plan,” or with greater precision, “The Redemption of the body and the Sacramentality of Marriage.” In the first of these titles, the term body does not even appear, and in the second, his concern for the body is directed at the body’s need for redemption. The redemption of the body is a complex issue, but, for John Paul II, one thing is clear: it involves a submission of the body to an ethos that must be grasped and mastered in the heart of the person. The redemption of
the body, like the ethos of the body, finds its roots in the interior life.

The form of the “new man” can come forth from this way of being and of acting in the measure in which the ethos of the redemption of the body dominates the concupiscence of the flesh and the whole man of concupiscence. Christ shows clearly that the way to attain this goal must be the way of temperance and of mastery of desires, already at the very root, already in the purely interior sphere.44

While the state of original innocence is beyond our grasp, there is nevertheless a link between that state and “the perspective of redemption.”41 By an interior mastery, the person is able to regain, to a significant degree, the vision and attitude of purity that constitutes the ethos of the body. Despite the temptations that one experiences (in the interior as well as the exterior life) as a result of original sin, a person can participate in the grace of the redemption, with a special attention to the value of the whole person, body and soul, to which concupiscence poses a threat.

The redemption of the body finds its origin in an awareness of our fallen nature. According to John Paul II, “we must admit that the awareness of sinfulness is not only a necessary point of departure in ‘historical’ man, but also an indispensable condition of his aspiration to virtue, to ‘purity of heart,’ to perfection.”45 Certainly, the pope is not, as some may think, proposing a miraculous dispensation from shame, under the name of redemption. Our “awareness” of our own sinfulness is the basis for our experience of shame, and this experience of shame is essential to our sharing in the grace of redemption.

One thing that is certain about the redemption of the body is that it is not some kind of magical spell cast upon the body by the waters of baptism. Throughout the history of the Church baptized members have struggled continuously with temptation. Even St. Paul mentions his struggles, and he tells us that his spirit “groans, awaiting the redemption of the body” (Rom 8:23). If St. Paul groans and awaits the deliverance of his body from the difficulties of our fallen state, we cannot maintain that the Redemption, which has already been accomplished by Christ, removes these kinds of challenges in the present life. Instead, what we see is that the grace of redemption affects the body to the extent that it is embraced and implemented in the heart of the person—to the extent that the interior man agrees to cooperate with grace and redirect his life, on the interior as well as the exterior level.

The ethos of the redemption of the body remains deeply rooted in the anthropological and axiological realism of revelation. When he appeals in this case to the “heart,” Christ formulates his words in the most concrete way: man, in fact, is unique and unrepeatable above all by reason of his “heart,” which is decisive for him “from within.”47

The grace of the redemption affects the whole person, body and soul, but the work of redemption begins in the interior of the human person, in the interior region of moral freedom by which man is able to choose and implement a new direction, in harmony with the divine plan.

From the inner recesses of the soul, we are called, in light of the redemption, to give the body a new meaning in accord with the objective ethos that alone can bring the body into the service of a communion of persons and a gift of self. In this way, the body regains a share of the integration that was natural to our first parents.

Redemption is a truth, a reality, in the name of which man must feel himself called, and “called with effectiveness” . . . . Man must feel himself called to rediscover, or even better, to realize, the spousal meaning of the body and to express in this way the interior freedom of the gift, that is, the freedom of that spiritual state and power that derive from mastery over the concupiscence of the flesh.48

What the pope is trying to teach us—what redemption, as he sees it, is trying to teach us—is the same thing Christ and the Church have been trying to teach us for two millennia: If (by the grace of God) we master the lust of the flesh and exercise our interior freedom, we gain the “spiritual power” to live a fulfilling life as persons in community. No longer are we mired in the lust of the flesh, but instead, we are freed to give and receive in accordance with the spousal meaning of the body, as it was in the beginning.

The redemption of the body finds its origins, according to John Paul II, in the interior life of the person. In the inner regions of the heart, the calling of redemption to rediscover the ethos of the body is grasped, embraced, and implemented.

Man is called to this rediscovery by the word of the Gospel, and so from “outside,” but at the same time he is also called from “inside.” The words of Christ, who in the Sermon on the Mount appeals to the “heart,” lead the listener in some way to such an inner call. If he allows them to work in him he can at the same time hear in his innermost [being] the echo, as it were, of that “beginning.”49
According to John Paul II, the words of Christ are meant to direct our attention to the “inside,” to the human heart. Even though we have “irrevocably” left the state of original innocence behind, we are reminded of the original meaning of human existence. Christ is directing our attention to the interior calling that we share in common with our first parents. In our calling to the grace of redemption, we are reminded of the image of God, in which we are created, and all of the implications that follow from that image. We are reminded of the meaning of the body in its relation to the interior life of the person. We are reminded of original solitude, but we are also reminded of the deep human significance of a communion of persons and a mutual gift of self. All of this is experienced in the heart, not as a mere collection of facts, but as a dynamic calling, a calling with “effectiveness.”

What then is the central message of the theology of the body? The pope certainly is concerned with the body, but his concern, in this regard, is primarily directed to the redemption of the body, which as we have seen, flows from the working of grace in the interior life of the soul. His point, therefore, is not to focus on the naked body per se. He is not trying, in any way, to minimize the significance of original sin, the effects of the fall, or the need for shame. Redemption of the body, as the pope makes clear, is not equal to original innocence. His point, instead, is to encourage people, who struggle with the effects of original sin, to embrace in their hearts the call of the redemption and to allow that calling to reform their lives and relationships on the spiritual as well as the bodily level. John Paul II is simply calling us to recapture the original meaning and ethos of the body. He wants us to see the spiritual value of a communion of persons that is only appreciable in the inner depths of the person. Recognizing fully the difficulties that we confront in our fallen state, John Paul II is calling us to turn our attention to the things that really matter in the interior regions of the human heart.

ENDNOTES

1 See John F. Kippley, “NFP Courses: Asking Questions Can Be Helpful,” Homiletic & Pastoral Review (August/September 2006): 72. “What any particular person means by his or her reference to the papal TOB is by no means clear.” A few years ago, I asked three TOB writers for a definition of the TOB in 50 words or less. They gave me three completely different definitions or descriptions. . . . Because of widespread references to the TOB, you need to recognize that almost no one knows what somebody else is talking about when he or she refers to the ‘theology of the body.’ Certainly every reference to the body is not the ‘theology of the body’!”

2 David L. Schindler laments that there are interpretations of John Paul II’s theology of the body that would lead one to think that the focus is primarily on sex or even on “our genitals,” “The Embodied Person as Gift and the Cultural Task in America: Status Quoæstionis,” Communio: International Catholic Review 35 (Fall 2008): 409–10 n. 22.

3 Before giving presentations on the theology of the body, I have asked the following question: “In the theology of the body, John Paul II teaches that, like our first parents, we can be ‘naked without shame.’ True or False?” About two-thirds say that the statement is true.


5 Ibid., 172.

6 Ibid., 323.


8 Pope John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them, 165.

9 Ibid., 220.

10 Concerning the Thomistic basis of John Paul II’s philosophical anthropology, see Mark S. Latkovic, “Pope John Paul II’s ‘Theology of the Body’ and the Significance of Sexual Shame in Light of the Body’s Nuptial Meaning: Some Implications for Bioethics and Sexual Ethics,” Nova et Vénæ 2.2 (2004): 311. “The pope’s anthropology, while different from Aquinas on some matters, as we will see, is an expression of traditional Christian anthropology as embodied in the Common Doctor, and not some drastic change in the way Catholicism understands the person.”

11 Ethos, in this context, refers to morality or a moral significance. Eros is concerned with the “sexual urge” as well as the whole realm of attraction (both interior and exterior) that follows upon the complementarity of the sexes.


13 Ibid., 322.

14 Ibid., 203.

15 Ibid., 164.

16 Ibid., 552.

17 Ibid., 371.

18 Ibid., 167.

19 Ibid., 195.

20 Ibid., 196.

21 Ibid., 197.

22 Ibid., 660.

23 Ibid., 659.

24 Ibid., 324.

25 Ibid., 323.

26 Ibid., 325.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., 312–13.

29 Ibid., 313.
Vladimir Putin’s Russia

by Jude P. Dougherty
The Catholic University of America

The economist Yegor Gaidar, in his authoritative study, Russia: A Long View, has shown convincingly that “[t]he Soviet Union of 1989, the Russia of 1992, and particularly the Russia of 2008 are different countries. Their economies, property ownership, state and public institutions are organized differently. The collapse of socialism set in motion a period of institutional disarray, when the old rules no longer worked and the new ones were not yet accepted [because] they lacked tradition, familiarity and public recognition.” The Russia of 1992, Gaidar explains, was a time of weak and unstable governments, unreliable money, and poorly obeyed laws. The situation, he found, was much different in 2009, the year of his death.¹

President Vladimir Putin, since assuming power in 1999, has not only grappled with the problems identified by Gaidar but has taken upon himself the task of defining Russian national identity and promoting unity, in an effort to restore the power and prestige to the Russian state. In a remarkably astute address, “Russia -The Ethnic Issue,”² he set forth his view of a post-Soviet Russia and the means of attaining it through a Western-inspired industrial modernization and the cultivation of patriotism through a common educational program. Patriotism, he believes, depends on an awareness of national identity, depends on a sense that one belongs to an identifiable whole, that is, a national unit in which one can take pride. Unity, he recognizes is challenging since historical (Imperial) Russia itself was a composite of many national identities. “We need a national policy based on civic patriotism,” he said in that January speech. “Any person living in our country must not forget his faith and ethnic affiliation. But he must above all be a citizen of Russia and be proud of that. No one has the right to place distinctive ethnic and religious features above the laws of the state. But at the same time, the laws of the state themselves must take into account the distinctive ethnic and religious features.”³

Putin hopes to advance civic unity or patriot allegiance primarily through instruction in Russian history and literature. In an effort to stimulate a sense of Russian identity, he has called for a Russian version of Mortimer Adler’s Great Books of the Western World. “Let us conduct a poll of our cultural authorities and form a list of 100 books that each graduate of a Russian school will have to read. Not memorize in school but read on his own.”

Believing that Russia is not simply European but Western European, Putin has made several attempts to create a broad Western-oriented partnership. His attempts to forge a network of economic, political, and even security ties between Russia and the West have been rebuffed by the United States but have been relatively successful with France and Germany. In an address to the German Bundestag in 2002 (the first ever by a Russian head of state), he acknowledged the great cultural debt Russia owes to Germany, citing the works of Schiller, Lessing, von Humboldt, Kant, and Goethe. Renewing a call for a Russian-Western partnership, he expressed regret that the Cold War years of Soviet ideology had led to his country’s estrangement. In the German parliament address he called for international collaboration in the face of a common threat to Western civilization from radical Islam.⁴ Economic ties he could take for granted. By 2005 the European Union had become Russia’s leading trading partner, and today the majority of foreign investment comes from firms based in the European Union.

In the drive for an expression of Russian unity, Putin recognizes the unifying role of religion. “We are a multi-ethnic society, but we are held together by a Russian core.” That core, he believes, is one of unshakable values, fundamental knowledge, and a common worldview. Speaking of the diversity of religions found within Russian boundaries, he says, “Despite all their differences and distinctive features, the basic, common, moral, ethical and spiritual values are based on Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism—compassion, mutual assistance, truth, justice, respect for elders, and the ideals of family and work. It is impossible to replace those moral guidelines with anything, and we need to strengthen them.”⁵ Thus the civil goal of education, of the educational system, is to give every person sufficient knowledge of the humanities to form the basis of collective self-identity. To that end, Putin says, “[t]he state, society, should welcome and support the work of Russia’s traditional religions in the system of education, in
the social sphere, and in the Armed Forces. At the same
time, the secular nature of the state, of course, must be
preserved.”

At a ceremony recognizing the unification of the
Russian Orthodox Church with the Russian Church
Abroad, the latter having been formed in 1922 in the
wake of the Revolution, President Putin proclaimed,
“Today’s revival of the Church’s unity is a crucial pre-
condition for restoring the unity of the entire Russian
world which has always seen Orthodoxy as its spiri-
tual foundation.” With Ivan Ilyin he could have said,
“Nationality is a climate of the soul and the soil of the
spirit, and nationalism is the striving to be part of that.
. . . We have been called to create our own culture in
our own way, a Russian culture in a Russian manner.” Putin is not reluctant to express his own Christian faith.
Secretly baptized as an infant, his mother retained his
baptismal cross and gave it to him 1993, when he as
president on official business took it with him to Israel
to have it blessed on the tomb of Christ.8 Lynch relates,
“He has not taken it off (at least in public) to the pre-
sent day.”

In the early pages of his biography, Allen C. Lynch,
professor of history at the University of Virginia, ob-
served, “During the twelve years [now 13] of his rule
the impression most American and Europeans have
developed about Putin and his policies diverge almost
completely. Americans as well as Europeans tend to
regard Putin as an aggressive, authoritarian, nostalgic
for the old Soviet order, and ruthlessly bent on eliminat-
ning opposition at home and asserting Russian power
abroad. Most Russians, by contrast, view Putin as hav-
ing stanchled the bleeding of the Russian state, presided
over the recovery of the economy after a decade of de-
pression, and defended Russian dignity in the councils
of the nations.”9 Putin’s approval rate in Russia hovers
between 68 and 87 percent. Allen Lynch’s own assessment of the Putin years
is cautious but on the whole favorable. Lynch sug-
ests that the ways in which Putin has attempted to estab-
lish state authority has seriously hindered Russia’s chance
for modernization. How so? “Throughout his presiden-
cy, he has tended to see the main danger to Russia as
stemming from disintegration rather than stagnation.”10
In a much more positive assessment, Yegor Gaidar in
his socioeconomic history of Russia reached a differ-
ent conclusion: “As I write now (2009), the basic goals
of the post-socialist transition in the Russian economy
have been met. Market institutions, albeit weak, have
been formed. The transformational recession is behind
us. The economy has been growing steadily for the last
ten years. Social, economic, and political problems still
cause anxiety, but they are different problems now.”11
Russia, Gaidar believes, has entered the modern eco-

nomical order. “Having gone through a stressful post-so-
cialist transition, Russia found herself not in a stagnant
traditional world, but in a dynamic changing world of
modern economic growth.”12 The macroeconomic de-
cisions made by Russian authorities in the Putin years
were already bearing fruit in Gaidar’s judgment as he
completed his book in 2009. 13 Furthermore, “[t]hey are
changing the political situation of the country. It is not
hard to be popular and have political support when you
have ten years of growth of real income at 10 percent
per year.”14 To borrow a line from Pierre Manent, “Peo-
ple prefer to be governed well rather than governed
badly.”15

ENDNOTES

1 Yegor Gaidar, Russia: A Long View, trans. Antonina W. Bovis (Cambridge,
3 Ibid.
4 Cf. Allen C. Lynch, Vladimir Putin and Russian Stagecraft (Washington,
6 Ibid. Here as in many of his public addresses, Putin may be following the
lead of the distinguished Russian philosopher Ivan Ilyin (1883-1954). Cf.
Ivan Ilyin, The National Philosophy of Putin’s Russia (Washington, D.C.:
Office of Russian and European Analysis, 2007).
7 Ivan Ilyin, The National Philosophy of Putin’s Russia, 75.
8 Lynch, Vladimir Putin, 13.
9 Ibid, xiii.
10 Ibid., 128.
11 Gaidar, Russia, xiv.
12 Ibid., 367.
13 Gaidar may have had something to do with those economic decisions,
given that he held a series of government positions in those years, serving
as minister of finance and as Boris Yeltsin’s acting prime minister in the
1990s.
14 Gaidar, Russia, 367.
Commentary on Kenneth D. Whitehead’s “Why the Church has had to fight the Contraception Mandate”

by Mary Kay Williams

In assessing the reception by the American Church of Pope Paul VI’s encyclical Humanae vitae in 1968 so as to understand its current battle over the contraception mandate, Kenneth Whitehead has overlooked an essential fact. Mr. Whitehead (FCS Quarterly, summer 2012) writes that “when the pope and the bishops were confronted with the massive rejection of Humanae vitae, they really did not know what to do, and, as is quite common in human affairs, when someone doesn’t know what to do, the end result is often that nothing is done. This proved to be the case with the Church’s teaching against contraception: essentially nothing was any longer said or done about it.”

I would advance that something very important and strategic was said and done about the contraception issue by the American Catholic bishops as a direct response to Humanae vitae’s appeal to medical science. Led by John Cardinal Wright of Pittsburgh, Patrick Cardinal O’Boyle of Washington, D.C., and Bishop Gregory Grutka from Gary, Indiana, the bishops voted in 1968 to create The Human Life Foundation and fund it with a million-dollar grant. The Foundation was launched the following year as an independent, nonsectarian organization to pursue scientific research essential to the improvement of natural methods of conception regulation. Through the years, individual bishops made additional contributions to the Foundation.

Independent research in Japan, France, England, Australia, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Canada, and the U.S. had begun serious attempts to develop reliable indicators of the fertile period prior to the development of the oral contraceptive and the modern IUD. But between the introduction of the pill on an international scale in the early 1960s and the publication of Humanae vitae in 1968, there was a lack of serious research by any major sponsor to improve fertility regulation through the observance of natural rhythms. The only exception was a World Health Organization study published in 1967. In this environment, The Human Life Foundation undertook its mission.

Based in Washington, D.C., The Human Life Foundation, under the direction of the indomitable campaigner Lawrence J. Kane, was governed by a dedicated lay board of directors headed by Edward B. Hanify, Esq., partner of the Boston law firm Ropes and Gray, and advised by a distinguished eighteen-person scientific advisory committee drawn from academic, medical, and government circles.

The Human Life Foundation supported reproduction research at Harvard Medical School, the University of Pittsburgh, Wesleyan University, the University of California, Fairfield University, and elsewhere including Frauenklinik des Kantonsspitals in Luzern, Switzerland. The Foundation sponsored curriculum development of the natural methods for standardized teacher training and couple education. At the same time, the Foundation provided encouragement to teaching programs around the world that delivered the natural methods within the context of marital chastity and the enrichment of family life.

In 1972, The Human Life Foundation, together with the Center for Population Research and the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, sponsored the first international conference on Natural Family Planning to assess the scientific investigation, method effectiveness, and clinical application of the natural methods. Convened in Warrenton, Virginia, the “Airlie House” conference drew nearly sixty delegates from Australia, Canada, Colombia, England, France, Germany, the Philippines, and the U.S., who shared research on the extraordinary properties of biological rhythms, on gamete survival, and on the critical question of prediction, detection, and control of ovulation. Delegates shared national program experiences with the natural methods as then realized in the U.K., the Philippines, Mauritius, and the U.S.

Of particular note at this conference was the presence of Drs. John and Evelyn Billings from Australia representing the Ovulation Method, Drs. François and Michèle Guy of France’s Action Familiale, Dr. Gerhard...
Döring of Germany on the Basal Body Temperature Method, and Dr. Claude A. Lanctôt of Canada who would go on to create the first worldwide organization supporting programs for natural methods within the context of promoting family life. (See “Proceedings of a Research Conference on Natural Family Planning,” edited by William A. Uricchio and Mary Kay Williams, published under a grant from the Knights of Columbus, New Haven, CT, 1973).

The Human Life Foundation and the Pan American Health Organization provided matching funds to advance Natural Family Planning in Latin America through a conference hosted by Colombia’s Fundación Carvajal in 1972.

The following year, with a government grant, The Human Life Foundation held an international symposium on Natural Family Planning in Washington, D.C., that marked the beginnings of an international effort to promote the natural methods throughout the world. It was the first time that many of the Natural Family Planning specialists had met their counterparts from other countries. Thus the conference provided a forum and facilitation that allowed these leaders to be in contact with each other, share experiences, and be energized.

A major outgrowth of the 1973 meeting was the founding of the International Federation for Family Life Promotion (IFFLP/FIDAF) by Dr. Lanctôt. In subsequent years, this organization convened multilingual hemispheric meetings in Africa, the Americas, Europe, and Asia/Oceania to advance and encourage the work of the natural methods within the family on the local level.

Thus, although there was widespread dissent from and indifference to Humanae vitae, there also existed heroic commitments by priests, religious, and laity around the world to the spirit, message, and moral imperatives of this prophetic encyclical. Overshadowed by a secular, sexualized culture that easily accepted the pill and IUD, their valiant work with couples, committed to the openness to human life as inscribed in the rationale of the natural methods, prospered in various parts of the world. In a sense, these leaders could be said to have already anticipated the “theology of the body” as later enunciated by Pope John Paul II.

To evoke some of these leaders and programs that kept alive the spirit of the encyclical in those early years (in addition to those mentioned above) is to unfortunately omit others, but a sampling would include: in the U.S., Dr. Hanna Klaus (medical missionary sister), Mercedes Wilson, and Dr. Tom Hilgers for the Billings Ovulation Method, John Kippley’s Couple to Couple League, Msgr. John J. Seli’s Natural Family Planning Federation, and Mary C. Martin’s standardized curriculums for teacher training; Canada’s SERENA led by Raymond and Marie-Paule Doyle; Colombia’s CENPAFAL by the Canadian Sulpician, Fr. Pierre Primeau; Haiti’s Family Life Program by the Dutch missionary, Fr. Michel Welters; Africa’s Family Life Mission by the German Lutheran pastor and his American wife, Walter and Ingrid Trobsch; and Austria’s Dr. Josef Rötzer’s clinical practice and research.

In a way, these people were the modern version of the early Irish monks in a new dark age inscribing civilization not book by book but couple by couple in the life-giving message of Humanae vitae. Openness to the transmission of new human life has always been at the heart of Humanae vitae. Openness to life is what has always set the natural methods apart from chemical and mechanical methods of contraception and abortifacients.

In its opposition to the contraception mandate of the Obama Administration, the American bishops indeed have a challenge. But they do not go into battle without historical traction. They carry the legacy of forty-five years ago left by their predecessors who did something brave and faithful in the founding of The Human Life Foundation, whose work involved the participation of government and science in the advancement of natural methods morally acceptable to the Church.

To assist scholars and researchers, the papers from the Foundation as well as Natural Family Planning programs and research studies around the world are held in the archives at Ave Maria University in Naples, Florida, under arrangements by Mr. Kane. In addition, the papers of IFFLP/FIDAF are being archived in Canada by Dr. Lanctôt. (The Human Life Foundation should not be confused with another organization of the same name, created in 1975 and based in New York, and which publishes the Human Life Review.)

The Human Life Foundation was in existence from 1969 to 1982 before merging with the Natural Family Planning Federation. In its lifetime, The Foundation did not change the culture. It did not impact masses of people. The Foundation did not secure a widespread adherence to Humanae vitae. But it carried the light of the encyclical’s truth into some dark corners of the world and that light, now borne by a new generation of Church leaders and laity, has not been extinguished.

Mary Kay Williams served as assistant director of The Human Life Foundation in Washington, D.C.
A Layman’s Brief Glance at Gaudium et spes

by Thomas W. Jodziewicz, University of Dallas

Gaudium et spes reminds us that the Word of God was “made flesh so that as perfect man He might save all men and sum up all things in Himself.” One might, not irreverently, begin with a reaction: “same old, same old.” As ever, and not simply in a modern world gripped more and more tightly by a secularism that promotes the leveling of all former traditions of meaning, “the Lord is [reaffirmed as] the goal of human history, the focal point of the longings of history and of civilization, the center of the human race, the joy of every heart and the answer to all its yearnings.” The Lord’s resurrection from the dead is the truth, not a sentiment or sentimental projection, or a metaphor. And now, “enlivened and united in His Spirit, we journey toward the consummation of human history, one which fully accords with the counsel of God’s love: ‘To reestablish all things in Christ, both those in the heavens and those on the earth’ (Eph. 11:10)” (GS, 45).

This is, of course, the Christian dispensation, a brief creedal proclamation of the gospel, the Good News, brought to us by Jesus Christ. But, in a time that literally celebrates obsolescence, it is a message two millennia old, an aged but holy commonplace among believers and interested, if not quite convinced, bystanders. Consider St. Augustine’s celebrated recognition of this circumstance of the old and the new, the joys and the hopes, in his own life, several centuries after Christ’s appearance among us:

Too late have I loved you, O Beauty so ancient and so new, too late have I loved you! Behold, you were within me, while I was outside: it was there that I sought you, and, a deformed creature, rushed headlong upon these things of beauty which you have made. You were with me, but I was not with you. They kept me far from you, those fair things which, if they were not in you, would not exist at all. You have called to me, and have cried out, and have shattered my deafness. You have blazed forth with light, and have shone upon me, and you have put my blindness to flight! You have sent forth fragrance, and I have drawn in my breath, and I pant after you. I have tasted you, and I hunger and thirst after you. You have touched me, and I have burned for your peace. (Confessions, book 10, chapter 27)

Clearly, the purpose of the Vatican Council was not to invent anew, but to proclaim this ancient but paradoxically new message to a new age. The ‘same old, same old’ is never in fact simply old, but rather Augustine’s “so ancient and so new.” It must be proclaimed, and reproclaimed, never hidden or buried away. This Good News is the source of true hope, despite the embarrassment its simplicity might cause for those in yet another self-conscious “new age” that now discovers (provisional) “truth” only in the material, natural world.

The moment of the Vatican Council, the mid-1960s, was an occasion, especially in the United States, of a concentrated, if diffuse, assault upon not only authority but also upon any uncritical acceptance of any idea, tradition, or person, outside the self, as authoritative. Surely it would be an overstatement, an uncharitable overstatement, to claim that the watchword of the era was “Non Serviam.” There was then and there continues to be in our nation much discussion of and longing for community and love. John Milton’s Satan, sure that it was “better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven,” was certainly not the intended standard for most of the “love generation.” Or the “me generation.” But he was perhaps on the sidelines, encouraging the illusion that we are fully autonomous but capable of community on our own terms, if we should so will it ourselves. But withal we are independent, self-assertive, self-authoritative. “Non Serviam.” Some of the more contemporary intellectual champions of our fundamental disconnectedness from any traditional notion of meaning not of our own formulation or choosing, and in a basically disenchanted modern world, are prominent and celebrated for their authentic humanism in our own “naked square.”

What is, is. Forget the silly old stories and riddles about God or Nature’s God or whatever supernatural fancy one might entertain. Progressive grown-ups need to move beyond such superstitions and heroically create meaning for themselves. One might consciously choose some form of interpersonal dependencies, some form of community, but these would be one’s own considered, subjective submission to things quite outside the self.

Gaudium et spes offers something radically different. The Christian narrative, or better yet, metanarrative, not only claims to be true and authoritative, but also understands how unashionable the story of dependency is according to contemporary intellectual considerations. Central Christian paradoxes—“finding oneself by losing oneself,” “carrying one’s cross, but yet a lightened and joyful burden...
because of one’s helpmate”—these are odd formulations that point to a most nonmodern acceptance of or abandonment to dependence.

As has been mentioned more than a few times in our public and intellectual conversations, the age of the “grand narrative” has seemingly receded into the past. In polite company one may not privilege one’s own horizon. Instead, let each have the apparently self-sustaining assurance of his or her own truth. This is the attitude of supposed true modesty and civil toleration. Contemporary historians, for example, struggle with this narrative problem if their accounts are expected to be something more than mere chronologies.

Gaudium et spes contests this intellectual poverty: Perennial issues do persist within considerations of what grounds human dignity or a vital community; what is an authentic human culture; what, pacem Pilate, constitutes truth; what are just economic and political reforms; what is the proper cultivation of a peaceful international community. All of these fundamental human questions, according to Gaudium et spes, have to do with God, in the first instance, and with his Church in the second instance. And this is a claim for a grand, but ancient, narrative! And it is a narrative within which and on behalf of which the Church must ever be engaged. While the Church’s purpose is eternal salvation, it does, as did its savior, embrace history. The Church is called “to form the family of God’s children during the present history of the human race, and to keep increasing it until the Lord returns.” Yes, the Church’s values are “heavenly values,” but values that are initially to be lived here and now, if ever so imperfectly. The Church is in the world, and present to the world, and “goes forward together with humanity and experiences the same earthly lot which the world does. She serves as a leaven and as a kind of soul for human society as it is to be renewed in Christ and transformed into God’s family.” There is a catch, however: “That the earthly and the heavenly city penetrate each other is a fact accessible to faith alone; it remains a mystery of human history, which sin will keep in great disarray until the splendor of God’s sons is fully revealed” (GS, 40).

Mystery and even faith can ironically be attractive alternatives to modern boredom. In our noisy stillness, in our uneasy notice of the hollowness of much of our consumerist culture, mystery and faith can seem luminous. But the claim of this particular Christian mystery and faith to be radical, to be at the very essence and root of human meaning, is unsettling. For claims of universal certitude are considered politically incorrect and intolerant. And still more claims follow: this mysterious faith is offered as a gift, unearned by human effort. Contemporary pride recoils at the whiff of nonpersonal agency, a favorite buzzword celebrating self-will. Ours is an age long on rights, but typically brief, uncertain, and even hostile in the face of any claims about the universally normative and certain. Even rights are no longer easily envisioned as settled in normative realities, but rather, and more heroically and modestly, they are seemingly generated ex nihilo.

Gaudium et spes sums up the Church’s enduring claim about the human condition: “it has been entrusted to the Church to reveal the mystery of God, Who is the ultimate goal of man.” As such, the Church “opens up to man at the same time the meaning of his own existence, that is, the innermost truth about himself. The Church truly knows that only God, Whom she serves, meets the deepest longings of the human heart, which is never fully satisfied by what this world has to offer” (GS, 41). The slogan is familiar: “be all that you can be,” join the army! But this is a fitting slogan for the Church: truly to be all you can be, be Christ-like, holy and courageous in imitation, humble and obedient in application. Such a conclusion can be too much, or too little, for the expectations of a modern image of self-fulfillment.

All this suggests to some the evisceration of the human in favor the divine, H. L. Mencken’s “cosmic Kaiser!” The confrontation is unequal. Human culture must recede in the face of this other-worldly juggernaut even if this divine energy is proposed to be in the ultimate human interest. But, again, in truth the here and now is hardly dismissed in the Christian dispensation. It is God’s world, which as such is seen as good. Human culture—the enlivening realities of man’s earthly, social furniture of sign, symbol, and understanding—is important and good, if yet subordinate “to the integral perfection of the human person, to the good of the community and of the whole society.” Culture, within its own proper place, then, serves the common good. Faith and reason are “two orders of knowledge” each with its own “legitimate autonomy.” Truth may be freely pursued by man, but there are limits. There is again dependency; “morality and the common interest” (59). In the end, one is not constructing ex nihilo. The outlaw is not the hero. There is a Creator, there are creatures, and there is a true, proper, and loving relationship between them. The hard truth for post-Edenic man is that the Church, “coming forth from the eternal Father’s love, founded in time by Christ the Redeemer and made one in the Holy Spirit . . . has a saving and eschatological purpose which can be fully attained only in the future world.” And, again, the Church “is already present in this world, and is composed of men . . . members of the earthly city who have a call to form the family of God’s children during the present history of the human race and to keep increasing it until the Lord returns” (GS, 40).

To the point: especially within a modern academic
community, much less an articulate portion of the larger public, the claims and assertions reaffirmed by Gaudium et spes are quickly judged illiberal, authoritarian, unproved, oddly idiosyncratic, and even hopelessly medieval! Such claims by the Church may be contested, but this happens less often in the form of fruitful tension and dialogue than in derisive dismissal. But there is always hope and the labor to speak the Gospel to a culture in that culture’s own terms proceeds, even on college campuses.

One of the treasures of a university’s core curriculum would necessarily be The Education of Henry Adams, oft-remarked upon if not always closely read, and withal a work of contestation and tension. This grandson and great-grandson of American presidents was wrestling at the turn of the twentieth century with issues of what he called unity and multiplicity. Put simply, man had always sought unity, integrated meaning and truth. According to Adams, in the Middle Ages the Blessed Virgin Mary had served as a symbol of such unified meaning. In the early twentieth century, however, religion, philosophy, politics, history, science (especially Darwinism), and ever-expanding technology were apparently incapable in themselves of recovering any authentic, or even symbolic, unity. Their very multiplicity, the contemporary chaos in which they all participated, suggested that meaning in a modern world was essentially dependent on an individual, existentialist moment. One must create one’s own meaning in the face of the failures of so many other external efforts to find unified meaning in the human condition.

Gaudium et spes and the old, ever new faith provide an answer, a grand answer to a Henry Adams world. The answer is a beauty paradoxically “so ancient and so new.” The Church can offer nothing less. But the Church, and the gospel it preaches, are then very clearly a ‘sign of contradiction’ in a pragmatic age so marked by firm and often polite skepticism, which suggests that our only real possibility for community is an ongoing civil conversation. This in itself would be an adult and generous embrace of an open-ended, ever-evolving, and unknowable universe. In such a universe, Augustine’s words on beauty and truth would seem too sure, too harsh, and even a form of hate speech given their traditional and ever more exiled morality.

One other thought: there is an expansive definition of “atheism” in Gaudium et spes. Atheism, in this retelling, is not simply a forthright denial of the existence of God, but also various reductionisms that minimize or emasculate any sense of a sovereign Lord. What is striking, and uncomfortable, is the document’s assertion of the unexpected complicity of nominal believers in the atheist project:

Believers can have more than a little to do with the birth of atheism. To the extent that they neglect their own training in the faith, or teach erroneous doctrine, or are deficient in their religious, moral or social life, they must be said to conceal rather than reveal the authentic face of God and religion. (GS, 19)

A very uncomfortable moment occurred on our campus several years ago during a presentation by a very personable and articulate rabbi. During the question and answer period, one of our intrepid students asked the rabbi why he was not a Christian. To paraphrase the polite response: Jesus Christ seems not to have made much difference over the past two millennia of world, and Christian, history. Or, perhaps in a less polite paraphrase: the fires of any Christian triumphalism, personal or corporate, might need to be banked in the face of man’s persisting inhumanity to man in the Christian era.

The Christian project reaffirmed by Gaudium et spes is a clear echo of St. Paul’s admonition in Romans 10:12–15:

For there is no distinction between Jew and Greek; the same Lord is Lord of all, enriching all who call upon him. For “everyone who calls on the name of the Lord will be saved.” But how can they call on him in whom they have not believed? And how can they believe in him of whom they have not heard? And how can they hear without someone to preach? As it is written, “How beautiful are the feet of those who bring [the] good news.”

The haunting cry of Cain—“Am I my brother’s keeper?” (Gn 4:9)—and the simple affirmative answer—remain just as true as ever. For most of us this keeping, this evangelization, has more to do with our example of charity grounded in orthodox faith than our intellectualizations. Gaudium et spes is about a reductionism. It reminds us of the old, holy reductionism of the Two Great Commandments: to love God, in truth and in justice, and to love our neighbor as ourselves—now, in our own age. This is a time like that of St. Augustine and that of Henry Adams. At heart it is a time like every time in the past two millennia. It is a time when the “beauty so ancient and so new” is not simply something to be defended but rather the thing ripe for retelling. We dwell in catacombs, not ghettos. As ever, whether in the fifth century or in the twenty-first century, a contemporary vocabulary must be appropriated, and transformed, in our own historical moment of inculturation. There is no authentic, charitable alternative.

Finally, there is an enduring scholastic admonition that is fundamental to Gaudium et spes: Omne quod est in aliquo est in eo per modum recipientis: “Whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver.” Accordingly, daily engaged in the modes or forms and tones of modernity, the laity are encouraged particularly to embrace faithfully this “beauty so ancient” while sharing it anew. There is never any alternative. But, thankfully, as we embrace our antimodern dependency, grace is ever abundant.
The first step to atheism is generally the denial of Divine Providence. When people declare that God can neither guide nor intervene in history, they are well on their way to denying God’s existence. In the eighteenth century, the forerunners of militant atheists like Diderot and d’Holbach were the deists who denied God’s Providence.

In our own day, too, the denial of Divine Providence is the doorway to atheism. When faced with public disasters, whether brought about by human wickedness or natural causes, many Christians—including some Catholics—argue that God cannot foresee nor prevent disasters. They see a contradiction between divine omniscience and omnipotence on the one hand, and God’s fatherly goodness on the other.

Jean-Pierre de Caussade (1675-1751) saw no such contradiction. In his masterpiece Abandonment to Divine Providence and his many letters to the contemplative nuns for whom he was spiritual director, Caussade vindicated God’s providential care of us in both the public and the private spheres, drawing inspiration from Bossuet, Fénelon, François de Sales, and Teresa of Avila. This great teacher dealt with topics that are bound to be of interest to Catholic scholars. I shall deal with two of them in my review: 1) the role of Divine Providence in public life, including in national calamities; and 2) the role of Providence in our personal journey to perfection, especially in helping us attain humility, the foundation of all holiness.

**Divine Providence in History**

Not only is the Bible “the mysterious utterance of a God yet more mysterious,” Caussade explains, but all public events that happen in this world are “the obscure language of this same hidden and unknown God.” The Lord speaks to mankind in general “by great public events” and addresses each person “by the circumstances occurring at every moment of life.” However, instead of hearing God’s voice in public and private events and receiving his mysterious messages with “awe,” people often see only the “outward aspect, or chance, or the caprice of others, and censure everything.” In our times especially, due to the prevalence of Darwinism, there is a widespread belief that chance, not Divine Providence, governs public and personal histories, not to mention natural history.

Yet all history, Caussade insists, is a book penned by the Holy Spirit “in characters of another world,” covering the entire span from eternity to eternity. Not a comma or period is missing, not a line but has “a meaning, a measure, a connection.” Indeed, everything makes “perfect sense,” though we’ll be incapable of understanding it till we arrive in heaven. What seems “perplexing” to us now will then ravish us with its “beauty, order, knowledge, wisdom.”

In all the world, nothing is so small or insignificant that God does not ordain or permit it. Without his permission “not a hair can fall from our heads, nor a leaf in autumn from all the innumerable trees of the forests. This is of faith.” Job did not say, “The Lord hath given, and the devil hath taken away,” because he knew that the devil was powerless to act without divine permission. And so, we too should be “profoundly persuaded” that whatever happens to us is from the hand of “our good Father,” who will “keep us in peace and quiet.”

Caussade assures us that to accept great public calamities as something sent from the hand of God is more valuable than “all worldly prosperity.” It will sanctify us: for just as tyrants made “martyrs of faith,” so the calamities of our “short and miserable life” make “martyrs of providence,” teaching us to live in total dependence on God “from day to day, hour to hour, moment to moment.” Divine Providence visits each country with “different chastisements” using “different rods” with which to punish sins, “but always with a fatherly love, since he only threatens and punishes us in this world in order to be able to save us with greater certainty.” Sad to say, however, few in our own times would dare to suggest that climate change is a divine chastisement, for fear of being rebuked and treated with contempt. To see Providence as active in the public sphere today is regarded as not only politically, but also theologically incorrect. We are confined to seeking material causes for disasters, for fear of widespread repentance.

**Divine Providence in Private Life**

Caussade teaches us that God is in charge not just of the public sphere, but also of every personal life. Here too the denial of Divine Providence leads straight to atheism. We see it today in the prevalent use of contraception and abortion among those who claim to be Christian: they are determined not to trust God to provide for their children. Instead, they prevent children from being conceived, or, failing that, they abort them. Abortion has rightly been called “atheism in action,” contraception, the doorway to abortion, should be called “the denial of Divine Providence in action.”

Caussade counsels us to trust in Divine Providence and gain a profound “peace of mind,” which is “the true root of the interior spirit.” Just as the Holy Spirit filled the martyrs’ souls with peace while their bodies suffered horrific torments, so God will “preserve the peace of your soul in spite of all the agitation of your mind and senses.”

Even such seeming trifles as involuntary distractions in prayer are grist for the mill of Providence. God often permits these distractions for our good. As long as we “desire to pray” in the depths of our heart—and it is in such “desire” that prayer consists, for in his eyes, “desires are equal to acts”—God can use our distractions to curb our “presumption and secret self-confidence” and to teach us “true humility of heart.” Caussade tells us to bear our involuntary distractions like a “cross” since they may be “more meritorious” than the prayer we wanted to make: “Do not ever force yourself to fight against these obstinate distractions,” but remain before God “like a beast of burden weighed down with its load.” It is enough to have “a great desire to be recollected; but only when it pleases God, and as much as it pleases him, neither more nor less.” When we are resigned to the loss of a “sensible and active recollection,” we gain doubly by prayers made “in a most penitential and crucifying manner.”

Divine Providence uses not only our distractions, but also our persistent faults and imperfections to teach us humility. Caussade directs us to be extremely...
gentle with ourselves and never let ourselves be discouraged when we fall again and again in the same faults: “Practice yourself, therefore, in being patient with regard to yourself...” and put up with yourself with the same gentleness which you should use toward your neighbor. This is a more important matter than you would imagine.” In another place, he adds that we must be even more gentle with ourselves than with others: “make frequent acts of submission to the holy will of God, of charity, of endurance and of gentleness toward yourself even more than toward your neighbor.”

When we use “excessive severity” toward ourselves because of our imperfections, he sees in this “the vexation of injured pride.” Why are we so sad and impatient? Because we realize we are still at the bottom of the “ladder of sanctity.” He warns us that “the inordinate love of our own excellence would carry us to as high a flight as Lucifer, but only, like him, to fall into the abyss of pride.” God, who knows our weakness in this respect, allows us to grovel like worms in the mud of our imperfections, until he finds us capable of being raised without feeling any foolish self-satisfaction, or any contempt of others.”

In Caussade’s letters, the daily pursuit of holiness appears like a pas de deux between us and God. When we experience our daily defeats, God seems to have withdrawn his presence, yet paradoxically, our misery demonstrates his presence: he has withdrawn only “to give himself more completely.” On our side, we gain an ever “fresh degree of humility” by rising from each fall as if “nothing had happened” and asking God’s forgiveness without anxiety or vexation, confident that we will gain the victory in God’s good time. It is our “business” to combat our faults peacefully, and it is his to provide the victory when it is safe for us. “It is our weakness, oh my God, it is our wretched self-love, it is our pride that prevents you giving us great graces without hiding them from us, or, in other words, without our knowledge, for fear that we should corrupt your gifts by appropriating them to ourselves in foolish, secret and imperceptible self-satisfaction.”

In a tranquil progress toward holiness, Caussade assures us, we give God “more glory” than if we used violent efforts to correct ourselves. Moreover, we gain a “peace of heart” that not even a prayer of ourselves can upset. Such is the road to sanctity: “Do you not know that to be able to bear one’s miseries, weaknesses, caprices, spiritual defects, follies and extravagancies of the imagination, is the effect of heroic virtue? What treasures have not these same miseries enabled a crowd of saints of both sexes to acquire? In using them as subjects and matter for interior combats they have served for victories and for the final triumph of grace.”

In addition to using our distractions in prayer and our daily falls to guide us gently toward perfection, God in his Providence also uses our trust in him to turn each of us into a unique work: “imagine yourself a canvas on which a great master is about to paint a picture, and arm yourself with courage because I foresee that it will take a considerable time to pound and mix the colors, and then to lay them on, arrange them and vary the tints.” In another place he tells us to think of ourselves as a piece of earth in which God may sow something or nothing: “you should regard your soul as ground that no longer belongs to you but to him alone in which to sow whatever seed he pleases...” or nothing at all if such should be his will. Oh! how terrible to self-love is this nothing! but how good and profitable for the soul is this grace and the life of faith.” Indeed, perfection does not require a lot of interior acts, but may consist in remaining “in his presence in a state of silence and humble recollection.”

To reach perfection, however, we will need to overcome “that most sensitive form of self-love, spiritual self-love.” Even the heart of a contemplative nun can harbor this kind of self-love, which impedes “the reign of divine love.” Caussade warns that after detaching ourselves from “worldly ambition,” we need to renounce “a still more subtle ambition,” namely, the “desire for a high position in the spiritual life.” The antidote to this ambition is to pray as follows: “I only desire to possess that degree of grace and virtue that you are pleased to bestow on me, and at the time appointed by your divine wisdom even should that be the last moment of my life; for your most holy will is the rule and measure of my desires, even of those that are most holy and lawful.” Caussade gives this advice to one of his cloistered correspondents: “you must abandon yourself to the commands of Divine Providence, and then he will himself lead you on, purify you and safely raise you, when and as it pleases him, to the degree of sanctity he wills for you.”

You must also “desire only that degree of virtue and eternal happiness which he intends you to have.” That degree is for God “to determine; it is his business, it is, so to say, his task.”

Caussade warns against a certain “kind of desire for perfection, born of pride, and of an inordinate love of one’s own excellence” that does not lean on God for support and is “always in a state of turmoil.” Even if it seems holy, this desire must be resisted, for its effects of “disquiet or anxiety” show that it proceeds from the devil. Writing to a certain nun, he tells her to moderate her desire to reach the heights of contemplation: “Why then, my dear Sister, do you desire with such fiery eagerness those lights of the soul, those feelings, interior joys, and that facility of recollection and prayer, and other gifts of God, if it does not please him to bestow them on you yet? Would not this be to make yourself perfect for your own pleasure, and not for his?” Perfection, he explains, consists in being “exactly what God wills.” We should rest “quietly and without the slightest anxiety in the arms of his merciful providence as a little child rests on the breast of its mother.”

Spiritual self-love not only rushes to capture the heights, but also craves the consolation of an “impossible certitude.” Caussade notes that “without a special revelation God does not let us have any assurance about that which concerns our eternal salvation.” Why? Because he wants to let us “walk in darkness, and thus to render our faith more meritorious,” as well as to counter our “natural and strong inclination to pride.” Instead of certitude, he gives us something better, “a firm hope” that does not deprive us of “the merit of abandonment, so glorious to God, and for us deserving of so great a reward. On what then is this firm hope founded? On the treasures of the infinite mercy and infinite merits of Jesus Christ.”

This edition of Caussade, with its hundreds of pages of letters added to the sublime treatise on Divine Providence, is very timely. If ever the belief in Providence needed to be reaffirmed, it is now at the start of our demographic winter, when children made in the image of God are unwanted because they are thought to be too expensive to conceive, bring to birth, and raise. But former generations believed that God would provide, and he did.
Each of the speeches in the book is prefaced by instructive commentary and embellished with notes (happily placed at the back of the book, so as not to distract) which identify and/or explain various items in the speeches with which the average reader is not likely to be familiar. I found these notes to be quite helpful, for whenever I came across something of which I was ignorant or puzzled about, it was invariably annotated, and any ignorance and puzzlement were quickly dissipated. The book contains a Glossary of Names, a Glossary of Terms, and handy maps of the Roman Empire in 51 B.C., of Rome at the time of the Late Republic, of Italy and Sicily, of Greece and the Balkans, and of Asia Minor. Adding it all up, what we have here is a very well-made book, one which gives clear evidence of the impressive scholarship that went into its making.

“We know more about Cicero,” McElduff tells us, “than any other ancient individual” (xii), and perhaps that partially explains why it is that, as she also tells us, “he can sometimes be a hard man to like, with his vanity, self-importance, occasional cowardice and willingness to compromise his principles” (xxvi). And yet, for all that, “he was perhaps the last man in an era of warlords to believe in the idea of the Republic, a very lonely position to hold. He was also one of the few in the Late Republic who never thought of turning to an army to force his will on the state. [As did, among others, Caesar, Pompey, and Marc Antony.] If that was a mistake, it was an honourable one” (ibid.).

Cicero lived in one of the most tumultuous times in Roman history, during the dying days of the Republic, and McElduff gives us a vivid sense of the general messiness, not to say precariousness, of the politics of those times. Cicero, by choice, often put himself in the very midst of the fray, and seemed to revel in the rough give and take—for the most part only verbal, but often enough physical as well—that was to be expected of those who entered the public arena. He was a member of the optimates, those who “believed in the authority of the Senate above all” (xiii), and was entirely dedicated to the preservation of the Republic. The highpoint of his political career was his crushing of the conspiracy masterminded by Lucius Catilina in the year 63 B.C. When civil war broke out between Pompey and Julius Caesar, Cicero assigned his loyalties to Pompey.

Things came to a head for the two rivals in the battle at Pharsalus in 48 B.C., from which Caesar emerged the victor, in consequence thereof the Republic was effectively doomed. Given that outcome, and the fact that Cicero had sided with Pompey, it would seem that he could not look forward to a very comfortable future, but Caesar granted him an unconditional pardon. It was a rather magnanimous gesture, it would seem, but one which did nothing to mitigate the animus Cicero bore toward Caesar. When Caesar was assassinated, in the spring of 44 B.C. (earlier that same year he had arranged to have himself appointed dictator for life), Cicero was positively exultant, describing Caesar’s assassins as the “liberators of the Roman people and savours of the Republic” (208). It was in that same year that Cicero wrote four of the fourteen Philippics, a series of speeches that were addressed directly to his archenemy, and defender of Caesar, Marc Antony, and which can reasonably be cited as a significant contributing cause of his own assassination the following year, 43 B.C. Cicero could be a master of abuse, and in the Philippics he pulled out all the stops in his frontal attacks on Marc Antony. Philippic II, one of the works included in this book, is pointedly described by McElduff as “a devastatingly complete character assassination” (197).

Besides his many speeches, Cicero also composed, over the course of his life, a number of other literary works, most of which were broadly philosophical in nature. Cicero himself may not have been an original philosopher, but he was an avid and perspicacious student of the science, and wrote about it tellingly. Educated for a time in Athens, he had a special interest in Hellenistic philosophy, and some of his expositions dealing with it were cast in dialogue form. Thanks to his writings, we know more about Epicureanism and Stoicism today than what otherwise would be the case. His works on ethics and politics are substantive, and what he has to say about human rights and brotherhood have, rightly, an enduring quality to them. A good deal of our thought regarding the natural law is owing to Cicero’s treatment of the subject. Anyone who is familiar with the works of St. Thomas Aquinas cannot help but be struck by the frequency with which the Angelic Doctor favorably cites the thoughts of “Tullius.”

Because human nature tends not to alter appreciably over time, nor, so it...
would seem, does the world of politics, there are any number of ideas and observations found in Cicero’s speeches which have a perennial ring to them, and can be easily taken to be as applicable to our day as they were to his. For example, when he says that “nothing is so sacred it cannot be corrupted, nothing so well guarded money cannot capture it” (5), the French proverb that tells us that “the more things change, the more they stay the same” comes readily to mind. And he is expressing an attitude often voiced today when he rails against government handouts, which, he tells us, have the effect, besides the obvious one of “emptying the treasury” (50), the more serious one of “setting traps for the freedom of the citizens” (56). What appear to be, at the taking of them, pure gifts, with no strings attached, turn out to have confining consequences for the recipients. Many of our contemporaries would consider his militant language to be appropriate when he urges, “We must go to war against excess, insanity, against crime” (87). And could not one readily recognize a perennial relevance to his coupled questions, “What is better for the people than peace? What is better for the people than freedom?” (53) We would want, though, some definitional clarity with regard to two key terms, “peace” and “freedom.”

Cicero presents us with an intriguing personality. As we can see from his speeches, he was a man who was not the least bit burdened by low self-esteem, and he was not at all shy about telling the world what an exceptional fellow he was. As McElduff wryly notes, “one of Cicero’s favourite subjects was himself” (122). If there is any one thing in which he shows himself to be entirely a child of his times, and of the peculiar pocket of Roman culture in which he was formed and nourished, it was in his total commitment to—almost wants to say obsession with—glory and fame, his own glory and fame. Interestingly, glory and fame happen to be among those things, Aristotle tells us in the Nicomachean Ethics, the pursuance of which is not conducive to true happiness. Cicero would not be amenable to accepting that point of view, for, to him, “It is the rings of glory that make men seem to ascend to heaven” (173). And “there is nothing finer one can seek in this life than glory and honour” (101). He spoke openly of “my passion for glory” (106), and always seemed to have had a keen eye out for anything that would contribute to the solidifying of his legacy. There was something about Cicero’s whole attitude toward life which was intensely this-worldly, which I suppose should not surprise us, for, after all, he was what he was—a good pagan.

There are not a few paradoxical elements in the psychology of the man. He was a rich mixture of opposites. There would seem to be no reason to doubt his basic sincerity, and one would not be reluctant to call him a man of integrity, in a sense, for his integrity was of a somewhat narrow and selective sort. His convictions regarding the supreme importance of the Republic, and the pressing need to preserve it—along with his abhorrence for kingship, and the imperativeness of never allowing it to again become a Roman institution—were clearly genuine, and he was willing to put his life on the line for the sake of those convictions. But might not his egotism have been a hindrance to the realization of his ideals? In his speech, “For the Manilian Law,” he unblushingly refers to “my incorruptible nature” (47). But we might ask, in what precisely, in his own mind, could his incorruptible nature be said to consist? Can we say that it importantly had to do with honesty, in the form of a scrupulous adherence on his part to the truth, with regard to whatever issue he happened to be dealing with in his speeches? It would seem not, for the man clearly had no hesitancy in relying heavily on prevarication, some of it quite blatant, if it suited his rhetorical purposes or the particular cause he was advocating. Commenting on “In Defence of Milo,” McElduff makes the devastating observation: “the speech is, to put it frankly, a tissue of lies” (136). Supposedly, for Cicero, honor and glory did not necessarily have to do with truth. He unquestionably had a wondrous way with words, but he did not consistently use language for the purpose it necessarily must serve, if, that is, anything deserving of being called civilization is to remain possible.

With In Defence of the Republic Siobhán McElduff has done English-speaking readers the signal service of bringing Marcus Tullius Cicero fully into the twenty-first century. Through her English, which is scintillant in its own right, we have effectively conveyed to us a sense of the brilliance of the great orator’s Latin.


Reviewed by Jude Dougherty, The Catholic University of America

This book is not simply about Russia. It is a socioeconomic history of Russia, to be sure, but it is more than that. Yegor Gaidar writes as a political theorist of first rank with a global perspective, drawing upon universal principles in an effort to comprehend the particular. Gaidar, it should be noted, served for a time in the early 1990s as Russia’s minister of finance and later as Boris Yeltsin’s acting prime minister. The focus of the present work may be Russia, but in discussing Russia Gaidar offers a time-transcending account of the interlocking of what he calls “wealth-creation, freedom and a sense of well-being in the populace.” Clearly the book is not intended for a mass audience, but it may be regarded as a primer for anyone interested in social and political philosophy.

Gaidar starts with some basic facts. Growth in the world economy is about 2 to 4 percent annually. Even so, life for the great majority of people changes little. Most have approximately the same income, the same selection of consumer goods and the same customs and mores, year in and year out. Historically considered, the vast majority of the world population has lived in slowly changing agrarian societies. In the early nineteenth century, for example, the gross domestic product (GDP) of India and China—the largest agrarian civilizations of the previous two millennia—was more than three times that of Western Europe. Modern economic growth, Gaidar tells us, began in England and spread to Belgium, Holland, France, the German principalities around the Rhine, Switzerland, Catalonia, Bohemia, and Austria and, in the 1830s, to the United States.

Addressing the topic of modern economic growth, Gaidar necessarily turns to the role of capital formation. He finds that it is more difficult to define “capitalism” today than it was in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Capitalism presupposes a specific combination of institutions characteristic of Northern and Western Europe, where private property is guaranteed by law and tradition, where one finds a wide distribution of production oriented toward the market, and where competition is allowed...
to prevail. Presupposed, too, is a tax system that does not permit authorities to make arbitrary decisions. This combination of institutional arrangements, first developed in the city-states of Italy, subsequently spread to Northern Europe and from there were disseminated worldwide.

Capitalist institutions paved the way with economic growth for profound structural changes in society. Agrarian societies with low rates of saving remain stagnant. A per capita GDP that is characteristic of an industrial society cannot be achieved on the basis of technologies available in an agrarian society. A savings rate of 5 to 10 percent is required for industrial take off. Gaidar is convinced that if one knows the size of the per capita GDP of any nation, one can determine with high probability the structure of its employment, its particularities of settlement, its literary levels, average number of years of education, the state burden on the economy, and the even the character of its political regime.

Critical of the work of Joseph Shumpeter and Marx, Gaidar is appreciative of the insight of Karl Popper, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and Isaiah Berlin. Marx was certain that the laws he observed in the middle of nineteenth-century England were of a general character and would not only continue but would grow. The strong class conflict—an obvious reality in England at the time of the publication of The Communist Manifesto—is made the basis of the concept of class struggle as a major process in world history. To the contrary, history has shown how dynamic and variable modern economic growth is and how dangerous it is to predict economic and political processes.

The most important tendencies in the development of production, Gaidar maintains, are unpredictable. Starting in the 1950s the rates of economic growth increased sharply, and world trade expanded. Something that Marx did not foresee was that the leading countries of the world increased their spending on social programs. Employment in industry, the engine of economic growth for decades, decreased, first in the United States, then in Western Europe. Employment in the service sector went up, accounting for more than half of national production in the most developed countries. As prosperity increased, most members of the population became property owners. And it follows that a society that reaches a state of prosperity in which the majority has something to lose does not like instability; it does not tend toward revolutionary explosions.

Modern economic growth is difficult to predict given the many social and political factors upon which it rests. In a chapter entitled, “The State Burden on the Economy,” Gaidar quotes John Adams, who, in his A Defense of the Constitution of the United States of America, wrote that if property were no longer a basis for the right to vote, “debts would be abolished first; taxes laid heavy on the rich, and not at all on the others; and last a downright equal division of everything be demanded and voted.” That chapter alone is worthy of the price of this remarkable book.


Reviewed by Jude Dougherty, The Catholic University of America

The aim of this treatise is to determine how four “liberal democracies”—France, Germany, Canada, and the United States—have responded to Islamic immigration and the demands made by their new immigrant population. As described by Joppke and Torpey, liberal institutions may be ill-suited to deal forthrightly with those demands. Given that liberal institutions are designed to remain indifferent to creeds and “comprehensive doctrines,” this complicates matters when it comes to assimilating Muslims. Such institutions are compelled to remain agnostic with respect to what Islam really is and to treat it as just another religion in the Western sense. That Islam may not be commensurate with liberal principles or pose a threat to liberal societies cannot be addressed. In our era of the procedural, post-national state, governing institutions are required to remain equidistant from majority and minority claims, in fact, even indifferent to the good. Neutrality, the authors claim, is tantamount to liberalism itself.

It remains a fact that the full accommodation of Islam and its practices has yet to be achieved within Western democracies. Islamic immigrants tend not to assimilate but choose to retain their inherited customs and desire to live under their own law. This sets them apart, and yet they claim a right to be treated equally with other religions. Thus the aim of this book is a comparison of the success Muslims have achieved through litigation as contrasted with what they have not been able to achieve through social integration or through legislation.

To illustrate some of the social tensions observed, beginning with France, Nicolas Sarkozy, even before he became president, insisted that newcomers from North Africa and the Middle East meet certain language requirements and pledge to adhere to the principles, values, and symbols of French democracy. Under his presidency, legislation was passed requiring candidates for citizenship to be tested on French culture and history and to prove that they could speak French as well as the average native fifteen-year-old. Displaying a limit to its tolerance, the French National Assembly, over opposition from the legal fraternity, passed in July 2010 a law banning the full facial veil, the niqab, as well as the burqa.

In Germany, from a legal point of view, the final frontier in the accommodation of Islam is the granting to Islamic organizations the status of “corporations,” which status would allow them to teach, as part of the normal school curriculum and at public expense, the tenets of their religion. Under German Basic Law, a religious organization must be judged to be a religious community capable and willing to cooperate with the state in fulfilling a public function. Paul Kirchhoff, a legal scholar, has argued that legal status should be denied if no participation in the culture underlying the Basic Law is to be expected. Kirchhoff explains that only the Christian religion is to be considered “the humus” of the German constitutional state. “Only the Christian religion that God has become human in the person of Jesus supports the principle of ‘personality,’ ‘dignity,’ and ‘equality’ on which the German constitutional order rests.” His argument was rejected outright by the Upper Administrative Court of Berlin when it decreed, against the stern opposition of the Berlin Senate, that a given Muslim organization, the IFBU, fulfilled all requirements of a religious community and was entitled to teach Islam in Berlin schools.

On this side of the Atlantic, Islamic accommodation in Canada is far from settled notwithstanding Canada’s liberal immigration policy and the socioeconomic well-being of most Muslims.


Reviewed by Thomas Jodziewicz, University of Dallas

In the best sense, these two volumes are quite complementary to each other. Both offer an informed account of contemporary American Catholicism and both offer hopeful antidotes for a faith, or rather for a faithful, that suffers now the consequences of too uncritical an assimilation into a modern, pagan or, at best, post-Christian society. Given his more particular historical narrative of the Catholic story in America, Shaw’s book might quite usefully be read first.

How have we gotten to such a pass in which simple numbers indicate a decline in practicing Catholics, those who seek to live orthodox and graced sacramental lives; where there is “widespread rejection of Church teaching, most conspicuous in relation to sexual morality but by no means limited to that”; when more and more “Catholic” colleges and universities claim to be “in the Catholic tradition,” which tends to suggest much less than an institutional, self-conscious and vital commitment to an intellectual tradition dating from the Fathers of the Church and becomes much more of an acceptance of a modern moral relativism and of a charge to forge credentials for material prosperity, and little else? It is also a time of fewer and fewer religious vocations, but as well a moment of more and more dissent in “Catholic” circles from doctrine and discipline; a painful time in which “uncertain leaders who appear to be unwilling or unable to provide strong, clear direction yet resist and ridicule those who are less hesitant than themselves”; and finally it is too often a sad time when “widespread confusion, discouragement, and apathy [exist] among Catholic laypeople who still come to church but slog on in a kind of joyless practice of their religion” (188–189). Shaw wonders if in fact the circumstances might actually become worse in a cultural moment marked by an apparently triumphant secularism grounded sympathetically in the American solvent of democratization and egalitarianism.

Shaw’s announced “intention . . . is to examine the Americanization of the Catholic Church in America” (21). What he presents is not simply the anticipated assimilation of the faith in a new land, a place at first of a grudging religious toleration, and then religious liberty (until recently), but more and more an uncritical (surely in Gospel terms) assimilation into a contemporary republic of outright hostility to any religious faith that would breach a public square in which religious belief will no longer be allowed a serious voice. He suggests further that the valued democratic and egalitarian elements in American culture, uncritically examined, have now poisoned the well of the ancient faith with its authoritative hierarchical foundation contested by more and more of a “Catholic” congregationalism that practices its own forms of a cafeteria “Catholicism.” Shaw offers a well-chosen, prescient comment by John Henry Cardinal Newman, already sensitive to the modernist, relativist breezes stirring Western civilization and culture, including the ever-liberalizing United States, in 1879:

> Liberalism in religion is the doctrine that there is no positive truth in religion, but that one creed is as good as another, and this is the teaching which is gaining substance and force daily. It is inconsistent with any recognition of any religion as true [sic]. It teaches that all are to be tolerated, for all are matter of opinion. Revealed religion is not a truth, but a sentiment and a taste; not an objective fact, not miraculous; and it is the right of each individual to make it say just what strikes his fancy. (52–53)

Such a form of toleration, of course, can lead not simply to toleration, but ultimately to indifference, along with the inevitable lukewarmness.

In his Foreword, “You Shall Be My Witnesses,” Archbishop Charles J. Chaput (Philadelphia) pulls no punches about our current state: “The world we live in is not a friend of the gospel, no matter how superficially ‘religious’ American culture may sometimes seem. It has contempt for Jesus Christ, contempt for the Cross, and contempt for the people who carry their own cross and follow him” (viii–ix). Ours (as ever?) is “a crisis of faith.” We must proclaim the Gospel “with the example of our lives,”
lives paradoxically used by a merciful Creator: “God sanctifies the world with sinful clay” (vii). In true charity, and with true humility, we cannot be “like everyone else” or console ourselves with the civic pabulum that “whatever is, is right.”

Archbishop Chaput adds,

The central issue of modern American Catholic life is the temptation to accommodate, to compromise, to get along, and to fit in—and then feel good about it. We accept tepidness in the name of pluralism. We put diversity of belief and behavior above truth. We place the individual above the common good. We elevate “tolerance” above love, justice, and real charity. None of this converts anybody. It does the opposite. It provides people with alibis for indifference and inaction, and it leeches away their faith. (ix)

The question is finally one of holiness, a holiness that is not an embarrassing desire, nor a self-righteous design, yet rather a call to which all of the faithful are invited to respond. But, “to the degree Catholics have longed to join the mainstream of American life, to become like everyone else, to accommodate and grow comfortable and assimilate, rather than be ‘other than’ and holy, we’ve abandoned who we really are” (x), or who we are called to be if we would honor the purpose of our own baptisms. Then again, if the “faith” is simply a cultural construct... so what is the point of believing?

In his text, Shaw emphasizes the delaying quest, understandable as it might have been, to enter the American mainstream. Apparently an earlier title for this book was The Gibbons Legacy, which refers to the extraordinarily influential James Cardinal Gibbons, archbishop of Baltimore (1877-1921). Gibbons, yes, understandably, wished for his fellows to be acceptable in the larger community. Apparently an earlier title for this book was The Gibbons Legacy, which refers to the extraordinarily influential James Cardinal Gibbons, archbishop of Baltimore (1877-1921). Gibbons, yes, understandably, wished for his fellows to be acceptable in the larger community. And, with his fellow Americanists, most prominently Archbishop John Ireland of St. Paul, he contemplated a Catholic America, a providential combination leading Church and state, arm in arm, into a wondrous future. As Shaw carefully demonstrates, such intentions, given the yet lingering (if waning) Christian elements abroad in American culture, were not unimaginable effects of a Catholic evangelization of the republic. Mostly innocent of Modernist currents—immanentism chief among them yet—the Americanists “were practical men, builders and doers, not theorists, and they wished to be loyal to the Church and to the pope” (50). Too much of their naivety, perhaps, was an American conceit, that “the city on a hill” which is so embedded in the American myths of exceptionalism is geographically, and scripturally, deficient: it is not Beacon Hill, surely not Capitol Hill. It is Calvary, and the true exceptionalism is not American but Christian.

In another brief, but accessible and well-taken moment, Shaw juxtaposes the energies of those two thoughtful American Catholics of the mid-nineteenth century, Orestes Brownson, journalist et al., and Isaac Hecker, founder of the Paulist order. The latter was ever hopeful of the conversion of his countrymen, the former initially so—then not so hopeful of such an eventuality. In a letter to Hecker in 1870, Brownson unburdened himself about the relationship of Catholic and American:

I think she [the Catholic Church] has here a more subtle and powerful enemy to combat than in any of the old monarchial nations of the world. Catholics as well as others imibe the spirit of the country, imbibe from infancy the spirit of independence, freedom from all restraint, unbounded license. So far are we from converting the country, we cannot hold our own... . How many Catholics can you find born & brought up in the country that do in reality hold the Church to be higher than the people, or who do not consider her voice authoritative only when it coincides with that of the people? These considerations make me feel that the whole influence of democratic ideas & tendencies is directly antagonistic to Catholicity. I think the Church has never encountered a social & political order so hostile to her, & that the conversion of our republic will be a far greater victory than the conversion of the Roman Empire... . I have hitherto wished to effect a harmony of the American & the Catholic idea, but I believe such harmony impracticable except by sacrificing the Catholic idea to the National. (32)

Given a history in America of experiencing first prejudice and persecution in the colonial moment; toleration and animosity, and then liberty, and animosity, in the new republic through the mid-twentieth century; and now apparent institutional and personal decline, and animosity (and indifference) in the aftermath of the 1960s as well as Vatican II, where then are we?

Perhaps one more brick might first be added to the wall of hostility that would separate the contemporary Church from the state, and the culture. Francis Cardinal George of Chicago comments on the pride of place in American culture of individualism: in the face of this cultural artifact, “the biblical message of freedom rooted in truth is treated at best as just one more personal option and at worst as a reactionary opposition to progressive cultural trends that are seen as liberating individuals from societal and institutional oppressions and dogmatisms of all sorts.”

And the result? “Society becomes a collection of individuals. Religious claims are at best private, and at worst morally oppressive” (57). It would be exhilarating, perhaps, simply to skewer the hollowness of our contemporary cultural wasteland, but charity just as readily intrudes once again, as it did for previous American Catholic promoters, from Archbishop John Carroll and Bishop John England, through Brownson and Hecker, and on past the Americanists and their successors. George reminds us that “anyone who wants to reform and convert his culture [always the baptismal dispensation] must love it” (58). There is simply never any charitable detour around the Two Great Commandments. But as ever, the Gospel, in authentic inculturation, is the critical truth, not the resident culture. One is a Catholic who happens to be American. Patriotism is not an alien burden, but as St. Thomas More will ever remind us, “we are God’s servants first.” There is yet a difference between a ghetto and the catacombs, between a self-insulation and a periodic retreat to recuperate, and to resist, and to love again.

In the face of the prominent post-1960s difficulties afflicting the Church in America—a culture of dissent, including prominent “Catholic” politicians who disguise their heterodoxy by hiding behind the lamentable but politically viable stance of John F Kennedy who embraced the absolute separation of church and state; the demise of authentic Catholic education, particularly higher education; latent clericalism, terribly visible in sex scandals and a culture of secrecy—Russell Shaw offers a project for reform that is, as would be expected, quite traditional, which means quite radical. First of all, a new, “healthy Catholic
subculture in America” must be created (194). It must be inclusive, as “it would be tragic if the new subculture turned out to be the preserve of aging Catholic Anglos” (197).

Newer associations of committed Catholics (for example the Society of Catholic Social Scientists, the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, the Cardinal Newman Society), long-standing public projects (Knights of Columbus), newer web activities (the Catholic Thing, the Crossroads Initiative), and Catholic media such as EWTN, are examples of a healthy Catholic subculture. We also need a re-vitalization of Catholic education at all levels by a re-formulation of an orthodox Catholic mission.

Surely, those Catholics, and non-Catholics, who cheer the entrance of an accommodative, and lower-cased catholicism, into a neutered public square, will wince at the apparent, and embarrassing, reappearance of the Romish ghost at the modern banquet. The whole point, though, is that the reappearance of a “sectarian” remnant must not be any sort of nostalgic retreat from the Great Commission. Rather, the universal call to holiness and the consequent evangelization of our culture is the charitable point. If it is all simply a cultural construct with no greater claim to authenticity than any other contemporary suggestion or popular-culture advertisement for the good life, then the faith, which after all features the cross, can seem less than attractive in a consumerist, materialist society. True happiness is not a momentary, self-referential response to alienation and boredom. Our melancholy can be excised radically only, our faith tells us, by the counter-intuitive: selflessness, sacrifice, unconditional love... i.e., Calvary and Easter. And, more to the moment:

Today it is not merely desirable but imperative that Catholics acknowledge the reality of a unique personal vocation as preached and taught by such figures as Saint Francis de Sales, Blessed John Henry Newman, and Blessed John Paul II and, having acknowledged this reality, that they get on with the work of discerning, accepting, and living out their own personal vocations—the particular roles God means for them to play in the great work of redemption. (209)

And, such a grand vocation means to live sacramental lives, lay as well as consecrated lives.

For good or ill, and mostly the latter, two terms enjoy precedence in discussions of the current circumstances of the Catholic Church: liberal and conservative. But, is there not simply too much of a resemblance here to the claims that elicited St. Paul’s admonition regarding divisive rivalries in Corinth: “I mean that each of you is saying, ‘I belong to Paul,’ or ‘I belong to Apollos,’ or ‘I belong to Cephas,’ or ‘I belong to Christ.’ Is Christ divided? Was Paul crucified for you? Or were you baptized in the name of Paul?” (1 Cor. 1:12-13). Shaw describes the bleak prediction for the Church’s future offered by David Carlin (The Decline and Fall of the Catholic Church in America [2003]), who imagines a probable conservative Catholic victory, and a consequent retreat from any direct engagement with the culture. Shaw would certainly not seem to accept the reliability of such a prediction, but he does offer a seamless transition to the other volume under review by noticing that John L. Allen, Jr. (The Future Church [2009]), “writing from a liberal Catholic perspective, in effect agrees with Carlin that conservative Catholics—he calls them ‘evangelical Catholics’—will emerge victorious in the Church in the United States, although the media, because of ideological sympathy, will continue to focus largely on liberal Catholicism” (193 n. 21). Enter George Weigel and his quite extraordinary Evangelical Catholicism: Deep Reform in the 21st-Century Church.

One might sum up Weigel’s witness quite simply: in our own particular cultural moment, and as always, we are all called to holiness and to some particular role in the Great Commission to evangelize and to baptize the world. Or, more dramatically: “no one gets a pass on the tongues of fire” (20). Weigel traces the re-awakening of Catholic evangelicism from the papacy of Leo XIII (1878-1903) and a developing effort to move beyond the Counter-Reformation Church, a church marked by a catechetical-devotional emphasis. The Christophobic world we inhabit, gnostic and anti-metaphysical, cannot be adequately engaged by this Counter-Reformation Church, according to Weigel. Our pagan modern world, long in its gestation, must be confronted by “the deep reforms of Evangelical Catholicism” (5). Such reform is at the same time both traditional and radical: “all genuine Catholic reform is a matter of ‘re-form,’ of reclaiming forgotten elements of the Church’s Christ-given constitution and making them the foundation from which to develop new models of Catholic life and practice” (234-235). Or, to repair to our institutional origins, the origins of Christ’s church, not ours, we will be equipped, laity and ordained leaders alike, “to convert a disenchanted and not-infrequently hostile world” (5). At the heart of Evangelical Catholicism, as ever at the heart of the Gospel, is truth and mission. And, again, “no one gets a pass on the tongues of fire.”

The good news of the Lord Jesus Christ is, of course, hardly new. In a culture that seeks constantly after novelty and distraction from a fundamental boredom, however, the Gospel is shocking, and far too intrusive, even arrogant, and embarrassing in its apparent simplicity to assimilated Catholics. Ours is a culture that proclaims the “mature” virtues of self-assertion and self-actualization and the “mature” burden of each with his own truths along with individual self-dependence and freely-chosen avenues to happiness. Here lies modern, sophisticated heroism. The Gospel proclaims selflessness, dependency and obedience, and sacrifice and the cross, along with a counter-intuitive joy and celebration. The Gospel, and the Church, proclaim that Jesus Christ is The Truth, authentic and enduring. Our culture proclaims: “whatever.”

Russell Shaw spends more particular time in detailing the American example of this modernity of the self, but Weigel concurs with this overall reading of the past fifty years of Western history: “the idea that the God of the Bible was the enemy of human maturation and freedom became the idea that the Catholic Church is the last institutional obstacle to the revolution of debonair nihilism” (103). Weigel argues, though, that beginning specifically with Pope Leo XIII, and even more particularly with the recent papacies of John Paul II and Benedict XVI, the Church is responding to the wasteland of modernity and post-modernity. The response must be charity, conversion and not convention, truth and not moral relativism, a reaffirmation of the fact that we are our brother’s and sister’s keepers, and that the beams in one’s own eyes do not preclude charitable, but firm, correction and admonition. The spiritual works of mercy have not been erased by the “social justice” of the more acceptable (to nonbelievers) corporal works of mercy. Orthopraxy must be connected with orthodoxy: “What the Church does [sic] cannot be separated...
from what the Church believes [sic].” Benedict XVI has reaffirmed that “there is no charity that is not charity in truth, caritas in veritate.” Or, more colorfully: “True Catholic reform, in other words, is not Catholic life” (96).

Weigel’s book is divided into two parts: “The Vision of Evangelical Catholicism” and “The Reforms of Evangelical Catholicism.” In the first part, he echoes Shaw’s description of the evaporation of an American Catholic subculture, and attendant “plausibility structure.” He, too, notices the left-right, traditionalist-progressive divisions in the Church and their basic superficiality as far as the Gospel demands of Evangelical Catholicism. So, too, with the post-Vatican II debates between “Catholic Antiqurianism” and “Catholic Presentitis”: such intramural bickering can cloud the truth of the Lord Jesus Christ. Weigel views Vatican II’s purpose as self-consciously evangelical. The point of Gaudium et spes (Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World) was/is “to propose to the world two essential truths: that Jesus Christ reveals the full truth about the human person, and that human beings only come into the fullness of their humanity through a sincere gift of themselves.” This is simply counter-cultural in our moment in history and, according to Weigel: “they were reference points for a dialogue with edge, not a dialogue of accommodation” (103).

In one of the more striking images in the book, Weigel reprises, as it were, Francis Thompson’s The Hound of Heaven when he reaffirms that God is seeking us: “Spirituality,” as the postmodern world understands it, is the human search for the divine. Christianity, by contrast, is about God’s search for us, and our learning to take the same path through history that God is taking. That is the understanding of Christianity that animates Evangelical Catholicism, in full agreement with Christian orthodoxy through the centuries—which itself mirrors the dynamics of God’s revelation to Abraham and his descendants, the Jewish people. (27)

Nourished by Word and Sacrament, “The Qualities of an Engaged Faith,” according to Weigel, are: radical conversion, deep fidelity, joyful discipleship, and courageous evangelism (47-51). Chapter Three in Part I offers “Evangelical Catholicism in Profile” (53-88). Its ten characteristics include: friendship with Jesus Christ; a counter-cultural affirmation of divine revelation and its clear connection with the Church and the Magisterium; the necessity of the seven sacraments for grace; a life-long conversion, which does acknowledge the importance of rules, but always in the service of metanoia, conversion; a liturgically-centered faith, open to the beauty that points always to God, and decidedly not anything resembling self-worship; a scripturally-centered life that makes use of tools such as the historical-critical method, but embraces the non-reductionist wholeness of the canon; a hierarchically ordered Church, as founded by Jesus, but a Church devoid of clericalism and simply managerial bishops and pastors, and marked by a laity, along with its ordained and consecrated leaders, that embraces Evangelical Catholicism, and not strictly and simply the laity involved in parish or diocesan administrative activities; a charitable, but counter-cultural engagement with a relativist-nihilist culture; a bilingual capacity to “speak” scripturally as well as with the grammar of reason in the public square; and so, and always, “Evangelical Catholicism awaits with eager anticipation the coming of the Lord Jesus in glory, and until that time, Evangelical Catholicism is ordered to mission—to the proclamation of the Gospel for the world’s salvation” (85).

Lest this review become a never-ending story, let it suffice to indicate that Part II (“The Reforms of Evangelical Catholicism”) contains much that is wise, and provocative, regarding the reforms of the episcopate, the priesthood, the liturgy, the consecrated life, the lay vocation, the Church’s intellectual life, the Church’s public policy advocacy, and the papacy. Whether one agrees or disagrees with Weigel’s specifics, estimations of situations and suggested reforms, the overall result of his intervention is a clarity about the circumstances of the American Catholic Church, but especially an extraordinary hope that graces his pages. Russell Shaw is certainly not unhelpful, but the purpose of his book is primarily to raise the alarm by emphasizing just how we got to where we are today. He succeeds admirably, and he does offer a brief exhortation to a revived Catholic culture and the holy obligation of evangelism. Weigel’s exhortation is far more complete and detailed, but also about Catholic culture and the enduring, joyful duty of spreading the Gospel. At heart neither book, given the Lord Jesus’ Great Commission, is new as far as what Christian discipleship is all about. But both are excellent given the historical circumstances in which we find ourselves, our own cultural moment to live and speak, sometimes even with words, the Good News of Jesus Christ.

One last, and most helpful, point that Russell Shaw and George Weigel would surely second. The faith is not a neo-Pelagian relic. We are not modern, or postmodern, pragmatic orphans, self-autonomous, and ever alone, lost in an ever-expanding and incomprehensible cosmos. As Pius VI has reminded us: “Evangelization will never be possible without the action of the Holy Spirit. . . . It is He who impels each individual to proclaim the Gospel, and it is He who in the depths of consciences causes the word of salvation to be accepted and understood” (Evangeli nuntiandi, 75). Thankfully, we are more than simply ourselves as we try to live the Lord Jesus’ charge: “I give you a new commandment: love one another. As I have loved you, so you also should love one another. This is how all will know that you are my disciples, if you have love for one another” (Jn 13:34-35).


With the publication of The Wound and the Blessing, Luigino Bruni asserts himself as an authoritative voice within the community of Catholic scholars critical of the long-term effects neoclassical economics has on individual, familial, and communal well-being.

The Wound and the Blessing is a succinct yet persuasively written book that brings to light Dr. Bruni’s concern that modern economics, which he believes is premised on the faulty anthropology of Adam Smith, David Hume, and Niccolo Machiavelli, has not brought about its intended goals. What modern economics has accomplished, Bruni argues, is that it has convinced us we can simultaneously live what Aristotle referred to as “the good life” while insulating ourselves from meaningful relationships, in particular meaningful relationships in the marketplace.

In an erudite and intricate fashion,
Bruni, an Italian philosopher of economics at the Milano-Bicocca University in Milano, argues that “modern humanity” is built on the “radical anthropological pessimism” of Machiavelli, and has made us incapable of seeing “the other” as a blessing. Instead, we see others as a “curse” much like the way we see them in the Hobbesian state of nature. With this understanding of “the other” as its foundation, modern economics is practically incapable of bringing about authentic human happiness.

Though at times it feels as if Bruni sees no inherent worth in market-based economies, he is quick to remind his readers that he “does not seek to incite opposition to markets or to construct society without them.” In fact, Bruni admits he is “convinced that a society without markets and contracts cannot be civil.” However, he does warn that “a society that seeks to regulate human relations only through markets and contracts is even less so.” Therefore, his primary thesis is to “reclaim the value” of a more fully dimensional marketplace in order to reassert the gift of “the encounter with the other.” In other words, he proposes a balance between rugged self-interest and altruism.

Recalling the arguments marshaled by Smith in The Wealth of Nations, Bruni reminds us that “market relationships” have “allow[ed] us to satisfy our needs without having to depend on others’ love.” The “snare” in this argument, however, according to Bruni, is that modern economics ushered in an era where mankind became dependent “on no one with a name.” We “depend anonymously” and “without the risk of injury” in a world run on Smith’s economic theory.

What ends up happening is that civil society reduces everything to “the contract.” This is wrong in Bruni’s eyes, for it begets a common good built on self-interest that disallows us from ever fully encountering the other. The contract protects us from being harmed by the other; never fully allowing for an authentic human relationship to take root.

To Bruni, a civil society where we are unable to enter into a more authentic, “gratuitous” encounter with “the other” is a civil society not founded on agape love. Rather, a civil society where we are unable to fully encounter the other is a society founded on eros love, an aggressive, erotic type of love rooted in indifferentness toward the well-being of the other. This results in a civil society wherein we “immunize” ourselves from ever being harmed by the other.

A society dominated by this view of economics suffers a relational crisis because it cannot account for agape love. Bruni, therefore, argues that “a challenge for civilization today is to place agape again at the center of the life of the polis rather than leave it confined to the private sphere, where it can play only a residual, minor role.”

Proponents of laissez-faire economics will argue that the market is a social entity and that it actually does take into account and even encourages individuals to enhance the relationships they have with one another. Bruni admits the market is a “social enterprise” in some regard, but it is social insofar as its participants, still protected from harm by way of “the contract,” merely interact with one another. In many ways the market is asocial for Bruni, as it views relationships in a manner that considers them valuable inasmuch as they are capable of fulfilling our individual desires. This is what Bruni refers to as instrumental relationships.

One of the ways modern economics attempts to correct for this relational crisis is with corporate social responsibility. Bruni highlights the various schools of thought surrounding the most recent corporate social responsibility movements, but he sees them as basically problematic and an inadequate remedy to what ails modern economics.

Bruni concludes his deftly written book by offering several solutions to this variegated problem. First and foremost we must seek to establish an economic system built around “relational goods.” Relational goods are goods premised on reciprocity and carried out by individuals engaging in a noninstrumental relationship and in a gratuitous manner. Next, we must realize that material well-being can never truly make us happy. Accumulating more and more and more wealth results in what is commonly called the “paradox of happiness.” And third, we must understand that we cannot promote human flourishing and experience authentic human happiness unless we encounter economic actors in a way that sees them as a blessing and not as a curse.

Bruni operates from a perspective many Catholics will find attractive. Indeed, his arguments echo the ideas put forth by Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI in Caritas in Veritate. Yet Bruni fails to investigate other, equally-germane topics relevant to his thesis.

Bruni asserts that contemporary economics is at fault for the inability of modern man to experience authentic happiness. However, it is never definitely argued when, where, or how this threshold was crossed. His on again, off again praise and denunciation of modern, market-based economies leaves one wondering if the fatal flaw of modern economics was built into Smith’s “Invisible Hand” and that we had no way to escape it or if it emerged over time. It seems as though Bruni believes it is the former. However, his condemnation remains somewhat conflicted.

One would have also liked to see Bruni pay more attention to the nuanced changes in global politics and economics since the time of Smith, Hume and Machiavelli. Indeed, one could argue that the Industrial Revolution, the advent of new technologies in the twentieth century, the rapid increase of secularization across Europe over the past half century, and the growing number of religiously unaffiliated citizens across the globe have all contributed to the obsessiveness with which individuals in first world countries pursue materialistic goals and seek “the good life” without meaningful relationships.

The Wound and the Blessing comes at a time when Catholics are realizing appeals to religious liberty within the liberal tradition is proving insufficient for the protection of their rights. In that vein, Catholics must also recognize the inherent conflicts between modern, liberal economics and Catholic social teaching. Professor Bruni’s book casts light on those conflicts. It would be wise for us not to shy away from his thought-provoking and forcefully argued message.

Frank Morgan, Both Sides of the Altar, South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2011.

Reviewed by Robert Nicholas Bérard, Mount Saint Vincent University and President of the Canadian Chapter of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars.

Frank Morgan was not the former, laicized priest you might have expected. We normally encounter books and articles written by inactive priests who seek to justify their decisions to leave the priesthood. Others publish in order to carry on a personal and/or
political vendetta against a Church which they believe somehow to have wronged them and which continues to do so. We have become so accustomed to the axiom that, for the popular media, the only devout Catholic is a dissenting Catholic, we are surprised by the priestly autobiography of Fr. Frank Morgan, a married ex-priest who expressed poignantly in his book genuine regrets about having left the priesthood, who loved the Church and was faithful to its teaching, and who sought, with mixed success, to offer the gifts of his inactive priesthood in the service of that Church.

“Both Sides of the Altar,” a title suggested by Fr. Morgan’s wife, Ruth, is a conversational memoir of a Canadian-born priest, ordained for the Diocese of Hamilton, Ontario in 1949. A star high school football player, with strong matinee idol features, Frank Morgan embodied the popular image of vocation in post-war Catholicism. Fifteen years later, after a period of spiritual dryness and personal discontent, rooted in what he saw as an excess of self-regard, a lack of appreciation of his contributions by his superiors, he left the priesthood. It is not an uncommon occurrence in the priesthood or religious life. Unfortunately, for many who have abandoned their vocations, this self-regard only grows, and their resentment hardens and becomes magnified. Fr. Morgan briefly fell into this spiral of bitterness, but ultimately emerged from it to spend the remainder of his life attending to his duties as a husband and a father, becoming reconciled to the Church, and helping other former priests be similarly reconciled.

Morgan recalls with admiration the intellectually gifted but deeply grounded priest-professors who guided him at St. Augustine’s, a crowded Toronto seminary in the post-war years, the indefatigable parish priests in the Diocese of Hamilton where he was raised and where he served as an assistant pastor, and his own brother, Vincent, a Jesuit who served in India. Frank Morgan's priesthood, however, was undermined by restlessness, disappointment, and frustration that his superiors failed to value adequately his zeal and his accomplishments. Immersed in a variety of parish duties and other forms of “outreach,” he began to neglect his own spiritual life, isolate himself from his brother priests, and become dissatisfied with his vocation.

Providentially, his bishop sent him to serve a small, struggling parish in rural north Texas. There, under the influence of an African-American priest who served as pastor in the town’s black Catholic church—segregation was very much a part of the Church in the American South during the 1950s—Fr. Morgan experienced a renewal in his priesthood, learning to make time for prayer before the Blessed Sacrament and engaging in a variety of parish-building and community-building activities. After three years in what Morgan describes as his “personal Eden,” he was recalled to his diocese in Canada. No longer a pastor, and resentful because of the inability to continue his work in Texas, he again became detached and dissatisfied, and in 1964 he decided, at the age of forty, to leave the priesthood.

For the next forty-four years, Frank Morgan worked to make a life on the other side of the altar. He held a number of jobs, primarily in human relations, and he married and became the father of two sons. At the same time, he never fully came to terms with his abandonment of the priesthood and looked for means to employ its inedible gifts in the service of others, particularly other inactive priests. Most of his initiatives met with some degree of success, particularly his involvement with the following groups: Contact, a support group for former priests and religious, established in the Archdiocese of Detroit; Legatus, an organization of Catholic business leaders established by Tom Monaghan; and Call to Holiness, a direct and orthodox response to the disingenuous Catholic “reform” group, Call to Action. Yet in each group Morgan met stiff opposition from priests and bishops who had a particular disdain for the traditional and orthodox zealousity of a married ex-priest.

While Frank Morgan may have forgiven the many Catholic clergy and laity who treated him and his wife shabbily and uncharitably—perhaps the most egregious act was his being told by the pastor of the parish he had grown up in that he was not to attend the funeral of his father or allow himself to be seen by parishioners—that treatment left deep scars. Yet he was sustained in the face of repeated rebuffs by many friends to whom readers are introduced, Protestants, Muslims, and Jews, as well as members of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, which accepted him as a rare member without an academic appointment or a scholarly record. Above all Fr. Morgan records his devotion to the great Jesuit theologian and writer, Fr. John Hardon, a founding member of the Fellowship who supported, defended, and encouraged him. Fr. Hardon’s death in 2000 prevented his writing an introduction to the book, a task admirably and perceptively taken up by another long-serving Fellowship member, Prof. Gerald V. Bradley.

Both Sides of the Altar is an important book, in its insights into the challenges and temptations facing priests, into the experiences of those who have left their vocations, and into the response of the Catholic hierarchy and the laity to what were once called “spoiled priests.” The book also offers a strong and impassioned critique of what the author calls “Catholicism Lite” or the “American Catholic Church” (in contradistinction to the Roman Catholic Church), so deeply sunk in dissent and disobedience that it is a danger to many souls. It is also a difficult and somewhat maddening book, sprawling and garrulous, jumping from one topic to another and back again, in the manner of a late night conversation in an Irish tavern.

The book was published posthumously, and it is something of a pity that Frank Morgan did not have the opportunity to work with an editor to reorder and revise his manuscript. It might have led to the elimination of countless clichéd expressions, to fewer typographical errors, to more carefully reasoned argument, to a more subtle treatment of the heroes and villains of the post-Vatican II era. It is painful to read, for example, Morgan’s encomium of the Legionaries of Christ in the light of what has come to be known about that order, and no one would feel the pain more sharply than Frank Morgan. On the other hand, we have Frank Morgan’s story in his own words, a story that the great Fr. Hardon rightly believed needed telling, being heard and understood.
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The Board of Directors of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars has established a special fund to support the travel and lodging expenses of the speakers at our annual conventions. I am happy to report that we now have about $20,000 in this fund, but the expenses each year are considerable, and so we need to continue to build it up. We have received a number of generous contributions from board members themselves as well as from other donors. We are deeply grateful for these donations. If you would like to make a donation or suggest someone whom we could approach, please contact me at koterski@fordham.edu.

Rev. Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.
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The very last word of Pope Francis’s Farewell Address was “solidarity.” Indeed, this was one of the great themes of the pope’s meeting with the young people of the world. At St. Francis of Assisi of the Providence of God Hospital the pope said, “To embrace, to embrace—we all have to learn to embrace the one in need, as St. Francis did.” This is a privileged way of embracing the suffering body of Christ, which brings light to the one offering help and exhortation, as the leper embraced by St. Francis was a “mediator of light” for him. Among the poor community of Varginha Pope Francis urged all his listeners to aim for solidarity in their lives, which is the path to real wealth and greatness. “[O]nly when we are able to share do we truly become rich; everything that is shared is multiplied…. The measure of the greatness of a society is found in the way it treats those most in need, those who have nothing apart from their poverty.”

To be in solidarity is to make sure the elderly are treated well and consulted as sources of wisdom. Real solidarity opposes the culture of rejection, especially of the old and the child. (This is surely an implicit reference to the evils of euthanasia and abortion.) Solidarity also moves a society to assure work for its young people. The pope laments the fact that so many young people throughout the world lack sufficient work to support themselves and to contribute to the common good. Also contributing to solidarity would be the rehabilitation of politics. To representatives of the leading classes of Brazil Pope Francis said, “[T]o rehabilitate politics…is one of the highest forms of charity.”

Pope Francis’s message is not the social gospel without the faith. He movingly exhorts young people to hold on to their faith without diluting it in any way. He urges them to be joyful disciples and missionaries in the world, able and willing to embrace the cross of Christ for the sake of love. In the prayer vigil on July 27 Pope Francis urged young people to be “Christ’s athletes,” to build up the Church of Christ, and to show people how joyful it is to live the beautiful Christian faith.

The well-being of the family is another recurring theme in the pope’s speeches. At the recitation of the Angelus on July 26 Pope Francis spoke about the importance of grandparents for family life, “for passing on the human and religious heritage which is so essential for each and every society!”

In his meeting with the bishops of Brazil the pope urged them to seek out those who no longer have any interest or hope in the Church, or “who already seem godless, both in theory and practice.” He said, “We need a Church unafraid of going forth into their night. We need a Church capable of meeting them on their way. We need a Church capable of entering into their conversation. We need a Church able to dialogue with those disciples who, having left Jerusalem behind, are wondering aimlessly, alone, with their own disappointment, disillusioned by a Christianity now considered barren fruitless soil, incapable of generating meaning.”

Taken all together these speeches reveal a pope in love with Christ and full of love for all human beings. He longs to bring the truth of the Christian faith to peoples and desires that solidarity be embraced in every country of the world.
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