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Fellowship of Catholic Scholars
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Reminder: Membership dues will be mailed out the first of the year and are based on a calendar (not academic) year.

THE PRESIDENT’S LETTER

Summer Doldrums?

by William L. Saunders, Esq.
Senior Vice President and Senior Counsel
Americans United for Life

Washington, D.C., from where I write, is known, for the summer doldrums: i.e., excessively hot and humid summer days that drain one’s energy. Of course, in D.C., as everywhere in the USA, we have air conditioning now, which makes it possible to live in this tropical environment. When I remarked to a friend recently that air-conditioning was the greatest invention of all time, he noted that, while the AC is good, there is another side to the matter: before we had air conditioning, Congress went home for the summer!

We are hardly in the “hazy, lazy” days of summer this year. As I write, not only is Congress still in session, but we are also poised between the release of two very important documents, documents which, taken together, will have a significant influence on how Catholics remember this summer. The first is the Pope Francis’s encyclical on the environment; the second is the Supreme Court’s decision regarding same-sex “marriage.”

First, to speak of an institution that still flees Washington in the summer, the Supreme Court is notorious for issuing its most controversial opinions at the very end of its term, the end of June. (For instance, recall that is when the Hobby Lobby decision was issued last year.) By the time you read this, the decision on same-sex marriage will have been issued. It is hazardous to predict the result, but many faithful Catholics expect a bad result, i.e., that the Court will find a right to same-sex marriage in the “due process” clause of the 14th Amendment. Of course, such a result would be absurd (for example, the 14th Amendment says not a word about marriage, which has always been a matter for state and local law), and would be particularly absurd coming from a Court who must have an institutional memory of the chaos it unleashed in its decision on abortion, Roe v. Wade. Indeed, Justice Antony Kennedy, who is expected to be the decisive vote in a 5–4 decision on marriage, was on the Court in 1992 when the Court, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, upheld Roe
despite the presence of three new supposedly pro-life justices. Therein, the Court told pro-life Americans to “go home” and accept its decision in Roe. Instead, 25 years later, pro-life Americans continue to fight for the defenseless unborn. If the Court decides in favor of a “constitutional right” to same-sex marriage, it can expect a similar result.

The second document, Pope Francis’s encyclical, Laudato Si, “On Care for Our Common Home,” was just issued as I was composing this letter. I have not had time to read and study it yet. Initial reactions are vigorous and across the spectrum. I have read some of these reports, and I am glad to see that there are passages that uphold the right to life of the unborn and refuse to blame population growth for the world’s problems. I am sure members of the Fellowship will be studying the document, and it should provide abundant material for discussion and analysis at our annual convention.

Let me take a moment to remind you about the annual convention: this year, in light of the fact that Pope Francis will be visiting the USA on the weekend when we traditionally hold our convention, we are holding it October 23-25. (This is a one-time change; after 2015, we will return to our practice of holding the annual convention during the last full weekend of September.) The 2015 convention will be in St. Paul/Minneapolis. Please go to our web page and register to attend — www.catholicscholars.org

I note, very briefly, the passing of two great Catholics, Ken Whitehead, who was a prolific writer and devoted member of the Fellowship, and law professor, Charles Rice. Please pray for them.

Also, please pray for—and support—the Fellowship.

See you in Minneapolis/St. Paul! ✯

The State of the Church in the United States: A Theological and Sociological Reflection

by Msgr. Robert J. Batule
Pastor of Corpus Christi Church, Mineola, NY

Later this year (December 7th), we will mark the fiftieth anniversary of the promulgation of Gaudium et spes, the last of the sixteen documents of Vatican II. Along with it being the final document approved by the council fathers and confirmed by Pope Paul VI, it is also the longest. In the lengthy text, there is a consideration of culture in Part II, Chapter II, in numbers 53-62.

The pastoral constitution refers to culture as “those things which go to the refining and developing of man’s diverse mental and physical endowments.” As such, culture “necessarily has historical and social overtones” and “carries…sociological and ethnological connotations.” And then there is this observation:

“[A] more universal form of culture is gradually taking shape.” Today, we would probably call this phenomenon “globalization.”

These descriptors above are all of a generic nature and pose no difficulty for anyone trying to come to terms with the Church’s attitude toward culture. What should interest us, theologically and sociologically, is the document’s treatment of conflict between faith and culture. On this point, the document refers to “difficulties in the way of harmonizing culture with Christian thought,” but surprisingly nothing else is said on the question of conflict between faith and culture.

It is fair to say that this is rather curious. It is rather curious because culture and faith have been bumping up against each other for centuries. Even if it was the intention of those who drafted the document to pass over specific historical examples of conflict between
faith and culture, it is still unusual that there would be such minimal acknowledgement of such a common feature like conflict in a 2,000-year association. Why is that?

Tracey Rowland thinks she has the answer. Rowland is the author of a volume entitled *Culture and the Thomist Tradition* (2003). Rowland’s analysis makes use of two terms inextricably bound up with the Second Vatican Council. These would be *aggiornamento* and *ressourcement*. The former is from the Italian and is translated as “updating.” The latter is from the French and means a “return.” Rowland thinks a true appraisal of culture—with its hazards and pitfalls as well as its potentialities—did not develop because the *aggiornamento* hermeneutic dominated the *ressourcement* hermeneutic.

Updating is one thing, accommodation is quite another. Rowland maintains that accommodation became the accepted way rather quickly for updating to be understood. In fact, as early as 1966, Karl Barth (1886–1968), the Neo-Orthodox Protestant theologian, was asking, “What does *aggiornamento* mean? Accommodation to what?”

That accommodation became the prevalent mode for the Church in the postconciliar period and that it developed so quickly is interesting when we consider the stated aim of the Council Fathers. In the beginning of *Gaudium et spes*, they write of a desire “to enter into dialogue” with the world about “different problems.” And what the council will do is “clarify these problems in the light of the Gospel.”

Notice should be taken of the word “dialogue.” A dialogue presupposes that both sides are contributing to the relationship and there is a genuine give and take occurring. But has this really happened? It would appear that it has been more of a monologue, with the “world” pretty much setting the terms of the debate. As far as problems are concerned, it is true that *Gaudium et spes* treats a host of problems—among them: atheism, war and peace and economic disparity in the community of nations. Yet, as the Council Fathers indicate in *Gaudium et spes*, these problems are to be addressed from the vantage point of the gospel. This too is what *Gaudium et spes* says about “reading the signs of the times.” The signs of the times are to be read in light of the gospel. The interpretation, “the reading” has not been adequate though because it lacks any serious critique of culture. And this is not just a difficulty of practical application. It begins, Rowland says, with a theoretical weakness in *Gaudium et spes*.

The theoretical weakness in the document, according to Rowland, is the absence of “any particular theology of culture.” Eschewing both the Augustinian and Thomistic traditions which could have served as interpretive keys for culture, the Council Fathers effectively leave it to the discretion of the faithful to find and utilize their own principles of interpretation for culture. Without a theological outlook to inform the appraisal of culture, many commentators have by default latched on to a characterization of the world and society as “modern” and have presumed that the “faith” is to be brought up to date with modernity. What we are left with then is a vague and amorphous “spirit of renewal” for faith to contribute in its influence on culture. And therein lies the problem. According to Fr. James Schall the “spirit of renewal has, in effect, insisted that the project be one, wherever possible, of accommodating Catholicism to modernity. It has not been seen, as perhaps it should have been, as a profound critique of modernity itself by Catholicism.”

But before dealing with the critique of modernity, we should stay with the idea of accommodation. I suggest this progression because the theoretical part of accommodation is inexorably connected to the practical expression of accommodation. Seeing the theoretical aspect of accommodation along with its practical dimension strengthens my case that the decline in the Church’s public witness is not just demonstrably true, but that it requires an urgent shifting of paradigms if we are to stem that decline.

At just about the midway point of the twentieth century, H. Richard Niebuhr (1894–1962), a professor at the Yale Divinity School, delivered a series of lectures at the Austin Presbyterian Theological Seminary. Two years later, his lectures were published in book form under the title *Christ and Culture* (1951). The volume contains what Niebuhr calls typologies or theoretical constructs for making sense of how faith and culture interact. According to Niebuhr, there are five types: Christ Against Culture, Christ of Culture, Christ Above Culture, Christ and Culture in Paradox and Christ the Transformer of Culture. The second type—Christ of Culture—is what concerns us now.

The Christ of Culture is described by Niebuhr with expressions like the following: “[N]o great tension between church and world”; “accommodate Christian-ity to the culture of the day”; “all conflict between Christ and culture is gone”; and “the Christ of culture becomes a chameleon.” Faith, according to this type, accepts and endorses the dominant patterns at work in the social fabric. Christians of this type do not clash
with their fellow citizens over values and vision.

Niebuhr’s types are somewhat akin to models that might be used in some disciplines to delineate different positions in relation to a matter at hand. The social sciences, for example, make use of models as a way of categorizing discreet schools of thought on a topic. Models even have their place in theology as Avery Dulles showed in Models of the Church (1974) and Models of Revelation (1983) although care is not always exhibited by all who employ the term around dogma and doctrine.

Models give a taxonomy as do types, and thus in this sense we can refer to the types as models. And given that Niebuhr himself refers to the Christ of Culture type as an accommodation, let us then call it the accommodation model. The accommodation model looks for the easy fit between Catholicism and the culture. If, for some reason, the easy fit is not there at the beginning, faith is pared and shaved until the right fit is eventually found. Accommodation is a pliable enough concept, yet for all intents and purposes, the culture never has to sacrifice its prerogatives. Its hegemony over faith is so complete that when people make capital decisions affecting the character and direction of their lives, it is more likely that faith recedes far into the background if it can be detected at all.

More can be said about the accommodation model but my point is clear, I think. Accommodation means that you are going to act pretty much like other people do across a wide range of behaviors. You arrange your life in such a way that faith is not going to hold you back from behaving like other people do. But what about data suggesting that an accommodation has occurred?

I started this presentation by calling attention to an event fifty years ago—the publication of Gaudium et spes. What was it like pastorally five decades ago in the United States? Anecdotes might help but they are not a sound basis for scientific verification. Historical novels might shed some light also but they have their limitations as well. It is best to draw on some statistical data because that will give us a picture that we would not have otherwise.

Every year, The Official Catholic Directory is produced by P.J. Kenedy and Sons. This volume gives an account of what is happening in the Catholic Church according to diocese, state, region and the whole country, of course. It is self-reporting; there is no hiding that fact. But it is self-reporting about acts in the sacramental sphere; it includes other indices too which offer a barometer or gauge of Catholic life. And unless counting is a problem (and it ought not to be), we have no reason to call into question the veracity of what is reported. Unlike survey data on opinions and attitudes when respondents may say one thing and do another, statistical data on acts of religion are transparent. Either the acts of religion as stated occurred or they didn’t. Now their effect is in the order of grace and that is beyond our reach of knowing. Besides, we are not undertaking an evaluation of the soul; we are attempting only to ascertain the practice of accommodation.

In the 1965 Kenedy Directory, infant baptisms numbered 1,310,413. In the 2014 edition of the volume, the latest year for which we have statistics, the number of infant baptisms totaled 730,171. In nearly fifty years, that is a decline of approximately 45 percent.

In 1965, there were 58,632 priests according to the Kenedy Directory. Through last year, there were 39,022 priests. Over the years, that is a drop-off in the range of 33 percent.

In 1965, 352,458 couples entered into marriages recognized as valid unions by the Catholic Church. Almost fifty years later, the number had fallen to 157,755. That is a drop of approximately 55 percent.

And then, of course, there is the matter of mass attendance. The Kenedy Directory does not publish statistics on this act of religion, but we do know that it was relatively high in 1965. The Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate put it then at 55 percent. Other estimates go even higher than that—but for comparison sake now, we’ll use the CARA statistic. The Pew Research Center polling found the rate of mass attendance in 2012 to be 24 percent. Personally, I believe the percentage to be even lower than that. I think 24 percent would be a high water mark observable in a few places where Catholic life is in better shape than the profile nationally. I suspect that in most urban and suburban locales the rate of Mass attendance now does not exceed 16 percent except on Christmas and Easter.

We start by acknowledging the most conspicuous thing about the statistical data I just cited. And it is this: Catholicism has a much smaller footprint in the culture than it used to have. Even though Catholics are 22 percent of the population nationally and still the largest denomination in the country, the fact that there are fewer of them getting baptized, getting married, getting ordained and going to mass regularly means that the Catholic charism is less and less evident in the culture. With fewer and fewer Catholics having less and less affiliation with the Church, there is a smaller and smaller
likelihood that the Catholic culture impacts the overall tenor of society. That in itself is an accommodation, but it only tells part of the story. Another critically important element is the attitudes Catholics have developed even apart from their smaller numbers.

Let’s start with some situational context. The clear trend is for parents to have fewer children today than did their parents and grandparents before them. Men and women, on average, marry later in life now than did those of earlier generations. It is more costly to raise children today, and economic conditions preclude having a big family, say many. Besides, some Catholic parents will say that they can’t do without what other middle class families have today—vacations, the resources to travel, a second home—just a few things which are now considered essential staples of middle class life.

A priestly vocation is not the same in terms of prestige and status that it was in 1965. Catholic young men today find celibacy a deterrent, some assert. Others allege unreal pastoral expectations and too much moving around in assignments which make for fewer priests now.

Cohabitation is popular with young people today, and why not choose “trial marriage” before the real thing? Since marriage is just a ceremony anyway, what’s wrong with a beach or a vineyard as the venue for the wedding?

I have lots to do on a weekend; I just can’t always make it to Mass…. I pray on my own; I don’t need to go to a church to pray…. I can still be a good person if I don’t go to Mass, right?

This is how a lot of Catholics raising families look upon having children today—as I described it above. This is how many Catholics view a priestly vocation today—as I described it above. This is how many Catholics consider marriage today—as I described it above. And this is how untold numbers of Catholics see the Eucharist today—as I described it above. These are, ineluctably, attitudes which come from somewhere. They are attitudes born of a culture, a culture at variance with the Catholic faith. And these by no means the only attitudes set in opposition to faith—not by a long shot.

Recent polling data shows that Catholic attitudes on key moral issues are completely out of step with Catholic teaching. On the question of so-called same-sex marriage, for example, a majority of Catholics (54 percent) favors it according to the Pew Research Center (2013). A majority of Catholics (66 percent) in another poll (Pew Research Center, 2014) does not regard homosexuality (actions and lifestyle) as sinful. A Gallup Poll (2012) indicates that 82 percent of Catholics do not find contraception morally objectionable. On this last point, it is a little surprising that Catholic approval of contraception is not at 90 percent, which the poll says is the non-Catholic approval rate of contraception. Thus, there is a slight difference on the issue of contraception according to this poll, but other polls show no difference between Catholic and non-Catholic approval.

I note about the statistics just cited on Catholic attitudes pertaining to so-called same-sex marriage, homosexuality, and contraception that they track very closely to the attitudes of other Americans. And we see clearly a clear difference between what the Church’s Magisterium holds on these matters and how they are viewed culturally. In other words, what the culture approves of, the Church’s teaching often opposes. Yet baptized Catholics—those practicing and those not—are clearly with the culture and not with the Church.

Things weren’t always this way. Fifty years ago, Catholic attitudes conformed much better to Catholic teaching and the culture itself was basically supportive of Catholic teaching. But, as we all know, the culture has changed drastically in five decades. To use the terminology of Bill O’Reilly, the Fox television host of “The O’Reilly Factor,” the United States is now made up of traditionalists and secular progressives. While the former group may in fact be larger than the latter, the values of the secular progressives are ascendant throughout the culture. It is the values of this group, the secular progressives, which determine the cultural agenda in the United States now.

An important contributing factor to this seismic shift in attitudes is traceable to the 1960s when the culture forming institutions—the family, schools, arts and entertainment, the media—were deeply affected by change agents and their ideas. At the fifty-year mark, many of the change agents have passed from the scene or are living comfortably in retirement. Their ideas however have not passed away. They have been carried and transmitted successfully in what might be termed “the march through the institutions.” The consequence, of course, is a virtual monopoly across all sectors of American culture, with the last holdout—business—joining most recently in the juggernaut.

To be specific about the ideas, I mention just a few: tolerance, being nonjudgmental, equality, nondiscrimination, inclusiveness, and diversity. These ideas and the rigid enforcement of a single interpretation of each idea
dominate today. Proscribed, of course, are these other ideas: nature, evil, sin, common good, and complementarity. Make no mistake about it, the stakes are very high. Either abide in the prevailing ethos or put at risk your career, your reputation, and social acceptability.

Regarding the pace of the attitudinal changes, we might say that it was not very accelerated at first. Yet even in the first ten years (1965–75), Pope Paul VI stated unambiguously in Evangelii nuntiandi (1973) that the split between the gospel and culture is without a doubt the drama of our time. Concern was also registered by Pope Saint John Paul II in his pastoral pilgrimage to France in 1980 when he remarked: “There exists only one problem, that of our faithfulness to the covenant with eternal wisdom, which is the source of true culture, that is, of man’s growth, and that of faithfulness to the promises of our baptism.” And, then, poignantly queried: “France, eldest daughter of the Church, are you faithful to the promises of your baptism?”

On a trip to the United States in 1987, the pontiff observed: “[C]ulture, while having a certain dynamic endurance, is always changing and developing as a way of life. Thus the American culture of today stands in continuity with your culture of 50 years ago. Yet it has changed; it has been greatly influenced by attitudes and currents of thought.” It surely has. And while the pope was too diplomatic to say so, I suspect he knew that the “attitudes and currents of thought” with the greatest influence over the American culture more than twenty-five years ago had largely become inhospitable to faith.

I do not go too far out on a limb when I hold that the pace of attitudinal change has picked up momentum in just the last few years. Take, for instance, the matter of so-called same-sex marriage. At the time of Evangelii nuntiandi and at the time of John Paul II’s second visit to the United States, the issue of so-called same-sex marriage wasn’t even on the cultural radar screen. Unlike some other issues which tip for and against by degree, the shift on so-called same-sex marriage has come at lightning speed. It seems clear that the cultural approbation conferred upon homosexual conduct made possible the subsequent cultural sanction given to so-called same-sex marriage. Cultural change happens slowly at the beginning until a certain threshold is reached. Then, its pace is quickened when any objection presented by faith is finally overcome.

This leaves us in the position of having to render an appraisal. I am arguing here, following the earlier assessment of Karl Barth, that faith has accommodated itself to culture. Moreover, I make the case here that a theoretical accommodation and a practical accommodation are inexorably linked. But before passing on to some other considerations in this presentation, let me clarify a few points.

I am not referring to any wholesale abandonment of faith. What I have in mind is a failure in formation. The Catholic Church has failed to form disciples who in turn have failed to sustain a genuinely Catholic culture—what sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann would call a plausibility structure. Let me add as well that the failure at discipleship and the failure at sustaining a genuinely Catholic culture has come on different levels. Thus, there is more than enough blame to go around personally and institutionally. Yet, the accommodation is not foremost about assigning blame, either. That having been said, we must characterize the situation accurately. And sometimes even our wisest commentators misjudge what is going on.

Three years before he became a Catholic, Richard John Neuhaus published a volume entitled The Catholic Moment (1987). It followed by three years his seminal work about the role of religion in society called The Naked Public Square (1984). By the time The Catholic Moment appeared, expectations had been running high that the Lutheran pastor would produce something just as grand and just as ambitious as The Naked Public Square. He did not disappoint, especially if you consider the following analysis at the end of The Catholic Moment. Surveying the American religious landscape at the time, Neuhaus concluded that “the moment in which the Roman Catholic Church in the United States assumes its rightful role in the culture-forming task of constructing a religiously informed public philosophy for the American experiment in ordered liberty” had arrived.

It was a provocative proposal advanced by Neuhaus. Historically, the United States had been thought of as a Protestant nation; besides, Catholics were not too far removed from their status as immigrants. There were other obstacles to overcome as well, including a mistrust that Catholic loyalties were not American enough—that somehow Catholics were, well, just too Catholic. How would it be possible then for them to assume the lead among all the religious bodies in the culture-forming task for America? It was a grand and ambitious assessment by Neuhaus and it would be a grand and ambitious accomplishment if Catholics could pull it off.

Catholics had begun to come of age in the United States after World War II. They had started earning
graduate degrees in large numbers then, and were now making names for themselves in the professions—succeeding like never before. They were everywhere—showing up in just about every field, in just about every occupation. By winning the White House in 1960, John F. Kennedy had helped to usher in a period of Catholic self-confidence, and had finally put to rest any latent suspicion that Catholics could not be Catholic and American at the same time.

With the Catholic record of achievement after World War II and the decline of mainline Protestantism evident from the 1960s onward, it is not difficult to see how the Catholic charism might be effective in shaping the American culture. Its emphasis on community as opposed to individualism and preservation as opposed to innovation provides Catholicism with distinct advantages in cultural formation. Additionally, the Church’s social teaching gives Catholics an authoritative voice in discussions over how best to maintain a just social order.

But whatever became of the Catholic Moment? Some twenty years after Neuhaus published his book heralding the arrival of the Catholic Moment, he came out with Catholic Matters (2006). In Catholic Matters, there is barely a mention of the earlier book or the promised era we were entering into according to the founding editor of First Things. I am inclined to think that Fr. Neuhaus misjudged the strength of Catholicism in the United States to influence things culturally. Catholicism has opted not to be a culture-forming faith and instead has settled for being a culture-following faith.

Avery Dulles, whom I cited earlier in this paper, was, like Neuhaus, a convert to Catholicism. Their entrance into the Church was separated by some fifty years—Dulles in 1940 and Neuhaus in 1990. Cardinal Dulles, though a mentor to and friend of Fr. Neuhaus, held a less sanguine view of the faith and culture in the United States to influence things culturally. Dulles personally that the Gospel may be heard and revered.

While Neuhaus was more optimistic than Dulles on faith’s vibrancy in a heavily secular culture, even he admitted that accommodation was a realistic prospect. Neuhaus understood the accommodation to have occurred when the accent is placed on the “American” in the coupling of Catholic and American. “The goal,” he once observed, “is to be a Catholic American; to be a person who knows what it means to be a Catholic in America.” Yet knowing what it means to be a Catholic in America is overlaid with enormous difficulty right now. There has been much confusion and controversy in the last fifty years that the splendor of truth is hardly noticeable anymore to a majority of Catholics in America today. What, then, can we do to help fellow Catholics to recognize the pearl of great price (cf. Matt 13:45-46) and help them to hold on to it with matchless joy?

One of the first things that comes to mind is catechism or a review of the original-catechism. We have at least two generations of poorly catechized adult Catholics in our midst now. And being poorly catechized makes them susceptible to false doctrine. Sadly, many Catholics right now cannot distinguish between an article of faith and an op-ed article in The New York Times. Well, that might be an exaggeration, but not by much. Still, we have to reclaim the didache of authentic discipleship (cf. Acts 2:42) and announce it confidently even if we know some are not going to like it and be upset by it.

We have to be committed unequivocally to the new evangelization. As we all know, Pope Saint John Paul II introduced the term new evangelization into the Catholic lexicon. The new evangelization is not a new program; it’s a new way of living the Catholic faith. Therefore, it behooves all of us to acquire for the first time or regain the ardor and fervor of the missionaries to foreign lands, and start applying these qualities to our own witness right here at home. We must take to heart the counsel Saint Paul gave to Saint Timothy when he wrote: “[B]e self-possessed in all circumstances; put up with hardship; perform the work of an evangelist; fulfill your ministry” (2 Tim 4:5). We must not be afraid to undertake sacrifices personally that the Gospel may be heard and revered.

And, obviously, we must not forget the call or summons to personal conversion. Our own personal relationship to the Lord must be renewed and revitalized. That, of course, necessarily involves an ongoing commitment to prayer and a conscientious participation in the sacramental life of the Church. Like the Apostle to the Gentiles, we don’t want to preach to others and find ourselves disqualified from inheriting...
the imperishable crown of eternal life (cf. 1 Cor. 9:27). In Latin, we say: salus animarum suprema lex—the salvation of souls is the highest law. It is not selfish to be concerned that I make it to heaven too.

As important as catechesis, evangelization, and holiness are to the discussion about faith and culture, we ought not to overlook three other salient points. They would be: prophecy, judgment, and typology. In this last part of my paper today, I want to show how all three of these issues figure in the interaction of faith and culture in the United States following the Second Vatican Council. I begin with prophecy.

Every baptized person is given a share in the prophecy of Christ. Baptism signifies that just as the Son was anointed with the Spirit (cf. Lk 4:18), so too are the adopted sons and daughters of God anointed with the Spirit to live and speak prophetically. The prophetic ministry that Jesus exercised was incontestably a public ministry. It was carried out for others to see and hear; otherwise, how would they become the Lord’s disciples? Not in secret but in the open were the disciples called and so would their witness have to be a public witness. This holds for Confirmation as well. The Catechism of the Catholic Church, quoting Saint Thomas, says the confirmed person receives the power to profess faith in Christ publicly and as it were officially (1305).

The distinction between public and private is a useful one, and we in the West are accustomed to keeping these two domains as separate from one another as we can make them. Today, people claim a zone of privacy which is thought to shield them from having to answer inquiries about their behavior. Think here of privacy laws covering the release of medical records to parties you have not authorized to receive that information. This is perfectly reasonable, and we ought to respect such fundamental partitions as being in accord with basic human dignity.

I have a sense, however, that there is excessive recourse to the public/private distinction as a way of not having to deal with divisive issues in society. Abortion comes to mind immediately. The fact that Catholic politicians claim to be privately opposed but not publicly opposed to abortion shows how willing we are to accept intellectual fallacy for political expediency.

God raised up prophets to restore the lost children of Israel. God does the same with the New Israel, the Church, to bring back those who have gone astray morally and spiritually. But how are people to know when they have exchanged the worship of the one, living God for the worship of the golden calf if not for the presence of prophets? Prophets let us know when we have crossed that line; their voices keep ringing in our ears.

The accommodation model lowers the volume on prophecy to the point of inaudibility. Prophecy will be honored again when a new model for the interaction of faith and culture is sought and appropriated.

Earlier in this paper, I made a reference to ideas which are in vogue right now, and I counted not being judgmental in that favored class. Children are growing up in a culture where judgments are forbidden because of the harm they do to self-esteem. Multiculturalism has made it difficult if not impossible to judge using categories such as better and worse and superior and inferior. And in that justly famous phrase uttered by then–Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, the dictatorship of relativism, we find an apt expression for the aversion to judgment which makes everything relative.

Seldom do we hear of judgment in Catholic circles anymore—not even at wakes and funerals. Either Jesus is not the Just Judge that the Word of God says he is, or everyone scores in the 99th percentile, only a shade away from perfection. If there is any talk of judgment at all, it is the right of culture to judge faith. And when that judgment is made, we stand accused, for instance of promoting patriarchy and sexism, all because we believe the Church is not authorized to break with the Lord’s example and ordain women to the ministerial priesthood. Such can be the smugness of culture—judging against revelation and for the assertion of a presumed right.

Judgment is an act of intelligence, and, according to Fr. Bernard Lonergan, it is the highest expression of intelligence. As conscience is a knowing with (con and scio), we know with God through the act of judging. And thus judgments are not to be avoided or attempted only as a last resort. Quite the contrary: They are to be made with care and forethought, insuring as best we can that our judgments are wise like the Wisdom of God.

Judgment also goes by the name of discernment. As Saint John tells us in the New Testament, we must discern the spirits to see which ones belong to God and which ones do not (cf. 1 Jn 4:1). That there are spirits in the world opposed to the Incarnate Lord and who seek to deceive the children of God (cf. 1 Jn 4:2–4) is a warning that we do not have it easy even if we have been given the Spirit of truth. We must therefore do the hard work of thinking through and rejecting the variations of, “If you are the Messiah, save yourself and us”
(Lk 23:39). That is, a salvation without the cross.

The accommodation model attenuates the eschatological character of faith. Stated another way, the last things of faith tend to get obscured or dismissed in a culture which recoils at the thought that we should atone for anything.

Much earlier in my presentation today, I adverted to H. Richard Niebuhr and his types for organizing how faith and culture are related to each other. I indicated then that the types are best seen as theoretical constructs. Theoretical constructs help us to distinguish one pattern from another and help us to identify strengths and weaknesses in the different ways there are for faith and culture to interact. I said also that our attention would be focused in this paper on the second of five types, the one called Christ of Culture.

As my remarks have shown today, I believe the accommodation model gives us an accurate account of what has transpired between faith and culture on the Catholic scene the last fifty years. It is my considered view that the attitudinal and behavioral evidence is there to back up my claim.

I mentioned too that accommodation has caused a decline in the Church’s public witness in the post-conciliar period. To reverse this situation, we need to consider two other types to guide our understanding of how faith and culture are to interact today.

These two other types are Christ Above Culture and Christ Against Culture, what are the third and first types in Niebuhr’s analysis. For all the reasons I have set forth, the accommodation model has served us poorly and it’s time we adopt a better way for connecting faith and culture.

The third type or model, Christ Above Culture, is the classically Catholic way of integrating faith and culture. What it does is seek a synthesis of faith and culture. The embodiment of this type is none other than Saint Thomas Aquinas whose life work was to show how grace and nature are related to one another. Grace perfects what is in nature, and thus we should seek what is noble and good in culture and elevate it through faith. But what about when we are confronted by things which are implacably hostile to the faith, what do we do then? It is necessary then, I think, to oppose what is irremediably contradictory to the faith. And thus we should then adopt the Christ Against Culture type for our witness.

The question arises though: Do we need to withdraw from the world and break off engagement with it? Do we need to go, as it were, into the desert and flee the corruption of the world? Father Neuhaus thinks not. In his book Catholic Matters he says, “The Church may sometimes appear to be against the world, but she is only against the world for the world.” He continues, “The Catholic disposition is culture-affirming… The Church imposes nothing; she only proposes, but what a proposal! When that proposal is rejected, the Church is joined with Christ in weeping over the human city that did not know the time of its visitation.” He definitely has a point here, but I am thinking today of what our response ought to be in the face of things like the Culture of Death.

I think when it comes to the life issues and religious freedom that we need to insist firmly that faith will not be compromised. Its integrity is too valuable and we should not make any concessions to the darkest cultural obsessions that are in our midst. If this takes us back to the golden age of the martyrs, so be it. But maybe it’s not going back at all—perhaps it’s really going forward: far forward into eternity! What we have seen over the last few months through the mainstream media reporting on it is a steady campaign of intense persecution against Christians precisely because of what they believe. Whether it’s in the Middle East or parts of Africa or right here in the United States, the Christian faith is a marked faith. Those who resist—whether they are red martyrs or white martyrs—are paying a heavy price for what they believe. They are helping us to clarify what we believe. They are helping us to stand up and be counted too.

To return again to that third type, Christ Above Culture, we need to incorporate the first type, Christ Against Culture, back into our public witness. When we do that, the accommodation model will have been effectively retired as a mode of public witness and we will no longer fear what others think of us. Then, it will only matter what Christ thinks of us. That’s when we will be free, free at last! *
The Impact of Vatican II

by Jude P. Dougherty
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In 1966, B. Herder Book Company of St. Louis published a collection of essays which I had assembled and edited under the title The Impact of Vatican II, even though the council was still in session. That volume followed another which I had previously published under the title The Theological Directions of the Ecumenical Movement. I was too inexperienced to fully understand what was going on in the Catholic intellectual world. Yet, for the Herder volume, I provided a preface that questioned the direction that the council seemed to be taking. The two volumes contained essays by Thomas Merton, and biblical scholars and philosophers, including Carroll Stuhlmueller, C.P., Aidan Kavanaugh, O.S.B., Eugene L. Peterman, C.P., and Alfred E. Horrigan.

It is difficult to say when the impact of the Second Vatican Council first began to be felt. Long before the concluding session there was a universal awareness that forces of considerable magnitude were at work within the Church. The very calling of the council itself stirred the imagination. When John XXIII went on to describe the aim of the Council as aggiornamento, he inspired inquiry into every aspect of the life of the Church. He repeatedly expressed his desire for renewal, a desire that the Church be brought up to date so that it might not be seen as some anachronistic relic of past ages but as the focus of all anxieties and aspirations that press upon mankind today.

As the council progressed, hardly any area of ecclesiastical affairs failed to experience the impact of its deliberations. Many sentiments and ideas subtly present within the structure of the church suddenly received articulation. Few doctrines, no matter how rigorous their traditional formulation, were left unexamined.

The liberal drive to bring the Church into the modern world soon overwhelmed the more cautious members of the council. The spirit of the day was reflected in the judgment of the French theologian, later Cardinal, Jean Danielou, “Theological inquiry can no longer restrict itself to Scholasticism, which is immobile and doesn’t take into account the two principles of modern thought: historicity and subjectivity.”

Jacques Maritain, writing at the time, was alarmed by what he saw. He was appalled, he wrote, “by the appreciable number of Catholic intellectuals who employ themselves to destroy the treasure of truth which is the Church’s responsibility to transmit.”

It is difficult to deny that the council altered the Catholic intellectual landscape. The scholastic tradition quickly fell out of favor. In some circles the study of philosophy came to be one of several options for those preparing to study theology on the way to ordination. Disciplines such as psychology, sociology, and history were held to be equally valuable for pretheological study. Did it matter?

“Scholasticism” is a term loosely employed to designate the perennial philosophy often associated with the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, although its roots can be found in the second- and third-century Church Fathers, Justin Martyr and Clement of Alexandria. Often called “realism” to distinguish it from empiricism, idealism, naturalism, and phenomenology, it maintains that philosophy is a science with conclusions that can be passed from generation to generation, that in the pursuit of wisdom, one does not have to start over again in the manner of Descartes, Hume, Kant, or Hegel. It is vital for an understanding of the faith, for it is the realistic metaphysics of Aristotle that Clement thought absolutely essential for the defense of the faith against heresy and skepticism and for the development of Christian doctrine.

Justin Martyr brought to his apologetics a knowledge of Plato and Aristotle and held that philosophy leads to Christianity as its fulfillment. Clement taught that the Greeks fortuitously had prepared the way for the reception of the truths of the gospel. “Jewish law and Greek philosophy are the two rivers at whose confluence Christianity has sprung forth.” His insight was commonly affirmed in Catholic circles by the dictum, “Christ came in the fullness of time when the intellect of the West was prepared to receive the truths of the Gospels.”

The abandonment, if not suppression, of scholastic philosophy in the aftermath of the council is not without consequence. Attention has shifted from religion and the things that pertain to the temple to the social order. One can feel its effects in the liturgy where families are mostly directed to the readings to the neglect of doctrine supporting worship and the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. Concern for the poor and the pursuit of
social justice are no substitute for religion. Without the intellectual tools supplied by classical learning, it is difficult to talk about the Incarnation, the Trinity, and even the existence and attributes of God. One can historically see the effects of the neglect of the rational preamble in the antimetaphysical attitude of Luther and other reformers. That neglect leads directly to the fideism of Søren Kierkegaard and his twentieth-century followers, Barth, Bultmann, and Tillich. Religion as the payment of a debt to God through worship becomes man-centered in what has come to be called the “social gospel.”

Intuition and Evolution in the Thought of Henri Bergson

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Although the perception of his significance may have waned by the mid twentieth century, it is still fair to consider Henri Bergson a major figure in contemporary philosophy. Indeed, no less than the Nobel Committee for Literature in 1927 decided to award him its prize, “in recognition of his rich and vitalizing ideas and the brilliant skill with which they have been presented.”

Said to be reacting against strains of rationalism, Bergson was keen to express the shortcomings of the human intellect and scientific analysis, and complementary to these themes he developed an understanding of reality as expansively creative. Intellect and science, as Bergson took them, are suited to grasp only the material dimensions of reality; moreover, in doing so they necessarily adopt a partial, and hence distorted, view of the whole. Accepting that the whole exceeds its material dimensions, however, Bergson maintained that in order to grasp the fullness of reality, one needs to transcend intellect and take what he called an intuitive approach, the sort of approach which alone is capable of grasping how life moves in ways that are not limited or determined by material conditions.

Two triads helpfully encapsulate important aspects of Bergson’s thought: intellect–science–matter and intuition–metaphysics–life. To spell out the connections briefly: The activity of intellect is science, which is the arresting schematization of certain aspects of the world’s material dimensions. The activity of intuition, by contrast, is metaphysics, whereby one is attentive to the movement of the principle of life in and through its opposite, matter. According to Bergson, evolution is properly grasped through metaphysical inquiry—it is the object, so to speak, of intuition, not intellect or science.

In what follows I examine the development of Bergson’s thought in this area, with special attention to his ideas about intuition and evolution.

I. Intuitive Self-Reflection

In his 1903 essay “An Introduction to Metaphysics,” Bergson sets out to clarify his thought on the nature of metaphysics, an issue that hinges on the distinction he makes between intellectual analysis and intuition. He begins with the comment that throughout the history of philosophy, thinkers have generally agreed in distinguishing these two ways of knowing, which he also refers to as relative and absolute types of knowledge. The former is the activity of intellect, which consists in forming an external perspective with respect to an object—“going all around it.” The latter, by contrast, may be described as an internal penetration or knowledge of an object gained “by entering into it” and grasping “from within, inside it, in what it is in itself.”

He offers the example of a literary character, typically known relatively by readers, through the series of traits and events that its author details. This intimate type of knowledge would supersede the former, rendering that presentation of details superfluous insofar as it would already be implicitly given in...
the absolutely known “inner meaning of the original” as “perfectly what it is.” Moreover, what is known in this absolute, intimate manner cannot properly speaking be represented through language, for “[s]ymbols and points of view then place me outside it; they give me only what it has in common with others and what does not belong properly to it. But what is properly itself, what constitutes its essence, cannot be perceived from without, being internal by definition, nor be expressed by symbols, being incommensurable with everything else.”

Intuition is thus contrasted with analysis: The former is a “sympathy by which one is transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with what there is unique and consequently inexpressible in it”;

the latter is an intellectual grasp of one or several partial views of an object, “which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, common to that object and to others.” Further, intuition gets at the essential mobility of reality, whereas intellect arrests that mobility by representing it with snapshot-like concepts. For Bergson, this distinction is essential for defining metaphysics, which proceeds by the intuitive “possessing of reality absolutely,” in contrast to positive science, not to mention much of professional philosophy, which trade in concepts and proceed by intellectual analysis.

Intuition of one’s self is the primary instance of metaphysical awareness, according to Bergson. He describes this type of self-reflection by contrasting it with the many and varied instances of intellectual self-awareness, each of which reveals the self in limited and partial ways. Intuitively one knows one’s self as something more than a sum of parts. I might be aware of and associate with my self an array of perceptions, memories, habits, feelings, bodily matter, and so on, and I might be inclined to conceive of my self as a concatenation thereof, but the intuition of my self is quite different. Bergson writes:

if I pull myself in from the periphery and towards the center, if I seek deep down within me what is the most uniformly, the most constantly and durably myself, …[w]hat I find beneath these clear-cut crystals and this superficial congelation is a continuity of flow comparable to no other flowing I have ever seen. It is a succession of states each one of which announces what follows and contains what preceded…. In reality none of them do [sic] begin or end; they all dove-tail into one another.

Two related features of the self revealed through this intuitive grasp are notable, namely, its complexity and its ever-changing continuity. The self is complex inasmuch as it is the spring or source from which flows all the partial views that intellect may take—the perceptions, memories, habits, feelings, bodily matter, and so on. It is the unity of their multiplicity, containing them all. For Bergson, one’s present state is really “the best illuminated point of a moving zone which comprises all that we feel or think or will—all, in short, that we are at any given moment. It is the entire zone which in reality makes up our state. Now, states thus defined cannot be regarded as distinct elements.” Nor, I might add, are they properly called “states,” for that word denotes the opposite of the ever-changing character of the self that is intuitively grasped.

To speak of one’s present “state” is to be metaphorical, at best, given that intuition reveals the self as pervasive change that somehow hangs together intractably. In this respect the intuitive grasp reveals the self as the absolute, intimate manner cannot properly speak, being incommensurable with everything else. The enduring self is continuously compounding, always moving irreversibly forward. One’s memories are an especially apt source for revealing duration, insofar as the experience of recollection signals that one’s conscious life is always being archived and carried forward: “These memories, messengers from the unconscious, remind us of what we are dragging behind us unawares…. [E]ven though we may have no distinct idea of it, we feel vaguely that our past remains present to us.” As such—as enduring—one experiences an ever-new present, for strictly speaking it is impossible to repeat any moment of one’s existence insofar as the present continually accumulates upon the past. Yet intuition still reveals the undeniable continuity and unity of one’s self, the flowing connectedness of all the moments of one’s life, a “moving, changing, colored and living unity.”

This is the nature of reality that endures—ever-new, nonrepeating, irreversible—quite unlike, say, the movement of a clock, which proceeds in a mechanical, ever-repeating fashion that may even be reversed.

This intuitive grasp of the duration of one’s self may be the primary instance of metaphysical awareness, according to Bergson, but such awareness is not necessarily limited to the self-reflective gaze. Rather, the intuition of one’s own duration may serve as a conduit for a broader attunement to reality in general. To explain how this may come to pass, he begins with the
II. The Evolution of Life: Reality as Expansively Creative

As we have seen in “An Introduction to Metaphysics,” Bergson describes the practice of metaphysics by contrasting it with science: ‘The former is intuition’s grasp of so-called enduring reality, whereas the latter is the intellect’s analysis of reality which transposes the essentially moving nature of that reality into static concepts and mathematical functions. In Creative Evolution, he reiterates this distinction and provides a substantive example of metaphysical reflection.

By critiquing various themes and issues in contemporary evolutionary thinking, he offers an extended reflection on, and indeed defense of, his understanding of reality as duration. The vision of that reality which emerges is one that includes, but is not confined to, the necessitated, mechanistic order of matter—one that is also hospitable to the free, spontaneous, undetermined movement of life which generates novelty and is thus essentially creative. By identifying matter and its laws as the objects of natural science, Bergson helps to clarify how and why reflection on the evolution of life exceeds scientific analysis and is properly within the purview of philosophy.

According to Bergson, the opposed principles of matter and life jointly comprise reality, and so a strictly materialist worldview is partial and incorrect. In chapter one of Creative Evolution, he offers a philosophical argument and follows it up with supporting evidence drawn from reflections on current scientific research. Consideration of the contrast between organic and inorganic bodies—the nature of individual, organized beings and how this differs from matter in general—reveals life as a principle distinct from matter. Living beings are themselves integrated wholes, and as such, they exist and operate with unique autonomy, resisting description in terms of simple, mechanistic processes. Yet this is not to deny that living bodies are corporeal and thus subject in some degree to the laws of matter. As Bergson writes:

Doubtless [the living body], also, consists in a portion of extension bound up with the rest of extension, and intimate part of the Whole, subject to the same physical and chemical laws that govern any and every portion of matter. But while the subdivision of matter
into separate bodies is relative to our perception, while the building up of closed-off systems of material points is relative to our science, the living body has been separated and closed off by nature herself. It is composed of unlike parts that complete each other. It performs diverse functions that involve each other. It is an individual, and of no other object …can this be said.  

The “individuality” spoken of here may be thought of as the collective autonomy of a being’s parts, which includes among other things the capacity of those parts to contribute to reproduction, that is, the perpetuation of life outside and independent of one’s own body. In such activities we see evidence of a principle overcoming what might be called the drag or resistance of matter, by initiating movements and processes that matter alone is incapable of bringing about.

Isolated and closed not by intellectual analysis but by nature, an organic being is a system whose temporal existence unfolds in a manner that eludes formulic encapsulation. Again, this is the unique temporal existence that Bergson refers to as durée or duration. The concrete time of enduring, living beings is radically different from the abstract, homogenous time of inorganic beings. The error of scientific analysis is to deny this difference—as when, for example, “[t]ime is assumed to have just as much reality for a living being as for an hour-glass, in which the top part empties while the lower fills, and all goes where it was before when you turn the glass upside down.” Science errs to the extent that it analyzes and maps the duration of organic beings along the abstract, homogenous timeline appropriate only for inorganic beings. Truly, the unfolding of the existence of an organic being is manifestly different insofar as mysteries persist, particularly in the processes of growth and aging. There is no consensus regarding “what is gained and what is lost between the day of birth and the day of death.” Science might assume that the changes undergone by a being throughout its life are ultimately explicable in terms of material processes, but truly, Bergson asserts, the explanations of these phenomena “must lie deeper.” Matter is the what that ages, not the why of aging, and so physico-chemical principles alone are insufficient to explain these life-processes.

In the physical sciences, the laws of matter render “certain aspects of the present …calculable as functions of the immediate past.” Traditional science operates by analyzing phenomena in terms of their material components, which by their very nature lend themselves to predictability according to the laws of matter. But given this way of proceeding, science expressly deals only with what is material; strictly speaking, it has no concern for or authority regarding whatever, if anything, is immaterial. With respect to the study of life, Bergson maintains that “calculation touches, at most, certain phenomena of organic destruction. Organic creation, on the contrary, …we cannot in any way subject to mathematical treatment.” He points to the limits of science, evident in such cases as its failures to synthesize life and to explain or predict the movements of even the simplest of organisms, as compelling reasons to concede that life is indeed a constitutive principle of reality distinct from and opposed to matter. Acknowledging the retort of science, namely, that its present limits might be due only to temporary and progressively receding ignorance, Bergson responds: “[But] [these limits] may equally well express the fact that the present moment of a living body does not find its explanation in the moment immediately before.” It is as plausible, and perhaps even more so, that an immaterial principle of life injects an element of indeterminacy or spontaneity into a process that would otherwise proceed mechanically, so that each moment of a living being’s existence is in fact “incommensurable with its antecedents.” Yet science balks at this suggestion, which is incompatible with its habit of material reduction and analysis.

Bergson diagnoses this prejudice as stemming from the fact that science is concerned largely with those functional activities of living beings that are repetitive and hence amenable to mechanistic interpretation and analysis. He notes, however, that histologists, embryologists, and naturalists, who study the structures of life, its genesis, and its evolution, take a broader view and are less inclined to subscribe to a reductive interpretation, for they observe in these phenomena aspects of the unpredictable creativity of life that confounds materialism. This point of view is much in line with Bergson’s. By means of his own philosophical criticisms of mechanistic and finalistic interpretations of evolution, he fleshes out his own so-called vitalistic position: that “evolution” itself necessarily entails—or indeed is—the activity of life’s creativity, over and against the resistance of matter.

According to Bergson, the mechanistic interpretation of evolution “is to regard the future and the past as calculable functions of the present, and thus to claim that all is given.” The mechanistic interpretation presupposes an exclusively materialist worldview, in which
all events in the universe unfold after the fashion of a cascading of set of dominoes laid out in an elaborate scheme. The process is an orderly succession of interrelated phases, all playing out according to determinate laws of nature. With sufficient accumulation of data, the disposition of the universe at any given time could be determined through careful computation. Such a system leaves no room for novelty or the unforeseen—words that represent “merely the infirmity of a mind that cannot know everything at once.”

Mechanism is often taken as the opposite of finalism—the interpretation of nature whereby events are not the result of blind mechanism but rather the progressive realization of a preestablished plan; but Bergson, interestingly, maintains that finalism “is only inverted mechanism…. [for it] substitutes the attraction of the future for the impulsion of the past.”†9 Granted, mechanism and finalism are not equivalent, inasmuch as finalism lacks the “fixed rigid outlines” of theoretically perfect predictability that mechanism entails. †10 Yet, in Bergson’s estimation, finalism is no different with respect to the issue of novelty and indeed creativity: If a plan is preestablished and the unfolding of events is the faithful realization of that plan, then the supposition is, once again, that all is given. Diversion from the course, spontaneity, novelty, creativity—these all are excluded from such a context.†11

Moreover, he objects to finalism on empirical grounds, insofar as the realization of a plan implies progressively greater and greater harmony, which is evidently not the case in the natural world. He notes: “Life, in proportion to its progress, is scattered in manifestations which undoubtedly owe to their common origin the fact that they are complementary to each other in certain aspects, but which are none the less mutually incompatible and antagonistic.”†12 Classic predator–prey relationships confirm this insight. Also, certain forms of life such as fungi serve as counterexamples to finalism: “No doubt there is progress [in the movement of life] …; but this progress is accomplished only on the two or three great lines of evolution on which forms ever more and more complex, ever more and more high, appear; between these lines run a crowd of minor paths in which…deviations, arrests, and setbacks are multiplied.”†13 Thus Bergson argues that, to the extent that finalism means that events in the universe move in a coordinated fashion toward the ever more perfect realization of a plan, it is manifestly untrue.

He also takes on the intellectual legacies of Darwin and of Lamarck, critiquing both versions of evolutionary thinking in order to support his own view that life or the élan vitale is a single, unified principle operating in opposition to matter. His point of departure is the puzzle of morphological analogies: How have certain species, some primitive and others more refined, which are thought to have emerged along divergent lines of evolution, come to possess organs of strikingly similar function? For example, consider the eyes of a mollusk and of a horse.

As Bergson characterizes it, Darwinism posits that an organism’s features have been assembled through a blindly mechanistic series of accidental variations, either several gradual ones or fewer sudden ones, weeded out and preserved through a process of natural selection.†14 According to Bergson, however, morphological analogies pose a problem for this theory, whether the variations are many and gradual or fewer and abrupt. Regarding the former option, he asks two questions. First, if a variation is so slight as to be imperceptible, how or why should it be retained by natural selection?†15 Second, “[h]ow could the same small variations, incalculable in number, have ever occurred in the same order on two independent lines of evolution, if they were purely accidental?”†16 With respect to the option that evolution occurs through fewer abrupt variations, he concedes that this might be statistically less improbable than the former, because sudden variations would more likely introduce functions deserving to be preserved by natural selection, and because fewer of them would be required.†17 Yet it is still highly improbable that the same coordinated, intricate series of variations would occur along independent lines of evolution.†18 In summary, his assessment is that “in neither case can parallel development of the same complex structures on independent lines of evolution be due to a mere accumulation of accidental variations.”†19 The notion that a blind mechanism spinning out variations could produce an elaborate organ like an eye in one line of evolution is difficult enough to believe. This difficulty is compounded when such an achievement is supposed to occur in separate lines of evolution, absent some “good genius” overseeing the processes.†20

Compared with the theory of accidental variations, Bergson favors the Lamarckian notion that evolution occurs by a process of adaptation to the environment. Such a theory of adaptation may not positively affirm the existence of an efficacious immaterial—or, one might say, supra- or counter-material—principle, but it at least leaves room for the possibility of one, whereby an individual organism can exert some sort of effort to
adjust its corporeal nature to its circumstances. However, the Lamarckian account is not without its problems, hinging mainly on the proposition that evolution occurs by the inheritance of adaptations or acquired traits. Aside from the fact that inheritance of acquired traits tends to be discredited a priori on the basis of advanced genetic science, Lamarckism is deficient to the extent that it relies on the adaptive efforts of individuals to explain the evolution of entire species. In this critique we see Bergson laying the ground of his argument for the single, unified life principle or élan vitale. On the inner source of adaptation he writes:

But if this cause is nothing but the conscious effort of the individual, it cannot operate in more than a restricted number of cases.... [Evolution requires] some sort of effort, but an effort of far greater depth than the individual effort, far more independent of circumstances, an effort common to most representatives of the same species, inherent in the germs they bear rather than in their substance alone, an effort thereby assured of being passed on to their descendants.

Evolution as we know and observe it is far better explained by the élan vitale—the unified “original impetus of life” that pushes forth and diverges across the many and varied material forms of different lines of evolution, from the most primitive to the most refined. It is the aforementioned “good genius” that solves the mystery of morphological analogies, explaining what Darwinian blind mechanism and Lamarckian adaptation and inheritance cannot, namely, the parallel convergence, in diverse species, of complexes of parts that form analogously functional organs.

For Bergson, the evolution of life is the movement of the élan vitale—the distinctively biological principle that is wholly other than physico-chemical principles—in and through the material world. Therefore, a proper grasp of evolution is an achievement of metaphysics, not science. Scientific analysis of evolution as an embodied, material process is not illegitimate, for indeed evolution is manifest in corporeal forms; even so, science cannot but take a partial, and hence distorted, view: “Though the whole be original, science will always manage to analyze it into elements or aspects which are approximately a reproduction of the past.... Anything that is irreducible and irreversible in the successive moments of a history eludes science.” Bergson insists that evolution is “creative,” the progressive introduction of novelty in the universe; its movement is evidently among the irreducible and irreversible moments that science itself is incapable of comprehending.

To flesh out an understanding of so-called creative evolution, it is helpful to consider Bergson’s character-ization of the evolution of life as a paradoxical embodiment. Evolution is the ongoing process whereby life, which is essentially free and indeterminate, propagates itself by entering into and commandeering its opposite, matter, which is unfree and determined by physico-chemical laws. Life’s mission, as it were, is “to create with matter, which is necessity itself, an instrument of freedom, to make a machine which should triumph over mechanism, and to use the determinism of nature to pass through the meshes of the net which this very determinism has spread.”

Bergson also speaks of life as the “inversion” of matter and “an effort to re-mount that incline that matter descends.” Take, for example, a simple plant, which defies inertia and gravity as it shoots new growth upward and outward. In general, the comparison of organic and inorganic beings shows that the former are somehow the enlivening of the very same substrate that makes up the latter, and that this enlivening consists in enabling the substrate to transcend its purely material limitations. As for the paradoxical aspect of life’s embodiment, Bergson writes: “[Life] is riveted to an organism that subjects it to the general laws of inert matter. But everything happens as if it were doing its utmost to set itself free from those laws.” Life seeks to expand itself—that is, its essential indeterminacy—precisely through a process whereby of necessity it subjects itself to the constraints of matter.

Bergson catalogs the three main lines of evolution—vegetative, invertebrate, and vertebrate—each representing a different mode of life’s “success” in achieving this end of the inversion of matter. In general, life operates in organized matter by harnessing, storing, and releasing energy in activity. In plants, this tendency of life is supported by nutritive processes that draw directly from the air, earth, and water; and so plants exist in torpor, fixed in locations hospitable to their nutritive processes. Animals, by contrast, are locomotive, for they require that the nutritive elements of the earth first be fixed by plants (or by other animals), and they must be able to move in order to seek and gain nourishment.

Within the animal kingdom, life subdivides into the “opposite and complementary” tendencies of instinct and intelligence, the former characteristic of invertebrates and the latter of vertebrates. Very briefly, instinct corresponds to the activity of life associated with a narrow range of tasks that can be performed by
the body and with certain tools that enhance natural bodily structures, whereas intellect corresponds to the activity of life that involves the fashioning and use of a much wider set of tools for an infinitely broader range of tasks. The instruments of intellect “can take any form whatsoever, serve any purpose, free the living being from every new difficulty that arises and bestow on it an unlimited number of powers.”62 And so, intellect has the capacity most fruitfully to fulfill the tendency of life, that “certain effort to obtain certain things from the material world.”63

According to Bergson, the progress of evolution, that movement of life into and through matter for the sake of expanding its essential indeterminacy, culminates in the human species. Man is the material form in which the greatest indeterminacy and “the full breadth of life” are empirically manifest.44

The physiological intricacies of any higher vertebrate center around and are subordinate to the functioning of the brain and nervous system; such an animal “is essentially a sensorimotor system installed on systems of digestion, respiration, circulation, secretion, etc., whose function it is to repair, cleanse and protect it, to create an unvarying internal environment for it, and above all to pass it potential energy to convert into locomotive movement.”64 Indeed, the nervous system is the material locus of freedom and indeterminacy, as Bergson asserts: “A nervous system, with neurons placed end to end in such wise that, at the extremity of each, manifold ways open in which manifold questions present themselves, is a veritable reservoir of indetermination.”65 Moreover, a highly developed nervous system is an economizing achievement whereby the élan vitale maximizes the efficiency of its movement. Such a nervous system is a complex “switchboard” (carrefour) that coordinates a direct proportion of automatic and voluntary activity; as more of the processes required to sustain the organism are automated, more effort and energy are freed up for voluntary activity.66 It is important to note that the mechanisms of the brain and nervous system are not the essence but merely the conditions of this activity, which is proper to the force of life itself.67

The material form of man is most hospitable to the tendency of the élan vitale that appears as intellect, which serves most fully both to transform and to transcend matter. Bergson reflects on concepts and language in general as the instruments of freedom proper to intellect. They are the products of intellect that are the keys to man’s own harnessing of the necessity of nature, as they are essential in the development and progress of science. Through scientific conceptualization and analysis, man’s intellect understands the natural world and appropriates its forces to his own ends; and in so doing intellect executes the mission of life, namely, the effort to wrest and invert the necessity of matter.68

Moreover, language is the key to man’s unique intellectual, moral, and aesthetic contemplation, for it “furnishes consciousness with an immaterial body in which to incarnate itself and thus exempts it from dwelling exclusively on material bodies, whose flux would soon drag it along and finally swallow it up.”69 Thus, the achievements of the élan vitale, as intellect, in and through the material form of man are a vast, perhaps immeasurably large, range of possibilities. They include but are not limited to the practically useful ends of science that are transformative of man’s natural environment, and they may even extend to and be transformative of man himself. Bergson writes, for example, of the potential effects of scientific or technological advances:

Though we derive an immediate advantage from the thing made, as an intelligent animal might do, and though this advantage be all the inventor sought, it is a slight matter compared with the new ideas and new feelings that the invention may give rise to in every direction, as if the essential part of the effect were to raise us above ourselves and enlarge our horizon.70

The evolution of life culminates in man, but this culmination is not a rounding out or completion. Rather, the evolution of life culminates in man insofar as man takes up the mission of life and carries on the process of its creative flow through the universe. Bergson writes: “Everywhere but in man, consciousness has had to come to a stand; in man alone it has kept on its way. Man, then, continues the vital movement indefinitely, although he does not draw along with him all that life carries in itself.”71 Man continues creatively to introduce novelty into the universe; but even in man, the paradox of life’s embodiment persists, as the material conditions of his being naturally restrict life’s movement and fulfillment. Even so, these limitations are compatible with Bergson’s vision of the universe as the setting in which the evolution of life pushes forward, in and through the activities of man, in unforeseen and indeed unforeseeable directions.
ENDNOTES

1 See http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/laurie\textemdash/laureates/1927/.


3 Ibid., 160: “L’introduction à la métaphysique,” 1394: “le sentiment simple et indivisible que j’éprouverais si je coinçais instant avec le personnage lui-même.”

4 Ibid., 161: “L’introduction à la métaphysique,” 1395: “Mais l’absolu est parfait en ce qu’il est parfaitement ce qu’il est.”

5 Ibid., 160: “L’introduction à la métaphysique,” 1394: “Symboles et points de vue ne me placent donc en dehors d’elle; ils ne me livrent d’elle que ce qui lui est commun avec d’autres et ne lui appartient pas en propre. Mais ce qui est proprement elle, ce qui constitue son essence, ne saurait s’apercevoir du dehors, étant intérieur par définition, ni s’exprimer par des symboles, étant incommensurable avec toute autre chose.”

6 Ibid., 161: “L’introduction à la métaphysique,” 1395: “la sympathie par laquelle on se transporte à l’intérieur d’un objet pour coincider avec ce qu’il a d’unique et par conséquent d’inexprimable.”

7 Ibid., 162: “L’introduction à la métaphysique,” 1395: “l’analyse est l’opération qui ramène l’objet à des éléments déjà connus, c’est-à-dire communs à cet objet et à d’autres.”


9 Ibid. Jacques Maritain (in Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, trans. Maybelle L. Andison, with J. Gordon Andison [New York: Philosophical Library, 1955]) offers an extended critique of both the nature and defense of Bergson’s intuitive philosophy. He diagnoses its errors as stemming from the fact that Bergson’s thought is a reaction to the false metaphysics of Kant and atomistic epistemology of Descartes. Direct philosophical intuition of reality cannot but proceed by means of concepts, Maritain maintains, and so to distinguish between intellect and intuition as Bergson does is to commit the “capital sin” of “breaking] asunder what is one…. [For it] is one and the same activity in us, especially immanent and virtually productive, that engenders concept and perceives what is, that perceives in conceiving and conceives in perceiving. It conceives in order to perceive, it abstracts, it enunciates, it reasons in order to perceive. All, in it, that is elaboration and disposition of ideas, is regulated by intellect and is a means of intellect” (ibid., 33). Moreover, Bergson mischaracterizes intellect as restricted to knowledge of matter and its laws. See ibid., 15–48.

10 Bergson, “An Introduction to Metaphysics,” 163: “L’introduction à la métaphysique,” 1397: “Mais si je remasse de la périphérie vers le centre, si je cherche au fond de ce qui est le plus uniformément, le plus constamment, le plus durablement moi-même, je trouve tout autre chose. C’est au-dessous de ces critères bien découpés et de cette conglomération superficielle, une continuité d’écoulement qui n’est comparable à rien de ce que j’ai vu s’écouler. C’est une succession d’états dont chacun annonce ce qui suit et contient ce qui précède…. En réalité, aucun d’eux ne commence ni ne finit, mais tous se prolongent les uns dans les autres.”

11 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (1911; Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1983), 3. The original appears as L’évolution créatrice, in Bergson, Oeuvres, 497: “le point le mieux éclairé d’une zone mouvante qui comprend tout ce que nous sentons, pensons, voulons, tout ce que nous sommes en un moment donné. C’est cette zone entière qui constitue, en réalité, notre état. Or, des états ainsi définis on peut dire qu’ils ne sont pas des éléments distincts,”

12 See also Milic Capek, who ties the rejection of this so-called psycholog-}

cal atomism to the thought of William James. Both Bergson and James view psychologial “states” as parts arbitrarily carved out of the whole of experience, and both object to the alleged or at least implicit immutability of such states. They affirm the continuous changing nature of the self in experience, and they resist the artificial unification of that experience by a “fictitious” philosophical abstraction like substance, soul, or ego. See Milic Capek, “Process and Personality in Bergson’s Thought,” 292–94.

13 Ibid., 4: L’évolution créatrice, 498: “La durée est le progrès continu du passé qui ronge l’avenir et qui gonfle en avançant.”

14 Ibid., 5: L’évolution créatrice, 498: “Ceux-là, messagers de l’inconscient, nous avertissent de ce que nous traînons derrière nous sans le savoir…. [L]ors même que nous n’en aurions pas l’idée distincte, nous sentirions vaguement que notre passé nous reste présent.”

15 Bergson, “An Introduction to Metaphysics,” 169: “L’introduction à la mé-

taphysique,” 1402: “Cette intuition même changeante, colorée, vivante.” In the words of Leszek Kolakowski, time as duration is “neither homog-
genous not divisible; it is not properly abstracted from the movement but it is in fact what each of us: we know it intuitively, from direct experi-
ence” (Leszek Kolakowski, Bergson [New York: Oxford University Press, 1985], 3).

16 It is notable, or at least arguable, that Bergson’s methodology closely resembles the pragmatic humanism of William James, according to which the content of self-awareness has primacy among the determinative prior ideas that guide all further development in philosophy.

17 Ibid., 184: “L’introduction à la métaphysique,” 1416: “[N]’allons-nous pas enfermer la philosophie dans sa contemplation exclusive de lui-même?”

18 Ibid. “L’introduction à la métaphysique,” 1416: “Ce serait méconnaître la nature singulière de la durée, en même temps que le caractère essentielle-
ment actif de l’intuition métaphysique.”


20 Ibid. “L’introduction à la métaphysique,” 1419: “A la rigueur il pourra-
rait n’exister d’autre durée que la nôtre, comme il pourrait n’y avoir au monde d’autre couleur que l’orangé, par exemple. Mais de même qu’une connaissance à base de couleur, qui sympathiserait intérieurement avec l’orangé au lieu du percevoir extérieurement, se sentirait prête entre d’un rouge et du jaune, pourrait au-dessous d’une dernière couleur, tout un spectre en lequel se prolonge naturellement la continuité qui va du rouge au jaune, ainsi l’intuition de notre durée, bien loin de nous laisser suspendus dans la vide comme ferait la pure analy-
se, nous met en contact avec toute une continuité de durées que nous devons essayer de suivre soit vers le bas, soit vers le haut.”

21 See, for example, ibid., 181–83: “L’introduction à la métaphysique,” 1414–16.

22 Ibid.

23 See, for example, Leszek Kolakowski, who writes that life for Bergson is “not a contingent by-product of physical laws…. it is a manifestation of creative energy. Though the human mind is a work of biological evolu-
tion, this evolution itself is the work of mind” (Kolakowski, Bergon, 8–9).

24 There is no circularity in this statement if we understand “mind” here as convertible with “life,” and human mind as a particular instantiation of the principle of “mind” of life in general.

25 Bergson, Creative Evolution, 12. L’évolution créatrice, 504: “Sans doute il consiste, lui aussi, en une portion d’étendue reliée au reste de l’étendue, solidaire du Tout, soumise aux mêmes lois physiques et chimiques qui gouvernent n’importe quelle portion de la matière. Mais, tandis que la subdivision de la matière en corps isolés est relative à notre perception, tandis que la constitution de systems clos de points matériels est relative à notre science, le corps vivant a été isolé et clos par la nature elle-même. Il se compose de parties hétérogènes qui se complètent les unes les autres. Il accomplit des fonctions diverses qui s’impliquent les unes les autres. C’est une indivisibilité, et d’autre objet… on ne peut en dire autant.”

26 See ibid., 13; L’évolution créatrice, 505.

27 Ibid., 17. L’évolution créatrice, 509: “Le temps a juste autant de réalité pour une être vivant que pour un sablier, où le réservoir d’en haut se vide tandis que le réservoir d’en bas se remplit, et où l’on peut remettre les choses en place en retournant l’appareil.”

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid., 18.

we will or no, we must appeal to some inner directing principle in order to account for this convergence of effects” (ibid., 76; L’évolution créatrice, 559–60). In response to this common criticism of evolutionary thinking, contemporary scientists have affirmed the plausibility of the evolution of a complex organ like the eye. See, for example, “The Evolution of Eyes,” special issue of Evolution: Education and Outreach 1, no. 4 (October 2008): 351–59.

See Creative Evolution, 77.

See ibid., 78–83. The central issue is whether an adaptation or acquired trait imprints on the gametes and is thus transmitted to offspring. In many cases, it evidently does not and is not so transmitted. At the time of his writing, Bergson is aware of arguments on both sides of the question. But even in cases where acquired traits appear to be passed on, he notes, “it is just here that the difficulty begins” (ibid., 79). For an examination of such traits shows that these are generally habits or the effects thereof, which raises the question of whether what is passed on is a habit itself or simply natural dispositions or potencies for such a habit. If the latter, then it seems that what is inherited is not really an adaptation or acquired trait at all.

Ibid., 86–87. L’évolution créatrice, 69ff. “Mais si cette cause n’est que l’effort conscient de l’individu, elle ne pourra opérer que dans un nombre assez restreint de cas…. Un changement héréditaire et de sens défini…. doit sans doute se rapporter à quelque espèce d’effort, mais à un effort autrement profond que l’effort individuel, autrement indépendant des circonstances, commun à la plupart des représentants d’une même espèce, inhérent aux germes qu’ils portent plutôt qu’à leur seule substance, au lieu de se transmettre à leurs descendants.”

Ibid., 82.

Ibid., 29–30. L’évolution créatrice, 59ff. “Si le tout est original, elle [la science] s’arrange pour l’analyser en éléments ou en aspects qui soient à peu près la reproduction du passé…. Ce qu’il y a d’irréductible et d’irréversible dans les moments successifs d’une histoire lui échappe.”

Ibid., 264. L’évolution créatrice, 718ff. “Il s’agissait de créer avec la matière, qui est la nécessité même, un instrument de liberté, de fabriquer un mécanisme qui triomphe du mécanisme, et d’employer le déterminisme de la nature à passer à travers les mailles du filet qu’il avait tendu.”

Ibid., 245. L’évolution créatrice, 703ff. “Toutes nos analyses nous montrent en effet dans la vie un effort pour remonter la pente que la matière descend.” See also ibid., 249.

Ibid. L’évolution créatrice, 703ff. “[La vie] est rivée à un organisme qui la soumet aux lois générales de la matière inerte. Mais tout se passe comme si elle faisait son possible pour s’affranchir de ces lois.”

Ibid., 129. These lines of evolution, he maintains, are more and more dissociated instantiations of the flow of the élan vital. In commenting on Aristotle’s biology he stakes a controversial metaphysical claim: “The cardinal error which, from Aristotle onwards, has vitiated most of the philosophies of nature, is to see in vegetative, instinctive and rational life, three successive degrees of the development of one and the same tendency, whereas they are three divergent directions of an activity that has split up as it grew. The difference between them is not a difference of intensity, nor, more generally, of degree, but of kind” (ibid., 135, emphasis removed; L’évolution créatrice, 600ff.).

See ibid., 115.

See ibid., 108.

Ibid., 135.

Ibid., 141. L’évolution créatrice, 614ff. “Il peut prendre une forme quelconque, servir à n’importe quel usage, tirer l’être vivant de toute difficulté nouvelle qui surgit et lui conférer un nombre illimité de pouvoirs.”

Ibid., 136.

Ibid., 100. L’évolution créatrice, 580ff. “le grand souffle de la vie.”

Ibid., 124ff. L’évolution créatrice, 601ff. “On pourra dire qu’un organisme supérieur est essentiellement constitué par un système sensori-moteur installé sur des appareils de digestion, de respiration, de circulation, de sécrétion, etc., qui ont pour rôle de le réparer, de le nettoyer, de le protéger, de lui créer un milieu interne constant, enfin et surtout de lui passer d’énergie potentielle à convertir en mouvement de locomotion.” Notwithstanding Bergson’s earlier use of the terms “teleology” and “finalism,” I submit that there is a genuine teleology implicit in this
description of the higher vertebrate body.

66 Ibid., 126. L'évolution créatrice, 662: “Un système nerveux, avec des neurones placés bout à bout de telle manière qu'à l'extrémité de chacun d'eux s'ouvrent des voies multiples où autant de questions se posent, est un véritable réservoir d'indétermination.”

67 “Switchboard” is Arthur Miller’s translation of “carefour.” See ibid., 183-84, 252, and 261.

68 See ibid., 261 ff. Something other than matter itself is evidently at work. It is helpful to draw out the contrast between the human brain and that of another species which might closely resemble it. Bergson offers the analogy of two steam engines, one an early version that requires a boy to operate its tags, and the other a later version that requires no such attendant. Materially, these mechanisms are quite indistinguishable, but indeed there is all the difference in the world “between a mechanism which engages the attention and a mechanism from which it can be diverted” (ibid., 184; L'évolution créatrice, 651). So too might the brains of a human and some other primate closely resemble one another, but evidently—on the basis of the wide range of activities that man can accomplish—something over and above matter is correlated with and operative alongside the mechanism of the human brain.

69 See ibid., 161-62.

70 Ibid., 265. L'évolution créatrice, 719: “Il le doit à son langage, qui fournit à la conscience un corps immatériel où s'incarner et la dispense ainsi de se poser exclusivement sur les corps matériels don't le flux l'entraînerait d'abord, l'engloutirait bientôt.”

71 Ibid., 183. L'évolution créatrice, 650: “Si nous retrouvons un avantage immédiat de l’objet fabriqué, comme pourrait le faire un animal intelligent, si même cet avantage est tout ce que l’inventeur recherchait, il est peu de chose en comparaison des idées nouvelles, des sentiments nouveaux que l’invention peut faire surgir de tous côtés, comme si elle avait pour effet essentiel de nous hausser au-dessus de nous-mêmes et, par là, d’élargir notre horizon.”

72 Ibid., 266. L’évolution créatrice, 720-21: “Partout ailleurs que chez l’homme, la conscience s’est vu acculer à une impasse; avec l’homme suel elle a poursuivi son chemin. L’homme continue donc indéfiniment le mouvement vital, quoique n’entraîne pas avec lui tout ce que la vie portait en elle.”

A Liturgical Aeneid

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C. S. Lewis somewhere distinguishes two different attitudes we may entertain while assisting at liturgy: that of the reverent participant, and that of the detached critic. An attitude of reverence typically allows us to be drawn spontaneously into liturgical worship without undue distraction. The attitude of the critic, however, interferes with worshiping God. The critic is seriously hindered from even finding God at mass.

Some may be quick to fault the critic himself for his harmful attitude. If he is not disposed properly at mass, it might well be his own fault. He could be guilty of sins of arrogance, elitism, snobbery, or indifferentism. He may need to “come to Jesus,” repent, be reconciled, and adjust his attitude so that he can enter properly into the spirit of the liturgy. Certainly this could be the problem.

What I would like to focus on here is another possibility, however. Is it not also possible that the form of the liturgical celebration itself, in some cases, can pose obstacles to our being properly disposed at mass? Cannot the mass itself—most obviously where there are explicit abuses, but even where the defects are subtler—erode our devotional attitude and turn us inadvertently into critics?

The Challenge

Perhaps some may recall what Raymond Cardinal Burke said in 2011 on the publication of a book in Italian by Fr. Nicola Bux by the startling title, How to Go to Mass and Not Lose Your Faith. Declaring that liturgical abuses damage the faith of Catholics far more than we realize, Burke said: “If we err by thinking we are the center of the liturgy, the mass will lead to a loss of faith. Unfortunately, too many priests and bishops treat violations of liturgical norms as something that is unimportant, when, in fact, they are serious abuses.”

In what follows I am not interested exclusively, or even primarily, in explicit violations of currently accepted liturgical practice. Rather, I am more interested in many features of the ordinary form of the mass found in most parishes today, which may now be canonically licit, but are recent historical innovations found virtually nowhere in Catholic liturgical tradition—things like mass facing the people, altar girls, lay Communion ministers, Communion in the hand while standing, praise bands up front with congregational applause, etc. (see “The fine print” below). When many of these practices were first introduced, they were criticized either as abuses because they violated then existing liturgical norms, or as innovations because they were nowhere even suggested, let alone mandated, by Vatican II in its Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy,

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As a result, the Eucharistic liturgy, which should be properly be the “source and summit of the Christian life” (CCC, 1324; cf. Lumen gentium, 11), was effectively politicized over the last four decades, making it often divisive rather than unitive, and a source of controversy, polarization, and alienation rather than consolation, devotion, and joy. I do not say that this was the experience of everyone; yet it was certainly the experience of many. I have little doubt that this is one reason why Pope Benedict XVI issued his motu proprio, Summorum pontificum (2007) and Instruction Universae ecclesiae (2011) guaranteeing universal permission for the celebration of the Traditional Latin Mass and promoting its proper instruction.

One of the many reasons why growing numbers of the faithful, Catholic families, and others of nontraditionalist backgrounds, have started attending the traditional Latin mass is not initially because of the abundant virtues that commend it, but because of the absence in it of the polarizing politicization attendant to the alternative. Nobody there is trying to promote politically correct language by eliminating masculine pronouns in the lectionary. Nobody is selecting the “shorter form” readings from the lectionary in order to avoid airing the “insensitive” passages about fornication, homosexuality, or the submission of wives to husbands, because there is no “shorter form.” Nobody is trying to promote female lectors or altar servers in the name of gender equity. Nobody is trying to promote the clericalization of the laity by assembling a company of matrons and gents around the altar after the consecration to distribute Holy Communion to each other and to the congregation and make the priest look like an out-of-place father in the kitchen. Nobody is going to interrupt your recollected state by reaching for your hand during the Our Father or by trying to hug you during the rite of peace, however well intended these gestures may be. All the previously mentioned obstacles that elicit the attitude of “critic” are simply and blessedly absent.

Thus, despite the learning curve involved in adjusting to liturgical Latin and the intricately layered, nonlinear shape of the traditional liturgy, such newcomers to the traditional mass are pleased to discover that, for them at least, it offers solace from the perpetual polarizing disquiet of the alternative. The burden of the critical attitude is lifted, leaving an atmosphere of reverence and amplitude of tranquility where an attitude of devotion is free to flourish. As C. S. Lewis once put it, referring to the liturgy, when the steps of the dance are continually being changed, one has to constantly mind his feet; but when the steps are long-established and unchanging, one can finally master the dance so that he is then free to concentrate on his partner.

How did things get this way?

I am well aware that many Catholics today may find what I have said above bewildering and even alien to their experience. Some may even be inclined to dismiss this sort of concern for liturgical form as an utterly wrongheaded obsession with “externals” at the expense of the interior disposition of the heart, just as I did as a Protestant, although such views would not always have been found among Catholics. There is a reason for this, which is well expressed by Galadriel’s voiceover at the beginning of the film version of J. R. R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings, in which she declares:

The world is changed.
I feel it in the water.
I feel it in the earth.
I smell it in the air.
Much that once was, is lost,
For none now lives who remembers it.

Nearly two generations have now passed since the introduction of the new mass by Pope Paul VI in 1969, and many of those living today have no living recollection of anything other than this new mass in its various current vernacular and regional forms; and very few are familiar with its history and genesis from impulses simmering below the surface long before the council.

In many ways, my own experience of the mass as a convert was probably not too different. Liturgy was not one of the sticking points in the course of my conversion, so I was not especially attentive to liturgical issues in 1987 when I began to consider seriously the claims of the Catholic faith. I had no firsthand acquaintance with the “Tridentine” mass or even any particular interest in it. At most, I remember thumbing through a copy of a preconciliar St. Joseph Sunday Missal that I picked up at a secondhand bookstore in Milwaukee and comparing some parts, such as the collects, with what was in my Anglican Book of Common Prayer. While struck by the similar elegance of the older English language, I was generally unconcerned with liturgical questions then and quite happy just to be coming “home to Rome,” to borrow my friend Scott Hahn’s expression.

As far as I was concerned at the time, there was
only “the mass.” All that essentially mattered was that it was the mass authorized by the one true Church. What this meant in practice, for better or worse, was of course the mass as it was celebrated in the parish where I was received into the Church. On a typical Sunday, our “Gathering Hymn” was just as likely as not Marty Haugen’s “Gather Us In.” Everyone held hands during the Our Father, raising them at the “kingdom and the power and the glory . . .” with a little squeeze at the end. Lay Eucharistic ministers blessed children. The congregation applauded performances by choir and praise band “on stage” to the side of the altar in front of the congregation. You get the picture. I’m sure it’s not an unfamiliar one. Innocent as I was, I was given to believe that this was all quite proper and regular—that it was simply how contemporary Catholics worshiped.

Fresh in the afterglow of my honeymoon with Catholicism in America, I confess that I couldn’t help loving the mass, just as I found it. Ignorance, as they say, is bliss. I will admit to a certain sense of having “married down” liturgically and aesthetically after my sojourn in the Anglican tradition for a time. But, after all, I was finally home in the Church! Jesus himself was making his appearance upon the altar at each mass. And if the Incarnate God of the universe could suffer himself to be born in a manger amidst the braying of asses and, again, suffer himself to abide in the Blessed Sacrament amidst the braying of third-class parish praise bands, who was I complain? I couldn’t help loving our Lord in the Eucharist, and I hardly let pass an opportunity to “assist at mass,” whether I was home then in North Carolina or traveling abroad and touring the great cathedrals of Europe.

The experience was, I suppose, a bit like buying a new used car. It may not have been factory fresh, exactly, but it was a vintage first-generation Ford Mustang, freshly refurbished with a shiny new coat of paint! Only after some time did I begin to explore what was under the hood, carefully examining the condition of the hoses, engine, shocks, alignment, and brakes. While I never suffered “buyer’s remorse,” a sobering realization slowly dawned on me. The Church may have the Holy Spirit for her soul; but this does not prevent her from having men with feet of clay for her body.

C. S. Lewis once said that a young man who wishes to remain a sound atheist cannot be too careful of his reading. So it is, too, with those who wish to remain blithely carefree in their enjoyment of the post-Vatican II Church.

For good or for ill, however, I was not careful about what I read. I wanted to know. I began reading and comparing old auto owner’s manuals I purchased from places like eBay, and began comparing what I found there with what I found under the hood of my new preowned vehicle. I began to notice little discrepancies, the gravity of which I was uncertain. Similarly there were discrepancies between “word” (from Rome) and “deed” (in the parish) at almost every turn, the gravity of which I was also uncertain.

The fine print

Here are just a few examples I noticed (and please bear with me, because I need some detail here to exhibit the pattern that began to emerge and how it impacted me, which had less to do with arguments for alternative practices than with the fact of the discrepancies themselves and the cognitive dissonance they created).

1. Lay Eucharistic Ministers

At first it was a matter of utter indifference to me whether clergy or laity distributed Holy Communion. It wasn’t an issue in my former Episcopal church, although lay ministers there were always vested in cassock and surplice and distributed at the Communion rail alongside the priest. For a time after my reception into the Church, I even consented to serve as a lay Communion minister, although I must confess that I never felt comfortable in the role, especially while standing nervously in the precincts of what felt like the Holy of Holies behind the altar with the priest. But at the time I did not see anything objectionable with this practice; not until I began reading about how it developed historically, along with things like this:

Indeed, the extraordinary minister of Holy Communion may administer Communion only when the Priest and Deacon are lacking, when the Priest is prevented by weakness or advanced age or some other genuine reason, or when the number of faithful coming to Communion is so great that the very celebration of Mass would be unduly prolonged. This, however, is to be understood in such a way that a brief prolongation, considering the circumstances and culture of the place, is not at all a sufficient reason (Redemptionis sacramentum, 2004).

2. Communion in the hand

It was also a matter of indifference to me initially whether one received Communion in the hand or on the tongue, even though I did miss the sense of natural
reverence and fittingness that accompanied kneeling at a Communion rail back at my Episcopal church. I soon learned, however, about the conflicting claims over what was thought to be the accepted practice in the early Church, such as the debate over the disputed authenticity of Saint Cyril’s remarks on the subject (“When thou goest to receive communion …[place] thy left hand as a throne for thy right, …to receive so great a King, and in the hollow of the palm receive the body of Christ, saying, Amen”), which have more recently been ascribed to an historical deception perpetrated by an anonymous crypto-Arian in Syria.¹ There was also the longstanding controversy over the fact that Communion in the hand was introduced in modern Catholic circles by dissenting revisionists in the Low Countries in violation of liturgical law, until national conferences of bishops were granted an indulg permitting the practice if they requested it; and by the fact that many of them were evidently invested in promoting a purely symbolic (Zwinglian) interpretation of the Eucharist.² Catholics are still permitted to receive on the tongue in principle, of course, although kneeling has come to be seen as an awkward impediment ever since the practice of filing up in queues to receive Communion in the hand has been mainstreamed as the norm. Still, none of this caused me undue concern until a number of Vatican statements and instructions began intruding into my consciousness that accompanied kneeling at a Communion rail back at my Episcopal church. I soon learned, however, about the conflicting claims over what was thought to be the accepted practice in the early Church, such as the debate over the disputed authenticity of Saint Cyril’s remarks on the subject (“When thou goest to receive communion …[place] thy left hand as a throne for thy right, …to receive so great a King, and in the hollow of the palm receive the body of Christ, saying, Amen”), which have more recently been ascribed to an historical deception perpetrated by an anonymous crypto-Arian in Syria.¹ There was also the longstanding controversy over the fact that Communion in the hand was introduced in modern Catholic circles by dissenting revisionists in the Low Countries in violation of liturgical law, until national conferences of bishops were granted an indulg permitting the practice if they requested it; and by the fact that many of them were evidently invested in promoting a purely symbolic (Zwinglian) interpretation of the Eucharist.² Catholics are still permitted to receive on the tongue in principle, of course, although kneeling has come to be seen as an awkward impediment ever since the practice of filing up in queues to receive Communion in the hand has been mainstreamed as the norm. Still, none of this caused me undue concern until a number of Vatican statements and instructions began intruding into my field of awareness and creating a bit more cognitive dissonance. Like these:

(a) “[I]t is clear that the vast majority of bishops believe that the present discipline [reception of Communion on the tongue] should not be changed, and that if it were, the change would be offensive to the sentiments and the spiritual culture of these bishops and of many of the faithful” (Pope Paul VI, Memoriale Domini, 1969).

(b) “It is not permitted that the faithful should themselves pick up the consecrated bread and the sacred chalice, still less that they should hand them from one to another” (Pope John Paul II, Inaestimabile donum, 1986).

3. Altar girls

Altar girls, too, might never have become an issue for me had it not been for an apparent controversy emanating from the Vatican itself. The procedure by which the practice was introduced in contemporary parishes, furthermore, highlights the problem of confusion and provocation of cynicism doubtless experienced by many.

On the one hand, Pope John Paul II seemed to be standing squarely within a well-established tradition when he forbade the practice:

(a) “Women are not, however, permitted to act as altar servers” (Pope John Paul II, Inaestimabile donum, 1986).

(b) “The minister serving at Mass may not be a woman, unless, there being no male available, for a just reason and with the proviso that the woman answer from a distance and in no case come up to the altar (ad altare accedat)” (Canon 813.2, 1917 Code of Canon Law).

(c) “Pope Gelasius in his ninth letter (chap. 26) to the bishops of Lucania condemned the evil practice which had been introduced of women serving the priest at the celebration of Mass. Since this abuse had spread to the Greeks, Innocent IV strictly forbade it in his letter to the bishop of Tusculum: ‘Women should not dare to serve at the altar; they should be altogether refused this ministry. We too have forbidden this practice in the same words in our oft-repeated constitution Etsi Pastoralis, sect. 6, no. 21’” (Pope Benedict XIV, Allatae sund, 1755).

On the other hand, the (then) still illicit practice of employing altar girls was not uncommon in the late 1980s, even before it was officially permitted in 1994: and when the hoped-for clarification came from the Vatican that year in a circular letter¹ on how the new 1983 Code of Canon Law (Canon 230 #2) could be read permissively, it appeared to break with long-standing tradition. A later 2001 document² seemed to backtrack by allowing that no priest was obliged to accept female altar servers, even if his bishop allowed them, since there was no question, after all, of anyone having the “right” to become an altar server; and, furthermore “it will always be very appropriate to follow the noble tradition of having boys serve at the altar.” The ultimate effect, then, of turning adherence to the traditional practice into an option (as is practically thematic in recent Vatican documents), seems to have been no different than sweeping it aside, as current practice makes abundantly clear.

4. Free standing altars

The placement and form of the altar did not even register as an issue for me until, again, I noticed a similar pattern emerging. The Episcopalian churches had free standing altars. But the question of the moment was:
why were these introduced into the Catholic Church? And, once again, the paper trail of tradition raised nettlesome questions:

(a) “[T]he use of the Latin language is to be preserved in the Latin rites…. [S]teps should be taken so that the faithful may also be able to say or to sing together in Latin those parts of the Ordinary of the Mass which pertain to them…. In accordance with the centuries-old tradition of the Latin rite, the Latin language is to be retained by clerics in the divine office Sacrosanctum concilium” (Promulgated by Paul VI, 1969).

(b) “[T]he Council was pushed aside. For instance, it had said that the language of the Latin Rite was to remain Latin, although suitable scope was to be given to the vernacular. Today we might ask: Is there a Latin Rite at all any more? Certainly there is no awareness of it. To most people the liturgy seems to be rather something for the individual congregation to arrange.”

(c) “[P]rimary place must surely be given to that language which had its origins in Latium, and later proved so admirable a means for the spreading of Christianity throughout the West…. Of its very nature Latin is most suitable for promoting every form of culture among peoples. It gives rise to no jealousies. It does not favor any one nation, but presents itself with equal impartiality to all and is equally acceptable to all. Nor must we overlook the characteristic nobility of Latin formal structure. Its ‘concise, varied and harmonious style, full of majesty and dignity’ [Pius XI, Epist. ap. officiorum omnium, Aug. 1, 1922] makes for singular clarity and impressiveness of expression. For these reasons the Apostolic See has always been at pains to preserve Latin, deeming its use by being used in the exercise of her teaching authority as the splendid vesture of her heavenly doctrine and sacred laws’ [Pius XI, Motu proprio litterarum latinarum, Oct. 20, 1924]. She further requires her sacred ministers to use it, for by so doing they are the better able, wherever they may be, to acquaint themselves with the mind of the Holy See on any matter, and communicate the more easily with Rome and with one another…. We also, impelled by the weightiest of reasons—the same as those which prompted Our Predecessors and provincial synods—are fully determined to restore this language to its position of honor, and to do all We can to promote

5. Mass facing the people
Nothing seemed more natural to me as a former Protestant than seeing the pastor face his congregation and employ his personal charisma and talent to engage, provoke, edify, exhort, and even entertain the gathered faithful. Yet I also remembered that the college church of the Lutheran institution where I taught for many years had a wall altar where I had seen Lutheran pastors celebrate their liturgy ad orientem—facing God. This gave rise to the question: why was a change introduced in the Catholic Church following Vatican II? And again, there was the nettlesome paper trail of tradition:

(a) “There never was a celebration versus populum in either the Eastern or Western Church. Instead there was a turning towards the east.”

(b) “The original meaning of what nowadays is called ‘the priest turning his back on the people’ is, in fact—as J.A. Jungmann has consistently shown—the priest and people together facing the same way in a common act of Trinitarian worship, such as Augustine introduced, following the sermon, by the prayer Conversi ad Dominum.”

(c) “[T]he possibility of mass being celebrated facing the people was not so much as mentioned in a single document of the Second Vatican Council, and, contrary to the impression frequently given by those in authority, there is no mandatory legislation from the Holy See requiring a versus populum celebration.”

6. Preservation of Latin
How could a former Protestant possibly find the vernacular objectionable! Wasn’t one of Luther’s bold conceits about the Roman liturgy, that nobody could understand it? This issue raises far more questions than we can begin to address adequately here, except to note the irony of those occasional “inclusive” liturgies celebrating “diversity” where one hears lectionary readings, alongside the English, in Spanish, Vietnamese, Polish, Italian, or French (but never Latin!)—or, again, how that unmistakable pattern exhibits itself here too:

(a) “[T]he use of the Latin language is to be preserved in the Latin rites…. [S]teps should be taken so that the faithful may also be able to say or to sing together in Latin those parts of the Ordinary of the Mass which pertain to them…. In accordance with the centuries-old tradition of the Latin rite, the Latin language is to be retained by clerics in the divine office Sacrosanctum concilium” (Promulgated by Paul VI, 1969).

(b) “[T]he Council was pushed aside. For instance, it had said that the language of the Latin Rite was to remain Latin, although suitable scope was to be given to the vernacular. Today we might ask: Is there a Latin Rite at all any more? Certainly there is no awareness of it. To most people the liturgy seems to be rather something for the individual congregation to arrange.”

(c) “[P]rimary place must surely be given to that language which had its origins in Latium, and later proved so admirable a means for the spreading of Christianity throughout the West…. Of its very nature Latin is most suitable for promoting every form of culture among peoples. It gives rise to no jealousies. It does not favor any one nation, but presents itself with equal impartiality to all and is equally acceptable to all. Nor must we overlook the characteristic nobility of Latin formal structure. Its ‘concise, varied and harmonious style, full of majesty and dignity’ [Pius XI, Epist. ap. officiorum omnium, Aug. 1, 1922] makes for singular clarity and impressiveness of expression. For these reasons the Apostolic See has always been at pains to preserve Latin, deeming its use by being used in the exercise of her teaching authority as the splendid vesture of her heavenly doctrine and sacred laws’ [Pius XI, Motu proprio litterarum latinarum, Oct. 20, 1924]. She further requires her sacred ministers to use it, for by so doing they are the better able, wherever they may be, to acquaint themselves with the mind of the Holy See on any matter, and communicate the more easily with Rome and with one another…. We also, impelled by the weightiest of reasons—the same as those which prompted Our Predecessors and provincial synods—are fully determined to restore this language to its position of honor, and to do all We can to promote
its study and use…. Bishops and superiors—general of religious orders shall …studiously observe the Apostolic See’s decision in this matter and obey these Our prescriptions most carefully” (John XXIII, Veterum sapientia, 1962).

7. Gregorian chant
This is one area where I had a dog in the fight. I was raised in a family, like many traditionally Protestant families, where we were all taught from youth to sing—in four-part harmony, in fact. We all loved sacred music. While Gregorian chant is something unique, it is nevertheless a well-known part of the classical repertory among those who know sacred music. In fact, it sometimes seemed that Lutheran and Anglican traditions have done more to keep Catholic traditions of Gregorian chant and sacred polyphony alive than the post-Vatican II Catholic Church. This, again, raised the question: what conceivable rationale could possibly justify the kinds of changes in liturgy that would lead Thomas Day to write a book like Why Catholics Can’t Sing: The Culture of Catholicism and the Triumph of Bad Taste (Crossroads, 1990)! The chasm between word and deed again exhibited a familiar pattern:

The Church acknowledges Gregorian chant as specially suited to the Roman liturgy: therefore, other things being equal, it should be given pride of place in liturgical services…. The typical edition of the books of Gregorian chant is to be completed; and a more critical edition is to be prepared of those books already published since the restoration by St. Pius X” (Sacer sanctum concilium, promulgated by Paul VI, 1963).

Bewilderment

It would not be hard, of course, to multiply examples—removed altar rails, tabernacles, kneelers, crucifixes, side altars, statues, etc. But here is the point: what was I to think? To revisit the analogy of the shiny new restored Ford Mustang, here were all sorts of things in my old eBay auto manuals that didn’t line up with what was under the hood. Some things under the hood, like mass facing the people and free standing altars, were not even mentioned in the manuals. So where did they come from and what were they doing there? Other things stressed by the manuals as important components, like Latin and Gregorian chant, I couldn’t find anywhere, at least not under the hood of my vehicle. Why not? What had happened to them? Still other components that were prominently visible under the hood looked like they had been jury-rigged to somehow facilitate the operation of the vehicle, even though they violated explicit codes in the fine print, like the regular use of lay Eucharistic ministers. Still other clearly visible components, though nowhere mentioned in the older manuals, were addressed in later manuals as emergency repair measures taken after recalls, or indults, like Communion in the hand and altar girls.

Just what were the pressing exigencies demanding these changes, I wondered. After all, changes in liturgical law might have unexpected consequences. I was repeatedly reminded of this every time I taught Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Treatise on Law, where he sharply cautions against changing law — any law — even when some improvement is possible, unless there is some “urgent necessity” or “substantial and obvious benefit,” since “the mere fact of change in law itself can be adverse to the public welfare” and lessen the “restraining power” of the law. So what was the “urgent necessity” or “substantial and obvious benefit” that required all these changes, despite the undermining effect such changes might have for the “restraining power” of the law? As one wag observed, there is no evidence that the police have had to be called out to Catholic churches each Sunday “to hold back the hordes of lapsed Catholics whose faith had been rekindled at the prospect of saying the Confiteor in English”—or, one might add, holding hands during the Our Father or exchanging hugs during the rite of peace. We need not rehearse the well-known statistics about plummeting mass attendance and vocations and closing parishes following Vatican II to note a possible connection.12

I do not presume here to examine the Gordian knot of liturgical arguments between the “ordinary” and “extraordinary” forms of the Roman rite, much less suggest a resolution to the problems at issue; my purpose is only to attest to the way in which the post-Vatican II liturgical crisis has impacted my own experience of the mass as a convert, and very likely those of others. This is not to suggest that I have neglected to study the issue. Indeed, these concerns have driven me to read extensively—far more than I should like—in the field liturgical history and reform. At the same time, however, my experience of delving into such reading has led me to ask why I should have thought it necessary to do so, and whether this perception didn’t represent some sort of anomaly, or response to an anomaly. If, as C. S. Lewis suggests, liturgy can be compared to a dance, why should the dancers have to become experts in
the history of the dance and principles governing its reform? A healthy and normal state would seem to be, rather, one in which everyone could take the steps of the dance for granted as received and simply concentrate on his partner. Is there not something unhealthy about so many of us feeling as if we have become liturgical experts? What has brought this about? Why do so many of us think this? The words of Martin Mosebach come to mind:

We have let ourselves be led into a kind of scholastic and juridical way of considering the liturgy. What is absolutely indispensable for genuine liturgy? When are the celebrant's whims tolerable, and when do they become unacceptable? We have got used to accepting the liturgy on the basis of minimum requirements, whereas the criteria ought to be maximal. And finally, we have started to evaluate liturgy—a monstrous act! We sit in the pews and ask ourselves, was that Holy Mass, or wasn’t it? I go to church to see God and come away like a theatre critic.

There was a time when, quite frankly, I came to dread Sunday mornings—surely a sign of something dreadfully wrong! The more knowledgeable I became about liturgical history and the background of recent innovations, the more impediments to spontaneous and reverent worship began to intrude into my consciousness. Like Mosebach, I went to mass hoping to encounter the Lord, but increasingly dreaded coming away as a “theatre critic.” At first I faulted my own increasingly critical attitude as a spiritually detrimental obsession and, reminding myself that Christ was objectively present at church regardless of the surroundings, I prayed for a better attitude and sought him in the innermost sanctuary of my heart. I admired those seemingly stronger souls around me who were unmoved by the liturgical liberties and novelties that unsettled me and where able to receive Christ from lay Eucharistic ministers amidst the bedlam of bongos and praise bands and come away feeling blessed.

For years I prayerfully struggled to ignore the “triggers” of cognitive dissonance and internal turmoil at mass. But then I also began to surmise that at least some of the problem might lie in the objective form of the mass, and I wondered whether some minor changes could be introduced into our local liturgical celebrations, or whether an alternative mass could be found, which would remove some of these triggers and restore an atmosphere more conducive to reverence and prayer. Initially I took some hope in the movement of “liturgical renewal” championed by Fr. Joseph Fessio and James and Helen Hitchcock and their *Adoremus Bulletin*. I talked to my pastor and corresponded with my bishop. I do not know that these efforts yielded a single change. I do recall that my pastor thought the *Adoremus Bulletin* too seditious for his parishioners; and that for many years I prayed for a liturgy that would be objectively—materially as well as formally—a fitting instrument to honor Christ by a proper reverence and worshipful dignity.

Further thoughts and questions

My prayers were eventually answered, as previously mentioned, by my discovery of the old liturgy, where all these distractions simply seemed to fall away. In fact, everything—each part of the liturgy, every carefully prescribed gesture of the servers and priest, their ad orientem disposition, their attentiveness and reverence toward the altar and the tabernacle at its center, and even the silence—seemed meticulously choreographed to draw my attention toward the Lord. Not one gesture by priest or servers called attention to itself, saying “Here, look at me!” but rather drew attention to what was going on at the altar in the great unfolding drama of Redemption. Even the long reverent silences of the Canon, far from reducing me to a passive spectator, conducted to concentrate my attentiveness to what was transpiring, and so to promote—in the truest sense—my active participation.

All of which still leaves us with the question: yes, but what about the vast majority of Catholics persevering in the ordinary form of the mass; and what if they are happy with things just as they are? That is a question they will inevitably answer, of course, for themselves. I must try here, however, to anticipate some objections and questions of the kind they might wish to raise for me. Why all this fuss about liturgical form? Why does any of this matter? Why should it matter, at the end of the day, whether one genuflects or bows, sits or kneels, receives on the tongue or in his hand, from the priest or lay Eucharistic minister, or whether the servers and lectors are male or female, clergy or laity? After all, does not Jesus call us in John 4:24 to worship him in “spirit and in truth”? Isn’t all the rest just adiaphora—matters of indifference? In fact, couldn’t we be neglecting if not quenching the “Spirit” in our obsession with the “letter of the law”?

I can think of two answers, both of which are
related to the question of Catholic identity: the first has to do with the “sacramental worldview” of Catholicism itself; the second, with Catholic liturgical law as part of the Catholic tradition of Church law.

First, these are just the sorts of questions I might have asked myself as a Protestant at one time, before my introduction to liturgical worship in the Lutheran and Anglican communions. They are the kinds of questions typically raised by evangelical Protestants who stand outside of any formal liturgical tradition, and by those who lack the “sacramental” worldview native to Catholicism, which is so elegantly described by Thomas Howard in his *An Antique Drum: The World as Image.* Just as a “sacrament” is a *fitting outward sign of* an inward reality, so the “sacramental” worldview sees everything we do in the physical world as pointing beyond itself; everything objectively means something. Hence, in the Catholic tradition, the body is viewed as expressing the interior reality of our spiritual actions. Things like bodily posture in prayer matter: it *means* something and is fitting that one kneels to pray, as opposed to lounging on one’s back in an easy chair while nursing a beer. The same is true, *a fortiori,* in the Eucharistic liturgy where our Lord to whom we pray in spirit becomes miraculously present to our senses under the symbolic species of bread and wine, and symbol becomes the *Reality* symbolized.

The logic of evangelical Protestantism in some ways points in the opposite direction—toward a “spiritualized” Christianity and a disembodied Christian spirituality. All that matters in the final analysis, on this logic, is Jesus and my spiritual relationship to him in my heart, and little else, beyond the bible. All that is needful can be garnered through prayer, and a living relationship with Jesus as my creator, redeemer, and friend. And that’s quite a bit, if not everything. It doesn’t ultimately matter where I am, what communion I’m attached to, or what external accoutrements are employed in worship. In fact, many would say, the less the better. It’s a very “portable” form of Christianity, because ordained clergy, ceremony and rubrics are virtually irrelevant.

Many Catholics have evidently also embraced something resembling this “spiritualized” view of the Christian faith. For what it’s worth, I would be the last to belittle what is good and positive in it. Our personal relationship to Jesus is vitally important. Yet I would ask whether the fullness of even Jesus can be found in this way, let alone the fullness of the faith as it has been handed down to us; or whether this logic doesn’t all-too-quickly lead to a free-floating form of the faith that historically comes untethered from any clear mooring in the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic tradition. The presence of elements of the gospel in it does not exactly make it Catholic. On a personal note, I should not have had to convert, to leave my erstwhile Protestant communion behind, and be received into the Catholic Church in order to have a religion of personal encounter with Jesus based on my own bible reading.

Second, if we are a Church of traditional laws—liturgical as well as canonical—then how can we behave as though we are not, as though we were a Church where contemporary personal tastes and preferences in worship trump the received form of liturgy and liturgical law? Some Catholics, I am afraid, have embraced a spirituality that in significant ways has come detached from the received liturgical tradition, if not from liturgical worship itself. Some today might even react to Saint Pius X’s injunction “Don’t pray at Holy Mass, but pray the Holy Mass” as a kind of ball and chain from which they have happily broken free to embrace more spontaneous and “spiritual” forms of personal prayer and worship, which they regard as more authentic avenues for encountering and experiencing God. The desire for a personal encounter and relationship with God may be laudable, and may even be viewed as a remedy for what some have called the problem of “sacramentalized pagans” in our parishes. Yet any logic that regards such a remedy as a pretext for disconnecting their spirituality and worship from our received tradition of worship in favor of free-floating forms of extemporaneous worship is essentially no different from the antinomian logic of “free church” Protestantism, if not docetic or Manichaean Gnosticism.

It is telling in this connection that Fr. Joseph Gelineau, S.J., whom the chief architect of the New Mass, Archbishop Annibale Bugnini, described as “one of the great masters of the international liturgical world,” understood liturgy as a “permanent workshop” of innovation, with implications far beyond anything mandated by Vatican II. Indeed, if Pope Saint John XXIII were to come back and step into just about any American Catholic parish today and witness the ordinary form of the mass as commonly celebrated, he might wonder whether he had found the right church. He would certainly be shocked to see no altar rail dividing the sanctuary from the congregation, to note the presence of lay lectors of both genders, altar girls, Protestant hymns and secular tunes instead of Gregorian chant, possibly even praise bands with guitars and drums, a priest facing the congregation, perhaps even...
preaching in the aisles, hearing the liturgical prayers spoken in English, and a free-standing altar table surrounded by nearly a dozen lay Eucharistic ministers of both gender who, together with the priest, administered Communion to people in the hand as they filed up; for not one of these practices was anywhere even alluded to, let alone mandated, in the documents of Vatican II. The question begs to be asked: why does the Church have liturgical laws and issue instructions and directives if nobody pays any attention to them? It would seem more consistent for Catholics of such a mind just to become evangelical Pentecostals; and sometimes I’m tempted to think they’ve done just that. By the same token, for the Church to restore a greater measure of credibility and shore up her authority in the minds of the faithful, she will need to begin closing the gap between “word” (from Rome) and “deed” (in the parish) in one way or other.

Epilogue

Humanly speaking, the Church has fallen on hard times of late. She faces immense challenges both from within and within. To be a Catholic these days is neither the most popular thing nor the easiest; the same is true, a fortiori, of those who find themselves in love with the Traditional Latin mass. As a Catholic convert now for upwards of a quarter of a century, I suppose there is a sense in which I do find myself at times somewhat “out of the frying pan and into the fire,” inside a Church strangely different from the Church of only sixty years ago, in a leaky Barque of Saint Peter that seems to be listing alarmingly to the port side as it takes on water. A secular observer might well say of the Church that her days are numbered.

In a temporal sense, I cannot quarrel with the data. They do not look good. But like J. R. R. Tolkien, I continue to hold fast to the Eucatastrophe, the dramatic narrative climax that delivers victory from the jaws of certain defeat. In the end, I should find it surprising if the Church were not under withering attack by the world, the flesh, and the devil. It is exactly what one should expect.

Thus as I approach my retirement years and look back over my life, I am unceasingly grateful to have been received into the Catholic Church. It is not simply a matter of there being no viable alternative (“Lord, to whom shall we go? You have the words of eternal life”). To be Catholic, rather, is to part of the most beautiful adventure in the world. It is to be recruited into an army to fight exhilarating battles with no hope of success—battles that are nonetheless exhilarating because they are battles in a war whose outcome is already known: in the end, we win. Our liege Lord has already assured us of that. Remember the words of Gandalf: “Look to my coming on the first light of the fifth day—at dawn look to the east!” Our King will invade, and nothing will stop him. This, my Lord and my King in whose Real Presence it is my privilege to humbly and gratefully genuflex and kneel in worship when entering his precincts at mass.

ENDNOTES

2 Cardinal Arinze, while prefect for the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments, repeatedly insisted that the ordinary mode of reception in the Roman Catholic liturgy was kneeling and on the tongue, stressing that reception in the hand while standing was an indulit, which has led to numerous abuses (“Cardinal Arinze Highlights Abuses Of Communion In The Hand,” Catholic News Agency, October 4, 2006). In his book, Dominus est, trans. Nicholas L. Gregorios (South Bend, IN: Newman House, 2009), Archbishop Athanasius Schneider examines the historical record of Catholic practice and calls for an end to Communion in the hand.
3 See the communication by Cardinal Antonio Maria Javerri Ortes, prefect for the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments, as reported in “Vatican Communication on Female Altar Servers” (CatholicCulture.org, March 15, 1994).
7 Joseph Ratzinger, Feast of Faith (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1986), 140.
8 Davies, Mass Facing the People, 4.
9 Ratzinger, Feast of Faith, 84.
10 Summa theologicae I-II, q. 97, a. 2.
What Ever Happened to the Principle of Subsidiarity?

by Joseph E. Dorner

On March 13, 2013, the world received its new pope, Jorge Mario Cardinal Bergoglio of Buenos Aires, who chose the name Francis. The name he chose caused a stir all by itself. As a Jesuit, did he choose the name in honor of Saint Francis Xavier, or was it the name of the famous Franciscan saint? Soon we learned that the first American pope had taken the name of the humble saint from Assisi.

As with all new pontiffs, he received his grace period and was welcomed with great excitement as people waited to learn what his vision would be for the Church and our world. Perhaps, if we are honest, quite a few of us were simply waiting to see if his agenda would be ours rather than to follow his lead. Regardless, it didn’t take long to hear the conflicting verdicts. The response took on a rather vocal turn with the publication of his Apostolic Exhortation, Evangelii gaudium, on November 24, 2013.

Many from the left applauded his critique of capitalism. There was an appreciation of passages such as: “Just as the commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill’ sets a clear limit in order to safeguard the value of human life, today we also have to say ‘thou shalt not’ to an economy of exclusion and inequality. Such an economy kills. How can it be that it is not a news item when an elderly homeless person dies of exposure, but it is news when the stock market loses two points? This is a case of exclusion…. Today everything comes under the laws of competition and the survival of the fittest, where the powerful feed upon the powerless. As a consequence, masses of people find themselves excluded and marginalized: without work, without possibilities, without any means of escape.”

“Human beings are themselves considered consumer goods to be used and then discarded…. In this context, some people continue to defend trickle-down theories which assume that economic growth, encouraged by a free market, will inevitably succeed in bringing about greater justice and inclusiveness in the world. This opinion, which has never been confirmed by the facts, expresses a crude and naïve trust in the goodness of those wielding economic power and in the sacralized workings of the prevailing economic system. Meanwhile, the excluded are still waiting. To sustain a lifestyle which excludes others, or to sustain enthusiasm for that selfish ideal, a globalization of indifference has developed…. The culture of prosperity deadens us; we are thrilled if the market offers us something new to purchase. In the meantime all those lives stunted for lack of opportunity seem a mere spectacle; they fail to move us.”

Others, from the right, either tried to soften such harsh critiques of our current free market system or simply pointed out that the Bishop of Rome is far from infallible or clear with his terms when treating issues of an economic nature.

As universal pastor, Pope Francis must speak out on the inequality and poverty in our world and the injustices in our economic system. Shepherds cannot simply speak in generalities. We must be heard in a world which suffers not only from a lack of charity, but also from a lack of basic justice. Of course there will always be better ways for something to have been written. Human efforts often fall short. All the same, perhaps the Holy Spirit is calling the world through His Holiness to take a serious look at the economic and legal system as it exists in the West, and indeed in nearly the entire world.

There can be no doubt that this passage of Evangelii gaudium points to serious issues. People from all political and economic persuasions can agree that there are serious injustices in our economic and legal systems which stand in need of significant improvement. Do we not all recognize systemic issues that need be addressed so that “the work of justice will be peace; the effect of justice, calm and security forever”? There are people who, through no fault of their own, go hungry, struggle to find gainful employment, affordable healthcare, or just a fair chance at putting into play their creativity and talents in our world. There are deeply imbedded shortcomings in our economic and legal systems that people of all political and economic opinions have witnessed and acknowledged.
Part of the debate and struggle to build God’s kingdom must be an attempt to find and name the shortcomings of our economic and legal systems as they exist, with precision. Only then can we find solutions. Just as doctors find the right course of action through understanding the causes of an illness, so too those interested in social justice, or in a proper application of the Catholic Church’s social doctrine, will take the right course when we understand the systemic problems in our economy, the structures of sin as Blessed John Paul named them, with enough specificity.

And perhaps this is where we all need to do better work, bishops and popes included. Pope Francis is very much open to critiques, and simply looks to participate in the dialogue. Maybe if we all took this approach, perhaps if we were all open to an exchange of perspectives, we could learn from one another, clarify our terms, and make real progress in improving our complex wonderfully productive but imperfect present-day free market system.

Our Catholic tradition has a lot of richness and depth, perhaps surprisingly to some, even in the field of economics. Just as Saint Thomas wrote extensively on topics that would one day be called ecclesiology, so too the Spanish scholastics wrote on topics that we today call economics. We might even be bold and propose there is a modern school of economic thought that has built upon this tradition. But we are getting ahead of ourselves.

Part of our tradition, one principle from our body of social doctrine, that the present author passionately believes will offer fruitful direction and insights, helping us make our economic system truly just, is the principle of subsidiarity. Many would ask, “How can one become passionate about the principle of subsidiarity?” It must be admitted that of the four permanent principles of the Church’s social doctrine: the dignity of the human person (upon which the remaining three are based), the common good, subsidiarity, and solidarity, subsidiarity engenders the least emotion or feeling. And yet, perhaps this is why it is one of the most neglected.

This principle can lead to many fruitful insights. It was ranked as one of the four permanent principles of the Church’s social doctrine in the 2004 compendium of social teaching. Yet in that very document, in the entire Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, there are only three small sections dedicated to the principle of subsidiarity, constituting only six paragraphs out of 583. In the universal Catechism of the Catholic Church, one finds that this principle, although given excellent and insightful treatment, does not stand out in the table of contents as do the other three permanent principles. And even in a more recent statement by the USCCB in which seven themes of social teaching were developed, it is interesting to note, the principle of subsidiarity is one of the four that falls from view.

Of the four permanent principles, the most abstract and academic seems to be subsidiarity. When we think of the dignity of the human person, we are reminded that we are created in the image of God. When we hear of the common good, immediately we think of the noble higher causes that give meaning to life: truth, beauty, and goodness, which stretch us beyond our limited significance as individuals. When we hear of solidarity, feelings of fellowship and magnanimity arise. But when we hear of the principle of subsidiarity, do we feel anything at all? Indeed, might it not be one of the most exciting underdeveloped principles of social doctrine? The purpose of this essay is to show how pivotal this principle is and thus provoke more research, reflection, and helpful applications to the economic and legal systems of today. Properly done, we will find solutions for our world, perhaps even a path to peace. It is this author’s contention that a great amount of social unrest and imbalance needlessly exists in our society because this principle has not been properly appreciated.

Concisely put, the principle of subsidiarity protects personal freedom and initiative, thus helping develop essential qualities of the person, especially the sense of initiative and responsibility. Properly applied, it does this by preventing the community of a higher order from interfering with the internal life of a community of a lower order, so that it does not deprive the latter of its functions. Indeed, how can we respect human dignity or achieve common good when persons, made in the image of the creator, are hampered or stymied in the exercise of their own freedom, responsibility, and creativity? From where else does the wealth of nations come, than from the individual? How many books have been authored, how many inventions patented by committees, compared with the achievements of individual persons made in the creative image of God? If we violate the principle of subsidiarity, impede the power and genius of the individual, who can name all the unintended consequences?

So the question becomes, using the language of the Catechism, “How does one determine the proper role of the community of a higher order in regard to a community of a lower order?” Phrased differently, “How do we protect freedom, and corresponding to this, the
creativity of the individual?” One goal of this article is to answer this question in broad terms, showing some possible avenues for us to take so as to make more just, harmonious, and productive the relationships that constitute our society in general and the community we call the free market.

The principle of subsidiarity is defined and developed in the first article of the second chapter of part three of the Catechism, which is entitled “The Person and Society.” Not without reason, however, already in the third article of the first chapter, the critical importance of protecting the individual’s freedom as much as possible is emphasized. This directly relates to and lays the groundwork for explaining the principle of subsidiarity in the second chapter. It is also interesting to note that the treatment of the importance of freedom comes second only to explaining man’s creation in the image of God and his call to true and eternal happiness in the prior two articles. As a church then, can we not conclude that the defense of our freedom comes second only to defending what it is rooted in our creation in the image of God, and an exhortation to use freedom well so as to find our beatitude or true and eternal happiness?

And so, before treating the Ten Commandments, the Church proclaims the importance of protecting freedom as foundational. It is put eloquently in this the third article of the very first chapter of the third part of the Catechism: Human freedom is a force for growth and maturity in truth and goodness. The more one does what is good, the freer one becomes. Freedom makes man responsible for his acts. Every human person, created in the image of God, has the natural right to be recognized as a free and responsible being. All owe to each other this duty of respect. The right to the exercise of freedom is an inalienable requirement of the dignity of the human person. This right must be recognized and protected by civil authority.

What we find in the Catechism is also taught by Saint Thomas and Sacred Scripture. Saint Thomas wrote that the New Law, as opposed to the Old Law, leaves much more to be determined by men and women in freedom. The New Law, the law of the gospel, is therefore called the “Law of Liberty.” It is true that the sacraments are specifically instituted in the New Law because they are necessary for the conferring of grace. Also, there are other exterior actions that are commanded or prohibited because they respectively make possible or impede the interior workings of grace. One can think here of the Ten Commandments and the Beatitudes. Yet, all other actions are left to the individual to determine in freedom as the Holy Spirit moves them, in what could be called the realm of the virtue of prudence.

In Sacred Scripture we also have many references to the importance of freedom. In part, it is in response to the excessive and stifling legislation found in some circles of first-century Jewish thought. In addition, however, it is also simply for the sake of protecting the freedom of man, himself created in the image of God who is free. Here are a few examples: For freedom Christ set us free; so stand firm and do not submit again to the yoke of slavery. For you were called for freedom, brothers. But do not use this freedom as an opportunity for the flesh; rather, serve one another through love. Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom. But the one who peers into the perfect law of freedom and perseveres, and is not a hearer who forgets but a doer who acts, such a one shall be blessed in what he does. Be free, yet without using freedom as a pretext for evil, but as slaves of God. He himself bore our sins in his body upon the cross, so that, free from sin, we might live for righteousness. They promise them freedom, though they themselves are slaves of corruption, for a person is a slave of whatever overcomes him. [SHOULD THESE SENTENCES BE IN QUOTATION MARKS?]

So freedom is not something just tolerated, but essential to Christian living. It is true that we are exhorted to use this freedom for God, but nowhere is there the concept that legislation is a tool that is to be applied so that we “use our freedom well.” In fact, when Saint Thomas treats of human law, in comparison to divine law, examples of which we have just seen, the role of freedom is found to be even more extensive.

But where does the role of law and regulation begin and where does it leave off? A key phrase is found in the last line of paragraph 1738 of the Catechism. The full statement reads, “This right [freedom] must be recognized and protected by civil authority within the limits of the common good and public order.” (The italics are mine.) What are the limits demanded by the common good and the public order? Saint Thomas examines this when he asked the question, “Does it pertain to human law to restrain all vices?” The question could have been phrased, “What freedoms can be restrained so we can coexist in a peaceful society?”

His answer is insightful: “Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Therefore human laws do not
forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft and such like.” 32 (The italics are mine)

The examples chosen by Saint Thomas are important. They are all immoral acts that directly harm one’s neighbor. Obviously all immoral behavior adversely affects our neighbor at least indirectly, if not directly. This is an important distinction. Applied to the economic realm, or free markets, laws should thus be made that protect those that participate in these types of exchanges from violence, fraud, theft, property damage, pollution, and the breaking of contracts, all direct attacks on one’s person or property. Laws, however, would not be made to impact market participants such that they encourage individuals to buy homes, for example, instead of renting. This is not the role of government, according to the principle of subsidiarity. People exercising their freedom over time best mature and learn what is in their interest and right. Even if some fail in this regard, they ought not to be formed in such matters by the law. This is the place of churches, the family, educators, and private associations.

This is not an isolated passage in Saint Thomas’s writings. Elsewhere he writes, “The purpose of human law is different than that of the divine law. The end of human law is temporal tranquility of society, for which purpose human law prohibits exterior actions that can disturb the peaceful state of society.” 33 Even more provocatively in another place he writes, “Human government is derived from the Divine government, and should imitate it. Now although God is all-powerful and supremely good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take place in the universe, which He might prevent, lest, without them, greater goods might be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly in human government also, those who are in authority, rightly tolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain greater evils be incurred: thus Augustine says (De Ordine ii, 4): ‘If you do away with harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust.’” 34 Think of our experience in trying to ban the use of alcohol and our current efforts to outlaw drugs. There is wisdom in what Saint Thomas and Saint Augustine intuited about how human nature reacts to authority trying to impose too much. Some have even pointed out that the use of alcohol actually went up during prohibition, the exact opposite effect of the intent of the law. 31 Could not something similar be occurring in what we now call the “war on drugs”?

It would seem that Saint Thomas and the best of our Catholic tradition sees the role of law and regulation to be that of enforcing justice, not temperance, fortitude, or prudence. As he writes, “Although prudence is simply foremost among all the moral virtues, yet justice, more than any other virtue, regards its object under the aspect of something due, which is a necessary condition for a law.” 35

Let’s apply this to the free market. The free market gets a lot of criticism, and considering its current state, that may be well merited. But do we truly have free markets? Better yet, we should ask, “What are free markets?” On the one hand, free markets should not be “free for all” markets; on the other hand, it is not the laws’ place to enforce charity, “noble, chivalrous behavior,” or “right choices.”

Following this tradition of limiting the purpose and aim of laws, regulations should be set such that violence, theft, fraud, property damage, and the breaking of contracts are forbidden. These things do direct violence against another’s person or property. However, according to the principle of subsidiarity, in an effort to preserve the freedom and personal responsibility of each individual or subsidiary organization or group, no laws should be written that would encourage people “to make good choices.”

When such laws are made and tolerated, as we do in so many ways in our modern society, we violate the principle of subsidiarity. We remove responsibility and decision making from lower order communities and individuals, causing these agents to atrophy in their moral constitution. We have all witnessed the phenomenon of “helicopter parents.” Why do we disparage such behavior? Precisely because it can keep a child from learning and taking responsibility, cause them to act out and fight authority, impede their ability to learn by trial and error, and basically thwart their freedom and creativity.

Analogously, what has been the effect upon our churches, private associations, and our sense of responsibility as individuals when we embrace “helicopter governments” that draft law after law to form us and make our decisions for us? We atrophy. Churches, private associations, and charities become less and less relevant in the minds of many citizens and indeed in practice. Their vigor and relevance begin to wane. Have we not seen this in the past hundred years in the West, as churches have become less and less involved in education, healthcare, welfare, and adoption efforts?
Freedom, responsibility, and creativity: the principle of subsidiarity protects and nurtures these. It is no small matter. Yet we have tolerated the loss of this principle out of fear of what people might choose if government were not involved. Have we lost our belief that we are formed in the image of God, free and responsible, guided by grace, that before us has been set “life and death, the blessing and the curse,” that we must have the freedom to “choose life that we and our descendants may live”?7

If we as a society were to focus our government on regulating what it ought to, and not being involved in areas where it ought not to be involved, such as promoting home ownership through the tax code, or trying to force people to avoid the use of marijuana, we would make great strides as a society. Obviously, we cannot be naive. No doubt, there would be people who previously didn’t use marijuana and would start using it, for example. There would be a period of adjustment as we accustomed ourselves the laws as a more limited master, and churches and other “communities of a lower order” would learn to step up and take their proper place in the organization of communal life.

But all change engenders these sorts of transitional difficulties, and so they do not justify continued violation of the principle of subsidiarity. What this does call us to is as pastors, parents, churches, and private associations to fulfill our roles once again as teachers of right and wrong. We cannot, as we have for too long, allow our role to be usurped by a community of a higher order. In extreme cases, when a community of a higher order interferes in the totality of human affairs, we call this “totalitarianism.” In such a social environment, various groups in society that before peacefully coexisted and tolerated one another, become highly antagonistic as they are forced to fight for their freedom, trying to ensure that government enforces their vision of right and wrong. Such a misplaced approach to making the world better, which is a misapplication of the principle of subsidiarity, ironically diminishes the moral strength, creativity, diversity, and freedom of society.

People of different political persuasions, with different ideas about the role and purpose of law in society, will naturally react differently to what has been written here. For the sake of clarity, we can conclude with a few examples of how implementing the principle of subsidiarity would impact our current economic and legal systems which together constitute our free markets and modern-day economies.

Subsidiarity—respecting reform would clearly entail some new regulations, but it would also mean deregulation in other areas. For example, current regulations that make it difficult if not impossible to purchase health insurance options across state lines would be removed. This would be an instance of “deregulation.” Current regulations unjustly impose on the freedom of market participants to enter into contracts and agreements of their choice. They also create undue competitive advantages for some companies and disadvantages for others. The whole issue of licensing would be reexamined. Any requirement of licenses or particular degrees in, for example, the healthcare field, that restricts the ability of patients and caregivers to come together freely would be reworked.

On the other hand, new regulations would be imposed in areas where they do not currently but ought to exist. In the financial industry for example, products that are currently fraudulent by nature, or tend to be occasions for fraud, would be removed by law from the market or clearly regulated in order to protect the property rights of all market participants. One area I have previously written about in some detail is the nature of our modern currency system, which is very prone to fraud.8 Proper regulation in this area alone would restore much justice, especially to the poor and middle classes.

These examples are just that—only examples—and are not intended to be exhaustive or of first importance. The point is that it isn’t a question of more regulation or less regulation. It is a question of proper regulation. Applying the principle of subsidiarity will help us discover the right path. As we formulate laws, the determining question should no longer be: Will this help people make the right moral decisions? Rather, the important questions should be: Does this law protect the person, property, and freedom of members of society from some direct attack? Is its focus basic justice?

Even if government were perfectly focused and exercised, we still would not have a perfect free market or society, only a just one. To achieve perfection, all individuals and subsidiary organizations would need to fulfill their proper roles. The key questions for them to consider would be: Are you doing all you can to shape the consumer’s tastes and your own so as to properly focus economic creativity? Are you doing all possible to perfect the justice of our free markets through the addition of beauty, goodness, and love?

If the answers to these questions is “yes,” then the concerns of our Holy Father would be well addressed. Immoral products and services would simply disappear.
for want of demand. All competition and power would be exercised in love and for the common good. People would not be marginalized but set free to create and contribute. A culture of prosperity would be replaced by a culture of the true, the good, and the beautiful. A globalization of indifference would be displaced by one of creativity freely placed in service of one’s neighbor, imitating the creative and generous genius of God himself. Who knows what wonders we would see?

ENDNOTES

1 Evangelii gaudium, 53-55.
2 Is 32:17.
5 Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2004), 160.
6 Ibid., 185-88, 419-20.
7 Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1882-83. One finds the first chapter of the first section of part three of the Catechism entitled, “The Dignity of the Human Person.” One finds a subsection under the second article of chapter two of the first section of part three entitled, “The Common Good.” One finds a subsection under the third article of chapter two of the first section of part three entitled, “Human Solidarity.” But nowhere is there any specific chapter, section, or subsection named after the fourth permanent principle of the Church’s social doctrine.
9 Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1882-83.
10 Ibid., 1731.
11 Ibid., 1733.
12 Ibid., 1734.
13 Ibid., 1738.
14 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica 1-II, q. 108, a. 1.
15 Gal 5:1.
17 2 Cor 3:17.
18 Jas 1:25.
19 1 Pt 2:16.
20 1 Pt 2:24.
21 2 Pt 2:19.
22 Ibid. I-II, q. 96, a. 2.
23 Ibid. I-II, q. 98, a. 1.
24 Ibid. II-II, q. 10, a. 11.12.
26 Summa theologica II-II, q. 56, a. 1, ad 1; a. 2.
27 Dt 30:19.
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n the winter issue of the 2001 Quarterly P.E. Hodgson had an article entitled “Climate Change.” That article succinctly provided the basic background scientific understanding and a rationale (nuclear) for coping with a future world warmed by carbon pollution. Fourteen years later many things have changed. Interestingly, one thing that has not changed is average global surface temperature. Statistically this temperature has not changed since before 2001. This is referred to as “the pause”; nobody really understands why this is happening, nor did any climate models predict it in 2001. So much for settled science.

The main thing with respect to climate that has changed since 2001 is a new technique to access energy. Horizontal drilling coupled with hydraulic fracturing (fracking), referred to as unconventional drilling, have enabled deep deposits of crude and natural gas to be economically developed. This technology has changed the global energy landscape. This technique has given us a tool to economically address carbon pollution in the near term, by displacing coal with gas-fired electric, while also addressing the energy crisis.

The real energy crisis is in the less developed world. Justice requires us to help the world’s poor rapidly obtain the energy required for a dignified standard of living. Fracking is an important tool, among many, for the delivery of such energy. Allow me to explain.

As Christians we are called to seek the common good of our neighbors, both domestically and internationally. Pope Francis has continually stressed the need for concern with the plight of “the least of these” (Mt 25). The development of safe, clean and affordable energy sources, especially for “the least of these,” is an important component of the common good.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has developed a measure of material quality of life called the human development index (HDI). This important socioeconomic index is composed of measures of “average national life quality” based upon: i) life expectancy at birth, ii) per capita income, and iii) mean years of schooling. HDI values are reported every other year and range from 0 to 1, with a 2012 value of 0.71 being the median (middle) value for the 187 ranked countries. Some examples of country values are (global HDI rank/HDI value): United States (#3/0.94), China (#101/0.70), South Africa (#121/0.63), India (#136/0.55), Mozambique (#161/0.33).

There is a linear correlation between national HDI values and per capita energy consumption for poor countries, i.e., HDI < 0.60: therefore, small increases in per capita energy significantly increase HDI values.

According to the World Bank there are 1.2 billion people in the developing world without electricity, and close to 3 billion people are without modern cooking facilities. The World Health Organization has recently estimated that annually 3 million of these die prematurely because of respiratory illnesses due to indoor air pollution from primitive cooking facilities (i.e. dung-, wood-, or peat-fueled fire). Additionally, 2 million premature deaths are attributable to outdoor air pollution. Most of these people are in India, sub-Saharan Africa, and developing Asia.

Unconventional drilling and fracking to fuel natural-gas-fired electricity generation, in addition to renewable energy and conservation where appropriate, is the best way to rapidly meet global electricity demands. The shale gas experience in the United States over the last ten years clearly illustrates that increasing gas production can decrease electricity prices when cheap gas displaces coal. This is good for the environment, health, and economic development of “the least of these.”

Clearly, replacing coal with gas for electricity generation is beneficial, but what about the environmental impact of unconventional gas drilling? In 2012 The Royal Society and The Royal Society of Engineering published a peer-reviewed analysis entitled “Shale Gas Extraction in the UK: A Review of Hydraulic Fracturing.” The review states:

The health, safety and environmental risks associated with ‘fracking’ …can be managed effectively in the UK as long as operational best practices are implemented and enforced through regulation. Hydraulic fracturing is an established technology that has been used in the oil and gas industries for many decades.

Consistent with this view is a 2014 peer-reviewed article in the International Journal of Coal Geology by Susan Brantley and colleagues detailing a thorough analysis of Pennsylvania records on shale gas development water issues from 2008-2012. During this period...
>6000 wells were drilled and >4000 were completed (e.g. fractured). Brandley et al. estimate that approximately twenty gas wells unambiguously contaminated wells, while thirty large spills also occurred. Most of the well water contamination incidents involved faulty well casings that permitted methane migration into water wells. This occurred in 0.24 percent of the gas wells developed. The most famous incident occurred in 2009 in Dimock, Pennsylvania, where a faulty well casing resulted in increased residential well methane levels in eighteen homes.

The development of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing has revolutionized the global energy landscape in just ten years. The production of abundant natural gas by these techniques has resulted in decoupling U.S. natural gas prices from global markets. Current U.S. natural gas prices are less than half that of global prices. It has been estimated that on average northeastern U.S. families saved $1,300 on heating bills over the harsh 2013/2014 winter. This situation contrasts with the German experience in renewable energy deployment. Stefan Nicola and Tino Andresen report in Bloomberg:

Europe must get a grip on energy prices to protect growth and stop its industry from fleeing abroad, according to two top policy makers. The region needs to reduce the cost gap with the U.S. …European Union Energy Commissioner Guenther Oettinger told a conference in Berlin …German companies and consumers are shouldering costs of as much as 24 billion euros ($32 billion) a year for clean-energy aid, the country’s Economy and Energy Minister Sigmar Gabriel told the same event. Europe’s biggest economy has reached “the limit” with renewables subsidies and must contain power prices or risk deindustrialization.

Shale formations are global and are believed to contain vast amounts of hydrocarbons. In principle the economic stimulus observed with U.S. shale development can occur in many other places to varying extents. For instance, South Africa is believed to have a shale gas potential of about two thirds that of the United States while only having about 16 percent of the population. If exploratory drilling proves this to be true, this reserve has tremendous potential to fuel economic development in the Indian Ocean region. South Africa gets about 80 percent of its energy from coal; development of its shale gas reserves would lower domestic natural gas prices while providing significant economic activity. As happened in the United States starting in 2005, low natural gas prices eventually displace coal in domestic electricity production with a concomitant decrease in carbon emissions and improved air quality. The U.S. EPA reports that carbon emissions decreased 10 percent between 2005 and 2012 due to switching to cheap natural gas from coal-fired electricity generation. For perspective, during the same time frame carbon emission in the E.U. decreased 14 percent but only 3.5 percent in Germany.

Currently, South Africa imports natural gas from its northern neighbor Mozambique, which is developing natural gas liquefaction (LNG) facilities because of vast offshore reserves. In principle, these facilities could be duplicated to export South African shale gas if fracking is pursued. Such a process, when duplicated in other regions, would increase global natural gas supplies and decrease prices. Lower global natural gas prices will decrease global coal consumption as it is replaced by natural-gas-fired power generation in countries such as India and China. India currently has approximately one quarter of its electric generation capacity idle because of high international gas prices. Coal-fired capacity is being used because of its cheaper price on the international market.

In this manner global carbon emissions would decrease, local air quality would improve, while global economic activity would increase with cheaper electricity rates (compared with developing an equal amount of electricity from solar and wind resources). It is conceivable that such a scenario would move the human development index (HDI) for South Africa (#121/0.63), India (#136/0.55), and Mozambique (#185/0.33) closer to the global median HDI value of ~0.7.

For optimal human development, sustainable fracking needs to be coupled with the Church’s vision of global development. Wolfgang Grassl reminds us that from the Church’s perspective each human is called to a vocation “to be more” in terms of, emotional, spiritual, educational, health, and economic spheres. This is referred to as authentic human development, to distinguish it from mere economic development, which if left unchecked by healthy spirituality, becomes destructive. Thus, sustainable fracking can be viewed as a tool that directly enhances the economic sphere through wealth generation that can enhance the educational and health spheres of “the least of these.” Reflecting on Christian mission activities reminds us that development of these spheres is a corequisite of spiritual/emotional development. All spheres must be developed simultaneously to
create a more just future.

From this perspective it is useful to reflect on Pope Benedict XVI’s encyclical Caritas in veritate (Charity in Truth), which focuses on the problems of global development and progress towards the common good. The pope writes:

Charity in truth, to which Jesus Christ bore witness by his earthly life and especially by his death and resurrection, is the principal driving force behind the authentic development of every person and of all humanity. Love—caritas—is an extraordinary force which leads people to opt for courageous and generous engagement in the field of justice and peace (1).

Benedict points out that the “Truth” of humanity’s transcendent vocation to progress “drives us to do more, know more and have more in order to be more” (16).

Benedict also reminds us:

Technology, viewed in itself, is ambivalent. If on the one hand, some today would be inclined to entrust the entire process of development to technology, on the other hand we are witnessing an upsurge of ideologies that deny in toto the very value of development, viewing it as radically anti-human and merely a source of degradation. This leads to a rejection, not only of the distorted and unjust way in which progress is sometimes directed, but also of scientific discoveries themselves, which, if well used, could serve as an opportunity of growth for all. The idea of a world without development indicates a lack of trust in man and in God. It is therefore a serious mistake to undervalue human capacity to exercise control over the deviations of development or to overlook the fact that man is constitutionally oriented towards “being more” (14).

Finally, I believe we all must develop a healthy worldview that contains an awareness of God’s loving care and provision woven into his creation. Healthy spirituality is necessary to prevent our desire “to be more” from becoming a “have more” mentality. The global lack of such spirituality, however, is not a reason to oppose fossil fuel use. Instead, we all need to redouble our efforts and join the Church’s spiritual efforts to promote a materially simpler and more just future for all.

I pray God will be with us as we help in our own small way to bring God’s mercy, justice, and peace to all.

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doctors tell us that it is not uncommon for periods of sustained unrest to follow major Church councils. Certain issues become highly controversial, and controversy sometimes develops into heated contentiousness. Almost a half century has now passed since the close of the Second Vatican Council, and the ecclesiastical waters remain in a decidedly choppy condition in the wake of that important event. Debate over the council has been known to take on a rather spiny quality at times, if indeed it does not occasionally wax positively acrimonious, as opponents contend with one another over just how the elusive “spirit” of the council is correctly to be discerned. Significant disagreement continues over a number of foundational questions: What exactly did the council say? What is the precise authoritative status of Vatican II, given its self-identification as a “pastoral” council? Is the present crisis in the Church to be taken as a direct result of the council?

Given the heat that is frequently generated by the exchanges of those who view the council in quite opposite ways, a heat which too often comes unaccompanied by helpful illumination, it is especially refreshing, and heartening, to have available now a book like *The Council in Question: A Dialogue with Catholic Traditionalism*. The book is a collection of spirited letters written by the Dominican theologian Father Aidan Nichols, who defends the position of the “official Church” on the council, and Moyra Doorly, a dedicated advocate of the position toward Vatican II taken by Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre, the founder of the Society of St. Pius X.

This exchange of letters can rightly be described as a debate, but a debate of a very special, perhaps even unusual, kind, for besides being substantive, pointed, and genuinely informative, besides having its positions articulated with clarity and cogency, it is governed throughout by the spirit of charity. The clear intent of both of the participants is to ferret out the truth, not to score points against the other.

The letters are introduced by some prefatory comments by the two authors, with Father Nichols leading off. He tells us that when Pope John XXIII called the council, Cardinal Montini, the then Archbishop of Milan and who was later to become Paul VI, expressed the fear that the council would stir up a “horns’ nest” (1), a fear that, it would seem, in view of what has transpired in the aftermath of Vatican II, was not without foundation. Father Nichols believes that the timing of the calling of the council was not especially felicitous. The decade of the 1960s began in a spirit of heady optimism, but “as the optimism turned to hedonism, the Western culture of the 1960s encouraged more of the second than the first” (2). He contends that when you add up all the things that came out of the council, they “amount to a ‘makeover’ of the Church more far-reaching [even] than that attempted by the Council of Trent,” and he sees it as having been “something of a runaway Council” (3). When the council closed, in 1965, “appeal to the ‘spirit of Vatican II’ covered—or rather exposed—a multitude of sins” (3). He calls attention to the fact that the Missal of Paul VI was put together only after the Council Fathers had returned home, and “can only be described as mandated by them in a somewhat Pickwickian sense” (4–5).

The Traditionalist Movement which is now a signal feature of contemporary Catholicism was clearly an “effect” of the council, and is to be explained generally by the “post-Conciliar crisis,” and, more specifically, by “the liturgical reform and the controversial Declaration” (5). He refers here to the *Declaration on Religious Liberty*. As one speaking on behalf of the official Church, Father Nichols asserts that the council and the Novus Ordo Missal are quite open to orthodox interpretation. “The letters that follow,” he writes, “seek to clarify the great issues at stake in this debate” (6).

In her own prefatory comments, Moyra Doorly straightforwardly informs us that she is defending the position taken by Archbishop Lefebvre and the Society of St. Pius X regarding the council in general and in particular the liturgical reforms it promulgated. The heart of the position she advocates, she explains, is “that the Council is the problem, not the manner in which it has been interpreted” (11). She quotes from a letter written to Cardinal Ottaviani by Archbishop Lefebvre (she quotes amply from the Archbishop’s writings throughout her letters), where he wrote: “We have lived to see the marriage of the Catholic Church with Liberal ideas” (9). The liberalism being referred to here is the ideology which came to the fore in the nineteenth century and which was vigorously opposed by Pope Pius IX. Moyra Doorly expresses the hope that her exchange of letters with Father Nichols will assist in “breaking down the barriers which define the current situation” (12).

A concern which finds prominent expression in all of Moyra Doorly’s letters—which she generally characterizes as coming from a “Confused Catholic”—has to do with the reform of the liturgy and specifically with the New Order of the Mass. What she finds particularly troublesome about the *Novus Ordo Missae* is that it diminishes, if it does not altogether, the central character of the mass as a propitiatory sacrifice. In light of this fact, she wonders if the liturgical renewal should not be regarded as “simply another example of a big idea gone wrong” (14).

Father Nichols responds sympathetically to her concerns, remarking that there is common agreement that what happened to the liturgy in the
aftermath of the Council was quite unprecedented. The liturgy has certainly undergone changes over the course of the Church’s long history, but those changes have always taken place in a gradual, incremental way, after the manner of the growth of a living organism. We have been presented with something which had “never previously taken place in the wholesale and systematic fashion which characterized the reform of the Missal” (22). The liturgy we now have is the product of an ad hoc committee, and this, as many have noted, represents a marked departure from tradition. Apart from that not insignificant factor, it has to be admitted, Father Nichols writes, that “the scale of this kind, even had its components been entirely felicitous, was imprudently chosen” (22). Among the things that need to be done to remedy the present situation, he believes “we need to work on not only catechesis but also, in the fullness of time, a revision of the Offertory texts, the ceremonial of the Mass, and (not least) the position of the celebrant, so as to reactivate the diminished, but by no means extinguished, feeling of the faithful for the sacramental identity of Calvary and the Eucharist of the Church” (25). He ends his letter with the pointed remark: “let us have done with the language of the ordained priest as president. Otherwise, what a word! Inspid, bureaucratic, jejune” (27).

Moyra Doorly sees the documents of Vatican II as ignoring “the theology of propitiation and supplication,” which represents for her “a doctrinal discontinuity of the first order.” The entire circumstance supports her long-held suspicion that the Church since the council “seems intent on passing Golgotha and heading straight for Pentecost” (29). She remains puzzled by the fact that, given the current crisis in the Church, “no one seems prepared to question Vatican II itself,” when it could be said that it invites questioning by the very way it defined itself. But that is not what we have. “Although defined as pastoral and not dogmatic, Vatican II is considered to be beyond criticism” (30).

In response to this, Father Nichols concedes that “a number of measures the Council fathers called for by way of liturgical revision offended against prudence” (35), and cites as an example of this the fact that “an opportunity was missed to spell out the ‘ends’—the purposes—of the Mass considered as a sacrifice” (30). This being the case, we need now, he tells Moyra Doorly, “to ‘re-sacralize,’ in your invented but useful word, our common or garden usage of the rite of Paul VI” (39), a significant element of which process would be the celebration of the Mass versus orientem, “with the priest and the entire congregation turned toward the Lord” (39). As to what is often referred to as the “active participation” in the liturgy, called for by the Council, that should mean, he argues, “engaged participation, not jumping up and down” (40).

In reply to the letter in which Moyra Doorly claims that “sterility and not fecundity is the mark of the Conciliar Church, as evidenced by the dearth of vocations, the wide-scale abandonment of the faith, and empty churches” (46), Father Nichols, while not denying the negative changes that have taken place in the Church since the council, points out that “the principal sign of the Church of Tradition is precisely, I would say, that she undergoes metamorphosis without deformation” (46). The hope would seem to be, then, that in the long run, if the Church remains loyal to Tradition, just those changes will prevail which serve to preserve the deposit of faith. Revelation is expressed in different ways, he argues, but its essence will remain intact. While one may speak of the documents of Vatican II as contributing to an accretion of the understanding of the deposit of faith, he sees no suggestion of an accretion of the deposit of faith itself. Apart from that, however, he has no doubt that the “still not fully resolved crisis in our Church” can be attributed to the fact that “episcopal guardianship has often been lacking” (53).

Moyra Doorly maintains that there are telltale signs, in the council documents, of the Modernism condemned by Pope Pius X. In his responding to the letter bearing that claim, Father Nichols writes: “Let me, then, in my turn make the concession to you that Modernism in some sense is to be found in those documents (or, rather, in some of them and notably in the Pastoral Constitution in the Modern World)” (63). But the Modernism he sees there is cultural, not dogmatic, by which he is referring to the expression, in the documents, of certain optimistic expectations on the part of some churchmen, who believed that a number of modern cultural trends were compatible with the Church’s truth regarding humanity. “This belief was, I’m sorry to say, the Achilles’ heel of the Second Vatican Council” (64). Perhaps it may be added that this belief resulted from a serious misreading of the “signs of the times,” which, supposedly, were being read aright. “What the Council failed to do,” Father Nichols explains, “was to bring critical intelligence to bear on what was for the most part merely a coincidence in rhetoric between the Western world of the 1950s and 60s and the moral discourse of the Church” (65). The principal task at hand for us now, he argues, is to make sure that “the naïve and, consequently, ambiguous statements of the Council fathers on matters of human culture” (66) are interpreted according to the truths found in the natural law and divine Revelation. The confusion caused by the “cultural naïveté” found in the council’s documents brought about the “dismantling” of much of the Church’s institutional life, in “Catholic universities, hospitals, schools, trade unions, political associations and even Religious congregations and programs of catechesis. The ‘knock-on’ effects have been horrendous. That is why, this time, we must get it right” (68). Of the various institutions Father Nichols lists there, doubtless it was the religious congregations that suffered the most.
devastating effects. Most of them are now but faint shadows of what they once were.

The next issue raised by Moyra Doorly, in her fifth letter, was ecumenism, in the advocacy of which, as expressed by the council, she sees what is in many respects a distinct departure from earlier Church teaching, especially as laid down in the writings of Pope Pius XII. Father Nichols admits that on this matter “we can legitimately point out failures of prudence on the part of the Council fathers” (75). There are indeed weaknesses in conciliar teaching, and he believes that the document on religious liberty is “the worst offender in this regard” (79). The main danger involved in pursuing a certain form of ecumenism is that of lapsing into “doctrinal indifferentism,” and because there have been “particular irresponsible actions” (79) on the part of some, people are given the erroneous impression that all the churches are pretty much the same and “the unique claims of the Catholic Church” (79) become blurred.

Moyra Doorly pursues the subject of doctrinal modernism, claiming that this is precisely what is to be found in the council documents. Father Nichols responds by asserting that in making that claim, she is going beyond “the limits of acceptable criticism” (81). In pressing her point, Doorly quotes a passage from the Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions (Nos-stra Aetate), which speaks admiringly of non-Christian religions. With that kind of attitude, she asks, how are we ever to hope to convert the pagans? In reply, Father Nichols asserts that the doctrinal intentions of the council are the heart of the matter, and on this point he notes a marked difference of opinion between himself and Doorly. We may be at liberty “to question the wisdom of the Council’s prudent statements,” he writes, but “I do not believe we have a similar liberty where the doctrinal statements of the Council are concerned even if we find these to be in some regard ambiguous in character” (87, emphasis in text). That much said, he does find non-
doctrinal problems in Nostra aetate; for example, in the fact that it “carries so few references to the history of religion as a story of error” (90).

Moyra Doorly devotes her final letter to the subject of religious liberty. She quotes Archbishop Lefebvre’s observation that we have witnessed “a complete overthrow of the entire tradition and teaching of the Church” as the result of the council, but in particular, she believes, as a result of the teaching found in the Declaration on Religious Liberty. By way of rejoinder, Father Nichols concedes that the doctrinal statements of the council “may be less than balanced or comprehensive in character and thus, by implication, need supplementation, whether from another Council or from other sources” (100). He cites as an example of the kind of ambiguity to be found in the documents what the Dogmatic Constitution on Revelation (Dei verbum, 11) has to say on the subject of the inerrancy of Sacred Scripture. And he is willing to grant that the Declaration on Religious Freedom “occasions a genuine difficulty for orthodox Catholics” (102).

In Father Nichols “Final But Not Necessarily Conclusive Reply” to Moyra Doorly’s last letter, he tells her that “the price of rejecting the Council en bloc is too high for me to pay” (118). He continues: “The weaknesses I have conceded in the Conciliar documents do not, I believe, outweigh their strengths. True, an occasional text is so bland as to be almost nugatory” (118). He cites as an example the Decree on the Instruments of Social Communication (Inter mirifica). Nonetheless, he believes that “the accents of the great doctors” are to be heard in the documents. He ends with this telling observation: “This is the tragedy of the post-Conciliar era, that an instrument of Catholic renaissance has been made into a stone of stumbling” (119).

George Cardinal Pell, the Archbishop of Sydney, wrote the foreword to this book, which he regards as deserving of being read widely. Interestingly, he likens the debate between Father Nichols and Moyra Doorly to a tennis match between Vatican II (Father Nichols) and the Council of Trent (Moya Doorly), and it is difficult to escape the impression that he thinks Trent came away with the laurels. In any event, he sees a marked contrast in the play of the two competitors: Moyra Doorly is the more aggressive player, who keeps her opponent constantly on his toes with smashing serves. “On some occasions,” the Cardinal writes, “Father Nichols had to work hard to keep the ball in play, but he was regularly successful” (viii). The Cardinal acknowledges that the Church is much changed for the worse since the council, but he believes that this is to be explained, in good part, to deleterious influences coming from outside the Church. “But many Catholic communities have been guilty also of self-harm, ignorantly encouraging secularization of institutions” (viii). “The crux of the discussion,” he maintains, “is whether the self-harm came from illegitimate appeals to ‘the spirit of Vatican II’ or can be-sheeted home to doctrinal errors in the Council teachings” (viii). He makes no attempt to provide an explicit response to that question.

Though not as beautifully crafted as the spirited debate presented in this book, innumerable other debates, formal and informal, over the same subject and dealing with much the same issues, have preceded it. And doubtless, the debates will go on, for every indication has it that Vatican II will remain “the Council in Question” for some time to come. Certainly Father Nichols and Moyra Doorly are not the only ones who have responded to the council questioningly, and one does not have to be a supporter of the views of Archbishop Lefebvre in order to harbor doubts about one aspect or another of Vatican II. Allusion has already been made to the misgivings voiced by the future Pope Paul VI as to the wisdom of the very calling of the council. Father Nichols cites the dire opinion of Father Louis Bouyer, who was a peritus at the council and a member
of the committee that was responsible for the reform of the liturgy; to Father Bouyer, who was a convert to the faith, we have seen, in the wake of Vatican II, nothing less than the “decomposition of Catholicism” (4). In the view of Giuseppe Cardinal Siri, “If the Church were not Divine, the Council would have buried her.” Joseph Cardinal Suenens claimed that “Vatican II is the French Revolution of the Church.” This can be taken as a positive assessment of the council, depending on how one views the French Revolution and the impact it has had on Western civilization. Surely the cardinal was not suggesting, in making that comparison, that something analogous to the Reign of Terror would now be part of the Church’s subsequent history. Archbishop Felici, the official secretary of the council, commented cryptically that “as for the declarations which have a novel character, we have to make reservations.” Finally, and apropos the debate between Father Nichols and Myra Doory, Cardinal Kasper observed: “The conciliar texts themselves have a huge potential for conflict, open the door to a selective reception in either direction.” Indeed.

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Reviewed by Anne Barbeau Gardiner

English Catholics and the Supernatural 1553-1829 is an example of how some Catholics in academe today have virtually no belief in the supernatural. In spite of his title, the author of this work deals only with the sensational or dark side of the “invisible world.” He is concerned with the preternatural rather than the supernatural. He focuses on ghosts, witches, demonic possession, and exorcisms, while ignoring the postbiblical miracles and the Real Presence. Even so, he is consistently skeptical about any such occurrences. Although a well-known English Catholic himself, Young is on the side of the “Catholic” dissidents of penal times who wrote between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, clergymen who openly opposed papal authority and were profoundly skeptical of the supernatural. Young speaks highly of these individuals—Blackloists, Anglo-Gallicans, and Cisalpines—all of whom stood against the pope’s supremacy in spiritual matters. In addition, he insistently excoriates the Jesuits, whom he faults for engaging in an “unrestrained promotion of exorcism and the miraculous” (8). His bias is seen when he writes, “The Jesuits were prepared to exorcize virtually anyone or anything, even if they considered a person’s suffering to be mental or moral rather than spiritual.” However, he makes a concession when he adds that, rather than using the official rite of exorcism, they generally “deployed confession, declarations of faith and holy water” (196). He never mentions that they were risking martyrdom by meeting the people’s spiritual needs (even those of Calvinists), for they were in danger of being hanged and quartered only for their priesthood, at least till 1681.

Young lauds the Catholic clergymen who made an accommodation with the persecuting government, such as Thomas White (alias Blacklo), a priest who was such a skeptic about miracles that he would give physical explanations even for biblical ones, and John Sergeant, who served the English government for a pension. On the other hand, Young blames the Jesuits for being agents of papal supremacy in spiritual matters and for using exorcism as missionary propaganda. He says they were “invariably prepared to make use of the official ‘magic’ of the church—such as exorcism and blessings,” even though the laity could not always see “the distinction” between the two (162). Really?!

Chapter 3 is about ghost stories supposedly written by Catholics for other Catholics. Young analyzes a ghost story connected to purgatory found in the archives of the English Carmelites of Lierre. Dismissing the story as manufactured, he remarks cynically that “belief in purgatory was sufficiently powerful among Catholics to make them part with their money” (95). This story, he surmises, was “intended as a piece of Catholic evangelistic propaganda” to warn Recusants against conforming to the Anglican Church, for the ghosts were presumed witnesses “against the Reformation and the folly of giving up masses for the dead” (94). One wonders, how does Young’s “Catholic” view of purgatory and masses for the dead here differ from that of a hostile Protestant?

Chapter 4 is about witchcraft and magic. Here Young asserts that even though Protestants often connected Catholic rites to witchcraft in their books, Catholics were not actually tried as witches and sorcerers in England, but rather were charged with being “inventer fakers of supernatual occurrences” (117). In the Middle Ages, he says, witchcraft was thought to be a delusion, but that changed after the Reformation. According to the Catholic theologian Thomas Stapleton, the growth of magic and witchcraft in the sixteenth century was related to the growth of heresy, since both came out of carnal opposition to “authority” and “impious curiosity” (129). The case of the Samlesbury Witches in 1612 shows how anti-Catholicism in England trumped the fear of witchcraft: a girl named Grace Sowerbutts accused her grandmother and aunts of being witches and claimed that they had killed an infant. The women were Protestants, except that one was also the widow of a prominent Catholic. As soon as the judge learned that Grace had been taught by a Catholic priest as her schoolmaster, he decided it was all “knaverie” and acquitted the three Protestant women. “The trial of the Samlesbury witches was a defining event in the development of anti-Catholic rhetoric,” Young remarks, for now Catholic priests were regarded as “fakers of the supernatural” and their
exorcisms fraudulent. Far from defending the accused priest, Young leaves it open whether or not Christopher Southworth “deliberately instructed Grace” to accuse her grandmother and aunts of witchcraft (146–50). It doesn’t occur to him that the girl might have been mentally ill.

Young accuses the Jesuits of having “endorsed the witchcraft beliefs prevalent in local communities and exploited their missionary potential with little thought of the dangers of engendering superstition among the laity” (156). Relentless in his skepticism regarding the supernatural, he adds: the Jesuits “were invariably prepared to make use of the official ‘magic’ of the church” even for Protestants who came to them asking for help. They “instrumentalized witchcraft belief as a missionary tool,” as can be seen, he alleges, in their Animal Letters, where they record the use of holy water and Agnus Deis to break enchantments (121).

Young writes about an English belief which he claims was not found on the Continent, that the devil could show himself in the form of animals. He gives two cases, that of a laborer’s son, who met the devil in the shape of three black dogs, and that of the Carmelite Sister Margaret Mostyn, who was left bruised when the devil trampled her in the form of a horse. Young speaks with contempt of the Lierre convent where this latter event occurred and of the “exalted Mariology and eccentric demonology” of the nuns and their confessor Edmund Bedingfield (210). He offers a psychological explanation for their experience of possession and exorcism—an experience that was chronicled at the time in great detail and has been printed for the first time in Nikki Hallett’s Witchcraft, Exorcism and the Politics of Possession in a Seventeenth-Century Convent (2007). He suggests that possession was merely a form of “opposition and dissent” within the convent (216).

Young notes that the Anglican Church (in Canon 72, 1604) forbade exorcism and thereby generated a popular demand for Catholic exorcists, who now “cornered the market when it came to unbewitching by religious rather than magical means” (152). He claims that the reason the Jesuits accommodated the strong demand was that “possession and exorcism, just like haunting, could serve as a strong incentive for occasional conformists and defectors to return to enthusiastic practice of Catholicism” (192). Among other sources, Young cites the manuscript relation of an exorcism performed by the martyr Robert Dibdale, in which the devil brought out of the possessed person “balls of hair, and pieces of iron.” He warns us not to take such stories at “face value,” for they are “triumphalist” and belong to the “internal mythology” of the Counter-Reformation (200, 203). In other words, this Catholic martyr was a liar.

In the century leading up to Catholic Emancipation in England (1829), Cisalpine or antipapal priests tried to liberate Catholicism from “darkness, superstition and deceit” (73). Of course, Young sides openly with these Cisalpines, who were characterized by a strong “suspicion of the supernatural” and a desire to accommodate the Enlightenment (74). One example of a Cisalpine he gives is of Joseph Berington, a secular priest who dismissed the many miracles attributed to a contemporary and then recently canonized Saint—Benedict Joseph Labre. Berington asserted that “far from working miracles and being a Saint, he [Labre] was hardly a Catholic” (75). Talk about being on the wrong side of Catholic history! Young is naturally against the Ultramontanes, who upheld papal authority and are represented here by the priest John Milner. He declares that Milner “attacked not only those who opposed miracles but also those who remained silent about them” (76). Bravo for Milner! If this book is evidence of where young English Catholics are heading today, it doesn’t bode well for Catholic England. After all, belief in the supernatural is essential to our Catholic faith.

Thomas Forrest Kelly, Capturing Music: The Story of Notation.
New York: W.W. Norton, 2015. 238 pp. $45.00 cloth.

Reviewed by Joseph W. Koterski, S.J., Fordham University

There is an historical amnesia that affects many scholarly disciplines today. In contemporary philosophy, for instance, one easily gets the impression that the only things thought worth discussing are the thoughts of today’s discussants, however innocent they may be of philosophy’s history. Likewise, much of current academic theology is gripped by a historicist hermeneutics and a faddish suspicion of earlier ages for holding certain convictions about the reality of timeless truths, objective moral norms, and the supernatural efficacy of the sacraments.

Resisting the inclination to confine the past to what George Orwell once called “the memory hole” requires the careful study of the history of the ideas and the intellectual techniques over which the pioneers in any given field labored. Thomas Forrest Kelly’s remarkable book Capturing Music: The Story of Notation makes a fine contribution to this project within the discipline of musicology by showing how medieval developments in the notation system for medieval liturgical music provided the basis of the formalisms still typical of musical notation today. This volume presents in a manner easily intelligible for the nonspecialist Kelly’s professional research into medieval developments in the area of musical notation. His prose provides a fine translation of the extremely technical aspects of the innovations made over the span of some five centuries during the Middle Ages for recording music visually in various systems of signs and symbols. The book is beautifully illustrated and includes a CD by the Blue Heron ensemble with samples of the music under study.
Of special interest for members of the Fellowship is the story of how the musicians of monasteries and cathedrals created the visual structures for what they needed in order to teach music orally and even to make it possible for someone to understand how something was supposed to sound without ever hearing it, that is, purely from reading a musical text. This book is not a technical manual that would teach anyone how to read medieval music manuscripts, nor does it assume that anyone who will take it up can read contemporary music. Rather, the book explains not only the conceptual developments that were crucial for preserving and teaching the music of the medieval liturgy but also its effects on music in a variety of secular settings. Kelly gives a fine account of the process of creating written notation and of standardizing certain formalisms for both singing and instrumentalation as well as for the oral and aural processes of transmitting skills and content. In what he recounts of the changes from a purely oral/aural musical world to one in which written notation played so great a role we can find considerable parallels to the cultural shifts that Marshall McLuhan and Walter Ong a generation ago chronicled in works like *Gutenberg Galaxy* and *Orality and Literacy*. In the shift toward a musical culture much more dependent on writing as in other aspects of life and culture, there proved to be unexpected consequences, such as in the new relationships between subjectivity and objectivity as well as in the development of a taste for spontaneity and for precise iterability of performance.

Kelly provides a fine sense of what achievements each innovation in musical notation brought and what new problems each innovation opened. In many respects his account is the story of the developing answer to a kind of challenge that the seventh-century polymath Isidore of Seville posed when he wrote: “Since sound is a thing of sense it passes along into past time, and it is impressed on the memory…. For unless sounds are held in the memory by man they perish, because they cannot be written down” (16).

In these pages we learn, for instance, of the techniques developed by Notker Balbulus (“the Stammerer”) for singing the elaborate liturgical sequences that he composed for ecclesiial use and that remained in frequent use until their suppression by the Council of Trent. To provide a way to remember long and difficult melodies sung on just a single syllable such as the final sound within the signing of the word “alleluia,” he used memorable strings of words. Like any good music teacher today, Kelly himself uses the technique when illustrating chants under discussion throughout the book, by having us recall patterns of worded song that we already know, like “Three Blind Mice” or “Mary had a little lamb.”

The volume explains in detail the way in which the chant used in early medieval Rome came to be associated with St. Gregory the Great (i.e., “Gregorian chant”). With the aid of some fascinating book illuminations, Kelly recounts the efforts of Charlemagne to use the moral authority of Gregory’s name to impose a unified pattern of liturgical music across his realm, in much the same way that he promoted a standard form of writing (the Carolingian minuscule).

The list of individuals who made important contributions is lengthy. To mention but a few, there is Guido of Arezzo, who invented the clef that assisted with keeping the pitch of various notes uniform throughout a composition. We hear of Master Leoninus of Paris with his collection of polyphonic liturgical compositions called the *Great Book of Organum*, and Perotinus, who revised that book so as to put special focus on the use of descant solos. Franco of Cologne, the author of many motets (a name drawn from the French word *mot* to designate “worded music”), reenvisioned the very shape of the notes that had been in use, so as to make it possible to record not only the intended pitch of the notes but also the intended rhythm. Philippe de Vitry replaced the still cumbersome system for recording rhythm that Perotinus created with his more flexible system of the Four Prolations and its opportunities for changing the rhythm within a musical piece as needed to reflect a change in the mood and content of liturgical texts (e.g., when there is a dramatic turn within a story from the Gospels).

Kelly’s volume is a delightful read. Not only will it contribute to our general education in a field important to Catholic culture even if it is outside the normal field of our expertise, but it will inspire a love for the scholarly work of generations of writers who lovingly created ways in which those of us who come so many centuries after their labors can have our minds and hearts raised in the same forms of prayer that was at the center of the scholarly metier of these medieval composers and musicians.

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Reviewed by Jude P. Dougherty  
*The Catholic University of America*
needed to perfect the instrument? And will he ever turn skyward the instrument designed for military use?

Such is the way the story unfolds as told by three historians of science whose narrative draws extensively on correspondence between aristocrats of the period. Call the book a social history of science, if you will. But it is foremost a history of the telescope. The story begins when the Flemish craftsman Hans Lipperhey visited The Hague early in 1608 to show Count Maurice of Nassau, Commander of the Armed Forces of the United Provinces (of the Low Countries), “a certain device through which all things at a very great distance can be seen as if they were nearby.” Lipperhey sought from the count a patent and financial support for the development of the instrument. News of the invention spread rapidly, as evidenced in a painting by Jan Brueghel the Elder depicting Archduke Albert of Bavaria with the spyglass observing a distant castle. Clearly, in the words of one correspondent, “the act of seeing no longer coincided with our natural organ of sight.”

Within a few months specimens of the spyglass could be found not only at The Hague but in the Court of Henry IV in Paris, at the Court of Rudolf II in Prague, at the Court of the Spanish King in Madrid, at the Residence of General Albert Spinola in Genoa, and at the Papal Court of Paul V in Rome. And, we might add, in the halls of nobility in London, Augsburg, and Naples, as well. Remarkably, the ambassador of the Hindu King of Siam helped spread the word as he visited European capitals as part of his trade mission.

In September and October of 1609, Galileo finally trained his then three-power instrument on the moon, whose rugged surface became visible. He may not have been the first to discover that the moon like the earth was pockmarked with hills and craters. But in short order, as he continued to perfect his telescope, Galileo discovered the satellites of Jupiter, the rings of Saturn, the phases of Venus, sun spots, and the true cause of the Milky Way. What more did a convinced Copernican need to support a heliocentric view of the universe? In 1610 he published Sidereus nuncius. Six days after it appeared in print, the initial run of 550 copies was sold out.

Instead of universal praise, Galileo met significant opposition. While Kepler, Paolo Sarpi, and Cardinal Federico Borromeo of Milan supported him, and even Paul V for a time, the pope eventually withdrew his support because of the uncomfortable conclusions to which it led. The Ptolemaic/Aristotelian view of the world order was not easy to abandon. Not only was the authority of Aristotle and the scholastic tradition called into question, but the bible itself had to be reinterpreted.

And there were political considerations too. Galileo had worked closely with the Venetian prelate, Friar Paolo Sarpi, a scientist and canon lawyer, who had made important discoveries on his own and who had supported Galileo in his work. When Galileo had failed to acknowledge the support of the Venetian Republic in the Sidereus nuncius and then took up residence in Padua as chief mathematician to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and professor for life at the university, it had the impact of the victory of one state over another, and lasting enmity on the part of some in Venice.

For Galileo everything would have gone smoothly if he had advanced heliocentrism as purely a mathematical theory, a hypothetical explanation of observed data, yet one not proved. Tycho Brahe knew that Galileo had not demonstrated his conclusion. So too did Cardinal Bellarmine, a convinced Aristotelian who knew the difference between a hypothetical explanation and proof. On April 12, 1615, Bellarmine wrote to Paolo Antonio Foscarini, who had published a troubling pamphlet on Copernican theology. We have the text: “Very Rev. Father, first I would like to say that you and Mr. Galileo are wise to speak ex suppositione and not in absolute terms, as I always believed Copernicus did. Because so saying, supposing that the Earth moves and the Sun stands still saves all the appearances better than by positing eccentrics and epicycles.”

The proof that Brahe sought but that eluded him was not forthcoming until Friedrich Bessel, director of the Konigsberg Observatory in Prussia, in 1838 was able to measure the parallax of the stars.

Galileo was so convinced that he was right, that he could not leave his conclusion as mere ex suppositione. In 1632 he published his Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, in which he in effect defended his view as substantiated. That quickly brought charges of heresy from two old adversaries in Venice. The story of Galileo’s telescope ends here.


Reviewed by D. Q. McInerny, Our Lady of Guadalupe Seminary, Denton, Nebraska

The Nature of Scientific Explanation by Professor Jude Dougherty, dean emeritus of the School of Philosophy at The Catholic University of America, is based on a series of lectures which he initially delivered at Charles University, Prague, in 1991, and then, in the years following, at a number of other venues. The first of the three parts into which the book is divided is entitled, “The Aristotelian Perspective,” and in that title we have clearly expressed the principal concern of the book. Dougherty sets out, and succeeds admirably, to do two things here: to make a case for the essential soundness, the perennial applicability, of Aristotelian realism, and to show the pressing need for a restoration of the Aristotelian worldview, for the sake of a healthy, properly focused science,
and for the sake of philosophy as well, specifically with respect to the way it looks at science.

In arguing from a realistic perspective, Dougherty tells us that he will insist, “contrary to popular opinion, that science is not reducible to description, to prediction, or to control, but rather is directed to an understanding of the processes of nature” (x). Science needs to liberate itself from the peculiar kind of narrowness to which it has confined itself, a narrowness with regard to general perspective, which in turn dictates a methodology that, for all its dazzling technological sophistication, is seriously limited in its investigative potential. Science has to learn how to go beyond the information delivered by the senses, be more penetrating in its analyses, and take on the difficult but supremely rewarding task of seeking “to know the intrinsic nature of things, why things are as they are” (76). Modern science is content, by and large, with exploring the superficial—albeit in an impressively detailed and precise way—while giving short shrift to, if not completely ignoring, the essential. By concentrating on what lends itself to mathematical description and analysis, science remains securely within the realm of sense experience. Of course, this is not a bad thing it itself; in fact, the quantifiable knowledge we can gain of the physical world has its unquestionable value, and it is quite proper that science should depend as heavily as it does on sense experience. But the importance of the empiricism to which science is rightly dedicated can be exaggerated to such an extent that one is no longer aware of its limitations. And then, as Dougherty notes, serious distortions ensue: “What the empiricist fails to recognize is that there is more to the sense report than the senses themselves are able to appreciate; the resulting failure in effect reduces all knowledge to sense knowledge” (58).

What we have, then, in so much modern science, is a marked turning away from the fundamental realities of the physical world, away from what lies beneath what is immediately registered by the senses and renders it intelligible. Of course, this state of affairs did not come out of the blue; it has a history behind it, a history the bulk of which dates from the seventeenth century and the scientific revolution. The dominant influential factors in that history were philosophical, not scientific just as such, for, at bottom, it is really a disoriented philosophy of science which is at issue here. Philosophical modernity doubtless has its root explanation, as Dougherty points out, in a break with the great systems of thought developed by Plato and Aristotle, which in turn led to the eclipse of metaphysics. Modern science’s systematic neglect of the first principles that stem from metaphysics has the result of undermining the efficacy of the very approach to the natural world upon which it so heavily leans, for the signal value of metaphysics is to remind us that “the realm of being is greater or wider in designation than the being reported by the senses” (6). Kant contributed significantly to the marginalizing of metaphysics, and the British Empiricists, with their rejection of substance and causality—two mainstays of Aristotelian thought—succeeded in persuading many that the metaphysical first principles could now be regarded as quite irrelevant. Then came Comte with his positivism, glibly dismissing causality as having no application to serious scientific inquiry; for him, description and prediction were what science was all about. In sum, Dougherty argues, what we have in the modern view of science is a sweeping dismissal of “the first principles of thought and being,” the defense of which is “a primary task of a philosophy of science” (9).

Another factor that contributed importantly to the creation of the modern philosophical climate, and which explains and sustains science’s careless indifference to first principles, is philosophical idealism. Here we have a point of view which, while antithetical to positivism, obviously could not, given its own ideological propensities, contribute much to the cause of realism. In this country especially, philosophical idealism proved to be, in the nineteenth century, a significant presence. “By the last quarter of the nineteenth century,” Dougherty writes, “nearly every chair of philosophy in the newly emerging universities was held by an idealist” (xiii). And he cites the founding of The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, in St. Louis, the first journal of philosophy in the English language, as another indication of the prominence of idealism. The purpose of the journal, taking Hegel as its model and guide, was to combat the kinds of ideas engendered by the British Empiricists, and, more generally, by the Enlightenment. And then there was the influence of Josiah Royce to be taken into account, America’s most distinguished idealist philosopher.

One of the more interesting, and suggestive, aspects of this book is Dougherty’s commentary on what has come to be known by some as the mathematizing of modern science, particularly of physics, which has had the effect of building a barrier between the inquiring average man and the world of physical reality. Mathematics, for all its prowess and aesthetic attractiveness, does not reveal the natures of things. But to listen to people like Roger Penrose, and before him Sir James Jeans, one could be convinced that it is not philosophy, more particularly metaphysics, which is to be regarded as the sure and definite road leading to a foundational understanding of the physical world, but rather mathematics. In The Mysterious Universe, Jeans claims that “the final truth about a phenomenon resides in the mathematical description of it,” Dougherty notes that rival geometries, such as the Euclidian and Riemannian, which clearly conflict with one another, can both be regarded as “true” within their proper spheres, “but they cannot be real in the philosophical sense of the word” (14). To which he adds the apt observation: “It comes down to this. A mathematical reading of sensible phenomena cannot
speak the last word about the physical real” (15). There are any number of limitations to be found in Gassendi’s philosophy of nature, but for all that he spoke wisely when he said that, “It is not permitted to transfer into Physics something abstractly demonstrated by geometry” (22). And there is no little significance in the fact that physicists who have a background in classical philosophy, as Dougherty notes, are reluctant to equate mathematic description with scientific explanation. The Nature of Scientific Explanation focuses on and gives pointed treatment to four subjects which figure prominently among “the first principles of thought and being”: induction, substance, potentiality, and final causality. Modern science relies heavily upon induction, that mode of reasoning whereby, from the close examination of particulars one then proceeds to the formulation of reliable generalizations about those particulars. This is all well and good, but one could be engaging in a form of induction that falls short of realizing induction’s full capabilities. Too often, induction, as practiced by modern science, gives too much emphasis to head counting without showing much concern with what, so to speak, is to be found within the head. Dougherty, in making a case for induction as understood and practiced by Aristotle, shows that it is not a matter of mere enumeration; with that approach, one will never be able to get beyond surface realities, for one would be following a procedure which in effect reflects the universal-denying prejudice of nominalism. Induction must be recognized as a mode of reasoning that involves a true inferential act on the part of the mind, where we move from the particular to the universal and, concomitantly, from sense experience to intellectual knowledge. It is through inference, rightly engaged in, that we succeed in grasping the nature of things, what they are in themselves. “Aristotle’s doctrine of substance,” Dougherty writes, “is as relevant today as it was when it was first propounded.” The British Empiricists have to bear much of the blame for the theoretical rejection of substance which is so widespread today in both philosophical and scientific circles. Locke presented himself as something of an agnostic with regard to substance, confused as he was as to what precisely the term referred to. Berkeley comes through as a strong believer in the reality of substance, but in a distortedly selective way, for he rejects the reality of physical substances, thus summarily destroying the very subject matter of the empirical sciences. It took Hume to complete the demolition project, for he did away with substance altogether. But substance would seem to be in an important respect like the principle of contradiction, which, as Aristotle remarked, though we can say that it is false, we cannot think it to be so; in the very effort by which we attempt to deny the principle, we unavoidably affirm it. So it is with those today who attempt to deny the reality of substance; what they ostentatiously toss out the front door, they then sneak back in through the rear entrance. Dougherty quotes Santayana, who gives a specific example of this process: “When modern philosophers deny material substance, they make substances out of the sensations or ideas which they regard as ultimate facts” (36).

The modern physicists in not oblivious to the reality of potential being, for he speaks often and confidently about potential energy, the pent-up possibility to do some work. But it would very probably be the rare physicist who would be operatively aware of the rich and wide-ranging understanding of potentiality that we learn from Aristotle, and which Dougherty nicely describes when he writes: “From an Aristotelian perspective, it [potentiality] is capacity, tendency, and disposition on the part of physical objects that are at once the ground of logical possibility, artistic imagination, and the object of scientific inquiry” (47). It would be chancy business to say which of Aristotle’s seminal insights ranks as the most brilliant, but certainly his recognizing, in contrast to the homogenous notion of being proposed by Parmenides, that being in fact evinces a remarkable complexity which manifests itself in the distinction between actual being and potential being, between what really is the case, here and now, and what really can be the case tomorrow.

As with substance, so too with final causality, the majority opinion in modern philosophy and science has it that it can easily be brushed aside as inconsequential. The more or less blanket rejection of the relevancy of final causality on the part of modern science is all the more astonishing when you compare it with Aristotle’s way of looking at the world. To him, finality in nature, the fact that things act always or for the most part for the sake of an end, was so large and glaring, so ubiquitous in its manifestations, that one would have to be either blind or perverse to deny it. And yet the modern mind has succeeded in convincing itself that final causality has no role to play in our understanding of how the world works. Dougherty addresses this mental opacity in an especially effective way in “Lecture Five” of the book, in which he makes the weighty point that if we deny final causality we are at one and the same time denying the intelligibility of change. All change is only identifiable, as change, if we recognize that it is necessarily ordered toward a definite culmination, the terminus ad quem. “Just as man’s activity is unintelligible apart from its purpose, so too is all activity in nature unintelligible apart from its purpose” (63). Of Aristotle’s four causes, moderns have selected out for keeping the material and the efficient cause, while casting formal and final cause into the exterior darkness. But what we witness in the actual behavior of the moderns, with regard to those latter two causes, is precisely the same thing seen in the way they handle substance: formal cause and final cause are rejected in theory, while being preserved in practice, though without of course giving them due recognition. But it could
not be otherwise; it is futile to fight against reality.

One of the paradoxes of modern science, which The Nature of Scientific Explanation calls attention to, is that whereas those disciplines that comprise modern science are commonly looked upon as being quintessentially concerned with the “real world,” and lauded for dealing with it most ably, and whereas most scientists would consider themselves to be, and pride themselves on being, eminently realistic, what we find, in fact, is that modern science in many respects has managed to distance itself from reality, in the sense that it has abandoned what Professor Dougherty sees as the proper object of science, to seek “to know the intrinsic nature of things, why things are as they are.” The overarching explanation for this state of affairs, which the book clearly and amply spells out for us, is the “shift from the Aristotelian worldview to modernity.” What Dougherty is calling for here, with his typical forcefulness and eloquence, is something which very much needs to be called for—a return to an Aristotelian, which is to say, a realistic, worldview. Is it possible? That is a large question, especially when one realizes that the disoriented state of modern science is in fact a reflection and a part of a larger disorientation which is to be found in the culture as a whole. This being the case, the change that needs to be brought about would have to be comprehensive in scope. With considerations of this sort clearly in mind, Professor Dougherty ends his book with a provocative question: “Given the amorphous state of our politicized universities, is it possible to reclaim the Hellenic and Christian sources of European culture” (111)?

Science is an integral part of the larger culture which embraces and fosters it; in the final analysis, then, the condition of science is in good part determined by that of the culture. But does the restoration process necessarily have to start with the culture as a whole, and then work itself down to the particular part of it represented by science? Might it not be possible to effect the restoration in reverse order, that is, by starting with science, and philosophy, then, with them being now in a healthy state, working upward toward the restoration of the culture as a whole? Supposing that to be a real possibility, a work like The Nature of Scientific Explanation, I would like to suggest, could serve as an excellent guide and spurring influence for that process.


Reviewed by D. Q. McInerny, Our Lady of Guadalupe Seminary, Denton, Nebraska

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evolutions, especially if they have “liberty” as their principal rallying cry, have a way of playing themselves out in ways that are not quite consonant with the inaugurating aspirations of the revolutionaries. The intended liberation can sometimes turn out to be, in effect, a new and completely unanticipated kind of bondage. To a disinterested observer of the scene, this would seem to qualify as an instance of that state of affairs where one’s second state ironically ends up being worse than the state with which one began. This would mean, with regard to the typical patterns of revolutions, that the prerevolutionary circumstances look, in retrospect, and taking them all in all, a lot better than the postrevolutionary circumstances. But this assessment is not one which the revolutionaries themselves would be likely to adopt. Seldom do the people who, having engaged in what they regard as heroic efforts to turn the world upside down, want to admit, in the aftermath, that the results of their labors were anything but happy. They may be prepared to concede that there are problems with the current situation, and freely complain about them, but they refuse to see those problems as the effects of causes which they set in place.

Such seems to be the case with the promoters and partisans of the vaunted sexual revolution of the 1960s, that tumultuous movement whose impelling purpose was to grace the world with “sexual liberation.” The basic idea behind sexual liberation was simple enough: the key to achieving a genuinely mature and fully human life for mid-twentieth-century men and women was for them to cast off the traditional bonds of sexual mores, by which they were being cruelly confined, and to follow their erotic impulses wherever they might lead. They would thus find themselves emancipated into a luminous new world of wide-open, no-fault sexual experience and experimentation. Henceforth the male of the species could pursue his to-be-expected-anyway male ways (boys will be boys, after all), fitting beelike from flower to flower, with guiltless abandon, and with never a worry that his dallying would be interrupted or arrested by any inconvenient biological “mistakes.”

And as for the female? She would now be free to mimic the male in his fun-loving ways of casual coupling, for, just as he no longer needed to fret over the possibility of being burdened by paternity, she, for her part, had no reason to be concerned about ever suddenly finding herself in the unwanted state of motherhood. Sex, thanks to the ever upward and onward advance of science, had been severed from its natural finality; it was now pure means, with no end in sight. The Pill made its appearance in most timely fashion, and could easily be accepted as a veritable gift from the gods, offering the giddy prospect of complete, untrammeled sexual freedom. Was this not in effect a new Eden Garden, into which modern man was graciously being invited?

Mary Eberstadt, in her impressively researched and forcefully written Adam and Eve After the Pill, argues compellingly, and with no small wit
and wisdom, that because the premises on which the sexual revolution was based were altogether faulty, it was a foregone conclusion that the heady promises which it had made to its hapless advocates were to prove to be utterly empty. To take up arms against nature is to seal your fate as a loser. She begins her disquisition by giving us a precise description of the phenomenon under discussion. The sexual revolution, she writes, was “the ongoing destigmatization of all varieties of non-marital sexual activity, accompanied by a sharp rise in such sexual activity, in diverse societies around the world (most notably, in the most advanced”) (12). “All varieties of non-marital sexual activity” means, of course, sexual activity which has been wrenched out of its proper context, divorced from its natural finality. The unnatural attitude toward human sexuality which fueled such activity was in a sense quite understandable, and perhaps even predictable, given the fact that it emerged out of a time in Western culture when the very idea of nature, of a natural order, had dimmed down to the point of near extinction. The sexual revolution gave rise to not simply a new interest in sex, but a positive obsession with it. That is significant, for what is particularly characteristic of an obsession is the manner in which it totally distorts its object.

That the sexual revolution was a real revolution there can be no doubt, and like almost all revolutions, it left havoc in its wake, principally in the realm of morals. The relatively ordered world (no human world is ever perfectly ordered) in which the revolution saw its inception ended up as seriously disordered. The many adverse effects it has had for contemporary culture are not to be denied. Eberstadt quotes the Harvard sociologist Pitirim Sorokin, who sees the effects of the sexual revolution as “more far-reaching than those of almost all other revolutions, except perhaps the total revolutions such as the Russian” (15). This judgment places the event in an appropriately important historical context, but one might wonder, apropos of Sorokin’s allusion to the Russian revolution, if there was not something “total” about the sexual revolution as well, given the wide-ranging and deeply disruptive repercussions it has had for the society in which we now live.

What has the sexual revolution wrought? Among other things cited by Eberstadt, there are the sharply rising divorce rates, increasing illegitimacy, and a concomitant increase in the number of abandoned and neglected children. One of the most telling effects of the sexual revolution is the dominant presence and power of the pornography industry. Pornography now insinuates its polluting influence in seemingly every nook and cranny of the culture, even finding welcome in our public schools. The arts, though they may not always sink to the level of pornography, have undergone a general coarsening. The intellectual atmosphere created by the revolution made possible the Roe v. Wade decision.

The prevalence—one could say the ubiquity—of pornography is an especially disconcerting effect of the sexual revolution. It has become the high-test fuel that feeds society’s grand obsession with all things sexual. It has figured large in the establishment of what Eberstadt aptly names “Toxic U.” We now bear witness to a situation where many of our third-level academic institutions, which once gave reasonably convincing signs of being genuinely concerned with something called education, have become open laboratories for the fairly untrammeled exercise of “sexual freedom,” but in a decidedly undemocratic way. As it happens, the situation turns out to be fairly pleasant for the male students, not so pleasant for the often preyed upon coeds.

A particularly bizarre item that Eberstadt’s research has uncovered is the fact that there is apparently a close connection between much modern day divorce and pornography. Here we have a case of the seductive power of the computer screen. In just about every instance it is the husband who is the guilty party. What happens is this: having effectively addicted himself to the pornography that the internet makes readily available to him, he becomes so completely captivated by the charms of his many and varied cyberspace mistresses that the arms of his flesh and blood spouse no longer appeal to him. Fantasy trumps reality; lust wins out over love. Divorce eventually follows, initiated almost always by the wife.

Eberstadt develops two especially poignant arguments in her book, to each of which she devotes an entire chapter, the first entitled “The Will to Disbelieve,” the second, “Is Food the New Sex?” She borrows the phrase “the will to disbelieve” from Jean Kirkpatrick, who in coining it very likely had William James’s “the will to believe” in mind. Eberstadt reminds us of the attitude taken by many Western leftist and Marxists, especially if they were academics, who were reluctant to own up to the brutal realities of Communism, as actually practiced, until eventually, with the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, they had to admit (or at least most of them did) that the system to which they had intellectually committed themselves was bankrupt. She compares that attitude with that of those today who have given their hearts to the sexual revolution and all it stood for. So far, there has been nothing in their experience to compare to the tearing down of the Berlin Wall or the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the result that, though doubts are apparently brewing in the minds of some, there is as yet no general admission that the sexual revolution has had disastrous results. There is still an appreciable portion of a whole generation, then, that does not want to admit that they hitched their wagon to a star that proved to be an exploding supernova. The brave new erotic world that they had so fervently favored has somehow not
come to pass. Against ever mounting evidence that it was a colossal failure, they continue, quite irrationally, to shut their eyes against the real effects of their revolution. They will to disbelieve what the facts of our current situation are clearly telling us.

The foundation for Ebersatdt’s argument in the “Is Food the New Sex?” chapter is a fetching contrast she draws between two women, Betty and Jennifer. (The names are perfect picks.) Betty is comfortably ensconced within the decade of the 1950s, and therefore pre-sexual revolution; Jennifer is very much a woman of the twenty-first century, and would doubtless look upon herself as a blessed beneficiary of the revolution. As we move from Betty to Jennifer, and the world views peculiar to each, we are led to see something like a Nietszchean transvaluation of all values. Betty is a wife, a mother, and a full-time homemaker. She is faithful to her husband, caring of her children, and fulfills her quotidian household duties in a conscientious though unflamboyant way. In preparing her family’s meals she would probably consult, if she felt the need, something along the lines of the Betty Crocker Cookbook. She would perhaps be amused by people who were overly scrupulous about dietary matters. She smokes cigarettes. Neither she nor her family knows anything of pornography, and she would find it abhorrent if given exposure to it. That anyone would choose to make it a regular feature of their lives would be quite incomprehensible to her.

Jennifer, for her part, might be described as a highly selective health nut, which is to say that she has much concern for the health of the body, and almost none for the health of the soul. Indeed, her concern for corporeal well-being borders on the neurotic. Smoking, for Jennifer, would rank as a secular mortal sin of the most egregious sort. If Betty would have had regarded an easy familiarity with pornography as clearly aberrational, Jennifer is quite at home with it, seeing it as a more or less normal part of the progressive world in which she is privileged to live. Watching a pornographic movie with the current boyfriend would not be a terribly unusual way of spending an evening. While Betty would find pornography abhorrent, Jennifer might well gasp in alarm at the manner in which Betty fed herself and her family. Food is the new sex for Jennifer, meaning that she assumes toward it the kind of attitude that many in the 1950s took toward sex. She regards food in a moralistic manner; whereas sex is taken casually, the strictest rules are to be religiously abided by in the kitchen, and some things are categorically forbidden there. But just about anything goes in the bedroom. The rules regarding sex are conveniently flexible, and always subject to alteration in the cause of liberation.

Eberstadt fills out this provocative study in contrasts by identifying pornography as the new tobacco. Her point here is that the people of Jennifer’s generation are in a state of self-protective denial with regard to the corrupting effects of pornography, just as those of Betty’s generation chose to persuade themselves that there was no great harm in tobacco. Betty could complacently puff away on one of her Kools, telling herself that her smoking, if not exactly a healthy pastime, was at least innocuous, and Jennifer plays the same kind of mind-game with herself when it comes to pornography: for her, it’s no big deal.

Mary Eberstadt ends Adam and Eve After the Fall with a weighty chapter dedicated to a vindication of Pope Paul VI’s encyclical Humane vitae. This document, whose publication arguably represents the high point of Pope Paul’s papacy, came out in 1968, just as the sexual revolution was building up to full steam. At the time of its appearance it was deliberately downplayed, if not simply ignored, by many bishops, while not a few Catholic theologians—moral theologians at that—made it the subject of unseemly invective. Eberhardt shows, with emphasis, that the encyclical had going for it what those who ignored or condemned it decidedly lacked—the simple truth. When Paul VI prophesied that a moral wasteland would be the inevitable outcome of the rejection of the Church’s invariable teaching on contraception, and of the natural law that informed that teaching, there were some who considered that to be laughably far-fetched. We now live in that wasteland, and only those with arid souls would think it cause for humor.

The proposition proposed with giddy self-confidence in the 1960s, that a comprehensive liberation of the human spirit was to be had by pretending that the natural finality of sexuality does not have to do centrally and necessarily with life, turned out, as it was bound to turn out, to be a fraud of monumental proportions. And yet the proposers and promoters of that proposition, albeit it seems now with steadily diminishing enthusiasm, continue to support the fraud. They balk from admitting what their taste buds are telling them about the ashes in the mouth.

‘Free, free, free at last,’ they sang. Even while knowing the freedom false.

In Adam and Eve After the Fall Mary Eberstadt has given us an important work; it shines a searching light on the current state of our culture, giving full exposure to the sad particulars of its deeply entrenched moral disorientation. The majority of our intellectuals, and those who control the mass media, may chose not to acknowledge the grand wrong-turning that took place in the 1960s in the form of what has come to be known as the sexual revolution, but the hope is that sooner or later a critical mass of the people will wake up to the fact that they are living in a decadent culture. It is books such as this that will be instrumental in bringing about that awakening.

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his is a secular look at both the doctrine and devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary in the Patristic and Medieval periods of history. Anyone with an interest in our Blessed Mother will find this book a treasure. The author states that his purpose is to avoid imposing any particular theoretical construct—feminist, psycho-social, postmodernist—preferring to deal with the subject on its own terms without imposing an anachronistic framework on the facts; throughout the book he claims to have given priority to the role that Christianity itself has played in determining the understanding of Mary, and he wishes to present how this affects Mary’s place in the divine economy with its changing perceptions, reflected in doctrine, devotion, imagery, and typology—all this while appealing to the needs of the average scholar.

Lumen gentium has stated the importance for theologians and preachers of the Word of God to be careful to refrain from all exaggeration or summary with regard to the special dignity of Mary (LG, 67). There is a summary approach in this book regarding the virginity of Mary, after the birth of Jesus. The author seems to question the perpetual virginity of Mary by saying that the fittingness of the mother of God having had relations after the birth of Christ was a major consideration, but no crucial theological issues depended on it. However, major documents on Our Lady in the Catholic Church show that her virginity enabled her to have the attitude of obedient faith necessary to become the mother of God and to carry out her place in the world’s salvation (LG, 64; Redemptoris mater, 13; CCC, 506). The author presents his section on motherhood, using the expression Theotokos (God bearer). He traces this oldest reference to Mary found in an Egyptian hymn “Sub tuum Praesidium,” dating to the third century, and he offers this beautiful description of Mary and her motherhood: he writes that Mary’s motherhood is therefore the explicit guarantee of Christ’s humanity without which he could not have suffered and died, the link between God and creation could not have been restored and humankind could not have looked forward to the hope of resurrection (27). This section on the Theotokos comprises one of the best parts of the text.

When the heresy of the hypostatic union had been put down, Mary was seen as above the angels and above every other human being, and her cult threatened to overshadow Christ himself, the author explains. Today, however, Church teaching presents this mediation of Mary as flowing from the efficacy of Christ (Redemptoris mater, 22, 39). The author further states how the mediation of Mary will continue until the end of time, how she will be Mediatrix of mercy at the second coming and how after her Assumption she will continue her maternal mediation, until the fulfillment of all the elect who constantly struggle with good and evil.

Presenting the theme of the coredeemplex, the author expands the Eve-Mary antithesis, based on Genesis 3:15, which was one of the earliest and most enduring of themes of Mariology, and remains the foundation for the notion of coredemption. He writes that the Latin Fathers tended to be more restrained in their treatments of the virgin’s contribution to redemption, whereas Ambrose said that without taking on flesh it would not have been possible for Christ to take on the burden of human sin and to redeem our nature through his suffering. The book presents both Ambrose and Augustine taking up Irenaeus’s notion of the virgin, the anti-Eve, which was important in transmitting this idea to other Western writers.

Hence the author asks why Mary’s universal mediation of grace and her coredemption have not been accepted as official doctrine. Yet writing in his encyclical on Mary, Pope John Paul II takes up this same theme of mediation and unites it with other titles of Mary including Advocate, Auxiliatrix, Adjutorix, and Mediatrix, stating that she is the mother of all in the order of grace. (Redemptoris mater, 40, 39; CCC, 969, 970). Therefore, today, in the Church, Mary is not presented as overshadowing Christ, nor does the Church ignore her official mediation.

The book finishes with sections on the Office of the Blessed Virgin Mary, litanies, dramas, the four great Marian antiphons, miracle stories, and religious orders. There are two prominent chapters at the end of the book, one on the Assumption and the other on the Immaculate Conception. The book is extremely erudite, presenting theology from the perspectives of both the East and the West. There are copious footnotes and a wealth of pertinent information for the scholar and the layman as well. It is not a treatise on the Church’s teachings about Mary, but it is a book that remains an important study which can enhance appreciation of the real Mary of Tradition.


Reviewed by T. A. Cavanaugh, University of San Francisco

In this slender rewarding volume, Ralph McInerny (former Grace Professor of Medieval Studies at Notre Dame, past president of the Fellowship, and—in the spirit of full disclosure—my dissertation advisor and friend) serves as our Virgil vis-à-vis our reading of Dante’s Commedia and the key role Our Lady plays in the same. As he notes in the preface, McInerny taught a Dante and Aquinas course at Notre
Dame (prior to his retirement in 2009). I recall once asking him when he was going to write a book on Dante. He responded that he would not be doing so, pledging to remain “in amateur.” In this book one finds him being so in the best sense of that word: a lover of the work. Clearly, this little gem arises from a profound knowledge of and love for the Blessed Virgin, Dante, *la Commedia*, Saint Thomas Aquinas, and more generally, the Catholic intellectual tradition.

Both readers familiar with Dante (I myself followed McInerny’s lead and after his death in 2010 began teaching a Dante and Aquinas course) as well as those unfamiliar with the *Commedia* will do well to secure a copy of this, the last book McInerny published in his lifetime of many published books. Reportedly, he smiled upon seeing the final product prior to his passing. It is a fitting tribute to Our Lady by a faithful Catholic who labored tirelessly on behalf of the Catholic intellectual tradition at what he hoped would always be the University of Notre Dame, Mary’s place of higher learning.

As McInerny notes at the outset of the task he sets himself, the “sheer bulk of Dante studies make it impossible for anyone to profit from more than a fraction of them” (11). Undaunted, he lays out the evidence that, “The Blessed Virgin is the key to Dante” (1). “Conscious of the difficulties of the task,” he proposes in the book to, “follow the thread that binds it all together, the role of the Blessed Virgin in Dante’s life and in the poem” (11).

Relying on works other than the *Commedia* as well as lines that might be overlooked in the poem (such as Dante’s autobiographical note that he prayed morning and night to Our Lady, *Par. 23.88-90/McInerny, 104*), McInerny makes out the case admirably. As readers of the *Commedia* know and as McInerny eloquently shows, the entire drama begins with Our Lady approaching Saint Lucy. Saint Lucy—the patroness of those having eye diseases; Dante had a special devotion to her as he himself suffered an eye disease due to excesses in both weeping and reading—then points Dante’s plight out to his beloved Beatrice who, in turn, enlists the help of Virgil to aid Dante. Dante, as we memorably learn in the insuperable first lines of the poem, has lost the straight way (*la diritta via era smarrita*). Here is McInerny commenting on that sequence:

[Dante] had fallen into mortal sin, his salvation was jeopardized by his actions, he found himself in a dark wood, lost, bewildered. We can all too easily get ourselves into such a predicament, but getting out is beyond our powers. The Mother of Mercy, painfully aware of Dante’s plight, tells St. Lucy to speak to Beatrice about it. The importance of these sequences cannot be overstated. One’s beloved may forget, a saint who has been the object of one’s special devotion may need reminding, but the Blessed Virgin Mary is, so to speak, the sleepless refuge of sinners. Mary is the prime mover of the *Commedia* (125-5).

As McInerny notes, Dante tells us that by the poem, “he wanted to move us from the misery of sin to eternal happiness” (144). As McInerny shows in this book, Dante subtly and at every crucial turn, “shows us the inescapable centrality of the Blessed Virgin in that conversion” (144). Those familiar with Dante’s *Commedia* will find most helpful McInerny’s third chapter (of four total), bearing particularly on *Purgatorio* and entitled “The Seven Storey Mountain.” At sixty-five pages, it illustrates the centrality of Mary in one’s understanding of the *Commedia* more generally. Here Our Lady figures most prominently, as Dante exemplifies each virtue opposed to the relevant vice purged in purgatory. Serving as our Virgil, McInerny points us to the relevant passage in Saint Thomas’s treatment of capital vices.

A teacher can employ this entire chapter to great effect with students reading *Purgatorio*. The treatment of sloth or *acedia* illustrates the point. After drawing our attention to Saint Thomas’s treatment, McInerny illuminates the account:

Since any sin can be said to involve sadness about some spiritual good, according to Thomas, it may seem that *acedia* cannot be a special vice. Nor can we simply say that such sadness comes into play because a spiritual good is difficult or entails bodily discomfort incompatible with sensual pleasure. That would be true of any carnal vice. What is necessary to understanding sloth is the recognition that there is an order of spiritual goods, with the divine good being chief among them. The special virtue of charity bears on the divine good, and charity brings with it a joy in the divine good. Thus, although any sin entails sadness with respect to a spiritual good, sadness as to the acts consequent upon charity gives rise to the special vice of *acedia* (*S.T. I* a.11, q.35, a.2). This justifies calling *acedia* a capital sin, since just as the delights of all the virtues are ordered to that of charity, similarly, sadness about the latter gives rise to other and lesser sadnesses (a.4). Thus, one who feels sadness with respect to spiritual goods is led on to carnal activities: the pursuit of pleasure in the usual sense from fleeting the greatest good, the *gaudio cum caritate*, or joy of charity (a. 4, ad 2) (McInerny, 73-74).

As McInerny draws to our attention, in *Purgatorio* Mary exemplifies the relevant virtue opposed to sloth, love of neighbor (and other central virtues in her other acts recalled in *Purgatorio*) as she, with haste, or in Dante’s Italian, “con fretta” runs to the mountain to see Elizabeth upon learning of Elizabeth’s pregnancy. The book is replete with such helpful expositions, uniting Dante’s poetic insight, Aquinas’s theological wisdom, and the richness of the Catholic intellectual tradition more generally.
This work shares an important feature with Dante’s *Commedia*. Namely, it repeatedly reminds the reader of the stakes for which we play with a view to moving us from misery to paradise.

I conclude endorsing McInerny’s promissory note issued at the beginning of the work. Indeed, he more than fully redeems it:

…the theme of this little book, Dante and the Blessed Virgin, provides a Catholic reader with a unique opportunity to respond to this central element of the great poet’s work in a way that goes far beyond scholarly or aesthetic appreciation (xi).

A unique opportunity to Catholic readers who can, do, and ought have recourse to, “the name of the beautiful flower that every morning and evening I [Dante] invoke” (Par. 23.88-90). The book succeeds while also always exemplifying deep scholarship and aesthetic sensibility.

As McInerny regards it as, “one of the most delightful tercets of the entire poem” (129), may we in his debt for this jewel of a work conclude with it, wishing that he, with Dante and Aquinas:

*riguarda omai ne la faccia che a Cristo più si somiglia, ché la sua chiarezza sola ti può disporre a veder Cristo /
Look now on that face that most resembles that of Christ; its brightness alone can dispose you to see Christ (Par. 32. 85-87).*


Reviewed by Jude P. Dougherty
*The Catholic University of America*

The Middle Ages are generally considered to be the period between 500 and 1500 A.D. That thousand-year period in Johannes Fried’s narrative begins with Boethius under the reign of the Emperor Justinian and effectively ends with Petrarch in the reign of Charles IV, who tried to woo him to the imperial court.

The book is too much to read in one sitting and obviously too great a work for a brief review. Nevertheless, it deserves notice, not merely for its account of the making of Europe but for the many lessons it holds for the present. In lieu of an extensive review, a few paragraphs may convey the character of Fried’s study.

Fried’s admiration of Pope Gregory the Great (590-604) is undisguised. “Gregory must be counted among the outstanding successors of St. Peter,” he writes. A member of a distinguished Roman aristocratic family and a former Roman prefect, Gregory came to the papacy with an extraordinary command of ancient learning. As pope he called Christians to embrace a life of contemplation and monastic simplicity. Consistently applying these principles to his private life, the wealthy Gregory vested all his family fortune in the Church and urban monastic orders.

Gregory’s extensive writings included theological works, biblical exegesis, sermons, and letters. He is cited by Fried for the lasting influence of his Commentaries on the Book of Job and for his Book of Pastoral Rule. The latter, we are told, proved to be a seminal text for the governance of the Church insofar as it helped to define the role of bishops and other Church leaders. As an interpreter of Sacred Scripture, Gregory followed the lead of Saint Jerome by distinguishing different layers of textual meaning in the Bible. “The written word, he held, is not simply to be understood literally, but may also be understood in various metaphorical senses.” Fried calls Gregory’s Commentary on the Book of Job “one of the greatest educational texts of the Middle Ages.”

Two centuries later, under the rule of Charlemagne (747-814) the Church was to become firmly integrated into the Empire’s ruling system. Charlemagne regarded the prosperity of a religious culture to be in the interest of the empire, and he acted accordingly. His religious initiative aimed first and foremost at promoting the worship of God and the liturgical reform it entailed. Fried believed that “in order not to offend the Lord, religious service called for correct liturgical language, error-free Latin, proper liturgical plainsong, and reliable scholarship.” In order to achieve his ecclesiastical reform, Charlemagne requested from Pope Adrian I the Roman Missal and from
BOOK REVIEWS

Pope Hadran I a definitive collection of canon law.

Given that the organization of the Church was seen as important to the Empire, bishops were charged with the education of their clergy. The fulfillment of that charge became the origin of the cathedral schools, which in the late Middle Ages became the embryos from which the great universities of Europe grew. From the tenth century on, dialectics and the sciences flourished in the cathedral schools that initially vied with exceptional monastery schools, but eventually the urban cathedral schools of Chartres, Reims, Leon, and Paris outstripped them.

Fried devotes a lengthy chapter to what he calls the Papal Schisms of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The intellectual culture of that period was in a state of upheaval, and Church reform and contentious papal elections were, in Fried’s judgment, simply manifestations of contemporary trends. Given the historic intertwining of the papacy and empire, the person who was the true successor of Peter had implications for kings and princes. It was not simply a matter of doctrine.

In the closing chapter of his narrative, Fried angrily address the origin of the “dark age myth.” He has few good words to say about the Renaissance humanists whom he takes to have originated the myth. Dismissing the logic, science, and art upon which they drew, the humanists denigrated the accomplishment that stood between them and an imaginary Rome and an idealized antiquity. Petrach and his fellow humanists, Fried tells us, inveighed against Aristotelian scholasticism and philosophers of the time for their insatiable curiosity, and warned “against investigations that knew no bounds.” And Fried adds that the humanists preferred to talk more about themselves than about anything else. He cites Petrach’s extensive correspondence as an example.

In Fried’s “Epilogue” to The Middle Ages, one finds the most devastating critique of Immanuel Kant as a representative of the Enlightenment that one is likely to encounter. Fried claims that Kant, who had little experience of the world, condemned the Middle Ages out of hand. “However exalted Kant’s contribution to critical philosophy may have been, in matters of anthropology, art appreciation, and historical understanding, Kant, like his comrades in arms, was simply a child of his age, and these men knew nothing about the Middle Ages, but also did not want to learn anything about it.” In Fried’s judgment, Kant and his contemporaries were heirs to the age they denigrated not its conquerors. They stood on the shoulders of others but were not aware of doing so. They despised what was in fact supporting them.

Given its solidly based scholarship and its depth of analysis the book belongs in the library of anyone who values knowledge for its own sake.


Reviewed by Deacon Stephen F. Miletic, Ph.D.

Over the past 250 or so years hermeneutical methods employed in academic analysis of scripture have proceeded along a trajectory which increasingly separated historical (scientific) from theological (faith) understandings of the biblical witness. The effect of the trajectory has been the embedment of a false dichotomy between history and theology, faith and reason in almost all methods of biblical interpretation. In short, what is taken as solid historical reconstruction (= objective, scientific) is pitted against faith claims (= subjective, unscientific) found in sacred texts and which have been developed in the creedal and magisterial teachings of various ecclesial bodies subscribing to historic Christianity.

Fr. Ignacio Carbajosa is a Spanish exegete and specialist in Semitic languages in the Faculty of Theology at the San Damiaso University of Madrid. His book-length study addresses the roots, development, triumph, and slow disintegration of the trajectory.

Carbajosa’s book is one of a few but growing number of responses to (then) Cardinal Ratzinger’s well-known presentation given in New York in 1988, in which Ratzinger raises the question of the necessity of a “critique of critical methods” used by biblicalists over the past two and a half centuries. The questions raised: Can there not be careful, critical, scientifically responsible exegesis which understands faith as an essential element of this kind of technical work? Can exegesis retain critical integrity for both history and faith?

Carbajosa organizes his well-researched presentation into three major steps. In chapters 1 and 2, Carbajosa surveys the last 200-plus centuries of Pentateuchal and Prophetic studies. He takes the reader through key methodological developments which have been joined to others and which in turn gained eventual widespread acceptance and in turn become major paradigms of interpretation. He points out their impact on interpreting the texts (e.g., literary evidence for the variegated literary sources of the Pentateuch; lateness of its editing [post-Davidic through post-Exilic]; references or the lack thereof to the Mosaic Law in prophetic preaching as one-time support of the Mosaic Law being post-Prophetic, etc.). He then lines up emerging critiques of these methods from within the discipline and eventual collapse of the paradigms. He concludes with a sober-minded critique inherent within the methods and paradigms. Much of their problems reside in defective philosophical assumptions about the relationship between the historical event of Revelation and its transmission and eventual stabilization in narrative. In his search to
explain how such problems could have gone unnoticed and critically evaluated for so long. Carbajosa digs deeper into the historical contexts of the interpreters and illustrates how cultural, political, philosophical, ideological and theological forces shaped “modern” thought and therefore the work of past exegetes and their methods.

In chapter 3, the third step, Carbajosa presents a masterful summary of a critical Catholic hermeneutic in four major parts. In the first part, he unfolds the nature of Scripture (an inspired witness to historical Revelation, a sacramental) and how this reality requires a twofold method: historical and theological.

In the second part, he develops this position by addressing a crucial underlying hermeneutical principle at the methodological level: all scientific instruments of exploration, analysis and evaluation must be consonant with the object being studied. If the object manifests religio-historical materials, three things must be in place. (1) Interpretive tools must be able to handle these phenomena (history and theology); (2) there is no such thing as interpretation without presuppositions. One might say that in this sense there is no “objective” reading of the text that is without prior commitments to how one knows and understands reality. (3) The interpreter must be able to address the truth claims of a transcendent being without a priori dismissal of such a being’s existence and possibility of self-communication within history. There are many other related issues he addresses, but we move on to his proposed solution to divorce between history and revelation.

The proposal is as follows. The inspired nature of scripture distinguishes it from other literature at the ontological level—it mediates or makes present something about the divine Person or Plan. As such, the historical and sociological processes forming Scripture include the faith of the hearer and the receiver of the historical revelation. Any authentic method of interpretation must respond to both the historical facts (such as they are or can be determined) and to the event of revelation (divine self-disclosure) mediated in scripture. What one “sees in the text” is also an ongoing reality in the faith experience of the Church (scripture mediates what is revealed). That same faith which formed the articulation and understanding of revelation in narrative is also present in the believing interpreter and is necessary for understanding the nature of the texts and their claims. In effect, the text does more than report; it is written to engage the hearer, the interpreter.

An impersonal, so-called scientific, objective response to this kind of literature is not possible. If faith is a formative power in the “construction” of scripture, then the interpreter is necessarily called to a moment of crisis (or, judgment) about what that faith event back in history, witnessed to in the text, signals for the interpreter right now, as part of the act of interpretation. The use of literary, historical, and theological methods is then guided not by ideology and certainly not solely by those methods’ first principles, but also by the interpreter’s ongoing openness to God, who is present to and known in the Church and normatively taught by the Magisterium. Faith, then, is the appropriate presupposition for interpreting Scripture.

In the third part, Carbajosa revisits the use of methodology in light of his critiques given in steps 1 and 2. He presents his case for the use of literary and historical methods. Carbajosa then addresses the all-important issue of interpreting the Old Testament in the light of the New. He develops the classic patristic position—the Old Testament finds its fulfillment in the New, which is hidden in the Old. Of the many solid points he develops, he thankfully argues that the fulfillment of the Old in the New is not a matter of creative literary work, texts interpreting texts, but a much larger issue of articulating how God’s progressive, historically rooted self-disclosure is best shown via continuity and discontinuity.

This book is a tour de force. From the perspective of multiple disciplines, the author has mastered at least three subareas of biblical studies (history of interpretation for Pentateuch, Prophets, and philosophical hermeneutics). Were he to have only presented in one of these subdisciplines he would have provided a valuable service. He has done much more. The Catholic hermeneutic developed in the third chapter complements and sustains his critiques found in the first two.

This well-balanced, patient, and sober-minded presentation affirms the absolute necessity of historical critical work and of critical theological reflection rooted in faith. This book would be suitable for undergraduate senior theology seminars and should be required reading at graduate schools of theology.

ENDNOTES

**IN MEMORIAM**

Rev. Austin Green, O.P., a member, died March 24, 2014. Dominican Father Austin E. Green, a priest for nearly 61 years, died March 24. The Chicago native was 93 and had been a Dominican for 68 years.

Father Green served in the Navy during WWII and joined the Dominican order in 1946. He was ordained in 1953.

His many ministries in education included working with the deaf for 25 years in Dallas. He also served with the deaf apostolate at Blessed Francis Xavier Seelos Parish in the Bywater area.

Since 2009, he resided at St. Anthony of Padua Church in New Orleans.

Charles Edward Rice, Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame since 1969 (the last ten as Emeritus Professor), died on February 25, 2015 after a brief terminal illness. “Charlie” is survived by his wife Mary, ten children, many grandchildren, and thousands of Notre Dame law students, who revered him as teacher, mentor, friend, and as the epitome of a Catholic gentleman. He received his B.A. from Holy Cross College, his J.D. from Boston College, and the LL.M and SJD degrees from New York University.

Professor Rice authored or edited thirteen books and countless scholarly articles, and served for many years (with the late Robert Rodes) as editor of The American Journal of Jurisprudence. He helped to found the New York state Conservative Party, was a stalwart of the pro-life movement since his native New York began to liberalize its abortion laws in 1969, and a frequent guest on EWTN and other Catholic radio and television programs. Charlie was a hugely accomplished but humble servant of the truth, and a faithful disciple of his Lord and Savior.

Gerard Bradley, Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School

Kenneth Whitehead. A man who loved the Church! One of the stalwart warriors for the soul of the Church in our generation, Ken Whitehead will be much missed here on earth. We can rejoice that we can count on his prayers for us in eternity.

There are many ways in which someone can show his love for God and for the Church. In his cheerful resilience, in even the toughest of times, Ken Whitehead displayed a marvelous range of virtues. A noble family man, he also served his country in the high ranks of public office, as U.S. Assistant Secretary of Education.

As a tireless author, he wrote in defense of Catholic teachings on such topics as religious freedom and morality. Some of his books were crafted to give a patient explanation of the Church’s teachings, as in his numerous essays addressing points of the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*. Others showed the firm but kind hand of someone who recognized the need to honor the Pauline mandate of fraternal correction when fellow members of the Catholic academic community had wandered away from sound teaching. This last kind of writing was something I particularly admired, for in the words he penned, Ken combined the clear, gentle, and yet firm authority that is needed in one of the most difficult but most urgent tasks of practical charity. He loved the Church!

Fr. Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.
Fordham University

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If you would like to receive one of these books to review for the Quarterly, please email Alice Osberger—Osberger.1@nd.edu


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- Dominican House of Studies, Washington DC and Gregorian University, Rome
Pope Benedict XVI’s Address in Westminster Hall on September 17, 2010

This address on the relation of religion and politics is one of the highlights of Pope Benedict’s journey to the United Kingdom in the late summer of 2010. The pope first pays tribute to the British Parliament, the worldwide influence of Britain’s common law tradition, and the English “vision of the respective rights and duties of the state and the individual, and of the separation of powers,” a vision held in such high regard throughout the world.

He then appeals to the figure of Saint Thomas More, ever the good servant of the king, who “chose to serve God first.” Pope Benedict doesn’t mention that More would not take an oath recognizing King Henry VIII as head of the Church in England. The pope does say that More’s dilemma of discerning “what is owed to God and what is owed to Caesar” provides a good context for reflecting “on the proper place of religious belief within the political process.” By invoking the example of More, Pope Benedict is implying that there are limits to the sovereignty of the government, that Christians have a duty to work for the common good of their country, and that Christian citizens may have to give up their lives rather than violate their consciences by being unfaithful to God.

Pope Benedict next points out the similarity between the British parliamentary tradition and Catholic social teaching. The former celebrates “freedom of speech, freedom of political affiliation and respect for the rule of law with a strong sense of the individual’s rights and duties, and of the equality of all citizens before the law.” The latter says that all people have equal dignity because they are created in the image of God and that every civil authority has the duty to promote the common good. The pope leaves unsaid that human dignity provides a foundation for both rights and duties. All have certain rights because of their God-given dignity, and all must fulfill various duties in order to live in accordance with their dignity. In Rerum novarum (no. 37) Pope Leo XIII said that “true dignity and excellence in men and women resides in moral living, that is, in virtue.” Such a formulation is most unlikely to be found in the British parliamentary tradition.

The pope spells out what concern for human dignity and the common good requires in the democratic process. It is not just any consensus arrived at by the majority that is sufficient to establish a healthy democracy. Both the economy and the political process need a solid ethical foundation. Benedict gives one example of British legislation that had a firm ethical basis, the abolition of the slave trade. “The campaign that led to this landmark legislation was built upon firm ethical principles, rooted in the natural law, and it has made a contribution to civilization of which this nation may be justly proud.” This example suggests that other legislation and British mores could profitably be based on the natural law.

Pope Benedict is now at the heart of the matter. After his brief mention of the natural law he looks to reason in general as a reliable guide to discern ethical norms to guide political choices. “The Catholic tradition maintains that the objective norms governing right action are accessible to reason, prescinding from the content of revelation.” While reason theoretically has the ability to discern the relevant ethical principles, it can go astray under the influence of culture or various ideologies. It was after all the “misuse of reason” that led to the slave trade and to the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century. As a remedy for the weakness of reason, Pope Benedict suggests that religion can help “purify” reason, making it a more fit instrument of ethical discernment. Here and in other contexts Pope Benedict makes the point that faith can correct the aberrations of reason, and reason can likewise help faith overcome its errors. “This is why I would suggest that the world of reason and the world of faith … need one another and should not be afraid to enter into a profound and ongoing dialogue, for the good of our civilization.” Every civilization needs reason and faith working together for the sake of the common good.

The cooperation between faith and religion and politics is not going well these days in various parts of the world. Benedict emphasizes the marginalization of Christianity that is taking place. Many want religious voices silenced or confined to the private sphere, leaving the public square without any religious influence.
Some even argue “that Christians in public roles should be required at times to act against their conscience.” Benedict doesn’t mention in this context that government officials tried to force Thomas More to act against his conscience, but intelligent listeners in the audience would naturally think of that fact. Benedict makes a plea for the toleration of religion in the public square and for the encouragement of “dialogue between faith and reason at every level of national life” so that the genuine good of the nations of the world might more easily be achieved.

After mentioning areas of cooperation between the United Kingdom and the Holy See, Pope Benedict notes “the positive signs of a worldwide growth in solidarity toward the poor,” mentioning in particular the contribution of the United Kingdom. He adds that the integral development of the world’s peoples is a very important endeavor.

Pope Benedict concludes with another plea for an ongoing dialogue between faith and reason and for cooperation between the Church and public authorities. For that cooperation to take place religious freedom must be protected. Religious bodies—“including institutions linked to the Catholic Church—need to be free to act according to their own principles and specific convictions based upon the faith and the official teaching of the Church.”

J. Brian Benestad
Editor

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