Fellowship of Catholic Scholars Quarterly

Vol. 42, Nos. 2-3

Summer-Fall 2019

William L. Saunders
   FCS President’s Letter................................................. 111
   Washington Insider:
   Abortion Comes to the Supreme Court. ......................... 113

Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.
   From the Editor’s Desk:
   The Importance of Newman’s Canonization. ................. 117

ARTICLES

John Ryle Kezel
   Priests, Prophets, and Kings:
   Ecclesiology in Newman and Tolkien. ....................... 131

Tom Nash
   Give the Prince of Peace a Chance: Woodstock Waged
   Culture War While Proclaiming Secular Peace. ............ 145

FROM THE 2019 FCS CONVENTION

David Clayton
   What the Icons of the Transfiguration and Our Lady
   of Guadalupe Tell Us about How to Evangelize
   the Culture and the World. ..................................... 151

Helena M. Tomko
   The Splendor of Hope in Days of Evil:
   Imagined Sanctity and the Subsistence
   of Catholic Literature in the Third Reich..................... 161

Bridget Olver
   Sacred and Secular Beauty: Comparing the Music
   of the Trecento to the Music of the Renaissance............ 173
MEMORIAL NOTICES

Anne Carson Daly
Just Wacky Enough to Be Wonderful
at a Breezy Time of Day: An Appreciation
of the Inimitable James V. Schall, S.J. (1928-2019)............. 183

Rev. Msgr. Robert J. Batule

BOOK REVIEWS

David B. Hart. That All Shall Be Saved: Heaven, Hell and
Universal Salvation
   Rev. John Gavin, S.J................................................... 197

Obianuju Ekeocha. Target Africa: Ideological Neocolonialism
in the Twenty-First Century
   Sr. Mary Jeremiah, O.P. ........................................... 204

Peter Kreeft. Symbol or Substance? A Dialogue on the Eucharist
with C. S. Lewis, Billy Graham, and J. R. R. Tolkien
   D. Q. McInerny...................................................... 208

Sam Guzman. The Catholic Gentleman:
Living Authentic Manhood Today
   Jared J. Schumacher.............................................. 212

Polish Christian Philosophers Series
   Joseph W. Koterski, S.J........................................... 215

Books Received......................................................... 217

Information about the Fellowship and the Quarterly................. 219
Letter from the President of the Fellowship

Dear Members of the Fellowship,

Greetings!

Particularly for those who were unable to join us for the 42nd annual convention in Montreal, I would like to offer a brief report.

The Fellowship’s first foray outside the United States was undertaken in solidarity with the Canadian chapter of the Fellowship, the only non-U.S. chapter that is currently active.

We were treated upon our arrival Friday to a surprise – a massive march against climate change, led by the young Swedish activist Greta Thunberg, who had only days before addressed the United Nations General Assembly. She was presented with keys to the city later that day. But at midday Friday, the tens of thousands who marched down the main street of Montreal for hours made it nearly impossible for us to get to mass! The opening mass was scheduled for the basilica of St. Patrick’s, which was on one side of the street, while our hotel was on the other side! However, our resourceful convention manager, Theresa Sullivan, found an underground passage from the hotel to the basilica, and we made it to mass on time. Whether this whole episode offers a foreshadowing of what awaits Catholics in an increasingly secularized and nature-worshiping culture in the United States, I leave to the reader to contemplate.

In addition, I must say two further things. First, St. Patrick’s is a glorious building, one of the most beautiful in the world, a fitting place to offer thanks and praise to the Creator.

Second, we will have to overcome such future obstacles without Theresa Sullivan, who will no longer be able to serve as our convention manager, given her obligations to her expanding family. We thank her for all she has done for the Fellowship.

At lunch on Saturday, we heard from one of the founders of a new journal for French-speaking Quebeois, Le Verbe. He chillingly described the secularized state of things in Montreal and in the province of Quebec. For that culture, he said, everything is serene, everything is placid, because “everyone agrees” that man can find his measure without God. God is an irrelevance. It reminded me of a burned landscape in winter, still and dead. Yet, like the first sprig in spring, the very existence of Le Verbe and the young Catholics behind it offer hope for the future of the Church in Montreal.

The convention was a success on account of the efforts of many people.

First, thanks to our sponsors. Without them, we could not have an annual
convention. I urge members of the Fellowship to thank them and also to support the Fellowship with your own gifts.

Second, thanks to Grattan Brown and his committee for putting together a fine program. Fortunately, you will all have the benefit of the talks as they will appear in the *Quarterly*.

Cordially,

William Saunders, Esq.
President, FCS
ON OCTOBER 4, THE SUPREME COURT granted review of an abortion case. The case, June Medical Services v. Gee, involves a law in Louisiana that requires abortionists to have admitting privileges at a local hospital. If they do not have them, they cannot commit abortions.

Oddly, at first glance, this issue appears to have already been decided by the Supreme Court. On June 27, 2016, that is, two and a half years ago, the Court decided Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt. In that decision, the Court struck down a Texas law that, among other things, required abortionists to have admitting privileges in a local hospital. The two cases seem more or less identical. What has changed? Why would the Court consider the issue again? Is not the Court bound by “precedent”? There are several answers to these questions, all of which bode well for the pro-life cause.

First, the major apparent change in circumstances is that the composition of the Court has changed. The majority that decided Hellerstedt (Stephen Breyer, Ruth Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomajor, Elena Kagan, and Anthony Kennedy) no longer exists. Anthony Kennedy has retired. Further, though there are nine seats on the Court, Hellerstedt was decided by a five to three vote. It was decided, in other words, during the period between the death of Antonin Scalia (on February 13, 2016) and the confirmation of his successor, Neil Gorsuch (on April 7, 2017) – a time when there were only eight justices on the Court. Finally, both Kennedy and Scalia were replaced by nominees of President Donald Trump, Brett Kavanaugh and Neil Gorsuch.

Trump, of course, pledged to nominate “originalists” to the Court. An originalist is a justice who tries to apply the law as written, whether he agrees with the perspective it expresses or not. Both Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, during hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, identified themselves with the originalist judicial philosophy. Consequently, both are pledged to apply the Constitution as written to decide abortion cases. Since, as readers will know, there is no right to

*William L. Saunders is fellow and director of the Program in Human Rights, Institute for Human Ecology, and codirector of the Center for Religious Liberty, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America. He is also president of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars. This essay originally appeared in the National Catholic Register and is reprinted here with permission.
abortion written in the Constitution, and since originalist justices now comprise a five-vote majority (Kavanaugh and Gorsuch plus the three justices who dissented in *Hellerstedt*, Samuel Alito, John Roberts, Clarence Thomas), this could indicate that the Justices will use the occasion of the *Gee* case to overrule the abortion license created by the Court in *Roe v. Wade* and *Doe v. Bolton*, companion cases, in 1973.

That, however, seems unlikely. The abortion license, or “right,” has been embedded by the Supreme Court in many decisions following *Roe* and *Doe* (most infamously in *Planned Parenthood v. Casey* in 1992 in which the Court admonished pro-life Americans from continuing to protest those outcomes). Overruling them all in a single case may be thought by some Justices to be going too far too fast. (And the reader must remember that it takes five votes to make a majority.) Chief Justice John Roberts in particular seems to be an “incrementalist.” In other words, he seemingly prefers to decide as narrow an issue, by as large a majority of justices, as possible. Thus, he will set the parameters of the outcome. Roberts has often expressed concern for public perception of, and support for, the Court’s decisions. The narrowest possible outcome would serve to “distinguish” *Gee* from *Hellerstedt*, in other words, to uphold both cases by finding that *Gee* is significantly different.

The court of appeals that decided *Hellerstedt*, in fact, said this was precisely what it was doing. It said the factual circumstances were different in the two cases and that this was determinative. It noted that, while the law in Texas was understood by the Court to have effectively closed many abortion clinics and have impacted many women, the Louisiana law would, even potentially, only impact a small number. This, the appellate court reasoned, did not violate Supreme Court precedent requiring a law limiting abortion not to place an “undue burden” on a woman seeking an abortion.

Nonetheless, it seems unlikely the Court will decide *Gee* so narrowly. If the Court felt *Gee* was an incorrect application of the *Hellerstedt*, it could simply have summarily reversed the appellate court. Thus, it seems a majority of the Court (which voted to grant review of the appellate court decision in *Gee*) must wish to do more than that. It seems more likely the Court wants to “limit,” or even reverse, *Hellerstedt*.

The reader should note that the undue burden test was itself created by the Supreme Court. It is notoriously difficult to apply. The Court has said that it is equivalent to a “significant obstacle” or that it must affect a “large fraction” of the cases. Such vague formulations do not help lower courts to apply the undue burden test, resulting in abortion cases being decided on an ad hoc basis, with the Supreme Court, as former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted, being “the nation’s de facto abortion review board.”
In his dissent in *Hellerstedt*, Justice Alito, joined by Thomas and Roberts, noted dissatisfaction with tests, such as undue burden, that have been created by the Court seemingly and solely in the abortion context to make it easier for abortion proponents to challenge state laws limiting abortion. In other decisions, other justices have expressed similar dissatisfaction with this kind of “abortion distortion.” Hence, it seems possible the Court will use its decision in *Gee* to correct this, and to make it clear that the regular rules of interpretation and of procedure apply to abortion cases, as they do to any other issue.

If so, that would be highly significant. Although the media often says abortion is a “fundamental right,” the Court has never said so. Fundamental rights (such as freedom from racial discrimination) are subject to a “strict scrutiny” standard. That means laws that embody them (for example, that discriminate on the basis of race) are unlikely to survive judicial scrutiny. Most laws are subject only to a “rational basis” review. That means if there is a rational basis for the law, it will be upheld. Abortion has been treated by the Court as having an “intermediate” status and subject to the undue burden test. If the undue burden standard is rejected, and the ordinary rational basis standard is henceforth to be applied to laws regulating abortion, those laws are almost certain to be upheld, and they will not require Supreme Court review.

Even more likely than elimination of the undue burden standard is that the Court will eliminate another abortion distortion. This is the “standing” rule that, only in abortion cases, allows abortion clinics to sue “on behalf of” women allegedly disadvantaged by the law. In all other areas, the one who sues, the plaintiff, must be one who has been – or is about to be – harmed by the law. In the abortion case, this would be the woman herself. Technically speaking, she would be raising an “as applied” challenge to the law rather than a “facial challenge” (which seeks to have a court reject a law before it has even been applied to anyone). The dissent in *Hellerstedt* indicated dissatisfaction with this, and *Gee* gives the new majority an occasion to eliminate it. Though such an outcome might not appear significant, it is. If abortion restriction laws can be challenged only when applied, it gives the law a chance to take effect and, practically speaking, limits the number of cases that arise, thereby removing the Supreme Court as the nation’s “de facto abortion review board.”

In sum, abortion jurisprudence is complicated and confusing (because the Supreme Court has made it so), and the results of future cases are hard to predict. However, in my view, the bottom line appears to be that the Court’s forthcoming decision in *Gee* will mark a significant restriction of the unrestricted abortion license the Court created in *Roe* and *Doe*. 
From the Editor’s Desk
The Importance of Newman’s
Canonization

Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.*

Canonization is a recognition by the Church that an individual has truly led a saintly life. In the popular press, this process is sometimes misunderstood, as if it were a decision by the Church to place someone in heaven. Quite the contrary. The lengthy process of examination of an individual’s life and deeds is a mark of the Church’s humility in this matter. There is no claim about altering anyone’s post-mortal destiny. Rather, in a canonization, the Church, with due humility, has come to a recognition that a person has truly led a holy life and is pleasing to God. By the formal act of a canonization the Church is proclaiming that we may honor such people as saints, ask their intercession with God, and take them as examples of holy living.

The canonization of John Henry Cardinal Newman this year is the result of a long process that involved a thorough examination of his life and his voluminous writings. And, as always, the Church awaited the special evidence of divine miracles. They are taken as a sign from God.

Why is his canonization important for our times? There are many reasons. Let us consider a few of them – proper understanding of the sacraments, the need for continuity with what Christ revealed in any claims about the development of doctrine, solid advice in spiritual matters, and clarity of philosophical thinking about faith and reason.

Understanding the Sacraments

For many people, the sacraments are thought of as merely nice ceremonies, without any real power or efficacy. Baptism is envisioned as a baby-naming ceremony, Confession as a spiritual way to deal with guilt feelings, the Eucharist as a community gathering to remember what Jesus did long ago, and Marriage as a stage on life’s way, an opportunity for publicly declaring a union of hearts in

* Fr. Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. teaches philosophy at Fordham University (Bronx, NY) and is the editor of the International Philosophical Quarterly as well as of the FCSQ.
love, if not simply a photo-op on a happy occasion.

The struggle that Newman underwent in the process of his conversion was centered largely on the question of the efficacy of the sacraments.\(^1\) As a young man, he grew interested in religion because it satisfied his emotional needs. Later, however, his teachers at Oxford help him to see the difference between an emotionally appealing ceremony and a true sacrament, established by Christ for the Church as a means for giving divine grace. In his forties, he came to see that it was the Catholic Church that had preserved the sacraments Christ established and to recognize that the “middle way” practiced by the Church of England was marred by historical discontinuity and insufficiency. There is much to learn from the reasons for Newman’s conversion about the nature and importance of the sacraments.

*The Development of Doctrine*

So many questions under discussion now in the Church concern the distinction between continuity and rupture. These questions concern not only discipline and practices but doctrine. When new ideas come and suggestions about how to express what is essential to the faith arise, there is need to determine whether they are genuine developments of what God revealed in Christ.

Following on the thought of one of the early Church Fathers, Vincent of Lerins, Newman wrote a very important volume on this subject, *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (1845, 1878). It was highly influential at the Second Vatican Council and remains crucial for evaluating the work of theologians ever since. As Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., often points out,\(^2\) careful study of Newman’s thought in this area is crucial, both to resist the misuse of Newman’s thought to suggest that there could ever be an evolution of doctrine that would overturn revelation and tradition on points that a later age finds unpalatable and to enjoy the fruits of Newman’s insights about the process by which we can come to appreciate better what God has revealed to us.

The cases that Newman takes up as illustrations of authentic and trustworthy growth in doctrinal understanding in his *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* come largely from the first six centuries of the Church’s life.\(^3\) He

\(^1\) There are many fine biographies of Newman, but especially good for appreciating the stages in the course of Newman’s conversion is Ian Ker’s *John Henry Newman: A Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).


Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.

examines them using seven criteria (what he called “notes”) for assessing whether or not a new idea is a true doctrinal development. While Newman intended his criteria primarily for theological questions, and above all to the question of whether the Catholic Church is a true development of Christianity from its founding by Jesus Christ, there are encouraging remarks in chapter five of the Essay on Development about the applicability of his criteria to philosophical questions as well as theological topics.

The first two of Newman’s criteria deserve to be taken as a pair. There needs to be a preservation of true meaning of the original formulation of a given doctrine and evidence of organic continuity in the process of articulating the new formulation for it to be considered a case of genuine development. New expressions of the truths of the Christian faith need to preserve the grounding principles whole and entire. The third and fourth of Newman’s “notes” put our focus on the assimilative power of some development under examination, to see if the new forms of expression maintain what has already been recognized as dogmatic truth and if they make explicit what is already implicit in divine revelation or what is a logical consequence of what has been revealed, even though such realizations or consequences were not recognized before. The final three criteria that Newman offers concern the likelihood of the new expression for helping to ensure the fidelity of believers to the deposit of revelation, the preservation of the original idea in some truly helpful new formulation, and the fruitfulness of the new development for understanding and living the faith.

Fruitfulness in this context is thus meant in contrast to the corruption, perversion, and decay typical of inauthentic development, however popular it may be in a later age. Familiarity with Newman’s actual thought in these matters can prove a helpful antidote to the tendency to misuse his name in service of an evolution of doctrine that really means a rejection of positions that tradition and revelation have identified as essential elements of the faith, in favor of positions that an age finds more compatible with its own desires and preferences.

Spiritual Matters

In their preaching, priests and deacons need good models of how to integrate solid Christian doctrine with practical advice and steady encouragement about taking one’s faith seriously. Newman’s sermons are models of how to do this, not to mention rich resources that preachers can mine for ideas. Although generally longer than the sermons of today, Newman’s sermons are delightful and inspiring reading, especially in the area of reliable spiritual advice.

By way of example, the very first item in his collection of Parochial Sermons
The Importance of Newman’s Canonization

is one entitled “Holiness Necessary for Future Blessedness.” It could well inspire homilies about heaven that encourage us to think about it as something more than an extension of our present lives. What, after all, will we do in heaven? Will it just be endlessly more of the activities we now find enjoyable? Will we ever get bored? Will it be entirely different from what we are used to? Granted the unfathomable creativity of God, will the life of the saints be like an endless cruise, with an out-of-this world entertainment director? Cruises are nice, but at some point even the most inveterate cruise-afficionado wants to return to port and get back home.

In this sermon Newman neither forecloses on nor insists on the possibility that there will be a walking tour of the City of God or dancing at the wedding of the Lamb. Instead, he offers the following sage comment:

It would be presumption to attempt to determine the employments of that eternal life which good men are to pass in God’s presence, or to deny that the state which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor mind conceived, may comprise an infinite variety of pursuits and occupations. Still so far as we are distinctly told, that future life will be spent in God’s presence, in a sense which does not apply to our present life, so that it may be best described as an endless and uninterrupted worship of the Eternal Father, Son, and Spirit.

A comment like this is very comforting, but it also makes us wonder. Just imagine a stroll through a city that has “no need of the sun or moon to illumine it.” Quoting the book of Revelation, Newman notes that the glory of God is going to give all the light anyone could ever need, and that “the nations of them which are saved shall walk in the light of it.” Further, we know that this will be the place of the wedding of the Lamb, and it is simply impossible to imagine the glories of a wedding without dancing and a great feast!

The title of this sermon (“Holiness Necessary for Future Blessedness”) comes from the line Newman quotes from the letter to the Hebrews: “Holiness, without which no man shall see the Lord.” He then takes a two-pronged approach by explaining (1) that without holiness no one will see God, and then, at greater length, (2) that even if someone of unholy life were allowed to enter heaven, that person would not be happy there. The idea of holiness that Newman envisions here thus comes directly from the Scriptures, and especially from the Sermon on

---

2 Sermon 1, p. 7.
4 See Revelation 19:6-9 on the wedding supper of the Lamb.
5 Hebrews, 12:14, quoted in Sermon 1, p. 3.
the Mount: “to love, fear, and obey God, to be just, honest, meek, pure in heart, forgiving, heavenly minded, self-denying, humble, and resigned.”

1 Why would God require this sort of holiness, Newman asks. Since eternal life is “the gift of God,” it is something for which God can establish the conditions for our being able to enter upon that life, and God has made it clear again and again that this is what he wants of us.

It is in his reflection on the second point that Newman becomes expansive. What he says has direct bearing on the question about what we will do in heaven. In this life, people may choose what pleases them, and it is understandable if we imagine that it will be the same in that other life, except that (we suppose) people there will be sure of getting what they want. Here in this life we are not always sure of that. It is this misplaced expectation that Newman wants to correct. In his judgment we often do not appreciate the real extent and importance of the preparation that is necessary for the next world. He writes:

We think that we can reconcile ourselves to God when we will; as if nothing were required in the case of men in general, but some temporary attention, more than ordinary, to our religious duties – some strictness, during our last sickness, in the services of the Church, as men of business arrange their letters and papers on taking a journey or balancing an account.

For Newman, even to put such a thought into words is to see the idea refuted. Heaven – scripture shows us – is not the sort of place where one can simply go around and do as we like: “Here every man can do his own pleasure, but there he must do God’s pleasure.”

2 It will not be a place of working out some temporal project, great or small, or extending our sphere of influence, or of doing our business. Good as such things may be during earthly life, there “we will hear solely and entirely of God.”

3 Newman’s view is quite clear, but some people may start to wonder if heavenly life may get dull and boring. In an image that is very memorable because of the way he develops it, Newman urges that being in heaven will be like being in church! There we will praise God, worship God, sing to God, thank God, give ourselves up to God, and ask God’s blessing. And so, just as it happens here and now, some will find it delightful but others will simply hate it! The striking image that Newman uses here should strike a deep chord in us. For my own part, I truly do not want to be the kind of preacher or celebrant who gives his congregation reason to make their shopping lists or to speculate about dinner! But that comparison only goes so far,
precisely because even now, during our liturgies on earth, the liturgy had better never be about the preacher! It has to be about the Lord, who is infinitely interesting and intriguing without pause.

By saying that being in heaven will be like being in church, Newman is not saying that we will simply be sitting in a pew forever, to be interrupted only by occasionally standing up, kneeling down, or perhaps undertaking a procession down one aisle and up the next. The point of his comparison is not in what we will be doing but in how we will like it. And it is this insight from which he draws the practical conclusion (that is, the second part) from the line from Hebrews, that “without holiness, no man shall see God.”

When we try to fathom this point, the comparisons we use will invariably fall short, and yet there is some good that can come from them. Suppose that we find ourselves at an extremely high-level discussion of some tricky point in logic. Those well prepared will find it fascinating, but the rest of us will do more than yawn! Newman’s point here, of course, has nothing to do with recherché academics. We could equally well use a comparison from soccer: suppose that we found ourselves at an extremely high level of low-scoring World Cup play. Those well prepared will find it fascinating, while the rest of us will wish we were elsewhere.

Newman’s image has little to do with even the most pious practices of church, and everything to do with holiness of life. Holiness means having a life that is truly centered upon God. To enjoy being in church means to take delight in God and so to love being in a place where this is the subject that we will hear about and the face that we will look upon. Unless we are the sort of people who find our pleasure in a life of holiness, we will be extremely unhappy there. Such a person, says Newman, “could not bear the face of the Living God; the Holy God would be no object of joy to him.”

The point of Newman’s comparison is clear. He is not saying that we will be cooped up in a pew for eternity and somehow enjoy it. Quite to the contrary, we will enjoy God’s presence in heaven if during our lives here on earth we have accepted the graces God is so eager to give us and if we have lived the sort of lives that God wants from us: true faith, good works, real repentance from sin, true delight in God himself, and true delight in what God has made. As Newman writes,

The more numerous are our acts of charity, self-denial, and forbearance, of course the more will our minds be schooled into a charitable, self-denying, and forbearing temper. The more frequent are our prayers, the more humble, patient, and religious are our daily deeds, this communion with God, these holy works will be the means of making our hearts holy, and

---

1 Sermon 1, p. 8.
of preparing us for the future presence of God.\(^1\)

In human beings, outward acts create inward habits, and for Newman this is the way to impress on our hearts a heavenly character. A habit that is formed within us can be for some great good, but it is equally possible to form bad habits. Imagine the lot of someone who acted throughout his life out of a bad spirit. He would have a corrupt state of heart, full of self-love, self-conceit, self-reliance. Without repentance, reparation, and cooperation with the grace God offers, an everlasting life that operates within those parameters would simply be endless misery.

Accordingly, the latter parts of Newman’s sermon on holiness are given to the urgency of getting started and persevering on the quest for holiness. For him, there is no place for thinking in polly-annish fashion that somehow all will be well without any real effort. There is no use contenting ourselves with the notion that somehow everything will work out, even if we never quite get around to doing anything about it.

Let me turn, for a moment, to my own Jesuit tradition. In much the same way St Ignatius of Loyola captures this point in his meditation on “Three Classes of Men.”\(^2\) It is a prayer exercise in which he asks us to contrast (1) a person who never takes the necessary means, (2) one who simply wants God to come around to his own point of view, and (3) one who is willing to be so devoted to God as to be ready either to follow or to let go of some preference (or some aversion), depending only on what God wants. Newman makes this same point in his words:

No one is able to prepare himself for heaven, that is, make himself holy, in a short time.... Yet, alas! as there are persons who think to be saved by a few scanty performances, so there are others who suppose that they may be saved all at once by a sudden and easily acquired faith. Most men who are living in neglect of God, silence their consciences, when troublesome, with the promise of repenting some future day. How often are they thus led on til death surprises them?\(^3\)

Newman is confident that God could by his grace bestow his forgiveness even on someone’s death bed. His concern here, however, is to note that it is hard to imagine how such a person would be ready to find joy in heaven. Which of our

---

\(^1\) Sermon 1, pp. 9-10.


\(^3\) Sermon 1, p. 10-11. For the role of conscience in the cultivation of holiness, see some of Newman’s other sermons on the topic, especially: Sermon 2 in Sermons on Subjects of the Day (“Saintliness not Forfeited by the Penitent”) and Sermon 5 in Discourses to Mixed Congregations (“Saintliness the Standard of Christian Principle”).
tastes or likings, he asks, can we change at a moment’s notice? In his view, this does not happen even with superficial things, let alone with “the whole frame and character of our minds.”

Thus, it is not that Newman in any way doubts what the grace of God can bring about, but rather that he wants us to meditate on the way in which God allows us our freedom for however many years there are in our lives. It is part of God’s mercy to allow us free choice and to respect the character traits that we form in ourselves by the myriads of choices that we make, day in and day out. He writes:

We dare not, of course, set bounds to God’s mercy and power in cases of repentance late in life.... Yet surely, it is our duty ever to keep steady before us, and act upon, those general truths which His Holy Word has declared. His Holy Word in various way warns us, that, as no one will find happiness in heaven who is not holy, so no one can learn to be so, in a short time, and when he will.\(^1\)

To obtain the gift of holiness, for Newman, is the work of a lifetime. It is a matter of constant cooperation with the graces the Holy Spirit provides us, and thus never a task beyond our strength.\(^2\)

**Faith and Reason**

The perennial questions about the relation of faith and reason can be handled in various registers. In addition to the Thomistic renaissance initiated by *Aeterni patris* (1879) from the pen of Leo XIII and still generating lively insight, there has been a sustained recovery of patristic thinking that has proven extremely fruitful as well as the flower of such new approaches as phenomenology and personalism. Newman has an important contribution in this area as well.

It is no surprise that even devoted readers of Newman seldom take up *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*. It is, by any judgment, a difficult book. He had been trying for decades to write a book on the problem of certitude in regard to religious faith, but felt stuck. While on vacation in August 1866 near the Lake of Geneva with his friend Ambrose St. John, it struck him that he had been proposing the problem to himself in the wrong way. Instead of beginning with the topic of “certitude,” perhaps he should slowly work toward the topic of certitude but should begin by contrasting “assent” with “inference.”

By reversing the order of the topics that he intended to cover, he allowed a stream of thought, long pent up in the reservoir of his mind, to find a release. The result was *An Essay* (in the sense of “an attempt”) *in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*.

---

\(^1\) Sermon 1, p. 11.

\(^2\) Sermon 1, p. 13.
(that is, an attempt to offer some help with grasping how we come to hold the positions that we take, both on religious and nonreligious questions).

The central thesis of this book is that we often come to hold many of the positions that we do (that is, we come to give our assent) not only on the basis of logic or demonstration but also on the basis of other mental and emotional processes, including feelings, memories, associations, “the right state of heart,” and even a sense of “the convergence of innumerable probabilities.”

It is not at all that Newman disdained logic or demonstration – in fact, much of the early part of this book is given to a careful review of these specific topics. But his main project is to counter a range of agnostic and atheistic propaganda that was gaining influence in his time, namely, the view that only what is scientifically demonstrated should be regarded as knowledge, that religious claims can never be considered genuine knowledge, and that religious belief is likely to be a menace to gaining any real knowledge.

Newman aims to show that much of daily life is based not on the sort of rigorous inferences (chains of reasoning) that are typical of science but on faith (in a general rather than a specifically religious sense), that is, trust in the credibility of someone’s word or testimony. We rely all the time on concrete acts of assent (that is, holding a belief, saying yes to a proposition) that in turn rest on countless probabilities (likelihoods).

To put the matter another way, the mind does no violence to itself in making such innumerable acts of assent in daily life. The judgments by which we hold this or that to be the case are normally not arbitrary or whimsical. Quite the contrary, they are based on experience, and further experience can confirm or disconfirm what we had been inclined to think. These many acts of assent that we make actually follow various laws and patterns, and the more that we notice and confirm the laws and patterns involved, the greater confidence we can have. They bring us certitude (that is, the confidence that what we are holding is right) in many fields and spheres, not merely in that of religion.

The portion of An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent on which I want to concentrate here comes from a section in the final chapter where Newman is discussing the distinction between natural religion and revealed religion. The term “natural religion” refers to what we can know about God and about our duties to him by the use of our minds in reflection on our experience of the world. He discusses natural religion at some length there. Then, after discussing what he calls “our great internal teacher of religion” – that is, our conscience, he turns to the topic of revealed religion.

To begin his reflections on what believers do when they accept divine revelation as true, he makes use of a passage from Aristotle that offers very prudent advice about giving our assent in various fields of inquiry and about what
The Importance of Newman’s Canonization

constitutes genuine knowledge. The lengthy quotation that Newman makes from Aristotle here focuses our attention on the need to remember the limits of the certitude that we can expect within a particular sphere:

Aristotle says, “A well-educated man will expect exactness in every class of subject, according as the nature of the thing admits; for it is much the same mistake to put up with a mathematician using probabilities and to require demonstration of an orator. Each man judges skilfully in those things about which he is well-informed; it is of these that he is a good judge, viz., he in each subject-matter, is a judge, who is well-educated in that subject-matter, and he is in an absolute sense a judge, who is in all of them well-educated.” Again, “Young men come to be mathematicians and the like, but they cannot possess practical judgment; for this talent is employed upon individual facts, and these are learned only by experience; and a youth has not experience, for experience is only gained by a course of years. And so, again, it would appear that a boy may be a mathematician, but not a philosopher, or learned in physics, and for this reason – because the one study deals with abstractions, while the other studies gain their principles from experience, and in the latter subjects do not give assent, but make assertions, but in the former they know what it is that they are handling.”

The text that Newman quotes here is from Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I, ch. 3. Before considering the application that Newman draws for the question about whether revelation can be said to give us real knowledge, let us first consider the meaning of Aristotle’s text.

In this passage Aristotle is insisting that we should not expect more certitude than the subject-matter can deliver, but we are entitled to expect certain levels of rigor in some fields. It would be an error, he says, to allow mathematicians to rest their case on probabilities; from professional mathematicians one expects tight patterns of reasoning that lay out all the possibilities and then exclude all but the correct line of thinking. From an orator, however, one should not expect that kind of argument. An orator will use appropriate generalizations, appeals to emotion, and the like. A well-educated person will look for precision in a given class of things insofar as the subject-matter admits of such precision. In a field where the best one can hope for is a convergence of probabilities, that will be taken as good grounds for giving that type of assent.

Using examples like these, Aristotle describes the sort of criteria that well-educated people can use for judging what they hear. One can be a good judge in a particular field when one is well-informed in that field. To be a good judge in general, one would need to have received a well-rounded education, and often one will need considerable experience.

In the second part of the text that Newman quotes, Aristotle offers some

---

examples. A young person can be a good judge in mathematics, for instance, for it is not experience of the world that matters as much as knowing various rules and then applying those rules to a highly restricted set of objects. In other fields, Aristotle argues, one needs more experience of the world. The example mentioned in the quoted passage is about physics, where one needs to have experiential knowledge of how things operate in the material world. By these examples Aristotle is leading the reader of the *Nicomachean Ethics* to make appropriate judgments about questions of morality.

This passage from Aristotle is a classic source-text for what the tradition has come to call the three degrees of certitude. To use the standard terminology, there are three types of certitude: metaphysical certitude, physical certitude, and moral certitude. The point of distinguishing these three levels of certitude from one another is to avoid expecting more certitude than the subject-matter can deliver. As we noted earlier, one of the main purposes of Newman in writing this book is to combat the false expectation that only scientific reasoning counts as genuine knowledge.

The level of metaphysical certitude is rare. This term refers to those situations in which one can exhaustively enumerate all the possibilities (for example: X, Y, and Z) and then exclude all but one of them. If the possible answers to a question are X, Y, and Z, and if I can exclude X and Y, then the answer must be Z. To have metaphysical certitude, one must have identified all the logical options and then ruled out all but one, so that there are no other logical alternatives remaining, and this can be difficult to establish.

Gaining physical certitude is not quite so rare. To attain this level of certitude requires us to understand something’s nature and typical operations. It is a level of certitude that we can expect when we understand something sufficiently according to its kind. Note the use here of a degree word – namely, *sufficiently*. In this context, this term means “to an adequate extent.” For example, we can say that water always or for the most part freezes if the temperature goes below zero degrees Celsius (below 32 degrees Fahrenheit).

Why would we say “for the most part”? We are right to assent to this general claim, but we need to make certain qualifications, for there could, for instance, be impurities in a given water sample that might change the temperature at which it will freeze. What we are assuming when we assent to the generalization are certain conditions about the purity of the sample, not to mention factors such as normal air pressure, the type and volume of the container, being at or near sea-level, and so on, for changes in the circumstances can bring about slight changes in the temperature when freezing begins. Much the same could be said when judging claims about the way certain types of animals hunt and the way certain types of trees bear fruit. The level called physical certitude allows us to say that
The Importance of Newman’s Canonization

something will take place “always or for the most part,” and it depends on knowledge of what Aristotle calls the things’s “nature” (in Greek, *physis*).

Finally, there is “moral certitude.” This term refers to the level of certainty that we can attain when we are making judgments about human conduct. Statement in this regard do not come simply from what we manage to discover about human nature (as in physical certitude) but from whatever we can discover about an individual’s character, about the circumstances, and so on.

That there is some genuine certitude possible in this domain (but certitude to a lesser degree than in the previous two levels) is the result of an additional factor that needs to be taken into account. It is not just a question of “impurities in the sample” or “altitude” or the “nature” of a thing. There is also the question of an individual’s exercise of the power of free choice to be considered, not to mention the difficulties of our ever knowing the internal state of mind of other people. And yet, even given these factors, we can still attain some sort of certainty. To offer just one example, this is the brand of certitude that is expected in a court of law when the judge instructs the jurors in a criminal case that they may only vote “guilty” only if they find themselves certain of an individual’s culpability “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Newman has chosen to quote the very passage from Aristotle that has been a classic source-text for distinguishing various types and levels of certitude. It seems to me that this distinction is well worth our reflection for many questions in life, and so I have tried to examine it at least briefly above. Let me offer one further point from the philosophical tradition in which Newman was operating before I turn to his use of this material on the question about knowledge and revealed religion.

Much of Newman’s book relies on a view of knowledge that has a long and respectable place in the history of thought, namely, the notion of knowledge as “justified true belief.” This is a notion that Plato articulated in his dialogue *Theaetetus*. Understanding this definition is crucial for appreciating Newman’s view. According to this definition, anything that we can claim as genuine knowledge involves, first of all, a kind of belief – that is, giving our assent or affirmation (making an assertion that something is the case). Otherwise all we have is opinion rather than making a claim to have knowledge.

We have already noted above Newman’s focus on assent. Secondly, for whatever it is that we believe to be true and give our assent, what we believe actually has to be the case in reality, or else we do not have knowledge. No matter how much we want to believe that a given claim is true, that claim cannot be judged to be a genuine case of knowledge unless what we assert really is the case. And yet even these two conditions (that we believe X to be the case and that X is the case) are not enough, for we could just be guessing and we might have just
gotten lucky! The third condition is that we have a justification, a reason, a warrant, a suitable ground for believing X to be the case.

It is this third dimension that is the precise area of Newman’s special concern throughout this book. Now, in the entire history of thought, only four types of justification have ever been identified: (1) evidence that is present to the senses (presuming, of course, that our sense-powers are healthy); (2) analysis of the meaning of a proposition, for instance, by showing that all that the wording of a given proposition involves is really an assertion that A is A (for example, that a bachelor is an unmarried man, or that the whole is equal to the sum of its parts); (3) a demonstration (whether deductive or inductive) in the ways that are appropriate to a given discipline (for instance, by showing that Y is the cause of X); (4) the testimony of a credible witness – that is, that one who is telling us something is one whom we have reason to trust and one who has access to (1), (2), or (3).

It is this fourth source of certitude that most of us use most of the time, whether we are claiming knowledge of an historical sort, claiming knowledge about a physical process that we have not ourselves investigated (such as having a science teacher explain to us that what we see as a “sunrise” is not really the sun moving upward but a change in the way the sun appears to us that is really the result of the revolution of the earth on its axis), or claiming knowledge about what our friends report to us in casual conversation about their activities the day before.

To begin a section of his book on knowledge through revelation, Newman uses this understanding of the four possible justifications for any knowledge claim that we might make as well as the distinction among the degrees of certitude that we can reasonably expect in different fields. He writes the following:

These words of a heathen philosopher, laying down broad principles about all knowledge, express a general rule, which in Scripture is applied authoritatively to the case of revealed knowledge in particular – and that not once or twice only, but continually, as is notorious. For instance, “I have understood,” says the Psalmist, “more than all my teachers, because Thy testimonies are my meditation.” And so our Lord: “He that hath ears, let him hear,” “If any man will do His will, He shall know the doctrine.” “He that is of God, heareth the words of God.” Thus too the Angels at the Nativity announce “Peace to men of good will.” And we read in the Acts of the Apostles of “Lydia, whose heart the Lord opened to attend to those things which were said by Paul.” And we are told on another occasion, that “as many as were ordained” (or disposed by God) “to life everlasting, believed.” And St. John tells us, “He that knoweth God, heareth us; he that is not of God, heareth us not; by this we know the spirit of truth, and the spirit of error.”

I find this to be a remarkable passage. Each of the scriptural quotations in this

---

1 Essay, p. 277.
paragraph is an instance of the fourth kind of justification: the testimony of a credible witness, whether it be the reference to God’s own testimony in the quotation from Psalm 119:99, or to the words of Jesus (Mt 11:15, Mk 4:9), or to various scripture passages about the words of the angels or one of the apostles.

The remainder of the chapter takes up various questions about what Newman calls “the evidences for Christianity” as well as a review of various authors from his day who advance arguments for or against the truth of the scriptures. Without pursuing the details of his apologetics here, we can simply note that he feels free to undertake that work by virtue of having defended the legitimacy of knowledge that comes from the testimony of reliable witnesses.

Deeply versed in the scriptures as Newman was, it is interesting to reflect on how rooted this approach is in the writing of a figure like St. Paul. Realizing that the truth of all the rest of the faith depends in great measure on whether Jesus really did rise from the dead, Paul devotes chapter 15 of 1 Corinthians not only to listing the witnesses to the resurrection (15:3-11) but to the construction of an argument for their credibility (15:12-19). If those who claimed to have seen Christ risen from the death knew that they were not telling the truth, there should have been something that they could have expected to gain by their lie. But men who do not receive any temporal gain (money, power, pleasure, or the like) and only suffering (imprisonment, shipwreck, suffering, death) have no good reason to lie when making claims about what they saw. For Paul, “if Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile and you are still in your sins.... If for this life only we have hoped in Christ, we are of all men most to be pitied” (15: 17-19).

In this Pauline spirit Newman provides his defense for the credibility of revealed religion. His deft use of certain philosophical insights from Aristotle provide the context for assessing the credibility of the witnesses and for describing the kind of certitude that one can reasonably claim. It is yet one of the many aspects of the thought of a man who is to be canonized in October of this year. In the spirit of our Fellowship, we do well to mine this corpus of writings for insight and inspiration.
Priests, Prophets, and Kings: 
Ecclesiology in Newman and Tolkien

John Ryle Kezel

ABSTRACT: This piece probes the significant, although unacknowledged, influence that St. John Henry Newman’s life and writings had on John Ronald Reuel Tolkien, most notably on his great epic, *The Lord of the Rings*. The lecture suggests that Tolkien used his personal knowledge of Cardinal Newman, drawn from his early experiences as a ward of Newman’s friend Fr. Francis Xavier Morgan, to create a “Mythology for England” that he would identify as “a fundamentally religious and Catholic work.” Like Newman, Tolkien believed that fellowship can provide its members with truths needed to understand their present conditions and ultimately to overcome the almost insurmountable obstacles that confront them while carrying out their vocation to follow Christ as priest, prophet, and king.

I CANNOT EXPRESS ADEQUATELY how pleased I am to be a part of this celebration of St. John Henry Newman’s canonization on 13 October 2019. I am especially pleased to be honoring Newman here at Fordham. Many of you are probably familiar with Newman’s statement about his conversion: “Catholics did not make us Catholics; Oxford made us Catholics.”1 Well, I can proclaim with equal boldness and pride: Fordham made me a Newmanist!

Of course, as a born Catholic and the grandson of an Episcopalian convert to the Church, I had always heard of Newman and respected his memory. I learned various facts about him while a student of the Sisters of Mercy at St. John’s Grammar School in Stamford, Connecticut, and even more from the Jesuits at Fairfield Prep and Fairfield University. Indeed, I can remember a very snowy day back in the 1960s when my class had been given “jug” for some misdemeanor and we all had to stand at attention, balancing our notepads in our left hand while we wrote over and over again Newman’s classic “Definition of a Gentleman” until Fr. Alfred Morris, S.J., was sure that it had produced its effect on us.

But it was only when I came to Fordham’s Graduate School and took a year-long course on Victorian literature that – like so many of us – I fell in love with Newman: the man, the priest, the thinker, and the saint. I owe this blossoming devotion to all things Newman to my professor, the late Vincent Ferrer Blehl of

* John Ryle Kezel is director of the Campion Institute at Fordham University.

1 Letter to E. E. Estcourt, 2 June 1860.
the Society of Jesus. Vinnie, a well-known Newman scholar and one of the editors of Newman’s letters, brought Newman alive to his students so that we felt we were reading the words of a contemporary friend rather than the works of a master of English prose. None of us was surprised when Fr. Blehl became chairman of the Historical Committee set up to examine Newman’s life, virtues, and reputation for sanctity. This committee completed its findings in 1986 when Fr. Blehl became Postulator of the Cause for the Canonization of John Henry Newman. It was Fordham’s own Vinnie Blehl who drew up the case for Newman’s holiness that was unanimously approved by the Committee of the Congregation for the Causes of Saints, so that Pope John Paul II declared, in January 1991, that Newman was a fit candidate for canonization. Thus, I am very proud to stand here today as one of Fr. Vincent Ferrer Blehl’s students and friends.

Paraphrasing St. Paul (Phil 2:16), I think I am justified in saying that Cardinal Newman – in imitation of the κένωσις or the self-emptying of the humble Christ – did not think of sanctity as a ἄρπαγμον, something to be grasped at. Like St. Philip Neri, the founder of the Oratory, Newman did not want people considering him a saint. To one correspondent, he wrote: “I have no tendency to be a saint – it is a sad thing to say so.” Newman went on to contend that “Saints are not literary men; they do not love the classics, they do not write Tales.”1 It is almost as if Newman believed that as the author of two novels – albeit religious ones – he could not be a saint. Well, I for one am glad that Pope John Paul II, Pope Benedict XVI, and Pope Francis did not agree with this view of religious writers. Consequently, I have decided today to speak about Newman’s influence on another Catholic writer, John Ronald Reuel Tolkien, one of the most popular authors in modern English literature.

I have to confess that I was somewhat late in coming to Tolkien. The first time I heard about Tolkien was in my junior year of college. Waiting for a Greek class on Euripides to begin, one of my friends began talking about the cult surrounding The Lord of the Rings. I determined then and there that I would never become a Frodo Freak or a Gandalf Ghouley. Once again, Fordham changed my mind. Two of my Anglo-Saxon mentors – Dr. Charles Donahue and Fr. Edwin Cuffe – both told me of their admiration for this Oxford scholar. So I relented and have never looked back.

When I first read Tolkien, what most impressed me was the manner in which Tolkien used his knowledge of Anglo-Saxon and Old Norse culture and literature to mold his own mythology for England – for example, the way that he uses the dragon episode in *Beowulf* as a major source in *The Hobbit* or the way he borrows the names of some of his dwarfs – or, as Tolkien would prefer, dwarves – from Old Norse literature. Gradually I began to become more interested in the religious themes that flow through Tolkien’s work, especially *The Lord of the Rings*. Eventually, as I became familiar with Tolkien’s biography, I began to appreciate the importance of Cardinal Newman as a major source for his writings – despite the fact that Tolkien never openly acknowledges him.

To begin to understand this influence, we need to review some important facts in Tolkien’s life. In 1892, two years after Newman’s death, Tolkien was born to British parents in Bloemfontein, South Africa, where he was baptized John Ronald Reuel in the Anglican Cathedral. When he was three, Tolkien’s parents decided to return to Great Britain. His mother Mabel sailed to England with Tolkien and his younger brother Hilary. Unfortunately, her husband Arthur contracted rheumatic fever and died before he could leave South Africa. Because of her lack of money, Mabel moved into a small house in Sarehole, a rural suburb of Birmingham. Unable to afford schooling, Mabel taught her two sons at home by giving them lessons in Latin, French, German, art, and music. Unfortunately, her conversion to Catholicism in 1900 alienated both her own family and her husband’s. She further enraged them by bringing up her sons in the Catholic faith.

In order that John could attend his father’s alma mater, King Edward’s School, Mabel moved into Birmingham itself, where she attended church at Cardinal Newman’s Oratory. On 14 November 1904, Mabel died of diabetes. Fearing that their relatives would not allow John and Hilary to remain Catholic, she had appointed in her will the Oratorian Fr. Francis Xavier Morgan as their guardian. Fr. Morgan used his own money to raise the two boys, whom he housed close to the Oratory. Each morning, the two brothers served Fr. Morgan’s Mass before eating breakfast in the Oratorian refectory. Tolkien described himself as “virtually a junior inmate of the Oratory house.”¹ It was Fr. Morgan, a friend of Newman’s, who must have first introduced them to the life and writings of the great cardinal. Tolkien followed the example of Newman and went to Oxford where eventually he became Professor of Anglo-Saxon. A married man with children, Tolkien remained a devout Catholic all his life and revered his mother, whom he truly considered a martyr for her Catholic faith. Tolkien lived to see his trilogy become a cult classic. He died on 2 September 1973.

Just from this short biography, one can see important similarities. Both

---

¹ Letters, §306: to Michael Tolkien.
Newman and Tolkien were English converts to Catholicism who became important figures at Oxford University and are today remembered as great men of letters. Here I would like to illustrate my suggestion that Cardinal Newman was a principal source for Tolkien’s trilogy. It is certainly true that both men have interested their readers by investigating the world of spiritual realities that supports the world as we know it. In his well-known autobiography, the *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, Newman reveals that his interest in the reality of a spiritual world began in his early childhood with the reading of the bible as well as with fantasy literature such as *The Arabian Nights*, whose magical tales he wished were true. Likewise, the young Tolkien delighted in *Alice in Wonderland* and the imaginative fairytales of George MacDonald. As they grew up, both men saw this early interest in spiritual worlds as a blessing, for it brought home to them an important truth. Newman writes, “We are then in a world of spirits, as well as in a world of sense, and we hold communion with it, and take part in it, though we are not conscious of doing so.”

In *The Lord of the Rings*, when the men of Rohan learn that hobbits really do exist, one of them asks, “Do we walk in legends or on the green earth in the daylight?” Aragorn replies that we can live in both worlds and, furthermore, we should not take such things as the “green earth” for granted because it too “is a mighty matter of legend,” though we “tread it under the light of day!” Over and over again in their writings both Newman and Tolkien remind us of this truth. Moreover, they make it clear that we should reach out in fellowship to the inhabitants of other worlds, be they saints, angels, elves, or hobbits.

In the sermon entitled “The Invisible World,” Newman states that we should not consider the spiritual world strange or remote because we encounter and communicate daily with a “third world” – the world of animals. It is clear that these creatures have passions, habits, and even a certain accountability. But what do we really know about them? (I think it is evident that Newman knew some cats!) While it may seem strange for Newman to bring up our fellowship with the animal kingdom, it would seem that such fellowship is part of the spirituality of the Oratorians.

St. Philip Neri, who founded the Oratory in the sixteenth century at around the same time that St. Ignatius founded the Jesuits, was fond of keeping animals in the religious house. Animals seemed to reciprocate his affection. Once, his friend St. Charles Borromeo brought his dog Capriccio with him on a visit to St. Philip. Capriccio refused to go home and from then on paid no attention to anyone but Philip. This lovable saint was not always so successful in his dealings with so-called pets. He had a favorite cat that refused to move with St. Philip when he

---

1 *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, Sermon 13, “The Invisible World.”
changed residences in Rome, the cat preferring to stay in its old haunts. Philip, however, never stopped caring for this rather ungrateful feline. Every evening, he would send some of his young followers back to his old home to feed Kitty and report back on its health and appetite. Just because you no longer live together does not mean that the duties of fellowship have ended.

Newman followed his founder’s example by befriending an old pony that had been given to him by a friend. Newman established a home for this pony named Charlie at the Oratorians’ country villa in Rednal. Newman delighted in recounting the antics of his pet and fourteen years later cared for Charlie when he was dying. He buried him under two sycamore trees that he hoped would be a living monument to his “virtuous” pony.¹ No doubt, Fr. Morgan used to point out this spot to Tolkien and his brother, who often used to visit Rednal.

I do not think I am wrong in seeing allusions to Charlie in Sam’s beloved old pony Bill or in Gandalf’s relationship with Shadowfax, the king of Rohan’s own horse, who like St. Philip’s Capriccio left his owner and would attend only to Gandalf. The wizard returns this affection. When they are in the city of Gondor, he sends off Pippin to see how well Shadowfax has been housed—shades of St. Philip’s cat!

Fellowship in both Newman and Tolkien extends to the world itself. In a sermon entitled “God’s Will the End of Life” from Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations, Newman tells his audience to look at the modern industrialized city if they want to see how out of joint we are with the Creator. What do we find? Overly crowded streets, the constant din of traffic, factories, slums, and overhead “a canopy of smoke” shrouding “God’s day from the realms of obstinate sullen toil.” How similar is this description to those of Tolkien when he describes the dehumanizing destruction of nature in Moria, Mordor, Isengard, and eventually even in the Shire. As the Hobbit Sam puts it, there’s devilry at work!

I think it is important to point out that neither Tolkien nor Newman is attacking modern scientific developments or the increasing globalization of society or even democratic principles. What they are attacking is a society that worships mindless progress and industrialization: namely, economic growth that excludes those human qualities that make a society more than just a collection of individuals, each pursuing his or her own end. What both Newman and Tolkien hold up as the ideal is a society that operates for the fulfillment of each of its members, who together form a community in fellowship with all of creation and in fellowship with God—in other words, a society based on the principles of Christian Humanism.

¹ Ward 2:313.
If we want to explore further what Tolkien was attempting to do with this theme of Christian fellowship and the role of Newman’s influence, we have to return to Tolkien’s biography. Anyone who has studied his life knows that Tolkien was the sort of man that Dr. Samuel Johnson called “clubbable.” He enjoyed intelligent, like-minded men whose company and conversation mutually inspire each other to live up to their ideals and accomplish great things. One immediately thinks of the Inklings, that Oxford group of friends that included Tolkien, C.S. Lewis, and Charles Williams. Long before the Inklings, the youthful Tolkien belonged to a group known as the TCBS – initials that stand for Tea Club, Barrovian Society. This club, composed of students from King Edward’s School, the exclusive public school that Tolkien attended, used to meet in the Tea Room of Barrows Store in Birmingham. Eventually the club centered on four major members, each of whom brought a specialization: Christopher Wiseman, an expert on music and natural sciences; R. Q. Gilson, called Rob, a lover of Renaissance painting and the eighteenth century; Geoffrey Bache Smith, known as GBS, knowledgeable about English literature, especially poetry; and finally Tolkien, called John Ronald, versed in Germanic languages and philology. Tolkien was the only Catholic in the group, but all four young men hoped to contribute to a moral and cultural renewal in England – as G. B. Smith put it, “to drive from life, letters, the stage and society that dabbling in and hankering after the unpleasant sides and incidents in life and nature which have captured the larger and worse tastes in Oxford, London and the world..., to reestablish sanity, cleanliness, and the love of real and true beauty in everybody’s breast.”¹ After they graduated, Wiseman and Gilson went off to Cambridge while Tolkien and Smith went to Oxford. Nevertheless, the four friends kept in contact and ultimately set up an important meeting of the TCBS at Wiseman’s London home on 12 and 13 December 1914. During this weekend, they spoke about their future artistic goals. This meeting, afterward known as the Council of London, was very significant for Tolkien, who claimed that he found there “a voice for all kinds of pent up things and a tremendous opening up of everything for me.”² At the Council of London, Tolkien determined that his future involved poetry and the writing of an epic.

What is important to keep in mind here is how early in Tolkien’s life appeared his motive and his desire to write an epic, a mythology for England, especially when we recall that the first volume of *The Lord of the Rings, The Fellowship of the Ring*, was not published until August 1954, forty years after the four members of the TCBS met for the Council of London. In 1951, Tolkien wrote to Milton Waldman, a Catholic member of the Collins publishing firm, about his

---

¹ Carpenter, 46-47.
² Letters, §5: to G. B. Smith.
long-standing desire to write a myth for England:

I was from early days grieved by the poverty of my own beloved country: it had no stories of its own (bound up with its tongue and soil), not of the quality that I sought, and found...in legends of other lands..., nothing English, save impoverished chap-book stuff.... Once upon a time...I had a mind to make a body of more or less connected legend, ranging from the large and cosmogonic, to the level of romantic fairy-story... which I could dedicate simply: to England; to my country. It should possess the tone and quality that I desire, somewhat cool and clear, be redolent of our “air” (the clime and soil of the North West, meaning Britain and the hither parts of Europe)... It should be “high,” purged of the gross, and fit for the more adult mind of a land long now steeped in poetry.¹

It is interesting to note that Tolkien told the American scholar Clyde S. Kilby, who was helping him put together *The Silmarillion*, the background mythology of *The Lord of the Rings*, that he had even considered dedicating this final work to Queen Elizabeth II, so seriously did he consider the importance of what he was doing.²

In actuality, Tolkien began to write his mythology on 24 September 1914, with a poem entitled “The Voyage of Earendel the Evening Star” that begins with the following lines:

Earendel sprang up from the Ocean’s cup  
In the Gloom of the mid-world’s rim;  
From the door of Night as a ray of light  
Leapt over the twilight brim,  
And launching his bark like a silver spark  
From the golden-fading sand  
Down the sunlit breath of Day’s fiery death  
He sped from Westerland.³

Tolkien seems to have received inspiration for his landscape descriptions from a walking holiday that he had taken the previous month with Fr. Vincent Reade, a priest of Newman’s Birmingham Oratory. For two weeks Tolkien and Fr. Reade explored the Lizard Peninsula in Cornwall where “the sun beats down...and a huge Atlantic swell smashes and spouts over the snags and reefs” in a “weird” and “eerie” country setting.⁴

There may be an even more significant connection to Newman in this first attempt at myth-making. Tolkien was inspired to write “The Voyage of Earendel”

---

¹ Letters §131: to Milton Waldman.
² Kilby in his *Tolkien & the Silmarillion*, 43.
³ Carpenter, 71.
⁴ Ibid., 70-71.
when he was reading the Anglo-Saxon poem “Crist, the Christ,” by the eighth-century poet Cynewulf, and came upon the following two lines: *Eala Earendel engla beorhtast / Ofer middangeard monnum sended.*¹ I would translate them as “Lo the dayspring, brightest of angels, / sent to men over middle earth.” Tolkien was struck by the beauty of the word for “dayspring”—*Earendel*—and used it as the personal name of the star Venus. Now, what this has got to do with Saint John Henry? The section of Cynewulf’s “Crist” that these lines come from is a poetic meditation on the famous “O Antiphons” of Advent, the seven antiphons for the Magnificat sung from the 17th of December until the 23rd. The lines Tolkien loved no doubt go with the antiphon for the 21st: *O Oriens, Splendor lucis aeternae, et sol iustitae: Veni et illumina sedentes in tenebris et umbra mortis* (O Dayspring, splendor of the eternal light and sun of justice: Come and shine on those sitting in darkness and the shadow of death). Cardinal Newman was very fond of the seven O Antiphons and, in his *Meditations and Devotions* he suggested using them when making “A Short Visit to the Blessed Sacrament before Meditation.” I cannot but wonder whether Tolkien himself, fond of visiting the Blessed Sacrament, was accustomed to reciting this particular antiphon, the one that Newman ascribed to Thursday. It certainly reminds one of the imagery not only of Newman’s “Lead, Kindly Light” but also of Tolkien’s *The Lord of the Rings*, whose major theme is mankind fighting against the powers of darkness. What I can say for certain is that Tolkien had encountered Cynewulf’s language, of which he wrote: “I felt a curious thrill as if something has stirred in me, half wakened from sleep. There was something very remote and strange and beautiful behind those words, if I could grasp it, far beyond ancient English.”² Sometime in the autumn or early winter of 1914, Tolkien showed his completed poem on “The Voyage of Earendel” to G.B. Smith of the TCBS and admits to Smith that he does not yet know what the poem is really about but promises that he will “try to find out.”³ I wonder if Tolkien realized that his quest for this knowledge would consume the rest of his life.

Just at the time that Tolkien and his three friends were dedicating their lives to reforming the corrupt state of arts and attitudes in England, they are confronted with the reality of World War I. When Tolkien and Fr. Reade were exploring Cornwall, Britain declared war on Germany. Christopher Wiseman joined the navy, while Rob Gilson, G. B. Smith, and Tolkien joined the army and were sent to France. On 1 July 1916, the first day of the Battle of the Somme, Rob Gilson was killed. G. B. Smith wrote to Tolkien: “Now one realizes in despair what the

---

¹ Ibid., 64.
² Ibid., 64.
³ Ibid., 75.
TCBS really was. O my dear John Ronald, whatever are we going to do?” In his reply to Smith, Tolkien referred to the hopes of the four friends that the TCBS would be

A great instrument in God’s hands – a mover, a doer, even an achiever of great things, a beginner at the very least of large things.... What I meant ...was that the TCBS had been granted some spark of fire – certainly as a body if not singly – that was destined to kindle a new light, or what is the same thing, rekindle an old light in the world; that the TCBS was destined to testify for God and Truth in a more direct way even than by laying down its several lives in this war.¹

Tolkien went back to fighting in the trenches, where he was most impressed not by his fellow officers but by the ordinary British soldiers who remained loyal and decent – despite what Tolkien called the “animal horror” of trench warfare. In late October 1916 Tolkien himself came down with trench fever, an illness carried by lice. In November he was sent back to England to recover. The following month, G. B. Smith was killed by a shell blast. Shortly before, he wrote to Tolkien:

My chief consolation is that if I am scuppered tonight...there will still be left a member of the great TCBS to voice what I dreamed and what we all agreed upon.... May God bless you, my dear John Ronald, and may you say the things have tried to say long after I am not there to say them.²

By the war’s end, only Tolkien and Christopher Wiseman remained alive. Wiseman wrote to his friend, “You ought to start the epic.”³ But for the most part, Wiseman did not play a significant role in Tolkien’s literary career. Ironically, his sister Margaret did. She became a Catholic and a Benedictine nun, Mother Mary St. John, at Oulton Abbey, from where she encouraged him with her prayers.

For me, Newman’s influence on Tolkien involves far more than isolated images and concepts. I believe that Tolkien centers his entire work on fundamental ideas found in Newman’s writing. On one level, I view The Lord of the Rings as a Bildungsroman, a novel that deals with the education of its principal characters. The more I read Tolkien the more I see Gandalf as a sort of fictionalized Newman. When Newman was at Oxford fighting to make the Church of England more Catholic and less Protestant, he was criticized as being a dangerous influence on the student body – leading them astray with the fireworks of his ideas, luring them to the “hocus pocus” of Catholicism more like a magician than a minister. Gandalf the wizard fits in nicely with this caricature of Newman.

¹ Letters §5: to G. B. Smith.
² Carpenter, 86.
³ Ibid., 90.
When Gandalf first appears after coming back from the dead, he is wearing a “wide-brimmed hat”! Could this possibly be an allusion to the wide-brimmed red hat Newman receives as a cardinal and that vindicates his years of being under a cloud? Gandalf even looks like the mature Newman who often complained that the anxieties and frustrations he had endured left his face so lined that he looked sad even when he was happy. Note what the hobbit Pippin says about Gandalf’s appearance: “Pippin glanced in some wonder at the face now close beside his own, for the sound of that laugh had been gay and merry. Yet in the wizard’s face he saw at first only lines of care and sorrow; though as he looked more intently he perceived that under all there was a great joy: a fountain of mirth enough to set a kingdom laughing, were it to gush forth.”

For those who cannot see Newman as a fountain of mirth, they should recall visitors to this “great man of letters” who found him “full of fun.” They should also recall that his grandnephew P.G. Wodehouse is one of the greatest humorists in English – the acorn does not fall far from the tree. As a young man, Newman was once forced to take on a paying student to make ninety pounds in the summer. He was a particularly obnoxious student; Newman called him “a little wretch.” When he had finally completed this dreadful task, he wrote to his sister Harriet that he was at last free: “Liber sum, and I have been humming, whistling, and laughing out loud to myself all day. I can hardly keep from jumping about.”

If we can view Gandalf as a Newman-type figure, then we can also see the four hobbits (Frodo, Sam, Merry, and Pippin) as his students. These natives of the Shire are just the sort of students Newman liked. Throughout The Lord of the Rings we are repeatedly reminded that they are courteous to a fault and peace-loving. Never has a hobbit within the Shire killed another hobbit. That is one of the reasons Frodo and Sam are horrified to think that the violent, inhospitable Gollum is actually a hobbit (though not of the Shire, thank goodness!). Frodo, Sam, Merry, and Pippin are naturally disposed to become the sort of gentlemen that Newman considered the hallmark of a university education. Newman’s classic definition of a gentleman can be summed up as “one who never inflicts pain.”

I always think of Merry and Pippin as true representatives of the Oxbridge tradition – what with their drawling slang and their fondness for pipes. By the end of the work, they have matured into proper young aristocrats who have literally grown in stature. Sam and Frodo, on the other hand, have become the noblest of gentlemen. The Jesuit poet Gerard Manley Hopkins (received into the Catholic Church by Cardinal Newman) once commented that the true gentleman was the one who most resembled Christ, who did not lord it over others but emptied himself of his divinity and in humble obedience to the Father died for us on a cross. Who can read about the experiences Frodo and Sam undergo in “the land of Shadow” without thinking about the Stations of the Cross?
In his “university” Gandalf follows Newman’s suggestions about teaching and learning, all of which center on fellowship, a loving relationship between faculty and their pupils as well as a warm collegiality among the students themselves. Gandalf also follows Newman in preferring a tutorial system over mere lecturing. Gandalf is quite capable of giving good lectures, as we see at the Council of Elrond in Rivendell (itself a fantasy version of Oxford with its towers, bells, gardens, rivers, and study halls). Nevertheless, Gandalf seems far more at home when he can sit back in a comfy chair, light his pipe, and engage in friendly banter with his pupil on those things that really matter. Like a good tutor, Gandalf knows when to withdraw and let pupils learn on their own. He also seems to be a great believer in study abroad and bringing in an occasional guest lecturer: the Lady Galadriel for ethics, Aragorn for political science, and the ancient Fangorn for world history. At other times, he leaves his pupils to themselves, for as Newman pointed out, the students in their conversations and debates are often their own best teachers. In all of his pedagogical techniques, Gandalf’s aim remains that of Newman: the promotion of “intellectual culture,” which Newman’s *The Idea of a University* defines as educating “the intellect to reason well in all matters, to reach out towards truth, and to grasp it”: the ability to see things as they are.

When Newman became a cardinal, he took as his motto *cor ad cor loquitur* (heart speaks to heart). As we have seen, this could also be Gandalf’s motto as he lovingly prepares the hobbits to confront the evil of their day: the excessive, cold rationalism of Saruman and the lust of Sauron for power. In much the same way, Newman too was preparing his followers to oppose the skepticism and alienating force of a nineteenth-century liberalism that would deny the truth of revelation and unsettle the minds of believers. Thus we have both Gandalf and Newman urging on their followers, encouraging them to stand united against a foe that can ultimately be identified only as the enemy of mankind. As Gandalf explains to the Steward of Gondor: “But I will say this: the rule of no realm is mine, neither of Gondor nor any other, great or small. But all worthy things that are in peril as the world now stands, those are my care. And for my part, I shall not wholly fail of my task, though Gondor perish, if anything passes through this night that can still grow fair or bear fruit and flower in days to come. For I also am a steward.”

In confronting such evils – surely a great cause of gloom and doom – both Newman and Gandalf teach their followers to remain cheerful, not allowing themselves to be overwhelmed by the immensity of these problems. In *The Lord of the Rings*, Gandalf and his fellows view their obstacles in the light of the Anglo-Saxon genre of “riddles.” It is significant that, in Newman’s time and afterward, the priests at the Birmingham Oratory would, after dinner, extemporaneously discuss a problem or complex situation that was identified as
a *dubium* (“riddle”). Gandalf’s use of riddles in his school allows his students to view their problems almost as games that unite the participants in joyful fellowship as they focus their energies on winning.

It is also significant that in their educational programs both Newman and Gandalf believe that learning traditional literature that has withstood the test of time remains the best preparation for dealing with present problems: whereas Newman proposes the classical literature of Greece and Rome, Gandalf uses the tales and songs that have been treasured throughout the ages. Through applying the matter of these tales and songs to their present condition, each of the members of the fellowship sees that they are more than nursery rhymes or old wives’ tales. Ultimately, the whole fellowship comes to see that this literary heritage provides them with those truths needed to understand their present conditions and to overcome the almost insurmountable obstacles that confront them.

Viewing *The Lord of the Rings* as a work that celebrates Newman’s educational ideals will help us to appreciate what Tolkien was doing in this long labor of love. He clearly stated that the work was “hobbito-centric” – that the four hobbits of the Shire were, for Tolkien, the most important protagonists in the novel. I don’t think that I am wrong if I see in these four loyal, high-minded, courageous friends a fictionalized portrait of the four idealistic friends of the TCBS. Merry, Pippin, Sam, and Frodo actually accomplish what Tolkien had told G.B. Smith was their destiny: “to kindle a new light, or what is the same thing, rekindle an old light in the world.”

On 25 December 1840, John Henry Newman delivered a sermon at the height of the Oxford Movement when he was discovering the truth of Catholicism. He entitled this sermon “The Three Offices of Christ”\(^1\) and discussed the “three chief views which are vouchsafed to us of His Mediatorial office. . . . Christ was Prophet, Priest, and King.” Newman explains these three offices or views:

> Christ exercised His prophetical office in teaching, and in foretelling the future; – in His sermon on the Mount, in His parables, in His prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem. He performed the priest’s service when He died on the Cross, as a sacrifice; and when He consecrated the bread and the cup to be a feast upon that sacrifice; and now that He intercedes for us at the right hand of God. And He showed Himself as a conqueror, and a king, in rising from the dead, in ascending into heaven, in sending down the Spirit of grace, in converting the nations, and in forming His Church to receive and to rule them.

As Newman demonstrates, Christ came into the world “to make a new world . . ., to regenerate it in himself, to make a new beginning, to be the beginning of the creation of God, to gather together in one, and recapitulate all things in Himself.”

---

\(^1\) *Sermons on the Subjects of the Day*, §5.
Newman further maintains that when Christ ascended to the Father, he left his Church to carry out his three offices: not just by the hierarchy and the ministerial priesthood but by all Christians who, by virtue of their baptism, are called upon to actualize these three Christological offices in living out their own lives. As Newman concludes:

This is the glory of the Church, to speak, to do, and to suffer, with that grace which Christ brought and diffused abroad. And it has run down even to the skirts of her clothing. Not the few and the conspicuous alone, but all her Children, high and low, who walk worthy of her and her Divine Lord, will be shadows of Him. All of us are bound, according to our opportunities – first to learn the truth; and moreover, we must not only know, but we must impart our knowledge. Nor only so, but next we must bear witness to the truth. We must not be afraid of the frowns or anger of the world, or mind its ridicule. If so be, we must be willing to suffer for the truth. This was the new thing that Christ brought into the world, a heavenly doctrine, a system of holy and supernatural truths, which are to be received and transmitted, for He is our Prophet, maintained even unto suffering after His pattern, who is our Priest, and obeyed, for He is our king.

I think we have come to the heart of what Tolkien meant when he wrote that “The Lord of the Rings is of course a fundamentally religious and Catholic work.” In Tolkien’s newly minted “Mythology for England,” he has created a brilliant image of the living Church at work in the world: Gandolf the Prophet, Aragorn the King, and Frodo the Priest who mediates the redemption of Middle Earth. Ultimately, the lesson that the four hobbits have learned is the lesson of the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church.

Thank you, and St. John Henry Newman, pray for us!
Give the Prince of Peace a Chance:
Woodstock Waged Culture War
While Proclaiming Secular Peace

Tom Nash*

ABSTRACT: Those who proclaimed “Make Love, Not War” regarding the Vietnam conflict, were ironically themselves engaged in domestic subversion – a culture war – by flouting sexual moral absolutes regarding marriage and family. While Woodstock didn’t ignite the sexual revolution, its moral detritus is emblematic of the disordered movement, which includes the marital turpitude of iconic rock star John Lennon, who couldn’t make Woodstock. What once was marginal behavior in society has since become normalized, including contraception, abortion, unwed births, cohabitation before marriage, divorce (and related fallout for affected children), and even the redefinition of marriage. Yet, the timeless truth of Jesus Christ and his Catholic Church provides perennial hope for true liberation, as Nash further notes in assessing the comparative fruits of two societal mega-gatherings for young adults – Woodstock and its successors versus the Church’s World Youth Day.

It was billed as “three days of peace and music,”¹ but when you are promoting “sex, drugs and rock ’n’ roll,”² and more than 400,000 young adults show up,³ you are bound to foster domestic warfare, even if you are at the same time decrying armed conflict overseas.

This is not about opposing protests against the Vietnam War, which was raging in August 1969 when Woodstock took place on Max Yasgur’s dairy farm in rural upstate New York. How the U.S. conducted that lengthy campaign was not fair to the soldiers sent to fight, nor was our pullout in April 1975 fair to the South Vietnamese who had supported us, including Venerable Francis Xavier

---

² “Yasgur’s farm for sale...for $8 million,” Associated Press, August 8, 2007; accessible at http://www.today.com/id/20183704/ns/today-today_entertainment/t/yasgurs-farm-sale-million#.XWU71-hKjIW.
³ Ibid.

---

* Tom Nash is a contributing apologist and speaker for Catholic Answers (www.catholic.com). An earlier version of this piece appeared in Catholic Answers Magazine Online. Reprinted with permission.
Nguyen Văn Thuan, who endured the crucible of being named the coadjutor Archbishop of Saigon less than a week before the U.S. exit by airlift. Nor is this about failing to appreciate the talented musicians who performed at the gathering.

Rather, this is about noting the irony of fomenting cultural subversion within one’s own country – in the name of personal and communal liberation – while condemning conventional warfare abroad, and all the while saying you are committed to promoting peace. Societal subversion is inevitable when you attempt to separate sex from its proper place within marriage and family. That is, when you disregard the plan for personal and social freedom that Jesus Christ, the Prince of Peace (Is 9:6-7), provides (Jn 8:31-32, 14:6) and instead seek a secular counterfeit, you will inexorably undermine the traditional family, the fundamental building block of any civilization. As historian James Perone writes,

Woodstock was the scene of open nudity... This free approach to nudity and sex of the 1969 festival was seen by those who supported the free hippie lifestyle of the Woodstock generation as beautiful and by those who did not support that particular lifestyle as symbolic of a breakdown of decency and morals in American society.

“Make Love, Not War”? So, which side was right? Woodstock certainly did not light the fuse of the sexual revolution and related cultural pathologies, but it was certainly emblematic of their disordered spirit. Man’s endeavors cannot conceive – let alone achieve – the self-denial and self-donation that is integral to the agapic love to which Christ calls his disciples, and then empowers them to live in advancing a genuine civilization of love (Mt 16:24-27).

“Make Love, Not War” may sound catchy and true until you are rudely reminded that sex invariably has consequences, and not good ones apart from matrimony. To the extent that sex is viewed as the consummation and renewal of the lifelong marriage covenant between a man and a woman, data shows that

---

3 James E. Perone, “Nudity,” in Woodstock: An Encyclopedia of the Music and Art Fair (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2005), 142; accessible https://books.google.com/books?id=M-yEPUnB7GsC&pg=PA142&lpg=PA142&dq=woodstock+1969++nudity&source=bl&ots=5YISW0c6Xt&sign=ACfU3U3AfRzzfgpKqKvrvj--FF2Dw_OJ0w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi6w6Ii_11XkAhUD7qKWHPcHAgQ6AEwCXoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q=woodstock%201969%20nudity&f=false.
individuals, couples, families, neighborhoods, cities, and societies flourish. In addition, the possibility of procreation is a natural affirmation of the religious conviction that two people who are conjugally intimate should be married (see Gn 2:23-24).

On the other hand, prospective and existing families as well as neighborhoods, cities, and societies are progressively undermined with each and every act of fornication or adultery, given the uncommitted and thus self-centered nature of these encounters. Self-centered here entails deliberately flouting God’s plan or foolishly attempting to remake Christ in our own image (Gn 1:26-27) instead of conforming ourselves to his plan with childlike trust (Mt 18:1-4).

An iconic example is John Lennon, who could not make Woodstock but released his antiwar anthem “Give Peace a Chance”\(^1\) a month earlier, and performed it a month after Woodstock at a music festival in Toronto. The previous year, however, Lennon had left his wife Cynthia and son Julian, causing havoc for both, as a reviewer of her memoir *John* reports:

“I’d buried a lot of it, because it was too painful, so to rake over all that was incredibly hard,” she says. She describes returning home from a holiday to find John and Yoko sitting cross-legged, facing each other, Yoko wearing Cynthia’s bathrobe. “The scene is implanted on my mind forever,” she says. “John had such indifference in his eyes. I held no fascination for him any more.”

Cynthia also depicts John as a hypocrite, spreading the message of peace and love while being dismissive and downright cruel to Julian [and Julian affirms the same].\(^2\) Once, on one of his son’s infrequent visits to see him in New York, John shouted at a giggling Julian that he never wanted to hear that “horrible laugh” again. It took years before Julian would allow himself to laugh, Cynthia says.\(^3\)

Lennon was raised an Anglican, but like the legions of Woodstock participants, he saw the life of Christ as restrictive, not liberating (Jn 8:31-32). And so his contempt for anything associated with moral absolutes (“Bishops and Fishops and Rabbis and Popeyes”\(^4\)) came through in “Give Peace a Chance” and was solidified in his 1971 utopian paean “Imagine,” which longed for a world without heaven,


hell and thus “no religion, too.”¹

_By Their Fruits You Shall Know Them_
Mere months after Woodstock, emancipation from agapic love gained formal legal support, as no-fault divorce made its national debut in California in January 1970. A great increase in divorce followed,² aided and abetted by other factors, including the concurrent sexual revolution and the rise of radical feminism.³ As American sociologist Brad Wilcox observes,

While less than 20% of couples who married in 1950 ended up divorced, about 50% of couples who married in 1970 did. And approximately half of the children born to married parents in the 1970s saw their parents part, compared to only about 11% of those born in the 1950s.⁴

Since 1980, Wilcox adds,

The worst consequences of the social revolution of the 1960s and ‘70s are now felt disproportionately by the poor and less educated, while the wealthy elites who set off these transformations in the first place have managed to reclaim somewhat healthier and more stable habits of married life.⁵

Those consequences include cohabitation, which by 1977 had become enough of a social trend to warrant a _Newsweek_ cover story,⁶ illustrating the increasing anxiety among the liberated yet commitment-phobic lovebirds. Several decades later, cohabitation has increased _900 percent_,⁷ and University of North Carolina researchers report that “70 percent of women aged 30 to 34 have cohabited with a male partner, and two-thirds of new marriages take place between couples who have already lived together for an average of 31 months,” even though, “on

---

⁴ Wilcox, “The Evolution of Divorce.”
⁵ Ibid.
average, researchers found that couples who cohabited before marriage had a 33 percent higher chance of divorcing than couples who moved in together after the wedding ceremony.”¹

Contrary to the anthem from the British rock band “The Who,” who did perform at Woodstock, the kids are not all right. Wilcox reports that “children who are exposed to divorce are two to three times more likely than their peers in intact marriages to suffer from serious social or psychological pathologies.”² Meanwhile, the unwed birth rate in America has risen from about 5 percent for the general population in 1963³ to more than 40 percent in recent years.⁴ And when a society willfully rejects the idea that openness to life is intrinsically bound up with the expression of conjugal love, we should not be surprised⁵ when marriage itself eventually gets redefined on purely subjective grounds.⁶

For those with eyes to see, the social chaos of which Woodstock was a harbinger was already evident in the event itself. A month after Woodstock, the clean-up was still going on,⁷ and concert organizers had to compensate Yasgur for extensive damage done to his farm.⁸ There were also 742 drug overdoses⁹ reported. In 1999, a thirtieth anniversary celebration of Woodstock was fraught

¹ Ibid.
² Wilcox, “The Evolution of Divorce.”
with problems, including sexual harassment\(^1\) and a number\(^2\) of sexual assaults,\(^3\) and the fiftieth was mercifully called off a few weeks before the big event.\(^4\)

Twenty-four years after the original Woodstock, Pope John Paul II drew 750,000 young adults to Denver’s World Youth Day without incident.\(^5\) In stark contrast with Woodstock, the massive World Youth Day festival even had a leavening effect\(^6\) on a major city that had been plagued by violence that summer. World Youth Day gatherings continue to be an edifying success across the globe,\(^7\) with the next one scheduled in 2022 for Lisbon in Portugal.\(^8\) By their fruits shall you know them.

---


\(^2\) Daniel Kreps, “19 Worst Things About Woodstock ‘99: From the horrific to the just plain lame, the most terrible things about one of modern concert-going’s biggest debacles,” *Rolling Stone* (July 31, 2014); as cited at https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/19-worst-things-about-woodstock-99-176052/.


\(^4\) Kory Grow, “Woodstock 50 Is Officially Canceled: Weeks before it was supposed to begin, Woodstock cofounder Michael Lang has decided to pull the plug after failing to get a free event off the ground in Maryland,” *Rolling Stone* (July 31, 2019); as cited at https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/woodstock-50-canceled-2-834313/.


What the Icons of the Transfiguration and Our Lady of Guadalupe Tell Us about How to Evangelize the Culture and the World

David Clayton*

ABSTRACT: The author offers a personal reflection on two famous images. He considers what lessons can be learned from them about how to approach evangelization and the unique role that art plays within that effort.

The Transfiguration

The icon of the Transfiguration (image 1) is by the contemporary British icon painter Aidan Hart. It shows Christ on the mountain, flanked by the two prophets, and three disciples who are visibly stunned by the sight of the transfigured Christ.

This scene is often presented as an anticipation of Christ’s heavenly glory, hitherto unseen by the disciples and only to be fully realized after the passion. Theologically, it is connected to the season of Epiphany (also known as Theophany). The early manifestations of God’s glory that are commemorated in the season of Epiphany – the baptism in the Jordan, the wedding feast at Cana, and the adoration of the magi – direct us to the moment of the Transfiguration as a sign of their fulfillment.

This painting bears all the stylistic elements that characterize the iconographic style. These include the lack of cast shadows, the flatness of the image arising from the gold backdrop, and the lack of single-point perspective. The description of form in the image is by line with tonal variation used as a supporting player. This feature is in contrast with more naturalistic styles such as the Baroque, which use predominantly tonal variation to describe form.

In the icon of the Transfiguration, the nimbus that surrounds Christ is called

* David Clayton is an internationally known artist, teacher, author, composer, and broadcaster. He is provost and a founding faculty member of a new institution, Pontifex University (www.Pontifex.University).
a mandorla, for its shape can resemble an almond (in Italian, *mandorla*). The mandorla surrounding Christ usually shows concentric bands of shading that become steadily darker as we move from the outer ring toward the center. This shading is deliberate. The intention is to communicate to us, pictorially, a theological truth: we must pass through stages of increasing mystery in order to encounter the person of Jesus Christ. This encounter, which takes place preeminently in the Mass with the Eucharist at its heart, is one that transforms us supernaturally so that by degrees, we can grasp the glory of Christ more directly and profoundly.

This liturgical encounter is made possible by baptism, confirmation, and communion so that we “put on Christ,” as St. Paul explains in Galatians. God’s actions are not restricted by the sacraments, of course, but as a general rule, until we become Catholic, we are likely to be dazzled into blindness by the transfigured Christ. So, for the unbaptized, the mandorla that represents this vision will look like a jet-black envelope with a heart of darkness – a spiritual black hole.

Those of us who participate in the sacramental life of the Church are postbaptismal Christians who can encounter Christ as the revealed Light at the center of the mandorla. The hidden “heart of darkness” is suggested visually in this icon. He we see Christ surrounded by darts of darkness (not light) that come from a point obscured by the figure of the Savior.

While the unbaptized who are not yet fully part of the body of Christ are not yet able to perceive him as they will once they are baptized, they can perceive his effects in those outer rings of the mandorla. In this context, these lighter layers represent the light of Christ reflected in the cosmos, that is, God’s creation, and in Christian culture.

Beauty is a perceptible sign of something we cannot see, Almighty God. It calls us to itself and then beyond, to him who inspired it, who is beauty itself. Creation is beautiful because it bears the mark of the Creator. The culture (or any aspect of it) can speak of this too if God has inspired the work of the artisan. Even everyday Christian activity is beautiful – graceful – if it is inspired by God, and it will draw people to God.

We need all the aspects of the reflected light of Christ to be present if many people are to connect what they see with its invisible source. The cosmos points to the culture, which points to Christians, whose lives direct us to Christ. This is why the rejuvenation of Catholic culture and the focus of holiness within the Church are so necessary as first steps to evangelization.

The Christian life well lived is one in which every discernible aspect of our lives contributes to the brightness of the outer rings of the mandorla through inspired contributions to the culture and our actions as good stewards of creation. Each of us as a member of the Church is also a pixel of supernatural light in the
Mystical Body of Christ, his Church, whom this figure of the Transfigured Christ also represents. So we too contribute to the brightness of the this image of the transfigured Christ.

The most powerful formation that will enable us to be contributors to a beautiful Catholic culture that bears this cosmic beauty is the central activity of the Church, the worship of God, for this is the place where we can most profoundly encounter and relate personally to Christ who transforms us. This icon, therefore, tells us the story of how we can draw people to Christ in our day-to-day activities as Christians.

Our Lady of Guadalupe

The story of the appearance of Our Lady of Guadalupe is remarkable in so many ways. According to tradition, Mary appeared to Juan Diego, who was an Aztec convert to Christianity, on December 9, 1531, and again on December 12 of that year. She requested that a shrine to her be built on the spot where she appeared, in what is now a suburb of Mexico City. The bishop, however, demanded a sign before he would approve construction of a church. Mary appeared a second time to Juan Diego and ordered him to collect roses. In a second audience with the bishop, Juan Diego opened his cloak, letting dozens of roses fall to the floor and revealing the image of Mary imprinted on the inside of the cloak—the image that is now venerated in the Basilica of Guadalupe (images 2 and 3). As a revealed image, it is a rare Western example of a small category of sacred art called in Greek acheiropoieta (not made by human hands). There are many such images in the Eastern Christian tradition, such as the painting of the face of Christ called the Mandylion.

The apparition caused millions to convert, and a large part of that was the result of the persuasive influence of this image. It spoke both to the Aztecs and to the occupying Spaniards. It has done to so since then and continues to draw devotion today from Christians from all over the world.

How does this image connect with so many people of such diverse cultures and times? Let me offer some personal thoughts in response to that question. The artist who created it included some details clearly derived from Aztec culture and some from traditional Christian culture, including some features not normally associated with the Spanish Christian culture of that time. It is the integration of these diverse aspects in a way that is authentically Christian that gives it such power.

For example, Our Lady’s hairstyle, with its central parting, was in sixteenth-century Aztec culture the sign of a maiden, a virgin. The ribbon and bow around her waist signified that she was pregnant. So when an Aztec looked at this image, he saw a young woman who was simultaneously a virgin and pregnant.
Furthermore, the quatrefoil roses articulated in sepia lines on the pale brown-ochre shawl signify royalty in the local culture.

But this image also has elements that come from traditional Christian culture. These are universal in that they speak to all. It is these that spoke to sixteenth-century Spaniards and have spoken to many from all over the world since. We can see, for example, the blue shawl. Blue is a common color for Mary’s outer robe. It is said to denote royalty, and Marian chapels often have their walls painted in this color. The eight-pointed stars represent her connection with the “eighth day” of Creation: her Son, Jesus Christ, who rose on the eighth day of the week. We see not only stars but the moon, too. This is consistent with scripture in that it shows Our Lady as the woman of the Apocalypse, with the upturned crescent moon.

Another feature that interests me greatly is the nimbus of light around her. The account of the woman in the Apocalypse describes her as being “clothed in the sun.” The golden nimbus around her whole person might correspond to this. There is, however, something else going on here that relates to the symbolism of the mandorla.

A mandorla is an iconographic symbol that is generally reserved for Christ alone, and I suggest that its presence here is to indicate the presence of Christ within her womb. It is not there so much for the God-bearer, but for God himself! This is the Christian way of indicating the Our Lady is with child, the divine child, in a way that complements the visual symbolism of pregnancy from Aztec culture. Remember that if this image had not spoken to the Spanish occupiers, too, none would have taken Juan Diego seriously.

Also, take a close look at the gold envelope that surrounds her. This is not, as one might first suspect, a series of bright gold darts emanating from Our Lady. Rather, it is a series of dark darts emanating from her on a gold background, the outer limits of which describe the smooth mandorla shape. In other words, this mandorla is getting darker the closer it is to her, just as the mandorla around Christ does in the Transfiguration.

These features show a subtlety that is in accord with the Christian tradition of iconography but would not necessarily known by Spanish artists of the day, who would have been more familiar with Renaissance or late Gothic art. In fact, if you look at copies of the image, both contemporary and modern, virtually every one of them gets this detail wrong and inverts the direction of the lines. For example, in image 4 we have one painted around 1700 in which we can clearly see darts of light.

In addition, we should consider the style of the image. Although it would never be mistaken for a Greek or Russian icon, it is very much in accordance with the iconographic prototype. One should not be surprised that this is the case. In accordance with the iconographic tradition, there is no strongly cast shadow. The
image is defined by line predominantly rather than tone.

What does this tell us about the artist of the image of Our Lady of Guadalupe? Even those who are skeptical of tradition and do not believe that this is a divinely revealed image would have to admit that this image has been created by an extraordinary mortal artist. He was someone who was simultaneously aware of scripture and Christian artistic tradition going back to the early Christian period. I suggest that someone of this profile would have been hard to find in Mexico in 1530!

If, on the other hand, we accept tradition (and I do), then what we have here is a revealed image. As such it is a rare Western example of the category of sacred art called *acheiropoietai* in Eastern Christianity. Once we accept this premise, then it is not difficult to imagine that a divine artist could draw in any range of influences that would suit his purposes.

This consideration tells us something very important about Christian tradition in art. The remarkable degree of conformity to these canons tells how authentic and true that tradition is. Historically, the iconographic tradition was developed by faithful Christians in the first centuries of the Church in order to communicate by visual means the truths of the *eschaton*. We must then admit that they were divinely inspired in their work, for their artistry is so strongly in conformity with the images that belong to the category of the *acheiropoietai*.

**Conclusion**

Meditation on the icon of the Transfiguration can teach us much about how to direct our own evangelization, while the icon of Our Lady of Guadalupe represents an example of the incarnation of those principles in a work of art to great effect. In both cases, I suggest, we see the value of sacred art and the essential role that it plays in the transmission of the Faith to believers and nonbelievers alike.

Whether we accept tradition and take the image of Our Lady of Guadalupe to be from the hand of God or believe it to be the work of a human artist of remarkable insight and inspiration, it is difficult (given the impact it has had on so many people) to deny that we have a wonderfully conceived and executed picture that participates in holy beauty. Furthermore, its participation in the forms typical of the Christian tradition of sacred art, as exemplified by the icon of the Transfiguration, reinforces the authentic nature of those traditional forms and their power to evangelize. It also provides us with a model of how to harmonize features that speak to a particular place and to a particular time with universal principles so that the image will sit within the mainstream of Christian culture as well as the local culture without compromising its Christian message.
The Splendor of Hope in Days of Evil: Imagined Sanctity and the Subsistence of Catholic Literature in the Third Reich

Helena M. Tomko

ABSTRACT: This paper offers an invitation to re-engage with the Catholic “inner exile” in Germany during the Third Reich. It is also a case study in how sanctity has so often inspired the Catholic imagination in times that have sought to obscure the beauty of holiness and our capacity to apprehend it. The posthumous journals of philosopher and Newman translator Theodor Haecker offer an eye-witness account of how the dehumanizing evils of National Socialism manipulated his compatriots’ apprehension of truth, goodness, and beauty. In Beauty (1936), Haecker pushes up against the Nazi system of censorship by challenging his contemporary German readers to seek out the “beauty of holiness” as a guard against the destructive “beauty of evil.” In his short story “Before the Horror” (1943), writer Reinhold Schneider joins Haecker in proposing that if we are to imitate the saints in life, we must preserve our capacity to recognize their sanctity and imagine it in art.

It is a strange fact in the history of the novel that the Second World War – that most evil of wars – provided inspiration for some of the best-loved Catholic fictions. Graham Greene’s The End of the Affair and Muriel Spark’s The Girls of Splendid Means are both postwar retrospectives set in the bombed-out streets of London. Greene would write that reality had never seemed more real than when air-raid sirens screeched deep into the city night.⁠¹ J. R. R. Tolkien wrote his Lord of the Rings trilogy between 1937 and 1949. The Anglican C. S. Lewis’s Narnia stories have as their mis-en-scène the evacuation of children from the London Blitz to a mysterious haven of hospitality in the English countryside.

⁠¹ Helena Tomko is associate professor of literature in the Department of Humanities at Villanova University.

¹ “That, I think, is why one feels at home in London – or in Liverpool or Bristol, or any of the bombed cities – because life there is what it ought to be. If a cracked cup is put in boiling water it breaks, and an old dog-toothed civilization is breaking now,” Graham Greene, “At Home” (1940), in Collected Essays (New York: Viking, 1969), 450.
Evelyn Waugh won beautiful, even funny, literary victories from the mundanities of his own military service. *Brideshead Revisited*, the jewel in the crown of Catholic novels, first appeared in 1945. Waugh would spend ten years writing his *Sword of Honor* trilogy, wringing dark humor from his memories of Europe’s darkest hour. Who can forget the comic absurdity of Apthorpe’s thunderbox from *Men at Arms* (1952)? And who is not moved by the heart-wrenching beauty of “a small red flame...relit before the beaten-copper doors of a tabernacle” that enlivens a war-weary Charles Ryder when he revisits Brideshead. In a world where goodness, truth, and beauty seem to be missing in action, Waugh claims in the final lines of *Brideshead Revisited* his most sincere moment of prose – a fictional salute to the Real Presence, who supplies all our lacks and can bring home all who wander; a statement of hope that faithful hearts, even English hearts, can find their way back to Christ’s gentle splendor.

German Catholic literature has no claim to a comparable literary harvest from the Second World War. Is it not distasteful to look for cultural fruit that might have been nurtured in Nazi Germany? Thomas Mann, who was exiled for the duration of the Third Reich, famously articulated just this distaste in an open letter, published in September 1945: “It was not permitted, it was impossible, to make culture in Germany when all around one was happening what we now know happened. It would be to whitewash depravity, to bejewel criminality.” Mann was frustrated by claims that a cultural “inner emigration” had subsisted in the Third Reich – literature written and read against the grain of National Socialist ideology. Inner-emigration (or inner-exile) culture in the Third Reich has remained a controversial topic, often functioning as an echo chamber for postwar historians’ debates about whether it is credible to say that Germans found meaningful ways to subsist, not to conform, and even to resist in literature and art, just as in daily life.

My scholarship has drawn me into this world of the inner exile, where I study Catholic writers who remained in Germany after 1933 and did try to write against the regime, with differing degrees of intensity, deliberateness, and visibility. These writers understood their life in the Third Reich as a quotidian “encounter

---

2 Thomas Mann, quoted in J. F. G. Grosser, *Die große Kontroverse: Ein Briefwechsel um Deutschland* (Hamburg: Nagel, 1963), 31. All translations are my own, unless otherwise noted.
3 For a helpful overview of this historical question, see Jo Fox, “Resistance and the Third Reich,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 39, no. 2 (2004): 271-83. For an important example of scholarship on the inner exile and its received paradigms, see *Flight of Fantasy: New Perspectives on Inner Emigration in German Literature*, ed. Neil H. Donahue and Doris Kirchner (New York: Berghahn, 2005).
with evil.” But they also tried to keep the ship of faith and culture afloat, against the odds and despite inevitable limits on their ability to speak and write freely.¹ In some instances, inner exiles wrote texts that were intended to be read as anti-Nazi. In other cases, it is more accurate to describe their writing as non-Nazi, more focused on resilience than resistance.² This paper thus offers a case study in seeking goodness, truth, and beauty in “days of evil.”³ While it might seem inauspicious to begin with the statement that twentieth-century German Catholicism will offer us nothing to rival Brideshead Revisited, the paper encourages renewed interest in German Catholic inner-exile art and thought. Re-engagement with this literature promises to yield insights of interest to scholars of literature, history, and theology alike. Moreover, much can be learned from observing how Catholic minds have tried to respond in different historical periods to the Psalmist’s mournful question: “If the foundations are destroyed, what can the righteous do?”⁴ The paper’s argument is thus simple: Thomas Mann understandably found it repulsive to imagine how the Third Reich could provide a habitat for art and beauty. But the imagination has wellsprings that are in excess of historical contingency, whatever material or spiritual limits any historical moment can impose upon a thinker or artist. Once the foundations of civic life founder, Christians have so often been blessed to see anew foundations that run deeper than civic life, not least in their contemplation of the radiant, transhistorical testimony of saints and martyrs. In what follows, the writing of two important German inner exiles, the philosopher-polemicist Theodor Haecker and the poet-novelist Reinhold Schneider, will show this impulse at work. Haecker and Schneider arrive at the consensus that the perennial role of Christian art is to imagine sanctity. Even in the worst of times, the beauty of holiness remains – in art and life – the “splendor of hope.”⁵

Theodor Haecker on the Beauty of Evil

A good way to conceptualize the inner exile in Germany, and in particular the Catholic inner exile, is as a sometimes loose, sometimes tight nexus of writers (and readers) who convened either intellectually by way of publishing houses and shared beliefs, or personally in friendship and direct collaboration. The canon of Catholic literary inner exiles includes Schneider, Gertrud von le Fort, Elisabeth

² On this distinction, see John Klapper, Nonconformist Writing in Nazi Germany: The Literature of Inner Emigration (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2015), 39-54.
³ Psalm 49:5 (KJV).
⁴ Psalm 11:3 (RSVCE).
⁵ Spe salvi, 41.
Langgässer, Karl Muth, and Werner Bergengrün, among others. Extended into philosophy, theology, and apologetics, this bigger nexus contains more familiar names. Josef Pieper, Fr. Alfred Delp, S.J., Fr. Romano Guardini, and even St. Teresa Benedicta of the Cross wrote texts that deploy the rhetorical strategies of inner-exile discourse.¹ As the newest research on inner exile has detailed, these strategies allowed nonconformist arguments to surface “against the grain” and “between the lines” by means of literary indirection and camouflage, sufficiently nuanced to bypass Nazi censors but not the intended reader.²

An unforgettable yet often forgotten figure in this nexus was the Munich-based philosopher and polemicist Theodor Haecker, whose life and writings typify the inner exile in general and the Catholic inner exile in particular. Forgotten or not, his name is likely familiar to a Catholic reader from the footnotes of books by Pieper, Hans Urs von Balthasar, or Pope Emeritus Benedict. His importance as German translator and disseminator of both Søren Kierkegaard and St. John Henry Newman keeps his name alive for scholars of the great Dane and his British contemporary.³ Haecker is best known today for his posthumous Journal of the Day and Night, a collection of aphorisms and meditations written between 1939 and 1945 that tease out, with the frightening clarity of the insomniac, the biggest philosophical and religious questions of his life, in tandem with his daily diagnoses of the evils of National Socialism. Haecker is also well known as a mentor of the White Rose students, who distributed anti-Nazi leaflets around Munich and other universities. Members of this heroic group were subjected to show trial and summary execution in February 1943. Haecker was held in custody during the investigation into these supposed “crimes.” He probably owed his life to his daughter, who had the guts to hide his anti-Nazi journals in her music case when the Gestapo arrived to search their home.⁴

---


² On this literary challenge, see William Dodd, National Socialism and German Discourse: Unquiet Voices (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 155-86.


⁴ Paul Shrimpton’s recent book about the White Rose offers a good account in English of Haecker’s interactions with the White Rose students, including his influence on their fourth leaflet, which famously concluded, “We will not be silent. We are your bad conscience. The White Rose will not leave you in peace.” See Shrimpton, Conscience
It is easy to vest Haecker with a heroism that he may deserve but that would likely horrify him. His consistent anti-Nazism is indisputable, going back as far as 1923. His friend Dietrich von Hildebrand would reflect on how Haecker taught him to recognize the perpetual importance of Judaism within Christian culture. But Haecker also had a day job with an illustrated journal that, during the war, had to publish government propaganda. His inner-exile writings after 1933 allowed him to benefit at least materially from his nonconformist status in the Third Reich. And he often lamented his own inadequacy to the situation in which he found himself. A good example is his journal entry for September 8, 1940, the morning after the first night of the London Blitz. He describes a dream he had that night. He is sitting in a café, as he had often done with fellow Munich intellectuals. In the dream he is writing, pages scattered all around his café table, as if he were at home working under cover of night. His friends stare, expressionless, at his imprudence. An elegant man tries to grab Haecker’s manuscript. Flustered, Haecker directs the man to a bookseller he knows, even though he can see that the man is clutching a pistol and a dagger. These are the anxieties of inner exile: anxieties about carrying on as normal when life is all but normal; about being caught for having written or read something you should not have; about friends who might betray you; about the friends whom you might betray.

Haecker’s journals record not just anxieties but also prayers, such as this one from Advent 1940: “O Lord, my God, have mercy on me and on my thoughts! That they may never lose their clarity in your light” (137). The obscuration of

before Conformity: Hans and Sophie Scholl and the White Rose Resistance in Nazi Germany (Leominster: Gracewing, 2018), 165 and passim.


4 “No one knows better than I myself how completely powerless I am against Hitler at this moment. I know the flavor and taste of this powerlessness in all its negative greatness. And yet I don’t know it in complete fullness, or else I would be as near to the Almighty as the martyrs and saints. And so I am at odds with myself.” Theodor Haecker, December 1940, in Tag- und Nachtbücher (Innsbruck: Haymon, 1989), 136-37. Hereafter, citations for Haecker’s Tag- und Nachtbücher will appear in the text.
faith and reason remains a concern in all his writing after 1933, published and covert. “The darkest hour of faith,” he had written earlier that year, “When all human models and examples fail” (54). In other words, the worst of times are when a good man is not just hard to find, but hard even to imagine. What happens, he asked himself, when the soul’s capacity to apprehend the good, the true, and the beautiful becomes atrophied? Haecker published a series of books in the Third Reich that tried to answer this question, among others, by means of an ambitious theological anthropology that put his studies of Kierkegaard and Newman into dialogue with the *philosophia perennis*. Haecker would likely have written similar books had history taken a happier turn. But the series certainly gained its shape from the challenges of life under Hitler. A recurrent theme is how the powers of the human soul conduce to desiring, recognizing, and imagining what sanctity is – and what the consequences of the atrophy of these powers are for the human person and society. Having hastily written a charter for his project in early 1933 (entitled *What Is Man?*), he quickly began work on two trilogies: one a Catholic rehabilitation of Kierkegaard’s tripartition of the aesthetic, ethical, and religious, extended to the topics of tragedy, history, and art (respectively); and a second, incomplete trilogy on how the powers of the soul correspond, and respond, to the transcendent properties of being: the intellect’s capacity for truth, the will’s capacity for the good, and feeling’s capacity for beauty.

Haecker’s third inner-exile book, *Beauty*, first published in 1936 and reprinted in 1940, expresses with rhetorical urgency why the aesthetic is so decisive in determining whether we will be able to recognize and reject evil when we encounter it, and whether we will recognize and love what is holy. Perhaps because of the pleasures that beauty elicits, Haecker conjectures that beauty may be even more vulnerable to manipulation than truth and goodness. St. Thomas’s maxim that “beauty is that which pleases when seen” remains Haecker’s yardstick. His particular interest, however, is in how the pleasures, the feelings, provoked by seeing beautiful things move us in the heart in a way that is somehow antecedent to their becoming the object of our thinking and willing. Haecker’s tripartition of the soul’s powers into feeling, thinking, and willing presumes an inextricable trinity of participation and correspondence, under the sovereignty of the intellect (28-29). Does feeling come before or after thinking and willing?

---

1 The next entry in the journal for April 30, 1940, looks deeper into this crisis of individual and collective complicity: “The one says he’s guilty of everything. The other says he’s guilty of absolutely nothing. Both have it wrong, but the former is surely closer to the truth” (54).

“Both, both, both,” delights Haecker in response to his own question (37). He uses the example of the lily, whose beauty is simply a given. Beauty is proper to the lily and cannot be given to it by the perceiving, receiving human subject (28). And yet the way we perceive beauty activates our metaphysical capacity to feel our way into what Haecker calls an undifferentiated communion with the object, an encounter in which the beholder of the beautiful thing can risk a kind of inner collapse into the object of its perception (29). The mysterious underground of our aesthetic responses presumes the indivisibility of intellect, will, and feeling, so that, all things being equal, the beautiful is “a harmony between the essence of things as they are given” and the “felt basis” or the “basic feeling” that undergirds the human mind.¹ All things being equal, the beautiful thus does its share in helping the adequation, or conformity, of intellect and thing and directing of the will to the good (38).

Yet all things are rarely equal for fallen humanity. While Haecker exemplifies the saints and their heavenly queen as both true lovers of beauty and beautiful in their own holiness (56-57, 116-18, passim), he applies his argument more often than not to explain how the soul’s capacity to feel, think, and will can atrophy: “I also concede, of course, that an intellectually ugly age can take someone to the brink of no longer seeing the beauty of a flower, although I deny that any age can prevent a flower from being beautiful” (28). Haecker explains this mistaken apprehension of the beautiful as a kind of aesthetic confusion, something like Plato’s “divine madness,” that, even as it orients the lover of beauty to the good, also opens up a disconcerting margin of error (75). Beauty rightly calls the soul into what Haecker calls the Reich, the realm, of grace and the Reich of God (44-45). But Lucifer – the beautiful fallen angel of light – has the power to lure souls into another Reich of murky indifference, the Reich of Satan (88-89). If beauty rightly brings the soul into communion with the goodness and truth of all things, the beauty of evil (that he believes God permits Satan to retain) misleads the soul into what Haecker calls “an after-communion with the mysterium iniquitatis” (76). Haecker builds to an account of the three perverse

¹ Ideas akin to Haecker’s seem to echo in Pope Emeritus Benedict’s Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan to the Transfiguration, trans. Adrian J. Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2008), namely, in relation to the sixth beatitude in St. Matthew’s gospel, “Blessed are the pure in heart” (Mt 5:8): “The organ for seeing God is the heart. The intellect alone is not enough. In order for man to become capable of perceiving God, the energies of his existence have to work in harmony. His will must be pure and so too must the underlying affective dimension of his soul, which gives intelligence and will their direction. Speaking of the heart in this way means precisely that man’s perceptive powers play in concert, which also requires the proper interplay of body and soul, since this is essential for the totality of the creature we call ‘man.’ ... Love is the fire that purifies and unifies intellect, will, and emotion” (92-93, 95).
attributes of what he calls the illusory “beauty of evil,” the sinister converse of St. Thomas’s three attributes of beauty, namely, integrity, due proportion, and clarity or radiance. The devil’s perverse beauty is: (1) never whole but instead always something that excludes; (2) never duly proportional but instead always confusing and destructive of the order of things; and (3) never clear, luminous, or splendid but instead always opaque.

An attentive reader will most likely note that these philosophical speculations about an intellectually ugly age are heavily inflected with Haecker’s critique of Nazism. Under what circumstances might human beings forget the beauty of self-evident things like lilies – or human life? What would it look like in history for a nation to mistake the part for the whole, to get collectively lost in confusion, and be blinded by the opacity of, for example, a propagandized dictatorship? In this published text, the critique of National Socialism is camouflaged by carefully constructed rhetorical surges and gestures toward arguments that Haecker assumes will speak to his ideal reader but not to the censor. “Anyone,” he writes, “who has freely determined and is objectively compelled to hide and to conceal the eternal source and sea of beauty, creates, as artist, the uncanny and the magical, rendering the objectively impossible subjectively possible by the only means available to him: the lie” (84). His posthumous diaries, however, show no such caution in stating forthright his conviction that the regime’s manipulation of the aesthetic – via radio and other media, via marketinglike propaganda, and via the perverse instrumentalizing of loveable things to despicable ends – is the first, decisive move of diabolical indoctrination from which his compatriots must be liberated. His night journals name the Nazis explicitly as swindlers and magicians, possessed of an uncanny ability to perform metaphysical sleights of hand, to manipulate feeling as a means to hoodwink intellect and will. In February 1941, for example, he tries to fathom why so many fall for the “humbug” that the war effort is perfectly calculable and under control: “it does seem to be possible, at least for a period of time, to convince innumerable people, en masse, via the arts of black magic. One must break through this madness with seriousness and good cheer” (177). If Hitler and his henchmen are what Haecker believes them to be – artists of evil and the lie – it becomes all the more important confidently to “break through” the diabolical illusion. Haecker and his compatriots must at all costs relearn how to know true beauty when they see it.

Reinhold Schneider’s Fiction of Imagined Sanctity

Reinhold Schneider and Theodor Haecker moved in the same nexus of inner

---

exiles, publishing with the same publishers and likely read by a similar readership. Although they corresponded by letter, they first met only in 1943 in German-occupied Alsace.\(^1\) Thanks to Schneider, Haecker was able to publish two books with the Catholic Alsatia publishing house, where the maverick autonomist Joseph Rossé worked to produce books that could not otherwise be produced within German jurisdiction. Schneider’s oppositional stance in the Third Reich is well documented, including some connections to the group responsible for the July 20, 1944, attempt to assassinate Hitler.\(^2\) Unlike Haecker, who died of a diabetic coma in the final weeks of war, Schneider lived long enough to regret that his opposition had not been more courageous, especially with regard to Nazi antisemitism.\(^3\) Nonetheless, his 1938 novel *Las Casas before Charles V: Scenes from the Age of the Conquistadors* has long been recognized as one of the boldest works of inner exile. Schneider’s account of Bartolomé de las Casas’s sixteenth-century defense of indigenous peoples against mistreatment by Spanish colonists is a barely masked critique of the Nazi persecution of the Jews. Despite ensuing prohibitions on his writing, Schneider continued to circulate his works, including nonconformist sonnets that found their way to soldiers on the front and even to prisoners in concentration camps.\(^4\)

One particular story by Schneider, “Before the Horror: The Beggar of San Ignazio” (1943), serves to exemplify the Catholic inner exiles’ collective response to life in dark times, as well as to show the necessity for Christian art at all times to rise to the challenge of imagining sanctity. Reckoning with Hitler and his artists of deception, Haecker had written on March 15, 1941: “Where is the voice that rings true? Are any left? My ear hungers and thirsts for just one voice. They all sound wrong, or they fail at the decisive moment – just like my own.”\(^5\) Schneider’s 1943 collection of short stories, *The Dark Night*, seems to intuit a response to this lament in the form of seven stories, five of which have a canonized saint as their protagonist.\(^6\) Although the collection as a whole lends

---

2 Klapper, *Nonconformist Writing in Nazi Germany*, 244, 252-53.
3 “But what did I myself do? When I heard about the fires, lootings, and atrocities, I locked myself away in my study, too much of a coward to face up to what was happening and to say something.” Schneider, quoted in ibid., 252.
4 Ibid., 244.
6 The saints are Pope St. Leo IX, St. Thomas More, St. John of the Cross, St. Francis Xavier, and St. Benedict Labre. The other two stories are about the Jesuit priest and poet Friedrich von Spee and the daughter of the early seventeenth-century Spanish Tenebрист painter Jusepe de Ribera. Hereafter, citations from “Before the Horror” (“Vor dem Grauen”) will appear in the text.
itself to an inner-exile reading, its final story, “Before the Horror,” offers a particularly clear demonstration of the strategies of Catholic inner-exile writing and the kind of interpretation it warrants. The epigraph to the story gives away its subject matter with a quote from a woman who sees Benedict Labre at prayer: “How blessed you are! Who knows what it is that you can see?” Being able to see the saint who sees in prayer is the heart of this short story, which narrates the travels of a young French aristocrat in the 1780s. At the end of his grand tour, during which he has been falling in love with the art of northern Europe, he arrives in Rome and takes as his guide a French abbé who is described as living in Rome without an official post but looking on with excitement as Enlightenment thought takes hold of Europe. This restless, heterodox cleric guides the young man around Rome, offering ironic commentaries on the lives of the saints depicted in the churches they visit—commentaries that seem always to bite at Church history (105). The young and naïve traveler has been wandering Europe like a Rousseauian tabula rasa. He feels that Rome is somehow the source of all that he has found beautiful on his travels. Despite his cynical companion, his responses to the beauty he beholds remain simple. He delights at a little girl who runs into one church quickly to kiss, on tippy toes, the statue of a saint. In the crypt of San Sebastiano, he sees a beggar, kneeling and reading, as if in ecstasy. The abbé seems disgusted by the destitute man and mocks this display of the kind of superstition that he thinks stands in the way of enlightened progress (107, 108). But the young man cannot shake off what the narrator calls the “seen image” in San Sebastiano, an image of saintly stillness, spiritedness, and mysterious suffering that he retains before his “inner eye” (107, 108). The young man intuits that at the heart of all the art he loves must lie something sacred. This beggar seems to know how to behold it best.

Equipped with this new insight, the young man re-encounters the beggar, who, of course, is none other than his compatriot, Benedict Labre. This holy fool had also wandered Europe in his youth in search of a vocation, only to find it praying, homeless, and impoverished in the churches of Rome. Schneider puts imagined words into the mouth of the imagined saint, who, though renowned for his silence, holds forth for almost a third of the story. Within the narrative, his prophesies seem to refer to the imminent French revolution. “Nothing is more dreadful than what is happening in Paris,” he warns (114). Only a small sideward step of interpretation allows us to hear his monologue speaking directly to Germans about Nazi Germany. Labre seems to have had a mystical vision of the

1 Quotations are taken from a reprint of the 1947 edition of Die dunkle Nacht, which includes only three stories from the 1943 edition and adds “Der Abgrund,” which had previously appeared in Der Überwinder, published by Alsatia in 1941. See Schneider, Die dunkle Nacht (Freiburg: Schnell und Steiner, 1960), 105.
future, of “images, of such a monstrous, horrific kind, that [his] blood might freeze”; the images seem only ever to advance and never to recede (115). He feels called to run ahead of this vision of future horrors, running fast in prayer and reparation: “We have to do something! ... We cannot await judgment with empty hands” (116). He recalls how great saints have been roused to holiness, suffering, and courage at times when the foundations seem to fail (116). “Perhaps this age in which we live is worse than those that have gone before” (117), he says, not least because of misdirected souls that have squandered their capacity to see, who no longer know what to revere: “What can we do,” he says, “when no yearning is roused in our innermost heart to look up at to the holy image that we pass by, day after day and hour after hour?” This lament refers to the priest, who has grown numb to the Marian statues hidden in the niches of Rome’s mazelike streets. Labre’s lament also recalls Theodor Haecker’s worry in his inner-exile writings about that creeping Reich of indifference, a diabolical Reich where partial, opaque, and off-balance simulacra of beauty deceive by stifling the soul’s capacity to see what is really good, true, and beautiful.1

The beauty of holiness resplendent in the hiddenness of Benedict Labre’s life compels the young aristocrat to ask: “But what should I do?” Labre responds: “Go straight to the very center of things! You will save nothing. For it is the Lord who saves, not man. But you must know for what it is that you stand” (121). This is exactly how the story ends. Following a providential encounter with the radiant corpse of Labre, the young man surrenders all personal ambition and, emboldened with a clear sense of vocation, hurries into a stormy night, intent on returning home to France. Schneider leaves open what the young man runs toward on this wet night in April 1783. The guillotine? The monastic life? What is clear is that he runs in a graced act of self-gift, toward “the hidden.” Whether he is heading toward a life of contemplation or politics, what Schneider does make clear is that the mysterious life of prayer and reparation to which Labre has borne such vivid witness will, and must, undergird the young man’s future. The imagined saint speaking in the fiction has thus become a prophetic and trustworthy mouthpiece of hope and courage, shining forth in humble exemplarity.

As they lived out “days of evil” that still haunt us today, Haecker and Schneider arrived at the important, shared conclusion that Christian artists in all times are charged with keeping alive the human capacity to apprehend the beauty of holiness. In July 1941, Haecker had questioned whether he had the kind of clarity of spiritual vision on which Schneider’s story depends: “I have the feeling that I would recognize someone who has been filled by the spirit of God. But I must not boast about this, rather: I boast in the Lord. But how hard that is! Yes,

---

1 Haecker, Tag- und Nachtbücher, 180.
it is impossible without grace. And deceptions, the self-deceptions are so easy.”¹
In conceding the difficulty of imagining and knowing the saints, Haecker also articulates the highest, and possibly most urgent, challenge for the Christian artist. We will always be dazzled by the splendor of hope offered to us incarnate in Christ, immaculate in Mary, and blessed in the communion of saints. But what is lost when we balk at imagining lived holiness in the stories we tell one another? If we cannot imagine the saints, how can we hope to imitate them?

Theodor Haecker died just a few weeks before VE Day in 1945. Around the same time, Evelyn Waugh began work on a new novel: “The end of the war is hourly expected,” he wrote in his diary. “Mussolini obscenely murdered, continual rumours that Hitler’s mind has finally gone. Communism gains in France. Russia insults USA. I will now get to work on St Helena.”² As Europe began to rebuild from the rubble of war, Waugh sent his fictional saint to Jerusalem to dig for the true Cross. His fictional retelling of the life of St. Helena, her holiness imagined with equal measures of wit and sincerity, would be published in 1950 but would never enjoy the success of Brideshead Revisited. Yet Waugh regarded Helena, with its ingenious combination of humor, history, and hagiography, as his best novel. This, I propose, was a sound intuition about the full girth and promise of the Christian imagination, in good times and in bad.

¹ Ibid., 195-96.
Sacred and Secular Beauty: Comparing the Music of the Trecento to the Music of the Renaissance

Bridget Olver*

ABSTRACT: Although the songs and mass settings of the Italian Trecento and the Renaissance differ in many ways, they share a common aim: to highlight the text through the stylistic innovations of each period and to add to the value of the words through the beauty of the music. This essay compares examples of sacred and secular music of the Italian Trecento and Renaissance eras, noting similarities and differences in each style of composition and illustrating the ways the music enhances each of the texts.

THE TERM “MADRIGAL” and its several variations (matricale, madriale, maregal, and marigalis)¹ have been used to denote separate musical and poetic forms in both the Trecento and Renaissance periods. Many people are aware of Renaissance madrigals, Italian secular vocal works written in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. They are considered the most important compositional genre of the Renaissance period and directly influenced the invention of opera around the year 1600. Less well-known are the Italian Trecento madrigals, secular vocal works from the fourteenth century. Although they share the same name, Trecento and Renaissance madrigals are entirely different genres and sound nothing alike.²

Similarly, much of the sacred music written in each historical era draws upon the musical innovations of the time in which it is written, even though many of the liturgical texts used remain the same. Although the compositions of the Trecento

---

and of the Renaissance differ in many ways, they share a common aim: to highlight the text through the stylistic innovations of each period and to add to the value of the words through the beauty of the music.

In this essay I will compare a madrigal and a Gloria from the Italian Trecento period with a madrigal and a Gloria from the Italian Renaissance, and then give some background of the eras and musical traditions from which they originate. I will note the similarities and differences in each style of composition and illustrate the ways the music enhances each of the texts. In this way it will become clear how beauty is attained in the compositions of each era, in both sacred and secular music.

The term “Trecento” is short for milletrecento or 1300. It refers to Italian arts and culture in the fourteenth century. As it relates to music, Trecento describes the Italian musical era that runs from about 1300 to 1420. It is considered to be part of the late medieval era. Most of the surviving music from the Trecento period is found in manuscripts compiled during the following century. These manuscripts contain three types of secular polyphonic song; the caccia, which is a lively type of song in canon; the ballata, which is a song for dancing; and the madrigal.

The Trecento Madrigal

There is still some debate about the origins of the word “madrigal.” It first appears in 1313 in a work by Francesco da Barbarino in which he describes the madrigal as “coarse and irregular.” Some possibilities are that it stems from the Latin word matrix or Italian matricale, meaning “in the mother tongue,” or the Italian word madriale, “a rustic kind of pastoral poem.” The Trecento madrigal fits both categories. There are several different rhyme schemes used in early madrigals, and they are indeed written in the mother tongue, Italian. The poetic form and musical idiosyncrasies of the madrigal’s early stage (c. 1330–1350) seem to suggest that it grew out of an Italian oral tradition.

---

2 Ibid., xix.
3 Burkholder et al., 134-36.
5 Ibid., 456 n. 12.
6 Ibid., 449.
7 Ibid., 451. Marracco gives a table of the rhyme schemes in all the madrigals known at the time of his writing and comments: “We are apparently justified in concluding that amorphousness is a notable feature of the early madrigal.”
8 Sarah M. Carleton, Heraldry in the Trecento Madrigal (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 30.
Early madrigals consist of two to five tercets, which are 3-line stanzas, followed often but not always by a 2-line ritornello. A ritornello is not a refrain but a concluding section of the poem following the tercets, which summarizes or comments on the main text of the poem.\(^1\) The ritornello is often given a different tune and can also be written in a different meter from the rest of the madrigal,\(^2\) so that the music’s form is usually AAB, with A being each stanza of the madrigal and B the ritornello.\(^3\) Later Trecento madrigals (1350–1370) have a more solidified structure, somewhat standardized by Franco Sacchetti (1335/40–1400) and his contemporaries as the rhyme scheme ABB CDD EE.\(^4\)

Although typically each line of such a text alternates between seven and eleven syllables, this does not throw off the rhythm of the music, for elaborate melismas ornament the first and last accented syllables.\(^5\) A melisma is a series of notes sung on a single syllable. It adds beauty to the text by stretching out the syllable, both highlighting the importance of the word and adding intricacy to the music. A familiar example still sung today is the lengthy “Gloria” in the Christmas hymn “Angels We Have Heard on High.”

The majority of Trecento madrigals are for two voices, with a very few for three voices.\(^6\) The upper voice moves freely over the more static lower voice, which frequently holds a note during the upper voice’s melismas. The lower voice gives a sense of stability to the structure of the music, while the upper voice gives a sense of freedom and lightness by the quick declamation of so many notes. Both voices can contain pauses before and within the melismas, not only to help the singers find a place to breathe but to keep the voices coordinated.\(^7\) The melismas, especially in the earlier madrigals, are not very organized, either by pitch, sequence, or imitation. The need for realignment via pauses and the high level of difficulty that memorizing the melismas would have involved points again to the Trecento madrigal’s improvisatory origins.\(^8\)

It seems that the first madrigals were written in Italian universities (like Parisian motets\(^9\)) but were subsequently written for courtly entertainment.\(^10\)

---

\(^1\) Ibid., 27.
\(^2\) Ibid., 29.
\(^3\) Marracco, 454.
\(^5\) Marracco, 454.
\(^7\) Toliver, 168-69.
\(^8\) Ibid., 167.
Madrigals can be moralistic, satirical, erotic, idyllic, or even heraldic in subject. Although often set in a pastoral background (bearing out the “madriale” translation), the Trecento madrigal is not as rustic as it first appears. Even the more idyllic examples are thought to be allegorical, using animals to represent virtues or people, while others contain acrostics and anagrams spelling the name of the composer or his patron. Some madrigals can be grouped according to the women to whom they were dedicated. Three composers of the court of Mastino II della Scala all wrote madrigals with *senhals* dedicated to the same woman, Anna della Scala.

Senhals are combinations of words that “sound out a person’s name (usually that of the composer’s patron or the patron’s wife) at a significant point in a song’s text.” They began in the age of the troubadours, who used them as code names for the real-life subjects of a song. By the Trecento period composers were not so secretive about a madrigal’s dedication and the practice had evolved into semi-hiding the subject’s real name, often within another word or between two words. Some senhals cleverly used numbers to spell out the name. One such dedication reads (in translation from the Italian), “one hundred and one, one hundred and one, with fifty-one and A,” which, put into Roman numerals, spells CICILIA. Senhals are usually placed in the first line of the ritornello. Since the tune and the meter also may suddenly change at this point, attention is called first to the name of the person mentioned, and then to the textual summary contained in the ritornello. Many senhals are also not immediately obvious from the text without listening to the music.

An example of this is found in *A press’un fiume*, a madrigal by Giovanni da Cascia, one of the composers who dedicated compositions to Anna della Scala.

---

The name “Anna” is emphasized in the word Annamorar at the beginning of the ritornello; this is a play on the Italian word innamorar, which means to fall in love.¹

The Trecento Gloria

It has been thought that composition in the Trecento era was mainly secular in nature and that the composition of sacred music in Italy paused during this time.² The reason for this assumption was that the largest complete manuscripts of Trecento compositions, such as the Rossi and Squarcialupi Codexes, contain only secular pieces. Recent scholarship, however, has turned toward fragmentary sources, some of which may not actually be fragments but may have been considered complete at the time they were assembled.³ New connections between sources thought to be separate are also being discovered, gradually uncovering a more complete understanding of the music of the period.⁴ This approach has revealed a sizeable body of sacred music composed during the Trecento era that consists of motets, settings of the Mass Ordinary, and other works.⁵

Of the surviving music for the Mass Ordinary, polyphonic settings of the Gloria are the most plentiful, followed by those for the Credo. So far there are about sixty known settings of the Gloria from the Trecento period.⁶ These are stand-alone compositions, not usually paired with any other Mass parts, for putting Mass parts into pairs or groups was a later organizational technique.⁷ There are several styles of Trecento Gloria, ranging from simple polyphony, of which there are only a few examples, to more complex compositions for multiple voices.⁸ Polyphony occurs when two or more melodies are sung or played at the same time. Great care is taken by the composer that the melodies are complementary and do not devolve into cacophony.

Although chant was still used frequently at Mass and other liturgical celebrations, polyphonic settings of Mass parts such as the Gloria were sung at

---

¹ A press’un fiume can be found at https://youtu.be/aMaUOL4e14M.
⁵ Fischer, “The Sacred Polyphony of the Italian Trecento,” 143-44.
⁷ Burkholder et al., 183-84, and Cuthbert and Nyikos, “Style, Locality and the Trecento Gloria,” 186.
⁸ Cuthbert, Trecento Fragments and Polyphony Beyond the Codex, 336.
feast days and occasions of importance within the Church.\(^1\) Polyphony and its innovations, used in sacred works, were not without criticism. The concern of medieval liturgists was whether the new style would interfere with a clear delivery of the text.\(^2\) Of particular concern was a musical device used during the Trecento era and earlier in the medieval period that was known as hocket.

Hocket, which is spelled a little differently in modern French and means “hiccup” (hoquet), is the musical device of “alternating between parts, single notes, or groups of notes. This results in a continuous flow with one voice resting while the other voice sounds.”\(^3\) A modern version of hocket is the “Galileo” section of “Bohemian Rhapsody,” sung with the high voice and low voice alternating. Hocket was first invented in the thirteenth century and was widely used until the fifteenth century. In the thirteenth century musical notation was introduced that included a system of rests and an ability to write down how long a note was to be held; thus, notation of hocket was first made possible.\(^4\) Hocket passages can be untexted, employing vocalized notes or onomatopoeic sounds like hunting calls or animal noises,\(^5\) or texted. When used with text, composers often preferred to give a passage of hocket monosyllabic words in order not to break up the text into scattered syllables. Unbroken texting was considered the ideal, but in practice this was not always possible.\(^6\) This irritated Pope John XXII to the point that in 1324 he wrote a papal bull entitled *Docta sanctorm patrum* that condemned not only sacred polyphony in general but specifically “disciples of the new school...[who] dismember melodies with hockets.”\(^7\) However, hocket written with one word per note was used frequently by composers as an excellent way to highlight parts of the text or important sections of the music.\(^8\)

An example of hocket is found at the beginning of a Gloria by Johannes Ciconia (c. 1370–1412), a late Trecento era composer.\(^9\) Ciconia was Flemish but lived and worked most of his life in Rome and Padua.\(^10\)

---

1. Ibid., 332.
5. Ibid., 227-28.
6. Ibid., 236, 246.
9. The *Gloria* by Ciconia can be found at https://youtube/jqiQlU3CV9rM.
The Renaissance Madrigal

Around the year 1400 the concept of a purely Italian vocal genre such as the madrigal was set aside for more than a hundred years, while French and Franco-Flemish forms became popular and nationalistic genres gave way to a more international style.\(^1\) By the time the term “madrigal” came to be used once more, composers and poets meant something completely different by it. Now a madrigal could refer to a musical setting of any Italian poetry, not referring to the specific (although somewhat loose) rules guiding the Trecento madrigal.\(^2\) The Italian madrigal of the sixteenth century emerged in Florence and Rome in the 1520s, although it was not referred to by the name “madrigal” until 1530.\(^3\) Originally thought to be developed from the frottola,\(^4\) which is another type of secular Italian song, madrigals and frottolas are now thought to have overlapped “chronologically rather than in musical or poetic style.”\(^5\) Some of the earliest madrigals were written by Bernardo Pisano (1490–1548), a Florentine composer living in Rome, whose collection of settings of Petrarch’s poetry was published in 1520.\(^6\) Pisano was following the lead of Cardinal Pietro Bembo, who argued for a return to a fourteenth-century Tuscan mode of Italian literary language, exemplified in the poetry of Francesco Petrarca (Petrarch).

Subsequent composers of early sixteenth-century madrigals also wrote settings of Petrarch’s poetry, but later madrigals were more often settings of new poetry that imitated Petrarch.\(^7\) Compositions were circulated in partbooks containing a single vocal part per book, so each singer sang from his own book.\(^8\)

Most madrigals of the Renaissance are through composed settings of a single poetic stanza, often with lines of seven or eleven syllables. They can be for three or four voices or can contain up to six or seven distinct vocal parts. Sixteenth-century madrigals use both homophony and free or imitative polyphony to express the poetic text.\(^9\) Composers and singers strove to communicate the text clearly and to convey its meaning and images through techniques such as word-painting, where the music is used as a special effect to demonstrate the literal meaning of

---

1 Burkholder et al., 240.
2 Ibid., 244-45.
4 Ibid., 5.
5 Ibid., 7.
7 Burkholder et al., 246-47
8 Ibid., 246.
9 Ibid., 244-45 and 250.
the words.¹ Chromaticism was used to portray grief,² while major thirds and sixths were considered to have a harsh sound, suitable to show bitterness, because the intervals are larger than their more “smooth” sounding minor counterparts.³ This focus on using the music’s expression to tell the story contained in the words very naturally lent itself to dramatization, and the madrigal later became one of the key influences in the invention of opera in the early 1600s.⁴

An example of word painting is found in Io mi pensai, an early Renaissance madrigal by Jacopo Arcadelt. Arcadelt was a Flemish composer who moved to Italy and helped establish the madrigal as a serious genre.⁵ This madrigal is written in duple time, except the eighth line, which is in triple time and which (translated) states: “[You] make yourself ever fairer and less compassionate.”⁶ Triple time gives a lilting, mocking feel to the eighth line, illustrating the lover’s flippant treatment of the singer.⁷

The Renaissance Gloria

The quest to use music to enhance liturgical texts without obscuring them continued in the Renaissance era. There is a popular legend in which the Council of Trent nearly decided to abolish polyphony at Mass altogether, and Giovanni Palestrina saved the day by composing a reverent polyphonic Mass that allowed the words to be clearly understood. This is only a legend, but it highlights the ideals composers and liturgists strove to attain.⁸ The Council of Trent said very little about sacred music in the end, but its directives to “keep away from...compositions in which there is an intermingling of the lascivious or the impure” inspired many composers to simplify sacred music and return to a reverent treatment of form and voicing that allowed the words to be heard clearly.⁹

Sacred compositions of the Renaissance emphasize smooth, consonant harmonies, feature equal polyphonic voicings, and often stay in one mode. The

¹ Tim Carter, “Word-painting,” Grove Music Online, 2001: “[Word-painting is] the use of musical gesture(s) in a work with an actual or implied text to reflect, often pictorially, the literal or figurative meaning of a word or phrase. A common example is a falling line for ‘descendit de caelis’ (‘He came down from Heaven’).” Available at https://doi.org/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.article.30568
² Burkholder et al., 251.
³ Ibid., 248-49.
⁴ Ibid., 256.
⁶ Translation by Martin Morell.
⁷ Io mi pensai is found at https://youtu.be/MhyV3ED5YJk.
⁸ Burkholder et al., 230.
⁹ Ibid., 228.
Polyphony is often imitative, but voices can vary the themes they imitate and often overlap, creating nearly continuous sound. Repetition is used to highlight important parts of the text. Each section then closes with a strong, full cadence, using chords rather than the hollow-sounding fourths, fifths, or octaves of the Trecento period. Composers in the Renaissance also gave precedence to formal symmetry, both within compositions and between all the parts of a Mass Ordinary setting. Often this symmetry was “text-generated” and was not simply form for form’s sake.

Our last musical example is the Gloria from a *Missa Brevis* by Andrea Gabrieli. Gabrieli was an organist at the Basilica of San Marco in Venice. San Marco was the private chapel of the Venetian doge, and the state funded lavish numbers of musicians. Because of the resources available to him, Gabrieli was able to write and direct many polychoral works, which are elaborate pieces written for several different choirs all singing together. In contrast, this little Gloria from Gabrieli’s *Missa Brevis* is written for only four voices and, by the standards of the time, is very short. It would probably have been used on an ordinary Sunday, rather than during a great feast. Following the ideals of textual clarity, Gabrieli set this Gloria mainly homophonically, which is when all voices sing the same words with the same rhythm at the same time and uses polyphony judiciously, for effect. He also tends to follow the natural speech rhythms of spoken Latin. For instance, *bonae voluntatis* uses shorter note values on *bonae volum*, and *ta-tis* is given longer note values, imitating the syllabic emphasis in the spoken Latin. An example of “text-generated symmetry” can be found in Gabrieli’s treatment of *Deus Pater* and *Jesu Christe*. Both use the same much longer note values, pausing on the words and drawing our attention to the names of God the Father and Jesus Christ, while emphasizing their oneness by using a similar rhythm for both.

Composers in both the Trecento and Renaissance periods worked to balance the needs of the text with each era’s musical innovations. Often writing for both church and court, they tailored the music to suit each context, and did so gracefully and with much ingenuity. They have left us beautiful examples of both sacred and secular music.

---

1 Ibid., 225.
3 Burkholder et al., 282-83.
4 The Gloria by Gabrieli is found at https://youtu.be/k2gBpWdGhMo.

Anne Carson Daly*

“Read it and do not neglect the metaphysics in it.”

How can anyone hope to capture the essence of Fr. James V. Schall in one short article? Even a cursory glance at some of the key facts of his life indicate the daunting scope of this remarkable man, priest, Jesuit, philosopher, professor, essayist, author, and lecturer.

Seventy-one years a Jesuit, fifty-six a priest, and nearly sixty a professor of political theory and government, Jim Schall initially studied at Santa Clara University before earning an M.A. in philosophy at Gonzaga University, an M.A. in sacred theology from Santa Clara University, and a Ph.D. from Georgetown University in political theory. After teaching at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome for thirteen years, he returned to America, where he taught at the University of San Francisco for nine years, before spending thirty-four at Georgetown. While there, Fr. Schall repeatedly won teaching awards, eliciting the affection and respect of the thousands he taught, worked with, mentored, and befriended. Much loved by several generations of students, he was an extraordinary professor, a born teacher, an entertaining raconteur, and a wonderful friend. A man of great intelligence, kindness, charm, humility, humor, rectitude,

* Carson Daly, a former professor of English, college president, and FCS Board member, was a good friend of Fr Schall’s for nearly forty years.

1 James V. Schall, “A Few Thoughts about Christmas Reading,” in Idylls and Rambles: Lighter Christian Essays (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 90, said in reference to Dorothy Sayers’s murder mystery The Nine Taylors
courtesy, and courage, he taught through the example of his own well-lived life as well as by speaking and writing about what he liked to call “the highest things.”

Born in Pocahontas, Iowa, in 1928, Fr. Schall wrote more than thirty books, edited another eight, penned more than 400 essays, and favored the reading public with countless columns on topics ranging from the inner life of the Trinity and the death of Socrates to the excellence of popcorn. In short compass, one cannot hope to capture the plenitude of the life and the work of a man who exemplifies the Catholic intellectual tradition in action, “the very embodiment of the Catholic mind at work.” JVS, as he invariably signed his letters, had encyclopedic knowledge, immense energy, and a stupefying work ethic. He said an early mass daily, walked miles every morning, and paid exemplary attention to the readings in his breviary – often presenting the fruits of his contemplation in his essays and columns.

Fr. Schall was a bibliovore. He read virtually everything he laid his eyes on and loved libraries and second-hand bookshops. He maintained that “anyone with a taste for wonder...should learn to haunt used book stores” – a practice, he observed, that might well save civilization. To those who dismiss such places as boring destinations for fuddy-duddies, Fr. Schall enjoyed quoting Mr. Mifflin, the fictional owner of just such a place, who boldly asserted that “[l]iving in a bookshop is like living in a warehouse of explosives. Those shelves are ranked with the most furious combustibles in the world – the brains of men.”

In addition to regularly plumbing the depths of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas, Fr. Schall tried to read something from Boswell’s Life of Johnson every day, constantly reread his personal favorite, G. K. Chesterton, repeatedly delved into the writings of St. John Paul II and Pope Benedict, and never tired of Dante, Hilaire Belloc, C. S. Lewis, Dorothy Sayers, Flannery O’Connor, Josef Pieper, or Saint-Exupéry’s The Little Prince. “Father Jim,” as many of his friends called him, came late to Jane Austen (at fifty-eight), but he relished her work all the more from the perspective of a wise, experienced observer of the human condition. He delighted in the eccentric characters and

---

1 In “James V. Schall, S.J.: The Embodied Catholic Mind at Work,” Crisis Magazine (April 22, 2019): 2, Marc D. Guerra hails Fr. Schall as “the very embodiment of the Catholic mind at work.” A few pages later in the same essay, Guerra writes that Schall “seems to embody the Catholic Western intellectual tradition” (5).


3 James V. Schall, S.J., Docilitas (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2016), 163. The quote is taken from Christopher Morley’s The Haunted Bookstore (1918).
madcap predicaments of P. G. Wodehouse’s protagonists, rejoiced in the philosophical truths illustrated in Charles Schultz’s Peanuts comic strip, and had a healthy respect for some of the insights found in MAD Magazine.

Georgetown’s most popular professor was also no slouch at ephemera – keeping up on the news and avidly following many sporting contests. He unapologetically read the sports pages first, claiming: “It is an act of spirituality looking obscurely for the highest fascination of what is.”¹ Fr. Schall enthusiastically digested the latest hiccups in policy and politics, reading with special interest the latest pronouncements from the Vatican and from the halls of power in Washington.

He was not only a voracious consumer of the written word, but also a philosophical and literary prestidigitator. He converted virtually everything he read into an astonishing number of books, lectures, and occasional pieces, usually noteworthy for their acute analysis, clear-eyed logic, and intellectual rigor, as well as for their idiosyncratic charm and humor.

In fact, the title of this appreciation of Fr. Schall’s life and work pays tribute to those last two qualities. The phrase “Wacky enough to be wonderful”² is his description of a conversation between two Peanuts cartoon characters in his whimsical essay “On Its Already Being Tomorrow in Australia.” At a Breezy Time of Day, the title of a selection of interviews with JVS published this year shortly before his death, exemplifies Fr. Schall’s philosophical and theological playfulness at work. Calling this collection At a Breezy Time of Day scored a polysemous one-two punch. The author comically yokes his own often sprightly and lightsome (a word he very much liked) interviews to God’s momentous meeting with Adam and Eve after the Fall, which Genesis records as having taken place “at a breezy time of day.” Always alert to the spiritual and intellectual resonances underlying any text, Fr. Schall intuits that the writer of Genesis was not, in this case, simply recording meteorological conditions in the Garden of Eden. In typical Schallian fashion, JVS has a metaphysical ace up his sleeve. For him, this “breeziness” conveys that all was not lost in the Fall, for the breeze not only echoes the breath of the Holy Spirit that brooded over the face of the deep at creation but also prefigures the sanctifying and purifying force that later would help to redeem the woeful effects of our first parents’ perfidy.

Although Schall was acutely aware that tragedy, sin, and evil are inseparable from the human condition, he always believed that the divina commedia, joy, and God’s glory have the final word. This perspective, which shines through all of his academic writings and his occasional pieces, illuminated his whole being, even

¹ "Spirituality and Sports," in Idylls, 117.
when he was manifestly suffering from a torn retina and when several unsuccessful surgeries caused him to lose eyesight in one eye, and later when he lost part of his jaw to cancer. He was convinced that the Incarnation and Resurrection of Christ have totally transformed the world and that despite sin, death, and every kind of malice, God brings great good out of evil. Those who knew Fr. Schall through the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, of which he was an enthusiastic member for many decades, are familiar with his strong faith, lucid intellect, wry sense of humor, kindness, self-deprecation, and fundamental cheerfulness based on profound supernatural hope.

Those who never had the good fortune to know Fr. Schall personally or to have read his work might – given the huge number of his publications – find it helpful to know which subjects were most important to him intellectually and personally. A close look at his many books and essays reveals that five allied topics formed the foundation of the Schallian œuvre: the importance of the truth, the objectivity of reality, the human mind’s capacity to know, reason’s inability to understand a complete picture of what is without revelation, and the complementarity of faith (or revelation) and reason. For Fr. Schall, “the first and final truth” is Deus logos est (God is the Logos). He boldly asserted that “the real and only adventure is to face the truth.” Like Thomas Aquinas, he believed that “the greatest good one can do to his neighbor is lead him to the truth.”

For Fr. Schall, truth is the bedrock on which both reason and faith build, and he believed that one could neither think nor act right without it. Quoting Benedict XVI, he emphasized that “Truth is the light...of reason and...of faith, through which the intellect attains to the natural and supernatural truth of charity.” In contrast to many modern philosophers, JVS believed that human reason can know reality or what is, and he delightedly repeated Aristotle’s observation that the mind of man is capax omnium. By this phrase Fr. Schall did not mean that humans can understand everything, but that they can reason about everything they encounter and can make rational deductions about what they experience.

---

1 Taken from the Dedication to the School of Philosophy at the Catholic University of America in Fr. Schall’s The Mind That Is Catholic: Philosophical & Political Essays (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008).
2 Docilitas, 79.
3 Ibid., 9.
4 In Fr. Schall’s On Christians and Prosperity, he quotes from Pope Benedict XVI’s column, “Truth in Charity,” which appeared in The Catholic Thing on December 1, 2016: “Only in truth does charity shine forth, only in truth can charity be authentically lived. Truth is the light that gives meaning and value to charity. That light is both the light of reason and the light of faith, through which the intellect attains to the natural and supernatural truth of charity: it grasps its meaning as gift, acceptence, and communion. Without truth, charity degenerates into sentimentality.”
However, the sage of Georgetown (how he would have laughed at such a moniker!) points out that the human mind quickly recognizes its limits and realizes that it needs more information – revelation – to gain a complete picture of what is. Thus, faith is a necessary complement to reason. As he emphasized in *The Mind That Is Catholic*, “Revelation is not opposed to thinking and to thinking well. Rather, it invites us to understand what is given, what is explained by ultimate things in revelation. In sorting it out, we learn to think more fully, more incisively” (309). In accord with Thomas Aquinas, Fr. Jim was firmly convinced that “Truth is...the conformity of mind with what is.”

One of Jim Schall’s great quarrels with the modern age is its effort to try to make truth and reality conform to the individual’s own thinking and behavior – especially muddy, narcissistic thinking and immoral behavior. He regularly denounced the resulting theoretical “pluralism” – the idea that “there is no ‘truth’ but one’s own finite feeling.” His writings repeatedly demonstrate that defining reality according to one’s own wrong thinking and behavior can often encourage us “to do what is evil if we will it.” Such an outcome was particularly distressing for Fr. Jim, for whom the foundation of Western Civilization and of Christianity is Socrates’s belief – reaffirmed by the death of Christ – “That it is never right to do wrong.”

“Theoretical pluralism,” Schall believed, leads to spiritual and intellectual relativism, and to dangerous ideologies. Such ideologies, he contended, achieve hellish results when they try to create a materialist heaven on earth – abolishing God, misapprehending human nature, and subjecting citizens to the arbitrary, brutal, and all-encompassing power of the state. Fr. Schall deplored ideologies of all varieties, especially secular humanism and its totalitarian cousins Communism and Fascism. He was even more distressed when he saw “theoretical pluralism” operating in the Church. “Perhaps nothing today,” he observed, “is more agonizing than the sloppiness of so much Christian thinking in which ideology passes for dogma,” for he believed that “Christianity is, above all, a religion of accurate thinking.” For Schall, ideologies humans create are a poor substitute for the world of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful ordained by a God “of

---

1 *Docilitas*, 79.
2 “Interview with Edward Jones in *Crossroads*, Belmont Abbey College,” in *At a Breezy Time of Day* (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2019), 120: “We cannot avoid facing the fact that an irregular moral life, personal life, will make us unable to see the truth.”
3 “On St. Augustine’s ‘Late, Late Have I loved Thee,’” in *Idylls*, 230.
4 *Docilitas*, 77.
5 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 236.
superabundance”¹ who has ordered life so as to provide joy in this life and immortal glory in the next. In fact, Fr. Schall quotes, with obvious approval, Flannery O’Connor’s statement that “[n]othing is more repulsive to me than the idea of myself setting up a little universe of my own choosing and propounding a little immoralistic universe.”²

For him, friendship is the opposite of wrong thinking, narcissistic relativism, egocentric denial of reality, and the oppressive state. It is impossible to overemphasize how important a role friendship played in Fr. Schall’s writings and in his life. He had a genius for friendship—reveling in camaraderie, conversations, and repartee. His joie de vivre was genuine and infectious. He was fascinated by life, interested in everyone and everything, and always willing to extend himself and to engage with others on virtually any topic. Those unfamiliar with his writings may be surprised that the basis of his thinking on friendship was his fascination with the Trinity.³ He never tired of saying that “the Trinity is friendship”⁴ and that “[a]ll human life originates and ends in friendship.”⁵ In fact, for Fr. Schall, “[t]he perfection of all human communication is friendship based on virtue.”⁶ He delighted in pointing out that the Incarnation brings “all human history into the Trinitarian life”: because Christ became man and called us his “friends” (Jn 15:15), “we are to participate in the inner life of God. We are to be, in Christ, friends of God and of one another.”⁷ Consequently, it is not surprising that Fr. Schall considered friendship indispensable to the good of the polis, the country, the Church, and the world, and even believed friendship would provide the foundation for our happiness in the hereafter. His vocation as a priest, a philosopher, and a teacher all grew out of his gift for friendship. His love for God and friendship with him provided the impetus for Fr. Schall’s service as a priest. His love for the Truth and his desire to encounter the great minds of the past (to become “friends” with them) impelled him to become a philosopher. His desire to share his love for God and the Truth and the knowledge gleaned from what his friends from the past had taught him inspired his desire to teach and befriend his students so that they could become friends of God, of each other, and of the great thinkers of former ages.

¹ “Interview with Edward Jones in Crossroads,” in Breezy, 120.
² “On Its Being Already Tomorrow in Australia,” in Breezy, 221.
³ “Interview on Ultimate Issues with Kathryn Lopez,” in Breezy, 152: “The Trinity has always fascinated me. A chapter in my first book, Redeeming the Time, was entitled: ’The Trinity—God is Not Alone’.”
⁴ The Mind That Is Catholic, 138.
⁵ Ibid., 128.
⁶ Ibid., 122.
⁷ Ibid., 146.
⁸ Ibid., 214.
In the Schallian world, teaching and learning are about sharing the truth, increasing in knowledge of the “highest things,” and growing in virtue, as well as in love for God and others. For Fr. Schall, laughter is a vital part of learning and teaching, there is a “gladness” about both enterprises, and the “joy behind things” is the destination. He frequently pointed out, in accord with G. K. Chesterton, that “serious” does not have to mean somber and that “there is no reason that what is true cannot also be funny.”

Passionately committed to learning and teaching, Fr. Schall wrote on both topics frequently. He agreed with Plato that “we have to find a teacher that loves the truth and loves us enough to guide us to it, so that we can see it for ourselves.” Indeed, Fr. Jim went so far as to say that teaching “is an overflow of the truth of existing things...affirmed in our souls.” In order to benefit from this “overflow,” Schall says that students must be “docile.” In his book Docilitas, published in 2016, he explains, “I have always loved the Latin word, docilitas, the capacity of being taught. It is related to the idea of gift, of being that sort of being to whom something lovely happens unexpectedly, to whom something is just given.” As someone who believed that the whole point of a college education “is to come to know ultimate things,” Fr. Schall found the state of modern higher education gravely wanting. The catalogue of aberrations that he describes is extensive: many universities no longer concern themselves with the truth, some academics believe that there is no such thing; others postulate there is no objective reality, and still others believe that even if there were, the human mind could not reliably know it. Building upon such spurious ideas, universities are often breeding grounds for ideologies that convince students that they can fashion their own philosophy independent of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful. This sometimes leads to what Fr. Schall considered “the ultimate evil”: “calling evil good.” He believed that the root of the problem was the refusal to address virtue and its relation to the truth, for “we...[should be] concerned with the delight of

---

1 “Interview with Carol Olson in Ignatius Insight Online,” in Breezy, 81.
2 Ibid.
4 “On the Teaching of Political Philosophy,” in Unseriousness, 111.
5 Docilitas, 179.
6 “Interview with Christopher Hauser in The Dartmouth Apologia,” in Breezy, 134.
7 “A Good Answer,” in Idyls, 171.
8 “Interview with Jordan Teti in The Harvard Ichthus,” in Breezy, 13: “nothing will really much improve higher education until the question of virtue and its relation to truth is frankly faced.”
truth...nothing more, but nothing less.”¹

To remedy the often serious inadequacy of a modern college education, Fr. Schall constantly “prescribed” lists of authors and books to help enlighten the student who, through no fault of his or her own, had been deprived of acquaintance with the Great Books and with many of the best minds the world has known. In Fr. Schall’s wonderfully subtitled Another Sort of Learning (1988), he addresses many lofty topics in a very practical manner – explaining what a college education should be, why one should read, how one should read, what the heart of the intellectual and spiritual life is, the nature of evil and suffering, and man’s supernatural dignity and destiny. For him, the whole point of learning is virtue, which he considers the appropriate response of a soul grateful for all it has been given. For this reason, in the Schallian world, there are no higher virtues than humility and gratitude. In fact, Fr. Jim’s favorite passage of G. K. Chesterton was the latter’s statement, “I would maintain that thanks are the highest form of thought and that gratitude is happiness doubled by wonder.”²

Many of the secrets of Fr. Schall’s charm as a scholar, a priest, a teacher, and a friend are revealed in his fondness for this quotation. Fr. Jim’s whole intellectual and spiritual life were motivated by wonder and suffused with gratitude. He was astonished by – and grateful for – the “bounty,” the “superabundance” that he saw as the mark of the Creator. JVS said that he had “little patience for believers in a parsimonious world” and that “the mystery of the universe is not the parsimony of God; it is the amazing bounty.”³ For Fr. Schall, there is no greater example of divine bounty than God’s offering each of us the opportunity to be his friends in this life and in the next. This prospect filled Fr. Schall with wonder, gratitude, and joy. May he, a dear friend to so many, now experience each of these graces abundantly, and participate fully in the “final gladness” of which he spoke so movingly at his last lecture at Georgetown in 2012.

† Requiescat in pace †

The Fellowship is deeply grateful for the many contributions that Father Schall made over the years to our conventions and publications. He generously shared his wisdom and learning on many questions. While the list of his works is far too

¹ The Mind That Is Catholic, 308.
² Quoted by J. V. Schall in Unseriousness, 66.
long for publication here, it only seemed fitting to include at very least a list of his published monographs.

– Fr. Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.

5) *Welcome Number 4,000,000,000*. Canfield, Ohio: Alba Books, 1977.
39) *Docilitas: On Teaching and Being Taught* (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press 2016.
43) *The Universe We Think In*. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press 2018.
I WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN by offering condolences and sympathies to the family of Msgr. Hamilton, Uncle Danny as you called him. I also extend my condolences and sympathies to the parishioners of Our Lady of Perpetual Help, Msgr. Hamilton’s other family. You formed Monsignor’s spiritual family while he was here for twenty-two years as your pastor. He was your shepherd who guided and directed you in imitation of the Good Shepherd who lays down his life for the sheep (cf. Jn 10: 10-18) and through whom we are offered the gift of eternal life.

As you know, Monsignor was well-organized and methodical about everything – including his own death! A couple of years ago, Monsignor gave me written instructions about how I should preach at the Mass of Transferal. He wanted me to be “priestly, straight-forward and brief.” I will try to oblige Monsignor on those counts as best I can, but I may not succeed on the last point.

Many of you might remember reading the novel *The Catcher in the Rye* as a school assignment for an English literature course. The author is J. D. Salinger, and his book was published in 1951. In surveys of readers, this volume consistently ranks as one of the best works of fiction in history. The main character, you may recall, is Holden Caulfield. Salinger at one point in the story has Holden speak these words: “You are a gentleman and a scholar, kid.”

Tonight, I would like to speak about being a gentleman, about being a scholar, and about being a kid. But I will also add a fourth category – about being a churchman.

Our identities have a lot to do with the families from which we come, especially our mothers and fathers who gave us life. Pope St. John Paul II put it this way in the post-synodal apostolic exhortation *Familiaris consortio* (1981): The family is a school for deeper humanity (21). Msgr. Hamilton was raised by Irish-born, immigrant parents, and they raised him to be a gentleman. And that’s the way Monsignor turned out – through and through, all the way to the end. He was unfailingly courteous and polite.

---

At my high school graduation in the year of our nation’s bicentennial, the address was given by the Honorable Malcolm Wilson, the former governor of New York. With so many of the graduation addresses to which we listen, we cannot remember what they were about even twenty-four hours later. Governor Wilson’s address was not like that. I recall all these years later that he called upon the graduates to be Catholic gentlemen. Among the difficulties in commencement addresses is the fact that the speaker does not know personally those whom he is addressing. A good speaker searches for a theme that will resonate with his listeners, and what better topic to take up than being a Catholic gentleman with a graduating class consisting of all Catholic young men!

Gentlemanliness is going to be tested; it always is. More than twenty years ago, I was visiting a priest-friend, Fr. Jim Schall, who at the time was teaching at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. My visit came in the summer on a Saturday. The highlight was lunch in the Jesuit dining room on campus. As I looked around the room, there must have been thirty Jesuits at the meal. I recognized a very few of them, and with one in particular, I wondered to myself what it was like for Fr. Schall to get along with a confrere with whom he had more than a few differences about important matters. Well, after lunch, I had my chance. On a walk to Fr. Schall’s office in another building, I stopped at a certain point, faced Fr. Schall, and with all the dramatic flair I could muster, I asked, “Jim, how do you guys do this together?” Fr. Schall replied simply, “Well, we try to be gentlemen.”

Not only did Msgr. Hamilton try to be a gentleman, he succeeded at it. You could have a disagreement with Msgr. Hamilton, but he never was less than gentlemanly with you.

There is an important lesson for all of us in Msgr. Hamilton’s gentlemanliness. And it is: We are made priests by grace, but grace needs to be received according to how we have been made. Grace can flourish in a humanitas that is open to the good, the true, and the beautiful.

Msgr. Hamilton was a churchman. I realize that priests are seldom referred to in this way anymore. And that is unfortunate, for we need churchmen now more than ever. Years ago, I was present for a priest’s anniversary celebrated with a Mass in a parish church on a Sunday afternoon. After the distribution of Holy Communion, an auxiliary bishop read a congratulatory letter from a well-known cardinal of the Catholic Church. To introduce the writer, the auxiliary bishop searched for a descriptive word before he could finally reveal the cardinal’s name. That descriptive word was churchman, and it was applied to John Cardinal O’Connor.

Priests are liturgists, homilists, teachers, confessors, and so much more. Each descriptor tells us something about what a priest does. All of the descriptors take
for granted that a priest acts in these precise ways for someone or some group. Since the priest’s actions are in relation to those who belong to the Church, the priest is rightly called a churchman.

Being a churchman allows you to serve competently and with distinction wherever you are assigned. Before coming to Our Lady of Perpetual Help in 1985 as your pastor, Msgr. Hamilton had already been a parochial vicar, a classroom teacher, an editor, a diocesan spokesman, and an ecumenical officer. All of these ministries prepared Msgr. Hamilton to be a pastor bonus, a good pastor. In being a good pastor, you need to have the good of the Church uppermost in your mind.

During Monsignor’s stay at Our Lady of Consolation in West Islip a few weeks ago, I found a man praying at his bedside. He himself was a patient at this healthcare facility, and upon learning of Monsignor’s presence there, he had to express somehow his gratitude to Monsignor for the learning and erudition he demonstrated as the editor of The Long Island Catholic. Another person, a laywoman, told me on several occasions that she loved when Monsignor had the noon Mass because his homily was always so instructive and so inspiring. Monsignor was a man of many talents, and he used them not for personal gain but for the edification of the Church.

As some of you know, Monsignor was a writer – not just in your weekly bulletin but in venues far and wide. He was a published author of long standing whose work made it into scholarly journals. He also knew how to write a letter to the editor. The publication that received more of his letters than any other was The New York Times. He began writing to the editor there as far back as 1961. Over the years, he sent some 300 letters, the last one written in 2014. A fair number of these letters made it into print too! Knowing that he was not going to write any more letters, he decided in 2015 to publish all of the letters in one place and called the volume Jousting with The New York Times. He took the Times to task on any number of points – mostly having to do with moral and cultural issues.

I think the point of Jousting was to remind us that we must engage with those who are our intellectual opponents – as the editorialists at the Times surely are. I think Monsignor had in mind that we should not retreat from the public square, even when we suffer defeat there. Our public life is impoverished with the marginalization of religion. This is my interpretation of Msgr. Hamilton’s offering to us in Jousting.

We ought to pay attention to the wise counsel of a man who viewed the sun setting in his own life much more than the sun rising. About two years ago, Monsignor said to me, “Bobby, I have about three years left.” Well, Monsignor didn’t make it quite that far. Wisdom he had, but a pinpoint accuracy in prediction eluded him, as it eludes all of us because we are first and always kids.
In tonight’s second reading, the sacred author writes that we are children of God (cf. 1 Jn 3:1). As children we inherit, and we can inherit no greater gift than that of eternal life. The One who makes this promise to us is the Lord raised from the dead in glory on Easter. We pray at this Mass tonight that the surpassing gift of risen life be granted to Monsignor.

For sixty years, Msgr. Hamilton had the privilege of calling down the Son of God on the altar every day at the Holy Eucharist. The Son of God is Priest too – High Priest (cf. Heb 4:14). May the High Priest accept into the sanctuary of heaven a servant whose priestly ministry foreshadowed the God who is over all and through all and in all (cf. Eph 4:6).

† Requiescat in pace †

The Fellowship is deeply grateful to Msgr Hamilton for his generous gifts in support of our conventions and publications. He regularly arranged for significant contributions to the Fellowship by the St. John Fisher Fund. He also shared his learning with us – for example, in his article “Critical Theological Issues in Contemporary Catholic Life,” in Teaching the Catholic Faith: Central Questions for the ’90’s: Proceedings of the Thirteenth Convention of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1990 (New York: Fellowship of Catholic Scholaes, 1991), pp. 73-108.

Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.
In his new book entitled *That All Shall Be Saved*, David B. Hart is condemning the infernalists – his designation for those who believe in the possibility of eternal damnation – and he pulls no punches in making his case for universal salvation. He has argued for universalism in various publications and presentations over the years, but this volume is more polemical. In his words, the “infernalists,” especially those mired in Augustinian teachings on original sin and damnation, offer only “an absolute midden of misconceptions, fragments of scriptural language wrenched out of context, errors of translation, logical contradictions and (I suspect) one or two emotional pathologies” (25). This book summarizes Hart’s passionate belief that, in the end, “all will be all in God” (1 Cor 15:28).

Though he structures the book around four “meditations” on creation, eschatology, and anthropology (personhood and will), his basic arguments can be summarized under the biblical, the historical, and the theological. I will briefly summarize his main points in these areas, followed by my own reactions to Hart’s arguments.

**A Summary of Hart’s Arguments for Universal Salvation**

1. The Biblical: The Bible, Hart claims, says nothing about hell or eternal damnation. This rejection of centuries of scriptural exegesis requires, on the one hand, an emphasis on those texts that express salvation for all (for example, Rom 5: 18-19, 1 Cor 15:22, 2 Cor 5:14, and so on). On the other hand, it demands the reassessment of passages that suggest eternal damnation. For instance, he dismisses passages dealing with images of eschatological punishment or judgment (for example, Mt 25:31-46) because these *images* – not doctrinal statements – express only the divine verdict on the corruption of human history, which has been overturned in the redeeming love of Christ. He also draws upon his own work as a translator of the New Testament in order to eliminate the traditional foundations for teachings on hell. “Gehenna,” for example, should not be taken
as an image for hell, but rather as the refining purgatorial fire. The Greek *aiôn* (*aiônios*) should be translated as “age” or “eon,” not “eternity.”

The Book of Revelation, with its cryptic symbolism and precise historical context, offers little, in his opinion, for solid doctrinal statements regarding the next life. For Hart, even the primary Pauline texts for debates regarding grace and salvation, Romans 9-11, actually present the apostle’s anguished reflections on the seemingly exclusionary nature of the divine promises that, in the end, find their conclusion in the discovery of universal salvation in Christ (132-38). In short, the bible does not say what most Christians claim it says; on the contrary, it proclaims salvation for all in and through Jesus Christ.

2. The Historical: Hart maintains that many, if not most, early Christians believed in universal salvation. Hart highlights those Fathers of the Church who taught some form of the *apokatastasis* – the universal return of all things to God: Origen of Alexandria, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, Isaac of Nineveh, and others. In turn, he condemns certain vocal and, very often, Western theologians – most notably Augustine – who imposed this false proposition of eternal damnation upon their flocks.

3. The Theological: A number of arguments come into play. First, Hart argues that the finite human will cannot possibly make a definitive, eternal choice against the universal Good, God. Once the ignorance of sin has been cleansed, the will – specifically, the natural will, or *thelêma* – is going to direct the person to the source of his being and fulfillment, that is, God. In this life, however, one can never possess absolute clarity for choosing or rejecting God – the circumstances of one’s birth, inherited traits, and educational opportunities will always prevent this – and one can therefore never be held fully responsible for transgressions or ignorance. Thus, no person can willfully reject the Creator in this life or the next.

Second, belief in a universal damnation is inconsistent with belief in a transcendent and good God. In fact, understanding original sin as an inherited guilt and the possibility of damnation without baptism is an abomination (24-25) that can lead only to a perverted vision of the relationship between the Creator and his creature made in the divine image. The eternal suffering of even one soul could not coexist with the source of Being, Goodness, and Love. God can never be the author of an absolute evil such as eternal suffering.

Third, the relational nature of personhood and the solidarity of persons in the Body of Christ lead to the conclusion that salvation must be universal, not partial. The resurrection of the dead will be a communal event in which God will be all in all. Such a solidarity does not allow for the exclusion of anyone in the ultimate deification of creation.
Finally, Hart adopts what may be called the Nyssean narrative of salvation. Gregory of Nyssa is clearly Hart’s theologian of choice. The most speculative of the Cappadocians rejected Origen’s preexistence of souls but accepted the salvation of all through Christ. Hart summarizes this patristic universal vision as follows:

We were born in bondage, in the house of a cruel master to whom we had been sold as slaves before we could choose for ourselves; we were born, moreover, not guilty or damnable in God’s eyes, but nonetheless corrupted and enchained by mortality, and so destined to sin through a congenital debility of will; we were ill, impaired, lost, dying; we were in hell already. But then Christ came to set us free, to buy us out of slavery, to heal us, to restore us to our true estate. In pursuit of those he loved, he invaded even the very depths of that hell we have made for ourselves and one another – so as to drag [Hart’s italics] us to himself. (26-27)

Gregory, as the most representative of the universalist fathers, offers a narrative that captures the genuine logic and intentions of the New Testament: “an epic tale of rescue and conquest, the overthrow of all evil – natural evil, moral evil, the evil of hell we bring upon ourselves – and the invasion of death’s kingdom by the shattering divinity of Christ. It is a tale that can end only in perfect victory and perfect peace” (164-65). Such a positive vision must supplant the perverse alternatives – especially Augustine’s – that make Christianity so unacceptable today.

Some Remarks on Hart’s Arguments

The debates surrounding the question of universalism have heated up in recent years. For instance, Ilaria Ramelli’s *The Christian Doctrine of the “Apokatastasis”* (2013) offers a detailed, though controversial, reading of the early historical record in order to argue for the mainstream acceptance of the universal return. Paul Griffith’s *Decreation: The Last Things of All Creatures* is an idiosyncratic eschatology that essentially promotes the salvation of all. Michael McClymond’s two-volume work *The Devil’s Redemption* (2018) surpasses Ramelli’s work in length and scope, and it makes a stronger argument against the universalist position. Hart’s slimmer and more accessible volume, however, will be the spark to ignite wider contemporary discussions.

I will now offer some brief reflections regarding each area of Hart’s arguments. Though I cannot fully address his points in this brief review, I hope that my remarks will stimulate deeper engagements with his book.

1. The Scriptures: Hart argues that passages that have traditionally indicated eternal punishment are simply images indicating either the divine judgment of
history or purification. At the same time, he highlights the more positive passages on redemption. Michael McClymond calls such an approach “a hermeneutics of diminishment” – for example, a reduction of passages regarding judgment or punishment to images of purification – that evacuates Jesus’s teaching of its force and urgency. Indeed, though Hart does rightly highlight the liberating and joyful message of the New Testament, he superficially passes over the challenging passages regarding eternal punishment. For instance, Hart points to the unforgiving servant in Matthew 18:21-35 as a sign of hope: the servant will be released from prison after he has paid the last penny. Yet, as many exegetes have noted, the servant’s debt was a massive sum, a sum far too great for him ever to repay. The contemporary reader would have recognized a chilling fact in the parable: there was no hope for the servant to leave that prison. Jesus’s parable therefore conveys the necessity and urgency of forgiveness in the starkest terms: it is a matter of freedom in life or perpetual incarceration in darkness. In short, the biblical foundations of universalism are not as obvious as Hart claims.

This approach is also evident in his translation of the Greek adjective 

_The Greek adjective aionios._ He rightly notes a degree of ambiguity in the term through a review of the use of aion in ancient Greek writings, and he also examines the scope of its likely Aramaic equivalent, alma. In the end, he opts for a translation that indicates a designated period of time – “age-long,” “of the Age” – as opposed to “eternal” or “everlasting” (120-27). Thus, the expression _eis kolasin aiônion_ in Matthew 25:46, traditionally translated as “to eternal punishment,” becomes, in Hart’s rendering, “to the chastening of that Age.” Punishment is in fact only a temporary purgation in the next Age, that is, in the next life.

This diminishment, however, shapes the translation in other ways. For instance, in the same verse considered above, one finds the expression _eis zóên aiônion_, generally translated as “to eternal life.” But in Hart’s translation this becomes “to the life of that Age.” He maintains this approach throughout his translation: for example, “And everyone who gave up houses or brothers or sisters of father or mother or children or fields for my name’s sake will receive many times as much and will inherit _life in that Age_” (Mt 19:29); “Teacher, by what deeds may I inherit _life in the Age_?” (Lk 10:25); “That everyone having faith in him might have the _life of the Age_” (Jn 3:15). Zôê aiônios refers no longer to eternal life but to life in the eschaton or “next Age.” Will this be eternal life? Or will it be like the “purgation” or “chastening” of the Age, that is, of limited duration? In short, Hart’s understanding opens up the possibility that even the promise of “life” will not endure. Perhaps we will simply lose our individual identities, to be absorbed into the divine; or perhaps the scriptures are open to Origen’s speculative cyclical returns.
Hart’s diminished reading therefore opens up strange possibilities, while also restricting the fuller range of *aiōnios*. While the authors of the New Testament may not have had sophisticated philosophical conceptions of eternity as an atemporal, nonlinear mode of existence, this is not to say that *aiōnios* did not have the simple meaning of “forever” or “unending.” In some cases “of the Age” simply does not capture the contextual import of the adjective. “Unending life” and “unending punishment” are not only within the range of the adjective, but the urgency of the Gospel message actually requires such renderings.

2. The Historical: Hart is correct that some of the Church Fathers taught a version of the *apokatastasis*. These fathers were generally part of the Eastern tradition – as an Orthodox Christian Hart does not hide his preference for the East and his distaste for the West – and found their inspiration in Origen of Alexandria. Yet, as the Origenist controversies of the late fourth and fifth centuries demonstrate, Origen’s universalism in general did not have widespread support. In the end, Hart can attribute the triumph of the infernalists only to pathological tendencies among powerful (mostly Western) bishops and theologians who were intent on perpetuating terrifying myths. Only the universalist fathers knew best; the rest should be ignored. Once again, we see a process of diminishment.

3. The Theological: Here I would like to consider some issues regarding anthropology and the Nyssean narrative. First, Hart’s positions on personhood and freedom of the will require greater scrutiny. His understanding of the will depends upon a particular reading of Maximus the Confessor, who distinguished between the “natural will” (*thelēma* or *thelēsis*), which he defined as “the power that desires to be according to nature,” and the “deliberative will” (*gnōmē*), which he defined as “a qualified will attached by relation to a real or apparent good.” While the former always draws the person toward the fulfillment of one’s nature, the latter, entailing free choice (*proairesis*) and deliberation among alternatives, represents a temporary faculty associated with the possibility of sin. Thus, in this reading of Maximus, the blessed after death will be liberated of the deliberative will, and only their *thelēma/thelēsis* will remain to direct them toward the final Good, that is, God. After death and purification, all will possess only a natural will, having been freed from ignorance and deliberation through Christ. In Maximus’s later works, Christ had only two natural wills – divine and human – and did not possess a deliberative will.

Nonetheless, Maximus did not always maintain such a strict distinction between these two “wills” and their characteristics. For instance, in one passage from the *Debate with Pyrrhus*, Maximus attributed the fall of Adam in some way to the *thelēsis*, the natural will, thereby requiring Christ to have a full human
thelēsis in order to heal man’s wounded will. In another late work, Maximus even wrote that God, angels, and human beings are endowed with a deliberative will (gnome), the source of free choice. (Admittedly, God’s manner of “deliberation” cannot be likened to our own.) He also wrote of Christ’s “immutability of free choice” (atrepsia tēs proaireseōs), although he generally associated free choice with the deliberative will. Why these inconsistencies, among others, in Maximus’s thought?

First, Maximus needed to explain how Adam, without the impediments of sin and ignorance, could have chosen disobedience. This could take place only if his natural will could somehow deviate from what was good for his nature. Deliberation was therefore still part of prelapsarian man’s mode of existence and therefore cannot be relegated entirely to fallen humanity.

Second, I would argue that Maximus was grappling with the need to explain how persons could be free if they only possessed a will that fulfills nature. Indeed, though the natural will always desires the good that fulfills nature, the person determines his particular mode (tropos) of existence through individual choices. Maximus therefore, in speaking of the next life, makes it clear that, while all natures will be saved, persons will come to possess differing modes of existence as determined by free choice and cooperation with grace. Some will have eternal well-being (to aei eu einai), and some will suffer eternal evil-being or eternal lamentation (to aei pheu einai). The deliberative will, in short, determines the personal mode of existence and can become by habit (hexis) immutable in the way it directs the individual. “God will be all in all,” that is, in human nature, but persons may have distinct modes of participation – including a deliberate turning from the divine in favor of personal choice for false images of the Good, that is, hell. The possession of only a natural will, however, implies the obliteration of personhood and the elimination of personal freedom.

As for the Nyssean narrative, it raises some serious questions regarding freedom and consequences. In Hart’s understanding, no one can be held eternally responsible for finite choices. In the end, having been liberated from ignorance, deliberation, and natural weaknesses, the human person can only choose God. Hell, in the end, is only the temporary broken world of our own making from which Christ has freed us. Yet, one must ask: What is the point of creation and this farce of freedom? We live in a world of suffering, much of which emerges from our own sinful choices, but none of it really matters. In the end, there are no real consequences for personal and communal sins, other than, perhaps, a longer period of purgation in the next Age. Christianity, therefore, is nothing more than one way among many to provide psychological and spiritual comfort in this life, while galvanizing communities for societal amelioration. Furthermore, one can easily conclude that a life of moral dissipation, followed by suicide, is a very good
option: drugs, sex, rock and roll, followed by a moment of pain, purification, and eternal bliss.... Something is clearly off in this narrative.

In the conclusion to his book, Hart admits that “[t]here was a time, in the early centuries of the church, and especially in the Eastern half of the imperial world, when it was still generally assumed that there were mysteries of the faith that should be preserved for only the very few, the Christian intellectual elite or pneumatikoi, ‘spiritual persons’” (200). He points to Gregory of Nazianzus as an example of one who believed in universal salvation but still preached the horrors of eternal damnation to the masses for the sake of promoting good behavior. One could add Gregory of Nyssa to the list of practitioners of this “holy duplicity,” since his Homilies on the Beatitudes say nothing about universal salvation, but several times they do offer some chilling words about damnation. For example:

And they [humanity at the final judgment] will stand suspended between fear and hope of the things to come, often trembling, which of the two things that are to be expected will be their final lot. What hope, I say, will he have, when even those who have lived with a good conscience will begin to doubt, as they see others dragged down into that black darkness by their evil conscience as by an executioner.

Hart makes it clear that he, as a modern man who believes in full disclosure, would share the truth of the apokatastasis with all. What are we to say of the Cappadocian universalists and similar fathers in the early Church? They are worse than Hart’s infernalists, since they preached lies to manipulate their flocks into peaceful conformity. At least the infernalists believe what they preach; the hellfire fabulists of old cast doubt on anything they ever said or wrote, including salvation in Christ.

We should not, however, see it in this way. These fathers, most of whom are saints, may have had their flaws, but they genuinely strove to lead all to Christ. Their adherence to conflicting esoteric and popular narratives reveals a misguided attempt to avoid the related sins of despair and presumption. The liberating joy of the Gospel message, salvation in Christ, must always take precedence in preaching, but the real, eternal consequences of mortal sin must not be relegated to myth. Hope in salvation fills life with meaning; fear of damnation awakens us from complacency. These fathers implicitly understood the flaws in a narrative that eliminated the genuine urgency of divine judgment. Even in their errors, they point us to a better way: instead of a holy duplicity, we need a solid preaching on the truth of the four last things.

Hart concludes by stating that nothing will change his position on universal salvation: “As I say, for me it is a matter of conscience, which is after all only a name for the natural will’s aboriginal and constant orientation toward the Good when that orientation expresses itself in our conscious motives. As such,
conscience must not abide by the rule of the majority. Placed in the balance over against its dictates, the authority of a dominant tradition or of a reigning opinion has no weight whatever” (208). His stand, in short, is immutable. His own Orthodox brethren will have to respond to his position.

In today’s Catholic Church, however, we find ourselves confronted with a popular form of universalism in the Age of Mercy. The results have been devastating. The urgency of the Gospel message has been replaced by complacency and cultural conformity; religious pluralism drives out the need for evangelization; sanctity gives way to mediocrity. While an overemphasis on sin and damnation can indeed obscure the power of divine mercy and love, the contemporary disappearance of preaching on sin and even hell has led to general confusion regarding the very need for the Church, the sacraments, and tradition. The God of Mercy has completely eclipsed the God of Justice and Judgment. The universalist narrative, thriving implicitly in the hearts of the faithful, priests, and religious, has demonstrated its flaws through bad fruit.

Hart’s book, despite its occasional bitter tone, therefore poses healthy challenges to us Catholics: How can we respond to this articulate defense of universalism, and how can we restore a balanced preaching of the quattuor novissima? We can take comfort in the fact that the Church proclaims certain of our number saints, while leaving the question of damnation up to Divine Judgment. Yet, this should not make us complacent. May we proclaim the eternal fruits of holiness won for us in Christ; but may we not hesitate to inform ourselves and the world of the eternal dangers of sin even in the light of Divine Mercy.


Reviewed by Sr. Mary Jeremiah, O.P., Lufkin, TX

This interesting and well-researched book is an eye-opener for members of the pro-life and pro-family movements. Obianuju Ekeocha writes in a clear and concise manner. Although she is from Nigeria in West Africa, she does a good job of representing the current situation in other nations of the continent. She points out how the cultures of Africa are very pro-family and pro-child and how the “culture of death” is radically contrary to their deepest roots. Each of the book’s eight chapters tackles one or another of the postmodern obsessions of the West: radical feminism, contraception, abortion, homosexuality, promiscuity, greed, addiction, and population growth. All of these societal ills are truly foreign to the fundamental mores of the African continent.
Chapter 1 ("Population Control") unmask the Western policies that regard the African continent as an alarming population bomb rather than a boom. The predicted population increase of the continent "could help to grow African economies and to lift many Africans out of poverty" (32). The United Nations has unleashed a "war against the bodies of African women" and their fertility by a massive contraception program, despite the way in which this plan is diametrically opposed to African beliefs. The author states: "Africans are the most philprogenitive people in the world" (39). She mentions Nigeria as a prime example of a country where many couples hope for a dozen children. Africa is a continent of the future and of hope. By contrast, Western and other first-world countries are dying demographically. Unfortunately, government leaders in most African nations want to imitate the West and invite in their anti-life policies and money. If they do, these countries will also imitate the "demographic suicide" that the West is experiencing today.

In chapter 2 ("The Hypersexualization of Youth") Ekeocha shows how the "cultural imperialists" import sexual immorality into the nations of the African continent. They humiliate the leaders into apologizing for such important elements of their culture as the importance of marriage, parents, tradition, and religion. The "enlightened" desire to spread the sexual revolution to African youth has created a massive HIV/AIDS epidemic on that continent. It goes without saying that Planned Parenthood is in the midst of the feverish activity to demoralize young people.

Chapter 3 is called "The Seeds of Radical Feminism." Ekeocha writes: "It is important to understand that the situation of women in Africa varies greatly from one place to another" (79). Many countries continue practices that are very harmful to women, including female genital mutilation, child marriage, and male domination. Even so, she was inspired and empowered by the freedom and strength she saw in the women in her life while growing up. African women radiate a grace, strength, beauty, and indomitable courage that is the polar opposite of what radical Western feminism proposed by glorifying individualism and selfishness. Africa needs a feminism that does not mimic left-wing ideologies but instead fosters the innate qualities of the continent’s women. They need to continue to reverence their feminine nature and qualities. Unfortunately, rich Western donors undermine much good work being done by authentic African groups that resist abortion. The author goes into considerable detail describing the various wealthy organizations trying to "recreate African in their image" (87).

Chapter 4 ("The Push for Abortion Rights") details the high maternal mortality rate in much of Africa. The new colonizers of Africa use this as a reason for introducing abortion. This idea is very tempting to some African leaders. Ekeocha points out that the medical answer to the problem of deaths in childbirth
is not abortion, however, but a better health-care system. Twenty-two African nations prohibit abortion, while only four have abortion on demand. Abortion is contrary to the African cultural and religious heritage. Unfortunately, abortion often takes place on account of pressure from others. The author notes the contradiction involved in promoting abortion while holding that it would be wrong to legalize other things such as human trafficking or the drug trade. In this section she quotes the American radio and internet host Dennis Prager: “Good societies can survive people doing immoral things. But a good society cannot survive if it calls immoral things moral” (117).

In chapter 5 (“The Normalization of Homosexuality”) Ekeocha points out that fertility is the greatness of Africa; numerous small villages and their economies depend upon it. And yet Western heads of state seem determined to destroy marriage and the family, which ultimately means the destruction of the human race. The author cites the case of former President Obama’s suggestion that African nations need to normalize the homosexual lifestyle. Happily, many leaders on the continent objected to Obama’s message, even when he tried to lay a guilt trip on them by saying the refusal to redefine African society amounts to hatred and discrimination against the West (127). With regard to the clashes between Western superpowers and African nations, Ekeocha writes: “Many Western leaders have revealed themselves to be modern colonial masters, threatening to withdraw aid from countries such as Nigeria and Uganda unless they accept their global sexual agenda” (132). As a result of these conflicts, Obama cut off at least $8 million in aid to Uganda (134). The European Union shows its hypocrisy by accepting harsh dictators but punishing “countries based on their cultural understanding of human sexuality” (136).

In chapter 6 (“Modern-Day Colonial Masters”) Ekeocha puts the blame where it belongs – on the Western rulers who are “behaving as though they are the rightful masters of Africa because of their wealth and power” (137). The author notes that the Trump administration is working to deconstruct the Obama “reign” by reinstating and expanding the Mexico City Policy that bans the use of U.S. foreign aid for abortions overseas and directs USAID away from providing abortions and contraception (164). Instead of working to provide the basic needs of clean water, good roads, and education, Western elites (the UN, the EU, the Gates Foundation, Planned Parenthood, CNN, and so on) work for population control in African countries. Our author is a committed human-rights activist who is very clear and bold about the new “colonial masters” when she writes:

Once again, colonialists are telling Africans that they know best. Only this time around, the very definition of what it means to be a man or a woman or a family is at stake. . . . Britain and the United States are among the countries that spend the most to undermine family life
and to reduce African fertility, yet they became prosperous and powerful when their laws and policies encourage the formation of stable, traditional families; their economic booms coincided with population growth” (155).

In chapter 7 (“Aid Addiction”) Ekeocha shows that it is because of greed that African leaders have colluded with Western money to the detriment of their own people. In this chapter Ekeocha details how “the economic well-being of most Africans has not improved” (163). While the “African ruling class live like royalty” (157), their “greed knows no bounds” (158), even though their own people are starving (159). The author concludes this chapter with the perfect sound bite: “Aid has become the opium of the ruling class of Africa” (174).

In chapter 8 (“Toward the Decolonization of Africa”) the author offers some solutions. She is a biomedical scientist and begins this chapter with an analogy to examining blood. When confronting a disease, one must first determine the cause in order to know what remedy will be appropriate. The condition that entices the new colonizers is the economic frailty and vulnerability of the sub-Saharan nations. To remedy this problem, she argues, we need to expose the corruption and “aid addictions” of government officials. Ekeocha quotes a British economist, Peter T. Bauer, in a 1974 article: “A society which cannot develop without external gifts is altogether unlikely to do so with them” (177). Foreign aid has been a colossal failure. It keeps countries dependent. Nations need trade, not aid (182). The president of Ghana, Nana Akufo-Addo, said that “Africa needs alliances and economic partnerships with the developed world” (184). Ekeocha takes note of the way in which UN documents have changed their language over the years to match the new ideology, especially when they write that it is children who cause poverty; the remedy, they argue, is to recognize the “basic human right” of access to contraception and abortion. Ekeocha replies: “The most precious gift that Africans can give to the world right now is our inherent culture of life. Most Africans understand, by faith and tradition, the inestimable value of human life, the beauty of womanhood, and the gift of children” (189). Uganda and Kenya have added to their constitutions protections for the life of the unborn child and a ban on abortion. “If Africa is to protect itself from the social breakdown taking place in the West, which the West is intent on exporting to us, it must stand up for marriage and for children, who are the future of the continent” (192).

Ekeocha concludes by recalling the African heroes who stood up for national independence in the mid-twentieth century. She calls for a new generation of heroes: “I long for independence from our neocolonial masters so that Africans can rule themselves in a manner that befits their values and aspirations” (196).

The book also includes Ekeocha’s “Open Letter to Melinda Gates” (available on the Vatican website at http://www.laici.va/content/laici/en/sezioni/donna/)
notizie/an-african-woman-s-open-letter-to-melinda-gates.html). In this letter Ekeocha suggests better ways in which the Gates Foundation might truly help the people of the African continent. On 25-26 September 2018, the Gates Foundation held a “goalkeepers” event in New York City after the United Nations General Assembly. At the meeting, the French president Emmanuel Macron said: “One of the critical issues of African demography is that it is not chosen fertility.” He also said that women in Africa would have smaller families if they had greater access to education and family planning (code words, in UN-speak, for contraception and abortion). In this same speech he made the statement that ignited outrage from women around the world who are both highly educated professionals and mothers of large families.

Recent events in Congress are another reason to read this book. Through an executive order President Trump reinstated the Mexico City Policy, but one of the budget proposals of the new 2019 Democratic House of Representatives provides a way of going around this executive order so that our tax dollars will once again fund the killing of babies in other countries. As Catholics, our greatest gift and weapon is prayer and sacrifice. We have much work to do. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation donates hundreds of millions of dollars to contraceptive programs around the world. Melinda is (or was) a Catholic. She and I attended the same Catholic high school. What a tragedy.

As of January 2019, the United States fertility rate has fallen below the replacement level. Is this really what is best for our world? Why would we want the moral depravity of the West imported and forced upon the nations of Africa? In the January 2019 issue of the magazine Inside the Vatican Obianuju Ekeocha ranks second on the list of the ten most important Catholic in the world. During the vigil before this year’s March for Life, she spoke to an arena filled with young people and said: “We have seen it happen before in slavery. We have seen it happen before during the holocaust. As an African, it’s actually something very close to my heart because we saw something similar during the Rwandan genocide.” Ekeocha is very thorough and resourceful, and it would behoove everyone to read this relatively short book. The battle for the African soul continues to be waged to this very day.


Reviewed by D. Q. McInerny, Our Lady of Guadalupe Seminary, Denton, NE

Peter Kreeft has a way of writing books that puts on full and captivating display his deep and wide-ranging erudition and his fertile imagination. In his latest work,
Symbol or Substance?, he gives us a fascinating account of an imagined meeting and intense exchange of views that takes place among three prominent Christian personages of the twentieth century, the British literary scholars and fictionists C. S. Lewis and J. R. R. Tolkien and the American evangelist Billy Graham. They are not meeting to engage in anything like an organized debate. The setting is informal. They gather at Tolkien’s home in Oxford, and the spirited and stimulating conversation that ensues is reminiscent of the free-flowing dynamics of a Platonic dialogue. Lewis and Tolkien are long-time friends. While Graham is meeting both of them for the first time, the three men quickly fall into a mode of easy familiarity.

Kreeft tells us in his introduction that he felt he was more successful in capturing the personality and manner of speaking of Lewis than he was with either Tolkien or Graham. However that might be, the latter two come across quite convincingly, as engaging and articulate discussants, each with a personality uniquely his own. Kreeft is especially concerned to state the Protestant point of view in a fair and sympathetic manner. This he has done with marked success. Graham’s presentation and defense of the Protestant position is clear, coherent, and forceful. The same can be said of the presentations by Lewis and Tolkien. Each participant speaks his mind freely, without equivocation, and in a manner that is sensitive to the views of his interlocutors. The three are engaged in argument in the best sense of the term: no one is out to best anyone else, but all are commonly committed to the pursuit of truth.

The principal subject for discussion is the great divide within Christianity between Catholicism and Protestantism. Early in the dialogue Lewis makes a point of accentuating the positive by telling the others: “We can’t make our divisions primary or prior” (31). Later he suggests that “our agreements are much more important than our differences” (34). At the same time he insists that their differences cannot be ignored or papered over. He poignantly adds: “you can’t paper over an elephant” (ibid.). The dialogue that follows, however, shows that the nature of the divisions is such that they cannot be anything but primary and prior. In fact, they are more important than the agreements. The presence of the elephant is commanding.

A number of issues given special treatment over the course of the dialogue: the role of Sacred Scripture, the nature and role of faith, the relation between faith and works, the meaning and role of tradition. But the three conversants quickly agree that the single most divisive issue for Christians is the Eucharist, and therefore that must be the focus of their discussion.

The dialogue presents three distinct points of view on the subject of the Eucharist: the Catholic, the Anglo-Catholic, and the Evangelical Protestant. The critical question has to do with the Real Presence. Lewis and Tolkien are
For Graham, the bread and wine in the Eucharist are to be taken only as symbols of Christ’s body and blood. His initial responses to the position taken by Lewis and Tolkien are rather sharp. He regards their literal reading of the words found in the Bible as being essentially materialistic, smacking of magic and even of idolatry. Their view of the sacraments is mechanistic, taking them as automatic dispensers of grace – “supernatural machines,” he calls them (109). The sum total of what Lewis and Tolkien have to say on behalf of the Real Presence is very impressive. They take pains to show that accepting the doctrine follows logically from a correct interpretation of Sacred Scripture. Lewis pointedly remarks that Graham’s stress on the spiritual, while paying insufficient attention to the material, suggests a leaning toward Gnosticism. Not surprisingly, Tolkien provides the most moving defense of the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist. It is evident that, for him, what is under discussion is simply an existential fact.

Graham is adamant in his commitment to *sola fide* and *sola scriptura*. As for the first, his understanding of faith seems so much to emphasize its subjective aspect, the act of faith on the part of the believer, that its objective aspect – what is to be believed – tends to be blurred. As for *sola scriptura*, in more than one place Tolkien, for Graham’s benefit, calls attention to the irrefutable historical fact that the Church, or tradition, precedes the Bible, for it was the Church that established the scriptural canon that all Protestants, rightly, now take as the revealed word of God. Graham does not deny this, but incongruously he maintains that Protestants accept no further authoritative declarations from the Chair of Peter: “We have no objections to the Church when she defines the Bible. We have objections to the Church when she defines new things, new dogmas” (181). The authority of the Church is to be recognized only selectively.

One of the amusing aspects of the dialogue is the fact that its three principal participants disclaim being theologians, and yet they do nothing from start to finish but talk theology, and pretty impressive theology at that. But does the dialogue in fact offer us three distinct Christian positions? It seems to me, based on the words of the participants themselves, with each of them articulating the position that he represents, that the dialogue presents only two positions, the Catholic and the Protestant. I would place Lewis on the Protestant side of the big divide. He identifies himself as representing a middle way between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, but his own words make the stability of his stance problematic. He avows that he is of one mind with Tolkien in believing in the Real Presence, the key issue in the dialogue: “But the Real Presence, yes indeed with all my heart I do believe it, just as Tollers [Tolkien] does” (124). But just before that, he tells us that in his belief “I do not go as far as the Catholics go” (ibid.). His problem is with the formula of Transubstantiation “and the authority of the
Church that supports it” (ibid.). He claims not to understand what the term means, and yet just a bit later (129) he gives a very reputable account of it, so it would seem he does understand what he is rejecting, precisely the Catholic position on the Real Presence. Lewis’s acceptance of tradition, as limited to the early Church Fathers, is consonant with what Protestantism would normally accept. He presumably would not want to be a spokesman for Anglicanism as a whole, for some of its adherents consider themselves to be Protestant. As a “high Anglican,” he belongs to a church whose identity is inseparable from the identity of a nation-state, and was founded by a monarch who, by explicitly rejecting the authority of the pope thereby assumed the definitive Protestant stance. Given this state of affairs, the Church of England cannot seriously lay claim to being the universal church. This is precisely what John Henry Newman eventually came to realize, as he recounts in his Loss and Gain: The Story of a Convert.

In Mere Christianity Lewis presents an arresting summary of the rudiments of the Christian faith. Those who subscribe to them are like people in a hallway off of which are a number of doorways that lead into rooms representing specific Christian denominations. He cautions that one should not stay out in the hallway but must choose a specific room to enter, based on the conviction that the room chosen represents the truth. When, late in the dialogue, Tolkien admits that the only way Christian unity will be realized is when Protestants “come home,” he is in effect telling Graham, and Lewis, that they are in the wrong room.

The situation in which the three men find themselves at dialogue’s end is disconcerting, for they are precisely where they were at the beginning. They are quite aware of this and call explicit attention to it. “But no one has changed his mind,” Lewis remarks, “no one convinced anyone else that his position was true, and we are still as far apart as we were at the beginning, aren’t we?” (230). Graham follows up on that note by adding: “[T]he gap between us has become clearer and sharper and apparently greater” (ibid.). He tries to put the best face on the situation by proposing that at least two things have been gained by their meeting and discussion: they are now friends who are bound together by deep mutual respect, and they each have a better understanding of the positions of the others. But what is the practical upshot of that better understanding? If no minds have been changed, it would seem that it serves only to solidify each man in his own beliefs, and confirm his conviction that those of the others are erroneous. The big divide remains unaltered.
I freely confess that when I received my review copy of Sam Guzman’s *The Catholic Gentleman*, I didn’t hold out much hope. The cover is adorned with the photo of a sleek and chic man – Guzman himself, judging from the author’s photo on the rear flap, though inference was necessary because his head has been decapitated in photoshop. He wears a grey leisure suit over which is embossed a papal tiara and dueling pipes – Guzman’s “brand” for his titular website, on which one may buy Catholic kitsch adorned with his logo.

I chambered a critique of monetized and reactionary Catholicism, ready to fire at the slightest provocation. I was prepared to read the decapitation on the cover as both a sign of the times and the danger of an over-determined reaction to them. It certainly didn’t help such a reading of his book that (as he discloses near the beginning) Guzman’s day job is marketing. I narrowed my sights and took aim.

But I hesitated. I sought to work past these superficial reflex reactions, in part because the conventional wisdom about summary judgment from covers – authors often don’t have creative license in the modern economy – but also for a different, more political, consideration.

Last month the Berkeley City Council voted unanimously to ban gendered words from appearing in its legislation, neutering all reference to natural sex, with specific prejudice against references of “man.” “Manhole,” “manpower,” and “mankind” have all been stricken from legal recognition. Aside from the historical and etymological naïveté that such a law evinces, the clear implication of this use of political power is the erasure of any positive reference to maleness, as though men were a hindrance to the flourishing that the modern world imagines for itself. In the wake of *Obergefell*, it has become increasing obvious that the primary front of “progress” in America has shifted from the naturalization of homosexual activity to the deconstruction of natural sexual difference altogether. On a fairer reading, *The Catholic Gentleman* is a timely reminder that resisting the inevitability of such false “progress” requires the restatement of an authentic view of manhood, and it is toward this end that Guzman’s book is thankfully aimed.

The book is organized as a series of what amount to vignettes on manhood, most with the following structure: description of a popular (mis)conception of what it means to be a man, criticism of this conception, and the offering of a more “traditional” – indeed Catholic – alternative. The figure of the “tradition” evoked throughout is the titular “gentleman,” whose lodestar is the chivalrous knight of
lore and yore – not the pusillanimous or effete “hipster,” his postmodern epigone, but “the real deal.”

What makes Guzman’s gentleman truly Catholic is the location of manhood not in yesteryear’s knight himself but in Christ, the archetype of all humanity, the once and future Priest, Prophet, and King. A list of medieval virtues is essential to the manhood that Guzman proceeds to recommend—heroism; being willing to fight to the death for the good, the beautiful, and the true; protecting the weak and defenseless; demonstrating “courly” behavior; and so on. But the true heart of manhood is revealed throughout to be the suffering sacred heart of Jesus, which is mirrored in his “living icons,” the saints. Chapters spent developing a Christocentric theology of manhood – particularly how Christ’s three spiritual offices are not simply natural to his person and work, but by virtue of the mystery of the Incarnation communicable vocations to all men – work toward this end. This is the theological center of the book.

One must appreciate the contextual difficulty of making this argument today. In an age where all meaning has been relativized to individual preference or private judgment, and thus the discourse of a transmogrifying, ever fluid, and personally chosen “gender” has come to displace the rationally grounded and ancient discourse of the “gift” of natural sexual difference, the argument for a stable “nature” of manhood with a fixed manly “essence” appears decidedly outmoded.

To his credit, Guzman does two things unflinchingly throughout the book. First, he embraces the seemingly antiquarian irrelevance of the old view and argues instead that it is precisely its enduring stability that makes the traditional view of manhood useful in an age of modern liquefaction. Or, as Guzman so memorably puts it by channeling the spirit of a Chestertonian inversion, “embracing tradition in a world hell-bent on erasing it is the ultimate act of revolution.” It takes a true man to resist conformity to the easy prejudices of a comfortable age. Guzman’s willingness to go against the grain allows his argumentative form to mirror the substance of his argument.

To my mind, the more important move that Guzman makes – though it comes in slowly and less ostensibly throughout the book – is his paradoxical recognition of the good things of modernity. This might surprise some who are put off by the tiara and who therefore might be tempted to read the book uncritically, given the number of times Guzman seems to deprecate “modernity.” He (rightly) attributes to our epoch a “consumeristic, choice-oriented culture” seeking “unlimited freedom” in a way that has wreaked havoc on the natural and cultural world. All this he sees grounded in a flawed, individualistic anthropology. It would be easy to misread Guzman in a reactionary vein, as participating in the politics of resentment that have come to characterize so many of the recent losers of history.
In such a misreading, Guzman’s “gentleman” could be trivialized as a spiteful Nietzschean superman, fatefuly indentured and stewing in the juices of the grapes of his wrath. But I would argue that this diminishes the thoughtfulness of Guzman’s engagement with modern man.

Exemplary of his nuance are the reflections on hipsterism that inaugurate the book. Although he rightfully chuckles at the excesses of “a suspendered, handlebar-mustached young man riding a penny-farthing” as though this were somehow a meaningful reclamation of masculinity, he sees in the (post)modern quest for “authenticity” a truly human desire: a rejection of the fake, the plastic, the superficial, the merely imitative, and a “hunger for something of substance.”

There are good things brewing in hipsterism beyond small-batch IPAs, and Guzman proves himself capable of recognizing this complexity.

Moreover, he spends a chapter on “the many faces of manhood” to emphasize a point in consonance with the best of postmodern thought: that manhood, while naturally singular, is embodied plurally. This means both that there are many ways of living “authentic” masculinity and that masculinity is always embedded in a community whose relations and cultural dynamics codetermine its lived reality. Chapters on devotion to Mary and the complementarity of male/female relations, particularly in marriage, highlight the fact that “[m]anhood is always something that is received and bestowed on us by a wider collective of men” and – the reason why those chapters are equally crucial – also women. His is not manhood actualized over women and against others, but a manhood by virtue of rightly ordered relations for the common good.

Thus, unlike the postmoderns, Guzman’s insight is sourced neither in a fashionable metaphysical pluralism, nor in a reactionarian essentialism, but in the legitimately Catholic plurality of vocations in the one body of Christ, and thus ultimately in the triune life of Father-Son-Spirit, the diverse unity standing beyond all natural difference.

And so, Guzman’s masculine heroism is not of the trigger-happy gunslinging variety. Rather, it involves the everyday sanctity of doing chores and comforting crying children, even if also being willing to fight the demons of the day. It thus recognizes some good developments in the (post)modern age and the malleability of some gender roles in diverse cultures beyond the medieval period. Knights may be dead, but chivalry is ageless, and it is chivalry to which we are called.

Although I have framed my review at the substantial level (since this is the level at which value-judgments impinge upon the circumstantial), it would be misleading to read Guzman as though his primary concern were an academic intervention. Indeed, it is clear that his first objective is to direct his readers’ actual spiritual lives toward holiness. Many chapters end with specific prayers or practical suggestions that are meant to influence the concrete life of faith.
Somewhat piggybacking on the Jordan Peterson phenomenon, he provides a “Rule of Life” and a reading list in appendices as further aids to spiritual and intellectual development. The primary audience is thus certainly Catholic men’s groups who are struggling to live faithfully as men in a world seeking to deny any natural meaning to masculinity. But one can imagine that the book would be of benefit to the feminine genius as well, in psychologically and spiritually understanding human complementarity in the one world that God has engendered.

Although some may find the superficialities of the book off-putting, the book can be recommended for what it is: an ageless call to embrace here and now the faith that makes all men and women into the faithful People of God, the One Body of Christ.

---


Reviewed by Joseph W. Koterski, S.J., Fordham University.

The first five volumes of the new “Polish Christian Philosophy in the 20th Century Series” have now appeared. Eight additional volumes are expected by the end of 2020, plus one entitled Companion to the Polish Christian Philosophy in the Twentieth Century that will survey the field as a whole. With the election of Karol Wojtyła to the papacy in 1978, scholarly curiosity about Polish Catholic philosophers and about the Lublin School of Thomism in particular began to grow in certain circles. The relative paucity of translations of this material, however, made it difficult to get to know these thinkers or to assess their accomplishments.

This new series intends to begin to remedy the problem. In the 200-plus pages of each volume the editors have provided an extensive essay on the life and thought of an important Polish Catholic philosopher and then a generous selection of that thinker’s writings as well as a bibliography of the person’s works.

Perhaps the best known of the figures treated thus far in the series is the Salvatorian priest Tadeus Styczeń (1931-2010). A close friend of Wojtyła and with him at his deathbed, Styczeń published nine books in the field of ethics and some 500 articles. He also edited a number of Wojtyła’s books and directed the John Paul II Institute at Lublin. Prominent in the selections chosen from his pen
are essays about the question of the sources of ethics and the ability of the human mind to come to know what is objectively good. His writings show an intense interest in giving a fair treatment to thinkers from the classical modern period of European philosophy and a considerable range of contemporary Marxists before marshaling his critique of their positions.

The volume dedicated to Zofia Józefa Zdybicka (1928– ), an Ursuline sister who taught at the Catholic University of Lublin, focuses on her contributions to metaphysics and the philosophy of religion. In the essays printed within this volume one finds not only the fruits of her research on the innate human tendency to search for God and for meaning in life but also a readiness to engage the works of figures like Leszek Kolakowski, who regularly advocated atheism as a source of human liberation and who criticized Catholic thinkers for trying to entangle human beings in the snares of religion.

Jacek Adam Woroniecki (1878-1949) is a representative of the previous generation of Catholic intellectuals in Poland. A diocesan priest who later entered the Order of Preachers, Woroniecki worked in the philosophy of education and neo-Thomism. The selections included in this volume, especially the one on what is needed for the development of one’s mind and the formation of one’s character, remind one not only of Jacques Maritain but of Josef Pieper.

The final two volumes among those just published concern thinkers in the area of philosophy of nature and philosophy of science. Piotr Lenartowicz (1934-2012) was a physician who later joined the Society of Jesus and took a doctorate in philosophy from the Gregorian University. The essays of his found in this volume show a great appreciation for genetics and molecular biology but also offer a sense of the limits of such approaches for giving an adequate account of the organism as a whole. He argues that an understanding of life needs to supplement the work of biochemistry with a study of the power of the whole to coordinate and direct the operations of its biological parts.

Stanisław Kamiński (1919-1986) was a priest who held appointments in various university faculties and worked in the areas of logic, philosophical methodology, and the philosophy of science. Among the essays included in this book are some fine pieces on the types of human knowledge and on some of the methodological peculiarities intrinsic to the study of metaphysics.

As would be expected, the series promises to include a volume on Karol Wojtyła as well as on some of the thinkers associated with the Solidarność movement such as Jósef Tischner and on the dean of the Lublin School of Thomism, Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec, among others.
Books Received


Please direct submissions and subscription requests electronically to the editor at koterski@fordham.edu. All submissions should be prepared for blind-review and should be accompanied by a letter from the author that confirms that the submission is not simultaneously under consideration elsewhere. Maximum length: 10,000 words, including all notes.

Membership in the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars includes a subscription to the FCSQ (print and online). Those who are not members of the FCS may subscribe to the journal at the following annual rates:

Domestic (individuals and institutions): $40.00 print
International (individuals and institutions): $50.00 print

For information about joining the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, visit our website at www.catholicscholars.org.
Officers and Directors of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars

President:
William L. Saunders, J.D.
The Catholic University of America

Vice-President: Secretary:
Susan Orr Traffas, Ph.D. Msgr. Stuart W. Swetland, S.T.D.
Benedictine College Donnelly College

Elected Directors


Carol Abromaitis, Ph.D. Betsy Ackerson, Ph.D.
Loyola University of Maryland St. Francis High School, Wheaton IL

Universidad Francisco de Vitoria The Catholic University of America

Thales College Sacred Heart Major Seminary

Rev. David V. Meconi, S.J., D.Phil. Randall Smith, Ph.D.
Saint Louis University University of St. Thomas, Houston

(2018-2021)

Maria Fedoryka, Ph.D.
Ave Maria University

Patrick Lee, Ph.D.
Franciscan University of Steubenville

R.J. Matava, Ph.D.
Christendom College

Rev. T. Weinandy, OFM Cap., PhD
Capuchin College